Taiwan Politics Database
www.taiwan-database.net

Other texts and documents

Note: This page presents a collection of selected important texts and documents pertaining to the Taiwan Politics Database. Alternatively, the user can also refer to a PDF file that shows the contents of this page as well—557 pages in A5 format, file size: 8.46 MB (file includes the ROC Constitution); click here to open.
In addition, separate relevant PDF files in A4 format are available for free download as listed below:

  • Selected imported texts and documents. 175 pages, file size 4.2 MB; click here
  • Inaugural addresses by ROC Presidents since 1996. 54 pages, file size: 2.3 MB; click here
  • Facts about the "1992 Consensus". 14 pages, file size: 1.6 MB; click here

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◆ Selected important texts and documents

In the field of international politics, the status of the ROC has long been highly controversial. Most countries in the world recognize the so-called "One China" principle (yige Zhongguo yuanze 一個中國原則), i. e. its interpretation by the PRC, according to which "there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is a part of that China". Today less than two dozen states, most of them with no international importance, maintain formal diplomatic relations with the ROC. The existence of the ROC is not only denied internationally but also domestically by pro-independence activists in Taiwan who claim that there was no legal foundation for Taiwan to be put under ROC control in 1945, making the now Taipei-based ROC government a "government-in-exile" (liuwang zhengfu 流亡政府). More details in this context can be found under the headline "Legal aspects of Taiwan in the ROC" of the section Taiwan Province on the page "Local administration".

Please note that the documents shown in this page's chapter are listed in chronological order. Most of them were selected for their significance to the status of China and Taiwan/the PRC and the ROC. Others were picked for their significance in the dispute concerning the Diaoyutai Islands (Diaoyutai lieyu 釣魚台列嶼)—called "Senkaku Islands" (Jian'ge zhudao 尖閣諸島, Japanese pronunciation "Senkaku shotō") by Japan—in the East China Sea which are claimed by the ROC, the PRC, and Japan, or as reference to be used in the controversy about overlapping sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, e. g. the Spratly Islands (nansha qundao 南沙群島).

All documents are presented in original full text, with two exceptions. Because the Treaty of Versailles and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are far too large to be included here (in fact, UNCLOS is even larger than all other texts in this chapter combined), only parts deemed relevant by the editor were selected—of the Treaty of Versailles which in the original has 440 articles in 15 parts, ten articles are shown, and one article out of the 320 articles in 17 parts of UNCLOS. A scissors symbol ("✄") indicates that most of the document's articles were left out.

As for important quotes like Bill Clinton's "Three No's", Lee Teng-hui's remarks about the "special state-to-state relationship" between the ROC and the PRC, and Colin Powell's statement on "one China" and Taiwan, only the paragraph with the actual wording is rendered here. Additional notes from the editor (i. e. this website's chief researcher) are marked as such and highlighted with a stop sign symbol (🛑).

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The following selected important texts and documents relevant to the status of Taiwan / the ROC are presented below.

Please note that the topic of Taiwan’s status under international law was the focus of a doctoral thesis written by German law expert Claudius Petzold: “Die völkerrechtliche Stellung Taiwans”, published in 2007 by Nomos Universitätsschriften – Recht, 226 pages (in German), ISBN 978-3-8329-2373-0. The text is available as eBook on the Nomos eLibrary.

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Treaty of Shimonoseki

Treaty of Peace

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of China, desiring to restore the blessings of peace to their countries and subjects and to remove all cause for future complications, have named as their Plenipotentiaries for the purpose of concluding a Treaty of Peace, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Count ITO Hirobumi, Junii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Paullownia, Minister President of State; and Viscount MUTSU Munemitsu, Junii, First Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

And His Majesty the Emperor of China, LI Hung-chang, Senior Tutor to the Heir Apparent, Senior Grand Secretary of State, Minister Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports of China, Viceroy of the province of Chili, and Earl of the First Rank; and LI Ching-fong, Ex-Minister of the Diplomatic Service, of the Second Official Rank:

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good and proper form, have agreed to the following Articles:—

Article 1 China recognises definitively the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea, and, in consequence, the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China, in derogation of such independence and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the future.
Article 2 China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon:—
(a) The southern portion of the province of Fêngtien within the following boundaries:
The line of demarcation begins at the mouth of the River Yalu and ascends that stream to the mouth of the River An-ping, from thence the line runs to Fêng-huang, from thence to Hai-cheng, from thence to Ying-kow, forming a line which describes the southern portion of the territory. The places above named are included in the ceded territory. When the line reaches the River Liao at Ying-kow, it follows the course of the stream to its mouth, where it terminates. The mid-channel of the River Liao shall be taken as the line of demarcation.
This cession also includes all islands appertaining or belonging to the province of Fêngtien situated in the eastern portion of the Bay of Liao-tung and the northern portion of the Yellow Sea.
(b) The island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa.
(c) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude.
Article 3 The alignment of the frontiers described in the preceding Article, and shown on the annexed map, shall be subject to verification and demarcation on the spot by a Joint Commission of Delimitation, consisting of two or more Japanese and two or more Chinese delegates, to be appointed immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. In case the boundaries laid down in this Act are found to be defective at any point, either on account of topography or in consideration of good administration, it shall also be the duty of the Delimitation Commission to rectify the same.
The Delimitation Commission will enter upon its duties as soon as possible, and will bring its labours to a conclusion within the period of one year after appointment.
The alignments laid down in this Act shall, however, be maintained until the rectifications of the Delimitation Commission, if any are made, shall have received the approval of the Governments of Japan and China.
Article 4 China agrees to pay to Japan as a war indemnity the sum of 200,000,000 Kuping taels; the said sum to be paid in eight instalments. The first instalment of 50,000,000 taels to be paid within six months, and the second instalment of 50,000,000 to be paid within twelve months, after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. The remaining sum to be paid in six equal instalments as follows: the first of such equal annual instalments to be paid within two years, the second within three years, the third within four years, the fourth within five years, the fifth within six years, and the sixth within seven years, after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. Interest at the rate of 5 per centum per annum shall begin to run on all unpaid portions of the said indemnity from the date the first instalment falls due.
China shall, however, have the right to pay by anticipation at any time any or all of the said instalments. In case the whole amount of the said indemnity is paid within three years after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act all interest shall be waived, and the interest for two years and a half or for any less period, if any already paid, shall be included as part of the principal amount of the indemnity.
Article 5 The inhabitants of the territories ceded to Japan who wish to take up their residence outside the ceded districts shall be at liberty to sell their real property and retire. For this purpose a period of two years from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the present Act shall be granted. At the expiration of that period those of the inhabitants who shall not have left such territories shall, at the option of Japan, be deemed to be Japanese subjects.
Each of the two Governments shall, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act, send one or more Commissioners to Formosa to effect a final transfer of that province, and within the space of two months after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act such transfer shall be completed.
Article 6 All Treaties between Japan and China having come to an end as a consequence of war, China engages, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act, to appoint Plenipotentiaries to conclude with the Japanese Plenipotentiaries, a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and a Convention to regulate Frontier Intercourse and Trade. The Treaties, Conventions, and Regulations now subsisting between China and the European Powers shall serve as a basis for the said Treaty and Convention between Japan and China. From the date of the exchange of ratifications of this Act until the said Treaty and Convention are brought into actual operation, the Japanese governments, its officials, commerce, navigation, frontier intercourse and trade, industries, ships, and subjects, shall in every respect be accorded by China most favoured nation treatment.
China makes, in addition, the following concessions, to take effect six months after the date of the present Act:—
First.—The following cities, towns, and ports, in addition to those already opened, shall be opened to the trade, residence, industries, and manufactures of Japanese subjects, under the same conditions and with the same privileges and facilities as exist at the present open cities, towns, and ports of China:
●　Shashih, in the province of Hupeh.
●　Chungking, in the province of Szechwan.
●　Suchow, in the province of Kiangsu.
●　Hangchow, in the province of Chekiang.
The Japanese Government shall have the right to station consuls at any or all of the above named places.
Second.—Steam navigation for vessels under the Japanese flag, for the conveyance of passengers and cargo, shall be extended to the following places:
●　On the Upper Yangtze River, from Ichang to Chungking.
●　On the Woosung River and the Canal, from Shanghai to Suchow and Hangchow.
The rules and regulations that now govern the navigation of the inland waters of China by Foreign vessels shall, so far as applicable, be enforced, in respect to the above named routes, until new rules and regulations are conjointly agreed to.
Third.—Japanese subjects purchasing goods or produce in the interior of China, or transporting imported merchandise into the interior of China, shall have the right temporarily to rent or hire warehouses for the storage of the articles so purchased or transported without the payment of any taxes or extractions whatever.
Fourth.—Japanese subjects shall be free to engage in all kinds of manufacturing industries in all the open cities, towns, and ports of China, and shall be at liberty to import into China all kinds of machinery, paying only the stipulated import duties thereon.
All articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in China shall, in respect of inland transit and internal taxes, duties, charges, and exactions of all kinds, and also in respect of warehousing and storage facilities in the interior of China, stand upon the same footing and enjoy the same privileges and exemptions as merchandise imported by Japanese subjects into China.
In the event additional rules and regulations are necessary in connexion with these concessions, they shall be embodied in the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation provided for by this Article.
Article 7 Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding Article, the evacuation of China by the armies of Japan shall be completely effected within three months after the exchange of the ratificatioins of the present Act.
Article 8 As a guarantee of the faithful performance of the stipulations of this Act, China consents to the temporary occupation by the military forces of Japan of Weihaiwei, in the province of Shantung.
Upon payment of the first two instalments of the war indemnity herein stipulated for and the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce and navigation, the said place shall be evacuated by the Japanese forces, provided the Chinese Government consents to pledge, under suitable and sufficient arrangements, the Customs revenue of China as security for the payment of the principal and interest of the remaining instalments of the said indemnity. In the event that no such arrangements are concluded, such evacuation shall only take place upon the payment of the final instalment of said indemnity.
It is, however, expressly understood that no such evacuation shall take place until after the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.
Article 9 Immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act, all prisoners of war then held shall be restored, and China undertakes not to ill-treat or punish prisoners of war so restored to her by Japan. China also engages to at once release all Japanese subjects accused of being military spies or charged with any other military offences. China further engages not to punish in any manner, nor to allow to be punished, those Chinese subjects who have in any manner been compromised in their relations with the Japanese army during the war.
Article 10 All offensive military operations shall cease upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act.
Article 11 The present Act shall be ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of China, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Chefoo on the 8th day of the 5th month of the 28th year of MEIJI, corresponding to the 14th day of the 4th month of the 21st year of KUANG HSÜ.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same and affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

DONE in Shimonoseki, in duplicate, this 17th day of the fourth month of the 28th year of MEIJI, corresponding to the 23rd day of the 3rd month of the 21st year of KUANG HSÜ.

Count Ito Hirobumi (Junii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Paullownia; Minister President of State; Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan)

Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu (Junii, First Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure; Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan)

Li Hung-chang (Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China; Senior Tutor to the Heir Apparent; Senior Grand Secretary of State; Minister Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports of China; Viceroy of the province of Chili; Earl of the First Rank)

Li Ching-fong (Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China; Ex-Minister of the Diplomatic Service, of the Second Official Rank)

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馬關條約

大清帝國大皇帝陛下及大日本帝國大皇帝陛下為訂立和約，俾兩國及其臣民重修和平，共用幸福，且杜絕將來紛紜之端， 大清帝國大皇帝陛下特簡大清帝國欽差頭等全權大臣太子太傅文華殿大學士北洋通商大臣直隸總督一等肅毅伯爵李鴻章、 大清帝國欽差全權大臣二品頂戴前出使大臣李經方、大日本帝國大皇帝陛下特簡大日本帝國全權辦理大臣內閣總理大臣從二位勳一等伯爵伊藤博文、 大日本帝國全權辦理大臣外務大臣從二位勳一等子爵陸奧宗光為全權大臣，彼此校閱所奉諭旨，認明均屬妥實無闕。會同議定各條款，開列於左：

第一款 中國認明朝鮮國確為完全無缺之獨立自主國，故凡有虧損其獨立自主體制，即如該國向中國所修貢獻典禮等，嗣後全行廢決。
第二款 中國將管理下開地方之權，並將該地方所有堡壘軍器工廠及一切屬公對象，永遠讓與日本。
一、 下開劃界以內之奉天省南邊地方以鴨綠江溯該江以抵安平河口，又以該河口劃至鳳凰城、海城、及營口而止，劃成折線以南地方。所有前開各城市，皆包括在劃界線內。該線抵營口之遼河後，及順流至海口止，彼此以河中心為界。遼東灣南岸及黃海北岸，在奉天所屬諸島亦一併在所讓界內。
二、 臺灣全島及所有附屬各島嶼。
三、 澎湖列島，即英國格林尼次東經百十九度起至百二十度止，及北緯三十三度起至二十四度之間諸島嶼。
第三款 前款所載及黏附本國之地圖所劃疆界，俟本約批准互換之後，兩國應各 選派官員二名以上，為公同劃定疆界委員，就地踏勘，確定劃界。若遇本國 所約疆界於地形或地理所關有礙難不便等情，各該委員等當妥為參酌更改。各該委員等當從速辦理界務，以期奉委之後限一年竣事，但遇各該委員等有 所更定劃界，兩國政府未經認準以前，應據本約所定劃界為正。
第四款 中國約將庫平銀二萬萬兩交與日本，作為賠償軍費。該款分作八次交完。 第一次五千萬兩，應在本約批准互換六個月內交清。第二次五千萬兩，應在本約批准互換後十二個月內交清。款平分六次，遞年交納，其法列下：第一次平分遞年之款，於兩年內交清。第二次於三年內交清，第三次於四年內交清，第四次於五年內交清，第五次於六年內交清，第六次於七年內交清。其年分均以本約批准互換之後起算。又第一次賠款交清後，未經交完之款，應按年加每百抽五之息，但無論何時應賠之款或全數或幾分，先期交清，均聽中國之便。如從條約批准互換之日起三年之內能全數還清，除將已付息金或兩年半或不及兩年半於應付本銀扣還外，仍全數免息。
第五款 本約批准互換之後，限兩年之內，日本準中國讓與地方人民願遷居讓與地方之外者，任便變賣所有產業退去界外，但限滿之後尚未遷徙者，酌宜視為日本臣民。又臺灣一省應於本約批准互換後，兩國立即各派大臣至臺灣，限於本約批准後兩個月交接清楚。
第六款 中日兩國所有約章，因此次失和，自屬廢決。中國約俟本約批准之後速派全權大臣與日本所派全權大臣，會同訂立通商行船條約，及陸路通商章程。兩國新訂約章，應以中國與泰西交國見行約章為本。又本國批准互換之日起，新訂約章未經實行之前，所有日本官吏臣民及商業工藝行船船隻陸路通商等，與中國最為優待之國禮護視，一律無異。
中國約將下開讓與各款，以兩國全權大臣押蓋印日起，六個月後方可照辦。
第一、見今中國已開通商口岸之外，應準添設下開各處，立為通商口岸以便日本臣民往來僑寓，從事商業工藝製作。所有添設口岸，均照向開通商 海口或向開內地鎮市章程一體辦理， 應得優例及利益等，亦當一律享受。
 （一）湖北省荊州府沙市。
 （二）四川省重慶府。
 （三）江蘇省蘇州府。
 （四）浙江省杭州府。日本政府得派遣領事官於前開各口駐紮。
第二、日本輪船得駛入下開各口，附搭行客裝運貨物：
 （一）從湖北省宜昌溯長江以至四川省重慶府。
 （二）從上海駛進吳淞江及運河以至蘇州府杭州府。中日兩國未經商定行船章程以前，上開各口行船務依外國船隻駛入 中國內地水路見行章程照行。
第三、日本臣民在中國內地購買工貨件，若自生之物，或將進口商貨運往內地之物，欲暫行存棧，除勿庸攳鈔派徵一切旅費外，得暫租棧房存貨。
第四、日本臣民得在中國通商口岸城邑任便從事各項工藝製造，又得將各項機器任便裝運進口，只交所定進口稅。日本臣民在中國製造一切貨物，其於內地運送稅，內地稅鈔課什派，以及中國內地沾及寄存棧房之益即照日臣民運入中國之貨物一體辦理，至應優例豁除，亦莫不相同。
嗣後如有因以上加讓之事應增章程規條，即載入本款所稱之行船通商條約內。
第七款 日本軍隊見駐中國境內者，應於本約批准互換之後三個月內撤回，但須照次款所定辦理。
第八款 中國為保證認真實行約內所訂各款，聽允日本軍隊暫佔守山東省威海衛。又於中國將本約所定第一、第二兩次賠款交清，通商行船亦經批准互換之後，中國政府與日本政府確定周全妥善辦法，將通商口岸關稅作為剩款並息之抵押，日本可允撤回軍隊。倘中國不即確定抵押辦法則未經交清末次賠款之前，日本仍不撤回軍隊。
第九款 本約批准互換之後，兩國應將是時所有俘虜盡數交還。中國約將由日本遣還俘虜，並不加以虐待若或置於罪戾。中國約將認為軍事間諜或被嫌逮係之日本臣民，即行釋放，並約此次交仗之所有關涉日本軍隊之中國臣民，概予寬貸，並飭有司不得擅為逮係。
第十款 本約批准互換日起，應按兵息戰。
第十一款 自本約奉大清國大皇帝陛下及日本帝國大皇帝陛下批准之後，定於光緒二十一年四月十四日，即日本明治二十八年五月初八日，在煙臺互換。

為此兩國全權大臣署名蓋印，以昭信守。

大清帝國欽差頭等全權大臣太子太傅文華殿大學士北洋通商大臣直隸總督一等肅毅伯爵 李鴻章（押印）
大清帝國欽差全權大臣二品頂戴前出使大臣 李經芳（押印）

大日本帝國全權辦理大臣內閣總理大臣從二位一等伯爵 伊藤 博文（押印）
大日本帝國全權辦理大臣外務大臣從二位勳一等子爵 陸奧 宗光（押印）

光緒二十一年三月二十三日訂於下之關繕寫兩分。
明治二十八年四月十七日

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Treaty of Shimonoseki (Maguan tiaoyue 馬關條約; title in Japanese: Shimonoseki Jōyaku 下関条約) was signed at Shimonoseki (下關) on April 17, 1895 and entered into force on May 8, 1895 by the exchange of the instruments of ratification at Chefoo (芝罘).

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Liaotung Convention

His Majesty the Emperor of China and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, desiring to conclude a Convention for the retrocession by Japan of all of the southern portion of the province of Fêngtien to the sovereignty of China, have for that purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of China, LI HUNG-CHANG, Minister Plenipotentiary, Senior Tutor of the Heir Apparent, Senior Grand Secretary of State and Earl of the First Rank, and
 His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Baron HAYASHI TADASU, Shoshii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Grand Officer of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary,
 who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, which were found to be in good and proper form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

Article 1 Japan retrocedes to China in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern portion of the province of Fêngtien, which was ceded to Japan under Article 2 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki on the 23rd day of the 3rd month of the 21st year of KUANG HSÜ, corresponding to the 17th day of the 4th month of the 28th year of MEIJI, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon at the time the retroceded territory is completely evacuated by the Japanese forces in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of this Convention, that is to say, the southern portion of the province of Fêngtien from the mouth of the River Yalu to the mouth of the River An-ping, thence to Feng-huang-ch'ên, thence to Hai-ch'êng and thence to Ying-kow; also all cities and towns to the south of this boundary and ail islands appertaining or belonging to the province of Fêngtien situated in the eastern portion of the Bay of Liaotung and in the northern part of the Yellow Sea. Article 3 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki is in consequence suppressed, as are also the provisions in the same Treaty with reference to the conclusion of a Convention to regulate frontier intercourse and trade.
Article 2 As compensation for the southern portion of the province of Fêngtien, the Chinese Government engage to pay to the Japanese Government 30,000,000 Kuping taels on or before the 30th day of the 9th month of the 21st year of KUANG HSÜ, corresponding to the 16th day of the 11th month of the 28th year of MEIJI.
Article 3 Within three months from the day on which China shall have paid to Japan the compensatory indemnity of 30,000,000 Kuping taels provided for in Article 2 of this Convention, the retroceded territory shall be completely evacuated by the Japanese forces.
Article 4 China engages not to punish in any manner, nor to allow to be punished, those Chinese subjects who have in any manner been compromised in connection with the occupation by the Japanese forces of.the retroceded territory.
Article 5 The present Convention is signed in duplicate in the Chinese, Japanese, and English languages. All these texts have the same meaning and intention, but in case of any differences of interpretation between the Chinese and Japanese texts, such differences shall be decided by reference to the English text.
Article 6 The present Convention shall be ratified by His Majesty the Emperor of China and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Peking within 21 days from the present date.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same and affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

DONE in Peking this 22nd day of the 9th month of the 21st year of KUANG HSÜ, corresponding to the 8th day of the 11th month of the 28th year of MEIJI.

LI HUNG-CHANG, [L.S.]———Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China
Senior Tutor to the Heir Apparent
Senior Grand Secretary of State
Earl of the First Rank

Baron HAYASHI TADASU, [L.S.]———Shoshii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure
Grand Officer of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun
Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan

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《中日遼南條約》

大清國大皇帝陛下、大日本國大皇帝陛下欲締結條約，由日本國交還奉天省南邊地方，一切仍歸中國管理。大清國大皇帝陛下持簡欽差全權大臣太子太傅文華殿大學士一等肅毅伯爵李鴻章；

大日本國大皇帝陛下特簡欽差駐紮北京全權大臣正四位勳一等男爵林董；

均作為全權大臣，互示所奉文憑妥當，議定各條開列于左：

第一款日本國將光緒二十一年三月二十三日，即明治二十八年四月十七日，訂立下之關條約第二款中國讓與日本國管理之奉天省南邊地方，即從鴨綠江口抵安平河口至鳳凰城、海城及營口而止，以南各城市邑以及遼東灣東岸、黃海北岸奉天所屬諸島嶼，並照本約第三款所定，日本國軍隊一律撤回之時，該地方內所有堡壘、軍器工廠及一切所屬公物件，永遠交還中國。因此下之關條約第三款，並擬訂立陸路通商章程之事，作為罷論。
第二款中國約，為酬報交還奉天省南邊地方，將庫平銀三千萬兩，迨于光緒二十一年九月二十日，即明治二十八年十-月十六日，交與日本國政府。
第三款中國將本約第二款所定之酬款庫平銀三千萬兩交與日本國政府，自是日起，五個月以內，日本國軍隊從該交還地方-律撤回。
第四款中國約，日本國軍隊佔踞之間，所有關涉該國軍隊之中國臣民概予寬貸，並飭有司不得擱為逮係。
第五款本約繕寫漢文、日本文及英文各二份，校對無偽，署名蓋印，漢文與日本文遇有解譯字義不同之處，以英文為憑。
第六款本約欽奉大清國大皇帝陛下，大日本國大皇帝陛下批准，自署名蓋印之日起二十一日內，在北京互換。

為此兩國全權大臣署名蓋印，以昭信守。

大清帝國欽差全權大臣太子太傅文華殿大學土。一等肅毅伯爵 李鴻章
大日本帝國欽差駐紮北京全權大臣正四位勳一等男爵 林董

光緒二十一年九月二十二日
明治二十八年十一月初八日
訂於北京

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Liaotung Convention (Liaodong tiaoyue 遼東條約 or Liaodong xieyi 遼東協議) was signed in Beijing on Nov. 8, 1895 and is also known under the following names: Fengtian Peninsula Return Treaty (Fengtian bandao huanfu tiaoyue 奉天半島還付條約), Sino-Japanese Liao-south Treaty (Zhong Ri Liaonan tiaoyue 中日遼南條約), or Treaty of Peking (Beijing tiaoyue 北京條約); in Japanese: Treaty Concerning Fengtien Peninsula Return (Hōten hantō kanpu ni kansuru jōyaku 奉天半島還付に関する条約).

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————————————————————

Peace Agreement between the Great Powers and China

Boxer Protocol, signed in Peking on Sept. 7, 1901

The Plenipotentiaries
—of Germany, M. Alfons Mumm (Freiherr von Schwarzenstein);
—of Austria-Hungary, Baron Moritz Czikann von Wahlborn;
—of Belgium, Maurice Joostens;
—of Spain, M. Bernardo J. de Cólogan;
—of the United States, Mr. William W. Rockhill;
—of France, M. Paul Beau;
—of Great Britain, Sir Ernest Satow;
—of Italy, Marquis Salvago Raggi;
—of Japan, M. Jutaro Komura 小村壽太郎;
—of the Netherlands, M. Fridolin Marinus Knobel;
—of Russia, M. Michael de Giers;
and the Plenipotentiaries of China, His Highness Yi-K'uang 奕劻, Prince of the First Rank; Ch'ing, President of the Board of Foreign Affairs; and his Excellency Li Hung-chang 李鴻章, Count of the First Rank; Su-Yi, Tutor of the Heir Apparent; Grand Secretary of the Wen-Hua Throne Hall, Minister of Commerce, Superintendent of Trade for the North, Governor-General of Chihli,
 have met for the purpose of declaring that China has complied with the conditions laid down in the note of the 22nd December, 1900, and which were accepted in their entirety by His Majesty the Emperor of China in a Decree dated the 27th December, 1900.

Article 1

1) By an Imperial Edict of the 9th June last, Tsai-Feng, Prince of the First Rank, Chün, was appointed Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of China, and directed in that capacity to convey to His Majesty the German Emperor the expression of the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China and of the Chinese Government at the assassination of his Excellency the late Baron von Ketteler, German Minister.

Prince Chün left Peking on the 12th July last to carry out the orders which had been given him.

2) The Chinese Government has stated that it will erect on the spot of the assassination of his Excellency the late Baron von Ketteler, commemorative monument worthy of the rank of the deceased, and bearing an inscription in the Latin, German, and Chinese languages which shall express the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China for the murder committed.

The Chinese Plenipotentiaries have informed his Excellency the German Plenipotentiary, in a letter dated the 22nd July last, that an arch of the whole width of the street would be erected on the said spot, and that work on it was begun on the 25th June last.

Article 2

1) Imperial Edicts of the 13th and 21st February, 1901, inflicted the following punishments on the principal authors of the attempts and of the crimes committed against the foreign Governments and their nationals:—

Tsa-Ii, Prince Tuan, and Tsai-Lan, Duke Fu-kuo, were sentenced to be brought before the Autumnal Court of Assize for execution, and it was agreed that if the Emperor saw fit to grant them their lives, they should be exiled to Turkestan, and there imprisoned for life, without the possibility of commutation of these punishments.

Tsai Hsün, Prince Chuang, Ying-Nien, President of the Court of Censors, and Chao Shu-chiao, President of the Board of Punishments, were condemned to commit suicide.

Yü Hsien, Governor of Shansi, Chi Hsiu, President of the Board of Rites, and Hsü Cheng-yu, formerly Senior Vice-President of the Board of Punishments, were condemned to death.

Posthumous degradation was inflicted on Kang Yi, Assistant Grand Secretary, President of the Board of Works, Hsü Tung, Grand Secretary, and Li Ping-heng, former Governor-General of Szu-chuan.

Imperial Edict of the 13th February last rehabilitated the memories of Hsu Yung-yi, President of the Board of War; Li Shan, President of the Board of Works; Hsu Ching Cheng, Senior Vice-President of the Board of Civil Office; Lien Yuan, Vice-Chancellor of the Grand Council; and Yuan Chang, Vice-President of the Court of Sacrifices, who had been put to death for having protested against the outrageous breaches of international law of last year.

Prince Chuang committed suicide on the 21st February last; Ying Nien and Chao Shu-chiao on the 24th February; Yu Hsien was executed on the 22nd February; Chi Hsiu and Hsü Cheng-yu on the 26th February; Tung Fu-hsiang, General in Kan-su, has been deprived of his office by Imperial Edict of the 13th February last, pending the determination of the final punishment to be inflicted on him.

Imperial Edicts, dated the 29th April and 19th August, 1901, have inflicted various punishments on the provincial officials convicted of the crimes and outrages of last summer.

2) An Imperial Edict, promulgated the 19th August, 1901, ordered the suspension of official examinations for five years in all cities where foreigners were massacred or submitted to cruel treatment.

Article 3

So as to make honourable reparation for the assassination of Mr. Sugiyama, Chancellor of the Japanese Legation, His Majesty the Emperor of China, by an Imperial Edict of the 18th June, 1901, appointed Na T'ung, Vice-President of the Board of Finances, to be his Envoy Extraordinary, and specially directed him to convey to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan the expression of the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China and of his Government at the assassination of Mr. Sugiyama.

Article 4

The Chinese Government has agreed to erect an expiatory monument in each of the foreign or international cemeteries which were desecrated, and in which the tombs were destroyed.

It has been agreed with the Representatives of the Powers that the Legations interested shall settle the details for the erection of these monuments, China bearing all the expenses thereof, estimated at 10,000 taels, for the cemeteries at Peking and in its neighbourhood, and at 5,000 taels for the cemeteries in the provinces. The amounts have been paid, and the list of these cemeteries is inclosed herewith.

Article 5

China has agreed to prohibit the importation into its territory of arms and ammunition, as well as of materials exclusively used for the manufacture of arms and ammunition.

An Imperial Edict has been issued on the 25th August, forbidding said importation for a term of two years. New Edicts may be issued subsequently extending this by other successive terms of two years in case of necessity recognized by the Powers.

Article 6

By an Imperial Edict dated the 29th May, 1901, His Majesty the Emperor of China agreed to pay the Powers an indemnity of 450,000,000 of Haikwan taels.

This sum represents the total amount of the indemnities for States, Companies, or Societies, private individuals and Chinese, referred to in Article 6 of the note of the 22nd December, 1900.

1) These 450,000,000 constitute a gold debt calculated at the rate of the Haikwan tael to the gold currency of each country, as indicated below:—

Haikwan tael =  Marks 3.055
Austro-Hungary crown 3.595
Gold dollar 0.743
Francs 3.740
£ sterling 3s.
Yen 1.407
Netherlands florin 1.796
Gold rouble (17.434 dolias fine) 1.412 

This sum in gold shall shall bear interest at 4 per cent. per annum, and the capital shall be reimbursed by China in thirty-nine years in the manner indicated in the annexed plan of amortization. Capital and interest shall be payable in gold or at the rates of exchange corresponding to the dates at which the different payments fall due.

The amortization shall commence the 1st January, 1902, and shall finish at the end of the year 1940. The amortizations are payable annually, the first payment being fixed on the 1st January, 1903.

Interest shall run from the 1st July, 1901, but the Chinese Government shall have the right to pay off within a term of three years, beginning January 1902, the arrears of the first six months ending the 31st December, 1901, on condition, however, that it pays compound interest at the rate of 4 per cent. a year on the sums the payment of which shall have been thus deferred.

Interest shall be payable semi-annually, the first payment being fixed on the 1st July, 1902.

2) The service of the debt shall take place in Shanghai in the following manner:—

Each Power shall be represented by a Delegate on a Commission of bankers authorized to receive the amount of interest and amortization which shall be paid to it by the Chinese authorities designated for that purpose, to divide it among the interested parties, and to give a receipt for the same.

3) The Chinese Government shall deliver to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps at Peking a bond for the lump sum, which shall subsequently be converted into fractional bonds bearing the signature of the Delegates of the Chinese Government designated for that purpose. This operation and all those relating to issuing of the bonds shall be performed by the above-mentioned Commission, in accordance with the instructions which the Powers shall send their Delegates.

4) The proceeds of the revenues assigned to the payment of the bonds shall be paid monthly to the Commission.

5) The revenues assigned as security for the bonds are the following:—

a) The balance of the revenues of the Imperial Maritime Customs, after payment of the interest and amortization of preceding loans secured on these revenues, plus the proceeds of the raising to 5 per cent. effective of the present tariff of maritime imports, including articles until now on the free list, but exempting rice, foreign cereals, and flour, gold and silver bullion and coin.

b) The revenues of the native Customs, administered in the open ports by the Imperial Maritime Customs.

c) The total revenues of the salt gabelle, exclusive of the fraction previously set aside for other foreign loans.

6) The raising of the present tariff on imports to 5 per cent. effective is agreed to on the conditions mentioned below. It shall be put in force two months after the signing of the present Protocol, and no exceptions shall be made except for merchandize in transit not more than ten days after the said signing.

a) All duties levied on imports ad valorem shall be converted as far as possible and as soon as may be into specific duties.

This conversion shall be made in the following manner:—

The average value of merchandize at the time of their landing during the three years 1897, 1898, and 1899, that is to say, the market price less the amount of import duties and incidental expenses, shall be taken as the basis for the valuation of merchandize.

Pending the result of the work of conversion, duties shall be levied ad valorem.

b) The beds of the Rivers Whangpoo and Peiho shall be improved with the financial participation of China.

Article 7

The Chinese Government has agreed that the quarter occupied by the Legations shall be considered as one specially reserved for their use and placed under their exclusive control, in which Chinese shall not have the right to reside, and which may be made defensible.

The limits of this quarter have been fixed as follows on the annexed plan.

●　On the east, Ketteler Street (10, 11, 12).
●　On the north, the line, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
●　On the west, the line 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
●　On the south, the line 12—1, drawn along the exterior base of the tartar wall, and following the line of the bastions.

In the Protocol annexed to the letter of the 16th January, 1901, China recognized the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the said quarter for the defence of its Legation.

Article 8

The Chinese Government has consented to raze the forts of Taku, and those which might impede free communication between Peking and the sea. Steps have been taken for carrying this out.

Article 9

The Chinese Government conceded the right to the Powers in the Protocol annexed to the letter of the 16th January, 1901, to occupy certain points, to be determined by an Agreement between them for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea. The points occupied by the Powers are:—

Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tien-tsin, Chun-liang-Cheng, Tong-ku, Lu-tai, Tong-shan, Lan-chou, Chang-li, Chin-wang Tao, Shan-hai Kuan.

Article 10

The Chinese Government has agreed to post and to have published during two years in all district cities the following Imperial Edicts:—

1) Edict of the ist February, 1901, prohibiting for ever under pain of death, membership in any anti-foreign society.

2) Edicts of the 13th and 21st February, 29th April and 19th August, 1901, enumerating the punishments inflicted on the guilty.

3) Edict of the 19th August, 1901, prohibiting examinations in all cities where foreigners were massacred or subjected to cruel treatment.

4) Edicts of the ist February, 1901, declaring all Governors-General, Governors, and provincial or local officials responsible for order in their respective districts, and that in case of new anti-foreign troubles or other infractions of the Treaties which shall not be immediately repressed and the authors of which shall not have been punished, these officials shall be immediately dismissed without possibility of being given new functions or new honours.

The posting of these Edicts is being carried on throughout the Empire.

Article 11

The Chinese Government has agreed to negotiate the amendments deemed necessary by the foreign Governments to the Treaties of Commerce and Navigation and the other subjects concerning commercial relations with the object of facilitating them.

At present, and as a result of the stipulation contained in Article 6 concerning the indemnity, the Chinese Government agrees to assist in the improvement of the courses of the Rivers Peiho and Whang-poo, as stated below.—

1) The works for the improvement of the navigability of the Peiho, begun in 1898 with the co-operation of the Chinese Government, have been resumed under the direction of an International Commission. As soon as the Administration of Tien-tsin shall have been handed back to the Chinese Government it will be in a position to be represented on this Commission, and will pay each year a sum of 60,000 Haikwan taels for maintaining the works.

2) A Conservancy Board, charged with the management and control of the works for straightening the Whangpoo and the improvement of the course of that river, is hereby created.

The Board shall consist of members representing the interests of the Chinese Government and those of foreigners in the shipping trade of Shanghai.

The expenses incurred for the works and the general management of the undertaking are estimated at the annual sum of 460,000 Haikwan taels for the first twenty years. This sum shall be supplied in equal portions by the Chinese Government and the foreign interests concerned.

Article 12

An Imperial Edict of the 24th July, 1901, reformed the Office of Foreign Affairs, Tsung-li Yamen, on the lines indicated by the Powers, that is to say, transformed it into a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wai Wu Pu, which takes precedence over the six other Ministries of State; the same Edict appointed the principal Members of this Ministry.

An agreement has also been reached concerning the modification of Court ceremonial as regards the reception of foreign Representatives, and has been the subject of several notes from the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, the substance of which is embodied in a Memorandum herewith annexed.

Finally, it is expressly understood that as regards the declarations specified above and the annexed documents originating with the foreign Plenipotentiaries, the French text only is authoritative.

The Chinese Government having thus complied to the satisfaction of the Powers with the conditions laid down in the above-mentioned note of the 22nd December, 1900, the Powers have agreed to accede to the wish of China to terminate the situation created by the disorders of the summer of 1900. In consequence thereof, the foreign Plenipotentiaries are authorized to declare in the names of their Governments that, with the exception of the Legation guards mentioned in Article VII, the international troops will completely evacuate the city of Peking on the 17th September, 1901, and, with the exception of the localities mentioned in Article IX, will withdraw from the Province of Chihli on the 22nd September, 1901.

The present final Protocol has been drawn up in twelve identical copies, and signed by all the Plenipotentiaries of the contracting countries. One copy shall be given to each of the foreign Plenipotentiaries, and one copy shall be given to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries.

(Signed) A. VON MUMM B. J. DE CÓLOGAN ERNEST SATOW

F. M. KNOBEL M. CZIKANN W. W. ROCKHILL

SALVAGO RAGGI M. DE GIERS M. JOOSTENS

P. BEAU JUTARO KOMURA [小村壽太郎]

(Signed) YI K'UANG [奕劻] LI HUNG-CHANG [李鴻章]

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辛丑條約

一九○一年九月七日，光緒二十七年七月二十五日，北京。

大清欽命全權大臣便宜行事總理外務部事務和碩慶親王；
大清欽差全權大臣便宜行事太子太傅文華殿大學士北洋大臣直隸總督部堂一等肅毅伯李鴻章；

大德欽差駐扎中華便宜行事大臣穆默；
大奧欽差駐扎中華便宜行事全權大臣齊乾
大比欽差駐扎中華便宜行事全權大臣姚士登；
大日欽差駐扎中華全權大臣葛絡乾；
大美國欽差特辦議和事宜全權大臣柔克義；
大法欽差全權大臣駐扎中國京都總理本國事務便宜行事鮑渥；
大英欽差便宜行事全權大臣薩道義；
大義欽差駐扎中華大臣世襲侯爵薩爾瓦葛；
大日本國欽差全權大臣小村壽太郎；
大和欽差駐扎中華便宜行事全權大臣克羅伯；
大俄欽命全權大臣內廷大夫格爾思；

今日會同聲明，核定大清國按西曆一千九百年十二月二十二日，即中曆光緒二十六年十一月初一日文內各款，當經大清國大皇帝于西曆一千九百年十二月二十七日，即中曆光緒二十六年十一月初六日，降旨全行照允，足適諸國之意妥辦（附件一）。

第一款 （一） 大德國欽差男爵克大臣被戕害一事，前於西曆本年六月初九日，即中曆四月二十三日奉諭旨附件二，欽派醇親王載澧為頭等專使大臣，赴大德國大皇帝前，代表大清國大皇帝暨國家惋惜之意。醇親王已遵旨於西曆本年七月十二日，即中曆五月二十七日自北京起程。
（二） 大清國國家業已聲明，在遇害處所豎立銘志之碑，與克大臣品位相配，列敘大清國大皇帝惋惜凶事之旨，書以辣丁德漢各文。前於西曆本年七月二十二日，即中曆六月初七日，經大清國欽差全權大臣，文致大德國欽差全權大臣附件三，現於遇害處所，建立牌坊一座，足滿街衢，已於西曆本年六月二十五日，即中曆五月初十日興工。
第二款 （一） 懲辦傷害諸國國家及人民之首禍諸臣，將西曆本年二月十三、二十一等日，即中曆上年十二月二十五、本年正月初三等日，先後降旨所定罪名開列於後附件四、五、六：端郡王載漪、輔國公載瀾均定斬監候罪名，又約定，如皇上以為應加恩貸其一死，即發往新疆永遠監禁，永不減免。莊親王載勳、都察院左都禦史英年、刑部尚書趙舒翹均定為賜令自盡。山西巡撫毓賢、禮部尚書啟秀、刑部左侍郎徐承煜均定為即行正法。協辦大學士·吏部尚書剛毅、大學士徐桐、前四川總督李秉衡均已身故，追奪原官，即行革職。又兵部尚書徐用儀、戶部尚書立山、吏部左侍郎許景澄、內閣學士兼禮部侍郎銜聯元、太常寺卿袁昶，因上年力駁殊悖諸國義法極惡之罪被害，於西曆本年二月十三日，即中曆上年十二月二十五日，奉上諭開復原官，以示昭雪附件七。莊親王載勳已於西曆本年二月二十一日，即中曆正月初三日；英年趙舒翹已於二十四日，即初六日，均自盡。毓賢已於二十二日，即初四日，啟秀徐承煜已於二十六日，即初八日，均正法。又西曆本年二月十三日，上諭將甘肅提督董福祥革職，俟應得罪名定讞懲辦。西曆本年四月二十九、六月初三、八月十九等日，即中曆三月十一、四月十七、七月初六等日，先後降旨將上年夏間凶慘案內，所有承認獲咎之各外省官員分別懲辦。
（二） 西曆本年八月十九日，即中曆二十七年七月初六日，上諭將諸國人民遇害被虐之城鎮，停止文武各等考試五年附件八。

第三款 因大日本國使館書記生杉山彬被害，大清國大皇帝從優榮之典，已於西曆本年六月十八日，即中曆五月初三日，降旨簡派戶部侍郎那桐為專使大臣，赴大日本國大皇帝前，代表大清國大皇帝及國家惋惜之意附件九。
第四款 大清國國家允定在於諸國被汙瀆及挖掘各墳塋，建立滌垢雪侮之碑，已與諸國全權大臣會同商定，其碑由各該國使館督建，並由中國國家付給估算各費銀兩。京師一帶每處一萬兩，外省每處五千兩，此項銀兩業已付清。茲將建碑之墳塋，開列清單附後附件十。
第五款 大清國國家允定不準將軍火暨專為製造軍火各種器料運入中國境內，已於西曆本年八月二十五日，即中曆二十七年七月十二日，降旨禁止進口二年，嗣後如諸國以為有仍應續禁之處，亦可降旨將二年之限續展附件十一。
第六款 按照西曆本年五月二十九日，即中曆四月十二日上諭，大清國大皇帝允定，付諸國償款海關銀四百五十兆兩。此款系西曆一千九百年十二月二十二日，即中曆光緒二十六年十一月初一日條款內第六款所載之各國各會各人及中國人民之賠償總數附件十二。
（甲） 此四百五十兆系照海關銀兩市價易為金款，此市價按諸國各金錢之價易金如左：海關銀一兩，即德國三馬克零五五，即奧國三克勒尼五九五，即美國圓零七四二，即法國三佛郎克七五，即英國三先零，即日本一圓四零七，即荷蘭國一弗樂林七九六，即俄國一魯布四一二，俄國魯布按金平算，即十七多理亞四二四。此四百五十兆按年息四厘，正本由中國分三十九年按後附之表各章清還附件十三。本息用金付給，或按應還日期之市價易金付給，還本於一千九百零二年正月初一日起，一千九百四十年終止。還本各款應按每屆一年付還，初次定於一千九百零三年正月初一日付還，利息由一千九百零一年七月初一日起算。惟中國國家亦可將所欠首六個月至一千九百零一半十二月三十一日之息，展在自一千九百零二年正月初一日起，於三年內付還。但所展息款之利，亦應按年四厘付清。又利息每屆六個月付給，初次定於一千九百零二年七月初一日付給。
（乙） 此欠款一切事宜，均在上海辦理如後，諸國各派銀行董事一名，會同將所有由該管之中國官員付給之本利總數收存，分給有干涉者，該銀行出付回執。
（丙） 由中國國家將全數保票一紙，支付駐京諸國欽差領銜大臣手內。此保票以後分作零票，每票上各由中國特派之官員畫押。此節以及發票一切事宜，應由以上所述之銀行董事，各遵本國飭令而行。
（丁） 付還保票財源各進款，應每月給銀行董事收存。
（戊） 所定承擔保票之財源開列於後：一、新關各進款俟前已作為擔保之借款各本利付給之後餘剩者，又進口貨稅增至切實值百抽五，將所增之數加之，所有向例進口免稅各貨，除外國運來之米及各雜色糧面，並金銀以及金銀各錢外，均應列入切實值百抽五貨內。二、所有常關各進款，在各通商日岸之常關均歸新關管理。三、所有鹽政各進項，除歸還前泰西借款一宗外，餘剩一併歸入。至進口貨稅增至切實值百抽五，諸國現允可行，惟須二端：一、將現在照估價抽收進口各稅，凡能改者，皆當急速改為按件抽稅幾何。定辦改稅一層如後：為估算貨價之基，應以一千八百九十七、八、九三年卸貨時各貨牽算價值，乃開除進口稅及雜費總數之市價。其未改以前各該稅，仍照估價徵收。二、北河黃浦兩水路均應改善，中國國家即應撥款相助。增稅一層，俟此條款畫押日兩個月後，即行開辦。除在此畫押日期後至遲十日已在途間之貨外，概不得免抽。

第七款 大清國國家允定各使館境界以為專與住用之處，並獨由使館管理，中國民人概不准在界內居住，亦可自行防守。使館界線於附件之圖上標明如後附件十四：東面之線系崇文門大街，圖上十、十一、十二等字，北面圖上系五、六、七、八、九、十等字之線，西面圖上系一、二、三、四、五等字之線，南面圖上系十二、一等字之線，此線循城牆南址隨城垛而畫。按照西曆一千九百零一年正月十六日，即中曆上年十一月二十六日文內後附之條款，中國國家應允諸國分應自主，常留兵隊分保使館。
第八款 大清國國家應允將大沽炮臺及有礙京師至海通道之各礮台，一律削平，現已設法照辦。
第九款 按照西曆一千九百零一年正月十六日，即中曆上年十一月二十六日文內後附之條款，中國國家應允由諸國分應主辦會同酌定數處，留兵駐守，以保京師至海通道無斷絕之虞。今諸國駐守之處，系黃村郎坊楊村天津軍糧城坡沽炮臺唐山灤州昌黎秦皇島山海關。
第十款 大清國國家允定兩年之久，在各府廳州縣將以後所述之上諭頒行佈告：
一、 西曆本年二月初一日，即中曆上年十二月十三日，上諭以永禁或設或入與諸國仇敵之會，違者皆斬附件十五。
二、 西曆本年二月十三、二十一、四月二十九、八月十九等日，即中曆上年十二月二十五、本年正月初三、三月十一、七月初六等日，上諭一道，犯罪之人如何懲辦之處，均一一載明。
三、 西曆本年八月十九日，即中曆七月初六日，上諭以諸國人民遇害被虐各城鎮，停止文武各等考試。
四、 西曆本年二月初一日，即中曆上年十二月十三日，上諭以各省督撫文武大吏暨有司各官，於所屬境內均有保平安之責。如複滋傷害諸國人民之事，或再有違約之行，必須立時彈壓懲辦，否則該管之員，即行革職，永不敘用，亦不得開脫別給獎敘附件十六。以上諭旨，現於中國全境慚次張貼。
第十一款 大清國國家允定將通商行船各條約內，諸國視為應行商改之處，及有關通商各他事宜，均行議商，以期妥善簡易。現按照第六款賠償事宜，約定中國國家應允襄辦改善北河黃浦兩水路，其襄辦各節如左：
一、 北河改善河道，在一千八百九十八年會同中國國家所興各工，近由諸國派員重修，一俟治理天津事務交還之後，即可由中國國家派員與諸國所派之員會辦。中國國家應付海關銀每年六萬兩，以養其工。
二、 現設立黃浦河道局，經管整理改善水道各工，所派該局各員，均代中國暨諸國保守在滬所有通商之利益。預估後二十年該局各工及經營各費，應每年支用海關銀四十六萬兩，此數平分，半由中國國家付給，半由外國各干涉者出資。該局員差並權責及進款之詳細各節，皆於後附檔內列明附件十七。
第十二款 西曆本年七月二十四日，即中曆六月初九日，降旨將總理各國事務衙門，按照諸國酌定改為外務部，班列六部之前，此上諭內已簡派外務部各王大臣矣附件十八。且變通諸國欽差大臣覲見禮節，均已商定，由中國全權大臣屢次照會在案，此照會在後附之節略內述明附件十九。
茲特為議明以上所述各語，及後附諸國全權大臣所發之文牘，均系以法文為憑。大清國國家既如此，按以上所述，西曆一千九百年十二月二十二日，即中曆光緒二十六年十一月初一日文內存款，足適諸國之意妥辦，則中國願將一千九百年夏間變亂所生之局勢完結，諸國亦照允隨行。是以諸國全權大臣，現奉各本國政府之命，代為聲明，除第七款所述之防守使館兵隊外，諸國兵隊即於西曆一千九百零一年九月十七日，即中曆光緒二十七年八月初五日，全由東城撤退；並除第九款所述各處外，亦於西曆一千九百零一年九月二十二日，即中曆光緒二十七年八月初十日由直隸省撤退。
今將以上條款繕定同文十二份，均由諸中國全權大臣畫押，諸國全權大臣各存一份，中國全權大臣收存一份。

一千九百零一年九月初七日
光緒二十七年七月二十五日
在北京定立

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

In Chinese, the Boxer Protocol is also called Peking Protocol (Beijing yidingshu 北京議定書), likewise in Japanese: Pekin giteisho 北京議定書.

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Treaty of Portsmouth

The Emperor of Japan on the one part, and the Emperor of all the Russias, on the other part, animated by a desire to restore the blessings of peace, have resolved to conclude a treaty of peace, and have for this purpose named their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say, for his Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Baron Komura Jutaro, Jusami, Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, and his Excellency Takahira Kogoro, Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, his Minister to the United States, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, his Excellency Sergius Witte, his Secretary of State and President of the Committee of Ministers of the Empire of Russia, and his Excellency Baron Roman Rosen, Master of the Imperial Court of Russia, his Majesty's Ambassador to the United States, who, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good and due form, and concluded the following articles:

The Imperial Government of Japan, on its part, undertakes that the proprietary rights of Russian subjects in the territory above referred to shall be perfectly respected.
Article 1 There shall henceforth be peace and amity between their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias, and between their respective States and subjects.
Article 2 The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military and economical interests engages neither to obstruct nor interfere with measures for guidance, protection and control which the Imperial Government of Japan may find necessary to take in Korea. It is understood that Russian subjects in Korea shall be treated in exactly the same manner as the subjects and citizens of other foreign Powers; that is to say, they shall be placed on the same footing as the subjects and citizens of the most favored nation. It is also agreed that, in order to avoid causes of misunderstanding, the two high contracting parties will abstain on the Russian-Korean frontier from taking any military measure which may menace the security of Russian or Korean territory.
Article 3 Japan and Russia mutually engage:
First. — To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, in conformity with the provisions of the additional article I annexed to this treaty, and,
Second. — To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria now in occupation, or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the territory above mentioned.
The Imperial Government of Russia declares that it has not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in the impairment of Chinese sovereignty, or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.
Article 4 Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce or industry of Manchuria.
Article 5 The Imperial Russian Government transfers and assigns to the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Talien and the adjacent territorial waters, and all rights, privileges and concessions connected with or forming part of such lease, and it also transfers and assigns to the Imperial Government of Japan all public works and properties in the territory affected by the above-mentioned lease.
The two contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.
Article 6 The Imperial Russian Government engages to transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, without compensation and with the consent of the Chinese Government, the railway between Chang-chunfu and Kuanchangtsu and Port Arthur, and all the branches, together with all the rights, privileges and properties appertaining thereto in that region, as well as all the coal mines in said region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway. The two high contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Government of China mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.
Article 7 Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and nowise for strategic purposes. It is understood that this restrictiction does not apply to the railway in the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.
Article 8 The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia with the view to promote and facilitate intercourse and traffic will as soon as possible conclude a separate convention for the regulation of their connecting railway services in Manchuria.
Article 9 The Imperial Russian Government cedes to the Imperial Government of Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern portion of the Island of Saghalin and all the islands adjacent thereto and the public works and properties thereon. The fiftieth degree of north latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded territory. The exact alignment of such territory shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the additional article II annexed to this treaty.
Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct in their respective possessions on the Island of Saghalin or the adjacent islands any fortification or other similar military works. They also respectively engage not to take any military measures which may impede the free navigation of the Strait of La Perouse and the Strait of Tartary.
Article 10 It is reserved to Russian subjects, inhabitants of the territory ceded to Japan, to sell their real property and retire to their country, but if they prefer to remain in the ceded territory they will be maintained protected in the full exercise of their industries and rights of property on condition of submitting to the Japanese laws and jurisdiction. Japan shall have full liberty to withdraw the right of residence in or to deport from such territory of any inhabitants who labor under political or administrative disability. She engages, however, that the proprietary rights of such inhabitants shall be fully respected.
Article 11 Russia engages to arrange with Japan for granting to Japanese subjects rights of fishery along the coasts of the Russian possession in the Japan, Okhotsk and Bering Seas.
It is agreed that the foregoing engagement shall not affect rights already belonging to Russian or foreign subjects in those regions.
Article 12 The treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and Russia having been annulled by the war the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia engage to adopt as a basis for their commercial relations pending the conclusion of a new treaty of commerce and navigation the basis of the treaty which was in force previous to the present war, the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing of the most favored nation, in which are included import and export duties, customs formalities, transit and tonnage dues and the admission and treatment of agents, subjects and vessels of one country in the territories of the other.
Article 13 As soon as possible after the present treaty comes in force all prisoners of war shall be reciprocally restored. The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia shall each appoint a special commissioner to take charge of the prisoners. All prisoners in the hands of one Government shall be delivered to and be received by the commissioner of the other Government or by his duly authorized representative in such convenient numbers and at such convenient ports of the delivering State as such delivering State shall notify in advance to the commissioner of the receiving State.
The Governments of Japan and Russia shall present each other as soon as possible after the delivery of the prisoners is completed with a statement of the direct expenditures respectively incurred by them for the care and maintenance of the prisoner from the date of capture or surrender and up to the time of death or delivery. Russia engages to repay as soon as possible after the exchange of statement as above provided the difference between the actual amount so expended by Japan and the actual amount similarly disbursed by Russia.
Article 14 The present treaty shall be ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias. Such ratification shall be with as little delay as possible, and in any case no later than fifty days from the date of the signature of the treaty, to be announced to the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia respectively through the French Minister at Tokio and the Ambassador of the United States at St. Petersburg, and from the date of the latter of such announcements shall in all its parts come into full force. The formal exchange of ratifications shall take place at Washington as soon as possible.
Article 15 The present treaty shall be signed in duplicate in both the English and French languages. The texts are in absolute conformity, but in case of a discrepancy in the interpretation the French text shall prevail.

Sub-Articles

In conformity with the provisions of articles 3 and 9 of the treaty of the peace between Japan and Russia of this date the undersigned plenipotentiaries have concluded the following additional articles:

SUB-ARTICLE TO ARTICLE 3

The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia mutually engage to commence the withdrawal of their military forces from the territory of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately after the treaty of peace comes into operation, and within a period of eighteen months after that date the armies of the two countries shall be completely withdrawn from Manchuria, except from the leased territory of the Liaotung Peninsula. The forces of the two countries occupying the front positions shall first be withdrawn.

The high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria. The number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per kilometre and within that maximum number the commanders of the Japanese and Russian armies shall by common accord fix the number of such guards to be employed as small as possible while having in view the actual requirements.

The commanders of the Japanese and Russian forces in Manchuria shall agree upon the details of the evacuation in conformity with the above principles and shall take by common accord the measures necessary to carry out the evacuation as soon as possible, and in any case not later than the period of eighteen months.

SUB-ARTICLE TO ARTICLE 9

As soon as possible after the present treaty comes into force a committee of delimitation composed of an equal number of members is to be appointed by the two high contracting parties which shall on the spot mark in a permanent manner the exact boundary between the Japanese and Russian possessions on the Island of Saghalin. The commission shall be bound so far as topographical considerations permit to follow the fiftieth parallel of north latitude as the boundary line, and in case any deflections from that line at any points are found to be necessary compensation will be made by correlative deflections at other points. It shall also be the duty of the said commission to prepare a list and a description of the adjacent islands included in the cession, and finally the commission shall prepare and sign maps showing the boundaries of the ceded territory. The work of the commission shall be subject to the approval of the high contracting parties.

The foregoing additional articles are to be considered ratified with the ratification of the treaty of peace to which they are annexed.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and affixed seals to the present treaty of peace.

Done at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, this fifth day of the ninth month of the thirty-eighth year of the Meiji, corresponding to the twenty-third day of August, one thousand nine hundred and five (September 5, 1905).

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朴茨茅斯條約

正約

日本國皇帝陛下及全俄國皇帝陛下，欲使兩國及兩國之人民回復平和之幸福，決定訂立講和條約，是以日本國皇帝陛下特派外務部大臣從三位勳一等男爵小村壽太郎及駐紮美國待命全權公使從三份勳一等高平小五郎，全俄國皇帝陛下特派內閣總理大臣威特及駐紮美國特命全權大使俄國御前大臣羅善，為全權委員，各將所奉全權文憑校閱，認明懼屬妥善，會上訂立各條款開列於下：

第一條 日本國至帝陛下與全俄國皇帝陛下間，及兩國並兩國臣民間，當和平親睦。
第二條 俄國政府承認日本國于韓國之政治軍事經濟上均有卓絕之利益，加指導保護監理等事，日本政府視為必要者即可措置，不得阻礙干涉。在韓國之俄國臣民，均應按照最惠國之臣民一律看待，不得歧視。
兩締約國為避一切誤解之原因起見，彼此同意于俄韓兩國交界間不得執軍事上之措置，致侵迫俄韓兩國領土之安全。
第三條 日俄兩國互相約定各事如下；
一、 除遼東半島租借權所及之地域不計外， 所有在滿洲之兵，當按本條約附約第一款所定，由兩國同時全數撤退；
二、 除前記之地域外，現被日俄兩國軍隊佔領及管理之滿洲全部，交還中國接收，施行政務；俄國政府聲明在滿洲之領土上利益，或優先的讓與，或專屬的讓與，有侵害中國主權及有違機會均等主義各，一概無之。
第四條 日俄兩國彼此約定，凡中國在滿洲為發達商務工業起見，所有一切辦法列國視為當然者，不得阻礙。
第五條 俄國政府以中國政府之允許，將旅順口、大連灣並其附近領土領水之租借權內一部份之一切權利及所讓與者，轉移與日本政府，俄國政府又將該租界疆域內所造有一切公共營造物及財產，均移讓於日本政府。
兩締約國互約，前條所定者，須商請中國政府允諾。
日本政府允將居住前開各地內之俄國臣民之財產權，當完全尊重。
第六條 俄國政府允將由長春(寬城子)至旅順口之鐵路及一切支路，並在該地方鐵道內所附屬之一切權利財產，以及在該處鐵道內附屬之一切煤礦，或為鐵道利益起見所經營之一切煤礦，不受補償，且以清國政府允許者均移讓於日本政府。
兩締約國互約前條所定者，須商請中國政府承諾。
第七條 日俄兩國約在滿洲地方，各自經營專以商工業為目的之鐵道，決不經營以軍事為目的之鐵道。
但遼東半島租借權效力所及地域之鐵道不在此限。
第八條 日本政府及俄國政府，為圖來往輸運均臻便捷起見，妥訂滿洲接續鐵道營業章程，務須從速另訂別約。
第九條 俄國政府允將庫頁島南部及其附近一切島嶼，並各該處之一切公共營造物及財產之主權，永遠讓與日本政府；其讓與地域之北方境界，以北緯五十度為起點，至該處確界須按照本條約附約第二條所載為准。
日俄兩國彼此商允在庫頁島及其附近島嶼之各自所屬領地內，不築造堡壘及類於堡壘之軍事上工作物；又兩國約定凡軍事上之措置有礙于宗穀海峽及韃靼海峽航行自由者，不得施設。
第十條 居住於讓與日本國地域內之俄國人民， 可出賣財產，退還本國；若仍欲留住該地域時，當服從日本國之法律及管轄權。至該住民經營事業行使財產，當由日本國完全保護，其有不安本分者，日本國亦當撤回其居住權並放逐之，但該住民之財產當完全尊重。
第十一條 俄國當與口本國協定允准日木國臣民在日本海、鄂霍次克海、白今海之俄國所屬沿岸一帶有經營漁業之權。
前項約束，經雙方同意，不得影響於俄國及週邊臣民在彼處應有之權利。
第十二條 日俄通商航海條約，因此次戰爭作廢，日本國政府及俄國政府允諾以開戰前所施行之條約為本，另訂通商航海新約；其未定以前，所有進口稅、出口稅、關章、子口稅、船鈔，並代表臣民船舶，由此國進彼國領土或由彼國進此國領土時之許可及待遇，均照相待最優之國辦理。
第十三條 本條約一經施行，速將一切俘虜彼此交還，由日俄兩政府各派接收俘虜之特別委員一名專司其事，彼此送還時，應由交犯國將在該國某處口岸可交還人數若干， 預先知照收犯國，即由兩國專派員或該員所派之有權代表員照以前通知之口岸人數，彼此交收。
日俄兩國政府一俟交還俘虜完畢後，將虜犯自被擄或投降之日起至死亡或交換之日止，所有因照管：及留養該犯之一切費用細帳互相交換後，俄國政府應將日本實用數目中，除去俄國實用數目，尚差若干，當由俄國從速償還日本。
第十四條 本條約當由日本國皇帝陛下及全俄國皇帝陛下批准，從速在華盛頓互換，自簽字之日起，無論如何當於五十日以內，由駐紮日本之法國公使及駐紮俄國之美國大使，各通知駐在國政府，宣佈之後，本條約即全部生效。
第十五條 本條約繕就英文法文各兩本，分別簽字，其本文雖全然符合，設有解釋不同之處，以法文為准。為此兩國全權委員署名蓋印，以昭信守。

明治三十八年九月五日
俄曆一九O五年八月二十三日

小村壽太郎 高平小五郎 威特 [Witte] 羅善 [Rosen]
在樸資茅斯

附約

日俄兩國按照本口所訂講和條約第三條及第九條所載，由兩國全權委員另立附約如下，

第一條 此條應附於正約第三條。日俄兩國政府彼此商允，一候講和條約施行後即將滿洲地域內軍隊同時開始撤退；自講和條約施行之日起，以十八個月為限，所有兩國在滿洲之軍隊除遼東半島租借地外，一律撤退。
兩國佔領陣地之前敵軍隊當先行撤退。
兩訂約國可留置守備兵保護滿洲各自之鐵道線路，至守備兵人數，每一公里不過十五名之數，由此數內，日俄兩國軍司令官可因時酌減，以至少足用之數為率。
滿洲之日本國及俄國軍司令官，可遵照以上所定，協商撤兵細目，並以必要之方法從速實行撤兵，無論如何不得逾十八個月之限。
第二條 此條應附正約第九條。兩訂約國一俟本約施行後須從速各派數目相等之劃界委員，將庫頁島之俄日兩國所屬確界劃清，以垂久遠。劃界委員應就地形以北緯五十度為境界線，倘遇有不能直劃必須偏出緯度以外時，則偏出緯度若干，當另在他處偏入緯度內若干以補償之。至讓界附近之島嶼，該委員等應備表及詳細書，並將所劃讓地界線繪圖簽名，呈由兩訂約國政府批准。

以上所增條款，當其附屬之講和正約批准時准。

明治三十八年九月五日
俄曆一九O五年八月二十三日

小村壽太郎 高平小五郎 威特 [Witte] 羅善 [Rosen]
在樸資茅斯

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

In Japanese, the Treaty of Portsmouth is called Pōtsumasu Jōyaku ポーツマス条約 or Nichi Ro Kōwa Jōyaku 日露講和条約.

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Japan's "21 Demands" to China

Group I

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous to maintain the general peace in the Far East and to strengthen the relations of amity and good neighbourhood existing between the two countries, agree to the following articles:

Article 1 The Chinese Government engage to give full assent to all matters that the Japanese government may hereafter agree with the German Government respecting the disposition of all the rights, interests and concessions, which, in virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possesses vis-à-vis China in relation to the province of Shantung.
Article 2The Chinese Government engage that, within the province of Shantung or along its coast, no territory or island will be ceded or leased to any other Power, under any pretext whatever.
Article 3The Chinese Government agree to Japan's building a railway connecting Chefoo or Lungkow with the Kiaochou Tsinanfu Railway.
Article 4The Chinese Government engage to open of their own accord, as soon as possible, certain important cities and towns in the Province of Shantung for the residence and commerce of foreigners. The places to be so opened shall be decided upon in a separate agreement.

Group II

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, in view of the fact that the Chinese Government has always recognized the predominant position of Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:

Article 1 The two contracting Parties mutually agree that the term of the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the term respecting the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to a further period of 99 years respectively.
Article 2 The Japanese subjects shall be permitted in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to lease or own land required either for erecting buildings for various commercial and industrial uses or for farming.
Article 3 The Japanese subjects shall have liberty to enter, reside, and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and to carry on business of various kinds commercial, industrial, and otherwise.
Article 4 The Chinese Government grant to the Japanese subjects the right of mining in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. As regards the mines to be worked, they shall be decided upon in a separate agreement.
Article 5 The Chinese Government agree that the consent of the Japanese Government shall be obtained in advance: (1) whenever it is proposed to grant to other nationals the right of constructing a railway or to obtain from other nationals the supply of funds for constructing a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and (2) whenever a loan is to be made with any other Power, under security of the taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.
Article 6 The Chinese Government engage that whenever the Chinese Government need the service of political, financial, or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or in Eastern Inner Mongolia, Japan shall first be consulted.
Article 7 The Chinese Government agree that the control and management of the Kirin-Chungchun Railway shall be handed over to Japan for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this treaty.

Group III

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, having regard to the close relations existing between Japanese capitalists and the Han-Yeh-Ping Company and desiring to promote the common interests of the two nations, agree to the following articles:

Article 1The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Han-Yeh-Ping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations, and that, without the consent of the Japanese Government, the Chinese Government shall not dispose or permit the Company to dispose of any right or property of the Company.
Article 2 The Chinese Government engage that, as a necessary measure for protection of the invested interests of Japanese capitalists, no mines in the neighbourhood of those owned by the Han-Yeh-Ping Company shall be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by anyone other than the Said Company; and further that whenever it is proposed to take any other measure which may likely affect the interests of the said Company directly or indirectly, the consent of the said Company shall first be obtained.

Group IV

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China, agree to the following article:

Article 1 The Chinese Government engage not to cede or lease to any other Power any harbour or bay on or any island along the coast of China.

Group V

Article 1 The Chinese Central Government to engage influential Japanese as political, financial, and military advisers.
Article 2 The Chinese Government to grant the Japanese hospitals, temples, and schools in the interior of China the right to own land.
Article 3 In the face of many police disputes which have hitherto arisen between Japan and China, causing no little annoyance the police in localities (in China), where such arrangement: are necessary, to be placed under joint Japanese and Chinese administration, or Japanese to be employed in police office in such localities, so as to help at the same time the improvement of the Chinese Police Service.
Article 4 China to obtain from Japan supply of a certain quantity of arms, or to establish an arsenal in China under joint Japanese and Chinese management and to be supplied with experts and materials from Japan.
Article 5 In order to help the development of the Nanchang-Kiukiang Railway, with which Japanese capitalists are so closely identified, and with due regard to the negotiations which have been pending between Japan and China in relation to the railway question in South China, China to agree to give to Japan the right of constructing a railway to connect Wuchang with the Kiukiang-Nanchang and Hangchou and between Nanchang and Chaochou.
Article 6 In view of the relations between the Province of Fukien and Formosa and of the Agreement respecting the non-alienation of that province, Japan to be consulted first whenever foreign capital is needed in connection with the railways, mines, and harbour works (including dockyards) in the Province of Fukien.
Article 7 China to grant to Japanese subjects the right of preaching in China.

[Jan. 18, 1915]

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日本的《二十一條要求》

第一號，關於日本繼承德國在山東的特權，共四款：

1. 日本政府擬向德國政府協定之所有德國關於山東省依據條約或其他關係對中國政府享有一切權力利益讓與等項處分，中國政府概行承認。
2.凡山東省內並沿海一帶土地及各島嶼，無論以何項名目，概不讓與或租借與他國。
3.日本建造由煙臺或龍口接連膠濟路線之鐵路。
4.中國政府從速自開山東省內各主要城市作為商埠。

第二號，關於「日本國在南滿洲及東部內蒙古享有優越地位」，共七款：

1. 兩訂約國互相約定，將旅順、大連租借期限並南滿洲及安奉兩鐵路期限，均展至九十九年為期。
2.日本臣民在南滿洲及東部內蒙古營造商工業應用房廠，或為耕作，可得其須要土地之租借權和所有權。
3.日本臣民得在南滿洲及東部內蒙古任便居住往來，並經營商工業各項生意。
4.中國政府允將南滿洲及東部內蒙古各礦開採權，許與日本臣民。
5.中國政府如准許他國在南滿洲及東部蒙古建造鐵路或以該地區課稅作抵押他國借款時，應先經日本政府同意而後辦理。
6.如中國政府在南滿洲及東部內蒙古聘用政治、財政、軍事各顧問教習，必須先嚮日本商議。
7.中國政府允將吉長鐵路管理經營事宜委任日本政府，其年限自本約畫押之日起，以九十九年為限。

第三號，關於漢冶萍公司，共二款：

1. 俟將來機會相當，將漢冶萍公司作為兩國合辦事業，未經日本政府之同意，所有該公司一切權力產業，中國政府不得自行處分，亦不得使該公司任意處分。
2.所有屬於漢冶萍公司各礦之附近礦山，如未經該公司同意，一概不准該公司以外之人開採。

第四號，關於「切實保全中國領土」一款：

1. 中國政府允准，所有中國沿岸港灣及島嶼，概不讓與或租與他國。

第五號，共七款：

1. 在中國中央政府，須聘用有力之日本人充當政治、財政、軍事等項顧問（該條袁世凱未直接同意，由段祺瑞執政時通過）。
2.所有在中國內地所設日本醫院、寺院、學校等，概允其土地所有權。
3.須將必要地方之警察作為中日合辦，或在此等地方之警察署內須聘用多數日本人，以資全面籌畫改良中國警察機關。
4.由日本採辦一定數量之軍械（譬如在中國政府所需軍械之半數以上），或在中國設立日中合辦之軍械廠，聘用日本技師，並採買日本材料。
5.允將接連武昌與九江、南昌之鐵路，及南昌至杭州、南昌至潮州各鐵路之建築權，許與日本國。
6.福建省內籌辦鐵路、開礦及整頓海口（船廠在內），如需外國資本時，先嚮日本協商。
7.允認日本人在中國有布教之權。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTES ===============

In Japanese the Twenty-One Demands are called Taika Nijūikkajō Yōkyū 対華二十一ヵ条要求.

Negotiations between Japan and China’s Yuan Shikai administration in the aftermath of the Twenty-One Demands resulted in an agreement which did not include the demands in Group 5, signed on May 25, 1915 under the name "Sino-Japanese Agreement" (Zhong Ri xinyue 中日新約) aka "Treaties of the Fourth Year of the Republic" (min si tiaoyue 民四條約), comprising the "Treaty Respecting the Province of Shandong" (guanyu Shandong zhi tiaoyue 關於山東之條約), the "Treaty Respecting Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia" (guanyu nan Manzhou ji dongbu Neimenggu zhi tiaoyue 關於南滿洲及東部內蒙古之條約), the "Exchange of Notes Respecting the Matter of Hanyehping" (guanyu Hanyeping shixiang zhi huanwen 關於漢冶萍事項之換文), the "Exchange of Notes Respecting the Restoration of the Leased Territory of Jiaozhou Bay" (guanyu jiaohuan Jiaoao zhi huanwen 關於交還膠澳之換文), and the "Exchange of Notes Respecting the Fujian Question" (guanyu Fujian shixiang zhi huanwen 關於福建事項之換文).

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Treaty of Versailles ✄

[...]

Part IV: German rights and interests outside Germany

[...]

Section II. China

Article 128 Germany renounces in favour of China all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on September 7, 1901, and from all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto. She likewise renounces in favour of China any claim to indemnities accruing thereunder subsequent to March 14, 1917.
Article 129 From the coming into force of the present Treaty the High Contracting Parties shall apply, in so far as concerns them respectively:
1. The Arrangement of August 29, 1902, regarding the new Chinese customs tariff;
2. The Arrangement of September 27, 1905, regarding Whang-Poo (黄浦), and the provisional supplementary arrangement of April 4, 1912. China, however, will no longer be bound to grant to Germany the advantages or privileges which she allowed Germany under these Arrangements.
Article 130 Subject to the provisions of Section VIII of this Part, Germany cedes to China all the buildings, wharves and pontoons, barracks, forts, arms and munitions of war, vessels of all kinds, wireless telegraphy installations and other public property belonging to the German Government, which are situated or may be in the German Concessions at Tientsin (天津) and Hankow (漢口) or elsewhere in Chinese territory. It is understood, however, that premises used as diplomatic or consular residences or offices are not included in the above cession, and, furthermore, that no steps shall be taken by the Chinese Government to dispose of the German public and private property situated within the so-called Legation Quarter (東交民巷) at Peking (北京) without the consent of the Diplomatic Representatives of the Powers which, on the coming into force of the present Treaty, remain Parties to the Final Protocol of September 7, 1901.
Article 131 Germany undertakes to restore to China within twelve months from the coming into force of the present Treaty all the astronomical instruments which her troops in 1900-1901 carried away from China, and to defray all expenses which may be incurred in effecting such restoration, including the expenses of dismounting, packing, transporting, insurance and installation in Peking.
Article 132 Germany agrees to the abrogation of the leases from the Chinese Government under which the German Concessions at Hankow and Tientsin are now held. China, restored to the full exercise of her sovereign rights in the above areas, declares her intention of opening them to international residence and trade. She further declares that the abrogation of the leases under which these concessions are now held shall not affect the property rights of nationals of Allied and Associated Powers who are holders of lots in these concessions.
Article 133 Germany waives all claims against the Chinese Government or against any Allied or Associated Government arising out of the internment of German nationals in China and their repatriation. She equally renounces all claims arising out of the capture and condemnation of German ships in China, or the liquidation, sequestration or control of German properties, rights and interests in that country since August 14, 1917. This provision, however, shall not affect the rights of the parties interested in the proceeds of any such liquidation, which shall be governed by the provisions of Part X (Economic Clauses) of the present Treaty.
Article 134 Germany renounces in favour of the Government of His Britannic Majesty the German State property in the British Concession at Shameen (沙面) at Canton (廣州). She renounces in favour of the French and Chinese Governments conjointly the property of the German school situated in the French Concession at Shanghai (上海).

[...]

Section VIII. Shantung

Article 156 Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title and privileges particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow (膠州), railways, mines and submarine cables which she acquired in virtue of the Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung (山東). All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway (膠濟鐵路), including its branch lines together with its subsidiary property of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and material for the exploitation of the mines, are and remain acquired by Japan, together with all rights and privileges attaching thereto. The German State submarine cables from Tsingtao (青島) to Shanghai and from Tsingtao to Chefoo (芝罘), with all the rights, privileges and properties attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and encumbrances.
Article 157 The movable and immovable property owned by the German State in the territory of Kiaochow, as well as all the rights which Germany might claim in consequence of the works or improvements made or of the expenses incurred by her, directly or indirectly, in connection with this territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and encumbrances.
Article 158 Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and documents of every kind, wherever they may be, relating to the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial or other, of the territory of Kiaochow. Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of all treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the rights, title or privileges referred to in the two preceding Articles.

[...]

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Treaty of Versailles (in French: Traité de Versailles, in Chinese: Fanersai tiaoyue 凡爾賽條約 or Fanersai heyue 凡爾賽和約, in Japanese Verusaiyu Jōyaku ヴェルサイユ条約) was signed on June 28, 1919 during the Paris Peace Conference which took place between Jan. 18, 1919 and Jan. 21, 1920. Members of the Chinese delegation included Lou Tseng-tsiang (陸徵祥), Wellington Koo (顧維鈞), Thomas Wang (王正廷), Alfred Sao-ke Sze (施肇基), Wei Chen-zu (魏宸組), and Tsao Ju-lin (曹汝霖), leading members of the large Japanese delegation were Marquess Saionji Kinmochi (西園寺公望), Baron Makino Nobuaki (牧野伸顕), Viscount Chinda Sutemi (珍田捨巳), Matsui Keishirō (松井慶四郎), and Ijuin Hikokichi (伊集院彦吉). Signatories were the German Reich, the Allied Powers (France, the British Empire, Italy, Japan, and the United States) and other countries including Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hejaz (= today's Saudi Arabia), Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Siam (= today's Thailand), Uruguay, and Yugoslavia as as well as Australia, Canada, South Africa, India, and New Zealand as part of the British Empire. China's representatives refused to sign the treaty because many former German concessions in China were not returned but handed to Japan instead.

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Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States

Signed at Montevideo, 26 December 1933

Entered into Force, 26 December 1934

Article 8 reaffirmed by Protocol, 23 December 1936

Convention on the Rights and Duties of States

This treaty was signed at the International Conference of American States in Montevideo, Uruguay on December 26, 1933. It entered into force on December 26, 1934. The treaty discusses the definition and rights of statehood.

The Governments represented in the Seventh International Conference of American States:

Wishing to conclude a Convention on Rights and Duties of States, have appointed the following Plenipotentiaries:

Honduras: MIGUEL PAZ BARAONA; AUGUSTO C. COELLO; LUIS BOGRAN

United States of America: CORDELL HULL; ALEXANDER W. WEDDELL; J. REUBEN CLARK; J. BUTLER WRIGHT; SPRUILLE BRADEN; Miss SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE

El Salvador: HECTOR DAVID CASTRO; ARTURO RAMON AVILA; J. CIPRIANO CASTRO

Dominican Republic: TULIO M. CESTERO

Haiti: JUSTIN BARAU; FRANCIS SALGADO; ANTOINE PIERRE-PAUL; EDMOND MANGONES

Argentina: CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS; JUAN F. CAFFERATA; RAMON S. CASTILLO; CARLOS BREBBIA; ISIDORO RUIZ MORENO; LUIS A. PODESTA COSTA; RAUL PREBISCH; DANIEL ANTOKOLETZ

Venezuela: CESAR ZUMETA; LUIS CHURTON; JOSE RAFAEL MONTTLLA

Uruguay: ALBERTO MANE; JUAN JOSE AMEZAGA; JOSE G. ANTUNA; JUAN CARLOS BLANCO; Senora SOFIA A. V. DE DEMICHELI; MARTIN R. ECHEGOYEN; LUIS ALBERTO DE HERRERA; PEDRO MANINI RIOS; MATEO MARQUES CASTRO; RODOLFO MEZZERA; OCTAVIO MORAT; LUIS MORQUIO; TEOFILO PINEYRO CHAIN; DARDO REGULES; JOSE SERRATO; JOSE PEDRO VARELA

Paraguay: JUSTO PASTOR BENITEZ; GERONIMO RIART; HORACIO A. FERNANDEZ; Senorita MARIA F. GONZALEZ

Mexico: JOSE MANUEL PUIG CASAURANC; ALFONSO REYES; BASILIO VADILLO; GENARO V. VASQUEZ; ROMEO ORTEGA; MANUEL J. SIERRA; EDUARDO SUAREZ

Panama: J. D. AROSEMENA; EDUARDO E. HOLGUIN; OSCAR R. MULLER; MAGIN PONS

Bolivia: CASTO ROJAS; DAVID ALVESTEGUI; ARTURO PINTO ESCALIER

Guatemala: ALFREDO SKINNER KLEE; JOSE GONZALEZ CAMPO; CARLOS SALAZAR; MANUEL ARROYO

Brazil: AFRANIO DE MELLO FRANCO; LUCILLO A DA CUNHA BUENO; FRANCISCO LUIS DA SILVA CAMPOS; GILBERTO AMADO; CARLOS CHAGAS; SAMUEL RIBEIRO

Ecuador: AUGUSTO AGUIRRE APARICIO; HUMBERTO ALBORNOZ; ANTONIO PARRA; CARLOS PUIG VILASSAR; ARTURO SCARONE

Nicaragua: LEONARDO ARGUELLO; MANUEL CORDERO REYES; CARLOS CUADRA PASOS

Colombia: ALFONSO LOPEZ; RAIMUNDO RIVAS; JOSE CAMACEO CARRENO

Chile: MIGUEL CRUCHAGA TOCORNAL; OCTAVIO SENORET SILVA; GUSTAVO RIVERA; JOSE RAMON GUTIERREZ; FELIX NIETO DEL RIO; FRANCISCO FIGUEROA SANCHEZ; BENJAMIN COHEN

Peru: ALFREDO SOLE Y MURO; FELIPE BARREDA LAOS; LUIS FERNAN CISNEROS

Cuba: ANGEL ALBERTO GIRAUDY; HERMINIO PORTELL VILA; ALFREDO NOGUEIRA

Who, after having exhibited their Full Powers, which were found to be in good and due order, have agreed upon the following:

Article 1 The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
Article 2 The federal state shall constitute a sole person in the eyes of international law.
Article 3 The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts.
The exercise of these rights has no other limitation than the exercise of the rights of other states according to international law.
Article 4 States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity in their exercise. The rights of each one do not depend upon the power which it possesses to assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence as a person under international law.
Article 5 The fundamental rights of states are not susceptible of being affected in any manner whatsoever.
Article 6 The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law. Recognition is unconditional and irrevocable.
Article 7 The recognition of a state may be express or tacit. The latter results from any act which implies the intention of recognizing the new state.
Article 8 No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.
Article 9 The jurisdiction of states within the limits of national territory applies to all the inhabitants.
Nationals and foreigners are under the same protection of the law and the national authorities and the foreigners may not claim rights other or more extensive than those of the nationals.
Article 10 The primary interest of states is the conservation of peace. Differences of any nature which arise between them should be settled by recognized pacific methods.
Article 11 The contracting states definitely establish as the rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure. The territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever even temporarily.
Article 12 The present Convention shall not affect obligations previously entered into by the High Contracting Parties by virtue of international agreements.
Article 13 The present Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uruguay shall transmit authentic certified copies to the governments for the aforementioned purpose of ratification. The instrument of ratification shall be deposited in the archives of the Pan American Union in Washington, which shall notify the signatory governments of said deposit. Such notification shall be considered as an exchange of ratifications.
Article 14 The present Convention will enter into force between the High Contracting Parties in the order in which they deposit their respective ratifications.
Article 15 The present Convention shall remain in force indefinitely but may be denounced by means of one year's notice given to the Pan American Union, which shall transmit it to the other signatory governments. After the expiration of this period the Convention shall cease in its effects as regards the party which denounces but shall remain in effect for the remaining High Contracting Parties.
Article 16 The present Convention shall be open for the adherence and accession of the States which are not signatories. The corresponding instruments shall be deposited in the archives of the Pan American Union which shall communicate them to the other High Contracting Parties.

In witness whereof, the following Plenipotentiaries have signed this Convention in Spanish, English, Portuguese and French and hereunto affix their respective seals in the city of Montevideo, Republic of Uruguay, this 26th day of December, 1933.

Reservations

The Delegation of the United States of America, in signing the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, does so with the express reservation presented to the Plenary Session of the Conference on December 22, 1933, which reservation reads as follows:

The Delegation of the United States, in voting "yes" on the final vote on this committee recommendation and proposal, makes the same reservation to the eleven articles of the project or proposal that the United States Delegation made to the first ten articles during the final vote in the full Commission, which reservation is in words as follows:

"The policy and attitude of the United States Government toward every important phase of international relationships in this hemisphere could scarcely be made more clear and definite than they have been made by both word and action especially since March 4. I [Secretary of State Cordell Hull, chairman of U.S. delegation] have no disposition therefore to indulge in any repetition or rehearsal of these acts and utterances and shall not do so. Every observing person must by this time thoroughly understand that under the Roosevelt Administration the United States Government is as much opposed as any other government to interference with the freedom, the sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes of the governments of other nations.

"In addition to numerous acts and utterances in connection with the carrying out of these doctrines and policies, President Roosevelt, during recent weeks, gave out a public statement expressing his disposition to open negotiations with the Cuban Government for the purpose of dealing with the treaty which has existed since 1903. I feel safe in undertaking to say that under our support of the general principle of non-intervention as has been suggested, no government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt Administration. I think it unfortunate that during the brief period of this Conference there is apparently not time within which to prepare interpretations and definitions of these fundamental terms that are embraced in the report. Such definitions and interpretations would enable every government to proceed in a uniform way without any difference of opinion or of interpretations. I hope that at the earliest possible date such very important work will be done. In the meantime in case of differences of interpretations and also until they (the proposed doctrines and principles) can be worked out and codified for the common use of every government, I desire to say that the United States Government in all of its international associations and relationships and conduct will follow scrupulously the doctrines and policies which it has pursued since March 4 which are embodied in the different addresses of President Roosevelt since that time and in the recent peace address of myself on the 15th day of December before this Conference and in the law of nations as generally recognized and accepted".

The delegates of Brazil and Peru recorded the following private vote with regard to article 11: "That they accept the doctrine in principle but that they do not consider it codifiable because there are some countries which have not yet signed the Anti-War Pact of Rio de Janeiro 4 of which this doctrine is a part and therefore it does not yet constitute positive international law suitable for codification".

Honduras: M. PAZ BARAONA; AUGUSTO C. COELLO; Luls BOGRXN

United States of America: ALEXANDER W. WEDDELL; J. BUTLER WRIGUT

El Salvador: HECTOR DAVID CASTRO; ARTURO R. AVILA

Dominican Republic: TULIO M. CESTERO

Haiti: J. BARAU; F. SALGADO; EDMOND MANGONES; A. PRRE. PAUL

Argentina: CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS; JUAN F. CAFFERATA; RAMON S. CASTILLO; I. Rulz MORENO; L. A. PODESTA COSTA; D. ANTOKOLETZ

Venezuela: LUIS CHURION; J. R. MONTILLA

Uruguay: A. MANE; JOSE PEDRO VARELA; MATEO MARQuEs CASTRO; DARDO REGULES; SOFIA ALVAREZ VIGNOLI DE DEMICIIELI; TEOFILO PINEYRO CHAIN; LUIS A. DE HERRERA; MARTIN R. EcnEcoYEN; JOSE G. ANTUNA; J. C. BLANCO; PEDRO MANINI RIOS; RODOLFO MEZZERA; OCTAVTO MORATO; LUIS MOROQUIO; JOSE SERRATO

Paraguay: JUSTO PASTOR BENITEZ; MARIA F. GONZALEZ

Mexico: B. VADILLO; M. J. STERRA; EDUARDO SUAREZ

Panama: J. D. AROSEMENA; MAGIN PONS; EDUARDO E. HOLGUIN

Guatemala: M. ARROYO

Brazil: LUCILLO A. DA CUNHA BUENO; GILBERTO AMADO

Ecuador: A. AGUIRRE APARICIO; H. ALBORNOZ; ANTONIO PARRA V.; C. PUIG V.; ARTURO SCARONE

Nicaragua: LEONARDO ARGUELLO; M. CORDERO REYES; CARLOS CUADRA PASOS

Colombia: ALFONSO LOPEZ; RAIMUNDO RIVAS

Chile: MIGUEL CRUCHAGA; J. RAMON GUTIERREZ; F. FIGUEROA; F. NIETO DEL RIO; B. COHEN

Peru: (with the reservation set forth) ALFREDO SOLF Y MURO

Cuba: ALBERTO GIRAUDY; HERMINIO PORTELL VILA; ING. NOGUEIRA

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The "Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States" is translated as Mengteweiduo guojia quanli yiwu gongyue 蒙特維多國家權利義務公約 in Chinese.

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The ROC's Declaration of War Against Japan

(December 9, 1941)

Japan's national policy has always aimed at the domination of Asia and mastery of the Pacific. For more than four years China has resolutely resisted Japan's aggression, regardless of suffering and sacrifice, in order not only to maintain her national independence and freedom but also to uphold international law and justice and to promote world peace and human happiness.

China is a peace-loving nation. In taking up arms in self-defense, China entertained the hope that Japan might yet realise the futility of her plans of conquest. Throughout the struggle all the other powers have shown the utmost forbearance likewise in the hope that Japan might one day repent and mend her ways in the interest of peace in the entire Pacific region.

Unfortunately Japan's aggressive capacities prove to be incorrigible. After her long and fruitless attempt to conquer China, Japan, far from showing any signs of penitence, has treacherously launched an attack on China's friends, the United States and Great Britain, thus extending the theater of her aggressive activities and making herself the arch-enemy of justice and world peace.

This latest act of aggression on the part of Japan lays bare her insatiable ambitions and has created a situation that no nation which believes in international good faith and human decency can tolerate.

The Chinese Government hereby formally declares war on Japan. The Chinese Government further declares that all treaties, conventions, agreements and contracts regarding relations between China and Japan are and remain null and void.

1941, December 9. Chairman, Lin Sen

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中華民國政府對日宣戰布告

（1941年12月9日）

日本軍閥夙以征服亞洲，并獨霸太平洋為其國策。數年以來，中國不顧一切犧牲，繼續抗戰，其目的不僅在保衛中國之獨立生存，實欲打破日本之侵略野心，維護國際公法、正義及人類福利与世界和平，此中國政府屢經聲明者也。

中國為酷愛和平之民族，過去四年余之神圣抗戰，原期侵略者之日本于遭受實際之懲創后，終能反省。在此時期，各友邦亦极端忍耐，冀其悔禍，俾全太平洋之和平，得以維持。不料強暴成性之日本，執迷不悟，且更悍然向我英、美諸友邦幵釁，擴大其戰爭侵略行動，甘為破壞全人類和平与正義之戎首，逞其侵略無厭之野心。舉凡尊重信義之國家，咸屬忍無可忍。茲特正式對日宣戰，昭告中外，所有一切條約、協定、合同，有涉及中、日間之關系者，一律廢止，特此布告。

中華民國三十年十二月九日 主席　林森

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Declaration by United Nations

(Subscribing to the Principles of the Atlantic Charter, January 1, 1942)

A Joint Declaration by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia.

The Governments signatory hereto,

Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter.

Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world,

DECLARE:

(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war.

(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.

The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.

DONE at Washington

January First, 1942

[The signatories to the Declaration by United Nations are as listed above.]

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聯合國共同宣言

美利堅合衆國、大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國、蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯盟、中國、澳大利亞、比利時、加拿大、哥斯達黎加、古巴、捷克斯洛伐克、多米尼加共和國、薩爾瓦多、希臘、危地馬拉、海地、洪都拉斯、印度、盧森堡、荷蘭、新西蘭、尼加拉瓜、挪威、巴拿馬、波蘭、南非聯邦和南斯拉夫各國的聯合宣言。

本宣言簽字國政府，對于1941年8月14日美利堅合衆國總統和大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國首相多座聯合宣言稱爲大西洋憲章內所載宗旨與原則的共同方案也已表示贊同，

深信完全戰勝它們的敵對國對于保衛生命、自由、獨立和宗教自由並對于保全其本國和其他各國的人權和正義非常重要，同時它們現在正對力圖征服世界的野蠻和殘暴的力量從事共同的鬥爭，

茲宣告：

（一） 每一征服各自保證對各該政府作戰的三國同盟成員國及其附從者使用其全部資源，不論軍事的或經濟的。

（二） 每一政府各自保證瘀斑宣言簽字國合作，並不與敵人締結單獨停戰協定或協約。

現在或可能將在戰勝希特勒主義的鬥爭中給予物質上援助和貢獻的其他國家得加入上述宣言。

於1942年1月1日訂於華盛頓。

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Cairo Declaration

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Mr. Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa. The following general statement was issued:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.

"The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

"With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

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開羅宣言

羅斯福總統、蔣委員長、邱吉爾首相、偕同各該國軍事與外交顧問人員，在北非舉行會議，業已完畢，茲發表概括之聲明如下：

三國軍事方面人員關於今後對日作戰計畫，已獲得一致意見，我三大盟國決心以不鬆弛之壓力從海陸空各方面加諸殘暴之敵人，此項壓力已經在增長之中。我三大盟國此次進行戰爭之目的，在於制止及懲罰日本之侵略，三國決不為自己圖利，亦無拓展領土之意思。三國之宗旨，在剝奪日本自從一九一四年第一次世界大戰開始後在太平洋上所奪得或佔領之一切島嶼；在使日本所竊取於中國之領土，例如東北四省(2)、臺灣、澎湖群島等，歸還中華民國；其他日本以武力或貪欲所攫取之土地，亦務將日本驅逐出境；我三大盟國稔知朝鮮人民所受之奴隸待遇，決定在相當時期，使朝鮮自由與獨立。根據以上所認定之各項目標，並與其他對日作戰之聯合國(3)目標相一致，我三大盟國將堅忍進行其重大而長期之戰爭，以獲得日本之無條件投降。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Cairo Conference was attended by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and ROC President Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 and took place Nov. 22–26, 1943. The Cairo Declaration (also called "Cairo Communique") was not a treaty, was not signed, and was released via radio broadcast on Dec. 1, 1943. It is called Kairo sengen カイロ宣言 in Japanese.

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Convention on International Civil Aviation

Done at Chicago on the 7th Day of December 1944

Preamble

WHEREAS the future development of international civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can become a threat to the general security; and

WHEREAS it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that cooperation between nations and peoples upon which the peace of the world depends;

THEREFORE, the undersigned governments having agreed on certain principles and arrangements in order that international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically;

Have accordingly concluded this Convention to that end.

Part I. Air Navigation

CHAPTER 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION

Article 1

Sovereignty The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.

Article 2

Territory For the purposes of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State.

Article 3

Civil and
state aircraft		 (a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to state aircraft.
 (b) Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be state aircraft.
 (c) No state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the terms thereof.
 (d) The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.

Article 4

Misuse of
civil aviation		Each contracting State agrees not to use civil aviation for any purpose inconsistent with the alms of this Convention.
CHAPTER II: FLIGHT OVER TERRITORY OF CONTRACTING STATES

Article 5

Right of non-scheduled flight Each contracting State agrees that all aircraft of the other contracting States, being aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air services shall have the right, subject to the observance of the terms of this Convention, to make flights into or in transit nonstop across its territory and to make stops for non-traffic purposes without the necessity of obtaining prior permission, and subject to the right of the State flown over to require landing. Each contracting State nevertheless reserves the right, for reasons of safety of flight, to require aircraft desiring to proceed over regions which are inaccessible or without adequate air navigation facilities to follow prescribed routes, or to obtain special permission for such flights.
 Such aircraft, if engaged in the carriage of passengers, cargo, or mail for remuneration or hire on other than scheduled international air services, shall also, subject to the provisions of Article 7, have the privilege of taking on or discharging passengers, cargo, or mail, subject to the right of any State where such embarkation or discharge takes place to impose such regulations, conditions or limitations as it may consider desirable.

Article 6

Scheduled
air services		No scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization of that State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or authorization.

Article 7

Cabotage Each contracting State shall have the right to refuse permission to the aircraft of other contracting States to take on in its territory passengers, mail and cargo carried for remuneration or hire and destined for another point within its territory. Each contracting State undertakes not to enter into any arrangements which specifically grant any such privilege on an exclusive basis to any other State or an airline of any other State, and not to obtain any such exclusive privilege from any other State.

Article 8

Pilotless aircraft No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall be flown without a pilot over the territory of a contracting State without special authorization by that State and in accordance with the terms of such authorization. Each contracting State undertakes to insure that the flight of such aircraft without a pilot in regions open to civil aircraft shall be so controlled as to obviate danger to civil aircraft.

Article 9

Prohibited areas  (a) Each contracting State may, for reasons of military necessity or public safety, restrict or prohibit uniformly the aircraft of other States from flying over certain areas of its territory, provided that no distinction in this respect is made between the aircraft of the State whose territory ls involved, engaged in international scheduled airline services, and the aircraft of the other contracting States likewise engaged. Such prohibited areas shall be of reasonable extent and location so &s not to lnterfered unnecessarily with air navigation. Descriptions of such prohibited areas in the territory of a contracting State, as well as any subsequent alterations therein, shall be communicated as soon as possible to the other contracting States and to the International Civil Aviation Organization.
 (b) Each contracting State reserves also the right, in exceptional circumstances or during a period of emergency, or in the interest of public safety, and with immediate effect, temporarily to restrict or prohibit flying over the whole or any part of its territory, on condition that such restriction or prohibition shall be applicable without distinction of nationality to aircraft of all other States.
 (c) Each contracting State, under such regulations as it may prescribe, may require any aircraft entering the areas contemplated in subparagraphs (a) or (b) above to effect a landing as soon as practicable thereafter at some designated airport within its territory.

Article 10

Landing at customs airport Except in a case where, under the terms of this Convention or a special authorization, aircraft are permitted to cross the territory of a contracting State without landing, every aircraft which enters the territory of a contracting State shall, if the regulations of that State so require, land at an airport designated by that State for the purpose of customs and other examination. On departure from the territory of a contracting State, such aircraft shall depart from a similarly designated customs airport. Particulars of all designated customs airports shall be published by the State and transmitted to the International Civil Aviation Organization established under Part II of this Convention for communication to all other contracting States.

Article 11

Applicability of air regulations Subject to the provisions of this Convention, the laws and regulations of a contracting State relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to the aircraft of all contracting States without distinction as to nationality, and shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entering or departing from or while within the territory of that State.

Article 12

Rules of
the air		Each contracting State undertakes to adopt measures to insure that every aircraft flying over or maneuvering within its territory and that every aircraft carrying its nationality mark, wherever such aircraft may be, shall comply with the rules and regulations relating to the flight and maneuver of aircraft there in force. Each contracting State undertakes to keep its own regulations in these respects uniform, to the greatest possible extent, with those established from time to time under this Convention. Over the high seas, the rules in force shall be those established under this Convention. Each contracting State undertakes to insure the prosecution of all persons violating the regulations applicable.

Article 13

Entry and clearance regulations The laws and regulations of a contracting State as to the admission to or departure from its territory of passengers, crew or cargo of aircraft, such as regulations relating to entry, clearance, immigration, passports, customs, and quarantine shall be complied with by or on behalf of such passengers, crew or cargo upon entrance into or departure from, or while within the territory of that State.

Article 14

Prevention
of spread of disease		Each contracting State agrees to take effective measures to prevent the spread by means of air navigation of cholera, typhus (epidemic), smallpox, yellow fever, plague, and such other communicable diseases as the contracting States shall from time to time decide to designate, and to that end contracting States will keep in close consultation with the agencies concerned with international regulations relating to sanitary measures applicable to aircraft. Such consultation shall be without prejudice to the application of any existing international convention on this subject to which the contracting States may be parties.

Article 15

Airport and similar charges Every airport in a contracting State which is open to public use by its national aircraft shall likewise, subject to the provisions of Article 68, be open under uniform conditions to the aircraft of all the other contracting States. The like uniform conditions shall apply to the use, by aircraft of every contracting State, of all air navigation facilities, including radio and meteorological services, which may be provided for public use for the safety and expedition of air navigation.
 Any charges that may be imposed or permitted to be imposed by a contracting State for the use of such airports and air navigation facilities by the aircraft of any other contracting State shall not be higher,
 (a) As to aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air services, than those that would be paid by its national aircraft of the same class engaged in similar operations, and
 (b) As to aircraft engaged in scheduled international air services, than those that would be paid by its national aircraft engaged in similar international air services.
 All such charges shall be published and communicated to the International Civil Aviation Organization: provided that, upon representation by an interested contracting State, the charges imposed for the use of airports and other facilities shall be subject to review by the Council, which shall report and make recommendations thereon for the consideration of the State or States concerned. No fees, dues or other charges shall be imposed by any contracting State in respect solely of the right of transit over or entry into or exit from its territory of any aircraft of a contracting State or persons or property thereon.

Article 16

Search of aircraft The appropriate authorities of each of the contracting States shall have the right, without unreasonable delay, to search aircraft of the other contracting States on landing or departure, and to inspect the certificates and other documents prescribed by this Convention.
CHAPTER III: NATIONALITY OF AIRCRAFT

Article 17

Nationality
of aircraft		Aircraft have the nationality of the State in which they are registered.

Article 18

Dual registrationAn aircraft cannot be validly registered in more than one State, but its registration may be changed from one State to another.

Article 19

National laws governing registrationThe registration or transfer of registration of aircraft in any contracting State shall be made in accordance with its laws and regulations.

Article 20

Display of marksEvery aircraft engaged in international air navigation shall bear its appropriate nationality and registration marks.

Article 21

Report of registrationsEach contracting State undertakes to supply to any other contracting State or to the International Civil Aviation Organization, on demand, information concerning the registration and ownership of any particular aircraft registered in that State. In addition, each contracting State shall furnish reports To the International Civil Aviation Organization, under such regulations as the latter may prescribe, giving such pertinent date as can be made available concerning the ownership and control of aircraft registered in that State and habitually engaged in international air navigation. The data thus obtained by the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be made available by it on request to the other contracting States.
CHAPTER IV: MEASURES TO FACILITATE AIR NAVIGATION

Article 22

Facilitation of formalitiesEach contracting State agrees to adopt all practicable measures, through the issuance of special regulations or otherwise, to facilitate and expedite navigation by aircraft between the territories of contracting States, and to prevent unnecessary delays to aircraft, crews, passengers and cargo, especially in the administration of the laws relating to immigration, quarantine, customs and clearance.

Article 23

Customs and immigration proceduresEach contracting State undertakes, so far as it may find practicable, to establish customs and immigration procedures affecting international air navigation in accordance with the practices which may be established or recommended from time to time, pursuant to this Convention. Nothing in this Convention shell be construed as preventing the establishment of customs-free airports.

Article 24

Customs duty (a) Aircraft on a flight to, from, or across the territory of another contracting State shall be admitted temporarily free of duty, subject to the customs regulations of the State. Fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment and aircraft stores on board an aircraft of a contracting State, on arrival in the territory of another contracting State and retained on board on leaving the territory of that State shall be exempt from customs duty, inspection fees or similar national or local duties and charges. This exemption shall not apply to any quantities or articles unloaded, except in accordance with the customs regulations of the State, which may require that they shall be kept under customs supervision.
 (b) Spare parts and equipment imported into the territory of a contracting State for incorporation in or use on an aircraft of another contracting State engaged in international air navigation shall be admitted free of customs duty, subject to compliance with the regulations of the State concerned, which may provide that the articles shall be kept under customs supervision and control.

Article 25

Aircraft in distressEach contracting State undertakes to provide such measures of assistance to aircraft in distress in its territory as it may find practicable, and to permit, subject to control by its own authorities, the owners of the aircraft or authorities of the State in which the aircraft is registered to provide such measures of assistance as may be necessitated by the circumstances. Each contracting State, when undertaking search for missing aircraft, will collaborate in coordinated measures which may be recommended from time to time pursuant to this Convention.

Article 26

Investigation of accidentsIn the event of an accident to an aircraft of a contracting State occurring in the territory of another contracting State, and involving death or serious injury, or indicating serious technical defect in the aircraft or air navigation facilities, the State in which the accident occurs will institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the accident, in accordance, so far as its laws permit, with the procedure which may be recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization. The State in which the aircraft is registered shall be given the opportunity to appoint observers to be present at the inquiry and the State holding the inquiry shall communicate the report and findings in the matter to that State.

Article 27

Exemption from seizure on patent claims (a) While engaged in international air navigation, any authorized entry of aircraft of a contracting State into the territory of another contracting State or authorized transit across the territory of such State with or without landings shall not entail any seizure or detention of the aircraft or any claim against the owner or operator thereof or any other interference therewith by or on behalf of such State or any person therein, on the ground that the construction, mechanism, parts, accessories or operation of the aircraft is an infringement of any patent, design, or model duly granted or registered in the State whose territory is entered by the aircraft, it being agreed that no deposit of security in connection with the foregoing exemption from seizure or detention of the aircraft shall in any case be required in the State entered by such aircraft.
 (b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this Article shall also be applicable to the storage of spare parts and spare equipment for the aircraft and the right to use and install the same in the repair of an aircraft of a contracting State in the territory of any other contracting State, provided that any patented part or equipment so stored shall not be sold or distributed internally in or exported commercially from the contracting State entered by the aircraft.
 (c) The benefits of this Article shall apply only to such States, parties to this Convention, as either (1) are parties to the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and to any amendments thereof; or (2) have enacted patent laws which recognize and give adequate protection to inventions made by the nationals of the other States parties to this Convention.

Article 28

Air navigation facilities and standard systemsEach contracting State undertakes, so far as it may find practicable, to:
 (a) Provide, in its territory, airports, radio services, meteorological services and other air navigation facilities to facilitate international air navigation, in accordance with the standards and practices recommended or established from time to time, pursuant to this Convention;
 (b) Adopt and put into operation the appropriate standard systems of communications procedure, codes, markings, signals, lighting and other operational practices and rules which may be recommended or established from time to time, pursuant to this Convention;
 (c) Collaborate in international measures to secure the publication of aeronautical maps and charts in accordance with standards which may be recommended or established from time to time, pursuant to this Convention.
CHAPTER V: CONDITIONS TO BE FULFILLED WITH RESPECT TO AIRCRAFT

Article 29

Documents carried in aircraftEvery aircraft of a contracting State, engaged in international navigation, shall carry the following documents in conformity with the conditions prescribed in this Convention:
 (a) Its certificate of registration;
 (b) Its certificate of airworthiness;
 (c) The appropriate licenses for each member of the crew;
 (d) Its journey log book;
 (e) If it is equipped with radio apparatus, the aircraft radio station license;
 (f) If it carries passengers, a list of their names and places of and destination;
 (g) If it carries cargo, a manifest and detailed declarations of the cargo.

Article 30

Aircraft radio equipment (a) Aircraft of each contracting State may, in or over the territory of other contracting States, carry radio transmitting apparatus only if a license to install and operate such apparatus has been issued by the appropriate authorities of the State in which the aircraft is registered. The use of radio transmitting apparatus in the territory of the contracting State whose territory is flown over shall be in accordance with the regulations prescribed by that State.
 (b) Radio transmitting apparatus may be used only by members of the flight crew who are provided with a special license for the purpose, issued by the appropriate authorities of the State in which the aircraft is registered.

Article 31

Certificates of airworthinessEvery aircraft engaged in international navigation shall be provided with a certificate of airworthiness issued or rendered valid by the State in which it is registered.

Article 32

Licenses of personnel (a) The pilot of every aircraft and the other members of the operating crew of every aircraft engaged in international navigation shall be provided with certificates of competency and licenses issued or rendered valid by the State in which the aircraft is registered.
 (b) Each contracting State reserves the right to refuse to recognize, for the purpose of flight above its own territory, certificates of competency and licenses granted to any of its nationals by another contracting State.

Article 33

Recognition of certificates and licensesCertificates of airworthiness and certificates of competency and licenses issued or rendered valid by the contracting State in which the aircraft is registered, shall be recognized as valid by the other contracting States, provided that the requirements under which such certificates or licenses were issued or rendered valid are equal to or above the minimum standards which may be established from time to time pursuant to this Convention.

Article 34

Journey log booksThere shall be maintained in respect of every aircraft engaged in international navigation a Journey log book in which shall be entered particulars of the aircraft, its crew and of each Journey, in such form as may be prescribed from time to time pursuant to this Convention.

Article 35

Cargo restrictions (a) No munitions of war or implements of war may be carried in or above the territory of a State in aircraft engaged in international navigation, except by permission of such State. Each State shall determine by regulations what constitutes munitions of war or implements of war for the purposes of this Article, giving due consideration, for the purposes of uniformity, to such recommendations as the International Civil Aviation Organization may from time to time make.
 (b) Each contracting State reserves the right, for reasons of public-order and safety, to regulate or prohibit the carriage in or above its territory of articles other than those enumerated in paragraph (a): provided that no distinction is made in this respect between its national aircraft engaged in international navigation and the aircraft of the other States so engaged; and provided further that no restriction shell be imposed which may interfere with the carriage and use on aircraft of apparatus necessary for the operation or navigation of the aircraft or the safety of the personnel or passengers.

Article 36

Photographic apparatusEach contracting State may prohibit or regulate the use of photographic apparatus in aircraft over its territory.
CHAPTER VI: INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES

Article 37

Adoption of international proceduresEach contracting State undertakes to collaborate standards and 1in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation.
 To this end the International Civil Aviation Organization shall adopt and amend from time to time, as may be necessary, international standards and recommended practices and procedures dealing with:
 (a) Communications systems and air navigation aids, including ground marking;
 (b) Characteristics of airports and landing strips;
 (c) Rules of the air and air traffic control practices;
 (d) Licensing of operating and mechanical personnel;
 (e) Airworthiness of aircraft;
 (f) Registration and identification of aircraft;
 (g) Collection and exchange of meteorological information;
 (h) Log books;
 (i) Aeronautical maps and charts;
 (j) Customs and immigration procedures;
 (k) Aircraft in distress and investigation of accidents;
 and such other matters concerned with the safety, regularity, and efficiency of air navigation as may from time to time appear appropriate.

Article 38

Departures from international standards and proceduresAny State which finds it impracticable to comply in all respects with any such international standard or procedure, or to bring its own regulations or practices into full accord with any international standard or procedure after amendment of the latter, or which deems it necessary to adopt regulations or practices differing in any particular respect from those established by an international standard, shall give immediate notification to the International Civil Aviation Organization of the differences between its own practice and that established by the international standard. In the case of amendments to international standards, any State which does not make the appropriate amendments to its own regulations or practices shall give notice to the Council within sixty days of the adoption of the amendment to the international standard, or indicate the action which it proposes to take. In any such case, the Council shall make immediate notification to all other states of the difference which exists between one or more features of an international standard and the corresponding national practice of that State.

Article 39

Endorsement of certificates and licenses (a) Any aircraft or part thereof with respect to which there exists an 1ntérnational standard of airworthiness or performance, and which failed in any respect to satisfy that standard at the time of its certification, shall have endorsed on or attached to its airworthiness certificate a complete enumeration of the details in respect of which it so failed.
 (b) Any person holding a license who does not satisfy in full the conditions laid down in the international standard relating to the class of license or certificate which he holds shall have endorsed on or attached to his license a complete enumeration of the particulars in which he does not satisfy such conditions.

Article 40

Validity of endorsed certificates
and licenses		No aircraft or personnel having certificates or licenses so endorsed shall participate in international navigation, except with the permission of the State or States whose territory is entered. The registration or use of any such aircraft, or of any certificated aircraft part, in any State other than that in which it was originally certificated shall be at the discretion of the State into which the aircraft or part is imported.

Article 41

Recognition
of existing standards of airworthiness		The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to aircraft and aircraft equipment of types of which the prototype is submitted to the appropriate national authorities for certification prior to a date three years after the date of adoption of an international standard of airworthiness for such equipment.

Article 42

Recognition
of existing standards of competency		The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to personnel whose licenses are originally issued of personnel prior to a date one year after initial adoption of an international standard of qualification for such personnel; but they shall in any case apply to all personnel whose licenses remain valid five years after the date of adoption of such standard.

Part II. The International Civil Aviation Organization

CHAPTER VII: THE ORGANIZATION

Article 43

Name and compositionAn organization to be named the International Civil Aviation Organization is formed by the Convention. It is made up of an Assembly, a Council, and such other bodies as may be necessary.

Article 44

ObjectivesThe aims and objectives of the Organization are to develop the principles and techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and development of international air transport so as to:
 (a) Insure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world;
 (b) Encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for peaceful purposes;
 (c) Encourage the development of airways, airports, and air navigation facilities for international civil aviation;
 (d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport;
 (e) Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competition;
 (f) Insure that the rights of contracting States are fully respected and that every contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines;
 (g) Avoid discrimination between contracting States;
 (h) Promote safety of flight in international air navigation;
 (i) Promote generally the development of all aspects of international civil aeronautics.

Article 45

Permanent
seat		The permanent seat of the Organization shall be at such place as shall be determined at the final meeting of the Interim Assembly of the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization set up by the Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago on December 7, 1944. The seat may be temporarily transferred elsewhere by decision of the Council.

Article 46

First meeting of AssemblyThe first meeting of the Assembly shall be summoned by the Interim Council of the above-mentioned Provisional Organization as soon as the Convention has come Into force, to meet at a time and place to be decided by the Interim Council.

Article 47

Legal
capacity		The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each contracting State such legal capacity as may be necessary for the performance of its functions. Full Juridical personality shall be granted wherever compatible with the constitution and laws of the State concerned.
CHAPTER VIII: THE ASSEMBLY

Article 48

Meetings of Assembly and voting (a) The Assembly shall meet annually and shall be convened by the Council at a suitable time and place. Extraordinary meetings of the Assembly may be held at any time upon the call of the Council or at the request of any ten contracting States addressed to the Secretary General.
 (b) All contracting States shall have an equal right to be represented at the meetings of the Assembly and each contracting State shall be entitled to one vote. Delegates representing contracting States may be assisted by technical advisers who may participate in the meetings but shall have no vote.
 (c) A majority of the contracting States is required to constitute a quorum for the meetings of the Assembly. Unless otherwise provided in this Convention, decisions of the Assembly shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast.

Article 49

Powers and duties of AssemblyThe powers and duties of the Assembly shall be
 (a) Elect at each meeting its President and other officers;
 (b) Elect the contracting States to be represented on the Council, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IX;
 (c) Examine and take appropriate action on the reports of the Council and decide on any matter referred to it by the Council;
 (d) its own rules of procedure and establish such subsidiary commissions as it may consider to be necessary or desirable;
 (e) Vote an annual budget and determine the financial arrangements of the Organization, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XII;
 (f) Review expenditures and approve the accounts of the Organization;
 (g) Refer, at its discretion, to the Council, to subsidiary commissions, or to any other body any matter within its sphere of action;
 (h) Delegate to the Council the powers and authority necessary or desirable for the discharge of the duties of the Organization and revoke or modify the delegations of authority at any time;
 (i) Carry out the appropriate provisions of Chapter XIII;
 (j) Consider proposals for the modification or amendment of the provisions of this Convention and, if of the proposals, recommend them to the contracting States in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXI;
 (k) Deal with any matter within the sphere of action of the Organization not specifically assigned to the Council.
CHAPTER IX: THE COUNCIL

Article 50

Composition and election
of Council		 (a) The Council shall be a permanent body responsible to the Assembly. It shall be composed of twentyone contracting States elected by the Assembly. An election shall be held at the first meeting of the Assembly and thereafter every three years, and the members of the Council so elected shall hold office until the next following election.
 (b) In electing the members of the Council, the Assembly shall give adequate representation to (1) the States of chief importance in air transport; (2) the States not otherwise included which make the largest contribution to the provision of facilities for international civil air navigation; and (3) the States not otherwise included whose designation will insure that all the major geographic areas of the world are represented on the Council. Any vacancy on the Council shall be filled by the as soon as possible; any contracting State so elected to the Council shall hold office for the unexpired portion of its predecessor's term of office.
 (c) No representative of a contracting State on the Council shall be actively associated with the operation of an international air service or financially interested in such a service.

Article 51

President of CouncilThe Council shall elect its President for a term of three years. He may be reelected. He shall have no vote. The Council shall elect from among its members one or more Vice Presidents who shall retain their right to vote when serving as acting President. The President need not be selected from among the representatives of the members of the Council but, if a representative is elected, his seat shall be deemed vacant and it shall be filled by the State which he represented. The dutles of the President shall be; to:
 (a) Convene meetings of the Council, the Air Transport Committee, and the Air Navigation Commission;
 (b) Serve as representative of the Council; and
 (c) Carry out on behalf of the Council the functions which the Council assigns to him.

Article 52

Voting in CouncilDecisions by the Council shall require approval by a majority of its members. The Council may delegate authority with respect to any particular matter to a committee of its members., Decisions of any committee of the Council may be appealed to the Council by any interested contracting State.

Article 53

Participation without a voteAny contracting State may participate, without a vote, in the consideration by the Council and by its committees and commissions of any question which especially affects its interests. No member of the Council shell vote in the consideration by the of a dispute to which it is a party.

Article 54

Mandatory functions of CouncilThe Council shall:
 (a) Submit annual reports to the Assembly;
 (b) Carry out the directions of the Assembly and discharge the duties and obligations which are laid on it by this Convention;
 (c) Determine its organization and rules of procedure;
 (d) Appoint and define the duties of an Air Transport Committee, which shall be chosen from among the representatives of the members of the Council, and which shall be responsible to it;
 (e) Establish an Air Navigation Commission, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X;
 (f) Administer the finances of the Organization in accordance with the provisions of Chapters XII end XV;
 (g) Determine the emoluments of the President of the Council;
 (h) Appoint a chief executive officer who shall be called the Secretary General, and make provision for the appointment of such other personnel as may be necessary, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XI;
 (i) Request, collect, examine and publish information relating to the advancement of air navigation and the operation of international air services, including information about the costs of operation and particulars of subsidies paid to airlines from public funds;
 (j) Report to contracting States any infraction of this Convention, as well as any failure to carry out recommendations or determinations of the Council;
 (k) Report to the Assembly any infraction of this Convention where a contracting State has failed to take appropriate action within a reasonable time after notice of the infraction;
 (l) Adopt, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VI of this Convention, international standards and recommended practices; for convenience, designate them as Annexes to this Convention; and notify all contracting States of the action taken;
 (m) Consider recommendations of the Air Navigation Commission for amendment of the Annexes and take action in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XX;
 (n) Consider any matter relating to the Convention which any contracting State refers to it.

Article 55

Permissive functions of CouncilThe Council may:
 (a) Where appropriate and as experience may show to be desirable, create subordinate air transport commissions on a regional or other basis and define groups of states or airlines with or through which it may deal to facilitate the carrying out of the alms of this Convention;
 (b) Delegate to the Air Navigation Commission duties additional to those set forth in the Convention and revoke or modify such delegations of authority at any time;
 (c) Conduct research into all aspects of air transport and air navigation which are of international importance, communicate the results of its research to the contracting States, and facilitate the exchange of information between contracting States on air transport and air navigation matters;
 (d) Study any matters affecting the organization and operation of international air transport, including the international ownership and operation of international air services on trunk routes, and submit to the Assembly plans in relation thereto;
 (e) Investigate, at the request of any contracting State, any situation which may appear to present avoidable obstacles to the development of international air navigation; and, after such investigation, issue such reports as may appear to it desirable.
CHAPTER X: AIR NAVIGATION COMMISSION

Article 56

Nomination and appointment of CommissionThe Air Navigation Commission shall be composed of twelve members appointed by the Council from among persons nominated by contracting States. These persons shall have suitable qualifications and experience in the science and practice of aeronautics. The Council shall request all contracting States to submit nominations. The President of the Air Navigation Commission shall be appointed by the Council.

Article 57

Duties of CommissionThe Air Navigation Commission shall:
 (a) Consider, and recommend to the Council for adoption, modifications of the Annexes to this Convention;
 (b) Establish technical subcommissions on which any contracting State may be represented, if it so desires;
 (c) Advise the Council concerning the collection and communication to the contracting States of all information which it considers necessary and useful for the advancement of air navigation.
CHAPTER XI: PERSONNEL

Article 58

Appointment of personnelSubject to any rules laid down by the Assembly and to the provisions of this Convention, the Council shall determine the method of appointment and of termination of appointment, the training, and the salaries, allowances, and conditions of service of the Secretary General and other personnel of the Organization, and may employ or make use of the services of nationals of any contracting State.

Article 59

International character of personnelThe President of the Council, the Secretary General, and other personnel shall not seek or receive instructions in regard to the discharge of their responsibilities from any authority external to the Organization. Each contracting State undertakes fully to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the personnel and not to seek to influence any of its nationals in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 60

Immunities and privileges of personnelEach contracting State undertakes, so far as possible under its constitutional procedure, to accord to the President of the Council, the Secretary General, and the other personnel of the Organization, the immunities and privileges which are accorded to corresponding personnel of other public international organizations. If a general international agreement on the immunities and privileges of international civil servants is arrived at, the immunities and privileges accorded to the President, the Secretary General, and the other personnel of the Organization shall be the immunities and privileges accorded under that general international agreement.
CHAPTER XII: FINANCE

Article 61

Budget and apportionment of expensesThe Council shall submit to the Assembly an annual budget, annual statements of accounts and estimates of all receipts and expenditures. The Assembly shall vote the budget with whatever modification it sees fit to prescribe, and, with the exception of assessments under Chapter XV to States consenting thereto, shall apportion the expenses of the Organization among the contracting States on the basis which it shall from time to time determine.

Article 62

Suspension of voting powerThe Assembly may suspend the voting power in the Assembly and in the Council of any contracting State that falls to discharge within a reasonable period its financial obligations to the Organization.

Article 63

Expenses of delegations
and other representatives		Each contracting State shall bear the expenses of its own delegation to the Assembly and the remuneration, travel, and other expenses of any person whom it appoints to serve on the Council, and of its nominees or representatives on any subsidiary committees or commissions of the Organization.
CHAPTER XIII: OTHER INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 64

Security arrangementsThe Organization may, with respect to air matters within its competence directly affecting world security, by vote of the Assembly enter into appropriate arrangements with any general organization set up by the nations of the world to preserve peace.

Article 65

Arrangements with other international bodiesThe Council, on behalf of the Organization, may enter into agreements with other international bodies for the maintenance of common services and for common arrangements concerning personnel and, with the approval of the Assembly, may enter into such other arrangements as may facilitate the work of the Organization.

Article 66

Functions relating
to other agreements		 (a) The Organization shall also carry out the functions placed upon it by the International Air Services Transit Agreement and by the International Air Transport Agreement drawn up at Chicago on December 7, 1944, in accordance with the terms and conditions therein set forth.
 (b) Members of the Assembly and the Council who have not accepted the International Air Services Transit Agreement or the International Air Transport Agreement drawn up at Chicago on December 7, 1944 shall not have the right to vote on any questions referred to the Assembly or Council under the provisions of the relevant Agreement.

Part III. International Air Transport

CHAPTER XIV: INFORMATION AND REPORTS

Article 67

File reports
with Council		Each contracting State undertakes that its international airlines shall, in accordance with requirements laid down by the Council, file with the Council traffic reports, cost statistics and financial statements showing among other things all receipts and the sources thereof.
CHAPTER XV: AIRPORTS AND OTHER AIR NAVIGATION FACILITIES

Article 68

Designation
of routes and airports		Each contracting State may, subject to the provisions of this Convention, designate the route to be followed within its territory by any international air service and the airports which any such service may use.

Article 69

Improvement of air navigation facilitiesIf the Council is of the opinion that the airports or other air navigation facilities, including radio and meteorological services, of a contracting State are not reasonably adequate for the safe, regular, efficient, and economical operation of international air services, present or contemplated, the Council shall consult with the State directly concerned, and other States affected, with a view to finding means by which the situation may be remedied, and may make recommendations for that purpose. No contracting State shall be guilty of an infraction of this Convention if it falls to carry out these recommendations.

Article 70

Financing of
air navigation facilities		A contracting State, in the circumstances arising under the provisions of Article 69, may conclude in arrangement with the Council for giving effect to such recommendations, The State may elect to bear all of the costs involved in any such arrangement. If the State does not so elect, the Council may agree, at the request of the State, to provide for all or a portion of the costs.

Article 71

Provision and maintenance of facilities by CouncilIf a contracting State so requests, the Council may agree to provide, man, maintain, and administer any or all of the airports and other air navigation facilities, including radio and meteorological services, required in its territory for the safe, regular, efficient and economical operation of the international air services of the other contracting States, and may specify just and reasonable charges for the use of the facilities provided.

Article 72

Acquisition or use of landWhere land is needed for facilities financed in whole or in part by the Council at the request of a contracting State, that State shall either provide the land itself, retaining title if it wishes, or facilitate the use of the land by the Council on Just and reasonable terms and in accordance with the laws of the State concerned.

Article 73

Expenditure and assessment of fundsWithin the limit of the funds which may be made available to it by the Assembly under Chapter XII, the Council may make current expenditures for the purposes of this Chapter from the general funds of the Organization. The Council shell assess the capital funds required for the purposes of this Chapter in previously agreed proportions over a reasonable period of time to the contracting States consenting thereto whose airlines use the facilities. The Council may also assess to States that consent any working funds that are required.

Article 74

Technical assistance and utilization of revenuesWhen the Council, at the request of a contracting State, advances funds or provides airports or other facilities in whole or in part, the arrangement may provide, with the consent of that State, for technical assistance in the supervision and operation of the airports and other facilities, and for the payment, from the revenues derived from the operation of the airports and other facilities, of the operating expenses of the airports and the other facilities, and of interest and amortization charges.

Article 75

Taking over of facilities from CouncilA contracting State may at any time discharge any obligation into which it has entered under Article 70, and take over airports and other facilities which the Council has provided in its territory pursuant to the provisions of Articles 71 and 72, by paying to the Council an amount which in the opinion of the Council is reasonable in the circumstances. If the State considers that the amount fixed by the Council is unreasonable it may appear to the Assembly against the decision of the Council and the Assembly may confirm or amend the decision of the Council.

Article 76

Return of fundsFunds obtained by the Council through reimbursement under Article 75 and from receipts of interest and amortization payments under Article 74 shall, in the case of advances originally financed by States under Article 73, be returned to the States which were originally assessed in the proportion of their assessments, so determined by the Council.
CHAPTER XVI: JOINT OPERATING ORGANIZATIONS AND POOLED SERVICES

Article 77

Joint operating organizations permittedNothing in this Convention shall prevent two or more contracting states from constituting joint air transport operating organizations or international operating agencies and from pooling their air services on any routes or in any regions, but such organizations or agencies and such pooled services shall be subject to all the provisions of this Convention, including those relating to the registration of agreements with the Council. The Council shall determine in what manner the provisions of this Convention relating to nationality of aircraft shall apply to aircraft operated by international operating agencies.

Article 78

Function of CouncilThe Council may suggest to contracting States concerned that they form joint organizations to operate air services on any routes or in any regions.

Article 79

Participation
in operating organizations		A State may participate in joint operating organizations or in pooling arrangements, either through its government or through an airline company or companies designated by its government. The companies may, at the sole discretion of the State concerned, be state-owned or partly state-owned or privately owned.

Part IV. Final Provisions

CHAPTER XVII: OTHER AERONAUTICAL AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS

Article 80

Paris and Habana ConventionsEach contracting State undertakes, immediately upon the coming into force of this Convention, to give notice of denunciation of the Convention relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation signed at Paris on October 13, 1919 or the Convention on Commercial Aviation signed at Habana on February 20, 1928, if it is a party to either. As between contracting States, this Convention supersedes the Conventions of Paris and Habana previously referred to.

Article 81

Registration
of existing agreements		All aeronautical agreements which are in existence on the coming into force of this Convention, and which are between a contracting State and any other State or between an airline of a contracting State and any other State or the airline of any other State, shall be forthwith registered with the Council.

Article 82

Abrogation of inconsistent arrangementsThe contracting States accept this Convention as abrogating all obligations and understandings between them which are inconsistent with its terms, and undertake not to enter into any such obligations and understandings. A contracting State which, before becoming a member of the Organization has undertaken any obligations toward a non-contracting State or a national of a contracting State or of a non-contracting State inconsistent with the terms of this Convention, shall take immediate steps to procure its release from the obligations. If an airline of any contracting State has entered into any such inconsistent obligations, the State of which it is a national shall use its best efforts to secure their termination forthwith and shall in any event cause them to be terminated as soon as such action can lawfully be taken after the coming into force of this Convention.

Article 83

Registration
of new arrangements		Subject to the provisions of the preceding Article, any contracting State may make arrangements not inconsistent with the provisions of this Convention. Any such arrangement shall be forthwith registered with the Council, which shall make it public as soon as possible.
CHAPTER XVIII: DISPUTES AND DEFAULT

Article 84

Settlement
of disputes		If any disagreement between two or more contracting States relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention and its Annexes cannot be settled by negotiation, it shall, on the application of any State concerned in the disagreement, be decided by the Council. No member of the Council shall vote in the consideration by the Council of any dispute to which it is a party. Any contracting State may, subject to Article 85, appeal from the decision of the Council to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal agreed upon with the other parties to the dispute or to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Any such appeal shall be notified to the Council within sixty days of receipt of notification of the decision of the Council.

Article 85

Arbitration procedureIf any contracting State party to a dispute in which the decision of the Council is under appeal has not accepted the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the contracting States parties to the dispute cannot agree on the choice of the arbitral tribunal, each of the contracting States parties to the dispute shall name a single arbitrator who sshall name an umpire. If either contracting State party to the dispute falls to name an arbitrator within a period of three months from the date of the appeal, an arbitrator shall be named on behalf of that State by the President of the Council from a list of qualified and available persons maintained by the Council. If, within thirty days, the arbitrators cannot agree on an umpire, the President of the Council shall designate an umpire from the list previously referred to. The arbitrators and the umpire shall then Jointly constitute an arbitral tribunal. Any arbitral tribunal established under this or the preceding Article shall settle its own procedure and give its decisions by majority vote, provided that the Council may determine procedural questions in the event of any delay which in the opinion of the Council is excessive.

Article 86

AppealsUnless the Council decides otherwise, any decision by the Council on whether an international airline is operating in conformity with the provisions of this Convention shall remain in effect unless reversed on appeal. On any other matter, decisions of the Council shall, if appealed from, be suspended until the appeal is decided. The decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice and of an arbitral tribunal shall be final and binding.

Article 87

Penalty for non-conformity of airlineEach contracting State undertakes not to allow the operation of an airline of a contracting State through the airspace above its territory if the Council has decided that the airline concerned is not conforming to a final decision rendered in accordance with the previous Article.

Article 88

Penalty for non-conformity by StateThe Assembly shall suspend the voting power in the Assembly and in the Council of any contracting State that is found in default under the provisions of this Chapter.
CHAPTER XIX: WAR

Article 89

War and emergency conditionsIn case of war, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the freedom of action of any of the contracting States affected, whether as belligerents or as neutrals, The same principle shall apply in the case of any contracting State which declares a state of national emergency and notifies the fact to the Council.
CHAPTER XX: ANNEXES

Article 90

Adoption and amendment of Annexes (a) The adoption by the Council of the Annexes described in Article 54, subparagraph (1), shall require the vote of two-thirds of the Council at a meeting called for that purpose and shall then be submitted by the Council to each contracting State. Any such Annex or any amendment of an Annex shall become effective within three months after its submission to the contracting States or at the end of such longer period of time as the Council may prescribe, unless in the meantime a majority of the contracting States register their disapproval with the Council.
 (b) The Council shall immediately notify all contracting States of the coming into force of any Annex or amendment thereto.
CHAPTER XXI: RATIFICATIONS, ADHERENCES, AMENDMENTS, AND DENUNCIATIONS

Article 91

Ratification of Convention (a) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America, which shall give notice of the date of the deposit to each of the signatory and adhering States.
 (b) As soon as this Convention has been ratified or adhered to by twenty-six States it shall come into force between them on the thirtieth day after deposit of the twenty-sixth instrument. It shall come into force for each State ratifying thereafter on the thirtieth day after the deposit of its instrument of ratification.
 (c) It shall be the duty of the Government of the United States of America to notify the government of each of the signatory and adhering States of the date on which this Convention comes into force.

Article 92

Adherence to Convention (a) This Convention shall be open for adherence by members of the United Nations and States associated with them, and States which remained neutral during the present world conflict.
 (b) Adherence shall be effected by a notification addressed to the Government of the United States of America and shall take effect as from the thirtieth day from the receipt of the notification by the Government of the United States of America, which shall notify all the contracting States.

Article 93

Admission of other StatesStates other than those provided for in Articles 91 and 92(a) may, subject to approval by any general international organization set up by the nations of the world to preserve peace, be admitted to participation in this Convention by means of a four-fifths vote of the Assembly and on such conditions as the Assembly may prescribe: provided that in each case the assent of any State invaded or attacked during the present war by the State seeking admission shall be necessary.

Article 94

Amendment of Convention (a) Any proposed amendment to this Convention must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly and shall then come into force in respect of States which have ratified such amendment when ratified by the number of contracting States specified by the Assembly., The number so specified shall not be less than two-thirds of the total number of contracting States.
 (b) If in its opinion the amendment is of such a nature as to Justify this course, the Assembly in its resolution recommending adoption may provide that any State which has not ratified within a specified period after the amendment has come into force shall thereupon cease to be a member of the Organization and a party to the Convention.

Article 95

Denunciation of Convention (a) Any contracting State may give notice of denunciation of this Conventlon three years after its coming into effect by notification addressed to the Government of the United States of America, which shall at once inform each of the contracting States.
 (b) Denunciation shall take effect one year from the date of the receipt of the notification and shall operate only as regards the State effecting the denunciation.
CHAPTER XXII: DEFINITIONS

Article 96

 For the purpose of this Convention the expression:
 (a) "Air service" means any scheduled air service performed by aircraft for the public transport of passengers, mail or cargo.
 (b) "International air service" means an air service which passes through the air space over the territory of more than one State.
 (c) "Airline" means any air transport enterprise offering or operating an international air service.
 (d) "Stop for non-traffic purposes" means a landing for any purpose other than taking on or discharging passengers, cargo or mail.

Signature of Convention

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned plenipotentiaries, having been duly authorized, sign this Convention on behalf of their respective governments on the dates appearing opposite their signatures.

DONE at Chicago the seventh day of December 1944, in the English language. A text drawn up in the English, French, and Spanish languages, each of which shall be of equal authenticity, shall be open for signature at Washington, D. C. Both texts shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America, and certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to the governments of all the States which may sign or adhere to this Convention.

FOR AFGHANISTAN:A. Hosayn AZIZ
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA:		Arthur S. DRAKEFORD
FOR BELGIUM:Vicomte du PARC
FOR BOLIVIA:Cor. Al. PACHECO
FOR BRAZIL:Fernando LOBO
FOR CANADA:H. J. SYMINGTON
FOR CHILE:R. SÁENZ
G. BISQUERT
R. MAGALLANES B.
FOR CHINA:CHANG Kia-ngau 張嘉璈
FOR COLOMBIA:Gonzalo RESTREPO JARAMILLO
FOR COSTA RICA:F. de P. GUTIÉRREZ
FOR CUBA:Gmo. BELT
FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA:V. S. HURBAN
FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC:C. A. MCLAUGHLIN
FOR ECUADOR:J. A. CORREA
Francisco GÓMEZ JURADO
FOR EGYPT:M. HASSAN
M. ROUSHDY
M. A. KHALIFA
FOR EL SALVADOR:Felipe VEGA GÓMEZ
FOR ETHIOPIA:Ras H. S. IMRU
FOR FRANCE:M. HYMANS
C. LEBEL
BOURGES
P. LOCUSSOL
FOR GREECE:D. T. Noti BOTZARIS
A. J. ARGYROPOULOS
FOR GUATEMALA:Osc. MORALES L.
FOR HAITI:G. Edouard ROY
FOR HONDURAS:E. P. LEFEBVRE
FOR ICELAND:Thor THORS
FOR INDIA:G. V. BEWOOR
FOR IRAN:M. SHAYESTEH
FOR IRAQ:Ali JAWDAT
FOR IRELAND:Robt. BRENNAN
John LEYDON
John J. HEARNE
T. J. O'DRISCOLL
FOR LEBANON:C. CHAMOUN
F. EL-HOSS
FOR LIBERIA:Walter F. WALKER
FOR LUXEMBOURG:Hugues LE GALLAIS
FOR MEXICO:Pedro A. CHAPA
FOR THE NETHERLANDS:COPES
F. C. ARONSTEIN
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF NEW ZEALAND:Daniel Giles SULLIVAN
FOR NICARAGUA:R. E. FRIZELL
FOR NORWAY:W. Munthe MORGENSTIERNE
FOR PANAMA: 

The Delegation of the Republic of Panama signs this Convention ad referendum, and subject to the following reservations:
 1. Because of its strategic position and responsibility in the protection of the means of communication in its territory, which are of the utmost importance to world trade, and vital to the defense of the Western Hemisphere, the Republic of Panama reserves the right to take, with respect to all flights through the air space above territory, all measures which in its judgment may be proper for its own security or the protection of said means of communication.
 2. The Republic of Panama understands that the technical annexes to which reference is made in the Convention constitute recommendations only, and not binding obligations.

FOR PARAGUAY:Celso R. VELÁZQUEZ
FOR PERU:A. REVOREDO
J. S. KOECHLIN
Luis ALVARADO
F. ELGUERA
Gllmo. VAN OORDT LEÓN
FOR THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH:J. HERNÁNDEZ
Urbano A. ZAFRA
J. H. FOLEY
FOR POLAND:Zbyslaw CIOLKOSZ
Dr. H. J. GÓRECKI
Stefan J. KONORSKI
Witold A. URBANOWICZ
Ludwik H. GOTTLIEB
FOR PORTUGAL:Mario de FIGUEREDO
Alfredo DELESQUE DOS SANTOS CINTRA
Duarte CALHIEROS
Vasco VIEIRA GARIN
FOR SPAIN:E. TERRADAS
Germán BARAIBAR
Duarte CALHEIROS
FOR SWEDEN:R. KUMLIN
FOR SWITZERLAND:Charles BRUGGMANN
FOR SYRIA:N. KAHALE
FOR TURKEY:S. KOCAK
F. SAHINBAS
Orhan H. EROL
FOR THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA:D. D. FORSYTH
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND:		SWINTON
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:Adolf A. BERLE Jr.
Alfred L. BULWINKLE
Chas. A. WOLVERTON
F. LaGUARDIA
Edward WARNER
L. Welch POGUE
William A. M. BURDEN
FOR URUGUAY:Carl CARBAJAL
Cor. Medardo R. FARÍAS
FOR VENEZUELA:—
FOR YUGOSLAVIA:—
FOR DENMARK :Henrik KAUFFMANN
FOR THAILAND:M. R. SENI PRAMOJ

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTES ===============

The Convention on International Civil Aviation was called guoji minyong hangkong gongyue 國際民用航空公約 or Zhijiage gongyue 芝加哥公約 in Chinese. It went into effect on April 4, 1947, the same day the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was established.

The Convention was signed at the end of the International Civil Aviation Conference which took place from Nov. 1 to Dec. 7, 1944 in Chicago (USA). The following 55 countries were invited by the US to attend the conference: Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, the USSR (= Soviet Union), Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

The official ICAO website lists 52 countries sending delegations to the Chicago conference, and the Convention was signed by 54 countries. While most of the invited countries sent delegates to the conference and signed the Convention, please note some additional remarks about the following countries.

  • Denmark: signed the Convention, but the official ICAO website does not list Danish delegates at the conference (invitation was extended to Denmark’s minister in Washington).
  • Panama: sent delegates—Carlos Icaza (chairman), Inocencio Galindo, Enrique Lefevre, and Narciso E. Garay. Panama was mentioned on the list of signatories (with reservations), but no member of the delegation actually signed with his name.
  • Saudi Arabia: was invited to the Chicago conference but sent no delegates, did not sign the Convention.
  • Soviet Union: was invited to the Chicago conference but sent no delegates, did not sign the Convention.
  • Thailand: signed the Convention, but the official ICAO website does not list Thai delegates at the conference (invitation was extended to Thailand’s minister in Washington).
  • Venezuela: sent delegates—Juan de Dios Celis Paredes as (absent) chairman, Francisco J. Sucre as acting chairman, and Julio Bunco Ustáriz, but none of them signed the Convention.
  • Yugoslavia: sent delegates—Vladimir M. Vukmirovic as chairman, Nenad Dj. Mirosavljevic, and Predrag Sopalovic, but none of them signed the Convention.

The Chinese delegation consisted of chairman Chang Kia-ngau 張嘉璈 (1889-1979, Jiangsu), Liu Chieh 劉鍇 (1907-1991, Guangdong) and Mow Pang-tsu 毛邦初 (1904-1987, Shanghai).

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Agreements reached at the Yalta Conference

(Jump to Agreement regarding Japan)

Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference

The Crimea Conference of the heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which took place from Feb. 4 to 11, came to the following conclusions:

I. World organization

It was decided:

1. That a United Nations conference on the proposed world organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25 April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.

2. The nations to be invited to this conference should be:

(a) the United Nations as they existed on 8 Feb., 1945; and

(b) Such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1 March, 1945. (For this purpose, by the term "Associated Nations" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the Conference on world organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United State of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e., the Ukraine and White Russia.

3. That the United States Government, on behalf of the three powers, should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

4. That the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations conference should be as follows:

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic invite the Government of -------- to send representatives to a conference to be held on 25 April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco, in the United States of America, to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The above-named Governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks conference and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

C. Voting

"1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.'

"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

"In the event that the Government of -------- desires in advance of the conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments."

Territorial trusteeship:

It was agreed that the five nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to

(a) existing mandates of the League of Nations;

(b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war;

(c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and

(d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be place under trusteeship.

[Begin first section published Feb., 13, 1945.]

II. Declaration of liberated Europe

The following declaration has been approved:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the people of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter — the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live — the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived to them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require,

(a) to establish conditions of internal peace;

(b) to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples;

(c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and

(d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measure necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order, under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

[End first section published Feb., 13, 1945.]

III. Dismemberment of Germany

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. John Winant, and Mr. Fedor T. Gusev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. Zone of occupation for the French and control council for Germany

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be allocated France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.

V. Reparation

The following protocol has been approved:

PROTOCOL

On the Talks Between the Heads of Three Governments at the Crimean Conference on the Question of the German Reparations in Kind

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

(b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

(c) Use of German labor.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied reparation commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives — one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression, the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

"The Moscow reparation commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the Paragraph 2 should be 22 billion dollars and that 50 per cent should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The British delegation was of the opinion that, pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow reparation commission, no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow reparation commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the commission.

VI. Major war criminals

The conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the conference.

[Begin second section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

VII. Poland

The following declaration on Poland was agreed by the conference:

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional of Government National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

"The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions in territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course of the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference."

VIII. Yugoslavia

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Ivan Subasitch:

(a) That the Tito-Subasitch agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new government formed on the basis of the agreement.

(b) That as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:

(I) That the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and

(II) That legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly; and that this statement should be published in the communiqué of the conference.

IX. Italo-Yogoslav frontier — Italo-Austrian frontier

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

X. Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations

There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with Mr. Molotov in Moscow. Mr. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

XI. Southeastern Europe

The British delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

(a) The Control Commission in Bulgaria.

(b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.

(c) Oil equipment in Rumania.

XII. Iran

Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.

[Begin third section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

XIII. Meeting of the three foreign secretaries

The conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.

These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

[End third section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

XIV. The Montreaux Convention and the Straits

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreaux Convention, and report to their Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.

The forgoing protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the Crimean Conference Feb. 11, 1945.

E. R. Stettinius Jr. M. Molotov Anthony Eden

Agreement regarding Japan

The leaders of the three great powers — the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain — have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved.

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:

(a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;

(b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored;

(c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to maintain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part, the Soviet Union expresses it readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Joseph Stalin  Franklin D. Roosevelt  Winston S. Churchill

February 11, 1945

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

Below are the Chinese and Japanese translations for the term "Yalta Conference".

Chinese Japanese
Yaerda huiyi 雅爾達會議 Yaruta kaidan ヤルタ会談

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Berlin Declaration

DECLARATION REGARDING THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY AND THE ASSUMPTION OF SUPREME AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

The German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air have been completely defeated and have surrendered unconditionally and Germany, which bears responsibility for the war, is no longer capable of resisting the will of the victorious Powers. The unconditional surrender of Germany has thereby been effected, and Germany has become subject to such requirements as may now or hereafter be imposed upon her.

There is no central Government or authority in Germany capable of accepting responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country and compliance with the requirements of the victorious Powers.

It is in these circumstances necessary, without prejudice to any subsequent decisions that may be taken respecting Germany, to make provision for the cessation of any further hostilities on the part of the German armed forces, for the maintenance of order in Germany and for the administration of the country, and to announce the immediate requirements with which Germany must comply.

The Representatives of the Supreme Commands of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the French Republic, hereinafter called the "Allied Representatives," acting by authority of their respective Governments and in the interests of the United Nations, accordingly make the following Declaration:

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority. The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of the said authority and powers does not affect the annexation of Germany.

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, will hereafter determine the boundaries of Germany or any part thereof and the status of Germany or of any area at present being part of German territory.

In virtue of the supreme authority and powers thus assumed by the four Governments, the Allied Representatives announce the following requirements arising from the complete defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany with which Germany must comply:

Article 1 Germany, and all German military, naval and air authorities and all forces under German control shall immediately cease hostilities in all theatres of war against the forces of the United Nations on land, at sea and in the air.
Article 2 (a) All armed forces of Germany or under German control, wherever they may be situated, including land, air, anti-aircraft and naval forces, the S.S., S.A. and Gestapo, and all other forces of auxiliary organisations equipped with weapons, shall be completely disarmed, handing over their weapons and equipment to local Allied Commanders or to officers designated by the Allied Representatives.
(b) The personnel of the formations and units of all the forces referred to in paragraph (a) above shall, at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Allied State concerned, be declared to be prisoners of war, pending further decisions, and shall be subject to such conditions and directions as may be prescribed by the respective Allied Representatives.
(c) All forces referred to in paragraph (a) above, wherever they may be, will remain in their present positions pending instructions from the Allied Representatives.
(d) Evacuation by the said forces of all territories outside the frontiers of Germany as they existed on the 31st December, 1937, will proceed according to instructions to be given by the Allied Representatives.
(e) Detachments of civil police to be armed with small arms only, for the maintenance of order and for guard duties, will be designated by the Allied Representatives.
Article 3 (a) All aircraft of any kind or nationality in Germany or German-occupied or controlled territories or waters, military, naval or civil, other than aircraft in the service of the Allies, will remain on the ground, on the water or aboard ships pending further instructions.
(b) All German or German-controlled aircraft in or over territories or waters not occupied or controlled by Germany will proceed to Germany or to such other place or places as may be specified by the Allied Representatives.
Article 4 (a) All German or German-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft, and merchant and other shipping, wherever such vessels may be at the time of this Declaration, and all other merchant ships of whatever nationality in German ports, will remain in or proceed immediately to ports and bases as specified by the Allied Representatives. The crews of such vessels will remain on board pending further instructions.
(b) All ships and vessels of the United Nations, whether or not title has been transferred as the result of prize court or other proceedings, which are at the disposal of Germany or under German control at the time of this Declaration, will proceed at the dates and to the ports or bases specified by the Allied Representatives.
Article 5 (a) All or any of the following articles in the possession of the German armed forces or under German control or at German disposal will be held intact and in good condition at the disposal of the Allied Representatives, for such purposes and at such times and places as they may prescribe:
(i) all arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war materials;
(ii) all naval vessels of all classes, both surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft and all merchant shipping, whether afloat, under repair or construction, built or building;
(iii) all aircraft of all kinds, aviation and anti-aircraft equipment and devices;
(iv) all transportation and communications facilities and equipment, by land, water or air;
(v) all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments;
(vi) all factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions, designed or intended to produce or to facilitate the production or use of the articles, materials, and facilities referred to in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) above or otherwise to further the conduct of war.
(b) At the demand of the Allied Representatives the following will be furnished:
(i) the labour, services and plant required for the maintenance or operation of any of the six categories mentioned in paragraph (a) above; and
(ii) any information or records that may be required by the Allied Representatives in connection with the same.
(c) At the demand of the Allied Representatives all facilities will be provided for the movement of Allied troops and agencies, their equipment and supplies, on the railways, roads and other land communications or by sea, river or air. All means of transportation will be maintained in good order and repair, and the labour, services and plant necessary therefor will be furnished.
Article 6 (a) The German authorities will release to the Allied Representatives, in accordance with the procedure to be laid down by them, all prisoners of war at present in their power, belonging to the forces of the United Nations, and will furnish full lists of these persons, indicating the places of their detention in Germany or territory occupied by Germany. Pending the release of such prisoners of war, the German authorities and people will protect them in their persons and property and provide them with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical attention and money in accordance with their rank or official position.
(b) The German authorities and people will in like manner provide for and release all other nationals of the United Nations who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint, and all other persons who may be confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as a result of any Nazi action, law or regulation which discriminates on the ground of race, colour, creed or political belief.
(c) The German authorities will, at the demand of the Allied Representatives, hand over control of places of detention to such officers as may be designated for the purpose by the Allied Representatives.
Article 7 The German authorities concerned will furnish to the Allied Representatives:
(a) full information regarding the forces referred to in Article 2 (a), and, in particular, will furnish forthwith all information which the Allied Representatives may require concerning the numbers, locations and dispositions of such forces, whether located inside or outside Germany;
(b) complete and detailed information concerning mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air, and the safety lanes in connection therewith. All such safety lanes will be kept open and clearly marked; all mines, minefields and other dangerous obstacles will as far as possible be rendered safe, and all aids to navigation will be reinstated. Unarmed German military and civilian personnel with the necessary equipment will be made available and utilized for the above purposes and for the removal of mines, minefields and other obstacles as directed by the Allied Representatives.
Article 8 There shall be no destruction, removal, concealment, transfer or scuttling of, or damage to, any military, naval, air, shipping, port, industrial and other like property and facilities and all records and archives, wherever they may be situated, except as may be directed by the Allied Representatives.
Article 9 Pending the institution of control by the Allied Representatives over all means of communication, all radio and telecommunication installations and other forms of wire or wireless communications, whether ashore or afloat, under German control, will cease transmission except as directed by the Allied Representatives.
Article 10 The forces, ships, aircraft, military equipment, and other property in Germany or in German control or service or at German disposal, of any other country at war with any of the Allies, will be subject to the provisions of this Declaration and of any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder.
Article 11 (a) The principal Nazi leaders as specified by the Allied Representatives, and all persons from time to time named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives as being suspected of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes or analogous offences, will be apprehended and surrendered to the Allied Representatives.
(b) The same will apply in the case of any national of any of the United Nations who is alleged to have committed an offence against his national law, and who may at any time be named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives.
(c) The German authorities and people will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for the apprehension and surrender of such persons.
Article 12 The Allied Representatives will station forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany as they may determine.
Article 13 (a) In the exercise of the supreme authority with respect to Germany assumed by the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the four Allied Governments will take such steps, including the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, as they deem requisite for future peace and security.
(b) The Allied Representatives will impose on Germany additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements arising from the complete defeat of Germany. The Allied Representatives, or persons or agencies duly designated to act on their authority, will issue proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions for the purpose of laying down such additional requirements, and of giving effect to the other provisions of this Declaration. All German authorities and the German people shall carry out unconditionally the requirements of the Allied Representatives, and shall fully comply with all such proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions.
Article 14 This Declaration enters into force and effect at the date and hour set forth below. In the event of failure on the part of the German authorities or people promptly and completely to fulfill their obligations hereby or hereafter imposed, the Allied Representatives will take whatever action may be deemed by them to be appropriate under the circumstances.
Article 15 This Declaration is drawn up in the English, Russian, French and German languages. The English, Russian and French are the only authentic texts.

BERLIN, GERMANY, June 5, 1945.

Signed at 1800 hours, Berlin time.

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Berlin Declaration (in Chinese: Bolin xuanyan 柏林宣言) was signed by the Allied commanders-in-chief:
 ● Georgy Zhukov for the Soviet Union
 ● Dwight D. Eisenhower for the United States
 ● Bernard Montgomery for the United Kingdom
 ● Jean de Lattre de Tassigny for France.

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Potsdam Agreement

(Jump to Potsdam Declaration)

(A) Protocol of the Proceedings, August 1, 1945

The Berlin Conference of the three heads of government of the USSR, USA, and UK, which took place from July 17 to August 2, 1945, came to the following conclusions:

I. Establishment of a council of foreign ministers

A. The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements:

(1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United States.

(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London which shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Ministers, and by a small staff of technical advisers.

(ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1st 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time.

(3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.

(ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other Members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.

(iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the Member Governments.

(4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question.

(ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problems under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the State chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem.

B. It was agreed that the three Governments should each address an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council. The text of the approved invitation was as follows:

Council of Foreign Ministers Draft for identical invitation to be sent separately by each of the Three Governments to the Governments of China and France.

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the U. S. S. R. consider it necessary to begin without delay the essential preparatory work upon the peace settlements in Europe. To this end they are agreed that there should be established a Council of the Foreign Ministers of the Five Great Powers to prepare treaties of peace with the European enemy States, for submission to the United Nations. The Council would also be empowered to propose settlements of outstanding territorial questions in Europe and to consider such other matters as member Governments might agree to refer to it.

The text adopted by the Three Governments is as follows:

(Here insert final agreed text of the Proposal)

In agreement with the Governments of the United States and U. S. S. R., His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and U. S. S. R., the United States Government, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Government extend a cordial invitation to the Government of China (France) to adopt the text quoted above and to join in setting up the Council. His Majesty's Government, The United States Government, The Soviet Government attach much importance to the participation of the Chinese Government (French Government) in the proposed arrangements and they hope to receive an early and favorable reply to this invitation.

C. It was understood that the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the text would be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodical consultation between the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom.

D. The Conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the Agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of surrender for Germany, for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the coordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Control Council at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly it was agreed to recommend that the European Advisory Commission be dissolved.

II. The principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period

A. POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.

1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council.

2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are:

(i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:-

(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the SS., SA., SD., and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations and all other military and semi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism;

(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms. ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented.

(ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

(iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.

(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.

4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discriminations on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.

5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.

7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.

8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion.

9. The administration in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:-

(i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation;

(ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;

(iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government;

(iv) for the time being, no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

B. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES.

11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed.

12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.

13. In organizing the German Economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.

14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to:

(a) mining and industrial production and its allocation;

(b) agriculture, forestry and fishing;

(c) wages, prices and rationing;

(d) import and export programs for Germany as a whole;

(e) currency and banking, central taxation and customs;

(f) reparation and removal of industrial war potential;

(g) transportation and communications.

In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions.

15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary:

(a) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament, demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports.

(b) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R.).

(c) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports.

(d) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein.

(e) to control all German public or private scientific bodies research and experimental institutions, laboratories, et cetera connected with economic activities.

16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any break-down in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited.

17. Measures shall be promptly taken:

(a) to effect essential repair of transport;

(b) to enlarge coal production;

(c) to maximize agricultural output; and

(d) to erect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities.

18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.

19. Payment of Reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports.

The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4 (a) and 4 (b) of the Reparations Agreement.

III. Reparations from Germany

1. Reparation claims of the U. S. S. R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U. S. S. R., and from appropriate German external assets.

2. The U. S. S. R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.

3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German external assets.

4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U. S. S. R. from its own zone of occupation, the U. S. S. R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones:

(a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.

(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously.

5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest.

6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 (a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U. S. S. R. in agreed installments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed.

7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect to such equipment as will be determined to he eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6.

8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below.

9. The Governments of the U. K. and U. S. A. renounce all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria.

10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany.

IV. Disposal of the German navy and merchant marine

A. The following principles for the distribution of the German Navy were agreed:

(1) The total strength of the German surface navy, excluding ships sunk and those taken over from Allied Nations, but including ships under construction or repair, shall be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., U. K., and U. S. A.

(2) Ships under construction or repair mean those ships whose construction or repair may be completed within three to six months, according to the type of ship. Whether such ships under construction or repair shall be completed or repaired shall be determined by the technical commission appointed by the Three Powers and referred to below, subject to the principle that their completion or repair must be achieved within the time limits above provided, without any increase of skilled employment in the German shipyards and without permitting the reopening of any German ship building or connected industries. Completion date means the date when a ship is able to go out on its first trip, or, under peacetime standards, would refer to the customary date of delivery by shipyard to the Government.

(3) The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. Not more than thirty submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the U. S. S. R., U. K., and U. S. A. for experimental and technical purposes.

(4) All stocks of armament, ammunition and supplies of the German Navy appertaining to the vessels transferred pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3) hereof shall be handed over to the respective powers receiving such ships.

(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite naval commission comprising two representatives for each government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German warships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German fleet. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than 15th August, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each Delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect German warships wherever they may be located.

(6) The Three Governments agreed that transfers, including those of ships under construction and repair, shall be completed as soon as possible, but not later than 15th February, 1946. The Commission will submit fortnightly reports, including proposals for the progressive allocation of the vessels when agreed by the Commission.

B. The following principles for the distribution of the German Merchant Marine were agreed:-

(1) The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever located, shall be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., the U. K., and the U. S. A. The actual transfers of the ships to the respective countries shall take place as soon as practicable after the end of the war against Japan. The United Kingdom and the United States will provide out of their shares of the surrendered German merchant ships appropriate amounts for other Allied States whose merchant marines have suffered heavy losses in the common cause against Germany, except that the Soviet Union shall provide out of its share for Poland.

(2) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships during the Japanese War period shall fall under the cognizance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority.

(3) While actual transfer of the ships shall be delayed until after the end of the war with Japan, a Tripartite Shipping Commission shall inventory and value all available ships and recommend a specific distribution in accordance with paragraph (1).

(4) German inland and coastal ships determined to be necessary to the maintenance of the basic German peace economy by the Allied Control Council of Germany shall not be included in the shipping pool thus divided among the Three Powers.

(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite merchant marine commission comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German merchant ships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German merchant ships. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than September 1st, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect the German merchant ships wherever they may be located.

V. City of Koenigsberg and the adjacent area

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government to the effect that pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia.

The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above subject to expert examination of the actual frontier.

The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.

VI. War criminals

The Three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London between British, United States, Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes under the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943 have no particular geographical localization. The Three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring these criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of these major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before 1st September.

VII. Austria

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria.

The three governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the city of Vienna.

It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria.

VIII. Poland

A. DECLARATION.

We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their territories and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.

The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens

The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference, has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections.

B. WESTERN FRONTIER OF POLAND.

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north 'end west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories cast of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinamunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

IX. Conclusion on peace treaties and admission to the United Nations Organization

The three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views.

For their part the three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty for Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations.

The three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic governments in these States will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.

The three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

As regards the admission of other States into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;

2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

The three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above.

The three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favour any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.

X. Territorial trusteeship

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the question of trusteeship territories as defined in the decision of the Crimea Conference and in the Charter of the United Nations Organization.

After an exchange of views on this question it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian colonial territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy and that the question of Italian colonial territory would be considered by the September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

XI. Revised allied control commission procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary

The three Governments took note that the Soviet Representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased.

The three Governments agreed that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries would now be undertaken, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries, and accepting as a basis, in respect of all three countries, the Soviet Government's proposals for Hungary as annexed hereto. (Annex I)

XII. Orderly transfer of German populations

The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.

Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem, with special regard to the question of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out having regard to the present situation in Germany.

The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending an examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council.

XIII. Oil equipment in Rumania

The Conference agreed to set up two bilateral commissions of experts, one to be composed of United Kingdom and Soviet Members and one to be composed of United States and Soviet Members, to investigate the facts and examine the documents, as a basis for the settlement of questions arising from the removal of oil equipment in Rumania. It was further agreed that these experts shall begin their work within ten days, on the spot.

XIV. Iran

It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Tehran, and that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September, 1945.

XV. The international zone of Tangier

A proposal by the Soviet Government was examined and the following decisions were reached:

Having examined the question of the Zone of Tangier, the three Governments have agreed that this Zone, which includes the City of Tangier and the area adjacent to it, in view of its special strategic importance, shall remain international.

The question of Tangier will be discussed in the near future at a meeting in Paris of representatives of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France.

XVI. The Black Sea Straits

The Three Governments recognized that the Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present-day conditions.

It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government.

XVII. International inland waterways

The Conference considered a proposal of the U. S. Delegation on this subject and agreed to refer it for consideration to the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

XVIII. European inland transport conference

The British and U. S. Delegations to the Conference informed the Soviet Delegation of the desire of the British and U. S. Governments to reconvene the European Inland Transport Conference and stated that they would welcome assurance that the Soviet Government would participate in the work of the reconvened conference. The Soviet Government agreed that it would participate in this conference.

XIX. Directives to military commanders on allied control council for Germany

The Three Governments agreed that each would send a directive to its representative on the Control Council for Germany informing him of all decisions of the Conference affecting matters within the scope of his duties.

XX. Use of allied property for satellite reparations or war trophies

The proposal (Annex II) presented by the United States Delegation was accepted in principle by the Conference, but the drafting of an agreement on the matter was left to be worked out through diplomatic channels.

XXI. Military talks

During the Conference there were meetings between the Chiefs of Staff of the Three Governments on military matters of common interest.

Annex I

TEXT OF A LETTER TRANSMITTED ON JULY 12 TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U. S. AND U. K. GOVERNMENTS ON THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION IN HUNGARY

In view of the changed situation in connection with the termination of the war against Germany, the Soviet Government finds it necessary to establish the following order of work for the Allied Control Commission in Hungary.

1. During the period up to the conclusion of peace with Hungary the President (or Vice-President) of the ACC will regularly call conferences with the British and American representatives for the purpose of discussing the most important questions relating to the work of the ACC. The conferences will be called once in 10 days, or more frequently in case of need.

Directives of the ACC on questions or principle will be issued to the Hungarian authorities by the President of the Allied Control Commission after agreement on these directives with the English and American representatives.

2. The British and American representatives in the ACC will take part in general conferences of heads of divisions and delegates of the ACC, convoked by the President of the ACC, which meetings will be regular in nature. The British and American representatives will also participate personally or through their representatives in appropriate instances in mixed commissions created by the President of the ACC for questions connected with the execution by the ACC of its functions

3. Free movement by the American and British representatives in the country will be permitted provided that the ACC is previously informed of the time and route of the journeys.

4. All questions connected with permission for the entrance and exit of members of the staff of the British and American representatives in Hungary will be decided on the spot by the President of the ACC within a time limit of not more than one week.

5. The bringing in and sending out by plane of mail, cargoes and diplomatic couriers will be carried out by the British and American representatives on the ACC under arrangements and within time limits established by the ACC, or in special cases by previous coordination with the President of the ACC.

I consider it necessary to add to the above that in all other points the existing Statutes regarding the ACC in Hungary, which was confirmed on January 20, 1945, shall remain in force in the future.

Annex II

USE OF ALLIED PROPERTY FOR SATELITE REPARATIONS OR WAR TROPHIES

1. The burden of reparation and "war trophies" should not fall on Allied nationals.

2. Capital Equipment-We object to the removal of such Allied property as reparations, "war trophies", or under any other guise. Loss would accrue to Allied nationals as a result of destruction of plants and the consequent loss of markets and trading connections. Seizure of Allied property makes impossible the fulfillment by the satellite of its obligation under the armistice to restore intact the rights and interests of the Allied Nations and their nationals.

The United States looks to the other occupying powers for the return of any equipment already removed and the cessation of removals. Where such equipment will not or cannot be returned, the U. S. will demand of the satellite adequate, effective and prompt compensation to American nationals, and that such compensation have priority equal to that of the reparations payment.

These principles apply to all property wholly or substantially owned by Allied nationals. In the event of removals of property in which the American as well as the entire Allied interest is less than substantial, the U. S. expects adequate, effective, and prompt compensation.

3. Current Production-While the U. S. does not oppose reparation out of current production of Allied investments, the satellite must provide immediate and adequate compensation to the Allied nationals including sufficient foreign exchange or products so that they can recover reasonable foreign currency expenditures and transfer a reasonable return on their investment. Such compensation must also have equal priority with reparations.

We deem it essential that the satellites not conclude treaties, agreements or arrangements which deny to Allied nationals access, on equal terms, to their trade, raw materials and industry; and appropriately modify any existing arrangements which may have that effect.

(B) Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, July 26, 1945

(1)We—The President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.
(2)The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.
(3)The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.
(4)The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.
(5)Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.
(6)There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.
(7)Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.
(8)The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.
(9)The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.
(10)We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.
(11)Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those [industries] which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.
(12)The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.
(13) We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The "Potsdam Agreement" was the result of the Potsdam Conference which took place from July 17 to Aug. 2, 1945 in Germany's Potsdam. The delegations of the three participating powers were represented by US President Harry S. Truman, the British Prime Minister—before July 26 Winston S. Churchill, after that Clement Attlee—and the Premier of the USSR Joseph V. Stalin. What is shown above as "B) Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender" also became known as "Potsdam Declaration" issued by US President Truman, UK Prime Minister Churchill and ROC Chairman of the Nationalist Government Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石.

Below are the Chinese and Japanese translations for both terms "Potsdam Agreement" and "Potsdam Declaration".

English Chinese Japanese
Potsdam Agreement Pocitan xieding 波茨坦協定 Potsudamu kyōtei ポツダム協定
Potsdam Declaration  Pocitan gonggao 波茨坦公告  Potsudamu sengen ポツダム宣言 

The Chinese translation of the Potsdam Declaration's full text is shown below.

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《波茨坦公告》（1945 年 7 月 26 日）

美、英、中三國政府領袖公告：

（一） 余等：美國總統、中國國民政府主席及英國首相代表余等億萬國民，業經會商，並同意對日本應予以一機會，以結束此次戰事。
（二） 美國、英帝國及中國之龐大陸、海、空部隊，業已增強多倍，其由西方調來之軍隊及空軍，即將予日本以最後之打擊，彼等之武力受所有同盟國之決心之支持及鼓勵，對日作戰，不至其停止抵抗不止。
（三） 德國無效果及無意抵抗全世界激起之自由人之力量，所得之結果，彰彰在前，可為日本人民之殷鑒。此種力量當其對付抵抗之納粹時，不得不將德國人民全體之土地、工業及其生活方式摧殘殆盡。但現在集中對待日本之力量則較之更為龐大，不可衡量。吾等之軍力，加以吾人之堅決意志為後盾，若予以全部實施，必將使日本軍隊完全毀滅，無可逃遁，而日本之本土亦必終歸全部殘毀。
（四） 現時業已到來，日本必須決定一途，其將繼續受其一意孤行計算錯誤，使日本帝國已陷于完全毀滅之境之軍人之統制，即或走向理智之路。
（五） 以下為吾人之條件，吾人決不更改，亦無其他另一方式。猶豫遷延，更為吾人所不容許。
（六） 欺騙及錯誤領導日本人民使其妄欲征服世界者之威權及勢力，必須永久剔除。蓋吾人堅持非將負責之窮兵黷武主義驅出世界，則和平安全及正義之新秩序勢不可能。
（七） 直至如此之新秩序成立時，及直至日本製造戰爭之力量業已毀滅，有確定可信之証據時，日本領土經盟國之指定，必須佔領，俾吾人在此陳述之基本目的得以完成。
（八） 《開羅宣言》之條件必將實施，而日本之主權必將限於本州、北海道、九州、四國及吾人所決定之其他小島之內。
（九） 日本軍隊在完全解除武裝以後，將被允許返其家鄉，得有和平及生產生活之機會。
（十） 吾人無意奴役日本民族或消滅其國家，但對於戰罪人犯，包括虐待吾人俘虜在內，將處以法律之裁判，日本政府必須將阻止日本人民民主趨勢在內之復興及增強之所有障礙予以消除，言論、宗教及思想自由以及對於基本人權之重視必須成立。
（十一）日本將被允許維持其經濟所必需及可以償付貨物賠款之工業，但可以使其重新武裝作戰之工業不在其內。為此目的，可准其獲得原料，以別于統制原料，日本最後參加國際貿易關係當可准許。
（十二）上述目的達到及依據日本人民自由之意志成立一傾向和平及負責之政府后，同盟國佔領軍隊當即撤退。
（十三）吾人通告日本政府立即宣布所有日本武裝部隊無條件投降，並對此種行動誠意實行予以適當之各項保証，除此一途，日本即將迅速完全毀滅。

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Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War (Jewel Voice Broadcast)

TO OUR GOOD AND LOYAL SUBJECTS:

After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure.

We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration.

To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of Our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by Our Imperial Ancestors and which lies close to Our heart.

Indeed, We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement.

But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone — the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people — the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.

Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should We continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.

We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to Our Allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently cooperated with the Empire towards the emancipation of East Asia.

The thought of those officers and men as well as others who have fallen in the fields of battle, those who died at their posts of duty, or those who met with untimely death and all their bereaved families, pains Our heart night and day.

The welfare of the wounded and the war-sufferers, and of those who have lost their homes and livelihood, are the objects of Our profound solicitude.

The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable.

Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial State, We are always with you, Our good and loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity.

Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion which may engender needless complications, or any fraternal contention and strike which may create confusion, lead you astray and cause you to lose the confidence of the world.

Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith in the imperishability of its sacred land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibility, and of the long road before it.

Unite your total strength, to be devoted to construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitude, foster nobility of spirit, and work with resolution — so that you may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State and keep pace with the progress of the world.

Hirohito [signature and official seal]

August 14, 1945

Prime Minister Baron Kantarō Suzuki (signature)

Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa (signature)

Minister of Justice Matsuzaka Hiromasa (signature)

Army Minister Korechika Anami (signature)

Minister of Munitions Toyoda Teijirō (signature)

Minister of Health Okada Tadahiko (signature)

Minister of State Sakurai Hyōgorō (signature)

Minister of State Sakonji Seizō (signature)

Minister of State Simomura Hirosi (signature)

Finance Minister Hirose Toyosaku (signature)

Minister of Education Ōta Kōzō (signature)

Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Ishiguro Tadaatsu (signature)

Interior Minister Abe Genki (signature)

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister for Greater East Asia Tōgō Shigenori (signature)

Minister of State Yasui Tōji (signature)

Minister of Transport Kobiyama Naoto (signature)

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終戰詔書

惟天下之大勢，睹本朝之現狀，欲取非常之措施，收拾時局。茲佈告天下：朕已諭令廷臣通告美、英、支、蘇四國，願受諾其共同宣言。

朕纘承洪緒，錫福生民。曩者，本朝傳檄四方、戰與英美，本求社稷於億萬斯年之舉，兼定東亞安寧平和之意。至如毀別國之宗社、奪領邦之故土，悉非朕意。今征伐已曆四載，雖我將兵驍勇善戰，百官有司勵精圖治，一億眾庶奉公體國，然時局每況愈下，失勢之徵已現。及今，夷軍彈石之殘虐，頻殺無辜，慘害生靈，實難逆料。如若征伐相續，則我生民不存於世，被髮左衽之期重現；如此，則朕何以保全億兆赤子、何面目複見列祖列宗乎？此朕所以敕令廷臣接受聯軍之誥者也。

至若同事業之盟邦，朕遺餘恨也。然念及臣工黔首曝屍於沙場，忠志之士殉國於內外，遺屬之狀慟天，朕五臟為之俱裂。而殘喘之生民，或負戰傷、禍難，或失家業、生計，朕所視之，深為軫念。故日後國朝所受之苦非常，臣民衷情之表勝往；雖時運之所趨，然朕欲忍所難忍、耐所難耐，以開太平于萬世。

朕於茲得護國體，賴爾等忠良之精誠，並與臣民之同在。若夫為情所激、妄滋事端，或同胞相煎、擾亂時局，何至迷途于大道、失信於天下哉？斯之謬誤，朕當深鑒。今誠宜舉國一家，子孫相傳，信神州之不沉，保家國於不滅，念任重而道遠，傾全力於建設，篤守道義，鞏固志操，誓必揚國體之精華，期同步天下之進化。於嚱，咨爾多方，宜悉朕意。

裕仁（簽字蓋章）

昭和二十年八月十四日

內閣總理大臣男爵 鈴木貫太郎（簽字）

海軍大臣 米內光政（簽字）

司法大臣 松阪廣政（簽字）

陸軍大臣 阿南惟幾（簽字）

軍需大臣 豊田貞次郞（簽字）

厚生大臣 岡田忠彥（簽字）

國務大臣 櫻井兵五郞（簽字）

國務大臣 左近司政三（簽字）

國務大臣 下村宏（簽字）

大藏大臣 廣瀨豐作（簽字）

文部大臣 太田耕造（簽字）

農商大臣 石黑忠篤（簽字）

內務大臣 安倍源基（簽字）

外務大臣兼大東亞大臣 東鄕茂德（簽字）

國務大臣 安井藤治（簽字）

運輸大臣 小日山直登（簽字）


🛑 EDITOR'S NOTES ===============

The Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War is called "Daitōa-sensō-shūketsu-no-shōsho" (大東亜戦争終結ノ詔書) in Japanese, abbreviated as "Sensō-no-shōsho" (終戦の詔書). "Jewel Voice Broadcast" in Japanese: Gyokuon-hōsō (玉音放送). It was broadcast in Japan's radio network on Aug. 15, 1945.

A brief timeline of events at the end of WWII concerning the Japanese theater is shown directly below (all dates in the year 1945).

July 16Successful test explosion of an atomic bomb in the desert of New Mexico, US (Project Trinity)
July 26The Allies define the terms for Japan’s surrender in the Potsdam Declaration
Aug. 6The US drop an atomic bomb (uranium-filled gun-type fission weapon nicknamed "Little Boy") on Hiroshima 廣島 (Honshu 本州, Japan), killing more than 70,000
Aug. 7The USSR declares war against Japan
Aug. 9The US drop an atomic bomb (plutonium-filled implosion-type nuclear weapon nicknamed "Fat Man") on Nagasaki 長崎 (Kyushu 九州, Japan), killing more than 60,000
 "The USSR begins its invasion of Japanese-occupied Manchuria (Manchukuo)
Aug. 15Japan’s Emperor Hirohito proclaims that Japan accepts the terms in the Potsdam Declaration
Aug. 17The Joint Chiefs of Staff issue the General Order No. 1
Sept. 2Japan’s First Instrument of Surrender is signed at Tokyo Bay
Sept. 9The Act of Surrender is signed by military officials of Japan and the ROC in Nanjing
Oct. 25Official retrocession of Taiwan and Penghu to China with a formal transfer ceremony in Taipei

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General Order No. 1

J.C.S. 1467/2

17 August 1945

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

INSTRUMENTS FOR THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN

GENERAL ORDER NO. 1

Note by the Secretaries

General order No. 1 (Enclosure), as approved by the President for issue by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters by direction of the Emperor, is circulated for information.

The President approved it with the understanding that it is subject to change both by further instructions issued through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by changes in matters of detail made by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the light of the operational situation as known by him.

ENCLOSURE (GENERAL ORDER NO. 1) SWNCC21/8

General Order No. 1

MILITARY AND NAVAL

1. The Imperial General Headquarters by direction of the Emperor, and pursuant to the surrender to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of all Japanese armed forces by the Emperor, hereby orders all of its commanders in Japan and abroad to cause the Japanese armed forces and Japanese-controlled forces under their command to cease hostilities at once, to lay down their arms, to remain in their present locations and to surrender unconditionally to commanders acting on behalf of the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as indicated hereafter or as may be further directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Immediate contact will be made with the indicated commanders, or their designated representatives, subject to any changes in detail prescribed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and their instructions will be completely and immediately carried out.

a. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa and French Indo-China north of 16 north latitude shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

b. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 38 north latitude and Karafuto shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.

c. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the Andamans, Nicobars, Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China south of 16 degrees north latitude, Malaya, Borneo, Netherlands Indies, New Guinea, Bismarcks and the Solomons, shall surrender to (the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Command or the Commanding General, Australian Forces—the exact breakdown between Mountbatten and the Australians to be arranged between them and the details of this paragraph then prepared by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers).

d. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the Japanese Mandated Islands, Ryukyus, Bonins, and other Pacific Islands shall surrender to the Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet.

e. The Imperial General Headquarters, its senior commanders, and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the main islands of Japan, minor islands adjacent thereto, Korea south of 38 north latitude, and the Philippines shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific.

f. The above indicated commanders are the only representatives of the Allied Powers empowered to accept surrenders and all surrenders of Japanese Forces shall be made only to them or to their representatives.

The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters further orders its commanders in Japan and abroad to disarm completely all forces of Japan or under Japanese control, wherever they may be situated and to deliver intact and in safe and good condition all weapons and equipment at such time and at such places as may be prescribed by the Allied Commanders indicated above. (Pending further instructions, the Japanese police force in the main islands of Japan will be exempt from this disarmament provision. The police force will remain at their posts and shall be held responsible for the preservation of law and order. The strength and arms of such a police force will be prescribed.)

2. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt of this order, complete information with respect to Japan and all areas under Japanese control as follows:

(a) Lists of all land, air and anti-aircraft units showing locations and strengths in officers and men.

(b) Lists of all aircraft, military, naval and civil giving complete information as to the number, type, location and condition of such aircraft.

(c) Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine and auxiliary naval craft in or out of commission and under construction giving their position, condition and movement.

(d) Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled merchant ships of over100 gross tons, in or out of commission and under construction, including merchant ships formerly belonging to any of the United Nations which are now in Japanese hands, giving their position con dition and movement.

(e) Complete and detailed information, accompanied by maps, showing location and layouts of all mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air and the safety lanes in connection therewith.

(f) Locations and descriptions of all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, anti-aircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas.

(g) Locations of all camps and other places of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees.

3. Japanese armed forces and civil aviation authorities will insure that all Japanese military, naval and civil aircraft remain on the ground on the water or abroad ship until further notification of the disposition to be made of them.

4. Japanese or Japanese-controlled naval or merchant vessels of all types will be maintained without damage and will undertake no movement pending instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Vessels at sea will immediately render harmless and throw overbroad explosives of all types. Vessels not at sea will immediately remove explosives of all types to safe storage ashore.

5. Responsible Japanese or Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities will insure that:

a. All Japanese mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea and air, wherever located, be removed according to instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

b. All aids to navigation be reestablished at once.

c. All safety lanes be kept open and clearly marked pending accomplishment of a. above.

6. Responsible Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities will hold intact and in good condition pending further instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the following:

a. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war material (except as specifically prescribed in Section 4 of this order).

b. All land, water and air transportation and communication facilities and equipment.

c. All military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, anti-aircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments.

d. All factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions designed or intended to produce or facilitate the production or use of all implements of war and other material and property used by or intended for use by any military or paramilitary organizations in connection with their operations.

7. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt of this order, complete lists of all the items specified in paragraph a, b and d of Section 6 above, indicating the numbers, types and locations of each.

8. The manufacture and distribution of all arms, ammunition and implements of war will cease forthwith.

9. With respect to United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of Japanese or Japanese-controlled authorities:

a. The safety and well-being of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees will be scrupulously preserved to include the administrative and supply services essential to provide adequate food shelter, clothing and medical care until such responsibility is undertaken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers;

b. Each camp or other place of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees together with nits equipment, stores, records, arms and ammunition will be delivered immediately to the command of the senior officer or designated representative of the prisoner of war and civilian internees;

c. As directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, prisoners of war and civilian internees will be transported to places of safety where they can be accepted by allied authorities;

d. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters will furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of the receipt of this order, complete lists of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees, indicating their location.

10. All Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities shall aid and assist the occupation of Japan and Japanese-controlled areas by forces of the Allied Powers.

11. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and appropriate Japanese officials shall be prepared on instructions from Allied occupation commanders to collect and deliver all arms in the possession of the Japanese civilian population.

12. This and all subsequent instructions issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or other allied military authorities will be scrupulously and promptly obeyed by Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil officials and private persons. Any delay or failure to comply with the provisions of this or subsequent orders and any action which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers determines to be detrimental to the Allied Powers, will incur drastic and summary punishment at the hands of allied military authorities and the Japanese Government.

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一般命令第一號

一、 日本帝國大本營遵奉日本天皇之指示，下令「所有日本軍隊」向盟軍最高統帥（麥克阿瑟元帥）投降。茲令所有日本帝國內外之司令官，使在其指揮之下之日本軍隊以及日本管制之軍隊，立刻停止戰鬥行為、放下武器、駐在其現時所在之地點，並向代表美國、中國、英國、蘇聯之司令官，如下列指定或如盟軍最高統帥所追加指定者，無條件投降。應立即連繫指定之司令官或其指定之代表，並接受盟軍最高統帥對於詳細規定的指示變更，各司令官及其代表之命令應馬上完全地執行。

甲、 在中國（滿洲除外）、台灣及北緯十六度以北之法屬印度支那境內的日軍高階司令官及所有陸、海、空軍及輔助部隊應向蔣介石統帥投降。

乙、 在滿洲、北緯三十八度以北之朝鮮半島部份及庫頁島境內之日軍高階司令官及所有陸、海、空軍及輔助部隊應向遠東蘇軍總司令官投降。

丙、 在安達曼群島、尼科巴群島、緬甸、泰國、北緯十六度以南之法屬印度支那、馬來亞、婆羅洲、荷屬印度、新幾內亞、俾斯麥群島及所罗门群岛境內之日軍高階司令官及所有陸、海、空軍及輔助部隊應向東南亞盟軍司令部最高統帥或澳大利亞軍隊之司令官投降，蒙巴頓與澳軍之確實劃分，由其自行商定後，再由盟軍最高統帥對於此節詳細規定。

丁、 在日本委任統治各島、琉球群島、小笠原群島及其他太平洋島嶼之日軍高階司令官及所有陸、海、空軍及輔助部隊應向美國太平洋艦隊總司令投降。

戊、 日本帝國大本營在日本主要島嶼、附近各小島、北緯三十八度以南之朝鮮半島及菲律賓之日軍高階司令官及所有陸、海、空軍及輔助部隊應向美國太平洋艦隊陸軍總司令投降。

己、 上述各指定司令官為唯一授權接受投降之同盟國代表，所有日本軍隊應只向彼等或其代表投降。

日本帝國大本營且命令其在日本及國外之各司令官，將日軍部隊及在日本策劃下之部隊，無論在何地點完全解除武器，並在同盟國司令官所指定之時間及地點，將所有武器及裝備完整與安全的繳出（在日本本土之日本警察，在另有命令以前，得免受此項解除武裝之規定。警察部隊各留崗位，並應負責維持法律與秩序。此類警察部隊之人數及武裝另行規定之）。

二、 日本帝國大本營應在收到此命令（若干日）內，以關於日本及在日本管制下各地區之全部情報供給盟軍最高統帥，如下：

甲、 關於一切陸上、空中及防空單位之明細表，說明此類官佐士兵之地點與人數。

乙、 所有陸軍、海軍和民用飛機之數量、型式、位置及狀態的完整資料明細表。

丙、 日本帝國及日本帝國控制下之所有海軍艦艇明細表，如水上及潛艇和輔導海軍艦艇，無論其係服役中、非服役中或建造中，均須提出其位置、狀態和航行資料。

丁、 日本帝國及日本帝國控制下總噸數超過一百噸之商船明細表（包括以往曾屬於同盟國，但現為日本帝國權力範圍內者），無論其係服役中、非服役中或建造中，均須提出其位置、狀態和航行資料。

戊、 現出所有地雷、水雷及其他對陸、海、空造成行動障礙之障礙物的位置與佈局，以及與上述相關之安全通道的完整、詳細且附有地圖之資料。

己、 包含機場、水上飛機基地、防空設施、港口及海軍基地、油庫、常設與臨時的陸上及海岸防禦碉堡、要塞及其他設防區在內之所有軍事設施和建築之位置及說明。

庚、 所有同盟國俘虜及被拘留平民之收容所或其他拘留場所的位置。

三、 在接獲進一步部署的通知之前，日軍及民間航空當局之一切日本帝國陸、海軍及民用航空機，須確實停留於其所在之陸上、海上及艦上之定點。

四、 在接獲盟軍最高統帥指示之前，日本帝國或日本帝國控制下之所有型式的海軍艦艇或商船，須毫無損傷地加以保存且不得加以移動。至於航海中之船舶須立即放下武器使其無害，並將所有種類之爆炸物拋入海中，而非航海中之船舶則須立即將所有種類之爆炸物移至岸上安全貯藏處所。

五、 日本帝國及日本帝國控制下負有責任之軍事政府及民間政府，須確實執行下列事項：

甲、 所有日本帝國內埋藏地雷、水雷及其他對陸、海、空行動之障礙物，無其位於任何地點，均須依盟軍最高統帥之指示予以去除。

乙、 立即修復所有便於航海之設施。

丙、 在前項實施完成之前，須開放且明白標示所有安全通路。

六、 日本帝國及日本帝國控制下負有責任之軍事政府及民間政府，在接獲盟軍最高統帥進一步指示之前，應將下列事物保持原狀且儘量維持良好狀態。

甲、 所有種類之武器、彈藥、爆炸物、軍用裝備、貯藏品、軍需品、軍用器材，及一切軍用物資（除本命令第四項之特別規定外）。

乙、 所有陸上、水上及空中運輸和通訊設施與設備。

丙、 所有機場、水上飛機基地、防空設施、港口及海軍基地、油庫、常設與臨時的陸上及海岸防禦碉堡，要塞及其他設防區，包含所有這些防禦設施、軍事設施和建築之圖面。

丁、 所有工廠、製造場所、工作場所、研究所、實驗所、試驗所、技術數據、專利、設計、圖面及發明，以用來設計或意圖製造、或促成生產，做為提供任何軍事機關或準軍事組織運作所使用的，或意圖使用的所有軍用器材與其他物資，及做為物業用途。

七、 日本帝國大本營於接獲本命令後，應毫無延遲就上面第六項甲、乙、丁中指定之所有項目，將其關於各自數量、型式及位置之完整明細表，提供給盟軍最高統帥。

八、 所有兵器、彈藥及軍用器材之製造及分配應立即終止。

九、 關於日本帝國或日本帝國控制下之政權掌握之同盟國俘虜及被拘留平民：

甲、 須嚴謹的維持所有同盟國俘虜及被拘留平民之安全及福祉，至盟軍最高統帥接替其責任為止，須提供包括充足的食物、住所、服裝及醫療在內之必要的管理及補給業務。

乙、 應立即將同盟國俘虜及被拘留平民所在之收容所及其他拘留所之設備、貯藏品、記錄、武器及彈藥，移交給俘虜及被拘留平民裡面的高階軍官或指定之代表，並置於其指揮之下。

丙、 依盟軍最高統帥所指示之地點，將俘虜及被拘留平民運送至同盟國當局能交接之安全處所。

丁、 日本帝國大本營於接獲本命令之後，應毫無延遲地將所有同盟國俘虜及被拘留平民所在地點之明細表，提供給盟軍最高統帥。

十、 所有日本帝國及日本帝國統治下之軍事政府及民間政府，應協助同盟國軍隊佔領日本帝國及日本帝國統治地域。

十一、 日本帝國大本營及日本帝國軍官應做成準備，在同盟國佔領軍司令官有所指示之際，收集且移交一般日本帝國國民所有之一切武器。

十二、 日本帝國及日本帝國統治下之軍部、行政官員及無官職人員，應嚴格且迅速服從本命令及爾後盟軍最高統帥或其他同盟國軍事當局所發出之一切指示，若有遲延或不遵守本命令和爾後任何命令之規定者，以及被盟軍最高統帥認定為係對同盟國有害之行為時，同盟國軍事當局及日本帝國政府將立即加以嚴懲。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

General Order No. 1 was General Douglas MacArthur's first order to the forces of the Empire of Japan following the surrender of Japan, and its final form was approved by US President Harry S. Truman on Aug. 17, 1945. It instructed Japanese forces to surrender to designated Allied commanders, reveal all current military deployments, and preserve military equipment for later disarmament. General Order No. 1 became known to the world when it was announced at the Japanese Surrender Ceremony on Sept. 2, 1945, being issued by Japan's Imperial General Headquarters that day. Please note that this document is also often referred to as "SCAP General Order No. 1", SCAP standing for "Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers" or "Supreme Command of Allies in the Pacific" (in Chinese: zhu Ri mengjun zongsiling 駐日盟軍總司令, in Japanese: rengō kokugun saikō shireikan sōshireibu 連合国軍最高司令官総司令部). Some sources use the heading "Surrender Order of the Imperial General Headquarters of Japan".

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Japan's First Instrument of Surrender

We, acting by command of and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions set forth in the declaration issued by the Heads of the Governments of the United States, China, and Great Britain on 26 July 1945 at Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which four powers are hereafter referred to as the Allied Powers.

We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese armed forces and all armed forces under the Japanese control wherever situated.

We hereby command all Japanese forces wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilites forthwith, to preserve and save from damage all ships, aircraft, and military and civil property and to comply with all requirements which my be imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by agencies of the Japanese Government at his direction.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Headquarters to issue at once orders to the Commanders of all Japanese forces and all forces under Japanese control wherever situated to surrender un- conditionally themselves and all forces under their control.

We hereby command all civil, military and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, and orders and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority and we direct all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their non-combatant duties unless specifically relieved by him or under his authority.

We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever actions may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Poers or by any other designated representative of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that Declaration.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to liberate all allied prisoners of war and civilian internees now under Japanese control and to provide for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to places as directed.

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender.

Signed at TOKYO BAY, JAPAN at 0904 I on the SECOND day of SEPTEMBER, 1945

Mamoru Shiegemitsu (By Command and on Behalf of the Emperor of Japan and the Japanese Government)

Yoshijiro Umezu (By Command and on Behalf of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters)

Accepted at TOKYO BAY, JAPAN at 0903 I on the SECOND day of SEPTEMBER, 1945, for the United States, Republic of China, United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and in the interests of the other United Nations at war with Japan.

Douglas MacArthur (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers)

C. W. Nimitz (United States Representative)

Hsu Yung-ch'ang (Republic of China Representative)

Bruce Fraser (United Kingdom Representative)

Kuzma Derevyanko (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Representative)

Thomas Blamey (Commonwealth of Australia Representative)

L. Moore Cosgrave (Dominion of Canada Representative)

Jacques LeClerc (Provisional Government of the French Republic Representative)

C. E. L. Helfrich (Kingdom of the Netherlands Representative)

Leonard M. Isitt (Dominion of New Zealand Representative)

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日本投降書

餘等茲對合衆國、中華民國及大不列顛帝國，各國政府首腦于1945年7月26日於波茨坦宣佈，爾後由蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯邦之參加宣言條款，並根據日本國政府、天皇及日本帝國大本營之命令代表受諾之；右述四國以後稱之爲聯合國。

餘等此佈告，無論日本帝國、大本營及任何地方所有之日本國軍隊與日本國所支配下之一切軍隊，悉對聯合國無條件投降。

餘等茲命令任何地方之一切日本國軍隊及日本國臣民，即刻停止敵對行為，保存所有船舶及軍用財產，且防止損毀，並服從聯合國最高司令官及其指示，對日本國政府之各機關所課之一切要求應予以應諾。

餘等此命令日本帝國大本營，對於任何地方之一切日本國軍隊，及由日本國支配下之一切軍隊指揮官，速即發佈其本身或其支配下之一切軍隊無條件投降之命令。

餘等茲對所有官廳、陸軍及海軍之職員，命令其遵守且施行聯合國最高司令官為實施此投降之檔,認為適當而由其自己發出或根據其委任發出之一切佈告及指示,且命令右開職員除由聯合國最高司令官，或根據其事務委任與解除其任務以外均須留於各自原有地位，且仍繼續行使各個之非戰鬥任務。

余等茲為天皇、日本國政府及其繼續者，承約切實履行波茨坦宣言之條款，發佈為實施該宣言之聯合國最高司令官及其他特派聯合國代表要求之一切命令，且實施一切措置。

餘等茲對日本國政府及日本帝國大本營命令，即速解放現由日本國支配下,所有聯合國俘虜及被拘留者，且執行對彼等之保護，津貼給養及對指定地點迅速運輸等措置。

天皇及日本國政府統治國家之權，限置於為實施投降條款採用認為適當措置之聯合國最高司令官之限制下。

1945年9月2日午前9時4分于東京灣密蘇裏號艦上簽字之，並根據大日本帝國天皇陛下及日本國政府之命令且以其名義。

根據日本帝國大本營之命令且以其名義 重光葵

梅津美治郎

1945年9月2日午前9時4分於東京灣爲合衆國、中華民國、聯合王國及蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯邦及與日本國存在戰爭狀態之其他聯合國之利益受諾之。

聯合國最高司令官　 道格拉斯 • 麥克阿瑟 元帥

合衆國代表　 尼米茲 元帥

中華民國代表　 徐永昌 上將

聯合王國代表　 福拉塞 上將

蘇維埃社會主義共和國代表　 狄裏夫揚柯 中將

澳大利亞聯邦代表　 布萊梅

加拿大代表　 哥斯格洛夫

法蘭西代表　 萊克勒

荷蘭代表　 赫夫裏區

新西蘭代表　 依西特

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

In Japanese, this document is called "Nipponno kōfuku bunsho" (日本の降伏文書).

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Act of Surrender

1. The Emperor of Japan, the Japanese government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, having recognized the complete military defeat of the Japanese military forces by the Allied forces and having surrendered unconditionally to the Supreme Commander for the Allied powers.

2. The Supreme Commander for the Allied powers directed by his General Order No. 1 that the senior commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces of Japan within China excluding Manchuria, Formosa and French Indo-China north of 16 degrees north latitude shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

3. We, the Japanese Commanders of all Japanese forces and auxiliaries in the areas named above, also recognizing the complete military defeat of the Japanese military forces by the Allied forces, hereby surrender unconditionally all of the forces under our command to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

4. All the Japanese forces hereby surrendered will cease hostilities and will remain at the stations they now occupy. They are now non-combatant troops and in due course will be demobilized.

5. They will assemble, preserve without damage, and turn over to the forces specified by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, all arms, ammunition, equipment, supplies, records, information and other assets of any kind belonging to the Japanese forces. Pending specific instructions, all Japanese aircraft, naval units, and merchant ships in the areas named above will be held without damage where they are at present located.

6. All the Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees now under Japanese control in the areas named above will be liberated at once and the Japanese forces will provide protection, care, maintenance, and transportation to places as directed.

7. Henceforth, all the Japanese forces, hereby surrendered, will be subject to the control of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Their movements and activities will be dictated by him, and they will obey only the orders and proclamations issued, or authorised, by him, or the orders of their Japanese commanders based upon his instructions.

8. This act of surrender and all subsequent orders and proclamations of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to the surrender forces will be issued at once to the appropriate subordinate commanders and forces and it will be the responsibility of all Japanese commanders and forces to see that such proclamations and orders are immediately and completely complied with.

9. For any failure or delay, by any member of the forces surrendered hereby to act in accordance with this act of surrender or future orders or proclamations of the Generalissimo, he will summarily and drastically punish both the violator and his responsible commanders.

Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, Signatory under orders of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and Commander of the Japanese Forces in Central China. (Signature and official seal)

Signed at 9.00 a.m. on Sept. 9 in the 20th year of Showa (1945 AD) in Nanjing, Republic of China.

The Representative of the Republic of China, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the other Allied Forces at war with Japan, accepted this act of surrender at 9.00 a.m. on Sept. 9 in the 34th year of the Republic of China (1945 AD) in Nanjing, Republic of China.

Army General Ho Ying-chen, Special Envoy of Supreme Commander in the China Theatre Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Army. (Signature and official seal)

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降書

一、日本帝國政府及日本帝國大本營已向聯合國最高統帥無條件投降。

二、聯合國最高統帥第一號命令規定在「中華民國（東三省除外）臺灣與越南北緯十六度以北地區內之日本全部陸、海、空軍與輔助部隊應向蔣委員長投降」。

三、吾等在上述區域內之全部日本陸海空軍及輔助部隊之將領，願率領所屬部隊，向蔣委員長無條件投降。

四、本官當立即命令所有上第二款所述區域內之全部日本陸、海、空各級指揮官，及其所屬部隊與所控制之部隊，向蔣委員長特派受降代表中國戰區中國陸軍總司令何應欽上將及何應欽上將指定之各地區受降主官投降。

五、投降之全部日本陸、海、空軍立即停止敵對行動，暫留原地待命，所有武器、彈藥、裝具、器材、補給品、情報資料、地圖、文獻檔案及其他一切資產等，當暫時保管。所有航空器及飛機場一切設備，艦艇、船舶、車輛、碼頭、工廠、倉庫及一切建築物，以及現在上第二款所述地區內日本陸、海、空軍或其控制之部隊所有或所控制之軍用或民用財產，亦均保持完整，全部待繳於蔣委員長及其代表何應欽上將所指定之部隊及政府機關代表接收。

六、上第二款所述區域內日本陸、海、空軍所俘聯合國戰俘及拘留之人民，立予釋放，並保護送至指定地點。

七、自此以後，所有上第二款所述區域內之日本陸、海、空軍當即服從蔣委員長之節制，並接受蔣委員長及其代表何應欽上將所頒發之命令。

八、本官對本降書所列各款及蔣委員長與其代表何應欽上將以後對投降日軍所頒發之命令，當立即對各級軍官及士兵轉達遵照，上第二款所述地區之所有日本軍官佐士兵，均須負完全履行此項命令之責。

九、投降之日本陸、海、空軍任何人員，對於本降書所列各款及蔣委員長與其代表何應欽上將嗣後所授之命令，倘有未能履行或遲延情事，各級負責官長及違反命令者願受懲罰。

奉日本帝國政府及日本帝國大本營命簽字人中國派遣軍總司令官陸軍大將 岡村寧次（簽字蓋章）

昭和二十年（公曆一九四五年）九月九日午前九時零分簽字於中華民國南京。

代表中華民國、美利堅合眾國，大不列顛聯合王國、蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯邦，並為對日本作戰之其他聯合國之利益，接受本降書於中華民國三十四年（公曆一九四五年）九月九日午前九時零分簽字於中華民國南京。

中國戰區最高統帥特級上將蔣中正特派代表中國陸軍總司令陸軍一級上將 何應欽（簽字蓋章）

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Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction No. 677

Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS of Supreme Commander for Allied Powers
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

APO 500
20 January 1946
AG 091 (29 Jan 46) GS
(SCAPIN - 677)

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.
THROUGH: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.
SUBJECT: Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan.

1. The Imperial Japanese Government is directed to cease exercising, or attempting to exercise, governmental or administrative authority over any area outside of Japan, or over any government officials and employees or any other persons within such areas.

2. Except as authorized by this Headquarters, the Imperial Japanese Government will not communicate with government officials and employees or with any other persons outside of Japan for any purpose other than the routine operation of authorized shipping, communications and weather services.

3. For the purpose of this directive, Japan is defined to include the four main islands of Japan (Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku) and the approximately 1,000 smaller adjacent islands, including the Tsushima Islands and the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands north of 30° North Latitude (excluding Kuchinoshima Island); and excluding (a) Utsuryo (Ullung) Island, Liancourt Rocks (Take Island) and Quelpart (Saishu or Cheju) Island, (b) the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands south of 30° North Latitude (including Kuchinoshima Island), the Izu, Nanpo, Bonin (Ogasawara) and Volcano (Kazan or Iwo) Island Groups, and all the other outlying Pacific Islands [including the Daito (Ohigashi or Oagari) Island Group, and Parece Vela (Okino-tori), Marcus (Minami-tori) and Ganges (Nakano-tori) Islands], and (c) the Kurile (Chishima) Islands, the Habomai (Hapomaze) Island Group (including Suisho, Yuri, Akiyuri, Shibotsu and Taraku Islands) and Shikotan Island.

4. Further areas specifically excluded from the governmental and administrative jurisdiction of the Imperial Japanese Government are the following: (a) all Pacific Islands seized or occupied under mandate or otherwise by Japan since the beginning of the World War in 1914, (b) Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, (c) Korea, and (d) Karafuto.

5. The definition of Japan contained in this directive shall also apply to all future directives, memoranda and orders from this Headquarters unless otherwise specified therein.

6. Nothing in this directive shall be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate determination of the minor islands referred to in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration.

7. The Imperial Japanese Government will prepare and submit to this Headquarters a report of all governmental agencies in Japan the functions of which pertain to areas outside a statement as defined in this directive. Such report will include a statement of the functions, organization and personnel of each of the agencies concerned.

8. All records of the agencies referred to in paragraph 7 above will be preserved and kept available for inspection by this Headquarters.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER: H. W. Allen
Colonel, AGD.
Asst. Adjutant General

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San Francisco Peace Treaty

Signed at San Francisco, 8 September 1951

Initial entry into force: 28 April 1952

Treaty of Peace with Japan

WHEREAS the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those of nations which, as sovereign equals, cooperate in friendly association to promote their common welfare and to maintain international peace and security, and are therefore desirous of concluding a Treaty of Peace which will settle questions still outstanding as a result of the existence of a state of war between them;

WHEREAS Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations and in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; to strive to realize the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to seek to create within Japan conditions of stability and well-being as defined in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by post-surrender Japanese legislation; and in public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair practices;

WHEREAS the Allied Powers welcome the intentions of Japan set out in the foregoing paragraph;

THE ALLIED POWERS AND JAPAN have therefore determined to conclude the present Treaty of Peace, and have accordingly appointed the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, who, after presentation of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

CHAPTER I———PEACE

Article 1

(a) The state of war between Japan and each of the Allied Powers is terminated as from the date on which the present Treaty comes into force between Japan and the Allied Power concerned as provided for in Article 23.

(b) The Allied Powers recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters.

CHAPTER II———TERRITORY

Article 2

(a) Japan recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.

(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.

(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.

(d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations Mandate System, and accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of 2 April 1947, extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan.

(e) Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals or otherwise.

(f) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.

Article 3

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 deg. north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

Article 4

(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this Article, the disposition of property of Japan and of its nationals in the areas referred to in Article 2, and their claims, including debts, against the authorities presently administering such areas and the residents (including juridical persons) thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and residents, and of claims, including debts, of such authorities and residents against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and such authorities. The property of any of the Allied Powers or its nationals in the areas referred to in Article 2 shall, insofar as this has not already been done, be returned by the administering authority in the condition in which it now exists. (The term nationals whenever used in the present Treaty includes juridical persons.)

(b) Japan recognizes the validity of dispositions of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to directives of the United States Military Government in any of the areas referred to in Articles 2 and 3.

(c) Japanese owned submarine cables connection Japan with territory removed from Japanese control pursuant to the present Treaty shall be equally divided, Japan retaining the Japanese terminal and adjoining half of the cable, and the detached territory the remainder of the cable and connecting terminal facilities.

CHAPTER III———SECURITY

Article 5

(a) Japan accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular the obligations

(i) to settle its international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

(ii) to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;

(iii) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action.

(b) The Allied Powers confirm that they will be guided by the principles of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations in their relations with Japan.

(c) The Allied Powers for their part recognize that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements.

Article 6

(a) All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty, and in any case not later than 90 days thereafter. Nothing in this provision shall, however, prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which have been or may be made between one or more of the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other.

(b) The provisions of Article 9 of the Potsdam Proclamation of 26 July 1945, dealing with the return of Japanese military forces to their homes, to the extent not already completed, will be carried out.

(c) All Japanese property for which compensation has not already been paid, which was supplied for the use of the occupation forces and which remains in the possession of those forces at the time of the coming into force of the present Treaty, shall be returned to the Japanese Government within the same 90 days unless other arrangements are made by mutual agreement.

CHAPTER IV———POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CLAUSES

Article 7

(a) Each of the Allied Powers, within one year after the present Treaty has come into force between it and Japan, will notify Japan which of its prewar bilateral treaties or conventions with Japan it wishes to continue in force or revive, and any treaties or conventions so notified shall continue in force or by revived subject only to such amendments as may be necessary to ensure conformity with the present Treaty. The treaties and conventions so notified shall be considered as having been continued in force or revived three months after the date of notification and shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. All such treaties and conventions as to which Japan is not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated.

(b) Any notification made under paragraph (a) of this Article may except from the operation or revival of a treaty or convention any territory for the international relations of which the notifying Power is responsible, until three months after the date on which notice is given to Japan that such exception shall cease to apply.

Article 8

(a) Japan will recognize the full force of all treaties now or hereafter concluded by the Allied Powers for terminating the state of war initiated on 1 September 1939, as well as any other arrangements by the Allied Powers for or in connection with the restoration of peace. Japan also accepts the arrangements made for terminating the former League of Nations and Permanent Court of International Justice.

(b) Japan renounces all such rights and interests as it may derive from being a signatory power of the Conventions of St. Germain-en-Laye of 10 September 1919, and the Straits Agreement of Montreux of 20 July 1936, and from Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923.

(c) Japan renounces all rights, title and interests acquired under, and is discharged from all obligations resulting from, the Agreement between Germany and the Creditor Powers of 20 January 1930 and its Annexes, including the Trust Agreement, dated 17 May 1930, the Convention of 20 January 1930, respecting the Bank for International Settlements; and the Statutes of the Bank for International Settlements. Japan will notify to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris within six months of the first coming into force of the present Treaty its renunciation of the rights, title and interests referred to in this paragraph.

Article 9

Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas.

Article 10

Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China, including all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on 7 September 1901, and all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto, and agrees to the abrogation in respect to Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes and documents.

Article 11

Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan, and will carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan. The power to grant clemency, to reduce sentences and to parole with respect to such prisoners may not be exercised except on the decision of the Government or Governments which imposed the sentence in each instance, and on recommendation of Japan. In the case of persons sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, such power may not be exercised except on the decision of a majority of the Governments represented on the Tribunal, and on the recommendation of Japan.

Article 12

(a) Japan declares its readiness promptly to enter into negotiations for the conclusion with each of the Allied Powers of treaties or agreements to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis.

(b) Pending the conclusion of the relevant treaty or agreement, Japan will, during a period of four years from the first coming into force of the present Treaty

(1) accord to each of the Allied Powers, its nationals, products and vessels

(i) most-favoured-nation treatment with respect to customs duties, charges, restrictions and other regulations on or in connection with the importation and exportation of goods;

(ii) national treatment with respect to shipping, navigation and imported goods, and with respect to natural and juridical persons and their interests — such treatment to include all matters pertaining to the levying and collection of taxes, access to the courts, the making and performance of contracts, rights to property (tangible and intangible), participating in juridical entities constituted under Japanese law, and generally the conduct of all kinds of business and professional activities;

(2) ensure that external purchases and sales of Japanese state trading enterprises shall be based solely on commercial considerations.

(c) In respect to any matter, however, Japan shall be obliged to accord to an Allied Power national treatment, or most-favored-nation treatment, only to the extent that the Allied Power concerned accords Japan national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment, as the case may be, in respect of the same matter. The reciprocity envisaged in the foregoing sentence shall be determined, in the case of products, vessels and juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, any non-metropolitan territory of an Allied Power, and in the case of juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, any state or province of an Allied Power having a federal government, by reference to the treatment accorded to Japan in such territory, state or province.

(d) In the application of this Article, a discriminatory measure shall not be considered to derogate from the grant of national or most-favored-nation treatment, as the case may be, if such measure is based on an exception customarily provided for in the commercial treaties of the party applying it, or on the need to safeguard that party's external financial position or balance of payments (except in respect to shiping and navigation), or on the need to maintain its essential security interests, and provided such measure is proportionate to the circumstances and not applied in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.

(e) Japan's obligations under this Article shall not be affected by the exercise of any Allied rights under Article 14 of the present Treaty; nor shall the provisions of this Article be understood as limiting the undertakings assumed by Japan by virtue of Article 15 of the Treaty.

Article 13

(a) Japan will enter into negotiations with any of the Allied Powers, promptly upon the request of such Power or Powers, for the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements relating to international civil air transport.

(b) Pending the conclusion of such agreement or agreements, Japan will, during a period of four years from the first coming into force of the present Treaty, extend to such Power treatment not less favorable with respect to air-traffic rights and privileges than those exercised by any such Powers at the date of such coming into force, and will accord complete equality of opportunity in respect to the operation and development of air services.

(c) Pending its becoming a party to the Convention on International Civil Aviation in accordance with Article 93 thereof, Japan will give effect to the provisions of that Convention applicable to the international navigation of aircraft, and will give effect to the standards, practices and procedures adopted as annexes to the Convention in accordance with the terms of the Convention.

CHAPTER V———CLAIMS AND PROPERTY

Article 14

(a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the same time meet its other obligations.

Therefore,

1. Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question. Such arrangements shall avoid the imposition of additional liabilities on other Allied Powers, and, where the manufacturing of raw materials is called for, they shall be supplied by the Allied Powers in question, so as not to throw any foreign exchange burden upon Japan.

2. (I) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (II) below, each of the Allied Powers shall have the right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of all property, rights and interests of

(a) Japan and Japanese nationals,

(b) persons acting for or on behalf of Japan or Japanese nationals, and

(c) entities owned or controlled by Japan or Japanese nationals,

which on the first coming into force of the present Treaty were subject to its jurisdiction. The property, rights and interests specified in this subparagraph shall include those now blocked, vested or in the possession or under the control of enemy property authorities of Allied Powers, which belong to, or were held or managed on behalf of, any of the persons or entities mentioned in (a), (b) or (c) above at the time such assets came under the controls of such authorities.

(II) The following shall be excepted from the right specified in subparagraph (I) above:

(i) property of Japanese natural persons who during the war resided with the permission of the Government concerned in the territory of one of the Allied Powers, other than territory occupied by Japan, except property subjected to restrictions during the war and not released from such restrictions as of the date of the first coming into force of the present Treaty;

(ii) all real property, furniture and fixtures owned by the Government of Japan and used for diplomatic or consular purposes, and all personal furniture and furnishings and other private property not of an investment nature which was normally necessary for the carrying out of diplomatic and consular functions, owned by Japanese diplomatic and consular personnel;

(iii) property belonging to religious bodies or private charitable institutions and used exclusively for religious or charitable purposes;

(iv) property, rights and interests which have come within its jurisdiction in consequence of the resumption of trade and financial relations subsequent to 2 September 1945, between the country concerned and Japan, except such as have resulted from transactions contrary to the laws of the Allied Power concerned;

(v) obligations of Japan or Japanese nationals, any right, title or interest in tangible property located in Japan, interests in enterprises organized under the laws of Japan, or any paper evidence thereof; provided that this exception shall only apply to obligations of Japan and its nationals expressed in Japanese currency.

(III) Property referred to in exceptions (i) through (v) above shall be returned subject to reasonable expenses for its preservation and administration. If any such property has been liquidated the proceeds shall be returned instead.

(IV) The right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of property as provided in subparagraph (I) above shall be exercised in accordance with the laws of the Allied Power concerned, and the owner shall have only such rights as may be given him by those laws.

(V) The Allied Powers agree to deal with Japanese trademarks and literary and artistic property rights on a basis as favorable to Japan as circumstances ruling in each country will permit.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.

Article 15

(a) Upon application made within nine months of the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned, Japan will, within six months of the date of such application, return the property, tangible and intangible, and all rights or interests of any kind in Japan of each Allied Power and its nationals which was within Japan at any time between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945, unless the owner has freely disposed thereof without duress or fraud. Such property shall be returned free of all encumbrances and charges to which it may have become subject because of the war, and without any charges for its return. Property whose return is not applied for by or on behalf of the owner or by his Government within the prescribed period may be disposed of by the Japanese Government as it may determine. In cases where such property was within Japan on 7 December 1941, and cannot be returned or has suffered injury or damage as a result of the war, compensation will be made on terms not less favorable than the terms provided in the draft Allied Powers Property Compensation Law approved by the Japanese Cabinet on 13 July 1951.

(b) With respect to industrial property rights impaired during the war, Japan will continue to accord to the Allied Powers and their nationals benefits no less than those heretofore accorded by Cabinet Orders No. 309 effective 1 September 1949, No. 12 effective 28 January 1950, and No. 9 effective 1 February 1950, all as now amended, provided such nationals have applied for such benefits within the time limits prescribed therein.

(c) (i) Japan acknowledges that the literary and artistic property rights which existed in Japan on 6 December 1941, in respect to the published and unpublished works of the Allied Powers and their nationals have continued in force since that date, and recognizes those rights which have arisen, or but for the war would have arisen, in Japan since that date, by the operation of any conventions and agreements to which Japan was a party on that date, irrespective of whether or not such conventions or agreements were abrogated or suspended upon or since the outbreak of war by the domestic law of Japan or of the Allied Power concerned.

(ii) Without the need for application by the proprietor of the right and without the payment of any fee or compliance with any other formality, the period from 7 December 1941 until the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned shall be excluded from the running of the normal term of such rights; and such period, with an additional period of six months, shall be excluded from the time within which a literary work must be translated into Japanese in order to obtain translating rights in Japan.

Article 16

As an expression of its desire to indemnify those members of the armed forces of the Allied Powers who suffered undue hardships while prisoners of war of Japan, Japan will transfer its assets and those of its nationals in countries which were neutral during the war, or which were at war with any of the Allied Powers, or, at its option, the equivalent of such assets, to the International Committee of the Red Cross which shall liquidate such assets and distribute the resultant fund to appropriate national agencies, for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families on such basis as it may determine to be equitable. The categories of assets described in Article 14(a)2(II)(ii) through (v) of the present Treaty shall be excepted from transfer, as well as assets of Japanese natural persons not residents of Japan on the first coming into force of the Treaty. It is equally understood that the transfer provision of this Article has no application to the 19,770 shares in the Bank for International Settlements presently owned by Japanese financial institutions.

Article 17

(a) Upon the request of any of the Allied Powers, the Japanese Government shall review and revise in conformity with international law any decision or order of the Japanese Prize Courts in cases involving ownership rights of nationals of that Allied Power and shall supply copies of all documents comprising the records of these cases, including the decisions taken and orders issued. In any case in which such review or revision shows that restoration is due, the provisions of Article 15 shall apply to the property concerned.

(b) The Japanese Government shall take the necessary measures to enable nationals of any of the Allied Powers at any time within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned to submit to the appropriate Japanese authorities for review any judgment given by a Japanese court between 7 December 1941 and such coming into force, in any proceedings in which any such national was unable to make adequate presentation of his case either as plaintiff or defendant. The Japanese Government shall provide that, where the national has suffered injury by reason of any such judgment, he shall be restored in the position in which he was before the judgment was given or shall be afforded such relief as may be just and equitable in the circumstances.

Article 18

(a) It is recognized that the intervention of the state of war has not affected the obligation to pay pecuniary debts arising out of obligations and contracts (including those in respect of bonds) which existed and rights which were acquired before the existence of a state of war, and which are due by the Government or nationals of Japan to the Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers, or are due by the Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers to the Government or nationals of Japan. The intervention of a state of war shall equally not be regarded as affecting the obligation to consider on their merits claims for loss or damage to property or for personal injury or death which arose before the existence of a state of war, and which may be presented or re-presented by the Government of one of the Allied Powers to the Government of Japan, or by the Government of Japan to any of the Governments of the Allied Powers. The provisions of this paragraph are without prejudice to the rights conferred by Article 14.

(b) Japan affirms its liability for the prewar external debt of the Japanese State and for debts of corporate bodies subsequently declared to be liabilities of the Japanese State, and expresses its intention to enter into negotiations at an early date with its creditors with respect to the resumption of payments on those debts; to encourage negotiations in respect to other prewar claims and obligations; and to facilitate the transfer of sums accordingly.

Article 19

(a) Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of the war or out of actions taken because of the existence of a state of war, and waives all claims arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of any of the Allied Powers in Japanese territory prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty.

(b) The foregoing waiver includes any claims arising out of actions taken by any of the Allied Powers with respect to Japanese ships between 1 September 1939 and the coming into force of the present Treaty, as well as any claims and debts arising in respect to Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of the Allied Powers, but does not include Japanese claims specificially recognized in the laws of any Allied Power enacted since 2 September 1945.

(c) Subject to reciprocal renunciation, the Japanese Government also renounces all claims (including debts) against Germany and German nationals on behalf of the Japanese Government and Japanese nationals, including intergovernmental claims and claims for loss or damage sustained during the war, but excepting (a) claims in respect of contracts entered into and rights acquired before 1 September 1939, and (b) claims arising out of trade and financial relations between Japan and Germany after 2 September 1945. Such renunciation shall not prejudice actions taken in accordance with Articles 16 and 20 of the present Treaty.

(d) Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of occupation under or in consequence of directives of the occupation authorities or authorized by Japanese law at that time, and will take no action subjecting Allied nationals to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts or omissions.

Article 20

Japan will take all necessary measures to ensure such disposition of German assets in Japan as has been or may be determined by those powers entitled under the Protocol of the proceedings of the Berlin Conference of 1945 to dispose of those assets, and pending the final disposition of such assets will be responsible for the conservation and administration thereof.

Article 21

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 25 of the present Treaty, China shall be entitled to the benefits of Articles 10 and 14(a)2; and Korea to the benefits of Articles 2, 4, 9 and 12 of the present Treaty.

CHAPTER VI———SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 22

If in the opinion of any Party to the present Treaty there has arisen a dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaty, which is not settled by reference to a special claims tribunal or by other agreed means, the dispute shall, at the request of any party thereto, be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice. Japan and those Allied Powers which are not already parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice will deposit with the Registrar of the Court, at the time of their respective ratifications of the present Treaty, and in conformity with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council, dated 15 October 1946, a general declaration accepting the jurisdiction, without special agreement, of the Court generally in respect to all disputes of the character referred to in this Article.

CHAPTER VII———FINAL CLAUSES

Article 23

(a) The present Treaty shall be ratified by the States which sign it, including Japan, and will come into force for all the States which have then ratified it, when instruments of ratification have been deposited by Japan and by a majority, including the United States of America as the principal occupying Power, of the following States, namely Australia, Canada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. The present Treaty shall come into force of each State which subsequently ratifies it, on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

(b) If the Treaty has not come into force within nine months after the date of the deposit of Japan's ratification, any State which has ratified it may bring the Treaty into force between itself and Japan by a notification to that effect given to the Governments of Japan and the United States of America not later than three years after the date of deposit of Japan's ratification.

Article 24

All instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America which will notify all the signatory States of each such deposit, of the date of the coming into force of the Treaty under paragraph (a) of Article 23, and of any notifications made under paragraph (b) of Article 23.

Article 25

For the purposes of the present Treaty the Allied Powers shall be the States at war with Japan, or any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, provided that in each case the State concerned has signed and ratified the Treaty. Subject to the provisions of Article 21, the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits on any State which is not an Allied Power as herein defined; nor shall any right, title or interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision of the Treaty in favour of a State which is not an Allied Power as so defined.

Article 26

Japan will be prepared to conclude with any State which signed or adhered to the United Nations Declaration of 1 January 1942, and which is at war with Japan, or with any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, which is not a signatory of the present Treaty, a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty, but this obligation on the part of Japan will expire three years after the first coming into force of the present Treaty. Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.

Article 27

The present Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America which shall furnish each signatory State with a certified copy thereof.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this eighth day of September 1951, in the English, French, and Spanish languages, all being equally authentic, and in the Japanese language.

For Argentina: Hipólito J. PAZ

For Australia: Percy C. SPENDER

For Belgium: Paul VAN ZEELAND SILVERCRUYS

For Bolivia: Luis GUACHALLA

For Brazil: Carlos MARTINS, A. DE MELLO-FRANCO

For Cambodia: PHLENG

For Canada: Lester B. PEARSON, R.W. MAYHEW

For Ceylon: J.R. JAYEWARDENE, G.C.S. COREA, R.G. SENANAYAKE

For Chile: F. NIETO DEL RÍO

For Colombia: Cipríano RESTREPO JARAMILLO, Sebastián OSPINA

For Costa Rica: J. Rafael OREAMUNO, V. VARGAS, Luis DOBLES SÁNCHEZ

For Cuba: O. GANS, L. MACHADO, Joaquín MEYER

For the Dominican Republic: V. ORDÓÑEZ, Luis F. THOMEN

For Ecuador: A. QUEVEDO, R.G. VALENZUELA

For Egypt: Kamil A. RAHIM

For El Salvador: Héctor DAVID CASTRO, Luis RIVAS PALACIOS

For Ethiopia: Men YAYEJIJRAD

For France: SCHUMANN, H. BONNET, Paul-Émile NAGGIAR

For Greece: A.G. POLITIS

For Guatemala: E. CASTILLO A., A.M. ORELLANA, J. MENDOZA

For Haiti: Jacques N. LÉGER, Gust. LARAQUE

For Honduras: J.E. VALENZUELA, Roberto GÁLVEZ B., Raúl ALVARADO T.

For Indonesia: Ahmad SUBARDJO

For Iran: A.G. ARDALAN

For Iraq: A.I. BAKR

For Laos: SAVANG

For Lebanon: Charles MALIK

For Liberia: Gabriel L. DENNIS, James ANDERSON, Raymond HORACE, J. Rudolf GRIMES

For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg: Hugues LE GALLAIS

For Mexico: Rafael DE LA COLINA, Gustavo DÍAZ ORDAZ, A.P. GASGA

For the Netherlands: D.U. STIKKER, J.H. VAN ROIJEN

For New Zealand: C. BERENDSEN

For Nicaragua: G. SEVILLA SACASA, Gustavo MANZANARES

For Norway: Wilhelm Munthe MORGENSTERNE

For Pakistan: ZAFRULLAH KHAN

For Panama: Ignacio MOLINO, José A. REMON, Alfredo ALEMÁN, J. CORDOVEZ

For Peru: Luis Oscar BOETTNER

For the Republic of the Philippines: Carlos P. RÓMULO, J.M. ELIZALDE, Vicente FRANCISCO, Diosdado MACAPAGAL, Emiliano T. TIRONA, V.G. SINCO

For Saudi Arabia: Asad AL-FAQIH

For Syria: F. EL-KHOURI

For Turkey: Feridun C. ERKIN

For the Union of South Africa: G.P. JOOSTE

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Herbert MORRISON, Kenneth YOUNGER, Oliver FRANKS

For the United States of America: Dean ACHESON, John Foster DULLES, Alexander WILEY, John J. SPARKMAN

For Uruguay: José A. MORA

For Venezuela: Antonio M. ARAUJO, R. GALLEGOS M.

For Viet-Nam: TRAN Van Huu 陳文友, T. VINH, D. THANH, BUU KINH

For Japan: Shigeru YOSHIDA 吉田茂, Hayato IKEDA 池田勇人, Gizo TOMABECHI 苫米地義三, Niro HOSHIJIMA 星島二郎, Muneyoshi TOKUGAWA 徳川宗敬, Hisato ICHIMADA 一万田尚登

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

Neither the ROC nor the PRC were invited to the San Francisco Peace Conference which took place Sept. 4–8, 1951, and neither were parties to the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT). The ROC concluded a separate peace treaty with Japan in 1952 (see below). Of the 51 nations that had sent delegates to the conference, three (Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union) did not sign the SFPT, India and Burma were not present at the conference at all.

Below see the translations for the term "San Francisco Peace Treaty" in Chinese and for the term "Treaty of Peace with Japan" in Japanese.

Chinese Japanese
Jiujinshan heyue 舊金山和約 Nippon kokutono heiwa jōyaku 日本国との平和条約

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————————————————————

Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan

Signed at Taipei on April 28, 1952

Entered into force on August 5, 1952, by the exchange of the instruments of ratification at Taipei

Treaty of Peace

The Republic of China and Japan,
 Considering their mutual desire for good neighbourliness in view of their historical and cultural ties and geographical proximity;
 Realising the importance of their close cooperation to the promotion of their common welfare and to the maintenance of international peace and security;
 Recognising the need for a settlement of problems that have arisen as a result of the existence of a state of war between them;
 Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace and have accordingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries,

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China: Mr. YEH KUNG-CHAO;

The Government of Japan: Mr. ISAO KAWADA

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

Article 1 The state of war between the Republic of China and Japan is terminated as from the date on which the present Treaty enters into force.
Article 2 It is recognised that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace which Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on 8 September 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the San Francisco Treaty), Japan has renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratley Islands and the Paracel Islands.
Article 3 The disposition of property of Japan and its nationals in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores), and their claims, including debts, against the authorities of the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and the residents thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and residents and their claims, including debts, against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between the Government of the Republic of China and the Government of Japan. The terms nationals and residents include juridical persons.
Article 4 It is recognised that all treaties, conventions, and agreements concluded before 9 December 1941 between Japan and China have become null and void as a consequence of the war.
Article 5 It is recognised that under the provisions of Article 10 of the San Francisco Treaty, Japan has renounced all special rights and its interests in China, including all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on 7 September 1901, and all annexes, notes, and documents supplementary thereto, and has agreed to the abrogation in respect to Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes, and documents.
Article 6 (a) The Republic of China and Japan will be guided by the principles of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations in their mutual relations.
(b) The Republic of China and Japan will cooperate in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, will promote their common welfare through friendly cooperation in the economic field.
Article 7 The Republic of China and Japan will endeavour to conclude, as soon as possible, a treaty or agreement to place their trading, maritime, and other commercial relations, on a stable and friendly basis.
Article 8 The Republic of China and Japan will endeavour to conclude, as soon as possible, an agreement relating to civil air transport.
Article 9 The Republic of China and Japan will endeavour to conclude, as soon as possible, an agreement providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas.
Article 10 For the purposes of the present Treaty, nationals of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all the inhabitants and former inhabitants of Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and their descendents who are of the Chinese nationality in accordance with the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores); and juridical persons of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all those registered under the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores).
Article 11 Unless otherwise provided for in the present Treaty and the documents supplementary thereto, any problem arising between the Republic of China and Japan as a result of the existence of a state of war shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of the San Francisco Treaty.
Article 12 Any dispute that may arise out of the interpretation or application of the present Treaty shall be settled by negotiation or other pacific means.
Article 13 The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Taipei as soon as possible. The present Treaty shall enter into force as from the date on which such instruments of ratification are exchanged.
Article 14 The present Treaty shall be in the Chinese, Japanese, and English languages. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at Taipei, this Twenty Eighth day of the Fourth month of the Forty First year of the REPUBLIC OF CHINA, corresponding to the Twenty Eighth day of the Fourth month of the Twenty Seventh year of SHOWA of Japan and to the Twenty Eighth day of April in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty Two.

YEH KUNG-CHAO, [L.S.] Minister of Foreign Affairs and Plenipotentiary
 of the Republic of China

ISAO KAWADA, [L.S.] Minister of Foreign Affairs and Plenipotentiary
 of Japan

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中華民國與日本國間和平條約

【中華民國與日本國間和平條約：>民國四十一年四月二十八日簽訂，民國四十一年八月五日互換批准書，民國四十一年八月五日生效】

中華民國與日本國
鑒於兩國由於其歷史文化關係及領土鄰近而產生之相互睦鄰願望；
了解兩國之密切合作對於增進其共同福利及維持世界和平與安全，均屬重要；
均認由於兩國間戰爭狀態之存在而引起之各項問題，亟待解決；
爰經決定締結和平條約，並為此各派全權代表如左：

中華民國總統閣下：葉公超先生；
日本國政府：河田烈先生；

各該全權代表經將其所奉全權證書提出互相校閱，認為均屬妥善，爰議定條款如左：

第一條 中華民國與日本國間之戰爭狀態，自本約發生效力之日起，即告終止。
第二條 茲承認依照公曆一千九百五十一年九月八日在美利堅合眾國金山市簽訂之對日和平條約（以下簡稱金山和約）第二條，日本國業已放棄對於臺灣及澎湖群島以及南沙群島及西沙群島之一切權利、權利名義與要求。

第三條 關於日本國及國民在臺灣及澎湖之財產及其對於在臺灣及澎湖之中華民國當局及居民所作要求(包括債權在內)之處置，及該中華民國當局及居民在日本國之財產及其對於日本國及日本國國民所作要求(包括債權在內)之處置，應由中華民國政府與日本國政府間另商特別處理辦法。本約任何條款所用「國民」及「居民」等名詞，均包括法人在內。
第四條 茲承認中國與日本國間在中華民國三十年即公曆一千九百四十一年十二月九日以前所締結之一切條約、專約及協定，均因戰爭結果而歸無效。
第五條 茲承認依照金山和約第十條之規定，日本國業已放棄在中國之一切特殊權利及利益。包括由於中華民國紀元前十一年即公曆一千九百零一年九月七日在北京簽訂之最後議定書與一切附件及補充之各換文暨文件所產生之一切利益與特權；並已同意就關於日本國方面廢除該議定書、附件、換文及文件。
第六條 （甲）中華民國與日本國在其相互之關係上，願各遵聯合國憲章第二條之各項原則
（乙）中華民國與日本國願依聯合國憲章之原則彼此合作，並特願經由經濟方面之友好合作，促進兩國之共同福利。
第七條 中華民國與日本國願儘速商訂一項條約或協定，藉以將兩國貿易、航業及其他商務關係，置於穩定與友好之基礎上。
第八條 中華民國與日本國願儘速商訂一項關於民用航空運輸之協定。
第九條 中華民國與日本國願儘速締結一項為規範或限制捕魚、及保存暨開發公海漁業之協定。
第十條 就本約而言，中華民國國民應認為包括依照中華民國在臺灣及澎湖所已施行或將來可能施行之法律規章而具有中國國籍之一切臺灣及澎湖居民及前屬臺灣及澎湖之居民及其後裔；中華民國法人應認為包括依照中華民國在臺灣及澎湖所已施行或將來可能施行之法律規章所登記之一切法人。
第十一條 除本約及其補充文件另有規定外，凡在中華民國與日本國間因戰爭狀態存在之結果而引起之任何問題，均應依照金山和約之有關規定予以解決。
第十二條 凡因本約之解釋或適用可能發生之任何爭執，應以磋商或其他和平方式解決之。
第十三條 本約應予批准，批准文件應儘速在臺北互換。本約應自批准文件互換之日起發生效力。
第十四條 本約應分繕中文、日文及英文。遇有解釋不同，應以英文本為準。

為此，雙方全權代表各於本約簽字蓋印，以昭信守。

本約共繕二份，於中華民國四十一年四月二十八日即日本國昭和二十七年四月二十八日即公曆一千九百五十二年四月二十八日訂於臺北。

中華民國代表　葉公超（蓋印）
日本國代表　河田烈（蓋印）

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan/Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (abbrev. Zhong Ri heping tiaoyue 中日和平條約 or Zhong Ri heyue 中日和約) is commonly also known as the Treaty of Taipei (Taibei heyue 台北和約); in Japanese: Nippon kokuto Chuka minkoku tono aidano heiwa jōyaku 日本国と中華民国との間の平和条約.

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Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty

Treaty signed at Washington December 2, 1954;
Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of America February 9, 1955;
Ratified by the President of the United States of America February 11,1955;
Ratified by the Republic of China February 15, 1955;
Ratifications exchanged at Taipei March 3, 1955;
Proclaimed by the President of the United States of America April 1,1955;
Entered into force March 3, 1955.
And exchange of notes
Signed at Washington December 10, 1954

By THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China was signed at Washington on December 2, 1954 by their respective plenipotentiaries, the original of which Treaty in the English and Chinese languages is word for word as follows:

Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the West Pacific Area,

Recalling with mutual pride the relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side by side against imperialist aggression during the last war,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the West Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the West Pacific Area,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1 The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
Article 2 In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

Article 3 The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with each other in the development of economic progress and social well-being and to further their individual and collective efforts toward these ends.
Article 4 The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty.
Article 5 Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it world act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
Article 6 For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms "territorial" and "territories" shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores: and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction. The provisions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.
Article 7 The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government of the United Stares of America accepts, the right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement.
Article 8 This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 9 This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of China in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Taipei.
Article 10 This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate, in the English and Chinese languages, at Washington on this second day of December of the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty-four, corresponding to the second day of the twelfth month of the Forty-third year of the Republic of China.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: John Foster Dulles

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA: George K. C. Yeh

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美利堅合眾國、中華民國共同防禦條約

本條約締約國

茲重申其對聯合國憲章之宗旨與原則之信心，及其與所有人民及政府和平相處之願望，並欲增強西太平洋區域之和平結構；

以光榮之同感，追溯上次大戰期間，兩國人民為對抗帝國主義侵略，而在相互同情與共同理想之結合下，團結一致併肩作戰之關係；

願公開正式宣告其團結之精誠，及為其自衛而抵禦外來武裝攻擊之共同決心，俾使任何潛在之侵略者不存有任一締約國在西太平洋區域立於孤立地位之妄想；並

願加強兩國為維護和平與安全而建立集體防禦之現有努力，以待西太平洋區域安全制度之發展；

茲議訂下列各條款。

第一條 本條約締約國承允依照聯合國憲章之規定，以不危及國際和平安全與正義之和平方法，解決可能牽涉兩國之任何國際爭議，並在其國際關係中，不以任何與聯合國宗旨相悖之方式，作武力之威脅或使用武力。
第二條 為期更有效達成本條約之目的起見，締約國將個別並聯合以自助及互助之方式，維持並發展其個別及集體之能力，以抵抗武裝攻擊，及由國外指揮之危害其領土完整與政治安定之共產顛覆活動。
第三條 締約國承允加強其自由制度，彼此合作以發展其經濟進步與社會福利，並為達到此等目的，而增加其個別與集體之努力。
第四條 締約國將經由其外交部部長或其代表，就本條約之實施隨時會商。
第五條 每一締約國承認對在西太平洋區域內任一締約國領土之武裝攻擊，即將危及其本身之和平與安全。茲並宣告將依其憲法程序採取行動，以對付此共同危險。
任何此項武裝攻擊及因而採取之一切措施，應立即報告聯合國安全理事會。此等措施應於安全理事會採取恢復並維持國際和平與安全之必要措施時予以終止。
第六條 為適用於第二條及第五條之目的，所有『領土』等辭，就中華民國而言，應指台灣與澎湖；就美利堅合眾國而言，應指西太平洋區域內在其管轄下之各島嶼領土。第二條及第五條之規定，並將適用於共同協議所決定之其他領土。
第七條 中華民國政府給予，美利堅合眾國政府接受，依共同協議之決定，在台灣澎湖及其附近，為其防衛所需而部署美國陸海空軍之權利。
第八條 本條約並不影響，且不應被解釋為影響，締約國在聯合國憲章下之權利及義務，或聯合國為維持國際和平與安全所負之責任。
第九條 本條約應由美利堅合眾國與中華民國各依其憲法程序以批准，並將於在台北互換批准書之日起發生效力。
第十條 本條約應無限期有效。任一締約國得於廢約之通知送達另一締約國一年後，予以終止。

為此，下開各全權代表爰於本條約簽字，以昭信守。
本條約用英文及中文各繕二份。
公曆一千九百五十四年十二月二日
中華民國四十三年十二月二日訂於華盛頓。

美利堅合眾國代表：約翰‧福斯特‧杜勒斯【John Foster Dulles】
中華民國代表：葉公超

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The US Congress Formosa Resolution

[Approved by House vote 409-3 on January 25, 1955 and by Senate vote 85-3 on January 28, 1955]

U.S. Congressional Authorization for the President to Employ the Armed Forces of the United States to Protect Formosa, the Pescadores, and Related Positions and Territories of That Area

Whereas the primary purpose of the United States, in its relations with all other nations, is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and Whereas certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China are now under armed attack, and threats and declarations have been and are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores,

Whereas such armed attack if continued would gravely endanger the peace and security of the West Pacific Area and particularly of Formosa and the Pescadores; and

Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and

Whereas the President of the United States on January 6, 1955, submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification a Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China, which recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against territories, therein described, in the region of Formosa and the Pescadores, would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the parties to the treaty:

Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

In Chinese, the Formosa Resolution by the US Congress (Meiguo guohui 美國國會) is called Taiwan jueyi'an 台灣決議案 or Fuermosha jueyi'an 福爾摩沙決議案. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed it into law on Jan. 29, 1955. It was repealed by the US Congress on Oct. 26, 1974.

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PRC Defense Minister Peng Dehuai’s Proclamation to Taiwan Compatriots

The Minister of Defense’s [Peng Dehuai] Proclamation to Taiwan Compatriots

(October 6, 1958)

Military and Civilian Compatriots on Taiwan, Penghu [Islands], Jinmen, Mazu:

We are all Chinese; of the thirty-six stratagems, Peace is the best. The battle for Jinmen is of a punitive nature. Your leaders have for a long time been too outrageous, directing aircraft to fly all over the mainland, reaching as far as Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Xikang, Qinghai, where they scattered leaflets, dropped spies, bombed Fujian, and harassed Jiangsu and Zhejiang. This is beyond intolerable. Therefore, we fired a few cannons, to get your attention.

Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu are Chinese territory. On this point you agree, as can be seen in your leader’s statements, and they are definitely not American territory. Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu are part of China, and not a separate country. There is only one China in the world, there are not two Chinas. On this point you also agree, as can be seen in your leader’s statements. Your leader has signed a military agreement with the Americans, which is one-sided, we don’t accept it, and it ought to be invalidated.

The Americans will certainly one day abandon you, don’t you believe it? The giant that is history will bear evidence to this. The clue is already exposed in Dulles’ September 30 interview. Can you not shiver, standing in your position? After all, American imperialism is our common enemy. 130,000 soldiers and civilians on Jinmen are running out of supplies, suffering from cold and hunger. They cannot go on in this condition. For humanitarian reasons, I have already ordered the front lines in Fujian [to observe] a one week temporary cease fire, starting on October 6, so that you can completely and freely transport supplies, on the condition that there is no American convoy. If there is a convoy then it won’t apply.

This war between us has already been going on for more than thirty years and still hasn’t ended, and that is not good. We propose holding negotiation, to achieve a peaceful settlement. Several years ago Premier Zhou [Enlai] had already told you about this. This is China’s internal affair, a problem between our two sides, it isn’t a bilateral problem involving the United States and China. The U.S. occupation of Taiwan, Penghu, and the Taiwan Straits – that is a bilateral problem between the United States and China, which ought to be resolved through negotiations between the two countries, and there are currently talks being held in Warsaw.

The Americans will have to leave one day, there is no alternative. It would be in the Americans’ interest to leave earlier, because they would retain the initiative. Leaving later won’t be good [for them] because they will be forced. Why did an Eastern Pacific country come to the Western Pacific? The Western Pacific is the Western Pacific people’s Western Pacific, just the same as the Eastern Pacific is the Eastern Pacific people’s Eastern Pacific, this is just common sense, and the Americans ought to understand it. There is no war between the People’s Republic of China and the United States, so there is no so-called cease-fire. To talk about a cease-fire where there is no fire, isn’t it plain nonsense? Friends on Taiwan, there are the fires of war between us, which ought to stop, and be extinguished. This will require negotiations. Of course, to fight for another thirty years would be no big deal, but ultimately it would be preferable to come to an early peaceful resolution. Please, it’s up to you to decide where you want to go.

[Peng Dehuai, Minister of Defense, PRC]

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中華人民共和國國防部告臺灣同胞書

中華人民共和國國防部告臺灣同胞書（作者：毛澤東）

1958 年 10 月 6 日

發佈機關：中華人民共和國國防部部長 彭德懷

臺灣、澎湖、金門、馬祖軍民同胞們：

我們都是中國人。三十六計，和為上計。金門戰鬥，屬於懲罰性質。你們的領導者們過去長時期間太倡狂了，命令飛機向大陸亂鑽，遠及雲、貴、川、康、青海，發傳單，丟特務，炸福州，擾江浙。是可忍，孰不可忍？因此打一些炮，引起你們注意。

台、澎、金、馬是中國領土，這一點你們是同意的，見之于你們領導人的文告，確實不是美國人的領土。台、澎、金、馬是中國的一部分，不是另一個國家。世界上只有一個中國，沒有兩個中國。這一點，也是你們同意的，見之于你們領導人的文告。你們領導人與美國人訂立軍事協定，是片面的，我們不承認，應予廢除。

美國人總有一天肯定要拋棄你們的。你們不信嗎？歷史巨人會要出來作證明的。杜勒斯九月三十日的談話，端倪已見。站在你們的地位，能不寒心？歸根結底，美帝國主義是我們的共同敵人。十三萬金門軍民，供應缺乏，饑寒交迫，難為久計。為了人道主義，我已命令福建前線，從十月六日起，暫以七天為期，停止炮擊，你們可以充分地自由地輸送供應品，但以沒有美國人護航為條件。如有護航，不在此例。

你們與我們之間的戰爭，三十年了，尚未結束，這是不好的。建議舉行談判，實行和平解決。這一點，周恩來總理在幾年前已經告訴你們了。這是中國內部貴我兩方有關的問題，不是中美兩國有關的問題。美國侵佔台澎與臺灣海峽，這是中美兩方有關的問題，應當由兩國舉行談判解決，目前正在華沙舉行。

美國人總是要走的，不走是不行的。早走于美國有利，因為它可以取得主動。遲走不利，因為它老是被動。一個東太平洋國家，為什麼跑到西太平洋來了呢？西太平洋是西太平洋人的西太平洋，正如東太平洋是東太平洋人的東太平洋一樣。這一點是常識，美國人應當懂得。中華人民共和國與美國之間並無戰爭，無所謂停火。無火而談停火，豈非笑話？臺灣的朋友們，我們之間是有戰火的，應當停止，並予熄滅。這就需要談判。當然，再打三十年，也不是什麼了不起的大事，但是究竟以早日和平解決較為妥善。何去何從，請你們酌定。

中華人民共和國國防部部長 彭德懷

一九五八年十月六日上午一時

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The English version of this document was made possible with support from the Chun & Jane Chiu Family Foundation (headquartered in Santa Clara, CA 95054, USA in the name of Chiu Chun-pang).

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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Legal Problems Regarding Formosa and the Offshore Islands

By Ely Maurer
Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs 1

Since August 23, when the Chinese Communists began their massive bombardment of Quemoy, no item has received as much coverage in the world press as the problems of Formosa and the offshore islands. We are now in a period of relative calm. However, in the 4 months that have elapsed since August 23 considerable discussion and world anxiety have been generated by the matter. In this discussion there have been intertwined elements of policy and of law. I do not intend here to go into the policy issues. I appreciate the opportunity you have afforded me to take up the legal problems. With respect to the questions of law these involve a blend of national and international aspects.

Before going into the legal problems it is desirable to review briefly the geographical and historical background of Formosa and the offshore islands.

Background

Formosa, or Taiwan, is an island about 100 miles from the mainland of China. It has an area equal to that of Maryland and a population of about 10 million people, comprising 8.5 million persons of Chinese descent, 1.5 million mainland Chinese, and 100,000 aborigines. Close to and westward of Formosa are the Pescadores Islands, or Penghus. I shall use the term “Formosa” hereafter as also covering these islands.

Close to the mainland of China, in the vicinity of the city of Amoy and about 5 miles away, is the Quemoy group of islands consisting mainly of Big Quemoy, Little Quemoy, and the two tiny Tan Islands.

About 120 miles up the mainland coast and in the vicinity of Foochow and about 10 miles off the coast is the Matsu group of islands.

Both these groups are in the control of the Republic of China. I shall hereafter speak of them as the offshore islands. These islands have been for a very long time under Chinese sovereignty.

Since the middle of the 17th century and up to 1895 Formosa was a part of the Chinese Empire. In 1895 under the Treaty of Shimonoseki China ceded Formosa to Japan. In the Cairo conference in November 1943 the United States, United Kingdom, and China declared it was their “purpose” that Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores “shall be restored to the Republic of China.” Thereafter in August 1945 in the Potsdam conference the United States, United Kingdom, and China declared that “the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out.” This Potsdam declaration was subsequently adhered to by the U.S.S.R. On September 2, 1945, the Japanese Government, in the instrument of surrender, accepted the provisions of the declaration. The Supreme Allied Commander for the Allied Powers then issued Directive No. 1, under which the Japanese Imperial Headquarters issued General Order No. 1 requiring Japanese commanders in Formosa to surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China. Since September 1945 the United States and the other Allied Powers have accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over the island. In article 2 of the Japanese Peace Treaty, which entered into force April 28, 1952, Japan renounced all “right, title and claim” to Formosa. Neither this agreement nor any other agreement thereafter has purported to transfer the sovereignty of Formosa to China.

In the meantime, since the end of the war in 1945, the Chinese Communists had been engaged in open hostilities with the Republic of China. On October 1, 1949, they proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Two days later the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with this regime. The Chinese Communists made their first attempt to capture Quemoy in late 1949 and were repulsed with heavy losses by the Chinese Government on October 27. The Chinese Government had been transferring its offices to Taipei, Formosa, and early in December 1949 Taipei became the provisional capital of the Republic of China.

On January 5, 1950, President Truman, in a public statement regarding Formosa, declared that the United States had no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory, did not seek any special privileges therein, and would not pursue a course which would lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. 2 However, when the Communists attacked the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950, President Truman issued a public statement noting that the Communists had made clear their intent to use armed invasion and war for purposes of conquest and had defied the Security Council of the United Nations. 3 He thereupon ordered the Seventh Fleet “to prevent any attacks on Formosa” and as a corollary called upon the Chinese Government to cease all operations against the mainland. In addition he stated that “The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.”

On August 24, 1950, the Chinese Communist regime sent a telegram to the President of the United Nations Security Council calling President Truman's action “a direct armed aggression on the territory of China and a total violation of the United Nations Charter.” In a statement on the same day the State Department said the United States would welcome the United Nations consideration of the problem, and on September 21 we formally asked that it be put on the agenda of the General Assembly. The United States made this request at a time when there seemed to be a reasonable prospect that peace and security could be restored in Korea. When these hopes were destroyed by Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, the United States on November 15 asked that consideration of the Formosa question be deferred. In the meantime the Soviet Union had initiated resolutions in the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations condemning the United States for alleged “armed invasion” of Formosa. The General Assembly never endorsed the charges, and they were dropped. The Security Council defeated the Soviet resolution on November 30 by a vote of 9 to 1.

In July of 1954, at the time when the Geneva Accords were being negotiated to end hostilities in Indochina, the Chinese Communist regime launched a massive propaganda campaign for the “liberation of Taiwan.” On September 3 the Chinese Communists began a heavy bombardment of the island of Quemoy, and military attacks spread to coastal islands including the Tachen Islands to the north. Against this background the United States–Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty was signed on December 2, 1954. 4 The territorial coverage of the treaty in respect of China was limited to Formosa. The treaty was accompanied by an exchange of notes of December 10 5 by which the United States and the Republic of China undertook not to use force from the Formosa area or the offshore islands except by joint agreement or in self-defense. It might be pointed out that these defensive arrangements merely formalized and did not in any way extend the United States undertaking for the defense of Formosa going back to June 1950.

The Peiping regime propaganda campaign was stepped up throughout December and January, and the Chinese Communists launched heavy aerial bombardment on the coastal islands and invaded and seized Ichiang Island. These actions were accompanied by broadcast declarations that the actions were preliminary to the taking of Formosa. Following these attacks President Eisenhower on January 24, 1955, requested a resolution from Congress publicly establishing the authority of the President to employ United States forces as he deemed necessary to secure and protect Formosa from armed attack. This joint resolution was passed January 29. 6 The United States also supported in the United Nations Security Council a New Zealand proposal for the consideration of the question of hostilities in the offshore-island area. However, the Peiping regime refused the invitation of the Security Council to be present and participate in the discussion. The Chinese Communists said that the New Zealand resolution was not within the competence of the United Nations because the liberation of Formosa and other coastal islands was a matter of “sovereign right” and an internal affair.

In several statements made in 1955 the President and the Secretary of State reiterated the desire of the United States to find a peaceful solution to the tension in the Formosa area, and ambassadorial talks were opened in Geneva in 1955 with the Chinese Communists relating to this subject as well as other topics. However, these conversations proved abortive since the Chinese Communists refused to agree to a proposal which concerned renunciation of force in the Formosa area.

During the period from February 1955 up to August 23 of this year the Chinese Communist attacks on the Republic of China were relatively infrequent. Then on August 23 the Chinese Communists commenced a massive bombardment of the Quemoy Islands, once again resorting to armed force and precipitating a grave situation in the Formosan Straits. From the beginning of the attacks the United States has shown a desire for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in the Formosa Straits. When the Chinese Communists on September 6 stated a willingness to resume the suspended ambassadorial talks at Geneva, the United States welcomed the prospect. Since that time the United States has, in talks now taking place in Warsaw, been seeking to obtain a cessation of Chinese Communist attacks.

On October 5 the Chinese Communists announced a 1-week suspension of the bombardment, conditional on the discontinuance of the United States escort activities. The Department of State issued a statement welcoming the Communist move and expressing the hope it foreshadowed a permanent end to the attacks. 7 At the end of the week the Chinese Communists extended their cease-fire for another 2 weeks. However, on October 20, justifying their action on alleged escorting activities, the Chinese Communists resumed bombardment but announced shortly thereafter that bombardment of certain areas on Quemoy would only take place on odd numbered days. Since that time bombardment has greatly diminished.

As a result of meetings between Secretary Dulles and Chiang Kai-shek pursuant to article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty a joint communique was issued on October 23. 8 In this communique it was recognized that under the present conditions the defense of the offshore islands is “closely related” to the defense of Formosa. Further, the Republic of China stated that the “principal means” of restoring freedom to its people on the mainland is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's “three people's principles” and “not the use of force.”

This then brings us up to the present. On the basis of this background we can now go into the legal issues presented.

National Legal Problems

The legal problems concerning Formosa and the offshore islands break down into two main subdivisions: (a) the legal problems with respect to the authority of the Executive under United States law, and (b) the authority of the United States Government under international law. It may be best to consider the national aspect first.

In January 1955, in a period in which the Chinese Communists were taking menacing actions with respect to the offshore islands and Formosa and after we had signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, the President sent a message to Congress urging a resolution by Congress authorizing him, if necessary, to take military action in the Formosa area. The message recited that Formosa constituted a part of the vital island chain of defenses of the United States and free nations in the Western Pacific. The President alluded to Quemoy as “one of the natural approaches to Formosa” and said that attacks upon the offshore islands have been asserted by the Chinese Communists themselves to be “a prelude to the conquest of Formosa.” The President then said:

  But, unhappily, the danger of armed attack directed against that area compels us to take into account closely related localities and actions which, under current conditions, might determine the failure or success of such an attack. The authority that may be accorded by the Congress would be used only in situations which are recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries to, an attack against the main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores.

After serious debate Congress passed House Joint Resolution 159 (Public Law 4, 84th Congress, 1st session, chapter 4). This resolution reads in pertinent part:

  ... the President of the United States be and he is hereby authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

In the light of the above, let us first take up the question of the authority of the President to take military action to defend Formosa. In this connection it should be recalled that under article V of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Government of China it is provided that an armed attack on the territories of one of the parties would be dangerous to the other party's peace and security and the other party declare that it would act to meet the common danger “in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Under article VI the term “territories” in respect to the Republic of China is limited to Formosa (and the Pescadores). Thus if an armed attack took place on Formosa the question might arise as to the content of the phrase “in accordance with its constitutional processes.” It might be argued that it is only Congress which could take action under the constitutional provision giving it the power to declare war. However, as is well known, it is considered that the President has a large power to take military action in emergency situations for the defense of the United States without awaiting action by Congress. In the present situation, House Joint Resolution 159 eliminates any problem on this score since, in the words of the President's message, the resolution clearly and publicly establishes the authority of the President to take military action in the defense of Formosa as he deems necessary.

The second question concerns the authority of the President to take action to defend the offshore islands. The Mutual Defense Treaty does not cover in its territorial scope the offshore islands, and there is no commitment therein of United States action in their defense. However, House Joint Resolution 159 authorizes the President to protect “such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands” and to take “such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.” What is the meaning of this clause?

It has been argued that the phrase “related positions and territories” refers only to areas that are necessary from the standpoint of military tactics for the defense of Formosa. Thus, this argument runs, the President has only the power to defend Quemoy if Quemoy in a military sense is essential to the defense of Formosa, so that if Quemoy fell the defense of Formosa would be tactically impossible. The argument continues that, since Quemoy is not essential in this sense, the President has no authority to defend it.

It is our view that the language with respect to the offshore islands, read in its natural sense and with relation to the background message of the President and the debate in Congress, permits a broader meaning. (1) The word “related” would seem logically to cover the situation where the position or territory in question is not “essential” to the defense of Formosa but one in which the loss of the position or territory would make that defense harder or more difficult. (2) More importantly, the word “related” would appear to cover the situation in which the offshore islands are part and parcel of a general plan for the seizure of Formosa or preliminary thereto. In the present situation it is evident from the innumerable statements issued by the Chinese Communists that they view their whole action with respect to the offshore islands as related in this way to the “liberation” of Formosa. (3) Further, it is improper in our view to give a too physical interpretation to the word “related.” In this connection it might be pointed out that the offshore islands constitute an extremely important psychological element in the will to resist of the defenders of Formosa. In this sense the loss of the offshore islands is quite clearly related to the defense of Formosa. (4) Fourthly, emphasis should be given to the language “such related positions” as “he judges to be required or appropriate” in assuring the defense of Formosa. Implicit in this language is that discretion is lodged in the President to determine what related positions are required or appropriate in the defense of Formosa. (5) Fifthly, it should be emphasized the President has also power to take “such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate” in the defense of Formosa, and this is not tied down to any phrase as to “related positions.”

Considering the cumulative effect of all these points and taking into account the inherent constitutional powers of the President, it is our view that the President has an extremely broad latitude of decision with respect to taking action to defend the offshore islands. In this connection it will be recalled that in the joint communique issued on October 23 at Taipei, at the conclusion of the Dulles-Chiang discussions, it was stated that “It was recognized that under the present conditions the defense of the Quemoys, together with the Matsus, is closely related” to the defense of Formosa.

International Legal Problems

On the international front it is best to examine the problem of Formosa separately from the problem of the offshore islands.

In giving the historical background of Formosa it has been pointed out that at Cairo the Allies stated it was their purpose to restore Formosa to Chinese sovereignty and that at the end of the war the Republic of China receive the surrender of Japanese forces on Formosa. It has also been pointed out that under the Japanese Peace Treaty Japan renounced all right, title, and claim to Formosa. However, neither in that treaty nor in any other treaty has there been any definitive cession to China of Formosa. The situation is, then, one where the Allied Powers still have to come to some agreement or treaty with respect to the status of Formosa. Any action, therefore, of the Chinese Communist regime to seize Formosa constitutes an attempt to seize by force territory which does not belong to it. Such a seizure is prohibited by international law and the United Nations Charter as an attempt to settle a claim to territory by force. It would thus appear that the United States is within its legal rights in taking action to defend Formosa.

With respect to the offshore islands the situation is admittedly somewhat different. There is no question that these islands are a part of the state of China. It may be admitted further that these islands are close to the mainland of China. However, the offshore islands have been in the possession and effective control of the Government of the Republic of China since its inception, except for the period of the Japanese war. Since 1949 a status quo has come into existence vis-a-vis the Peiping regime. It is this status quo which the Chinese Communists have threatened with the menace of armed force. It is our view that we have here in fact a situation comparable to that which obtained in Korea preceding the invasion of south Korea by north Korea. In other words, the action of the Chinese Communists in taking warlike measures is an effort to change the status quo and to gain additional territory by force in violation of the prohibitions of the United Nations Charter.

It has been urged that this is essentially a civil war and therefore it is improper for the United States to participate with the Government of the Republic of China in defense of the offshore islands. It should first be pointed out that it is too narrow to look upon the conflict merely as a civil war. Even as early as the end of the war with Japan the Soviet Union, in violation of its treaty with the Chinese Nationalists, turned over large stores of equipment and in other ways furnished material aid to the Chinese Communists. Since that time the Soviet Union has continued giving large assistance to the Chinese Communist regime. Thus much of the ammunition, artillery, and planes that are at present being used by that regime derive from Russian sources. And the Soviet Union is allied by military treaty with the Chinese regime. On the other hand the United States has vital interests in the Formosa area and is allied with the Republic of China in a Mutual Defense Treaty and has agreements to supply arms for defensive purposes. In the circumstances it seems fair to say that we are here involved in what is realistically an international dispute which the Communist regime is attempting to settle by force.

Further with respect to the argument that this is a civil war, it will be recalled that this was the same argument that was made by Vishinsky regarding the north Korean invasion of south Korea. It was an argument however which the United Nations paid no heed to but, instead, viewed the action of the north Koreans as one of aggression which came under the ban of the United Nations Charter. Secretary Dulles has summarized the situation forcefully in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly on September 18. 9 He said:

  1. The Chinese Communist regime has never during its 9 years of existence exercised authority over Taiwan, the Penghus, or the Quemoy or Matsu Islands.

  2. The Chinese Communist regime is now attempting to extend its authority to these areas by the use of naked force.

  The issue is thus a simple one: armed conquest.

  In 1950 the United Nations met that issue squarely. By overwhelming vote it found that the attack of north Korea to “unify” Korea was armed aggression. It condemned the Chinese Communist regime as an aggressor because of its part in that armed attack.

  I do not ignore the argument that today's Chinese Communist attack is a “civil war” operation. Mr. Vishinsky made a parallel argument in 1950. He told us that the war in Korea was purely a “civil war” and that outsiders who intervened were “aggressors.” The United Nations overwhelmingly rejected that contention. ...

  The fact is that, when one regime attempts by force to take additional territory which has long been under the authority of another government, recognized as such by a respectable part of the world community, that is a use of force which endangers world order.

On this phase of the matter it is our view, then, that the United States would be justified from an international standpoint in cooperating with the Republic of China in the defense of the offshore islands and Formosa.

Recognition of Communist China

Related to the problems of Formosa and the offshore islands is the question of the recognition policy of the United States. The United States Government has been criticized for its failure to recognize the Chinese Communist regime, some commentators taking the view that, since the Communist regime controls the great mass of mainland China as well as its 600 million inhabitants, the United States must accord recognition. It is the view of the United States Government that international law does not require one government to accord diplomatic recognition to another government. It is our view that the matter of diplomatic recognition is one solely to be determined as the national interest dictates, and in this case on an examination of all facets of the subject the United States Government believes that it would be contrary to our national interest to accord recognition. The various considerations involved in reaching this conclusion were spelled out in press release No. 459 of August 11, 1958, issued by the State Department. 10 This press release embodied the text of a memorandum sent by the Department to its missions abroad.

It is true that, in reviewing whether we should extend recognition, the United States Government, in this as well as in previous administrations, has looked to certain factors which are generally considered significant. These factors are (1) whether the government in question is in control of a certain territory, (2) whether the government reflects the will of the nation substantially declared, (3) whether the government is prepared to honor its international obligations. While the United States examines these factors, we do not view recognition as required upon a satisfactory finding with respect to these factors. Even if that were our view, there is serious question whether the Chinese Communist regime can in any way be considered to reflect the will of the nation; and there is no doubt, in view of flagrant past treaty violations and violations of the United Nations Charter and violations of international law and in view of statements made by the Chinese Communist regime about disregarding preexisting treaties, that the Chinese Communist regime is not prepared to honor its international obligations. Thus, even on this view, the Chinese Communists are not entitled to recognition.

As Secretary Dulles has pointed out, however, our failure to recognize the Chinese Communist regime has not meant that we refuse to deal with them where it is essential to our purpose and inures to our benefit. Thus we are at present carrying on conversations in Warsaw as we have carried on conversations in Geneva; we dealt with them in the Korean armistice negotiations; we dealt with them with respect to the cease-fires in Indochina; and we are prepared to deal with them whenever we believe it to be in the interest of the United States to do so.

Territorial Sea

As a collateral legal issue related to the Formosa Straits area there has arisen the question of the extent of the territorial sea. The Chinese Communist regime in a declaration dated September 4, 1958 declared their territorial sea to extend to 12 miles. In addition, their declaration indicated that they viewed the baselines from which the 12 miles were to be calculated as being points connecting basepoints on the mainland and on certain islands offshore. On the ground of this declaration they considered all the waters around the Quemoys and Matsus and areas well into the Formosa Straits as being internal or territorial waters, and they have charged the United States forces with more than 40 intrusions of such internal or territorial waters by warships and aircraft. The United States position on this matter is quite clear. The United States only recognizes the Government of the Republic of China; and as far as the United States is concerned the declaration of the Chinese Communist regime has therefore no force or validity. In addition the United States considers that international law recognizes only a 3-mile limit, that it is not possible for a country by unilateral action to take unto itself that which is the common property of all nations, and that this is, moreover, in violation of the universally accepted principle of the freedom of the high seas. The United States position finds support in the report of the United Nations International Law Commission 11 wherein it is stated that “international law does not require states to recognize a breadth [of territorial sea] beyond 3 miles.”

Further, a country is not free to choose whether its territorial sea will be measured from the lowwater mark on the coast, which is the normal baseline, or whether it will use straight baselines connecting salient points or offshore islands. While article 4 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 12 adopted by the recent Geneva Conference on Law of the Sea permits the establishment of straight baselines in localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, it is clear that the Chinese coast along which the straight lines described in the statement of September 4 are drawn does not conform to the geographic conditions which are set forth in article 4. There is even less legal basis for drawing straight baselines from outermost points on a group of islands and claiming waters thereby included as internal waters. Similar attempts by other countries to claim, as internal waters, large areas of high seas within groups of islands or archipelagoes have been protested by many countries. The straight baselines described in the statement of September 4, 1958, are accordingly regarded by the United States as completely arbitrary and without any basis in recognized international law.

Another problem has been raised in the press with respect to United States escort activities of vessels of the Republic of China. Heretofore the United States vessels have avoided entering the territorial sea around Quemoy and the other offshore islands. The question has been raised whether in so doing we have been giving some implied recognition to the claim of the Chinese Communist regime as to its right to this territorial sea. Nothing could be further from the fact. Since the Government of the Republic of China is in effective control of Quemoy and the other offshore islands, we consider that it has the right to the territorial sea around these islands, just as it has the right to the territorial sea around Formosa. Moreover, just as our warships have, with the consent of the Government of the Republic of China, moved through the territorial sea of Formosa, so similarly with the consent of the Government of the Republic of China they could move through the territorial sea of Quemoy and the other offshore islands. There is no question that the Government of the Republic of China would be willing to give the United States such permission with respect to Quemoy and the offshore islands. However, the United States has thought it best as a matter of policy to keep United States warships in what are clearly international waters near Quemoy and the other offshore islands.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is our view that from a national and international standpoint the President may properly use United States armed forces for the defense of Formosa and the offshore islands; the United States is not required to recognize the Chinese Communist regime; the declaration by the Chinese Communist regime regarding a 12-mile territorial sea has no validity.

Footnotes

1 Address made before Washington Chapter of the Federal Bar Association at Washington, D. C., on Nov. 20 (press release 723 dated Nov. 28).
2 BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1950, p. 79.
3 Ibid., July 3, 1950, p. 5.
4 For background and text, see ibid., Dec. 13, 1954, p. 895.
5 Ibid., Jan. 24, 1955, p. 152.
6 For President Eisenhower’s message to Congress and text of the resolution, see ibid., Feb., 7, 1955, p. 211.
7 Ibid., Oct. 27, 1958, p. 650.
8 For text of the communique and a statement by Secretary Dulles, see ibid., Nov. 10, 1958, p. 721.
9 Ibid., Oct. 6, 1958, p. 525.
10 Ibid., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 385.
11 U. N. doc. A/3159.
12 BULLETIN of June 30, 1958, p. 1111.

(Source: Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1017, pp. 1005-1011; dated Dec. 22, 1958)

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Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan

Japan and the United States of America,

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,

Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

Article 1 The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.
Article 2 The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.
Article 3 The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.
Article 4 The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.
Article 5 Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
Article 6 For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.
Article 7 This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 8 This Treaty shall be ratified by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.
Article 9 The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.
Article 10 This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area. However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in duplicate at Washington in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.

FOR JAPAN: Nobusuke Kishi 岸信介, Mitsujiro Ishii 石井光次郎, Koichiro Asakai 朝海浩一郎, Aiichiro Fujiyama 藤山愛一郎, Tadashi Adachi 足立正

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Christian A. Herter, J. Graham Parsons, Douglas MacArthur 2nd

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan is called as follows in Chinese and Japanese:

Chinese Japanese
Meilijian hezhongguo yu Ribenguo zhi anquan baozhang tiaoyue 美利堅合眾國與日本國之安全保障條約, abbrev. Mei Ri anbao tiaoyue 美日安保條約 Nippon kokuto Amerika gasshū koku tono aidano sōgo kyōryoku oyobi anzen hoshō jōyaku 日本国とアメリカ合衆国との間の相互協力及び安全保障条約

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Czyzak Memorandum

US Department of State

Memorandum from the Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs (L/FE - John J. Czyzak) to Mr. Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser

February 3, 1961

Subject: "Legal Status of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores Islands (Penghu)"

History of status of Formosa and the Pescadores

Prior to the Korean Hostilities

From the middle of the 17th century to 1895, Formosa and the Pescadores were part of the Chinese Empire. China then ceded these islands to Japan in 1895 in the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

When China declared war on Japan on December 9, 1941, she also declared that all treaties concerning the relations between China and Japan "are and remain null and void".

In the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the United States, Great Britain and China stated it to be their purpose that "all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as ... Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China". These same three governments on July 26, 1945 issued the Potsdam Proclamation declaring that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine". On August 8, 1945 the Soviet Union adhered to the Potsdam Proclamation. In the Instrument of Surrender signed September 2, 1945, the Japanese Government accepted its provisions.

Pursuant to Japanese Imperial General Headquarters General Order No. 1 issued at the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Japanese commanders in Formosa surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek "acting on behalf of the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". Continuously since that time, the Government of the Republic of China has occupied and administered Formosa and the Pescadores and subsequent to the surrender declared Formosa to be a part of China. Although there is no indication that the United States ever received official notification of such declaration, it can be said that the United States was aware of the fact that the Republic of China treated Formosa as a part of China. The view of the United States government in the post-war period, however, was typified by a statement on April 11, 1947 of Acting Secretary Acheson that the transfer of sovereignty over Formosa to China "has not yet been formalized". Sovereignty, it would appear, remained in Japan.

After a prolonged period of civil strife, the Chinese Communists succeeded in driving the Government of the Republic of China off the Chinese mainland. On October 1, 1949 the Chinese Communists proclaimed the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China. The seat of the Government of the Republic of China was transferred to Formosa, and in early December 1949, Taipei became its provisional capital.

The Korean Conflict

The outbreak of hostilities in Korea on June 25, 1950 brought to the fore the question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores. President Truman, in ordering the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, stated that "the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations".

[On August 25, 1950] the United States replied to the United Nations Security Council that

"The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the allied forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the Island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now."

By a letter dated September 20, 1950, the United States requested that the question of Formosa be placed on the agenda of the fifth session of the U.N. General Assembly. In an explanatory note of September 21, the United States, citing the Cairo and Potsdam declarations and the Japanese surrender, stated nevertheless:

"Formal transfer of Formosa to China was to await the conclusion of peace with Japan or some other appropriate formal act."

Consideration of this item by the General Assembly was eventually postponed.

Meanwhile the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council condemning the United States for acts of aggression and intervention in the internal affairs of China. The USSR also proposed for inclusion on the agenda of the fifth regular session of the General Assembly the question of "American aggression against China". In both cases the USSR asserted that Taiwan was an inalienable part of the territory of China. The U.S. delegate in Committee One, John Foster Dulles, answered the Soviet complaint of aggression in part as follows:

"In connection with this whole question of Formosa, I think it is wise for us to bear in mind that Formosa is still affected with an international interest. It is a former Japanese colony in the process of detachment. The United States certainly is entitled to some voice in the determination of the future of Formosa, because if it were not for the tremendous military effort and the great sacrifice which the United States made in that area of the world, none of us here today would be sitting around talking about Formosa.

"The United States, as one of the principal victors in the war against Japan, has a legitimate voice in what President Truman referred to as the "determination of the future status of Formosa," which he says, "must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan or consideration by the United Nations."

The Security Council defeated the Soviet resolution, and the General Assembly failed to endorse the charges against the U.S.

Japanese Peace Treaty

In September and October 1950, the United States proposed in a brief statement to the members of the Far Eastern Commission general principles for a Peace Treaty with Japan.

In an aide memoire dated November 20, 1950, the USSR commented:

"2. By the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943 . . . and the Potsdam Agreement of July 26, 1945 . . . the question of returning Formosa and the Pescadores to China was decided. In a similar manner the Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945 . . . decided the questions of returning the southern part of Sakhalin Island and the adjacent islands to the Soviet Union and handing over to her the Kurile Islands."

The United States replied in an aide memoire dated December 27, 1950:

" ... 2. The Cairo Declaration of 1943 stated the purpose to restore 'Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores to the Republic of China.' That declaration, like other wartime declarations such as those of Yalta and Potsdam, was in the opinion of the United States Government subject to any final peace settlement where all relevant factors should be considered ... "

From September 4 to 8, 1951 a conference for the conclusion and signature of a Treaty of Peace with Japan was held at San Francisco. China was not represented at the Conference because of the disagreement among the participants as to who actually represented the government of that country. Reflecting this disagreement is Article 2 of the Peace Treaty as it was signed on September 8 which reads in its pertinent part:

"(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores."

John Foster Dulles, U.S. delegate at the Conference, commented on this provision in Article 2:

"Some Allied Powers suggested that Article 2 should not merely delimit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam, but specify precisely the ultimate disposition of each of the ex-Japanese territories. This, admittedly, would have been neater. But it would have raised questions as to which there are now no agreed answers. We had either to give Japan peace on the Potsdam surrender terms or deny peace to Japan while the allies quarrel about what shall be done with what Japan is prepared, and required, to give up. Clearly, the wise course was to proceed now, so far as Japan is concerned, leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international solvents other than this treaty."

The delegate of the United Kingdom remarked:

"The treaty also provides for Japan to renounce its sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. The treaty itself does not determine the future of these islands."

The USSR refused to sign the Treaty. It objected, among other things, to the provision regarding Formosa and the Pescadores:

" ... this draft grossly violates the indisputable rights of China to the return of integral parts of Chinese territory; Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Paracel and other islands ... the draft contains only a reference to the renunciation by Japan of its rights to these territories but intentionally omits any mention of the further fate of these territories."

It is clear from these and other statements made at San Francisco, that sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores was not considered to have finally been determined by the Peace Treaty.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations also took this view. In its Report on the Treaty dated February 14, 1952, the Committee stated:

"It is important to remember that Article 2 is a renunciatory article and makes no provision for the power or powers which are to succeded Japan in the possession of and sovereignty over the ceded territory.

"During the negotiation of the Treaty some of the Allied Powers expressed the view that Article 2 of the treaty should not only relieve Japan of its sovereignty over the territories in question but should indicate specifically what disposition was to be made of each of them. The committee believes, however, that this would have been an unwise course to pursue. It might have raised differences among the allies which would have complicated and prolonged the conclusions of the peace. Under the circumstances it seems far better to have the treaty enter into force now, leaving to the future the final disposition of such areas as South Sakhalin and the Kuriles."

Although China was not a party to the San Francisco Treaty, a separate Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan was signed in Taipei on April 28, 1952. Article II of that treaty provided:

"It is recognized that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco in the United States of America on September 8, 1951 ... Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands."

Article 25 of the Treaty stated that the Treaty shall not confer any rights, title or benefits on any state not a party to the Treaty.

Chinese Mutual Defense Treaty and the Formosa Resolution

Against the background of a massive Chinese Communist propaganda campaign for the "liberation" of Taiwan, supplemented by military action against Quemoy and other offshore islands, the United States and the Republic of China signed a Mutual defense Treaty on December 2, 1954. The first paragraph of Article V of the Treaty reads:

"Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

Article VI provides that for the purpose of Article V the term "territories" shall mean in respect to the Republic of China, "Taiwan and the Pescadores". In an exchange of notes accompanying the Treaty, there appears the statement, "The Republic of China effectively controls both the territory described in Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Defense . . . and other territory".

In its report on the Treaty, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations briefly discussed the question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores:

"By the peace treaty of September 8, 1951, signed with the United States and other powers, Japan renounced 'all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.' The treaty did not specify the nation to which such right, title and claim passed. Although the Republic of China was not a signatory to the Treaty, it and the parties at the conference expressly recognized that it did not dispose finally of Formosa and the Pescadores . . . .

"Secretary Dulles informed the committee that the reference in Article V to 'the territories of either of the Parties' was language carefully chosen to avoid denoting anything one way or another as to their sovereignty.

"It is the view of the committee that the coming into force of the present treaty will not modify or affect the existing legal status of Formosa and the Pescadores. The treaty appears to be wholly consistent with all actions taken by the United States in this matter since the end of World War II, and does not introduce any basically new element in our relations with the territories in question . . . .

"To avoid any possibility of misunderstanding on this aspect of the treaty, the committee decided it would be useful to include in this report the following statement: It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or sovereignty of the territories to which it applies."

The question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores was again discussed on January 24, 1955, before a joint executive session of the Senate committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, in connection with the Formosa Resolution. It is understood that during the course of these hearings, Secretary Dulles indicated that sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores was not considered to have been transferred to the Republic of China in the Japanese Peace Treaty and that the question of sovereignty over these islands was not yet finally determined.

Discussion

It may be well at this time to examine the various legal theories outlined [in] this memorandum regarding the status of Formosa and the Pescadores in the light of the historical analysis set forth above.

1. The most tenable theory regarding the status of Formosa and the Pescadores is that sovereignty over the islands has not yet been finally determined. The Cairo and Potsdam declarations were statements of intention on the part of the Allied Powers that the islands would return to "the Republic of China". Chiang Kai-shek was authorized by the Allied Powers to take the surrender of the Japanese on the islands, and the Government of the Republic of China has continued to occupy and administer the islands ever since. This surrender by Japan of Formosa and the Pescadores, although providing a legal basis for the continued occupation and administration of the islands by the Government of the Republic of China, would not appear to have effected a transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of China.

Because of differences among the Allied Powers as to who represented China, no agreement on the disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores could be reached in the Japanese Peace Treaty. That the San Francisco Peace Treaty was intended to divest Japan of its sovereignty over the islands without transferring that sovereignty to any other country is abundantly clear from the record. There does not appear to have occurred anything subsequent to the Peace Treaty which can be said to have effected a transfer of that sovereignty.

An analogy to the status of Formosa as described may be found in the case of Cuba after the Spanish-American War. By Article I of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, Spain relinquished "all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba". Although the treaty named the United States as occupying power for the relinquished territory, it did not specify to whom sovereignty was to be transferred.

It may be well to point out that the legal status of the offshore islands, the Quemoy and Matsu groups, is different from that of Formosa and the Pescadores as described here. The offshore islands, although like Formosa and the Pescadores under the control of the Republic of China, have always been considered as part of "China". As Secretary Dulles explained:

"The legal position is different . . . , by virtue of the fact that technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been settled. That is because the Japanese Peace Treaty merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to these islands. But the future title is not determined by the Japanese Peace Treaty nor is it determined by the Peace Treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and Japan. Therefore the juridical status of these islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, is different from the juridical status of the offshore islands which have always been Chinese territory."

The usual way in which a formal transfer of territory is effected under international law is by cession, which typically consists of an agreement between the ceding and acquiring state. No such cession has occurred here. As has been seen, the Republic of China did declare the islands to be a part of China subsequent to the surrender, and such declaration might be considered an annexation of this territory. However, in view of the fact that Chiang Kai-shek, in accepting the Japanese surrender, was acting on behalf of the Allied Powers, it may be questioned whether any such attempted annexation would have validity in international law. Normally, military occupation does not have the effect of transferring sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant. Furthermore, the whole history of the San Francisco and Sino-Japanese Peace Treaties casts doubt on this interpretation.

... it has been contended that the transfer of Formosa and the Pescadores to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki was null and void in that these islands had been taken away from China at that time by force, contrary to international law. However, it is generally accepted that international law as it existed at that time disregarded "the effect of coercion in the conclusion of a treaty imposed by the victor upon the vanquished State" [I Oppenheim, International Law 891 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955)].

On February 11, 1945, at Yalta, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin agreed that the USSR would enter the war against Japan on condition, among others, that the southern part of Sakhalin and all the islands adjacent to it "shall be returned to the Soviet Union" and that the Kurile Islands "shall be handed over the Soviet Union". The Yalta agreement like the Cairo declaration has been considered by the United States to be a statement of intention rather than as creating binding international commitments.

The question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores must be viewed in the light of a parallel question regarding the Kurile Islands, the southern portions of Sakhalin and certain islands adjacent to it. Pursuant to the same instrument which directed Chiang Kai-shek to accept the Japanese surrender on Formosa and the Pescadores, the Soviet Union accepted the Japanese surrender on these islands had has continuously thereafter controlled and administered them. The USSR purported to annex the islands by a decree of February 2, 1946. The United States Government has maintained, however, that the USSR does not possess sovereignty over them.

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UN Resolution 1668

United Nations

General Assembly—Sixteenth Session

1668 (XVI). Representation of China in the United Nations.

The General Assembly,

Noting that a serious divergence of views exists among Member States concerning the representation of a founder Member who is named in the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling that this matter has been described repeatedly in the General Assembly by all segments of opinion as vital and crucial and that on numerous occasions its inclusion in the agenda has been requested under rule 15 of the Assembly's rules of procedure as an item of an important and urgent character,

Recalling further the recommendation contained in its resolution 396 (V) of 14 December 1950 that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case,

Decides, in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations, that any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question.

1080th plenary meeting,

15 December 1961.

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聯合國決議 1668 號

大會第十六屆會

一六六八（十六）．中國在聯合國之代表權問題

大會，

鑒於各會員國對於列名於聯合國憲章之一創始會員國之代表權問題，意見極度懸殊，

憶及此一問題會一再在大會被各方意見指為重大而有決定性之問題，且屢經依據大會議事規則第十五條作為重要而緊急之項目請求列入議程，

復憶大會一九五０年十二月十四日決議案三九六（五）中建議，凡遇主張有權代表某一會員國出席聯合國之政府不止一個當局，而該問題又成為聯合國爭執之點時，則此問題應依憲章宗旨原則並就個別情形，予以審議，

茲決議依照聯合國憲章第十八條之規定，任何改變中國代表權之提案為一重要問題。

一九六一年十二月十五日，

第一０八０次全體會議。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

According to records provided by the United Nations, voting summary was as follows: 61 Yes, 34 No, 7 Abstentions, 2 Non-voting. Total voting membership was 104. The following list shows the voting summary in detail.

Yes No Abstentions Non-voting
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo (Brazzaville)
Congo (Leopoldville)
Costa Rica
Dahomey
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Federation of Malaya
France
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Iceland
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Japan
Jordan
Laos
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Mauritania
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
South Africa
Spain
Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Upper Volta
Uruguay
Venezuela		 Afghanistan
Albania
Bulgaria
Burma
Byelorussian SSR
Cambodia
Ceylon
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Ethiopia
Finland
Ghana
Guinea
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iraq
Mali
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Norway
Poland
Romania
Sudan
Sweden
Syria
Tunisia
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
United Arab Republic
Yemen
Yugoslavia		 Austria
Cyprus
Nigeria
Pakistan
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Tanganyika		 Gabon
Togo

 
* * * SEE ALSO * * *

UN Resolution 2758: Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations (1971)

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Okinawa Reversion Agreement

Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands

Washington and Tokyo (simultaneously), 17th June, 1971

The United States of America and Japan

Noting that the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Japan reviewed together on November 19, 20, and 21, 1969 the status of the Ryukyu Islands the Daito Islands, referred to as "Okinawa" in the Joint Communique between the President and the Prime Minister issued on November 21, 1969, and agreed that the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan should enter immediately into consultations regarding the specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of these islands to Japan;

Noting that the two Governments have conducted such consultations and have reaffirmed that the reversion of these islands to Japan be carried out on the basis of the said Joint Communique;

Considering the United States of America desires, with respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, to relinquish in favour of Japan all rights and interests under Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the City of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, and thereby to have relinquished all its rights and interests in all territories under the said Article; and Considering further that Japan is willing to assume full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands;

Therefore, have agreed as follows:

Article 1 1. With respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, as defined in paragraph 2 below, the United States of America relinquishes in favour of Japan all rights and interests under Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the City of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, effective as of the date of entry into force of this Agreements. Japan, as of such date, assumes full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the said islands.
2. For the purpose of this Agreement, the term "the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands" means all the territories and their territorial waters with respect to which the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction was accorded to the United States of America under Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan other than those with respect to which such right has already been returned to Japan in accordance with the Agreement concerning the Amami Islands and the Agreement concerning Nanpo Shoto and Other Islands signed between the United States of America and Japan, respectively on December 24, 1953 and April 5, 1968.
Article 2 It is confirmed that treaties, conventions and other agreements concluded between the United States of America and Japan, including, but without limitation, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, and its related arrangements and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of American and Japan signed at Tokyo on April 2,1953, become applicable to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement.
Article 3 1. Japan will grant the United States of America on the date of entry into force of this Agreement the use of facilities and areas in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in accordance with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan signed at Washington on January 19, 1960 and its related arrangements.
2. In the application of Article lV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of the United States Armed Forces in Japan signed on January 19, 1960, to the facilities and areas the use of which will be granted in accordance with paragraph I above to the United States of America on the date of entry into force of this Agreement, it is understood that the phrase "the condition in which they were at the time they became available to the United States Armed Forces" in paragraph I of the said Article IV refers to the condition in which the facilities and areas first came into the use of the United States Armed Forces, and that the term "improvements" in paragraph 2 of the said Article includes those made prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement.
Article 4 1. Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nations against the United States of America and its nationals and against the local authorities of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of the United States of America in these islands, or from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of the United States of America having had any effect upon these islands, prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement.
2. The waiver in paragraph 1 above does not, however, include claims of Japanese nationals specifically recognized in the laws of the United States of America or the local laws of these islands applicable during the period of United States administration of these islands. The Government of the United States of America is authorised to maintain its duly empowered officials in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in order to deal with and settle such claims on and after the date of entry into force of this Agreement in accordance with the procedures to be established in consultation with the Government of Japan.
3. The Government of the United States of America will make ex gratia contributions for restoration of lands to the nationals of Japan whose lands in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands were damaged prior to July 1, 1950, while placed under the use of United States authorities, and were released from their use after June 30, 1961 and before the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Such contributions will be made in an equitable manner in relation under High Commissioner Ordinance Number 60 of 1967 to claims for damages done prior to July 1, 1950 to the lands released prior to July 1, 1961.
4. Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of the United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands under or in consequence of directives of the United States or local authorities, authorised by existing law during that period, and will take no action subjecting the United States nationals or the residents of these islands to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts of omissions.
Article 5 1. Japan recognizes the validity of, and will continue in full force and effect, final judgements in civil cases rendered by any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement, provided that such recognition or continuation would not be contrary to public policy.
2. Without in any way adversely affecting the substantive rights and positions of the litigants concerned, Japan will assume jurisdiction over and continue judgement and execution of any civil case pending as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement in any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.
3. Without in any way adversely affecting the substantive rights of the accused or suspect concerned, Japan will assume jurisdiction over, and may continue or institute proceedings with respect to, any criminal cases with which any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands is seized as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement or would have been seized had the proceedings been instituted prior to such date.
4. Japan may continue the execution of any final judgements rendered in criminal cases by any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.
Article 6 1. The properties of the Ryukyu Electric Power Corporation, the Ryukyu Domestic Water Corporation and the Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation shall be transferred to the Government of Japan on the date of entry into force of this Agreement, and the rights and obligations of the said Corporations shall be assumed by the Government of Japan on that date on conformity with the laws and regulations of Japan.
2. All other properties of the Government of the United States of America, existing in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement and located outside the facilities and areas provided on that date in accordance with Article III of this Agreement, shall be transferred to the Government of Japan on that date, except for those that are located on the lands returned to the landowners concerned before the date of entry into force of this Agreement and for those the title to which will be retained by the Government of the United States of America after that date with the consent of the Government of Japan.
3. Such lands in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands reclaimed by the Government of the United States of America and such other reclaimed lands acquired by it in these islands are held by the Government of the United States of America as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement become the property of the Government of Japan on that date.
4. The United States of America is not obliged to compensate Japan or its nationals for any alteration made prior to the date of entry into force of this agreement to the lands upon which the properties transferred to the Government of Japan under paragraphs I and 2 above are located.
Article 7 Considering, inter alia, that United States assets are being transferred to the Government of Japan under Article VI of this Agreement, that the Government of the United States of America is carrying out the return of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands to Japan in a manner consistent with the policy of the Government of Japan as specified in paragraph 8 of the Joint Communique of November 21,1969, and that the Government of the United States of America will bear extra costs, particularly in the area of employment after reversion, the Government of Japan will pay to the Government of the United States of America in United States dollars a total amount of three hundred and twenty million United States dollars (U.S. $320,000,000) over a period of five years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Of the said amount, the Government of Japan will pay one hundred million United States dollars (U.S. $100,000,000) within one week after the date of entry into force of this Agreement and the remainder in four equal annual instalments in June of each calendar year subsequent to the year in which this Agreement enters into force.
Article 8 The Government of Japan consents to the continued operation by the Government of the United States of America of the Voice of America relay station on Okinawa island for a period of five years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement in accordance with the arrangements to be concluded between the two Governments. The two Governments shall enter into consultation two years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement on future operation of the Voice of America on Okinawa Island.
Article 9 This Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Tokyo. This Agreement shall enter into force two months after the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Washington and Tokyo, this seventeenth day of June, 1971, in duplicate in the English and Japanese language, both equally authentic.

For the United States of America: WILLIAM P. ROGERS

For Japan: KIICHI AICHI 愛知揆一

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The U.S. reverted the islands to Japan on May 15, 1972.

The Okinawa Reversion Agreement is called as follows in Chinese and Japanese:

Chinese Japanese
Chongsheng guihuan xieding 沖繩歸還協定 Okinawa henkan kyōtei 沖縄返還協定

The full formal title (Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands) translates to Japanese as follows: Ryūkyū shotō oyobi Daitō shotō ni kansuru Nippon kokuto Amerika gasshū koku tono aidano kyōtei 琉球諸島及び大東諸島に関する日本国とアメリカ合衆国との間の協定.

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Starr Memorandum

US Department of State

Memorandum from the Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asia and the Pacific (L/EA - Robert I. Starr) to the Director of the Office of Republic of China Affairs (Charles T. Sylvester)

July 13, 1971

Subject: "Legal Status of Taiwan"

You have asked for a comprehensive memorandum analyzing the question of the legal status of Taiwan in terms suitable for Congressional presentation. Attached is a paper that should serve this purpose. It is drawn mainly from the February 3, 1961 Czyzak memorandum, and contains no sensitive information or reference to classified documents.

Concurrence: L – Mr. Salans

L:L/EA:RIStarr:cdj: 7/13/71 ex 28900

Legal Status of Taiwan

Prior to the Korean Hostilities

From the middle of the 17th century to 1895, Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores (Penghu) were part of the Chinese Empire. China then ceded these islands to Japan in 1895 in the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shimonoseki.

In the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the United States, Great Britain, and China stated it to be their purpose that "all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as…Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China". These same three governments on July 26, 1945 issued the Potsdam Proclamation declaring that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine". On August 8, 1945 the Soviet Union adhered to the Potsdam Proclamation. By an Imperial Rescript of September 2, 1945, the Japanese Emperor accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, and in the Instrument of Surrender signed on the same date, the Japanese Government "and their successors" undertook to carry out the provisions of the Declaration.

Pursuant to Japanese Imperial General Headquarters General Order No. 1, issued at the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Japanese commanders in Formosa surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek "acting on behalf of the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". Continuously since that time, the Government of the Republic of China has occupied and exercised authority over Formosa and the Pescadores.

The view of the U.S. in the intermediate post-war period was typified by a statement on April 11, 1947 of then Acting Secretary of State Acheson, in a letter to Senator Ball, that the transfer of sovereignty over Formosa to China "has not yet been formalized".

After a prolonged period of civil strife the Chinese Communists succeeded in driving the Government of the Republic of China off the Chinese mainland. On October 1, 1949 the Chinese Communists proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The seat of the Government of the Republic of China was transferred to Formosa, and in early December 1949, Taipei became its provisional capital.

Shortly thereafter, President Truman, in a statement of January 5, 1950, referred to a U.N. General Assembly Resolution of December 8, 1949, (Res. 291(IV)) which called on all states to refrain from "(a) seeking to acquire spheres of influence or to create foreign controlled regimes within the territory of China; (b) seeking to obtain special rights or privileges within the territory of China". He said:

"A specific application of the foregoing principles is seen in the present situation with respect to Formosa …

"The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time… the United States Government will no pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China."

The Korean Conflict

The outbreak of hostilities in Korea on June 25, 1950 brought to the fore the question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores. President Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, and as a corollary called upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all operations against the mainland. In addition, he stated that "the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations".

On August 24, 1950 the United States explained its position to the United Nations Security Council in the following terms:

"The action of the United States was expressly to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the allied forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the Island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now."

By a letter dated September 20, 1950, the United States requested that the question of Formosa be placed on the agenda of the fifth session of the U.N. General Assembly. In an explanatory note of September 21, the United States, citing the Cairo and Potsdam declarations and the Japanese surrender, stated nevertheless:

"Formal transfer of Formosa to China was to await the conclusion of peace with Japan or some other appropriate formal act."

That note also stated:

"The Government of the United States has made it abundantly clear that the measures it has taken with respect to Formosa were without prejudice to the long-term political status of Formosa, and the United States has no territorial ambitions and seeks no special position of privilege with respect to Formosa. The United States believes further that the future of Formosa and of the nearly eight million people inhabited there should be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."

Japanese Peace Treaty

From September 4 to 8, 1951 a conference for the conclusion and signature of a Treaty of Peace was held at San Francisco. China was not represented at the Conference because of the disagreement among the participants as to who actually represented the government of that country. Reflecting this disagreement is article 2 of the Peace Treaty, which reads in its pertinent part:

"(b) Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores."

John Foster Dulles, U.S. delegate at the Conference, commented on this provision in article 2:

"Some Allied Powers suggested that article 2 should not merely delimit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam, but specify precisely the ultimate disposition of each of the ex-Japanese territories. This, admittedly, would have been neater. But it would have raised questions as to which there are now no agreed answers. We had either to give Japan peace on the Potsdam Surrender Terms or deny peace to Japan while the allies quarrel about what shall be done with what Japan is prepared, and required, to give up. Clearly, the wise course was to proceed now, so far as Japan is concerned, leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international solvents other than this treaty."

The delegate of the United Kingdom remarked:

"The treaty also provides for Japan to renounce its sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. The treaty itself does not determine the future of these islands."

The USSR refused to sign the Treaty. It objected, among other things, to the provision regarding Formosa and the Pescadores:

"…this draft grossly violates the indisputable rights of China to the return of integral parts of Chinese territory: Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Paracel and other islands…. The draft contains only a reference to the renunciation by Japan of its rights to these territories but intentionally omits any mention of the further fate of these territories."

It is clear from these and other statements made at San Francisco, that although the Treaty provision constituted an appropriate act of renunciation by Japan, the future status of Formosa and the Pescadores was not considered to have finally been determined by the Peace Treaty.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations also took this view. In its Report on the Treaty dated February 14, 1952, the Committee stated:

"It is important to remember that article 2 is a renunciatory article and makes no provision for the power or powers which are to succeed Japan in the possession of and sovereignty over the ceded territory.

"During the negotiation of the Treaty some of the Allied Powers expressed the view that article 2 of the treaty should not only relieve Japan of its sovereignty over the territories in question but should indicate specifically what disposition was to be made of each of them. The committee believes, however, that this would have complicated and prolonged the conclusion of the peace. Under the circumstances it seems far better to have the treaty enter into force now, leaving to the future the final disposition of such areas as South Sakhalin and the Kuriles."

Although China was not a party to the San Francisco Treaty, a separate Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan was signed in Taipei on April 28, 1952. Article II of that treaty provided:

"It is recognized that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco in the united States of America on September 8, 1951…, Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores)…."

Explaining this provision to the Legislative Yuan, Foreign Minister Yeh of the Republic of China stated that under the San Francisco Peace Treaty "no provision was made for the return [of these islands] to China." He continued:

"Inasmuch as these territories were originally owned by us and as they are now under our control and, furthermore, Japan has renounced in the Sino-Japanese peace treaty these territories under the San Francisco Treaty of Peace, they are, therefore, in fact restored to us."

At another point, Foreign Minister Yeh stated that "no provision has been made either in the San Francisco Treaty of Peace as to the future of Taiwan and Penghu". During the interpellations of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in the Legislative Yuan, the Foreign Minister was asked, "What is the status of Formosa and the Pescadores?" He replied:

"Formosa and the Pescadores were formerly Chinese territories. As Japan has renounced her claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, only China has the right to take them over. In fact, we are controlling them now, and undoubtedly they constitute a part of our territories. However, the delicate international situation makes it that they do not belong to us. Under present circumstances, Japan has no right to transfer Formosa an the Pescadores to us; nor can we accept such a transfer from Japan even if she so wishes… In the Sino-Japanese peace treaty, we have made provisions to signify that residents including juristic persons of Formosa and the Pescadores bear Chinese nationality, and this provision may serve to mend any future gaps when Formosa and the Pescadores are restored to us."

Chinese Mutual Defense Treaty

Against the background of a Chinese Communist propaganda campaign in July, 1954 for the "liberation" of Taiwan, supplemented in September, 1954 by military action against Quemoy and other offshore islands, the United States and the Republic of China signed a Mutual Defense Treaty on December 2, 1954. The first paragraph of Article V of the Treaty reads:

"Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

Article VI provides that for the purpose of Article V the term "territories" shall mean in respect to the Republic of China, "Taiwan and the Pescadores". In an exchange of notes accompanying the Treaty, there appears the statement, "The Republic of China effectively controls both the territory described in Article VI of the Treaty… and other territory".

In its report on the Treaty, the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations discussed the question of the true status of Formosa and the Pescadores:

"By the peace treaty of September 8, 1951, signed with the United States and other powers, Japan renounced 'all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.' The treaty did not specify the nation to which such right, title and claim passed. Although the Republic of China was not a signatory to the Treaty, it recognized that it did not dispose finally of Formosa and the Pescadores ….

"…he (Secretary Dulles) informed the committee that the reference in article V to 'the territories of either of the Parties' was language carefully chosen to avoid denoting anything one way or the other as to their sovereignty.

"It is the view of the committee that the coming in to force of the present treaty will not modify or affect the existing legal status of Formosa and the Pescadores. The treaty appears to be wholly consistent with all actions taken by the United States in this matter since the end of World War II, and does not introduce any basically new element in our relations with the territories in question. Both by act and by implication we have accepted the Nationalist Government as the lawful authority on Formosa."

To avoid any possibility of misunderstanding on this aspect of the treaty, the committee decided it would be useful to include in this report to following statement: "It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or sovereignty of the territories to which it applies."

In presenting the Committee's report to the Senate on February 9, 1955, Senator Walter George referred to the question of the legal status of Taiwan: "The view was advance during committee's consideration of the treaty that it may have the effect of recognizing that the government of Chiang Kai-shek has sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores."

On the one hand, reference was made to the Cairo Declaration which stated that Japan was to be stripped of her island territories in the Pacific and that territories stolen from the Chinese such as Formosa and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic of China. On the other hand, reference was made to the fact that while Japan renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, such title was not conveyed to any nation. After full exploration of this matter with Secretary Dulles, the committee decided that this treaty was not a competent instrument to resolve doubts about sovereignty over Formosa. It agreed to include in its report the following statement:

"It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the present treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or the sovereignty of the territories referred to in article VI.

In other words, so far as the United States in concerned, it is our understanding that the legal status of the territories referred to in article VI, namely, Formosa and the Pescadores – whatever their status may be – is not altered in any way by the conclusion of this treaty."

Quemoy and Matsu

It may be well to note the special status of the offshore islands, the Quemoy and Matsu groups, in contrast to that of Formosa and the Pescadores as described here. The offshore islands have always been considered as part of "China". As Secretary Dulles explained in 1954:

"The legal position is different..., by virtue of the fact that technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been settled. That is because the Japanese Peace Treaty merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to these islands. But the future title is not determined by the Japanese Peace Treaty nor is it determined by the Peace Treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and Japan. Therefore the juridical status of these islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, is different from the juridical status of the offshore islands which have always been Chinese territory."

Recent Restatement of the United States Position

The position of the United States was set forth by the States Department in connection with the 1970 Hearings before the Subcommittee on the United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (91st Cong., 2d Sess.):

"Legal Status of Taiwan as Defined in Japanese Peace Treaty and Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty

"Article 2 of the Japanese Peace treaty, signed on September 8, 1951 at San Francisco, provides that 'Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores'. The same language was used in Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace between China and Japan signed on April 28, 1952. In neither treaty did Japan cede this area to any particular entity. As Taiwan and the Pescadores are not covered by any existing international disposition, sovereignty over the area is an unsettled question subject to future international resolution. Both the Republic of China and the Chinese Communists disagree with this conclusion and consider that Taiwan and the Pescadores are part of the sovereign state of China. The United States recognized the Government of the Republic of Taiwan as legitimately occupying and exercising jurisdiction over Taiwan and the Pescadores."

The future relationship of Taiwan to mainland China and the resolution of disputes dividing the governments in Taipei and Peking involve issues that the United States cannot resolve. We have made clear that our primary concern is that these issues should be resolved by peaceful means, without resort to the use of force. Until such a resolution is achieved we may continue to deal respectively with the government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of China on matters affecting mutual interests, accepting the practical situation as we find it.

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UN Resolution 2758

United Nations

General Assembly—Twenty-sixth Session

2758 (XXVI). Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations

The General Assembly,

Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China is essential both for the protection of the Charter of the United Nations and for the cause that the United Nations must serve under the Charter,

Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council,

Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.

1976th plenary meeting,

25 October 1971.

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聯合國決議 2758 號

大會第二十六屆會

二七五八（二十六）．恢復中華人民共和國在聯合國的合法權利

大會，

回顧聯合國憲章的原則，

考慮到，恢復中華人民共和國的合法權利對於維護聯合國憲章和聯合國組織根據憲章所必須從事的事業都是必不可少的，

承認中華人民共和國政府的代表是中國在聯合國組織的唯一合法代表，中華人民共和國是安全理事會五個常任理事國之一，

決定：恢復中華人民共和國的一切權利，承認她的政府的代表為中國在聯合國組織的唯一合法代表並立即把蔣介石的代表從它在聯合國組織及其所屬一切機構中所非法佔據的席位上驅逐出去。

一九七一年十月二十五日，

第一九七六次全體會議。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTES ===============

According to records provided by the United Nations, voting summary was as follows: 76 Yes, 35 No, 17 Abstentions, 3 Non-voting. Total voting membership was 131. The following list shows the voting summary in detail, ROC diplomatic allies at the time being highlighted with a red asterisk (*).

Yes No Abstentions Non-voting
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Austria
Belgium *
Bhutan
Botswana *
Bulgaria
Burma
Burundi
Byelorussian SSR
Cameroon
Canada
Ceylon
Chile
Congo (Brazzaville)
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Democratic Yemen
Denmark
Ecuador *
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Ghana
Guinea
Guyana
Hungary
Iceland
India
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Kenya
Kuwait
Laos
Libyan Arab Republic *
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mexico *
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Netherlands
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Peru *
Poland
Portugal *
Romania
Rwanda *
Senegal *
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Somalia
Sudan
Sweden
Syrian Arab Republic
Tanzania
Togo *
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
United Kingdom
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Zambia		 Australia *
Bolivia *
Brazil *
Central African Republic *
Chad *
Congo (Leopoldville) *
Costa Rica *
Dahomey *
Dominican Republic *
El Salvador *
Gabon *
Gambia *
Guatemala *
Haiti *
Honduras *
Ivory Coast *
Japan *
Khmer Republic
Lesotho *
Liberia *
Madagascar *
Malawi *
Malta *
New Zealand *
Nicaragua *
Niger *
Paraguay *
Philippines *
Saudi Arabia *
South Africa
Swaziland *
United States *
Upper Volta *
Uruguay *
Venezuela *		 Argentina *
Bahrain
Barbados *
Colombia *
Cyprus *
Fiji
Greece *
Indonesia
Jamaica *
Jordan *
Lebanon *
Luxembourg *
Mauritius
Panama *
Qatar
Spain *
Thailand *		 China
Maldives *
Oman

On the day of the vote the ROC maintained diplomatic relations with 59 states, 56 of them UN members, but only 33 allies supported keeping the ROC on China's UN seat, 23 allies denying the ROC support in the vote by voting Yes, abstaining or not participating in the vote.

10 ROC diplomatic allies voted Yes (i. e. in favour of the PRC and against the ROC): Belgium, Botswana, Ecuador, Libya, Mexico, Peru, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, and Togo. All of them cut official ties with the ROC before the end of September 1978.

12 ROC diplomatic allies abstained: Argentina, Barbados, Colombia, Cyprus, Greece, Jamaica, Jordan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Panama, Spain, and Thailand. All of them (except Panama) cut official ties with the ROC before the end of February 1980; Panama did so on June 13, 2017.

The Maldives were an ROC diplomatic ally (until April 15, 1972) but are listed as non-voting.

Two UN members which did not maintain formal diplomatic relations with the ROC at the time but supported the ROC by voting No were the Khmer Republic (today's Cambodia) and South Africa.

The voting list did not include three additional ROC diplomatic allies—South Korea became a UN member on Sept. 17, 1991 (cut official ties with the ROC on Aug. 24, 1992); Vietnam joined the UN on Sept. 20, 1977 (South Vietnam cut official ties with the ROC on April 30, 1975); and the Vatican is not a UN member but an observer since April 6, 1964.

It should be pointed out that the text of the UN Resolution 2758 does not mention Taiwan at all, so it doesn't support Beijing's claim that Taiwan 'is part of the PRC'.

* * * SEE ALSO * * *

UN Resolution 1668: Representation of China in the United Nations (1961)

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Shanghai Communiqué

1. President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

2. President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tsetung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

3. During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

4. President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

5. The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

6. The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution—this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal: big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea". It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the Indo-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

7. The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to reexamine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Viet Nam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of december 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

8. There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-in- terference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

9. With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

  • progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
  • both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
  • neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
  • neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

10. Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

11. The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined".

12. The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

13. Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

14. The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

15. The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

16. President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

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中華人民共和國和美利堅合眾國聯合公報（《上海公報》）

（1972 年 2 月 28 日）

1. 應中華人民共和國總理周恩來的邀請，美利堅合眾國總統理查德.尼克松自一九七二年 二月二十一日至二月二十八日訪問了中華人民共和國。陪同總統的有尼克松夫人、美國國務卿威廉.羅杰斯、總統助理亨利.基辛格博適和其他美國官員。

2. 尼克松總統于二月二十一日會見了中國共產黨主席毛澤東。兩位領導人就中美關係和國際事務認真、坦率地交換了意見。

3. 訪問中，尼克松總統和周恩來總理就美利堅合眾國和中華人民共和國關係正常化以及 雙方關心的其他問題進行了廣泛、認真和坦率的討論。此外，國務卿威廉.羅杰斯和外 交部長姬鵬飛也以同樣精神進行了會談。

4. 尼克松總統及其一行訪問了北京，參觀了文化、工業和衣業項目，還訪問了杭州和 上海，在那裡繼續同中國領導人進行討論，並參觀了類似的項目。

5. 中華人民共和國和美利堅合眾國領導人經過這麼多年一直沒有接觸之後，現在有機會 坦率地互相介紹彼此對各種問題的觀點，對此，雙方認為是有益的。他們回顧了經歷著重大變化和巨大動盪的國際形勢，闡明了各自的立場和態度。

6. 中國方面聲明：那裡有壓迫，那裡就有反抗。國家要獨立，民族要解放，人民要革命， 已成為不可抗拒的歷史潮流。國家不分大小，應該一律平等，大國不應欺負小國，強國 不應欺負弱國。中國決不做超級大國，並且反對任何霸權主權和強權政治。中國方面表示：堅決支持一切被壓迫人民和被壓迫民族除爭取自由、解放的鬥爭，各國人民有權按 照自已的意願，選擇本國的社會制度，有權維護本國獨立、主權和領土完整，反對外來 侵略、干涉、控制和顛覆。一切外國軍隊都應撤回本國去。中國方面表示：堅決支持 越南、查莫、柬埔寨三國人民為實現自己的目標所作的努力，堅決支持越南南方共和臨時革命政府的七點建議以及在今年二月對其中兩個關鍵問題的說明和印度支那人民最高級會議聯合聲明；堅決支持朝鮮民主主義人民共和國政府一九七一年四月十二日 提出的朝鮮和平統一的八點方案和取消"聯合國韓國統一復興委員會"的主張；堅決反對日本軍國主義的復活和對外擴張，堅決支持日本人民要求建立一個獨立、民主、 和平和中立的日本的願望；堅決主張印度和巴基斯坦按照聯合國關於印巴問題的決議，立即把自己的軍隊全部撤回到本國境內以及查莫和克什米爾停火線的各自一方，堅決 支持巴基斯坦政府和人民維護獨立、主權的鬥爭以及查莫和克什米爾人民爭取自決權的鬥爭。

7. 美國方面聲明：為了亞洲和世界的和平，需要對緩和當前的緊張局勢和消除衝突的基本 原因作出努力。美國將致力於建立公正而穩定的和平。這種和平是公正的，因為它滿足 各國人民和各國爭取自由和進步的願望。這種和平是穩定的，因為它消除外來侵略的 危險。美國支持全世界各國人民在沒有外來壓力和干預的情況下取得個人自由和社會 進步。美國相信，改善具有不同意勢形態的國與國之間的聯繫，以便減少由於事故、 錯誤估計或誤會而引起的對峙的危險，有助於緩和緊張局勢的努力。各國應該互相尊重 並願進行和平競賽，讓行動作出最後判斷。任何國家都不應自稱一慣正確，各國都要 準備為了共同的利益重新檢查自己的態度。美國強調：應該允許印度支那各國人民在 不受外來干涉的情況下決定自己的命運；美國一慣的首要目標是談判解決。越南共和國 和美國在一九七二年一月二十七日提出的八點建議提供了實現這個目標的基礎；在談判得不到解決時，美國預計在符合印度支那每個國家自決這一目標的情況下以這個地區 最終撤出所有美國軍隊。美國將保持其與大韓民國的密切聯繫和對它的支持；美國將 支持大韓民國為謀求在朝鮮半島緩和緊張局勢和增加聯繫的努力。美國最高度地珍視同 日本的友好關係，並將繼續發展現存的緊密紐帶。按照一九七一年十二月廿一日聯合國 安全理事會的決議，美國贊成印度和巴基斯坦之間的停火繼續下去，並把全部軍事力量 撤至本國境內以及查漠和克什米爾停火線的各自一方；美國支持南亞各國人民和平地、 不受軍事威脅地建設自己的未來的權力，而不使這個地區成為大國競爭的目標。

8. 中美兩國的社會制度和對外政策有著本質的區別。但是，雙方同意，各國不論社會制度 如何，都應根據尊重各國主權和領土完整、不侵犯別國、不干涉別國內政、平等互利、 和平共處的原則來處理國與國之間的關係。國際爭端因在此基礎上予以解決，而不訴諸 武力和武力威脅。美國和中華人民共和國準備在它們的相互關係中實行這些原則 。

9. 考慮到國際關係的上述這些原則，雙方聲明：

── 中美兩國關係走向正常化是符合所有國家的利益的；

── 雙方都希望減少國際軍事衝突的危險；

── 任何一方都不應該在亞洲－太平洋地區謀求霸權，每一方都反對任何其他國家或國家集團建立這種霸權的努力；

── 任何一方都不准備代表任何第三方進行談判，也不准備同對方達成針對其他國家的協定或諒解。

10. 雙方都認為，任何大國與另一大國進行勾結反對其他國家，或者大國在世界上劃分利益範圍，那都是違背世界各國人民利益的。

11. 雙方回顧了中美兩國之間長期存在的嚴重爭端。中國方面重申自己的立場；台灣問題是 阻礙中美兩國關係正常化的關鍵問題；中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府； 台灣是中國的一個省，早已歸還祖國；解放台灣是中國內政，別國無權干涉；全部美國武裝力量和軍事設施必須從台灣撤走。中國政府堅決反對任何旨在製造"一中一台"，"一個中國、兩個政府"、"兩個中國"、"台灣獨立"和鼓吹"台灣地位未定"的 活動。

12. 美國方面聲明：美國認識到，在台灣海峽兩邊的所有中國人都認為只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部份。美國政府對這一立場不提出異議。它重申它對由中國人自己和平解決台灣問題的關心。考慮到這一前景，它確認從台灣撤出全部美國武裝力量和軍事設施的最終目標。在此期間，它將隨著這個地區緊張局勢的緩和逐步減少它在台灣的武裝力量 和軍事設施。雙方同意，擴大兩國人民之間的瞭解是可取的。為此目的，它們就科學、技術、文化、 體育和新聞等方面的具體領域進行了討論。在這些領域中進行人民之間的聯繫和交流將會是互相有利的。雙方各自承諾對進一步發展這種聯繫和交流提供便利。

13. 雙方把雙邊貿易看作是另一個可以帶來互利的領域，並一致認為平等互利的經濟關係 是符合兩國人民的利益的。它們同意為逐步發展兩國間的貿易提供便利。

14. 雙方同意，它們將通過不同渠道保持接觸，包括不定期地派遣美國高級代表前來北京， 就促進兩國關係正常化進行具體磋商並繼續就共同關心的問題交換意見。

15. 雙方希望，這次訪問的成果將為兩國關係開闢新的前景。雙方相信，兩國關係正常化 不僅符合中美兩國人民的利益，而且會對緩合亞洲及世界緊張局勢作出貢獻。

16. 尼克松總統、尼克松夫人及美方一行對中華人民共和國政府和人民給予他們有禮貌的款待，表示感謝 。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the PRC

September 29, 1972

Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier of the State Council Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from September 25 to September 30, 1972. Accompanying Prime Minister Tanaka were Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ohira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido and other government officials.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung met Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on September 27. They had an earnest and friendly conversation.

Prime Minister Tanaka and Minister for Foreign Affairs Ohira had an earnest and frank exchange of views with Premier Chou En-lai and Minister for Foreign Affairs Chi Peng-fei in a friendly atmosphere throughout on the question of the normalization of relations between Japan and China and other problems between the two countries as well as on other matters of interest to both sides, and agreed to issue the following Joint Communique of the two Governments:

Japan and China are neighbouring countries, separated only by a strip of water with a long history of traditional friendship. The peoples of the two countries earnestly desire to put an end to the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The realization of the aspiration of the two peoples for the termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between Japan and China will add a new page to the annals of relations between the two countries.

The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself. Further, the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations between the two countries from the stand of fully understanding "the three principles for the restoration of relations" put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.

In spite of the differences in their social systems existing between the two countries, the two countries should, and can, establish relations of peace and friendship. The normalization of relations and development of good-neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the interests of the two peoples and will contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and peace in the world.

1. The abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of China is terminated on the date on which this Joint Communique is issued.

2. The Government of Japan recognizes that Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.

3. The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Postsdam Proclamation.

4. The Government of Japan and the Government of People's Republic of China have decided to establish diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to take all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of the functions of each other's embassy in their respective capitals in accordance with international law and practice, and to exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.

5. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.

6. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to establish relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

The two Governments confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Japan and China shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.

7. The normalization of relations between Japan and China is not directed against any third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

8. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, the two Governments will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace and friendship.

9. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to further promoting relations between the two countries and to expanding interchanges of people, the two Governments will, as necessary and taking account of the existing non-governmental arrangements, enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding agreements concerning such matters as trade, shipping, aviation, and fisheries.

Done at Peking, September 29, 1972

Prime Minister of Japan, Tanaka Kakuei

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Ohira Masayoshi

Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Zhou Enlai

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Ji Pengfei

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中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府聯合聲明(中日聯合聲明)

（1972 年 9 月 29 日）

日本國內閣總理大臣田中角榮應中華人民共和國國務院總理周恩來的邀請，於一九七二年九月二十五日至九月三十日訪問了中華人民共和國。陪同田中角榮總理大臣的有大平正芳外務大臣、二階堂進內閣官房長官以及其他政府官員。

毛澤東主席于九月二十七日會見了田中角榮總理大臣。雙方進行了認真、友好的談話。 周恩來總理、姬鵬飛外交部長和田中角榮總理大臣、大平正芳外務大臣，始終在友好氣氛中，以中日兩國邦交正常化問題為中心，就兩國間的各項問題，以及雙方關心的其他問題，認真、坦率地交換了意見，同意發表兩國政府的下述聯合聲明：

中日兩國是一衣帶水的鄰邦，有著悠久的傳統友好的歷史。兩國人民切望結束迄今存在於兩國間的不正常狀態。戰爭狀態的結束，中日邦交的正常化，兩國人民這種願望的實現，將揭開兩國關係史上新的一頁。

日本方面痛感日本國過去由於戰爭給中國人民造成的重大損害的責任，表示深刻的反省。日本方面重申站在充分理解中華人民共和國政府提出的"複交三原則"的立場上，謀求實現日中邦交正化這一見解。中國方面對此表示歡迎。

中日兩國儘管社會制度不同，應該而且可以建立和平友好關係。兩國邦交正常化，發展兩國的睦鄰友好關係，是符合兩國人民利益的，也是對緩和亞洲緊張局勢和維護世界和平的貢獻。

（一）自本聲明公佈之日起，中華人民共和國和日本國之間迄今為止的不正常狀態宣告結束。

（二）日本國政府承認中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府。

（三）中華人民共和國政府重申：臺灣是中華人民共和國領土不可分割的一部分。日本國政府充分理解和尊重中國政府的這一立場，並堅持遵循波茨坦公告第八條的立場。

（四）中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府決定自一九七二年九月二十九日起建立外交關係。兩國政府決定，按照國際法和國際慣例，在各自的首都為對方大使館的建立和履行職務採取一切必要的措施，並儘快互換大使。

（五）中華人民共和國政府宣佈：為了中日兩國人民的友好，放棄對日本國的戰爭賠償要求。

（六）中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府同意在互相尊重主權和領土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉內政、平等互利、和平共處各項原則的基礎上，建立兩國間持久的和平友好關係。 根據上述原則和聯合國憲章的原則，兩國政府確認，在相互關係中，用和平手段解決一切爭端，而不訴諸武力和武力威脅。

（七）中日邦交正常化，不是針對第三國的。兩國任何一方都不應在亞洲和太平洋地區謀求霸權，每一方都反對任何其他國家或集團建立這種霸權的努力。

（八）中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府為了鞏固和發展兩國間的和平友好關係，同意進行以締結和平友好條約為目的的談判。

（九）中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府為進一步發展兩國間的關係和擴大人員往來，根據需要並考慮到已有的民間協定，同意進行以締結貿易、航海、航空、漁業等協定為目的的談判。

日本國內閣總理大臣 田中角榮（簽字）

日本國外務大臣 大平正芳（簽字）

中華人民共和國國務院總理 周恩來（簽字）

中華人民共和國外交部長 姬鵬飛（簽字）

一九七二年九月二十九日於北京

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

In Japanese, the "Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the PRC" is called as follows: Nippon koku seifuto Chūgoku jimmin kyōwakoku seifuno kyōdō seimei 日本国政府と中華人民共和国政府の共同声明.

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the PRC

Japan and the People's Republic of China,

Recalling with satisfaction that since the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China issued a Joint Communique in Peking on September 29, 1972, the friendly relations between the two Governments and the peoples of the two countries have developed greatly on a new basis.

Confirming that the above-mentioned Joint Communique constitutes the basis of the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries and that the principles enunciated in the Joint Communique should be strictly observed.

Confirming that the principles of the Charter of the United Nations should be fully respected.

Hoping to contribute to peace and stability in Asia and in the world.

For the purpose of solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries.

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace and Friendship and for that purpose have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

● Japan: Minister for Foreign Affairs Sunao Sonoda

● People's Republic of China: Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1 1. The Contracting Parties shall develop relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.
2. The Contracting Parties confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, they shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.
Article 2 The Contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
Article 3 The Contracting parties shall, in the good-neighborly and friendly spirit and in conformity with the principles of equality and mutual benefit and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, endeavor to further develop economic and cultural relations between the two countries and to promote exchanges between the peoples of the two countries.
Article 4 The present Treaty shall not affect the position of either Contracting Party regarding its relations with third countries.
Article 5 1. The present Treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification which shall take place at Tokyo. The present Treaty shall remain in force for ten years and thereafter shall continue to be in force until terminated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2.
2. Either Contracting Party may, by giving one year's written notice to the other Contracting Party, terminate the present Treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE in duplicate, in the Japanese and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic, at Peking, this twelfth day of August, 1978.

For the People's Republic of China: Huang Hua (signature)

For Japan: Sunao Sonoda (signature)

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中華人民共和國和日本國和平友好條約（中日和平友好條約）

（1978 年 8 月 12 日）

1972年中日邦交正常化後，雙方在政治、經濟等方面的交流發展很快。在此背景下，兩國要求儘早展開和平友好條約談判的呼聲日益高漲。1975 年 1 月，中日兩國進行了預備性談判，並達成兩點共識。但是，由於雙方在某些特定問題上始終無法達成一致，談判一度擱淺。

隨著國際局勢和中日兩國國內形勢的變化，締約談判出現轉機。1978 年 7 月，中斷了兩年多的中日締約談判在北京重新舉行。經歷多輪艱苦談判後，中國外交部長黃華與日本外相園田直 8 月 12 日在北京正式簽訂《中日和平友好條約》。10 月 23 日，中國國務院副總理鄧小平訪問日本期間，兩國互換《中日和平友好條約》批准書，條約正式生效。

中華人民共和國和日本國滿意地回顧了自一九七二年九月二十九日中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府在北京發表聯合聲明以來，兩國政府和兩國人民之間的友好關係在新的基礎上獲得很大的發展；確認上述聯合聲明是兩國間和平友好關係的基礎，聯合聲明所表明的各項原則應予嚴格遵守；確認聯合國憲章的原則應予充分尊重；希望對亞洲和世界的和平與安定作出貢獻；為了鞏固和發展兩國間的和平友好關係；決定締結和平友好條約，為此各自委派全權代表如下：

中華人民共和國委派外交部長 黃華；

日本國委派外務大臣 園田直。

雙方全權代表互相校閱全權證書，認為妥善後，達成協議如下：

第一條 一、締約雙方應在互相尊重主權和領土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉內政、平等互利、和平共處各項原則的基礎上，發展兩國間持久的和平友好關係。
二、根據上述各項原則和聯合國憲章的原則，締約雙方確認，在相互關係中，用和平手段解決一切爭端，而不訴諸武力和武力威脅。
第二條 締約雙方表明：任何一方都不應在亞洲和太平洋地區或其他任何地區謀求霸權，並反對任何其他國家或國家集團建立這種霸權的努力。
第三條 締約雙方將本著睦鄰友好的精神，按照平等互利和互不干涉內政的原則，為進一步發展兩國之間的經濟關係和文化關係，促進兩國人民的往來而努力。
第四條 本條約不影響締約各方同第三國關係的立場。
第五條 一、本條約須經批准，自在東京交換批准書之日起生效。本條約有效期為十年。十年以後，在根據本條第二款的規定宣佈終止以前，將繼續有效。
二、締約任何一方在最初十年期滿時或在其後的任何時候，可以在一年以前，以書面預先通知締約另一方，終止本條約。

雙方全權代表在本條約上簽字蓋章，以昭信守。

本條約於一九七八年八月十二日在北京簽訂，共兩份，每份都用中文和日文寫成，兩種文本具有同等效力。

中華人民共和國全權代表　黃華（簽字）

日本國全權代表　園田直（簽字）

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

In Japanese, the "Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the PRC" is called as follows: Nippon kokuto Chūgoku jimmin kyōwakoku tono aidano heiwa yūkō jōyaku 日本国と中華人民共和国との間の平和友好条約.

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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Joint Communiqué of the US and the PRC (Normalization Communiqué)

January 1, 1979

(The communiqué was released on December 15, 1978, in Washington and Beijing.)

1. The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.

2. The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

3. The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué and emphasize once again that:

4. Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.

5. Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

6. Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

7. The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

8. Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange Ambassadors and establish Embassies on March 1, 1979.

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美國──中華人民共和國建立外交關係的聯合公報（關係正常化公報）

一九七九年一月一日

1. 中華人民共合國和美利堅合眾國商定自一九七九年一月一日起互相承認並建立外交關係。

2. 美利堅合眾國承認中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府。在此範圍內，美國人民將同台灣人民保持文化、商務和其他非官方關係。

3. 中華人民共和國和美利堅合眾國重申上海公報中雙方一致同意的各項原則，並再次強調。

4. 雙方都希望減少國際軍事衝突的危險。

5. 任何一方都不應該在亞洲-太平洋地區以及世界上任何地區謀求霸權，每一方都反對 任何其他國家或國家集團建立這種霸權的努力。

6. 任何一方都不準備代表任何第三方進行談判，也不準備同對方達成針對其他國家的 協議或諒解。

7. 美利堅合眾國政府承認中國的立場，即只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部份。

8. 雙方認為，中美關係正常化不僅符合中國人民和美國人民的利益，而且有助於亞洲 和世界的和平事實。

中華人民共和國和美利堅合眾國將於一九七九年三月一日互派大使並建立大使館。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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Message to Compatriots in Taiwan

January 1, 1979

(The Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress at its Fifth Plenary Session on December 26, 1978 adopted after discussion a message to compatriots in Taiwan.)

Dear Compatriots in Taiwan:

Today is New Year's Day 1979. We hereby extend our cordial and sincere greetings to you on behalf of the people of all nationalities on the mainland of our motherland.

As an old saying goes, "When festival times come round people think all the more of their loved ones." On this happy occasion as we celebrate New Year's Day, our thoughts turn all the more to our kith and kin, our old folks, our brothers and sisters, in Taiwan. We know you have the motherland and your kinsfolk on the mainland in mind too. This mutual feeling of many years standing grows with each passing day. From the day when Taiwan was unfortunately separated from the motherland in 1949, we have not been able to communicate with or visit each other, our motherland has not been able to achieve reunification, relatives have been unable to get together, and our nation, country and people have suffered greatly as a result. All Chinese compatriots and people of Chinese descent throughout the world look forward to an early end to this regrettable state of affairs.

The Chinese nation is a great nation. It accounts for almost a quarter of the world's population and has a long history and brilliant culture, and its outstanding contributions to world civilization and human progress are universally recognized. Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times. The Chinese nation has great vitality and cohesion. Throughout its history, foreign invasions and internal strife have failed to split our nation permanently. Taiwan's separation from the motherland for nearly 30 years has been artificial and against our national interests and aspirations, and this state of affairs must not be allowed to continue. Every Chinese, in Taiwan or on the mainland, has a compelling responsibility for the survival, growth and prosperity of the Chinese nation. The important task of reunifying our motherland, on which hinges the future of the whole nation, now lies before us all; it is an issue no one can evade or should try to. If we do not quickly set about ending this disunity so that our motherland is reunified at an early date, how can we answer our ancestors and explain to our descendants? This sentiment is shared by all. Who among the descendants of the Yellow Emperor wishes to go down in history as a traitor?

Radical changes have taken place in China's status in the world over the past 30 years. Our country's international prestige is rising constantly and its international role becomes ever more important. The people and governments of almost all countries place tremendous hopes on us in the struggle against hegemonism and in safeguarding peace and stability in Asia and the world as a whole. Every Chinese is proud to see the growing strength and prosperity of our motherland. If we can end the present disunity and join forces soon, there will be no end to our contributions to the future of mankind. Early reunification of our motherland is not only the common desire of all the people of China, including our compatriots in Taiwan, but the common wish of all peace-loving peoples and countries the world over.

Reunification of China today is consonant with popular sentiment and the general trend of development. The world in general recognizes only one China, with the government of the People's Republic of China as its sole legal government. The recent conclusion of the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the normalization of relations between China and the United States show still more clearly that no one can stop this trend. The present situation in the motherland, one of stability and unity, is better than ever. The people of all nationalities on the mainland are working hard with one will for the great goal of the four modernizations. It is our fervent hope that Taiwan returns to the embrace of the motherland at an early date so that we can work together for the great cause of national development. Our state leaders have firmly declared that they will take present realities into account in accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the motherland and respect the status quo on Taiwan and the opinions of people in all walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures in settling the question of reunification so as not to cause the people of Taiwan any losses. On the other hand, people in all walks of life in Taiwan have expressed their yearning for their homeland and old friends, stated their desire "to identify themselves with and rejoin their kinsmen," and raised diverse proposals which are expressions of their earnest hope for an early return to the embrace of the motherland. As all conditions now are favourable for reunification and everything is set, no one should go against the will of the nation and against the trend of history.

We place hopes on the 17 million people on Taiwan and also the Taiwan authorities. The Taiwan authorities have always taken a firm stand of one China and have been opposed to an independent Taiwan. We have this stand in common and it is the basis for our co-operation. Our position has always been that all patriots belong to one family. The responsibility for reunifying the motherland rests with each of us. We hope the Taiwan authorities will treasure national interests and make valuable contributions to the reunification of the motherland.

The Chinese government has ordered the People's Liberation Army to stop the bombardment of Jinmen (Quemoy) and other islands as from today. A state of military confrontation between the two sides still exists along the Taiwan Straits. This can only breed man-made tension. We hold that first of all this military confrontation should be ended through discussion between the government of the People's Republic of China and the Taiwan authorities so as to create the necessary prerequisites and a secure environment for the two sides to make contacts and exchanges in whatever area.

The prolonged separation has led to inadequate mutual understanding between the compatriots on the mainland and on Taiwan and various inconveniences for both sides. Since overseas Chinese residing in faraway foreign lands can return for visits and tours and hold reunions with their families, why can't compatriots living so near, on the mainland and on Taiwan, visit each other freely? We hold that there is no reason for such barriers to remain. We hope that at an early date transportation and postal services between both sides will be established to make it easier for compatriots of both sides to have direct contact, write to each other, visit relatives and friends, exchange tours and visits and carry out academic, cultural, sports and technological interchanges.

Economically speaking, Taiwan and the mainland of the motherland were originally one entity. Unfortunately, economic ties have been suspended for many years. Construction is going ahead vigorously on the motherland and it is our wish that Taiwan also grows economically more prosperous. There is every reason for us to develop trade between us, each making up what the other lacks, and carry out economic exchanges. This is mutually required and will benefit both parties without doing any harm to either.

Dear compatriots in Taiwan,

The bright future of our great motherland belongs to us and to you. The reunification of the motherland is the sacred mission history has handed to our generation. Times are moving ahead and the situation is developing. The earlier we fulfil this mission, the sooner we can jointly write an unprecedented, brilliant page in the history for our country, catch up with advanced powers and work together with them for world peace, prosperity and progress. Let us join hands and work together for this glorious goal!

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告台灣同胞書

中華人民共和國全國人大常委會告台灣同胞書

（一九七九年一月一日，第五屆全國人民代表大會常務委員會於一九七八年十二月二十六日舉行第五次會議討論通過）

親愛的台灣同胞：

今天是一九七九年元旦。我們代表祖國大陸的各族人民，向諸位同胞致以親切的問候和衷心的祝賀。

昔人有言："每逢佳節倍思親"。在這歡度新年的時刻，我們更加想念自己的親骨肉——台灣的父老兄弟姐妹。我們知道，你們也無限懷念祖國和大陸上的親人。這種綿延了多少歲月的相互思念之情與日俱增。自從一九四九年台灣同祖國不幸分離以來，我們之間音訊不通，來往斷絕，祖國不能統一，親人無從團聚，民族、國家和人民都受到了巨大的損失。所有中國同胞以及全球華裔，無不盼望早日結束這種令人痛心的局面。

我們中華民族是偉大的民族，占世界人口近四分之一，享有悠久的歷史和優秀的文化，對世界文明和人類發展的卓越貢獻，舉世共認。台灣自古就是中國不可分割的一部分。中華民族是具有強大的生命力和凝聚力的。儘管歷史上有過多少次外族入侵和內部紛爭，都不曾使我們的民族陷於長久分裂。近三十年台灣同祖國的分離，是人為的，是違反我們民族的利益和願望的，決不能再這樣下去了。每一個中國人，不論是生活在台灣的還是生活在大陸上的，都對中華民族的生存、發展和繁榮負有不容推諉的責任。統一祖國這樣一個關係全民族前途的重大任務，現在擺在我們大家的面前，誰也不能回避，誰也不應回避。如果我們還不儘快結束目前這種分裂局面，早日實現祖國的統一，我們何以告慰于列祖列宗？何以自解於子孫後代？人同此心，心同此理，凡屬黃帝子孫，誰願成為民族的千古罪人？

近三十年來，中國在世界上的地位已發生根本變化。我國國際地位越來越高，國際作用越來越重要。各國人民和政府為了反對霸權主義、維護亞洲和世界的和平穩定，幾乎莫不對我們寄予極大期望。每一個中國人都為祖國的日見強盛而感到自豪。我們如果儘快結束目前的分裂局面，把力量合到一起，則所能貢獻於人類前途者，自更不可限量。早日實現祖國統一，不僅是全中國人民包括台灣同胞的共同心願，也是全世界一切愛好和平的人民和國家的共同希望。

今天，實現中國的統一，是人心所向，大勢所趨。世界上普遍承認只有一個中國，承認中華人民共和國政府是中國唯一合法的政府。最近中日和平友好條約的簽定，和中美兩國關係正常化的實現，更可見潮流所至，實非任何人所得而阻止。目前祖國安定團結，形勢比以往任何時候都好。在大陸上的各族人民，正在為實現四個現代化的偉大目標而同心戮力。我們殷切期望台灣早日歸回祖國，共同發展建國大業。我們的國家領導人已經表示決心，一定要考慮現實情況，完成祖國統一大業，在解決統一問題時尊重台灣現狀和台灣各界人士的意見，採取合情合理的政策和辦法，不使台灣人民蒙受損失。台灣各界人士也紛紛抒發懷鄉思舊之情，訴述"認同回歸"之願，提出種種建議，熱烈盼望早日回到祖國的懷抱。時至今日，種種條件都對統一有利，可謂萬事俱備，任何人都不應當拂逆民族的意志，違背歷史的潮流。

我們寄希望於一千七百萬台灣人民，也寄希望於台灣當局。台灣當局一貫堅持一個中國的立場，反對台灣獨立。這就是我們共同的立場，合作的基礎。我們一貫主張愛國一家。統一祖國，人人有責。希望台灣當局以民族利益為重，對實現祖國統一的事業作出寶貴的貢獻。

中國政府已經命令人民解放軍從今天起停止對金門等島嶼的炮擊。台灣海峽目前仍然存在著雙方的軍事對峙，這只能製造人為的緊張。我們認為，首先應當通過中華人民共和國政府和台灣當局之間的商談結束這種軍事對峙狀態，以便為雙方的任何一種範圍的交往接觸創造必要的前提和安全的環境。

由於長期隔絕，大陸和台灣的同胞互不瞭解，對於雙方造成各種不便。遠居海外的許多僑胞都能回國觀光，與家人團聚。為什麼近在咫尺的大陸和台灣的同胞卻不能自由來往呢？我們認為這種藩籬沒有理由繼續存在。我們希望雙方儘快實現通航通郵，以利雙方同胞直接接觸，互通訊息，探親訪友，旅遊參觀，進行學術文化體育工藝觀摩。

台灣和祖國大陸，在經濟上本來是一個整體。這些年來，經濟聯繫不幸中斷。現在，祖國的建設正在蓬勃發展，我們也希望台灣的經濟日趨繁榮。我們相互之間完全應當發展貿易，互通有無，進行經濟交流。這是相互的需要，對任何一方都有利而無害。

親愛的台灣同胞：

我們偉大祖國的美好前途，既屬於我們，也屬於你們。統一祖國，是歷史賦於我們這一代人的神聖使命。時代在前進，形勢在發展。我們早一天完成這一使命，就可以早一天共同創造我國空前未有的光輝燦爛的歷史，而與各先進強國並駕齊驅，共謀世界的和平、繁榮和進步。讓我們攜起手來，為這一光榮目標共同奮鬥！

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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Taiwan Relations Act

Public Law 96-8 96th Congress

An Act:

To help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

Section 1.

This Act may be cited as the "Taiwan Relations Act".

FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF POLICY

Section 2.

(a) The President—having terminated governmental relations between the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, the Congress finds that the enactment of this Act is necessary—

(1) to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; and

(2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan.

(b) It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area;

(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;

(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;

(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;

(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and

(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

(c) Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the United States in human rights, especially with respect to the human rights of all the approximately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.

IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY WITH REGARD TO TAIWAN

Section 3.

(a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

(b) The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.

(c) The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.

APPLICATION OF LAWS; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Section 4.

(a) The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect the application of the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan, and the laws of the United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979.

(b) The application of subsection (a) of this section shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

(1) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with such respect to Taiwan.

(2) Whenever authorized by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to conduct or carry out programs, transactions, or other relations with respect to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized to conduct and carry out, in accordance with section 6 of this Act, such programs, transactions, and other relations with respect to Taiwan (including, but not limited to, the performance of services for the United States through contracts with commercial entities on Taiwan), in accordance with the applicable laws of the United States.

(3) (A) The absence of diplomatic relations and recognition with respect to Taiwan shall not abrogate, infringe, modify, deny, or otherwise affect in any way any rights or obligations (including but not limited to those involving contracts, debts, or property interests of any kind) under the laws of the United States heretofore or hereafter acquired by or with respect to Taiwan.

(B) For all purposes under the laws of the United States, including actions in any court in the United States, recognition of the People's Republic of China shall not affect in any way the ownership of or other rights or interests in properties, tangible and intangible, and other things of value, owned or held on or prior to December 31, 1978, or thereafter acquired or earned by the governing authorities on Taiwan.

(4) Whenever the application of the laws of the United States depends upon the law that is or was applicable on Taiwan or compliance therewith, the law applied by the people on Taiwan shall be considered the applicable law for that purpose.

(5) Nothing in this Act, nor the facts of the President's action in extending diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, the absence of diplomatic relations between the people on Taiwan and the United States, or the lack of recognition by the United States, and attendant circumstances thereto, shall be construed in any administrative or judicial proceeding as a basis for any United States Government agency, commission, or department to make a finding of fact or determination of law, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, to deny an export license application or to revoke an existing export license for nuclear exports to Taiwan.

(6) For purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Taiwan may be treated in the manner specified in the first sentence of section 202(b) of that Act.

(7) The capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued in courts in the United States, in accordance with the laws of the United States, shall not be abrogated, infringed, modified, denied, or otherwise affected in any way by the absence of diplomatic relations or recognition.

(8) No requirement, whether expressed or implied, under the laws of the United States with respect to maintenance of diplomatic relations or recognition shall be applicable with respect to Taiwan.

(c) For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United States, the Congress approves the continuation in force of all treaties and other international agreements, including multilateral conventions, entered into by the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and in force between them on December 31, 1978, unless and until terminated in accordance with law.

(d) Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization.

Overseas Private Investment Corporation

Section 5.

(a) During the three-year period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, the $1,000 per capita income restriction in insurance, clause (2) of the second undesignated paragraph of section 231 of the reinsurance, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall not restrict the activities of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in determining whether to provide any insurance, reinsurance, loans, or guaranties with respect to investment projects on Taiwan.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, in issuing insurance, reinsurance, loans, or guaranties with respect to investment projects on Taiwan, the Overseas Private Insurance Corporation shall apply the same criteria as those applicable in other parts of the world.

THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF TAIWAN

Section 6.

(a) Programs, transactions, and other relations conducted or carried out by the President or any agency of the United States Government with respect to Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be conducted and carried out by or through—

(1) The American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia, or

(2) such comparable successor nongovernmental entity as the President may designate, (hereafter in this Act referred to as the "Institute").

(b) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to enter into, perform, enforce, or have in force an agreement or transaction relative to Taiwan, such agreement or transaction shall be entered into, performed, and enforced, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, by or through the Institute.

(c) To the extent that any law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the District of Columbia, or of any State or political subdivision thereof in which the Institute is incorporated or doing business, impedes or otherwise interferes with the performance of the functions of the Institute pursuant to this Act; such law, rule, regulation, or ordinance shall be deemed to be preempted by this Act.

Services by the Institute to United States Citizens on Taiwan

Section 7.

(a) The Institute may authorize any of its employees on Taiwan—

(1) to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, affidavit, or deposition, and to perform any notarial act which any notary public is required or authorized by law to perform within the United States;

(2) To act as provisional conservator of the personal estates of deceased United States citizens; and

(3) to assist and protect the interests of United States persons by performing other acts such as are authorized to be performed outside the United States for consular purposes by such laws of the United States as the President may specify.

(b) Acts performed by authorized employees of the Institute under this section shall be valid, and of like force and effect within the United States, as if performed by any other person authorized under the laws of the United States to perform such acts.

Tax Exempt Status of the Institute

Section 8.

(a) The Institute, its property, and its income are exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States (except to the extent that section 11(a)(3) of this Act requires the imposition of taxes imposed under chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, relating to the Federal Insurance Contributions Act) or by State or local taxing authority of the United States.

(1) For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the Institute shall be treated as an organization described in sections 170(b)(1)(A), 170(c), 2055(a), 2106(a)(2)(A), 2522(a), and 2522(b).

FURNISHING PROPERTY AND SERVICES TO AND OBTAINING SERVICES FROM THE INSTITUTE

Section 9.

(a) Any agency of the United States Government is authorized to sell, loan, or lease property (including interests therein) to, and to perform administrative and technical support functions and services for the operations of, the Institute upon such terms and conditions as the President may direct. Reimbursements to agencies under this subsection shall be credited to the current applicable appropriation of the agency concerned.

(b) Any agency of the United States Government is authorized to acquire and accept services from the Institute upon such terms and conditions as the President may direct. Whenever the President determines it to be in furtherance of the purposes of this Act, the procurement of services by such agencies from the Institute may be effected without regard to such laws of the United States normally applicable to the acquisition of services by such agencies as the President may specify by Executive order.

(c) Any agency of the United States Government making funds available to the Institute in accordance with this Act shall make arrangements with the Institute for the Comptroller General of the United States to have access to the; books and records of the Institute and the opportunity to audit the operations of the Institute.

TAIWAN INSTRUMENTALITY

Section 10.

(a) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to render or provide to or to receive or accept from Taiwan, any performance, communication, assurance, undertaking, or other action, such action shall, in the manner and to the. extent directed by the President, be rendered or Provided to, or received or accepted from, an instrumentality established by Taiwan which the President determines has the necessary authority under the laws applied by the people on Taiwan to provide assurances and take other actions on behalf of Taiwan in accordance with this Act.

(b) The President is requested to extend to the instrumentality established by Taiwan the same number of offices and complement of personnel as were previously operated in the United States by the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979.

(c) Upon the granting by Taiwan of comparable privileges and immunities with respect to the Institute and its appropriate personnel, the President is authorized to extend with respect to the Taiwan instrumentality and its appropriate; personnel, such privileges and immunities (subject to appropriate conditions and obligations) as may be necessary for the effective performance of their functions.

SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH THE INSTITUTE

Section 11.

(a) (1) Under such terms and conditions as the President may direct, any agency of the United States Government may separate from Government service for a specified period any officer or employee of that agency who accepts employment with the Institute.

(2) An officer or employee separated by an agency under paragraph (1) of this subsection for employment with the Institute shall be entitled upon termination of such employment to reemployment or reinstatement with such agency (or a successor agency) in an appropriate position with the attendant rights, privileges, and benefits with the officer or employee would have had or acquired had he or she not been so separated, subject to such time period and other conditions as the President may prescribe.

(3) An officer or employee entitled to reemployment or reinstatement rights under paragraph (2) of this subsection shall, while continuously employed by the Institute with no break in continuity of service, continue to participate in any benefit program in which such officer or employee was participating prior to employment by the Institute, including programs for compensation for job-related death, injury, or illness; programs for health and life insurance; programs for annual, sick, and other statutory leave; and programs for retirement under any system established by the laws of the United States; except that employment with the Institute shall be the basis for participation in such programs only to the extent that employee deductions and employer contributions, as required, in payment for such participation for the period of employment with the Institute, are currently deposited in the program's or system's fund or depository. Death or retirement of any such officer or employee during approved service with the Institute and prior to reemployment or reinstatement shall be considered a death in or retirement from Government service for purposes of any employee or survivor benefits acquired by reason of service with an agency of the United States Government.

(4) Any officer or employee of an agency of the United States Government who entered into service with the Institute on approved leave of absence without pay prior to the enactment of this Act shall receive the benefits of this section for the period of such service.

(b) Any agency of the United States Government employing alien personnel on Taiwan may transfer such personnel, with accrued allowances, benefits, and rights, to the Institute without a break in service for purposes of retirement and other benefits, including continued participation in any system established by the laws of the United States for the retirement of employees in which the alien was participating prior to the transfer to the Institute, except that employment with the Institute shall be creditable for retirement purposes only to the extent that employee deductions and employer contributions, as required, in payment for such participation for the period of employment with the Institute, are currently deposited in the system' s fund or depository.

(c) Employees of the Institute shall not be employees of the United States and, in representing the Institute, shall be exempt from section 207 of title 18, United States Code.

(1) For purposes of sections 911 and 913 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, amounts paid by the Institute to its employees shall not be treated as earned income. Amounts received by employees of the Institute shall not be included in gross income, and shall be exempt from taxation, to the extent that they are equivalent to amounts received by civilian officers and employees of the Government of the United States as allowances and benefits which are exempt from taxation under section 912 of such Code.

(2) Except to the extent required by subsection (a)(3) of this section, service performed in the employ of the Institute shall not constitute employment for purposes of chapter 21 of such Code and title II of the Social Security Act.

REPORTING REQUIREMENT

Section 12.

(a) The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress the text of any agreement to which the Institute is a party. However, any such agreement the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States shall not be so transmitted to the Congress but shall be transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President.

(b) For purposes of subsection (a), the term "agreement" includes—

(1) any agreement entered into between the Institute and the governing authorities on Taiwan or the instrumentality established by Taiwan; and

(2) any agreement entered into between the Institute and an agency of the United States Government.

(c) Agreements and transactions made or to be made by or through the Institute shall be subject to the same congressional notification, review, and approval requirements and procedures as if such agreements and transactions were made by or through the agency of the United States Government on behalf of which the Institute is acting.

(d) During the two-year period beginning on the effective date of this Act, the Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House and Senate House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of Foreign Relations the Senate, every six months, a report describing and reviewing economic relations between the United States and Taiwan, noting any interference with normal commercial relations.

RULES AND REGULATIONS

Section 13.

The President is authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act. During the three-year period beginning on the effective date speaker of this Act, such rules and regulations shall be transmitted promptly to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Such action shall.not, however, relieve the Institute of the responsibilities placed upon it by this Act.'

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Section 14.

(a) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and other appropriate committees of the Congress shall monitor—

(1) the implementation of the provisions of this Act;

(2) the operation and procedures of the Institute;

(3) the legal and technical aspects of the continuing relationship between the United States and Taiwan; and

(4) the implementation of the policies of the United States concerning security and cooperation in East Asia.

(b) Such committees shall report, as appropriate, to their respective Houses on the results of their monitoring.

DEFINITIONS

Section 15.

For purposes of this Act—

(1) the term "laws of the United States" includes any statute, rule, regulation, ordinance, order, or judicial rule of decision of the United States or any political subdivision thereof; and

(2) the term "Taiwan" includes, as the context may require, the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores, the people on those islands, corporations and other entities and associations created or organized under the laws applied on those islands, and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing authorities (including political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities thereof).

Authorization of Appriations

Section 16.

In addition to funds otherwise available to carry out the provisions of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State for the fiscal year 1980 such funds as may be necessary to carry out such provisions. Such funds are authorized to remain available until expended.

Severability of Provisions

Section 17.

If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section 18.

This Act shall be effective as of January 1, 1979. Approved April 10, 1979.

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台灣關係法

(本譯文僅供參考，引用請以原始英文條文為依歸)

January 1, 1979

台灣關係法

Public Law 96-8 96th Congress

An Act

本法乃為協助維持西太平洋之和平、安全與穩定，並授權繼續維持美國人民與在台灣人民間之商業、文化及其他關係，以促進美國外交政策，並為其他目的。

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

簡稱———第一條：

本法律可稱為「臺灣關係法」

政策的判定及聲明———第二條：

（甲）由於美國總統已終止美國和臺灣統治當局（在 1979 年 1 月 1 日前美國承認其為中華民國）間的政府關係，美國國會認為有必要制訂本法：

　（一）有助於維持西太平洋地區的和平、安全及穩定；

　（二）授權繼續維持美國人民及臺灣人民間的商務、文化及其他各種關係，以促進美國外交政策的推行。

（乙）美國的政策如下：

　（一）維持及促進美國人民與臺灣之人民間廣泛、密切及友好的商務、文化及其他各種關係；並且維持及促進美國人民與中國大陸人民及其他西太平洋地區人民間的同種關係；

　（二）表明西太平洋地區的和平及安定符合美國的政治、安全及經濟利益，而且是國際關切的事務；

　（三）表明美國決定和「中華人民共和國」建立外交關係之舉，是基於臺灣的前途將以和平方式決定這一期望；

　（四）任何企圖以非和平方式來決定臺灣的前途之舉 -- 包括使用經濟抵制及禁運手段在內，將被視為對西太平洋地區和平及安定的威脅，而為美國所嚴重關切；

　（五）提供防禦性武器給臺灣人民；

　（六）維持美國的能力，以抵抗任何訴諸武力、或使用其他方式高壓手段，而危及臺灣人民安全及社會經濟制度的行動。

（丙）本法律的任何條款不得違反美國對人權的關切，尤其是對於臺灣地區一千八百萬名居民人權的關切。玆此重申維護及促進所有臺灣人民的人權是美國的目標。

美國對臺灣政策的實行———第三條：

（甲）為了推行本法第二條所明訂的政策，美國將使臺灣能夠獲得數量足以使其維持足夠的自衛能力的防衛物資及技術服務；

（乙）美國總統和國會將依據他們對臺灣防衛需要的判斷，遵照法定程序，來決定提供上述防衛物資及服務的種類及數量。對臺灣防衛需要的判斷應包括美國軍事當局向總統及國會提供建議時的檢討報告。

（丙）指示總統如遇臺灣人民的安全或社會經濟制度遭受威脅，因而危及美國利益時，應迅速通知國會。總統和國會將依憲法程序，決定美國應付上述危險所應採取的適當行動。

法律的適用和國際協定———第四條：

（甲）缺乏外交關係或承認將不影嚮美國法律對臺灣的適用，美國法律將繼續對臺灣適用，就像 1979 年 1 月 1 日之前，美國法律對臺灣適用的情形一樣。

（乙）前項所訂美國法律之適用，包括下述情形，但不限於下述情形：

　（一）當美國法律中提及外國、外國政府或類似實體、或與之有關之時，這些字樣應包括臺灣在內，而且這些法律應對臺灣適用；

　（二）依據美國法律授權規定，美國與外國、外國政府或類似實體所進行或實施各項方案、交往或其他關係，美國總統或美國政府機構獲准，依據本法第六條規定，遵照美國法律同樣與臺灣人民進行或實施上述各項方案、交往或其他關係（包括和臺灣的商業機構締約，為美國提供服務）。

　（三）１ 美國對臺灣缺乏外交關係或承認，並不消除、剝奪、修改、拒絕或影響以前或此後臺灣依據美國法律所獲得的任何權利及義務（包括因契約、債務關係及財產權益而發生的權利及義務）。

　２為了各項法律目的，包括在美國法院的訴訟在內，美國承認「中華人民共和國」之舉，不應影響臺灣統治當局在 1978 年 12 月 31 日之前取得或特有的有體財產或無體財產的所有權，或其他權利和利益，也不影響臺灣當局在該日之後所取得的財產。

　（四）當適用美國法律需引據遵照臺灣現行或舊有法律，則臺灣人民所適用的法律應被引據遵照。

　（五）不論本法律任何條款，或是美國總統給予「中華人民共和國」外交承認之舉、或是臺灣人民和美國之間沒有外交關係、美國對臺灣缺乏承認、以及此等相關情勢，均不得被美國政府各部門解釋為，依照 1954 年原子能法及 1978 年防止核子擴散法， 在行政或司法程序中決定事實及適用法律時，得以拒絕對臺灣的核子輸出申請，或是撤銷已核准的輸出許可證。

　（六）至於移民及國籍法方面，應根據該法 202 項 (b) 款規定對待臺灣。

　（七）臺灣依據美國法律在美國法院中起訴或應訴的能力，不應由於欠缺外交關係或承認，而被消除、剝奪、修改、拒絕或影響。

　（八）美國法律中有關維持外交關係或承認的規定，不論明示或默示，均不應對臺灣適用。

（丙）為了各種目的，包括在美國法院中的訴訟在內，國會同意美國和(美國在 1979 年 1 月 1 日前承認為中華民國的)臺灣當局所締結的一切條約和國際協定(包括多國公約)，至 1978 年 12 月 31 日仍然有效者，將繼續維持效力，直至依法終止為止。

（丁）本法律任何條款均不得被解釋為，美國贊成把臺灣排除或驅逐出任何國際金融機構或其他國際組織。

美國海外私人投資保證公司———第五條：

（甲）當本法律生效後三年之內，1961 年援外法案 231 項第2段第2款所訂國民平均所得一千美元限制。將不限制美國海外私人投資保證公司活動，其可決定是否對美國私人在臺投資計畫提供保險、再保險、貸款或保證。

（乙）除了本條 (A.) 項另有規定外，美國海外私人投資保證公司在對美國私人在臺投資計畫提供保險、再保險、貸款或保證時，應適用對世界其他地區相同的標準。

美國在台協會———第六條：

（甲）美國總統或美國政府各部門與臺灣人民進行實施的各項方案、交往或其他關係，應在總統指示的方式或範圍內，經由或透過下述機構來進行實施：

　（一）美國在台協會，這是一個依據哥倫此亞特區法律而成立的一個非營利法人：

　（二）總統所指示成立，繼承上述協會的非政府機構。（以下將簡稱「美國在台協會」為「該協會」。）

（乙）美國總統或美國政府各部門依據法律授權或要求，與臺灣達成、進行或實施協定或交往安排時，此等協定或交往安排應依美國總統指示的方式或範圍，經由或透過該協會達成、進行或實施。

（丙）該協會設立或執行業務所依據的哥倫比亞特區、各州或地方政治機構的法律、規章、命令，阻撓或妨礙該協會依據本法律執行業務時，此等法律、規章、命令的效力應次於本法律。

該協會對在臺美國公民所提供的服務———第七條：

（甲）該協會得授權在臺雇員：

　（一）執行美國法律所規定授權之公證人業務，以採錄證詞，並從事公證業務：

　（二）擔任已故美國公民之遺產臨時保管人：

　（三）根據美國總統指示，依照美國法律之規定，執行領事所獲授權執行之其他業務，以協助保護美國人民的利益。

（乙）該協會雇員獲得授權執行之行為有效力，並在美國境內具有相同效力，如同其他人獲得授權執行此種行為一樣。

該協會的免稅地位———第八條：

該協會、該協會的財產及收入，均免受美國聯邦、各州或地方稅務當局目前或嗣後一切課稅。

對該協會提供財產及服務、以及從該協會獨得之財產及服務———第九條

（甲）美國政府各部門可依總統所指定條件，出售、借貸或租賃財產（包括財產利益）給該協會，或提供行政和技術支援和服務，供該協會執行業務。此等機構提供上述服務之報酬，應列入各機構所獲預算之內。

（乙）美國政府各部門得依總統指示的條件，獲得該協會的服務。當總統認為，為了實施本法律的宗旨有必要時，可由總統頒佈行政命令，使政府各部門獲得上述服務，而不顧上述部門通常獲得上述服務時，所應適用的法律。

（丙）依本法律提供經費給該協會的美國政府各部門，應和該協會達成安排，讓美國政府主計長得查閱該協會的帳冊記錄，並有機會查核該協會經費動用情形。

臺灣機構———第十條：

（甲）美國總統或美國政府各機構依據美國法律授權或要求，向臺灣提供，或由臺灣接受任何服務、連絡、保證、承諾等事項，應在總統指定的方式及範圍內，向臺灣設立的機構提供上述事項，或由這一機構接受上述事項。此一機構乃總統確定依臺灣人民適用的法律而具有必需之權力者，可依據本法案代表臺灣提供保證及採取其他行動者。

（乙）要求總統給予臺灣設立的機構相同數目的辨事處及規定的全體人數，這是指與 1979 年 1 月 1 日以前美國承認為中華民國的台灣當局在美國設立的辦事處及人員相同而言。

（丙）根據臺灣給予美國在臺協會及其適當人員的特權及豁免權，總統已獲授權給予臺灣機構及其適當人員有效履行其功能所需的此種特權及豁免權（要視適當的情況及義務而定）。

公務人員離職受雇於協會———第十一條：

（甲）（一）依據總統可能指示的條件及情況，任何美國政府機構可在一特定時間內，使接受服務於美國在臺協會的任何機構職員或雇員脫離政府職務。

　（二）任何根據上述 (1.) 節情況離開該機構而服務於該協會的任何職員或雇員，有權在終止於協會的服務時，以適當的地位重新為原機構（或接替的機構）雇用或復職，該職員或雇員並保有如果末在總統指示的期間及其他情況下離職所應獲得的附帶權利、特權及福利。

　（三）在上述 (2.) 項中有權重新被雇用或復職的職員或雇員，在繼續不斷為該協會服務期間，應可繼續參加未受雇於該協會之前所參加的任何福利計劃，其中包括因公殉職、負傷或患病的補償；衛生計劃及人壽保險；年度休假、病假、及其他例假計劃；美國法律下任何制度的退休安排。此種職員或雇員如果在為該協會服務期間，及重為原機構雇用或復職之前死亡或退休，應視為在公職上死亡或退休。

　（四）任何美國政府機構的職員或雇員，在本法案生效前享准保留原職而停薪情況進入該協會者，在服務期間將獲受本條之下的各項福利。

（乙）美國政府任何機構在臺灣雇用外國人員者，可將此種人員調往該協會，要自然增加其津貼、福利及權利，並不得中斷其服務，以免影響退休及其他福利，其中包括繼續參加調往該協會前，法律規定的退休制度。

（丙）該協會的雇用人員不是美國政府的雇用的人員，其在代表該協會時，免於受美國法典第 18 條 207 項之約束。

（丁）（一）依據一九五四年美國國內稅法 911 及 913 項，該協會所付予雇用人員之薪水將不視為薪資所得。該協會雇用人員所獲之薪水應予免稅，其程度與美國政府的文職人員情況同。

　（二）除了前述 (A.) (3.) 所述範圍，受雇該協會所作的服務，將不構成社會安全法第二條所述之受雇目的。

有關報告之規定———第十二條：

（甲）國務卿應將該協會為其中一造的任何協定內容全文送交國會。但是，如果總統認為立即公開透露協定內容會危及美國的國家安全，則此種協定不應送交國會，而應在適當的保密命令下，送交參院及眾院的外交委員會，僅於總統發出適當通知時才得解除機密。

（乙）為了 (A.) 段所述的目的，「協定」一詞包括

　（一）該協會與臺灣的治理當局或臺灣設立之機構所達成的任何協定；

　（二）該協會與美國各機構達成的任何協定。

（丙）經由該協會所達成的協定及交易，應接受同樣的國會批准、審查、及認可，如同這些協定是經由美國各機構達成一樣，該協會是代表美國政府行事。

（丁）在本法案生效之日起的兩年期間，國務卿應每六個月向眾院議長及參院外交委員會提出一份報告，描述及檢討與臺灣的經濟關係，尤其是對正常經濟關係的任何干預。

規則與章程———第十三條：

授權總統規定適於執行本法案各項目的的規則與章程。在本法案生效之日起三年期間，此種規則與章程應立即送交眾院議長及參院外交委員會。然而，此種規則章程不得解除本法案所賦予該協會的責任。

國會監督———第十四條：

（甲）眾院外交委員會，參院外交委員會及國會其他適當的委員會將監督：

　（一）本法案各條款的執行；

　（二）該協會的作業及程序；

　（三）美國與臺灣繼續維持關係的法律及技術事項；

　（四）有關東亞安全及合作的美國政策的執行。

（乙）這些委員會將適當地向參院或眾院報告監督的結果。

定義———第十五條：

為本法案的目的

（甲）「美國法律」一詞，包括美國任何法規、規則、章程、法令、命令、美國及其政治分支機構的司法程序法；

（乙）「臺灣」一詞將視情況需要，包括臺灣及澎湖列島，這些島上的人民、公司及根據適用於這些島嶼的法律而設立或組成的其他團體及機構，1979 年 1 月 1 日以前美國承認為中華民國的臺灣治理當局，以及任何接替的治理當局（包括政治分支機構、機構等）。

撥款之授權———第十六條：

除了執行本法案各條款另外獲得的經費外，本法案授權國務卿在 1980 會計年度撥用執行本法案所需的經費。此等經費已獲授權保留運用，直到用盡為止。

條款效力———第十七條：

如果本法案的任何條款被視為無效，或條款對任何人或任何情況的適用性無效，則本法案的其他部份，以及此種條款適用於其他個人或情況的情形，並不受影響。

生效日期———第十八條：

本法案應於 1979 年 1 月 1 日生效。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

Additional information concerning the Taiwan Relations Act can be found on relevant page of the US Congress; please click here.

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Nagoya Resolution

RESOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Nagoya, 25th October 1979

The People’s Republic of China:

Name: Chinese Olympic Committee

NOC anthem, flag and emblem: flag and anthem of People’s Republic of China.
The emblem submitted to and approved by the Executive Board.

Constitution: In order.

Committee based in Taipei:

Name: Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee

NOC anthem, flag and emblem: Other than that used at present and which must be approved by the Executive Board of the IOC.

Constitution: to be amended in conformity with IOC rules by 1st January 1980.
 FLAG 
 EMBLEM 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
  
CHINESE TAIPEI

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Nagoya Resolution represents a decision by the IOC Executive Board allowing teams both from Taiwan/the ROC and China/the PRC to participate in future Olympic Games, with precise specifications for admissible flag, emblem, and team name. The resolution was published in English and French, but no officially authorized Chinese version was released. More information concerning the name issue can be found here.

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Ye Jianying’s “Nine-Point Policy”

Articles & Documents

Interview With Xinhua Correspondent

Chairman Ye Jianying’s Elaborations on Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan To Motherland and Peaceful Unification

Ye Jianying, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, in an interview with a Xinhua correspondent on September 30, 1981, elaborated on the policy concerning the return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of China’s peaceful reunification.
The full text of his statement follows:

Today, on the eve of the 32nd anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China and at the approach of the 70th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, I wish, first of all, to extend my festive greetings and cordial regards to the people of all, to extend my festive greetings and cordial regards to the people of all nationalities throughout the country, including the compatriots in Taiwan, Xianggang (Hong Kong) and Aomen (Macao), and Chinese nationals residing in foreign countries.

On New Year’s Day 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress issued a message to the compatriots in Taiwan, in which it proclaimed the policy of striving to reunify the motherland peacefully. The message received warm support and active response from the people of all nationalities throughout China, including the compatriots in Taiwan, Xianggang and Aomen, and those residing abroad. A relaxed atmosphere has set in across the Taiwan Straits. Now, I would taken this opportunity to elaborate on the policy concerning the return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of peaceful reunification:

  1. In order to bring an end to the unfortunate separation of the Chinese nation as early as possible, we propose that talks be held between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang of China on a reciprocal basis so that the two parties will co-operate for the third time to accomplish the great cause of national reunification. The two sides may first send people to meet for an exhaustive exchange of views.
  2. It is the urgent desire of the people of all nationalities on both sides of the straits to communicate with each other, reunite with their families and relatives, develop trade and increase mutual understanding. We propose that the two sides make arrangements to facilitate the exchange of mails, trade, air and shipping services, family reunions and visits by relatives and tourists as well as academic, cultural and sports exchanges, and reach an agreement there upon.
  3. After the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and it can retain its armed forces. The Central Government will not interfere with local affairs on Taiwan.
  4. Taiwan’s current socio-economic system will remain unchanged, so will its way of life and its economic and cultural relations with foreign countries. There will be no encroachment on the proprietary rights and lawful right of inheritance over private property, houses, land and enterprises, or on foreign investments.
  5. People in authority and representative personages of various circles in Taiwan may take up posts of leadership in national political bodies and participate in running the state.
  6. When Taiwan’s local finance is in difficulty, the Central Government may subsidize it as is fit for the circumstances.
  7. For people of all nationalities and public figures of various circles in Taiwan who wish to come and settle on the mainland, it is guaranteed that proper arrangements will be made for them, that there will be no discrimination against them, and that they will have the freedom of entry and exit.
  8. Industrialists and businessmen in Taiwan are welcome to invest and engage in various economic undertakings on the mainland, and their legal rights, interests and profits are guaranteed.
  9. The reunification of the motherland is the responsibility of all Chinese. We sincerely welcome people of all nationalities, public figures of all circles and all mass organizations in Taiwan to make proposals and suggestions regarding affairs of state through various channels and in various ways.

Taiwan’s return to the embrace of the motherland and the accomplishment of the great cause of national reunification is a great and glorious mission history has bequeathed on our generation. China’s reunification and prosperity is in the vital interest of the Chinese people of all nationalities-not only those on the mainland, but those in Taiwan as well. It is also in the interest of peace in the Far East and the world.

We hope that our compatriots in Taiwan will give full play to their patriotism and work energetically for the early realization of the great unity of our nation and share the honor of it. We hope that our compatriots in Xianggang and Aomen and Chinese nationals residing abroad will continue to act in the role of a bridge and contribute their share to the reunification of the motherland.

We hope that the Kuomintang authorities will stick to their one-China position and their opposition to “two Chinas” and that they will put national interests above everything else, forget previous will and join hands with us in accomplishing the great cause of national reunification and the great goal of making China prosperous and strong, so as to win glory for our ancestors, being benefit to our posterity and write a new and glorious page in the history of the Chinese nation!

(Xinhua News Agency, September 30, 1981, Beijing)
Source: Beijing Review 1981, No. 40 (October 5 edition), p. 10-11; retrieved from Taiwan Info

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葉劍英向新華社記者發表的談話

（1981 年 9 月 30 日）

今天是中華人民共和國 32 周年國慶前夕，又欣逢辛亥革命 70 周年紀念日即將來臨之際，我首先向全國各族人民，包括台灣同胞、港澳同胞以及國外僑胞致以節日祝賀和親切問候。

1979 年元旦，全國人民代表大會常務委員會發表《告台灣同胞書》，宣佈了爭取和平統一祖國的大政方針，得到全中國各族人民，包括台灣同胞、港澳同胞以及國外僑胞的熱烈擁護和積極回應。台灣海峽出現了和緩氣氛。現在，我願趁此機會進一步闡明關於台灣回歸祖國，實現和平統一的方針政策：

（一）為了儘早結束中華民族陷於分裂的不幸局面，我們建議舉行中國共產黨和中國國民黨兩黨對等談判，實行第三次合作，共同完成祖國統一大業。雙方可先派人接觸，充分交換意見。
（二）海峽兩岸各族人民迫切希望互通音訊、親人團聚、開展貿易、增進瞭解。我們建議雙方共同為通郵、通商、通航、探親、旅遊以及開展學術、文化、體育交流提供方便，達成有關協議。
（三）國家實現統一後，台灣可作為特別行政區，享有高度的自治權，並可保留軍隊。中央政府不干預台灣地方事務。
（四）台灣現行社會、經濟制度不變，生活方式不變，同外國的經濟、文化關係不變。私人財產、房屋、土地、企業所權、合法繼承權和外國投資不受侵犯。
（五）台灣當局和各界代表人士，可擔全國性政治機構的領導職務，參與國家管理。
（六）台灣地方財政遇有困難時，可由中央政府酌情補助。
（七）台灣各族人民、各界人士願回祖國大陸定居者，保證妥善安排，不受歧視，來去自由。
（八）歡迎台灣工商界人士回祖國大陸投資，興辦各種經濟事業，保證其合法權益和利潤。
（九）統一祖國，人人有責。我們熱誠歡迎台灣各族人民、各界人士、民眾團體通過各種管道、採取各種方式提供建議，共商國事。

台灣回歸祖國，完成統一大業是我們這一代人光榮、偉大的歷史使命。中國的統一和富強，不僅是祖國大陸各族人民的根本利益所在，同樣是台灣各族同胞的根本利益所在，而且有利於遠東和世界和平。
我們希望廣大台灣同胞，發揚愛國主義精神，積極促進全民族大團結早日實現，共用民族榮譽。希望港澳同胞、國外僑胞繼續努力，發揮橋樑作用，為統一祖國貢獻力量。
我們希望國民黨當局堅持「一個中國」、反對「兩個中國」的立場，以民族大義為重，捐棄前嫌，同我們攜起手來，共同完成統一祖國大業，實現振興中華的宏圖，為列祖列宗爭光，為子孫後代造福，在中華民族歷史上譜寫新的光輝篇章。
中央政府門戶網站　來源：新華社

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The formal term of Ye Jianying’s “Nine-Point Policy” is “Nine Principles for the Peaceful Reunification with Taiwan” (youguan heping tongyi Taiwan de jiutiao fangzhen zhengce 有關和平統一台灣的九條方針政策, abbrev. Ye jiutiao 葉九條), in English it is also often referred to as “Ye’s Nine Principles” or “Nine-Article Statement”. On Jan. 11, 1982 Deng Xiaoping revealed to foreign guests that Ye’s Nine-Point Policy actually means “One Country, Two Systems” (yiguo liangzhi 一國兩制, abbrev. 1C2S) and would also apply to the issue of Hong Kong. In this context Deng on June 26, 1983 explained his “Six Conceptions for the Peaceful Reunification” (guanyu shixian Taiwan han zuguo dalu heping tongyide liutiao gouxiang 關於實現台灣和祖國大陸和平統一的六條構想, abbrev. Deng liutiao 鄧六條) which are shown further below.

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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The "Six Assurances" to Taiwan ROC

Note: On July 14, 1982, James Lilley, at the time director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the US's nominally unofficial representative body in Taiwan, called on ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo. In US President Ronald Reagan's name, Lilley delivered orally—not in writing—six assurances regarding US policy toward Taiwan. Lilley explained:

The United States...

 ● had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to the Republic of China;

 ● had not agreed to hold prior consultations with the PRC regarding arms sales to the Republic of China;

 ● would not play a mediation role between the PRC and the Republic of China;

 ● would not revise the Taiwan Relations Act;

 ● had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and

 ● would not exert pressure on the Republic of China to enter into negotiations with the PRC.

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雷根總統的『六項保證』

1）美國未同意在對我軍售上，設定結束期限；

2）美方對北京要求就對我軍售事與其事先諮商事未予同意；

3）美方無意扮演任何我與中國大陸間調解人的角色；

4）美方將不同意修改〈台灣關係法〉；

5）美方並未改變其對台灣主權的一貫立場；

6）美方不會對我施加壓力與北京進行談判。

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Joint Communiqué of the PRC and the US

August 17, 1982

(1) In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America, the United States of America recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. Within that context, the two sides agreed that the people of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between China and the United States were normalized.

(2) The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side stated that it would raise the issue again following normalization. Recognizing that this issue would seriously hamper the development of China-United States relations, they have held further discussions on it, during and since the meetings between Premier Zhao Ziyang and President Ronald Reagan and between Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua and Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. in October 1981.

(3) Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding China-United States relations. These principles were confirmed in the Shanghai Communiqué of February 28, 1972 and reaffirmed in the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on January 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically state that these principles continue to govern all aspects of their relations.

(4) The Chinese Government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair. The Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued By China on January 1, 1979 promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification of the motherland. The Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981 represented a further major effort under this fundamental policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.

(5) The United States Government attaches great importance to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." The United States Government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question as indicated in China's Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued on January 1, 1979 and the Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981. The new situation which has emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also provides favorable conditions for the settlement of China-United States differences over United States arms sales to Taiwan.

Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue.

(6) In order to bring about, over a period of time, a final settlement of the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan, which is an issue rooted in history, the two Governments will make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to the through settlement of this issue.

(7) The development of United States–China relations is not only in the interests of the two peoples but also conducive to peace and stability in the world. The two sides are determined, on the principle of equality and mutual benefit, to strengthen their ties in the economic, cultural, educational, scientific, technological and other fields and make strong, joint efforts for the continued development of relations between the Governments and peoples of the United States and China.

(8) In order to bring about the healthy development of United States–China relations, maintain world peace and oppose aggression and expansion, the two Governments reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique and the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. The two sides will maintain contact and hold appropriate consultations on bilateral and international issues of common interest.

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中華人民共和國和美利堅合衆國聯合公報（八一七公報）

（1982 年 8 月 17 日）

一、在中華人民共和國政府和美利堅合衆國政府發表的一九七九年一月一日建立外交關係的聯合公報中，美利堅合衆國承認中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府，並承認中國的立場，即只有一個中國，臺灣是中國的一部分。在此範圍內，雙方同意，美國人民將同臺灣人民繼續保持文化、商務和其他非官方關係。在此基礎上，中美兩國關係實現了正常化。

二、美國向臺灣出售武器的問題在兩國談判建交的過程中沒有得到解決。雙方的立場不一致，中方聲明在正常化以後將再次提出這個問題。雙方認識到這一問題將會嚴重妨礙中美關係的發展，因而在趙紫陽總理與羅納德·雷根總統以及黃華副總理兼外長與亞歷山大·黑格國務卿于一九八一年十月會見時以及在此以後，雙方進一步就此進行了討論。

三、互相尊重主權和領土完整、互不干涉內政是指導中美關係的根本原則。一九七二年二月二十八的上海公報確認了這些原則。一九七九年一月一日生效的建交公報又重申了這些原則。雙方強調聲明，這些原則仍是指導雙方關係所有方面的原則。

四、中國政府重申，臺灣問題是中國的內政。一九七九年一月一日中國發表的告臺灣同胞書宣佈了爭取和平統一祖國的大政方針。一九八一年九月三十日中國提出的九點方針是按照這一大政方針爭取和平解決臺灣問題的進一步重大努力。

五、美國政府非常重視它與中國的關係，並重申，它無意侵犯中國的主權和領土完整，無意干涉中國的內政，也無意執行 "兩個中國" 或 "一中一台" 政策。美國政府理解並欣賞一九七九年一月一日中國發表的告臺灣同胞書和一九八一年九月三十日中國提出的九點方針中所表明的中國爭取和平解決臺灣問題的政策。臺灣問題上出現的新形勢也爲解決中美兩國在美國售台武器問題上的分歧提供了有利的條件。

六、考慮到雙方的上述聲明，美國政府聲明，它不尋求執行一項長期向臺灣出售武器的政策，它向臺灣出售的武器在性能和數量上將不超過中美建交後近幾年供應的水平，它準備逐步減少它對臺灣的武器出售，並經過一段時間導致最後的解決。在作這樣的聲明時，美國承認中國關於徹底解決這一問題的一貫立場。

七、爲了使美國售台武器這個歷史遺留的問題，經過一段時間最終得到解決，兩國政府將盡一切努力，採取措施，創造條件，以利於徹底解決這個問題。

八、中美關係的發展不僅符合兩國人民的利益，而且也有利於世界和平與穩定。雙方決心本著平等互利的原則，加強經濟、文化、教育、科技和其他方面的聯繫，為繼續發展中美兩國政府和人民之間的關係共同作出重大努力。

九、為了使中美關係健康發展和維護世界和平、反對侵略擴張，兩國政府重申上海公報和建交公報中雙方一致同意的各項原則。雙方將就共同關心的雙邊問題和國際問題保持接觸並進行適當的磋商。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [Article 121] ✄

Done at Montego Bay, Jamaica, December 10, 1982

Entered into force November 16, 1994

[...]

Part VIII, Article 121 (Regime of Islands)

1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.

2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.

3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no EEZ or continental shelf.

[...]

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聯合國海洋法公約

一九八二年十二月十日訂于蒙特哥灣

[...]

第八部分 島嶼制度

第一二一條

島嶼制度

1. 島嶼是四面環水並在高潮時高於水面的自然形成的陸地區域。

2. 除第3款另有規定外,島嶼的領海、毗連區、專屬經濟區和大陸架應按照本公約適用於其他陸地領土的規定加以確定。

3. 不能維持人類居住或其本身的經濟生活的岩礁,不應有專屬經濟區或大陸架。

[...]

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The complete English text of UNCLOS can be found here.

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Deng Xiaoping’s “Six Conceptions”

Meeting with Professor Yang Liyu from Seton Hall University of the US on June 26, 1983, Deng Xiaoping elaborated the concept of “One Country, Two Systems”.

  1. The core of the Taiwan question is the Taiwan question is the reunification has become the common aspiration of both the Communist Party and the Kuomintang and thus has constituted the ground for the third cooperation between the two parties.
  2. While maintaining the one-China policy, the two sides can adopt different systems, but the People’s Republic of China should be the sole representative of China in the international community.
  3. Taiwan’s “absolute autonomy” is not allowed. The “absolute autonomy” actually means two Chinas. There should be some restrictions on autonomy, and the bottom line is that the interest of a unified state must not be harmed.
  4. After reunification, as a special administrative region, Taiwan can adopts systems different from those on the mainland and enjoys privileges, which other provinces and autonomous regions may not share. The region can have the powers of a legislature, judiciary and final adjudication. The region can also have its own army as long as it poses no threat to the mainland. The central government will not send officials. Affairs pertaining to Taiwan’s political parties, government and army shall be managed by Taiwan itself, while the central government will reserve some positions for Taiwan.
  5. Peaceful reunification does not mean the mainland will swallow Taiwan, or vice versa. To reunify China with the “Three People’s Principles” is not practical.
  6. The proper way for peaceful reunification is to hold negotiations between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang on an equal footing. After the two sides reach an agreement, an official announcement can be made. Foreign powers cannot be allowed to interfere with this affair, because it would otherwise mean China has not achieved independence and would only give use to endless future troubles.

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鄧小平論以“一國兩制”解決台灣問題

1983 年 6 月 25 日，鄧小平在會見美國西東大學教授楊力宇時，闡述了按照「一國兩制」解決台灣問題、實現國家統一的構想：

（一） 台灣問題的核心是祖國統一。和平統一已成為國共兩黨的共同語言。我們希望國共兩黨共同完成民族統一，大家都對中華民族作出貢獻。
（二） 我們不贊成台灣「完全自治」的提法。自治不能沒有限度，既有限度就不能「完全」。「完全自治」就是「兩個中國」，而不是一個中國。
（三） 制度可以不同，但在國際上代表中國的，只能是中華人民共和國。
（四） 我們承認台灣地方政府在對內政策上可以搞自己的一套。台灣作為特別行政區，雖是地區政府，但同其他省、市以至自治區的地方政府不同，可以有其他省、市、自治區所沒有而為自己所獨有的某些權力，條件是不能損害統一的國家的利益。
 祖國統一後，台灣特別行政區可以有自己的獨立性，可以實行同大陸不同的制度。司法獨立，終審權不須到北京。台灣還可以有自己的軍隊，只是不能構成對大陸的威脅。大陸不派人駐台，不僅軍隊不去，行政人員也不去。台灣的黨、政、軍等系統，都由台灣自己來管。中央政府還要給台灣留出名額。
（五） 和平統一不是大陸把台灣吃掉，當然也不能是台灣把大陸吃掉。所謂「三民主義統一中國」，這不現實。
（六） 要實現統一，就要有個適當方式，所以我們建議舉行兩黨平等會談，實行第三次合作，而不提中央與地方談判。雙方達成協議後，可以正式宣佈。但萬萬不可讓外國插手，那樣只能意味著中國還未獨立，後患無窮。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

Most Chinese sources have omitted the precise numbering which in this version was derived from the website of the PRC embassy in Japan but does not exactly correspond with the numbering shown in the official English version.

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong

Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China have reviewed with satisfaction the friendly relations existing between the two Governments and peoples in recent years and agreed that a proper negotiated settlement of the question of Hong Kong, which is left over from the past, is conducive to the maintenance of the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and to the further strengthening and development of the relations between the two countries on a new basis. To this end, they have, after talks between the delegations of the two Governments, agreed to declare as follows:

1. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that to recover the Hong Kong area (including Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories, hereinafter referred to as Hong Kong) is the common aspiration of the entire Chinese people, and that it has decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997.

2. The Government of the United Kingdom declares that it will restore Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China with effect from 1 July 1997.

3. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that the basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong are as follows:

(1) Upholding national unity and territorial integrity and taking account of the history of Hong Kong and its realities, the People's Republic of China has decided to establish, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region upon resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong.

(2) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be directly under the authority of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People's Government.

(3) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The laws currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged.

(4) The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive will be appointed by the Central People's Government on the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally. Principal officials will be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for appointment by the Central People's Government. Chinese and foreign nationals previously working in the public and police services in the government departments of Hong Kong may remain in employment. British and other foreign nationals may also be employed to serve as advisers or hold certain public posts in government departments of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(5) The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will be protected by law.

(6) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the status of a free port and a separate customs territory.

(7) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the status of an international financial centre, and its markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures will continue. There will be free flow of capital. The Hong Kong dollar will continue to circulate and remain freely convertible.

(8) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will have independent finances. The Central People's Government will not levy taxes on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(9) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may establish mutually beneficial economic relations with the United Kingdom and other countries, whose economic interests in Hong Kong will be given due regard.

(10) Using the name of "Hong Kong, China", the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own maintain and develop economic and cultural relations and conclude relevant agreements with states, regions and relevant international organisations.

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own issue travel documents for entry into and exit from Hong Kong.

(11) The maintenance of public order in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be the responsibility of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(12) The above-stated basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong and the elaboration of them in Annex I to this Joint Declaration will be stipulated, in a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, and they will remain unchanged for 50 years.

4. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China declare that, during the transitional period between the date of the entry into force of this Joint Declaration and 30 June 1997, the Government of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong with the object of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity and social stability; and that the Government of the People's Republic of China will give its co-operation in this connection.

5. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China declare that, in order to ensure a smooth transfer of government in 1997, and with a view to the effective implementation of this Joint Declaration, a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group will be set up when this Joint Declaration enters into force; and that it will be established and will function in accordance with the provisions of Annex II to this Joint Declaration.

6. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China declare that land leases in Hong Kong and other related matters will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Annex III to this Joint Declaration.

7. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to implement the preceding declarations and the Annexes to this Joint Declaration.

8. This Joint Declaration is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which shall take place in Beijing before 30 June 1985. This Joint Declaration and its Annexes shall be equally binding.

Done in duplicate at Beijing on December 19, 1984 in the English and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Margaret Thatcher

For the Government of the People's Republic of China
Zhao Ziyang

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ANNEX I

Elaboration by the government of the People's Republic of China of its basic policies regarding Hong Kong

The Government of the People's Republic of China elaborates the basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong as set out in paragraph 3 of the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong as follows:

I. CONSTITUTION

Establishment of the Hong Kong S.A.R.

The Basic Law

The Constitution of the People's Republic of China stipulates in Article 31 "that the state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by laws enacted by the National People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions." In accordance with this Article, the People's Republic of China shall, upon the resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997, establish the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China shall enact and promulgate a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Basic Law) in accordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, stipulating that after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region the socialist system and socialist policies shall not be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and that Hong Kong's previous capitalist system and life-style shall remain unchanged for 50 years.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be directly under the authority of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Except for foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People's Government, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The Central People's Government shall authorise the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to conduct on its own those external affairs specified in Section XI of this Annex.

Chief Executive. Principal Officials. The Legislature

The government and legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government. Principal officials (equivalent to Secretaries) shall be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and appointed by the Central People's Government. The legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by elections. The executive authorities shall abide by the law and shall be accountable to the legislature.

Language

In addition to Chinese, English may also be used in organs of government and in the courts in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Regional flag and emblem

Apart from displaying the national flag and national emblem of the People's Republic of China, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may use a regional flag and emblem of its own.

II. LEGAL SYSTEM

Laws previously in force

After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong (i.e. the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law) shall be maintained, save for any that contravene the Basic Law and subject to any amendment by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature.

Legislative power

The legislative power of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The legislature may on its own authority enact laws in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and legal procedures, and report them to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record. Laws enacted by the legislature which are in accordance with the Basic Law and legal procedures shall be regarded as valid.

Laws of the SAR

The laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the Basic Law, and the laws previously in force in Hong Kong and laws enacted by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature as above.

III. JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Previous judicial system

After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the judicial system previously practised in Hong Kong shall be maintained except for those changes consequent upon the vesting in the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the power of final adjudication.

Judicial power; Precedents

Judicial power in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The courts shall exercise judicial power independently and free from any interference. Members of the judiciary shall be immune from legal action in respect of their judicial functions. The courts shall decide cases in accordance with the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and may refer to precedents in other common law jurisdictions.

Appointment and removal of judges

Judges of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region courts shall be appointed by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region acting in accordance with the recommendation of an independent commission composed of local judges, persons from the legal profession and other eminent persons. Judges shall be chosen by reference to their judicial qualities and may be recruited from other common law jurisdictions. A judge may only be removed for inability to discharge the functions of his office, or for misbehaviour, by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region acting in accordance with the recommendation of a tribunal appointed by the chief judge of the court of final appeal, consisting of not fewer than three local judges. Additionally, the appointment or removal of principal judges (i.e. those of the highest rank) shall be made by the chief executive with the endorsement of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature and reported to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record. The system of appointment and removal of judicial officers other than judges shall be maintained.

Power of final judgment

The power of final judgment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the court of final appeal in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which may as required invite judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the court of final appeal.

Prosecutions

A prosecuting authority of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall control criminal prosecutions free from any interference.

Legal practitioners

On the basis of the system previously operating in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall on its own make provision for local lawyers and lawyers from outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to work and practise in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Reciprocal juridical assistance

The Central People's Government shall assist or authorise the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to make appropriate arrangements for reciprocal juridical assistance with foreign states.

IV. PUBLIC SERVICE

Public servants and members of judiciary previously serving in H.K.

After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, public servants previously serving in Hong Kong in all government departments, including the police department, and members of the judiciary may all remain in employment and continue their service with pay, allowances, benefits and conditions of service no less favourable than before. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall pay to such persons who retire or complete their contracts, as well as to those who have retired before 1 July 1997, or to their dependants, all pensions, gratuities, allowances and benefits due to them on terms no less favourable than before, and irrespective of their nationality or place of residence.

Foreign nationals in public service

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may employ British and other foreign nationals previously serving in the public service in Hong Kong, and may recruit British and other foreign nationals holding permanent identity cards of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to serve as public servants at all levels, except as heads of major government departments (corresponding to branches or departments at Secretary level) including the police department, and as deputy heads of some of those departments. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may also employ British and other foreign nationals as advisers to government departments and, when there is a need, may recruit qualified candidates from outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to professional and technical posts in government departments. The above shall be employed only in their individual capacities and, like other public servants, shall be responsible to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government.

Appointment and promotion of public servants

The appointment and promotion of public servants shall be on the basis of qualifications, experience and ability. Hong Kong's previous system of recruitment, employment, assessment, discipline, training and management for the public service (including special bodies for appointment, pay and conditions of service) shall, save for any provisions providing privileged treatment for foreign nationals, be maintained.

V. FINANCE

Budget

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall deal on its own with financial matters, including disposing of its financial resources and drawing up its budgets and its final accounts. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall report its budgets and final accounts to the Central People's Government for the record.

Taxation and public expenditure

The Central People's Government shall not levy taxes on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall use its financial revenues exclusively for its own purposes and they shall not be handed over to the Central People's Government. The systems by which taxation and public expenditure must be approved by the legislature, and by which there is accountability to the legislature for all public expenditure, and the system for auditing public accounts shall be maintained.

VI. ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Economic and trade system.

Ownership of property

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the capitalist economic and trade systems previously practised in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall decide its economic and trade policies on its own. Rights concerning the ownership of property, including those relating to acquisition, use, disposal, inheritance and compensation for lawful deprivation (corresponding to the real value of the property concerned, freely convertible and paid without undue delay) shall continue to be protected by law.

Free port and free trade policy

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall retain the status of a free port and continue a free trade policy, including the free movement of goods and capital. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own maintain and develop economic and trade relations with all states and regions.

Customs territory.

GATT.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a separate customs territory. It may participate in relevant international organisations and international trade agreements (including preferential trade arrangements), such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and arrangements regarding international trade in textiles. Export quotas, tariff preferences and other similar arrangements obtained by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be enjoyed exclusively by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have authority to issue its own certificates of origin for products manufactured locally, in accordance with prevailing rules of origin.

Trade missions

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, as necessary, establish official and semi-official economic and trade missions in foreign countries, reporting the establishment of such missions to the Central People's Government for the record.

VII. MONETARY SYSTEM

Previous monetary and financial systems

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall retain the status of an international financial centre. The monetary and financial systems previously practised in Hong Kong, including the systems of regulation and supervision of deposit taking institutions and financial markets, shall be maintained.

Monetary and financial policies

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may decide its monetary and financial policies on its own. It shall safeguard the free operation of financial business and the free flow of capital within, into and out of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. No exchange control policy shall be applied in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures shall continue.

Hong Kong dollar

The Hong Kong dollar, as the local legal tender, shall continue to circulate and remain freely convertible. The authority to issue Hong Kong currency shall be vested in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may authorise designated banks to issue or continue to issue Hong Kong currency under statutory authority, after satisfying itself that any issue of currency will be soundly based and that the arrangements for such issue are consistent with the object of maintaining the stability of the currency. Hong Kong currency bearing references inappropriate to the status of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China shall be progressively replaced and withdrawn from circulation.

Exchange Fund

The Exchange Fund shall be managed and controlled by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, primarily for regulating the exchange value of the Hong Kong dollar.

VIII. SHIPPING

Previous systems of shipping management and regulation

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain Hong Kong's previous systems of shipping management and shipping regulation, including the system for regulating conditions of seamen. The specific functions and responsibilities of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government in the field of shipping shall be defined by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government on its own. Private shipping businesses and shipping-related businesses and private container terminals in Hong Kong may continue to operate freely.

Shipping registers and issue of certificates

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be authorised by the Central People's Government to continue to maintain a shipping register and issue related certificates under its own legislation in the name of 'Hong Kong, China'.

Access to HKSAR ports

With the exception of foreign warships, access for which requires the permission of the Central People's Government, ships shall enjoy access to the ports of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

IX. CIVIL AVIATION

Previous system of civil aviation management

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the status of Hong Kong as a centre of international and regional aviation. Airlines incorporated and having their principal place of business in Hong Kong and civil aviation related businesses may continue to operate. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall continue the previous system of civil aviation management in Hong Kong, and keep its own aircraft register in accordance with provisions laid down by the Central People's Government concerning nationality marks and registration marks of aircraft. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be responsible on its own for matters of routine business and technical management of civil aviation, including the management of airports, the provision of air traffic services within the flight information region of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the discharge of other responsibilities allocated under the regional air navigation procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organisation.

Air services

The Central People's Government shall, in consultation with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, make arrangements providing for air services between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other parts of the People's Republic of China for airlines incorporated and having their principal place of business in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other airlines of the People's Republic of China. All Air Service Agreements providing for air services between other parts of the People's Republic of China and other states and regions with stops at the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and air services between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other states and regions with stops at other parts of the People's Republic of China shall be concluded by the Central People's Government. For this purpose, the Central People's Government shall take account of the special conditions and economic interests of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and consult the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. Representatives of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may participate as members of delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of China in air service consultations with foreign governments concerning arrangements for such services.

Air Service Agreements

Acting under specific authorisations from the Central People's Government, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may:

  • renew or amend Air Service Agreements and arrangements previously in force; in principle, all such Agreements and arrangements may be renewed or amended with the rights contained in such previous Agreements and arrangements being as far as possible maintained;
  • negotiate and conclude new Air Service Agreements providing routes for airlines incorporated and having their principal place of business in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and rights for overflights and technical stops; and
  • negotiate and conclude provisional arrangements where no Air Service Agreement with a foreign state or other region is in force.

All scheduled air services to, from or through the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region which do not operate to, from or through the mainland of China shall be regulated by Air Service Agreements or provisional arrangements referred to in this paragraph.

The Central People's Government shall give the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government the authority to:

  • negotiate and conclude with other authorities all arrangements concerning the implementation of the above Air Service Agreements and provisional arrangements;
  • issue licences to airlines incorporated and having their principal place of business in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
  • designate such airlines under the above Air Service Agreements and provisional arrangements; and
  • issue permits to foreign airlines for services other than those to, from or through the mainland of China.

X. EDUCATION

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the educational system previously practised in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall on its own decide policies in the fields of culture, education, science and technology, including policies regarding the educational system and its administration, the language of instruction, the allocation of funds, the examination system, the system of academic awards and the recognition of educational and technological qualifications. Institutions of all kinds, including those run by religious and community organisations, may retain their autonomy. They may continue to recruit staff and use teaching materials from outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Students shall enjoy freedom of choice of education and freedom to pursue their education outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

XI. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

General

Subject to the principle that foreign affairs are the responsibility of the Central People's Government, representatives of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may participate, as members of delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of China, in negotiations at the diplomatic level directly affecting the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region conducted by the Central People's Government. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own, using the name 'Hong Kong, China', maintain and develop relations and conclude and implement agreements with states, regions and relevant international organisations in the appropriate fields, including the economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping, communications, touristic, cultural and sporting fields. Representatives of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may participate, as members of delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of China, in international organisations or conferences in appropriate fields limited to states and affecting the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, or may attend in such other capacity as may be permitted by the Central People's Government and the organisation or conference concerned, and may express their views in the name of 'Hong Kong, China'. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, using the name 'Hong Kong, China', participate in international organisations and conferences not limited to states.

International agreements

The application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of international agreements to which the People's Republic of China is or becomes a party shall be decided by the Central People's Government, in accordance with the circumstances and needs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and after seeking the views of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. International agreements to which the People's Republic of China is not a party but which are implemented in Hong Kong may remain implemented in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Central People's Government shall, as necessary, authorise or assist the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to make appropriate arrangements for the application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of other relevant international agreements. The Central People's Government shall take the necessary steps to ensure that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall continue to retain its status in an appropriate capacity in those international organisations of which the People's Republic of China is a member and in which Hong Kong participates in one capacity or another. The Central People's Government shall, where necessary, facilitate the continued participation of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in an appropriate capacity in those international organisations in which Hong Kong is a participant in one capacity or another, but of which the People's Republic of China is not a member.

Consular and other missions

Foreign consular and other official or semi-official missions may be established in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region with the approval of the Central People's Government. Consular and other official missions established in Hong Kong by states which have established formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China may be maintained. According to the circumstances of each case, consular and other official missions of states having no formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China may either be maintained or changed to semi-official missions. States not recognised by the People's Republic of China can only establish non-governmental institutions.

The United Kingdom may establish a Consulate-General in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

XII. DEFENCE

The maintenance of public order in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the responsibility of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. Military forces sent by the Central People's Government to be stationed in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for the purpose of defence shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Expenditure for these military forces shall be borne by the Central People's Government.

XIII. BASIC RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

General

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall protect the rights and freedoms of inhabitants and other persons in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region according to law. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall maintain the rights and freedoms as provided for by the laws previously in force in Hong Kong, including freedom of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, to form and join trade unions, of correspondence, of travel, of movement, of strike, of demonstration, of choice of occupation, of academic research, of belief, inviolability of the home, the freedom to marry and the right to raise a family freely.

Legal advice and judicial remedies

Every person shall have the right to confidential legal advice, access to the courts, representation in the courts by lawyers of his choice, and to obtain judicial remedies. Every person shall have the right to challenge the actions of the executive in the courts.

Religion

Religious organisations and believers may maintain their relations with religious organisations and believers elsewhere, and schools, hospitals and welfare institutions run by religious organisations may be continued. The relationship between religious organisations in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and those in other parts of the People's Republic of China shall be based on the principles of non-subordination, non-interference and mutual respect.

International Covenants

The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force.

XIV. RIGHT OF ABODE, TRAVEL, IMMIGRATION

Right of abode

The following categories of persons shall have the right of abode in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and, in accordance with the law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, be qualified to obtain permanent identity cards issued by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, which state their right of abode:

  • all Chinese nationals who where born or who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for a continuous period of 7 years or more, and persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of such Chinese nationals;
  • all other persons who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for a continuous period of 7 years or more and who have taken Hong Kong as their place of permanent residence before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and persons under 21 years of age who were born of such persons in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
  • any other persons who had the right of abode only in Hong Kong before the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Passports etc

The Central People's Government shall authorise the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to issue, in accordance with the law, passports of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China to all Chinese nationals who hold permanent identity cards of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and travel documents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China to all other persons lawfully residing in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The above passports and documents shall be valid for all states and regions and shall record the holder's right to return to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Use of travel documents

For the purpose of travelling to and from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may use travel documents issued by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, or by other competent authorities of the People's Republic of China, or of other states. Holders of permanent identity cards of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may have this fact stated in their travel documents as evidence that the holders have the right of abode in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of persons from other parts of China shall continue to be regulated in accordance with the present practice.

Immigration controls

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may apply immigration controls on entry, stay in and departure from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by persons from foreign states and regions.

Freedom to leave SAR

Unless restrained by law, holders of valid travel documents shall be free to leave the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region without special authorisation.

Visa abolition agreements

The Central People's Government shall assist or authorise the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to conclude visa abolition agreements with states or regions.

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ANNEX II

Sino-British Joint Liaison Group

1. In furtherance of their common aim and in order to ensure a smooth transfer of government in 1997, the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed to continue their discussions in a friendly spirit and to develop the cooperative relationship which already exists between the two Governments over Hong Kong with a view to the effective implementation of the Joint Declaration.

2. In order to meet the requirements for liaison, consultation and the exchange of information, the two Governments have agreed to set up a Joint Liaison Group.

3. The functions of the Joint Liaison Group shall be:

a) to conduct consultations on the implementation of the Joint Declaration;

b) to discuss matters relating to the smooth transfer of government in 1997;

c) to exchange information and conduct consultations on such subjects as may be agreed by the two sides.

Matters on which there is disagreement in the Joint Liaison Group shall be referred to the two Governments for solution through consultations.

4. Matters for consideration during the first half of the period between the establishment of the Joint Liaison Group and 1 July 1997 shall include:

a) action to be taken by the two Governments to enable the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to maintain its economic relations as a separate customs territory, and in particular to ensure the maintenance of Hong Kong's participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Multifibre Arrangement and other international arrangements; and

b) action to be taken by the two Governments to ensure the continued application of international rights and obligations affecting Hong Kong.

5. The two Governments have agreed that in the second half of the period between the establishment of the Joint Liaison Group and 1 July 1997 there will be need for closer cooperation, which will therefore be intensified during that period. Matters for consideration during this second period shall include:

a) procedures to be adopted for the smooth transition in 1997;

b) action to assist the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to maintain and develop economic and cultural relations and conclude agreements on these matters with states, regions and relevant international organisations.

6. The Joint Liaison Group shall be an organ for liaison and not an organ of power. It shall play no part in the administration of Hong Kong or the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Nor shall it have any supervisory role over that administration. The members and supporting staff of the Joint Liaison Group shall only conduct activities within the scope of the functions of the Joint Liaison Group.

7. Each side shall designate a senior representative who shall be of Ambassadorial rank, and four other members of the group. Each side may send up to 20 supporting staff.

8. The Joint Liaison Group shall be established on the entry into force of the Joint Declaration. From 1 July 1988 the Joint Liaison Group shall have its principal base in Hong Kong. The Joint Liaison Group shall continue its work until 1 January 2000.

9. The Joint Liaison Group shall meet in Beijing, London and Hong Kong. It shall meet at least once in each of the three locations in each year. The venue for each meeting shall be agreed between the two sides.

10. Members of the Joint Liaison Group shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities as appropriate when in the three locations. Proceedings of the Joint Liaison Group shall remain confidential unless otherwise agreed between the two sides.

11. The Joint Liaison Group may by agreement between the two sides decide to set up specialist sub-groups to deal with particular subjects requiring expert assistance.

12. Meetings of the Joint Liaison Group and sub-groups may be attended by experts other than the members of the Joint Liaison Group. Each side shall determine the composition of its delegation to particular meetings of the Joint Liaison Group or sub-group in accordance with the subjects to be discussed and the venue chosen.

13. The working procedures of the Joint Liaison Group shall be discussed and decided upon by the two sides within the guidelines laid down in this Annex.

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ANNEX III

Land Leases

The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with effect from the entry into force of the Joint Declaration, land leases in Hong Kong and other related matters shall be dealt with in accordance with the following provisions:

1. All leases of land granted or decided upon before the entry into force of the Joint Declaration and those granted thereafter in accordance with paragraph 2 or 3 of this Annex, and which extend beyond 30 June 1997, and all rights in relation to such leases shall continue to be recognised and protected under the law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

2. All leases of land granted by the British Hong Kong Government not containing a right of renewal that expire before 30 June 1997, except short term tenancies and leases for special purposes, may be extended if the lessee so wishes for a period expiring not later than 30 June 2047 without payment of an additional premium. An annual rent shall be charged from the date of extension equivalent to 3 per cent of the rateable value of the property at that date, adjusted in step with any changes in the rateable value thereafter. In the case of old schedule lots, village lots, small houses and similar rural holdings, where the property was on 30 June 1984 held by, or, in the case of small houses granted after that date, the property is granted to, a person descended through the male line from a person who was in 1898 a resident of an established village in Hong Kong, the rent shall remain unchanged so long as the property is held by that person or by one of his lawful successors in the male line. Where leases of land not having a right of renewal expire after 30 June 1997, they shall be dealt with in accordance with the relevant land laws and policies of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

3. From the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997, new leases of land may be granted by the British Hong Kong Government for terms expiring not later than 30 June 2047. Such leases shall be granted at a premium and nominal rental until 30 June 1997, after which date they shall not require payment of an additional premium but an annual rent equivalent to 3 per cent of the rateable value of the property at that date, adjusted in step with changes in the rateable value thereafter, shall be charged.

4. The total amount of new land to be granted under paragraph 3 of this Annex shall be limited to 50 hectares a year (excluding land to be granted to the Hong Kong Housing Authority for public rental housing) from the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997.

5. Modifications of the conditions specified in leases granted by the British Hong Kong Government may continue to be granted before 1 July 1997 at a premium equivalent to the difference between the value of the land under the previous conditions and its value under the modified conditions.

6. From the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997, premium income obtained by the British Hong Kong Government from land transactions shall, after deduction of the average cost of land production, be shared equally between the British Hong Kong Government and the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. All the income obtained by the British Hong Kong Government, including the amount of the above-mentioned deduction, shall be put into the Capital Works Reserve Fund for the financing of land development and public works in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government's share of the premium income shall be deposited in banks incorporated in Hong Kong and shall not be drawn on except for the financing of land development and public works in Hong Kong in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 7(d) of this Annex.

7. A Land Commission shall be established in Hong Kong immediately upon the entry into force of the Joint Declaration. The Land Commission shall be composed of an equal number of officials designated respectively by the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China together with necessary supporting staff. The officials of the two sides shall be responsible to their respective governments. The Land Commission shall be dissolved on 30 June 1997.

The terms of reference of the Land Commission shall be:

a) to conduct consultations on the implementation of this Annex;

b) to monitor observance of the limit specified in paragraph 4 of this Annex, the amount of land granted to the Hong Kong Housing Authority for public rental housing, and the division and use of premium income referred to in paragraph 6 of this Annex;

c) to consider and decide on proposals from the British Hong Kong Government for increasing the limit referred to in paragraph 4 of this Annex;

d) to examine proposals for drawing on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government's share of premium income referred to in paragraph 6 of this Annex and to make recommendations to the Chinese side for decision.

Matters on which there is disagreement in the Land Commission shall be referred to the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China for decision.

8. Specific details regarding the establishment of the Land Commission shall be finalised separately by the two sides through consultations.

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Memoranda (Exchanged Between the Two Sides)

United Kingdom Memorandum

In connection with the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the question of Hong Kong to be signed this day, the Government of the United Kingdom declares that, subject to the completion of the necessary amendments to the relevant United Kingdom legislation:

a) All persons who on 30 June 1997 are, by virtue of a connection with Hong Kong, British Dependent Territories Citizens (BDTCs) under the law in force in the United Kingdom will cease to be BDTCs with effect from 1 July 1997, but will be eligible to retain an appropriate status which, without conferring the right of abode in the United Kingdom, will entitle them to continue to use passports issued by the Government of the United Kingdom. This status will be acquired by such persons only if they hold or are included in such a British passport issued before 1 July 1997, except that eligible persons born on or after 1 January 1997 but before 1 July 1997 may obtain or be included in such a passport up to 31 December 1997.

b) No person will acquire BDTC status on or after 1 July 1997 by virtue of a connection with Hong Kong. No person born on or after 1 July 1997 will acquire the status referred to as being appropriate in sub-paragraph (a).

c) United Kingdom consular officials in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and elsewhere may renew and replace passports of persons mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) and may also issue them to persons, born before 1 July 1997 of such persons, who had previously been included in the passport of their parent.

d) Those who have obtained or been included in passports issued by the Government of the United Kingdom under sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) will be entitled to receive, upon request, British consular services and protection when in third countries.

Beijing, 19 December 1984.

Chinese Memorandum

The Government of the People's Republic of China has received the memorandum from the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated 19 December 1984.

Under the Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, all Hong Kong Chinese compatriots, whether they are holders of the 'British Dependent Territories Citizens' Passport' or not, are Chinese nationals.

Taking account of the historical background of Hong Kong and its realities, the competent authorities of the Government of the People's Republic of China will, with effect from 1 July 1997, permit Chinese nationals in Hong Kong who were previously called 'British Dependent Territories Citizens' to use travel documents issued by the Government of the United Kingdom for the purpose of travelling to other states and regions.

The above Chinese nationals will not be entitled to British consular protection in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other parts of the People's Republic of China on account of their holding the above-mentioned British travel documents.

Beijing, 19 December 1984.

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《中華人民共和國政府和大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府關於香港問題的聯合聲明》

中華人民共和國政府和大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府滿意地回顧了近年來兩國政府和兩國人民之間的友好關係，一致認為通過協商妥善地解決歷史上遺留下來的香港問題，有助於維持香港的繁榮與穩定，並有助於兩國關係在新的基礎上進一步鞏固和發展，為此，經過兩國政府代表團的會談，同意聲明如下：

一、中華人民共和國政府聲明：收回香港地區（包括香港島、九龍和"新界"，以下稱香港）是全中國人民的共同願望，中華人民共和國政府決定於一九九七年七月一日對香港恢復行使主權。

二、聯合王國政府聲明：聯合王國政府於一九九七年七月一日將香港交還給中華人民共和國。

三、中華人民共和國政府聲明，中華人民共和國對香港的基本方針政策如下：

（一） 爲了維護國家的統一和領土完整，並考慮到香港的歷史和現實情況，中華人民共和國決定在對香港恢復行使主權時，根據中華人民共和國憲法第三十一條的規定，設立香港特別行政區。

（二） 香港特別行政區直轄於中華人民共和國中央人民政府。除外交和國防事務屬中央人民政府管理外，香港特別行政區享有高度的自治權。

（三） 香港特別行政區享有行政管理權、立法權、獨立的司法權和終審權。現行的法律基本不變。

（四） 香港特別行政區政府由當地人組成。行政長官在當地通過選舉或協商産生，由中央人民政府任命。主要官員由香港特別行政區行政長官提名，報中央人民政府任命。原在香港各政府部門任職的中外藉公務、警務人員可以留用。香港特別行政區各政府部門可以聘請英籍人士或其他外籍人士擔任顧問或某些公職。

（五） 香港的現行社會、經濟制度不變；生活方式不變。香港特別行政區依法保障人身、言論、出版、集會、結社、旅行、遷徙、通信、罷工、選擇職業和學術研究以及宗教信仰等各項權利和自由。私人財産、企業所有權、合法繼承權以及外來投資均受法律保護。

（六） 香港特別行政區將保持自由港和獨立關稅地區的地位。

（七） 香港特別行政區將保持國際金融中心的地位，繼續開放外匯、黃金、證券、期貨等市場，資金進出自由。港幣繼續流通，自由兌換。

（八） 香港特別行政區將保持財政獨立。中央人民政府不向香港特別行政區徵稅。

（九） 香港特別行政區可同聯合王國和其他國家建立互利的經濟關係。聯合王國和其他國家在香港的經濟利益將得到照顧。

（十） 香港特別行政區可以 "中國香港" 的名義單獨地同各國、各地區及有關國際組織保持和發展經濟、文化關係，並簽訂有關協定。香港特別行政區政府可自行簽發出入香港的旅行證件。

（十一） 香港特別行政區的社會治安由香港特別行政區政府負責維持。

（十二） 關於中華人民共和國對香港的上述基本方針政策和本聯合聲明附件一對上述基本方針政策的具體說明，中華人民共和國全國人民代表大會將以中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法規定之，並在五十年內不變。

四、中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府聲明：自本聯合聲明生效之日起至一九九七年六月三十日止的過渡時期內，聯合王國政府負責香港的行政管理，以維護和保持香港的經濟繁榮和社會穩定；對此，中華人民共和國政府將給予合作。

五、中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府聲明：為求本聯合聲明得以有效執行，並保證一九九七年政權的順利交接，在本聯合聲明生效時成立中英聯合聯絡小組；聯合聯絡小組將根據本聯合聲明附件二的規定建立和履行職責。

六、中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府聲明：關於香港土地契約和其他有關事項，將根據本聯合聲明附件三的規定處理。

七、中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府同意，上述各項聲明和本聯合聲明的附件均將付諸實施。

八、本聯合聲明須經批准，並自互換批准書之日起生效。批准書應於一九八五年六月三十日前在北京互換。本聯合聲明及其附件具有同等約束力。

一九八四年十二月十九日在北京簽訂，共兩份，每份都用中文和英文寫成，兩種文本具有同等效力。

中華人民共和國政府代表 趙紫陽（簽字）

大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府代表 瑪格麗特 • 柴契爾（簽字）

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附件一

中華人民共和國政府對香港的基本方針政策的具體說明

中華人民共和國政府就中華人民共和國政府和大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府關於香港問題的聯合聲明第三款所載中華人民共和國對香港的基本方針政策，具體說明如下：

一

中華人民共和國憲法第三十一條規定："國家在必要時得設立特別行政區。在特別行政區內實行的制度按照具體情況由全國人民代表大會以法律規定。"據此，中華人民共和國將在一九九七年七月一日對香港恢復行使主權時，設立中華人民共和國香港特別行政區。中華人民共和國全國人民代表大會將根據中華人民共和國憲法制定並頒布中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法（以下簡稱《基本法》），規定香港特別行政區成立後不實行社會主義的制度和政策，保持香港原有的資本主義制度和生活方式，五十年不變。

香港特別行政區直轄於中華人民共和國中央人民政府，並享有高度的自治權。除外交和國防事務屬中央人民政府管理外，香港特別行政區享有行政管理權、立法權、獨立的司法權和終審權。中央人民政府授權香港特別行政區自行處理本附件第十一節所規定的各項涉外事務。

香港特別行政區政府和立法機關由當地人組成。香港特別行政區行政長官在當地通過選舉或協商產生，由中央人民政府任命。香港特別行政區政府的主要官員（相當於"司"級官員）由香港特別行政區行政長官提名，報請中央人民政府任命。香港特別行政區立法機關由選舉產生。行政機關必須遵守法律，對立法機關負責。

香港特別行政區的政府機關和法院，除使用中文外，還可使用英文。

香港特別行政區除懸掛中華人民共和國國旗和國徽外，還可以使用區旗和區徽。

二

香港特別行政區成立後，香港原有法律（即普通法及衡平法、條例、附屬立法、習慣法）除與《基本法》相抵觸或香港特別行政區的立法機關作出修改者外，予以保留。

香港特別行政區的立法權屬於香港特別行政區立法機關。立法機關可根據《基本法》的規定並依照法定程序制定法律，報中華人民共和國全國人民代表大會常務委員會備案。立法機關制定的法律凡符合《基本法》和法定程序者，均屬有效。

在香港特別行政區實行的法律為《基本法》，以及上述香港原有法律和香港特別行政區立法機關制定的法律。

三

香港特別行政區成立後，除因香港特別行政區法院享有終審權而產生的變化外，原在香港實行的司法體制予以保留。

香港特別行政區的審判權屬於香港特別行政區法院。法院獨立進行審判，不受任何干涉。司法人員履行審判職責的行為不受法律追究。法院依照香港特別行政區的法律審判案件，其他普通法適用地區的司法判例可作參考。

香港特別行政區法院的法官，根據當地法官和法律界及其他方面知名人士組成的獨立委員會的推薦，由行政長官予以任命。法官應根據本人的司法才能選用，並可從其他普通法適用地區聘用。法官只有在無力履行職責或行為不檢的情況下，才能由行政長官根據終審法院首席法官任命的不少於三名當地法官組成的審議庭的建議，予以免職。主要法官（即最高一級法官）的任命和免職，還須由行政長官徵得香港特別行政區立法機關的同意並報全國人民代表大會常務委員會備案。法官以外的其他司法人員的任免制度繼續保持。

香港特別行政區的終審權屬於香港特別行政區終審法院。終審法院可根據需要邀請其他普通法適用地區的法官參加審判。

香港特別行政區的檢察機關主管刑事檢察工作，不受任何干涉。

香港特別行政區政府可參照原在香港實行的辦法，作出有關當地和外來的律師在香港特別行政區工作和執業的規定。

中央人民政府將協助或授權香港特別行政區政府同外國就司法互助關係作出適當安排。

四

香港特別行政區成立後，原在香港各政府部門（包括警察部門）任職的公務人員和司法人員均可留用，繼續工作；其薪金、津貼、福利待遇和服務條件不低於原來的標準。對退休或約滿離職的人員，包括一九九七年七月一日以前退休的人員，不論其所屬國籍或居住地點，香港特別行政區政府將按不低於原來的標準向他們或其家屬支付應得的退休金、酬金、津貼及福利費。

香港特別行政區政府可任用原香港公務人員中的或持有香港特別行政區永久性居民身份證的英籍和其他外籍人士擔任政府部門的各級公務人員，各主要政府部門，（相當於"司"級部門，包括警察部門）的正職和某些主要政府部門的副職除外。香港特別行政區政府還可聘請英籍和其他外籍人士擔任政府部門的顧問；必要時並可從香港特別行政區以外聘請合格人員擔任政府部門的專業和技術職務。上述人士只能以個人身份受聘，並和其他公務人員一樣對香港特別行政區政府負責。

公務人員應根據本人的資格、經驗和才能予以任命和提升。香港原有關於公務人員的招聘、僱用、考核、紀律、培訓和管理的制度（包括負責公務人員的任用、薪金、服務條件的專門機構），除有關給予外籍人員特權待遇的規定外，予以保留。

五

香港特別行政區自行管理財政事務，包括支配財政資源，編製財政預算和決算。香港特別行政區的預決算須報中央人民政府備案。

中央人民政府不向香港特別行政區徵稅。香港特別行政區的財政收入全部用於自身需要，不上繳中央人民政府。徵稅和公共開支經立法機關批准、公共開支向立法機關負責和公共帳目的審計等制度，予以保留。

六

香港特別行政區保持原在香港實行的資本主義經濟制度和貿易制度。香港特別行政區政府自行制定經濟和貿易政策。財產所有權，包括財產的取得、使用、處置和繼承的權利，以及依法徵用財產得到補償（補償相當於該財產的實際價值、可自由兌換、不無故遲延支付）的權利，繼續受法律保護。香港特別行政區將保持自由港地位，並繼續實行自由貿易政策，包括貨物和資本的自由流動。香港特別行政區可單獨同各國、各地區保持和發展經濟和貿易關係。

香港特別行政區為單獨的關稅地區。香港特別行政區可參加關稅和貿易總協定、關於國際紡織品貿易安排等有關的國際組織和國際貿易協定，包括優惠貿易安排。香港特別行政區取得的出口配額、關稅優惠和達成的其他類似安排，全由香港特別行政區享有。香港特別行政區有權根據當時的產地規則，對在當地製造的產品簽發產地來源證。

香港特別行政區可根據需要在外國設立官方或半官方的經濟和貿易機構，並報中央人民政府備案。

七

香港特別行政區將保持國際金融中心的地位。原在香港實行的貨幣金融制度，包括對接受存款機構和金融市場的管理和監督制度，予以保留。

香港特別行政區政府可自行制定貨幣金融政策，並保障金融企業的經營自由以及資金在香港特別行政區流動和進出香港特別行政區的自由。香港特別行政區不實行外匯管制政策。外匯、黃金、證券、期貨市場繼續開放。

港元作為當地的法定貨幣，繼續流通，自由兌換。港幣發行權屬香港特別行政區政府，在確知港幣的發行基礎是健全的以及有關發行的安排符合保持港幣穩定的目的的情況下，香港特別行政區政府可授權指定銀行根據法定權限發行或繼續發行香港貨幣。凡所帶標誌與中華人民共和國香港特別行政區地位不符的香港貨幣，將逐步更換和退出流通。

外匯基金由香港特別行政區政府管理和支配，主要用於調節港元匯價。

八

香港特別行政區保持原在香港實行的航運經營和管理體制，包括有關海員的管理體制。香港特別行政區政府可自行規定在航運方面的具體職能和責任。香港的私營航運及與航運有關的企業和私營集裝箱碼頭，可繼續自由經營。

香港特別行政區經中央人民政府授權繼續進行船舶登記，並可根據法律以"中國香港"名義頒發有關證件。

除外國軍用船隻進入香港特別行政區須經中央人民政府特別許可外，其他船舶可根據香港特別行政區法律進出其港口。

九

香港特別行政區將保持香港作為國際和區域航空中心的地位。在香港註冊並以香港為主要營業地的航空公司和與民用航空有關的行業可繼續經營。香港特別行政區繼續沿用原在香港實行的民用航空管理制度，並按中央人民政府關於飛機國籍標誌和登記標誌的規定，設置自己的飛機登記冊。香港特別行政區自行負責民用航空的日常業務和技術管理，包括機場管理，在香港特別行政區飛行情報區內提供空中交通服務，以及履行國際民用航空組織的區域性航行規劃程序所規定的其他職責。

中央人民政府經同香港特別行政區政府磋商作出安排，為在香港特別行政區註冊並以香港特別行政區為主要營業地的航空公司和中華人民共和國的其他航空公司，提供香港特別行政區和中華人民共和國其他地區之間的往返航班。凡涉及中華人民共和國其他地區與其他國家和地區的往返並經停香港特別行政區的航班，和涉及香港特別行政區與其他國家和地區的往返並經停中華人民共和國其他地區航班的民用航空運輸協定，由中央人民政府簽訂。為此，中央人民政府將考慮香港特別行政區的特殊情況和經濟利益，並同香港特別行政區政府磋商。中央人民政府在同外國政府商談有關此類航班的安排時，香港特別行政區政府的代表可作為中華人民共和國政府代表團成員參加。

經中央人民政府具體授權，香港特別行政區政府可以：對原有的民用航空運輸協定和協議續簽或修改，這些協定和協議原則上都可以續簽或修改，原協定和協議規定的權利盡可能保留；談判簽訂新的民用航空運輸協定，為在香港特別行政區註冊並以香港特別行政區為主要營業地的航空公司提供航線，以及過境和技術停降權利；在同外國和其它地區沒有民用航空運輸協定的情況下，談判簽訂臨時協議。凡不涉及往返、經停中國內地而只往返、經停香港特別行政區的定期航班，均由本段所述的民用航空運輸協定或臨時協議加以規定。

中央人民政府授權香港特別行政區政府：同其他當局商談並簽訂有關執行上述民用航空運輸協定和臨時協議的各項安排；對在香港特別行政區註冊並以香港特別行政區為主要營業地的航空公司簽發執照；按照上述民用航空運輸協定和臨時協議指定航空公司；對外國航空公司除往返、經停中國內地的航班以外的其他航班簽發許可證。

十

香港特別行政區保持原在香港實行的教育制度。香港特別行政區政府自行制定有關文化、教育和科學技術方面的政策，包括教育體制及管理、教學語言、經費分配、考試制度、學位制度、承認學歷及技術資格等政策。各類院校，包括宗教及社會團體所辦院校，均可保留其自主性，並可繼續從香港特別行政區以外招聘教職員，選用教材。學生享有選擇院校和在香港特別行政區以外求學的自由。

十一

在外交事務屬中央人民政府管理的原則下，香港特別行政區政府的代表，可作為中華人民共和國政府代表團的成員，參加由中央人民政府進行的與香港特別行政區直接有關的外交談判。香港特別行政區可以"中國香港"的名義，在經濟、貿易、金融、航運、通訊、旅遊、文化、體育等領域單獨地同世界各國、各地區及有關國際組織保持和發展關係，並簽訂和履行有關協定。對以國家為單位參加的、與香港特別行政區有關的、適當領域的國際組織和國際會議，香港特別行政區政府的代表可作為中華人民共和國政府代表團的成員或以中央人民政府和上述有關國際組織或國際會議允許的身份參加，並以"中國香港"的名義發表意見。對不以國家為單位參加的國際組織和國際會議，香港特別行政區可以"中國香港"的名義參加。

中華人民共和國締結的國際協定，中央人民政府可根據香港特別行政區的情況和需要，在徵詢香港特別行政區政府的意見後，決定是否適用於香港特別行政區。中華人民共和國尚未參加但已適用於香港的國際協定仍可繼續適用。中央人民政府根據需要授權或協助香港特別行政區政府作出適當安排，使其他有關的國際協定適用於香港特別行政區。對中華人民共和國已經參加而香港目前也以某種形式參加的國際組織，中央人民政府將採取必要措施使香港特別行政區以適當形式繼續保持在這些組織中的地位。對中華人民共和國尚未參加而香港目前以某種形式參加的國際組織，中央人民政府將根據需要使香港特別行政區以適當形式繼續參加這些組織。

外國在香港特別行政區設立領事機構或其他官方、半官方機構，須經中央人民政府批准。同中華人民共和國建立正式外交關係的國家在香港設立的領事機構和其他官方機構，可予保留；尚未同中華人民共和國建立正式外交關係國家的領事機構和其他官方機構，可根據情況予以保留或改為半官方機構；尚未為中華人民共和國承認的國家，只能設立民間機構。

聯合王國可在香港特別行政區設立總領事館。

十二

香港特別行政區的社會治安由香港特別行政區政府負責維持。中央人民政府派駐香港特別行政區負責防務的部隊不干預香港特別行政區的內部事務，駐軍軍費由中央人民政府負擔。

十三

香港特別行政區政府依法保障香港特別行政區居民和其他人的權利和自由。香港特別行政區政府保持香港原有法律中所規定的權利和自由，包括人身、言論、出版、集會、結社、組織和參加工會、通信、旅行、遷徙、罷工、遊行、選擇職業、學術研究和信仰自由、住宅不受侵犯、婚姻自由以及自願生育的權利。

任何人均有權得到秘密法律諮詢、向法院提起訴訟、選擇律師在法庭上為其代理以及獲得司法補救。任何人均有權對行政部門的行為向法院申訴。

宗教組織和教徒可同其他地方的宗教組織和教徒保持關係，宗教組織所辦學校、醫院、福利機構等均可繼續存在。香港特別行政區的宗教組織與中華人民共和國其他地區宗教組織的關係應以互不隸屬、互不干涉和互相尊重的原則為基礎。

《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》和《經濟、社會與文化權利的國際公約》適用於香港的規定將繼續有效。

十四

在香港特別行政區有居留權並有資格按香港特別行政區的法律獲得香港特別行政區政府簽發的載明此項權利的永久性居民身份證者為：在香港特別行政區成立以前或以後在當地出生或通常居住連續七年以上的中國公民及其在香港以外所生的中國籍子女；在香港特別行政區成立以前或以後在當地通常居住連續七年以上並以香港為永久居住地的其他人及其在香港特別行政區成立以前或以後在當地出生的未滿二十一歲的子女；以及在香港特別行政區成立前只在香港有居留權的其他人。

中央人民政府授權香港特別行政區政府依照法律，給持有香港特別行政區永久性居民身份證的中國公民簽發中華人民共和國香港特別行政區護照，並給在香港特別行政區的其他的合法居留者簽發中華人民共和國香港特別行政區其他旅行證件。上述護照和證件，前往各國和各地區有效，並載明持有人有返回香港特別行政區的權利。

香港特別行政區居民出入當地，可使用香港特別行政區政府或中華人民共和國其他主管部門，或其他國家主管部門簽發的旅行證件。凡持有香港特別行政區永久性居民身份證者，其旅行證件可載明此項事實，以證明其在香港特別行政區有居留權。

對中國其他地區的人進入香港特別行政區將按現在實行的辦法管理。

對其他國家和地區的人入境、逗留和離境，香港特別行政區政府可實行出入境管制。

有效旅行證件持有人，除非受到法律制止，可自由離開香港特別行政區，無需特別批准。

中央人民政府將協助或授權香港特別行政區政府同各國或各地區締結互免簽證協定。

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附件二

關於中英聯合聯絡小組

一、為促進雙方共同目標，並為保證一九九七年政權的順利交接，中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府同意，繼續以友好的精神進行討論並促進兩國政府在香港問題上已有的合作關係，以求《聯合聲明》得以有效執行。

二、為了進行聯絡、磋商及交換情況的需要，兩國政府同意成立聯合聯絡小組。

三、聯合聯絡小組的職責為：

（一）就《聯合聲明》的實施進行磋商；

（二）討論與一九九七年政權順利交接有關的事宜；

（三）就雙方商定的事項交換情況並進行磋商。

聯合聯絡小組未能取得一致意見的問題，提交兩國政府通過協商解決。

四、在聯合聯絡小組成立到一九九七年七月一日的前半段時期中審議的事項 包括：

（一）兩國政府為使香港特別行政區作為獨立關稅地區保持其經濟關係，特別是為確保香港特別行政區繼續參加關稅及貿易總協定、多種纖維協定及其他國際性安排所需採取的行動；

（二）兩國政府為確保同香港有關的國際權利與義務繼續適用所需採取的行動。

五、兩國政府同意，在聯合聯絡小組成立到一九九七年七月一日的後半段時期中，有必要進行更密切的合作，因此屆時將加強合作，在此第二階段時期中審議的事項包括：

（一）為一九九七年順利過渡所要採取的措施；

（二）為協助香港特別行政區同各國、各地區及有關國際組織保持和發展經濟、文化關係並就此類事項簽訂協議所需採取的行動。

六、聯合聯絡小組是聯絡機構而不是權力機構，不參與香港或香港特別行政區的行政管理，也不對之起監督作用。聯合聯絡小組的成員和工作人員只在聯合聯絡小組職責範圍內進行活動。

七、雙方各指派一名大使級的首席代表和另外四名小組成員。每方可派不超過二十名的工作人員。

八、聯合聯絡小組在《聯合聲明》生效時成立。聯合聯絡小組自一九八八年七月一日起以香港為主要駐地。聯合聯絡小組將繼續工作到二○○○年一月一日為止。

九、聯合聯絡小組在北京、倫敦和香港開會。每年至少在上述三地各開會一次。每次開會地點由雙方商定。

十、聯合聯絡小組成員在上述三地享有相應的外交特權與豁免。除非雙方另有協議，聯合聯絡小組討論情況須加以保密。

十一、經雙方協議，聯合聯絡小組可決定設立專家小組以處理需要專家協助的具體事項。

十二、聯合聯絡小組成員以外的專家可參加聯合聯絡小組和專家小組的會議。每方按照討論的問題和選定的地點，決定其參加聯合聯絡小組或專家小組每次會議的人員組成。

十三、聯合聯絡小組的工作程序由雙方按照本附件規定討論決定。

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附件三

關於土地契約

中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府同意自《聯合聲明》生效之日起，按下列規定處理關於香港土地契約和其他有關事項：

一、《聯合聲明》生效前批出或決定的超越一九九七年六月三十日年期的所有土地契約和與土地契約有關的一切權利，以及該聲明生效後根據本附件第二款或第三款批出的超越一九九七年六月三十日年期的所有土地契約和與土地契約 有關的一切權利，按照香港特別行政區的法律繼續予以承認和保護。

二、除了短期租約和特殊用途的契約外，已由香港英國政府批出的一九九七年六月三十日以前滿期而沒有續期權利的土地契約，如承租人願意，均可續期到不超過二○四七年六月三十日，不補地價。從續期之日起，每年交納相當於當日該土地應課差餉租值百分之三的租金，此後，隨應課差餉租值的改變而調整租金。至於舊批約地段、鄉村屋地、丁屋地和類似的農村土地，如該土地在一九八四年六月三十日的承租人，或在該日以後批出的丁屋地的承租人，其父系為一八九八年在香港的原有鄉村居民，只要該土地的承租人仍為該人或其合法父系繼承人，租金將維持不變。一九九七年六月三十日以後滿期而沒有續期權利的土地契約，將按照香港特別行政區有關的土地法律及政策處理。

三、從《聯合聲明》生效之日起至一九九七年六月三十日止，香港英國政府可以批出租期不超過二○四七年六月三十日的新的土地契約。該項土地的承租人須交納地價並交納名義租金至一九九七年六月三十日，該日以後不補地價，但需每年交納相當於當日該土地應課差餉租值百分之三的租金，此後，隨應課差餉租值的改變而調整租金。

四、從《聯合聲明》生效之日起至一九九七年六月三十日止，根據本附件第三款所批出的新的土地，每年限於五十公頃，不包括批給香港房屋委員會建造出租的公共房屋所用的土地。

五、在一九九七年七月一日之前，可繼續批准修改香港英國政府所批出的土地契約規定的土地使用條件，補交的地價為原有條件的土地價值和修改條件後的土地價值之間的差額。

六、從《聯合聲明》生效之日起至一九九七年六月三十日止，香港英國政府從土地交易所得的地價收入，在扣除開發土地平均成本的款項後，均等平分，分別歸香港英國政府和日後的香港特別行政區政府所有。屬於香港英國政府所得的全部收入，包括上述扣除的款項，均撥入"基本工程儲備基金"，用於香港土地開發和公共工程。屬於香港特別行政區政府的地價收入部分，將存入在香港註冊的銀行，除按照本附件第七款（四）的規定用於香港土地開發和公共工程外，不得動用。

七、《聯合聲明》生效之日起，立即在香港成立土地委員會。土地委員會由中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府指派同等人數的官員組成，輔以必要的工作人員。雙方官員向各自的政府負責。土地委員會將於一九九七年六月三十日解散。

土地委員會的職權範圍為：

（一）就本附件的實施進行磋商；

（二）監察本附件第四款規定的限額，批給香港房屋委員會建造出租的公共房屋所用的土地數量，以及本附件第六款關於地價收入的分配和使用的執行；

（三）根據香港英國政府提出的建議，考慮並決定提高本附件第四款所述的限額數量；

（四）審核關於擬動用本附件第六款所述的屬於香港特別行政區政府的地價收入部分的建議，並提出意見，供中方決定。

土地委員會未能取得一致意見的問題，提交中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府決定。

八、有關建立土地委員會的細則，由雙方另行商定。

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雙方交換的備忘錄

備忘錄（英方）

聯繫到今天簽訂的大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府和中華人民共和國政府關於香港問題的聯合聲明，聯合王國政府聲明，在完成對聯合王國有關立法的必要修改的情況下，

一、凡根據聯合王國實行的法律，在 1997 年 6 月 30 日由於同香港的關係為英國屬土公民者，從 1997 年 7 月 1 日起，不再是英國屬土公民，但將有資格保留某種適當地位，使其可繼續使用聯合王國政府簽發的護照，而不賦予在 聯合王國的居留權。取得這種地位的人，必須為持有在 1997 年 7 月 1 日以前簽發的該種英國護照或包括在該種護照上的人，但 1997 年 1 月 1 日或該日 以後、1997 年 7 月 1 日以前出生的有資格的人，可在 1997 年 12 月 31 日截止的期間內取得該種護照或包括在該種護照上。

二、在 1997 年 7 月 1 日或該日以後，任何人不得由於同香港的關係而取得英國屬土公民的地位。凡在 1997 年 7 月 1 日或該日以後出生者，不得取得第一節中所述的適當地位。

三、在香港特別行政區和其他地方的聯合王國的領事官員可為第一節中提及的人所持的護照延長期限和予以更換，亦可給他們在 1997 年 7 月 1 日前出生並且原來包括在他們護照上的子女簽發護照。

四、根據第一節和第三節已領取聯合王國政府簽發的護照的人或包括在該護照上的人，經請求有權在第三國獲得英國的領事服務和保護。

英國駐華大使館（印）

１９８４年１２月１９日

備忘錄（中方）

中華人民共和國政府收到了大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府 1984 年 12 月 19 日的備忘錄。

根據中華人民共和國國籍法，所有香港中國同胞，不論其是否持有"英國屬土公民護照"，都是中國公民。

考慮到香港的歷史背景和現實情況，中華人民共和國政府主管部門自 1997 年 7 月 1 日起，允許原被稱為"英國屬土公民"的香港中國公民使用由聯合王國政府簽發的旅行證件去其他國家和地區旅行。

上述中國公民在香港特別行政區和中華人民共和國其他地區不得因其持有上述英國旅行證件而享受英國的領事保護的權利。

中華人民共和國外交部（印）

１９８４年１２月１９日

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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————————————————————

National Security Law During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion

Adopted by the Legislative Yuan on June 23, 1987, promulgated by the President on July 1, 1987, effective as of July 15, 1987.

(Note: This is a translation from the Chinese text of the law. In case of any discrepancy between the Chinese and English texts, the Chinese text shall govern.)

Article 1 The present law is hereby enacted to safeguard national security and maintain social stability during the period of national mobilization for suppression of the Communist rebellion.
Matters for which the present law does not provide shall be governed by other relevant laws.
Article 2 No person may violate the Constitution or advocate Communism or the division of national territory in the exercise of the people’s freedom of assembly and association.
The assembly and association stated in the preceding paragraph shall be governed by laws to be enacted separately.
Article 3 For entry into and exit from the Taiwan Region1, all persons shall apply for permission from the Entry and Exit Service Bureau of the National Police Administration, Ministry of the Interior. A person without permission may not enter into or depart from the Taiwan Region.
Applications for entry or exit permission may be denied if the applicants:
(1) have been sentenced under a final criminal judgment to punishments of imprisonment or greater but have not served or completed the term of sentence, or have been wanted by the judicial authorities, or have been otherwise denied exit permission by the civilian or military judicial authorities; or
(2) have been strongly suspected, on the bases of sufficient factual evidence, to be grave security risks to national security or social stability; or
(3) have been denied entry or exit permission pursuant to other laws.
Applicants denied such permission shall be notified in writing with reasons for denial and with directions appended regarding remedial procedures.
The Ministry of the Interior shall organize a review committee compsed of, inter alia, generally recognized impartial personages to review cases of denial decided pursuant to subparagraph (2), paragraph 2 of the present Article.
Article 4 The police authorities may, when necessary, conduct searches and inspection on the following persons, goods, and transports:
(1) entry and exit passengers and their belongings;
(2) entry and exit vessels, aircraft and other transports;
(3) inland vessels, rafts, aircraft and the passengers and cargo aboard;
(4) sailors, flight crews, fishermen, and other working members of the transports stated in the preceding two subparagraphs, and their belongings.
Article 5 To safeguard coastal defenses, military installations and mountain areas, the Ministry of National Defense may, in consultation with the Ministry of the Interior, designate and declare certain sea coasts, mountain areas or important military facilities as restricted zones.
All persons desiring entry into and exit from the restricted zones stated in the preceding paragraph shall apply for permission from the authorities in charge.
Within these restriced zones stated in paragraph 1, construction may be restricted or prohibited as required by military considerations; the scope of which shall be determined jointly Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, and other related agencies.
Taxes and other levies on the land on which construction is restricted or prohibited shall be reduced or exempted.
Article 6 A person who violated paragraph 1 of Article 3 by entering into or departing from the Taiwan Region without permission shall be punished with imprisonment of not more than three years, detention, and/or a fine of not more than 30,000 yuan.
A person who without justifiable reason refuses or evades searches or inspections conducted pursuant to Article 4 shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than six months, detention, and/or a fine of not more than 5,000 yuan.
Article 7 A person who without reason violates paragraph 2 of Article 5 by entering into or departing from the restricted zones without applying for permission and refuses to leave after having been notified to do so shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than six months, detention, and/or a fine of not more than 5,000 yuan.
A person who without reason violates paragraph 3 of Article 5 concerning prohibited or restricted construction and refuses to comply with instructions to cease construction shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than six months, detention, and/or a fine of not more than 5,000 yuan.
Article 8 Except for military personnel in active military service, no civilian shall be subjected to military trial.
All military personnel in active military service who have committed a criminal offense shall be prosecuted and tried by military judicial authorities unless the criminal offense committed is not provided for under the Criminal Code of the Armed Forces or other special enactments thereof but is provided for under Article 61 of the Criminal Code.
Article 9 Criminal cases regarding civilians who, having been tried or being tried by military courts in areas in which the Chieh-yen2 (Emergency) Decree had been in effect, shall be dealt with according to the following provisions after the termination of the Chieh-yen (Emergency) Decree:
(1) Where military trial proceedings have not been completed, cases undergoing investigation shall be transferred to competent (civilian) public prosecutor for investigation; cases pending trial shall be transferred to a competent (civilian) court for trial.
(2) Where criminal judgments have become final, appeal or interlocutory appeal to a competent (civilian) court shall not be allowed; however, where grounds for retrial or extraordinary appeal exist, applications for retrial or extraordinary appeal may be made pursuant to the law.
(3) Where final criminal judgments have not yet been executed, or are being executed, they shall be transferred to a competent (civilian) public prosecutor for execution under his direction.
Article 10 The enforcement regulations of the present law and the date of its coming into force shall be made and determined respectively by the Executive Yuan.

Translator’s notes:
1. The term “Taiwan Region” refers to Taiwan, the Pescadores, Kinmen (Quemoy), Matsu and other territories currently under the effective control of the Republic of China government.
2. The term “Chieh-yen” is generally but inadequately translated as “martial law”. Under the Republic of China’s legal system, which is continental-European in origin, the Chieh-yen Law and the Chieh-yen Decree are two different matters. The former does not apply unless and until activated by the president’s issuance of the latter. When the Chieh-yen Decree is lifted, the Chieh-yen Law remains on the books but becomes inoperative.

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動員戡亂時期國家安全法

中華民國 76 年 06 月 23 日

第一條 動員戡亂時期為確保國家安全，維護社會安定，特制定本法。
本法未規定者，適用其他有關法律之規定。
第二條 人民集會、結社，不得違背憲法或主張共產主義，或主張分裂國土。
前項集會、結社，另以法律定之。
第三條 人民入出境，應向內政部警政署入出境管理局申請許可。未經許可者，不得入出境。
人民申請入出境有左列情形之一者，得不予許可：
一、經判處有期徒刑以上之刑確定尚未執行或執行未畢，或因案通緝中，或經司法或軍法機關限制出境者。
二、有事實足認為有妨害國家安全或社會安定之重大嫌疑者。
三、依其他法律限制或禁止入出境者。
前項不予許可，應以書面敘明理由，通知申請人，並附記不服之救濟程序。
內政部應聘請包括社會公正人士組成審查委員會，審核第二項第二款未經許可事項。
第四條 警察機關於必要時對左列人員、物品及運輸工具得實施檢查：
一、入出境之旅客及其所攜帶之物件。
二、入出境之船舶、航空器或其他運輸工具。
三、航行境內之船筏、航空器及其客貨。
四、前二款運輸工具之船員、機員、漁民或其他從業人員及其所攜帶之物件。
第五條 為確保海防及軍事設施安全，並維護山地治安，得由國防部會同內政部指定海岸、山地或重要軍事設施地區，劃為管制區，並公告之。
人民入出前項管制區，應向該管機關申請許可。
第一項之管制區，為軍事所必需者，得實施限建、禁建；其範圍由國防部會同內政部及有關機關定之。
前項限建或禁建土地之稅捐，應予減免。
第六條 違反第三條第一項規定，未經許可入出境者，處三年以下有期徒刑、拘役或科或併科三萬元以下罰金。
無正當理由，拒絕或逃避依第四條規定所實施之檢查者，處六月以下有期徒刑、拘役或科或併科五千元以下罰金。
第七條 違反第五條第二項未經申請許可，無故入出管制區，經通知離去而不從者，處六月以下有期徒刑、拘役或科或併科五千元以下罰金。
違反第五條第三項禁建、限建之規定，經制止而不從者，處六月以下有期徒刑、拘役或科或併科五千元以下罰金。
第八條 非現役軍人，不受軍事審判。
現役軍人犯罪，由軍法機關追訴審判。但所犯為陸海空軍刑法及其特別法以外之罪，而屬刑法第六十一條所列各罪者，不在此限。
第九條 戒嚴時期戒嚴地域內，經軍事審判機關審判之非現役軍人刑事案件，於解嚴後依左列規定處理：
一、軍事審判程序尚未終結者，偵查中案件移送該管檢察官偵查，審判中案件移送該管法院審判。
二、刑事裁判已確定者，不得向該管法院上訴或抗告。但有再審或非常上訴之原因者，得依法聲請再審或非常上訴。
三、刑事裁判尚未執行或在執行中者，移送該管檢察官指揮執行。
第十條 本法施行細則及施行日期，由行政院定之。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTES ===============

When the National Security Law During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion (dongyuan kanluan shiqi guojia anquanfa 動員戡亂時期國家安全法) was promulgated on July 1, 1987, martial law was still in force in Taiwan. The name of the law was changed to National Security Act (guojia anquanfa 國家安全法) by ROC President Lee Teng-hui on July 29, 1992. Its legislative history is as follows:

  1. Enacted and Promulgated by President Order Hua-Tsung (1)-Yi-Tzu No. 2360 on July 1, 1987.
  2. Amended and promulgated by President Order Hua-Tsung (1)-Yi-Tzu No. 3667 on July 29, 1992.
  3. Amended and promulgated by President Order Hua-Tsung (1)-Yi-Tzu No. 8500027120 on Feb. 5, 1996.
  4. Amended and promulgated by President Order Hua-Tsung (1)-Yi-Tzu No. 10000259741 on Nov. 23, 2011.
  5. Amended and promulgated by President Order Hua-Tsung (1)-Yi-Tzu No. 10200156111 on Aug. 21, 2013.
  6. Amended on July 3, 2009.
  7. Amended on June 8, 2022.

The source for the English text is the Republic of China Yearbook 1989, p. 724-725.

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Guidelines for National Unification

Adopted by the National Unification Council at its third meeting on February 23, 1991, and by the Executive Yuan Council at its 2223rd meeting on March 14, 1991.

I. Foreword

The unification of China is meant to bring about a strong and prosperous nation with a long-lasting, bright future for its people; it is the common wish of Chinese people at home and abroad. After an appropriate period of forthright exchange, cooperation and consultation conducted under the principles of reason, peace, parity, and reciprocity, the two sides of the Taiwan Straits should foster a consensus of democracy, freedom, and equal prosperity and together build anew a unified China. Based on this understanding, these Guidelines have been specially formulated with the express hope that all Chinese throughout the world will work with one mind toward their fulfillment.

II. Goal

To establish a democratic, free and equitably prosperous China.

III. Principles

Both the mainland and Taiwan areas are parts of Chinese territory. Helping to bring about national unification should be the common responsibility of all Chinese people. The unification of China should be for the welfare of all its people and not be subject to partisan conflict. China's unification should aim at promoting Chinese culture, safeguarding human dignity, guaranteeing fundamental human rights, and practicing democracy and the rule of law. The timing and manner of China's unification should first respect the rights and interests of the people in the Taiwan area, and protect their security and welfare. It should be achieved in gradual phases under the principles of reason, peace, parity, and reciprocity.

IV. Process

1. Short term, a phase of exchanges and reciprocity.

(1) To enhance understanding through exchanges between the two sides of the Strait and eliminate hostility through reciprocity; and to establish a mutually benign relationship by not endangering each other's security and stability while in the midst of exchanges and not denying the other's existence as a political entity while in the midst of effecting reciprocity.

(2) To set up an order for exchanges across the Strait, to draw up regulations for such exchanges, and to establish intermediary organizations so as to protect people's rights and interests on both sides of the Strait; to gradually ease various restrictions and expand people-to-people contacts so as to promote the social prosperity of both sides.

(3) In order to improve the people's welfare on both sides of the Strait with the ultimate objective of unifying the nation, in the mainland area economic reform should be carried out forthrightly, the expression of public opinion there should be gradually allowed, and both democracy and the rule of law should be implemented while in the Taiwan area efforts should be made to accelerate constitutional reform and promote national development to establish a society of equitable prosperity.

(4) The two sides of the Strait should end the state of hostility and, under the principle of one China solve all disputes through peaceful means, and furthermore respect, not reject, each other in the international community, so as to move toward a phase of mutual trust and cooperation.

2. Medium term, a phase of mutual trust and cooperation.

(1) Both sides of the Strait should establish official communication channels on equal footing.

(2) Direct postal, transport and commercial links should be allowed and both sides should jointly develop the southeastern coastal area of the Chinese mainland and then gradually extend this development to other areas of the mainland in order to narrow the gap in living standards between the two sides.

(3) Both sides of the Strait should work together and assist each other in taking part in international organizations and activities.

(4) Mutual visits by high-ranking officials on both sides should be promoted to create favorable conditions for consultation and unification.

3. Long term, a phase of consultation and unification

A consultative organization for unification should be established through which both sides, in accordance with the will of the people in both the mainland and Taiwan areas, and while adhering to the goals of democracy, economic freedom, social justice and nationalization of the armed forces, jointly discuss the grand task of unification and map out a constitutional system to establish a democratic, free, and equitably prosperous China.

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國家統一綱領

中華民國八十年二月二十三日國家統一委員會第三次會議通過,

中華民國八十年三月十四日行政院第二二二三次會議通過

中華民國九十五年三月一日行政院第二九八０次院會決定「『國家統一綱領』終止適用」函知本院所屬各機關查照

壹、前言

中國的統一，在謀求國家的富強與民族長遠的發展，也是海內外中國人共同的願望。海峽兩岸應在理性、和平、對等、互惠的前提下，經過適當時期的坦誠交流、合作、協商，建立民主、自由、均富的共識，共同重建一個統一的中國。基此認識，特制訂本綱領，務期海內外全體中國人同心協力，共圖貫徹。

貳、目標

建立民主、自由、均富的中國。

參、原則

一、 大陸與台灣均是中國的領土，促成國家的統一，應是中國人共同的責任。

二、 中國的統一，應以全民的福祉為依歸，而不是黨派之爭。

三、 中國的統一，應以發揚中華文化，維護人性尊嚴，保障基本人權，實踐民主法治為宗旨。

四、 中國的統一，其時機與方式，首應尊重台灣地區人民的權益並維護其安全與福祉，在理性、和平、對等、互惠的原則下，分階段逐步達成。

肆、進程

一、 近程－－交流互惠階段

(一) 以交流促進瞭解，以互惠化解敵意；在交流中不危及對方的安全與安定，在互惠中不否定對方為政治實體，以建立良性互動關係。

(二) 建立兩岸交流秩序，制訂交流規範，設立中介機構，以維護兩岸人民權益；逐步放寬各項限制，擴大兩岸民間交流，以促進雙方社會繁榮。

(三) 在國家統一的目標下，為增進兩岸人民福祉：大陸地區應積極推動經濟改革，逐步開放輿論，實行民主法治；台灣地區則應加速憲政改革，推動國家建設，建立均富社會。

(四) 兩岸應摒除敵對狀態，並在一個中國的原則下，以和平方式解決一切爭端，在國際間相互尊重，互不排斥，以利進入互信合作階段。

二、 中程－－互信合作階段

(一) 兩岸應建立對等的官方溝通管道。

(二) 開放兩岸直接通郵、通航、通商，共同開發大陸東南沿海地區，並逐步向其他地區推展，以縮短兩岸人民生活差距。

(三) 兩岸應協力互助，參加國際組織與活動。

(四) 推動兩岸高層人士互訪，以創造協商統一的有利條件。

三、 遠程－－協商統一階段

成立兩岸統一協商機構，依據兩岸人民意願，秉持政治民主、經濟自由、社會公平及軍隊國家化的原則，共商統一大業，研訂憲政體制，以建立民主、自由、均富的中國。

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February 28 Incident Research Report

(Jump to Chinese version of the text)

Foreword

"An investigative study conducted by the Executive Yuan into the February 28 Incident, an incident that no one had dared mention before the end of martial law and that had caused social unease in Taiwan, was to be used by the government as a reference in the settlement of the aftermath of the February 28 Incident." Therefore, in January 1991, the "February 28 Incident Research Group" was established with eight members, Chen Chung-Kuang, Yeh Ming-hsun, Li Yunhan, Chih Ching-Teh, Chang Yu-fa, Marvin Ho, Chen San-ching and Lai Jeh-hang, and with Chen Chung-Kuang and Yeh Ming-hsun as conveners and Lai Jeh-hang as chief writer. Apart from Lai Jeh-hang, the group also invited four other professors, Huang Fu-san, Wu Wenxing, Huang Xiuzheng, and Hsu Hsueh-chi, to join the writers panel. Chen Mei-fei, Chien Jung-tsung and Fang Huifang were part-time researchers, respectively assisting Huang Fu-san, Huang Xiuzheng and Yeh Ming-hsun, the so called "Working Team."

"The above-mentioned authors conducted archive and literature research and oral history recording in accordance with their academic conscience and non-partisan positions." Although the research period was only one year, they were able to gain access to first hand materials from the government and to interview hundreds of witnesses before systematically and objectively analyzing the incident in its entirety.

"When it came to the collection of material, in addition to sourcing from the existing archives of the Taiwanese government, researchers also went to China and other countries to collect relevant data of high value, including documents concerning the February 28 Incident donated by George H. Kerr to Stanford University's Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Tamsui Consulate documents provided by the Public Record Office of the United Kingdom, documents provided by the Second Historical Archives of China in Nanjing, etc. The material obtained by the research team can be counted as some of the richest among all overseas and domestic research programs in relation to this topic.

"After the publication of the February 28 Incident investigation report on February 22, 1992, it was generally accepted by the public in spite of disagreements over some details." Referring to further information, the authors edited and supplemented the original report and had it published by China Times Publishing Co. on February 20, 1994. This was how "Research Report on the February 28 Incident" came into being.

There is no doubt that "Research Report on the February 28 Incident" is the primary source that people should refer to if they wish to understand this incident. However, a total of 504 pages can be quite burdensome for members of our busy modern society. The "Conclusion" chapter of the report, which spans from page 405 to page 412, provides a brief description and review of the February 28 Incident, allowing readers to understand the cause, progression and aftermath of the incident. Therefore, the Memorial Foundation of 228 especially chose this chapter as the core of this article, which is divided into eight sections and supplemented with footnotes to strengthen the clarity of the main text. Footnotes are all quoted from the "Research Report" except where specified otherwise. It is expected that readers of this article can gain a comprehensive idea of the February 28 Incident within an hour. Of course, if you wish to understand the entire incident in more detail, you should refer to the original report.

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1. Background of the incident

The February 28 Massacre (Footnote 1) took place less than a year and a half after the end of the Second World War (Footnote 2). The background of the incident is extremely complicated and cannot be explained in terms of only one factor. First of all, fifty years of Japanese colonial rule led to a general lack of understanding of both the political system and societal circumstances of China. Therefore, disillusionment with the new regime became apparent before the end of 1945 (Footnote 3). Secondly, on the political front, the system of the Chief Executive's Office (Footnote 4) was beset with many defects and problems, including the corrupt and ineffective behaviors of government officials (Footnote 5) and soldiers (Footnote 6), unfair distribution of political resources (Footnote 7), etc. On the economic front, improper policies for controlling the economy (Footnote 8) resulted in an industrial slump (Footnote 9), hyperinflation (Footnote 10) and severe unemployment. On the societal front, Taiwanese veterans who served in the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy (Footnote 11) could find hardly any employment opportunities after returning from the battlefields and ended up destitute, which resulted in the gradual formation of an undercurrent of anti-government sentiment. In addition, the obstinate personality of Chief Executive Chen Yi (Footnote 12) made it impossible for him to understand the feelings of the Taiwanese people, which resulted in the deterioration of the relationship between the government and the people. The above-mentioned factors contributed to a premonition of an imminent crisis among people of insight (Footnote 13) well before the Chief Executive's Office became aware of it (Footnote 14).

Footnotes:

1. The time frame of "Research Report on the February 28 Incident" spans from February 27, 1947, when the conflict around contraband tobacco occurred, to May 16, when the "village purging" ended. [Foreword]
2. 1945
3. Due to the long-time censoring of information, Taiwanese people who lived under Japanese colonial rule did not know much about their Ancestral Country. Because of this, Taiwanese people tended to compare the governance of the Chinese Nationalist government, which extended its rule to Taiwan after the Second World War, with the Japanese colonial government, especially when it came to military, political, economic and societal aspects. Seeing the stark contrast between the two regimes, Taiwanese people started to feel that newcomers from their Ancestral Country were worse than the Japanese and feelings of contempt and disdain were thus rooted in their minds. In addition, the schism between Taiwanese locals and people from different provinces of China was further widened because some people from the Chinese mainland cajoled Taiwanese women into fake marriages, and the lifestyles, values and ethics of the newcomers conflicted with those of the locals due to incompatible social backgrounds and a lack of modern knowledge. Taiwanese people's expectations of this regime that came from their Ancestral Country were too high, and their general disappointment was soon followed by widespread contempt. (Page 27)
4. According to the Taiwan Province Chief Executive's Office Organization Act, the Chief Executive's Office was entrusted by the Central Government to manage its administrative affairs. The Chief Executive had the power to mandate and supervise departments of the Central Government in Taiwan and to issue office orders and separate regulations within the scope of his responsibilities. At the same time, he also assumed post of commander-in-chief of the Taiwan Garrison Command. It can be seen that the Chief Executive's Office system was a form of centralized leadership which placed the judicial, legislative, military, and administrative powers of Taiwan province in the Chief Executive himself. The Chief Executive was appointed by the Central Government, which was different to the directorial system used in other Chinese provinces. The implementation of the directorial system in all provincial governments meant that the members of directorial boards and chairmen were all senior ranking officials; while all the people working for the departments of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office (such as Departments of Secretariat, Civil Affairs, Education, Finance, Agriculture, Forestry, Industry and Mining, Transportation, Police and Accounting) and secretary-generals were all contracted staff members of the Chief Executive himself. In addition, an organic law committee, propaganda committee and assessment and design committee were also set up in Taiwan. The system of banking and currency was also different to China. Chen Yi believed that the Taiwan dollar and Taiwanese financial institutions should maintain their own original systems and the current legal tender of China should be prevented from circulating in Taiwan, so that "Taiwan could avoid the consequences of hyperinflation which was out of control in the Chinese mainland provinces caused by the over-issuing of the legal tender." Therefore, Chen Yi proposed that "the priority was to maintain stability by issuing an independent New Taiwan dollar so that prosperity could be achieved in Taiwan without being affected by the serious depreciation of legal tender used on the mainland." Before Chen Yi came to Taiwan, his proposal was approved by President Chiang Kai-shek, who later personally instructed Soong Tse-ven to implement Chen Yi's idea. Because of this, four banks and two financial entities (Central Bank, Bank of China, Bank of Communications, Farmers Bank, Central Trust of China and General Post Office) that originally intended to set up branches in Taiwan were not allowed to do so. The Ministry of Finance also issued Regulations Concerning the Currency Exchange Between Taiwan and the Mainland, which stipulated that "no banks except the Central Bank and those that are endorsed by the government are allowed to undertake currency exchanges between the Taiwan dollar and the legal tender of China." (Page 6) Many Taiwanese people believed that the financial arrangement of the Nationalist government treated them as if they were being colonized, and they felt discontented with the government. (Page 4)
5. Government officials not only did not serve the citizens on weekdays, but also put on official airs or acted irresponsibly and inattentively when they were approached. These drawbacks dramatically contrasted the diligence and efficiency of officials from the Japanese colonial period. (Page 20) A lack of political efficiency and an overly bureaucratic manner were things that Taiwanese people had not experienced during the Japanese colonial period. Within one year and a half, it became evident that the Taiwan Province Executive's Office was outperformed greatly by its Japanese predecessor. Newspapers often reported that government officials were involved in scandals like going to bars, lack of discipline and corruption. For example, on February 22, 1947, Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News published an editorial opinion piece "On the Problem of Corruption," which not only disclosed a stunning number of corruption cases, but also pointed out the fact that many government officials frequently attended ballrooms, tea houses, restaurants and casinos in the cities, showing that there were too many unnecessary employees in the government, as well as the fact that people's impression of government officials was very poor. Corruption cases were not limited to general officials. Prosecutors, court presidents, and even teachers were found to be corrupt. Soldiers not abiding by the law or not paying when shopping or traveling was very common, and there was even public looting. Many of these corruption cases exceeded 10 million Taiwan dollars in amount. (Page 21)
6. The troops stationed in Taiwan had a poor reputation. Soldiers often "forcibly borrowed money, raped women, and shot and wounded people. It was not uncommon to see soldiers buying five-dollar eggs with only one dollar. Disputes in the markets were commonplace." Robbery and theft were also commonly seen. (Page 23)
7. During the Japanese colonial period, it was difficult for Taiwanese people to gain fair political treatment for administrative, professional and technological advancement. After the Second World War, many Taiwanese people harbored the fantasy of an autonomous Taiwan and believed they should be able to self-rule from then on. To the contrary, among 18 directors and deputy directors from nine important departments of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office, only one deputy director was from Taiwan. Among 17 mayors of cities and counties, only Taipei Mayor You Mijian, Hsinchu County Mayor Liu Qiguang, Kaohsiung Mayor Huang Zhongtu (formerly Lian Mou), and Kaohsiung County Mayor Xie Dongyu (formerly Huang Daping at the time of the February 28 Incident) were Taiwanese, but they were all Puànn-suann-á, meaning officials of Taiwanese heritage who had returned from Chongqing, the former capital of the Chinese Nationalist government, and were not welcome by Taiwanese locals. What made Taiwanese people even more upset was the treatment of "unequal pay for the same work" and the difficulty associated with becoming employed by the government or public institutions. (Page 19)
8. Foreign trade is extremely important to the economy of an island region. If an island region does not rely on foreign trade, it must have a considerable amount of resources. Because Taiwan was not considered to be resource-rich, it still needed to trade with the world. However, Chen Yi did not seem to understand the situation. After he arrived in Taiwan, he began to implement a controlled economy... Although he knew that this would invoke opposition from businesspeople, Chen Yi believed that this economic policy was for the benefit of the public, not for private interests.
 "What Chen Yi wanted to pursue was not to fatten the pockets of a few people but to gradually deal with the livelihood issues facing Taiwanese people in terms of food, clothes, and amenities." Chen Yi's attitude showed his longing for socialist ideas, which, coupled with his obstinate and stubborn character, resulted in considerable criticism and condemnation of his economic policies. This became one of the catalysts triggering the February 28 Incident. (Page 7)
 Because of the uniqueness of Taiwan's administrative arrangement, the Taiwan Province Executive's Office did not welcome influences from outside the island. This mentality was evident in the rejection of Chinese banks seeking to operate in Taiwan, including the above-mentioned "four banks and two financial entities" and other private banks, which "brought a halt to the operation of any private trade enterprises except the ones run by government officials and police." This situation also caused the government banks on the Chinese mainland to use "the currency exchange problem" as an excuse to adopt a blockade policy in retaliation against Taiwan, which made Taiwan become self-isolated. As a result, ferry and air tickets were not allowed to be sold, Taiwanese customs lost tax revenue, and ships were not permitted to leave ports, impeding the transportation of goods to the outside world. In addition, the controlled economy policy implemented by the Taiwan Province Executive's Office, which in reality amounted to the dominance of the government in trade business and an unpredictable exchange rate, demotivated businesspeople. Because of this, shipping and selling goods in Taiwan became difficult, which resulted in a self-isolated situation in which foreign goods could not reach Taiwan and Taiwanese goods could not ship overseas. (Page 25)
 On January 10, 1946, a Taiwanese compatriot petitioned the Executive Yuan that "the Central Government should abolish government-run trade enterprises and any other similar intermediary institutions that compromised the free market and revoke all types of military laws to lighten the load on the people." This showed that the people were dissatisfied with Chen Yi's policy of a controlled economy. (Page 22)
9. (Chen Yi) not only set up the Monopoly Bureau to continue the monopoly system that the Japanese colonial government had implemented in Taiwan, but also controlled the Trade Bureau that managed transportation to and from Taiwan. His regime monopolized almost every aspect of the island's trade and industries, hindering the development of private enterprises and causing discontent and disillusion among locals. Therefore, these two institutions became the target that reform-minded people sought to abolish during the February 28 Incident. (Page 26)
10. The economic crisis in Taiwan was mainly caused by inflation and soaring prices, especially food prices. Taiwan was originally known for its production of rice. During the Japanese colonial period, crop production dropped dramatically "due to the war…" Soon after the Chinese Nationalist government extended its rule to Taiwan in 1946…Taiwan experienced a serious food shortage that was evident in the rocketing price of rice, such that some people at the time believed that the price level in Taiwan was higher than that in any province of China. Famine broke out in many places, and social unrest even occurred in rice production areas, such as in Taichung and Tainan. More and more people lost their jobs over time. Daylight robbery and burglary were everywhere. (Page 23)
 From October 1945 to December 1946, Taiwan's price level had inflated more than a hundredfold. The problem of food prices was particularly serious. (Page 25)
 600 grams of rice originally sold for only 1.5 Taiwan dollars. However, in early 1946, the price for this much rice had already risen to more than 10 Taiwan dollars. On February, 1947, the price reached 32 Taiwan dollars per 600 grams. This was not something that Taiwanese people had experienced before, so they were particularly angry about the food price crisis. (Page 8)
11. About 100,000 Taiwanese servicemen…enlisted in the Imperial Japanese Army or Navy. (Page 118)
12. Surrounded by immoral staff, Chen Yi trusted his subordinates too much and was too permissive with them. Chiang Wei-chuan, the then chairman of the Taipei Chamber of Commerce, once criticized Chen Yi in person, saying that he resided in the deep end of the palace surrounded by corrupt officialdom and a few opportunists who claimed to be the bridge between the government and the people but who knew nothing about society or the people, resulting in a situation where public opinions were blocked from reaching him. (Page 12)
13. Less than three months after Taiwan fell under the rule of the Chinese Nationalist government, many Taiwanese people were already criticizing Chen Yi for his inappropriate approach in Taiwan. In early 1946, the situation in Taiwan had deteriorated dramatically, causing concerns in China and the West. Mintai News Agency urged the government to pay more attention to the problems in Taiwan. Millard's Review from Shanghai published the article "Taiwan moving 50 years backward," saying that "in five months Taiwan would become the ‘Ireland' of China." In early 1946, a report presented by the U.S. Consulate in Taiwan to the U.S. ambassador to China and the U.S. Department of State, wrote, "Taiwan is already on the verge of an armed rebellion." By early 1947, many acute observers had already realized the graveness of the situation. For example, the Taiwan correspondent of a Shanghai magazine The Observers predicted on February 2, 1947, just before the February 28 Incident: "Taiwan is in the middle of a crisis. The situation is precarious. At any time, disturbance or rebellion could occur here." It was clear that many people in China and the West had already seen that Taiwan was on the brink of social upheaval. (Page 10)
14.  In the aspects of politics and the economy, Taiwanese people were greatly disappointed by the government. Nonetheless, Chen Yi, who sought to gloss over the domestic problems in Taiwan, still managed to send the government army stationed on the island to the Chinese mainland to crack down on communist activities, which left Taiwan in a militarily vulnerable position. Because of this, radicals were made to believe that they could definitely overturn Chen Yi's regime and fearlessly encouraged ordinary people to rebel against the government. (Page 25)

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2. The outbreak of the massacre

The February 28 Massacre resulted from the misconduct of contraband investigators and police and military police authorities in regards to contraband tobacco confiscation (Footnote 15), which gave rise to mass petition and protest and strike actions from laborers and shopkeepers in Taipei on February 28 (Footnote 16). An incident in which guards shot at protesters at the headquarters of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office the same day (Footnote 17) meant the unrest was further exacerbated and became unstoppable. The petition for punishing the perpetrators was turned into a fight against the Taiwan Province Executive's Office (Footnote 18). Conflict between Taiwanese locals and people from other Chinese provinces was thus provoked (Footnote 19). Resistance and conflict spread throughout the whole island in no time, transforming an originally quite simple public security incident into a political movement. Local leaders took advantage of this opportunity to demand total reform. Military conflicts broke out in some areas after insurgents took control of weapons that belonged to the military and police (Footnote 20).

Footnotes:

15.  The February 28 Massacre was triggered by an accident regarding contraband tobacco confiscation near Chien-Cheng Circle. An outline of what happened in the incident is as follows. At about 11 a.m. on February 27, 1947, the Monopoly Bureau received an intelligence that around 50 boxes of matches and tobacco had been smuggled in through Tamsui Port. Later, six contraband investigators, Yeh Te-ken, Chung Yen-chou, Chao Tzu-chien, Liu Chao-chun, Sheng Tie-fu and Fu Hsueh-tung, along with four policemen from the local police squad, were sent by the bureau to Tamsui, where they only confiscated five boxes of smuggled goods. Soon after, another intelligence showed that the rest of the smuggled goods had been shipped to somewhere near Tianma Tea House, situated on Taipei's Nanjing West Road (formerly known as Taiheicho, on the current Yanping North Road). This area was renowned for being the largest destination of contraband. The investigators and policemen first went to Hsiao Hsiang Yuan (which was near Taiheicho) for dinner, so that they could proceed with their investigation nearby. At 7:30 p.m., they arrived at Tianma Tea House to discover that the contraband sellers had already left, except for Lin Chiang-mai, a 40-year-old widow who was selling both legal and smuggled cigarettes, which were soon confiscated along with the cash she had. Lin Chiang-mai practically knelt down to beg the investigators and said: "If you confiscate all my belongings, I will have no money to buy food. You should at least return my cash money and the cigarettes produced by the Monopoly Bureau to me…." However, the investigators ignored her request. At the time, there was a crowd of bystanders, many of whom also started to implore the investigators on her behalf. All of a sudden, Lin Chiang-mai frantically grasped at one of the investigators, not letting him go. Seeing this, another investigator, Yeh Te-ken, hit her head with the barrel of his gun, making her head bleed profusely. Witnessing the violent scene, the crowd of bystanders burst into anger and surrounded the investigators, passionately shouting, "A-suann (a derogatory name for Chinese Mainlanders) are too unreasonable," "These pigs are monstrous" and "Return the cigarettes." As soon as the investigators realized they had got themselves into trouble, they tried to escape from the crowd chasing close behind. One investigator called Fu Hsueh-tung pulled his trigger in an attempt to escape, but he accidentally shot Chen Wen-si, a fellow citizen who had been watching the incident in front of his house, who died the next day. Investigators escaped to Eirakuchō (Xinin) Police Station before they went to the Police Headquarters right next to Zhongshan Hall. The angry protesters smashed the glass windows of the investigators' truck and pushed it over on the roadside. Later they surrounded the police station, demanding the murderer to be handed over and brought to justice. After Li Chiung, a member of the Standing Committee of the Monopoly Bureau, and Yang Tzu-tsai, the leader of the fourth group of the sales department, learned of the conflict at about 9 p.m. they rushed to the conflict site, where their truck was attacked by around 100 protesters assembled there. Li and Yang quickly went to the Taipei City Police Station, where a crowd of about 600 to 700 people followed them. Li and Yang promised the protesters that they would punish the investigators, but the crowd insisted that they should hand over the criminals. Li and Yang, accompanied by the director of the Taipei City Police Station, had no choice but to send the six investigators to the Military Police Corps. However, the people were not satisfied with the measure, demanding the six investigators should be arrested immediately. Seeking an excuse to pacify the crowd, Li and Yang kept saying that they were "not authorized to reply to the request because the laws clearly stipulated how to punish the perpetrators and penalize the wrongdoing," but they were not understood. After the protesters learned that the investigators had been sent to the Military Police Corps, located to the opposite of the Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News office, they moved to surround the building, demanding the criminals be handed over. The regiment leader Zhang Mutao firmly denied the request and ordered a platoon of military police soldiers get into shooting position. Seeing this, the protesters hid in the arcade of the Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News office. Chou Chuang-chih, who had witnessed the whole situation, remembered that Wu Chin-lien, the Chief Editor of the Japanese version of Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News, had walked outside to see what was going on out of curiosity before he saw and greeted Chou Chuang-chih smilingly. Chou asked him, "Do you have gongs?" Wu said, "Yes." He went back to the office to fetch copper gongs. Soon after a rainstorm, the gongs were banged loudly and the protesters went on surrounding the Military Police Corps again. There were also some young people shouting out loud "Taiwanese people must get revenge" and "People who don't get revenge are not Taiwanese" while banging their gongs on the streets overnight. Some people went to ask Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News to cover the conflict. The Chief Editor Wu Chin-lien declined the request, saying that the Propaganda Commission of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office had ordered the newspaper not to report on the incident. In response, the protesters threatened to burn down the newspaper with gasoline, which forced Li Wanju, the chief executive officer of Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News, to talk to the protesters. Soon after Li Wanju agreed to publish the news, protesters started to leave the site. The next day, Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News reported on the conflict using number five font size in approximately a hundred words. (Page 48) Following the news coverage, the injuries and killings caused by the anti-contraband operation ignited public anger that had been simmering for over a year. The outraged people went to burn cars and surround the police stations and Military Police Corps, requesting the government execute the perpetrators. Not satisfied with the response from the government, the mass of protesters remained on the site not wanting to leave, which culminated in intensified conflict the following day. (Page 51)
16. On February 28 at 9 a.m., protestors continued to bang their gongs on the streets to announce a shutdown of all commercial activities, as the injuries and killings that had occurred in the anti-contraband operation had not been resolved. Citizens and shops immediately joined the strike and one after another shut their doors. A group of protesters marched to Taihei-cho Ni-chome Police Station, where the police station director, Huang, attempted to stop the rally. Remembering that Huang had been very abusive to the people living in his precinct, the protesters started to attack him and smashed the windows and belongings of the police station. As time passed, more and more people joined the rally, and, at about 10 a.m., they broke into the Taipei branch of the culpable Monopoly Bureau, located in Honmachi (today's Chongqing South Road), to discover a few contraband investigators inside the building. The protesters believed one of the investigators to be the murderer from last night, so they beat him and a policeman to death and injured four other people. They also took the matches, tobacco, alcohol, car and seven or eight bicycles that were stored in the building out to the street and burned them. The fire had not died off completely by the next day. By that time, there were about 2000 to 3000 people watching nearby. Military police and police were sent there in no time, but they did not dare deal with the conflict and eventually left… At midday, the protesters moved to the Monopoly Bureau headquarters located near the South Gate, where they continued to demand the punishment of the murderer. But military police and police authorities had already prepared themselves for the coming protesters so that only windows were broken… Because the protesters' request was not accepted by the Monopoly Bureau headquarters, they later headed to the Taiwan Province Executive's Office…The factory near the South Gate that belonged to the Monopoly Bureau was also damaged by the protesters, which showed how fierce the public resentment toward the Monopoly Bureau was. (Page 51)
17. Around 1 p.m., a rally of about 400 to 500 shouting, chanting protesters was led by the banging gongs to march from Taipei Railway Station to the headquarters of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office. It was said that many people who had suffered the consequences of the market rice shortage followed the march to the headquarters, hearing that rice was being given away there. As a result, the march seemed to become a formidable force, until it was obstructed at the Zhongshan Road intersection by well-equipped soldiers with rifles pointed at the protesters before they reached the square of the headquarters. In no time, waves of bullets forced the protesters to escape, leaving some people wounded or dead on the road. This was the Executive's Office Guard Shooting Incident, which was a key factor in the exacerbation of the whole situation. (Page 52)
18. After the shooting outside the headquarters of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office, large-scale confrontation became inevitable. The clash between Taiwanese locals and new immigrants from China that had been intensifying since the end of the Second World War was turned into violent conflict. While Taiwanese locals were fighting against the government, they also initiated a series of violent actions, "Attack A-suann," targeting the new Chinese immigrants. At around 2 p.m. on February 28, the protesters gathered at Taipei Park (now known as the 228 Peace Memorial Park) before they occupied the Taiwan Radio Station to broadcast to the whole island. While on air, they accused the government of corruption and criticized its forced rice exportation policies and the economic turmoil, as well as urged the public to ostracize the corrupt officials for the sake of self-preservation. However, it is said that the transmission station in Banqiao boycotted the uprising so that the radio proclamation was not passed on to the rest of the island and the message only circulated in the Taipei area. Whether true or not, Taiwan being small in territory meant that its relative ease of travel and communication did not hinder the conflict that occurred in Taipei on February 28 from spreading to the rest of island, where the request for punishing the perpetrators was heightened to a political struggle movement. At 3 p.m., seeing the dire situation, the Taiwan Garrison Command announced the imposition of martial law and sent armed police and soldiers to patrol the streets and machine-gun civilians. Nevertheless, protesters continued surrounding the Monopoly Bureau headquarters, Railway Police Bureau and Department of Transportation and other government agencies, where many civilians, including students, were killed in the conflict with police and soldiers. According to a "briefing" from the Taiwan Garrison Command, more than 1000 people gathered at the General Post Office refused to be dispersed by police and soldiers in the afternoon, and the ensuing clash resulted in the injury or death of about ten people. (Page 54)
19. Taiwanese people also vented their anger at the new immigrants from China, indiscriminately making reprisals against innocent people. Cheng Hwa Travel Agency and Tiger Brand's Yong An Tang, both located at former Honmachi, suffered the first blows. Not only were their windows smashed, their belongings were also moved out to be burned in open fires. At about 5 p.m., Sin Tai Company, the largest department store in Taipei run by the Sakaecho Trade Bureau, was also broken into and its products were taken out for public burning. Anyone who seized the chance to steal would be beaten up. People who were driving cars or trucks were asked to leave behind their vehicles, which were later pushed to Taipei Railway Station and Chien-Cheng Circle and burned. According to data, more than ten vehicles were set on fire. In addition to wreaking havoc, Taiwanese people also indiscriminately attacked new immigrants from China. In Honmachi, Taipei Railway Station, Taipei Park, Sakaecho, Eirakucho, Taiheicho and Wanhua, many new Chinese immigrants were reported to have been attacked by locals for no obvious reason. Hsinchu County Mayor, Wen-bo Chu, and the director of Taipei City Government's Department of Land were both publicly humiliated and beaten up. It is generally believed that these series of riots against new Chinese immigrants were unleashed by an explosion of pent-up anger accumulated in the one year and a half since the end of Second World War. Innocent low-ranking civil servants and their families, and Chinese businesspeople who came to travel or do business in Taiwan, became scapegoats of the public indignation. Many appalling violent acts were also reported… Wang Yi-ting, who served at the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration back then, witnessed these acts himself. But he said in most cases the attacks were done with bats or rod, and he did not see people using samurai swords. Not many assaults were carried out against women or aged people. Rape was not commonly reported. It was said that at least 15 newly-immigrated Chinese people were beaten to death and some others were paralyzed in wooden bat attacks. (Page 55)
20. Zhang Mutao, the leader of the Military Police Corps, also pointed out that the situation in Taiwan was reaching the stage of "treasonous uprising," with local governments completely losing their ability to control. Many police stations and army battalions around Taiwan were disarmed by the rioters, who took away at least 4000 firearms in total. Zhang accused Chen Yi of "seeming not to understand the severity of the situation and of still trying to paint an illusion of peace." (Page 203)

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3. The escalation of the conflict

Taipei City was in the eye of this political storm before it engulfed the whole island. The February 28 Incident Settlement Committee (Footnote 21) in Taipei and its branches in many municipalities were the main actors in the political turmoil. During this period of turbulence, certain government officials who were already despised by the local people before the conflict quit their positions and escaped one by one, which meant that even those government officials who were willing to maintain the public order and cooperate with the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee were forced by the changing situation to temporarily hide away for their safety. The February 28 Incident Settlement Committee in Taipei and its branches in other municipalities all bore heavy responsibility for gathering public opinion, maintaining the public order and promoting political reforms, as well as communicating with the Chief Executive's Office (Footnote 22). This meant that at times they almost replaced the function of the Chief Executive's Office and local governments (Footnote 23). However, there were divergent opinions and conflicting policies within the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee and there were no unified administrative guidelines for its local branches to follow, which resulted in its failure to fully perform its function of pacifying the political situation.

After the outbreak of the incident, conflicts at different places were intensified, which gave the opportunity for the Chinese Communist Party and its allies to interfere politically. For example, Hsieh Hsueh-hung and Yang Ke-huang directed the Taichung area insurgence of the March 2 Incident (Footnote 24). Hsieh Hsueh-hung not only convened an "assembly of citizens" to take advantage of the power of demonstrators in completely taking over official institutions of the Taichung City Government, but also mobilized young people and students to organize the 27 Brigade (Footnote 25), which was a militarized force striving for the complete democratization of Taiwan. The path of armed uprising was thus created beyond the parliamentary approach adopted by the Settlement Committee.

The Chiayi area showed different characteristics from other places following the March 2 Incident (Footnote 26). First of all, local people formed an armed group and joined the military operation attacking an armory near Lantan Lake and Shueishang Airport (Footnote 27). Most of the participants in these actions were not professional soldiers. Secondly, many people in the Chiayi area supported these uprising actions. Because of this, Mayor Sun Chih-chun believed that the intensity of the battle and the casualties of civil servants and teachers were possibly the highest among all municipalities in Taiwan.

From March 3, Kaohsiung had experienced social unrest triggered by furious locals, who took increasingly drastic actions as time went by and later besieged the 105 Military Hospital and the headquarters of the Kaohsiung Military Police Corps (Footnote 28). Peng Meng-Chi, the commander of the Kaohsiung Military Fortress, believed that the besiegement already constituted a rebellion and was ready to resort to military crackdown. On March 6 at around 2 p.m., Peng Meng-Chi detained the delegates of the opposition (Footnote 29) and suppressed the uprising with a swift military operation (Footnote 30), which although stabilized the tumultuous situation in Kaohsiung, resulted in casualties inside the Kaohsiung City Government building (Footnote 31) and outside the railway station (Footnote 32). In the village purging that came afterwards, 1500 suspected "criminals" were arrested, some of whom were even executed in public. This is said to be one of the important reasons the trauma of the conflict could not be properly healed for a long time.

Footnotes:

21.  To reflect public opinion, the Taipei City Council invited Taiwanese members of the National Assembly, the Taiwan Provincial Assembly and the National Political Council to attend the inaugural conference of the Contraband Cigarette Murder Investigation Committee at 10 a.m. on March 1 at Zhongshan Hall. During the conference, a resolution was passed to delegate Huang Chao-chin (the speaker of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly), Chou Yan-shou (member of the Taipei City Council), Wang Tien-teng (member of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly) and Lin Chung (member of the National Political Council) to meet the Chief Executive and make several requests, including the abolishment of martial law, the release of civilians who had been arrested, the refraining of police and soldiers from shooting people, the organization of a settlement committee consisting of both representatives from the government and civil society, and the above-mentioned requests to be broadcast by Chen Yi to the whole population of Taiwan. Chen Yi accepted all the requests and thought that the Committee would be better renamed the "February 28 Incident Settlement Committee," which is how the organization came to have this name. (Page 57)
 The February 28 Incident Settlement Committee on the one hand was trying to strengthen its function, while at the same time to promote itself. On the afternoon of March 6, the Settlement Committee hosted its inaugural conference at Zhongshan Hall chaired by Wang Tien-teng. In the conference, two people from the National Political Council (Lin Hsien-tang, Chen Yi-song), four from the National Assembly (Li Wanju, Lien Chen-tung, Lin Lien-Chung, Huang Kuo-shu), five from the Taipei City Council (Chou Yan-shou, Pan Chu-yuan, Chien Sheng-yu, Hsu Chun-ching, Wu Chun-lin) and six from the Taiwan Provincial Assembly (Wang Tien-teng, Huang Chao-chin, Su Wei-liang, Huang Chun-ching, Lin Wei-gong, Kuo Kuo-chi) were elected as standing members. Hung Huo-lien and Wu Kuo-hsin were placed on the waiting list. (Page 66)
22. On March 7, Chen Yi sent a letter to the Settlement Committee saying the many disputes and competing opinions among all parties in civil society should be discussed and integrated by the Commission before it presented proposals to the Chief Executive's Office. (Page 70)
23. From March 3 to 5, municipal branches of the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee were set up one after another across Taiwan, which indicated that the power of the Chief Executive's Office had been undermined. (Page 66)
24. On the morning of March 2, Taichung locals gathered at the Theater of Taichung to…join a civic assembly. Yang Ke-huang, a faculty member from the private Chienkuo Polytechnic School, hosted the meeting, and made a presentation on the origin of the incident in Taipei and the people's petition activities, as well as explained the political movement in Taipei and the requests made by the protestors. Later, the attendants unanimously chose the principal of Chienkuo Polytechnic School, Hsieh Hsueh-hung, to be the chairperson of the assembly. After assuming this position, Hsieh "described in detail the repressive rule by Chen Yi and the political atmosphere in Taiwan after the end of the Second World War, emphasizing that if Taiwanese people wanted to liberate themselves from the agony, they must unite to end the one-party authoritarian rule of the Chinese Nationalist Party and immediately implement the democratic autonomy of Taiwan. To achieve this, they must join the heroic resistance of the people of Taipei. They must struggle and fight for total victory regardless of the sacrifice that must be made." After Hsieh finished her speech, Wu Yong-chang, representing the Taiwan Political Construction Association, and lawyer Chang Feng-mo also gave speeches, which were considered to "be subversive to the government and provocative of the anti-newcomer sentiments in the Taiwanese population." At about 10 a.m., the attendees of the event decided to demonstrate on the street to show their support for the movement. Protesters turned on the sirens of fire engines to call on the people of Taichung to join the active resistance in this revolution. In no time, Taichung was shaken by the wave of uprising to the point that extreme tension could be felt everywhere in the city. (Page 84)
25. On March 6, Hsieh Hsueh-hung, who wished to thoroughly pursue her political agenda, decided to continue her resistance activity. She mustered around 400 young students to form the 27 Brigade inside the 8th Troop. Hsieh Hsueh-hung assumed the role of the brigade chief commander and appointed Chung Yi-jen and Tsai Tieh-cheng to be captain and chief of staff respectively. Important cadre members included Yang Ke-huang, Li Chiao-sung and Gu Rui-yun. The core troops consisted of the Puli Combat Team, headed by Chung Yi-jen's trusted aide Huang Hsin-chin; the Taichung Commercial School Combat Team, headed by Ho Tsip-huai and Tsai Po-hsun (with some communists as its team members); the Taichung Normal School Combat Team, headed by communist Lu Huan-chang; the Public Security Team, headed by Huang Chin-tao; and the Chienkuo Polytechnic School Combat Team, headed by Li Bing-kun. In addition, members also included farmers who had been enlisted by the Japanese Army; students from Yanping College; former second-lieutenants and engineers from the Japanese Army, and some people who voluntarily joined the fight. The establishment of the 27 Brigade was a manifestation of armed struggle against the local governments. "This militia represented an armed struggle alternative to the parliamentary route of the Settlement Commission. Among all the military resistance forces in central and southern Taiwan, the 27 Brigade was the one that endured the longest." (Page 91)
26. On March 2 at 3 p.m., a couple of dozen young people from Changhua and Taichung headed south to Chiayi Railway Station and Chiayi Fountain Circle. Among them, a rifle-carrying man whose age was about 30 or 40 was shouting on the street, urging his fellow citizens to burn down Mayor Sun Chih-chun's official residence. Seeing the dire situation, Mayor Sun jumped over the wall, having decided to seek refuge at the local military corps. Unfortunately, a large crowd of protesters followed him behind, appearing as a dangerous threat to the mayor's life. He was fortunate to encounter two City Council members, Lin Bao and Lin Wen-shu, who helped him get to the headquarters of the military police corps.
 When Mayor Sun Chih-chun was trying to escape, actions like attacking newcomers from China, surrounding police stations, and taking over weapons could already be seen occurring on the streets. Because police officers had started to leave their posts one after another, the city center was in chaos. At 5 p.m., Mayor Sun Chih-chun tried to contact the garrison on the phone and asked Chiayi City Council Speaker Chung Chia-cheng to maintain the public order. On March 3, the day the assembly of citizens was convened, Chiayi City's branch of the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee was established with Chen Fu-chih (director of the Chiayi branch of the Preparatory Office of the Three People's Principles Youth Corps) as director and combat commander, and Li Hsiao-fang as secretary. Different groups and teams in the Committee were set up under its supervision. (Page 105)
27. After a couple of hours of negotiations, Chiayi City's branch of the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee decided to take over the radio station and broadcast its voluntary soldier recruitment message across the whole of Chiayi City and other places in Taiwan. Responding to this appeal, many people from Budai, Puzi, Yanshui, Jiali, Liujiao, Fanlu, Douliu, Taichung, Puli and Tainan Technical College came to Chiayi to join the movement. Under Mayor Sun's request, Luo Di-guang, the commander of the battalion (1st Battalion, Independent Regiment, 21st Division) stationed at Tomoncho sent his soldiers to crack down on the uprising activity in the city center, which made the development of the situation more uncertain. Given that the powerful weapons held by the government army could easily cause significant casualties, the Chiayi Settlement Committee delegated City Council members to negotiate with the military police corps with the aim of solving the conflict in a peaceful manner. However, both parties could not agree on the terms of a peaceful settlement.
 On the same day, about 3000 volunteers who came to Chiayi to join the resistance force started to attack the Military Police Corps, Lantan Lake 19th Armory, Shueishang Airport and Tomoncho Battalion. On March 3 at 9 p.m., the Chiayi City Government was taken over by the resistance force and all police officers who were recent immigrants from China retreated to Tomoncho under the guidance of Police Chief Lin Tian-gang. (Page 106)
28. On March 3, "hundreds of villains" who had come down from Taipei were brought to the city center on trucks, and students from Tainan Technical College also arrived in Kaohsiung. This was the beginning of Kaohsiung's version of the February 28 Incident. At first, a platoon of the government army (1st Platoon, 7th Company, Independent Regiment) stationed at the 105 Military Hospital was attacked. At the same time, about 400 to 500 people were gathering at Yancheng attempting to attack the military corps. The beating up, humiliation and robbing of new immigrants from China and their businesses was heard of from time to time. The city center of Kaohsiung was in the grips of a severe public security crisis. In the evening, Police Chief Tung Pao-chao sought refuge at the Military Fortress after his car was set on fire by protesters. Before dawn, the police station's telephone line was cut off and its weapons were taken away. Many Taiwanese police officers fled with their guns. Some went home directly, no longer willing to be responsible for maintaining the public order. Some joined the resistance force. (Page 115)
29. On March 6 at 9 a.m., Kaohsiung City Mayor Huang Chung-tu and six other people, Peng Ching-Kao (City Council speaker), Tu Guang-ming, Fan Tsang-rung, Tseng Feng-ming, Lin Chieh (Lingya District mayor) and Li Fo-hsu (director of Taipower Kaohsiung Office) ascended the mountain to the Military Fortress Command in desperation. According to Huang Chung-tu, when he was planning to ask the Military Fortress Command about what the crackdown approach should be, tens of people broke into the City Government Office with guns, knives and grenades, and verbally abused him. The head of the group Tu Guang-ming put forward some illegal requests in an attempt to make unacceptable demands from the government army. He forced the city mayor and City Council speaker at gunpoint to take some members of his group to the Military Fortress Command… After the seven people entered the reception room of the Fortress Command, Commander Peng Meng-Chi walked in through another door. They sat at a round table. The mayor and speaker sat next to Commander Peng, while the other five people sat in front of him. The mayor later produced "nine peace clauses" to the commander. Commander Peng Meng-chi did not intend to negotiate, but to buy some time. He angrily bashed the table with his hand and shouted "ridiculous," before asking soldiers outside the room to come in to search each of the seven people. According to Peng Meng-chi, Tu Guang-ming was found to have a gun and Fan Tsang-rung and Tseng Feng-ming were both found to have grenades. Tu, Fan and Tseng were arrested immediately, while the others waited in the reception room watched by guards. (Page 117)
30. Under the guidance of Peng Meng-chi, his troops were divided onto three routes: one passed through Jianguo 3rd Road; another marched straight down from the Fortress Command on Shoushan, passed Gushan 1st Road and the Dagong Road Bridge, and arrived at the Kaohsiung City Government; the other went past the level crossing and entered Wufu 4th Road. Every route had three squads, consisting of about 100 soldiers in total per route. (Page 119)
31. The military group that was ordered to attack the Kaohsiung City Government building on the afternoon of March 6 was the one led by Chen Guo-ru. Seeing that machine guns were installed on the building, the government army confirmed that those who occupied the Kaohsiung City Government building were insurgents. Because of this, the military group did not follow the order of firing a warning shot in the air. Instead, soldiers threw grenades into the building and shot anyone they could see, which meant that the insurgents could hardly resist the attack and suffered significant casualties. There were 50 to 60 people who lost their lives, including City Council members Hsu Chiu-tsung, Huang Tzu, and Wang Ting-shih… When City Council member Chiu Tao-te stepped into the Kaohsiung City Government building, the floor was covered with corpses and blood as thick as sludge. (Page 119)
32. The troops tasked with the mission of attacking Kaohsiung Railway Station and Kaohsiung Senior High School were led by Ho Chun-Chang (3rd Battalion, 21st Division). The attack was divided into two routes. When the troops arrived at the railway station, a graduate of Kaohsiung Senior High School, Yan Tsai-tse, was leading his fellow students at Chang Chun Hotel to shoot the coming soldiers in an attempt to disperse them. Knowing the inferiority of his side, he risked his life to rush out of the hotel. When Yan Tsai-tse was shot and critically wounded, people in front of the railway station soon started to flee. Some hid in the underground passage, where the military later indiscriminately fired, leading to many deaths and injuries. (Page 119)

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4. The reaction of the government and the settlement of the incident

After the incident had spread and escalated, Chen Yi, who understood the insufficiency of his government's military strength (Footnote 33) and strived to maintain his powerful position, originally intended to downplay the severity of the situation and focus on resolving the conflict with a political approach. At first, the civil society leaders who had participated in the operation of the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee were only concerned with the murder that had occurred in a contraband cigarette operation (Footnote 34). However, the Chief Executive's Office did not handle it well, turning the original simple petition of prosecuting the murderer into a political reform movement that took advantage of the groundswell of public anger to gradually increase its demands from the government (Footnote 35). Due to the loose nature of the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee's organizational structure in Taiwan, the Central Government believed that the Committee was engaged in treasonous activities, which constituted an excuse for military crackdown in the eyes of public security agencies. Why did the government suppress the social unrest militarily? Existing archives, various literature and oral history records that the Central Government's response was deeply influenced by the opinions of those who dominated politics in Taiwan. At the beginning of the incident, Chen Yi and Ko Yuan-fen, who were in charge of the administration and military in Taiwan, did not understand the uniqueness of Taiwanese society, believing that the requests proposed by the Taiwanese people and the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee were unreasonable and disingenuous. As a result, the authorities in Taiwan employed divide and conquer tactics (Footnote 40) and infiltration strategy to try to de-escalate the crisis on the one hand; while constantly exaggerating the severity of the conflict so that they could demand more troops from the Central Government for military crackdown on the other.

As shown in government archives, the chairman of the Nationalist Government Chiang Kai-shek did not advocate a military crackdown at first, instead simply agreeing to dispatch a strengthened corps to Taiwan. The intention was to relocate troops back to where they were originally stationed to prevent the situation from worsening in Taiwan. Later, after Chiang Kai-shek received requests from Chen Yi and intelligence agencies, he changed his attitude to characterize the incident as an insurgency organized by rebels, ignored the petitions from Taiwanese civil society (Footnote 41), and decided to send in troops to clamp down on the resistance movement (Footnote 42). The military crackdown could be roughly divided into two main parts: armed raids and "village cleansing." Due to the thorough planning and military deployment by the Chief Executive's Office and the deliberate exaggeration of the actual situation of the rebellious movement, the armed raids were far more effective than initially expected. Except for some residual resistance from the 27 Brigade in central Taiwan (Footnote 43), confrontations rarely occurred in other parts of the island (Footnote 44). However, when executing the military crackdown in various regions, the government army engaged in retaliatory behavior, resulting in innocent casualties and the shooting of suspects on the spot without trial (Footnote 45).

The military crackdown was followed by "village cleansing," the main objectives of which were to arrest suspects (Footnote 46), confiscate weapons, check on residents, process those who turned themselves in (Footnote 47), and collect "Guarantees to Report Outlaws" from households. All of the above-mentioned tasks were fulfilled in time. However, in reality, many suspects were falsely incriminated or reported by revengeful individuals. Military police and police authorities rushed to arrest and interrogate these suspects without first obtaining sufficient evidence, which resulted in many cases of miscarriages of justice. There were also some convicted criminals who bribed their way out of charges or were helped free from jail by some people with special connections. Some unscrupulous soldiers and police took advantage of the opportunity to blackmail, extort and rob civilians of their personal possessions, causing public resentment to boil. There is little doubt that this was because the military authorities at the time failed to effectively prevent wrongdoing and control the situation, and failed to enforce effective discipline on soldiers. The military authorities should be held responsible for a great number of innocent causalities.

The February 28 Massacre is one of the greatest tragedies in Taiwanese history (Footnote 48). This tragedy can be looked at from two different perspectives. For Taiwanese people who fell victim to the massacre, it was ironic that it was not at the hands of imperialists during the Japanese colonial period that they perished, but at those of a military crackdown by a regime that came from the "ancestral land" to which they had always hoped to return (Footnote 49). They may have criticized the government or advocated for Taiwanese autonomy, actions far from treasonous in their minds, but they were executed by the authorities anyway. Most of the executions occurred after not first being subject to public trial, and secret executions, after which the bodies were carelessly disposed of, were no exception. These practices should have no place in a civilized society. Many victims who did not even participate in the anti-government movement were accidentally shot dead on the street by soldiers. From the perspective of the Chinese immigrants who came to work in Taiwan after the Second World War, although corruption and malfeasance were not uncommon in the army and the public service, not every single recently immigrated Chinese official was corrupt. However, in this incident, some recent immigrants from China became scapegoats, were injured or killed after being blindly attacked by furious mobs. Even though the number of these casualties was not as high as the Taiwanese victims, these attacks so horrified some of the recently immigrated public officials and teachers that they eventually left Taiwan. Cases like this widened the schism between both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Without doubt, those who beat up new immigrants from China, attacked government institutions or airports, or even committed homicide should be subject to legal prosecution. Therefore, not everyone who was injured or killed in the February 28 Massacre was an innocent victim, and must be differentiated.

Footnotes:

33.  In terms of military capacity in Taiwan, there was only a total of 5251 soldiers (an independent regiment and an engineer battalion from the 21st Division and three corps at the Fortress Command) stationed on the island before the incident. The three corps at the Fortress Command had 1532 soldiers; the engineer battalion responsible for protecting the area to the north of Taichung had 517 soldiers; the independent regiment responsible for protecting the area to the south of Chiayi had 2500 soldiers. The headquarters of the Taiwan Garrison Command could only maneuver soldiers from one battalion of the independent regiment, which only had approximately 700 soldiers. A military capacity this weak was not sufficient for the mission of guarding the Taipei area. (Page 201)
34. On March 6, Wang Tien-teng read a report regarding the truth of the February 28 Incident over broadcast radio to a domestic and foreign audience, hoping to eliminate doubt on all sides. The main content of this report was to clarify that the goal of the Settlement Committee was "not to prevent compatriots from other provinces from participating in the improvement of Taiwanese politics, but to remove corrupt officials and strive for political reform in Taiwan." In the report, solutions to the aftermath of the incident were proposed, which included seven articles regarding the "handling of the current situation" and 25 articles regarding "core solutions" (consisting of three military and 22 political solutions). This was the famous "32 Demands." The full proposal is as follows:
A: On the handling of the current situation
 1. The troops of the government army stationed in various places in Taiwan should immediately order their soldiers to temporarily disarm themselves and hand over their weapons to the joint custody of the Settlement Committee local branches and local military corps, so that further bloodshed can be prevented.
 2. After the disarmament of the troops, local public order shall be maintained by military police, unarmed police officers and civil organizations.
 3. When there is no threat from government army troops, no armed fighting is permitted anywhere. If there is a corrupt official, whether he is from Taiwan or other provinces of China, the only action that can be taken is to report him to the Settlement Committee, which will ask the military police and police authorities to arrest the corrupt official. He will be strictly prosecuted according to the law. No one is permitted to resort to any extrajudicial punishment.
 4.　Any suggestions regarding political reform can be written down in a list before being submitted to the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee, which will work on a total resolution.
 5. It is highly advisable that the government should suspend all military operations immediately in Taiwan. The Central Government should not be asked under any circumstances to dispatch troops to Taiwan. Any attempt to solve the incident militarily will only bring more bloodshed, resulting in international intervention.
 6. Before the political problems can be fundamentally resolved, every governmental policy (whether it is military or political) must be discussed with the Settlement Committee. This will prevent people from doubting the sincerity of the government, and avoid any kind of misunderstanding.
 7. Regarding this incident, the government should not hold any member of the public accountable. In the future, there is no excuse for the government to arrest anyone involved in this incident. Victims of this incident should be preferentially compensated.
B: Core solutions
a: Regarding the military
 8. Troops with inadequate education and training are absolutely not allowed to be stationed in Taiwan.
 9. The Central Government can dispatch officials to conscript Taiwanese soldiers for the purpose of protecting Taiwan.
 10. Before the end of the Civil War on the Chinese mainland, any form of conscription in Taiwan is strongly opposed except that which is meant for protecting the island in order to prevent Taiwan from being implicated in the warfare.
b: Regarding political reform
 11. A self-government act should be legislated as the foundation of Taiwanese politics in order to realize the ideas Sun Yat-sen formulated in his Fundamentals of National Reconstruction.
 12. City and county mayors should be democratically elected before June this year. Re-election of city and county council members should be held at the same time.
 13. Candidates for directorships of departments in the Taiwan Provincial Government should be approved by the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, which will be called the "Taiwan Provincial Council" after reorganization. The re-election for the members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly should be held before June this year. For the moment, candidates for department directorships should be suggested by the Chief Executive before they are reviewed by the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee.
 14. More than two thirds of positions for department directors in the Taiwan Provincial Government should be taken by people who have lived in Taiwan for at least 10 years (it is recommended that the same logic be applied to the departments of Secretary General, Civil Administration, Finance, Industry and Mining, Agriculture and Forestry, Education, and Police).
 15. The director positions of the Police Department and all municipal police stations should be given to Taiwanese locals. The provincial Police Squad, Railway Police and Industry and Mining Police should be abolished immediately.
 16. At least half of the members of the Legal Affairs Commission should be Taiwanese locals. The chair of the commission should be elected from among the members.
 17. No other authorities except police authorities can arrest suspects.
 18. Military police can only arrest suspects affiliated to the army.
 19. Any politically-motivated arrest and incarceration is prohibited.
 20. The rights to freedom of unarmed assembly and to freedom of association with others should be absolutely protected.
 21. The rights to freedom of speech, publication, and strike should be absolutely protected. The application registration system for newspaper publications should be abolished.
 22. The Civil Organization Act should be repealed immediately.
 23. The regulation regarding the verification of candidates' qualifications in legislative elections should be repealed.
 24. It is recommended that the legislative election procedure at all levels should be improved.
 25. Uniform progressive taxation should be implemented for all income tax. Besides luxury tax and inheritance tax, no other additional taxes should be imposed.
 26. All the director positions of state-owned enterprises should be taken by Taiwanese people.
 27. Democratically elected monitoring committees should be set up in all state-owned enterprises. The responsibility for dealing with any remaining Japanese-owned properties should be entrusted to the Taiwan Provincial Government. When nationalizing the factories and mines previously owned by the Japanese, administration committees should be set up and more than half of the committee members should be Taiwanese.
 28. The Monopoly Bureau should be abolished. Rationing of life essentials should be implemented.
 29. The Trade Bureau should be abolished.
 30. The Propaganda Commission should be abolished.
 31. The president and chief prosecutor positions of all district courts should be taken by Taiwanese people.
 32. More than half of judicial officers, such as judges and prosecutors, should be Taiwanese citizens. (Page 66)
35. On the afternoon of March 7, the Settlement Committee held a plenary meeting, in which the original 32 demands were passed along with 10 additional demands. Among these 10 demands, two demands about military affairs and eight demands about political affairs completed the so-called "42 Demands." The additional demands are as follows:
 1. The armed forces in Taiwan should recruit as many Taiwanese citizens as possible.
 2. The Chief Executive's Office should be reorganized into the Taiwan Provincial Government. Before this proposal is endorsed by the Central Government, the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee's Political Affairs Bureau should be responsible for the re-organization and the recruitment of judicious and talented people for the future government.
 3. The Political Affairs Bureau should be set up under the Settlement Committee before March 15. One candidate will be chosen by the representatives of each township before he can be elected by the municipal legislative councils. The member quotas for each municipality are as follows: two for Taipei, three for Taipei County, one for Keelung City, three for Hsinchu County, one for Taichung City, four for Taichung County, one for Changhua City, one for Chiayi City, one for Tainan City, four for Tainan County, one for Kaohsiung City, three for Kaohsiung County, one for Pingtung City, one for Penghu County, one for Hualien County, and one for Taitung County, making a total of 30 (actually 29).
 4. The Political Affairs Bureau will be in charge of reviewing and authorizing the abolishment and merging of labor camps and other unnecessary institutions.
 5. The processing of Japanese-owned properties should be entrusted to the Taiwan Provincial Government.
 6. The Taiwan Garrison Command should be abolished so that military power is not abused.
 7. Aboriginal people's political and economic rights and interests should be protected.
 8. Labor protection law should be implemented on June 1 this year.
 9. Taiwanese prisoners of war and traitor suspects who are imprisoned should be released immediately with no conditions attached.
 10. Taiwan should be reimbursed the estimated value of 150000 tons of sugar previously given to the Central Government. (Page 70)
36. On the one hand, Chen Yi agreed with the demands made by the Taiwanese legislative representatives that the Settlement Committee should be set up as a joint effort of the government and civil society. On the other hand, Chen Yi, Ko Yuan-fen and Chang Mu-tao contacted Chiang Wei-chuan in an attempt to sabotage the unity of the Settlement Committee's leadership. National Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (NBIS) agent Hsu Te-huei became the leader of the Chung Yi Service Squad and the head of the Public Order section of the Settlement Committee. The head of the NBIS Taipei Branch Lin Ting-li was appointed by the Taiwan Garrison Command as leader of the Yi Yong Squad, which was set up for the mission of "dividing the unity of rebels and using the power of the people to attack them. Behind the scenes, factions of the Chinese Nationalist Party, the government and the army were allegedly competing with each other for greater power. The party-directed intelligence agency, the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (CBIS) accused Chiang Wei-chuan and Wang Tien-teng of being political opportunists who continued fanning the flames of public fury. Ko Yuan-fen, who represented the NBIS, the Central Government's military intelligence agency, criticized Chiang and Wang for both being bullies recently recruited by the party's headquarters. In the early days of the Settlement Committee, its members were predominantly from the Chinese Nationalist Party. However, the party's office in Taiwan did not try to guide the development of the Settlement Committee. Instead, it chose to watch it decline and fall from the sidelines. As a result, under different influences, the Settlement Committee continued to increase the magnitude of its requests, which later became justification for the Chief Executive's Office decision in favor of military crackdown. (Page 201)
37. According to Su Sin, who later defected to the Chinese Communist Party, the "32 Demands" was drafted by left-wing youth surrounding Wang Tien-teng, such as Pan Tsin-sin, Hsiao You-san, Tsai Ching-jong and Su Sin. Their participation in the drafting was endorsed by the underground leader of the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan… Chen Yi-song, a former member of the National Political Council, said that there were indeed left-wing young people drafting for Wang Tien-teng, but Taiwanese Communist Party members tended to exaggerate their contributions during the February 28 Incident after they defected to China, so the credibility of their claims is questionable. According to a member of the NBIS who investigated the Tsai Hsiao-chien communist spy case, the Chinese Communist Party had a very limited influence in Taiwan at the time and the Taiwanese Communist Party was not the same thing as the Chinese Communist Party. (Page 69)
38. It is said that when the "32 Demands" was proposed, intelligence officers from the NBIS and the CBIS, such as Bai Cheng-chi and Lu Bo-hsiung from the CBIS and Hsu Te-huei from the NBIS, were present. The additional 10 demands, which were used as an excuse for military crackdown by the government, were deliberately suggested by the NBIS and CBIS employees present at the meeting. For example, the 29th political demand that "Taiwanese prisoners of war and traitor suspects who are imprisoned should be released immediately" was suggested by Wu Kuo-hsin, National Assembly member and secretary of the Chinese Nationalist Party's special branch of Taiwan Railways, and was passed with a cheering crowd. It was also heard that there were originally only 12 demands and the other 32 demands and additional 10 demands were passed by an applauding crowd made up by members of the Constitutional Association. (Page 71)
39. On March 8, the Settlement Committee released a statement overturning the resolution passed the day before, saying that too many people participating in the meeting had resulted in the passing of 42 impetuous and inappropriate demands, such as "abolishing the Taiwan Garrison Command and demilitarizing the government army. Demands like these were on the verge of a rebellion against the Central Government and were not in line with the public opinion of Taiwanese people." (Page 72)
40. After the outbreak of the incident, it is said that Liou Chi-Kuang advocated a compete military crackdown and Ko Yuan-fen (the chief of staff of the Taiwan Garrison Command), Chen Ta-yuan (director of the investigative department of the Taiwan Garrison Command), and Lin Ting-li (the head of the NBIS Taipei Branch) suggested "using the people's power to fight against the people's power." On February 28, Ko Yuan-fen ordered intelligence officers to investigate and monitor the major figures inside the Settlement Committee. The Chief Executive's Office understood the government army was not strong enough to deliver a military crackdown and, instead of oppression from outside, the best way to suppress a social movement was to infiltrate the movement to divide and destroy it from within. The Chief Executive's Office soon adopted the latter strategy, taking advantage of Chiang Wei-chuan's Taiwan Political Construction Association to weaken the power of the Settlement Committee by infiltrating it with intelligence officers waiting for an opportunity to undermine its operation. From February 28 to March 1, the commander of the 4th Military Police Regiment wrote to Chiang Wei-chuan twice, urging him to "clear up the mess." On March 1, Ko Yuan-fen also wrote to Chiang Wei-chuan, inviting him to help with the precarious situation. This showed that the Chief Executive's Office had already planned a strategy for infiltration and sabotage of the Settlement Committee. (Page 59)
41. On March 3, the Settlement Committee resolved to telegraph Chairman Chiang Kai-shek, informing him of the truth of the whole incident. On the same day at 4 p.m., a telegraph was sent in the name of the Taiwanese People's Congress, accusing the Chief Executive's Office of allowing soldiers and police to randomly attack civilians and shoot innocent people, of causing public anger among the Taiwanese population, of being permissive of government misconduct and unlawful business, and of ignoring complaints from the Taiwanese people. In the same telegraph, the Taiwanese People's Congress also urged the Central Government to send high officials to investigate in Taiwan so that public anger could be soothed, and demanded local autonomy soon be implemented in Taiwan. On the same day, Li Kuang-wei, the chairman of the Taiwanese Compatriot Association in Shanghai, submitted a request to Chiang Kai-shek, demanding him to seriously investigate the incident, to punish those who were politically and morally responsible for the incident, and to restore Taiwanese people's trust in the government by purging corrupt officials. All the above showed that Chiang Kai-shek not only fully grasped the intelligence and opinions regarding the incident, but also understood the feelings and expectations of Taiwanese people. (Page 203)
42. After Chen Yi announced the implementation of martial law in Taiwan over radio on March 10, the military crackdown was in full swing. (Page 211)
43. On March 15, the government army was advancing toward Puli, narrowing the encirclement… The 27 Brigade was in the very disadvantaged situation of not being able to communicate with the outside world after two major external traffic routes were blockaded. Soon, Chen Ming-chung was delegated as the head of a guerrilla force that was divided into three columns to attack the government army stationed near Sun Moon Lake. At the same time, Huang Chin-tao, head of the Public Security Team, led a squad safeguarding the Wu-niu-lan Bridge in order to prevent the government army from attacking from the back. The guerrilla force engaged in a fierce battle with a troop of the government army (4th Company, 2nd Battalion, Regiment 436) near Sun Moon Lake, which resulted in severe casualties in the government army and forced it to retreat to Shuili. However, running out of ammunition, the 27 Brigade's guerrilla force also suffered a massive casualty toll. The next day (March 16), soldiers from two battalions of the government army (2nd and 3rd Battalion, Regiment 436) engaged in another fierce battle with Huang Chin-tao's squad at Wu-niu-lan Bridge. At first, the squad took advantage of a good location to heavily ambush the government army, causing mass causalities. Due to a lack of sufficient firepower and battle experience, Huang Chin-tao's squad gradually found itself in the dire situation of being besieged by the encroaching troops of the government army. Huang Chin-tao had no choice but to break through the blockage with another fighter, escaping to seek help from the headquarters of the 27 Brigade. But after arriving at the Puli Martial Arts Hall, where the 27 Brigade's headquarters was based, chaos and panic reigned among the rebels, and fewer than 20 people were willing to help. In the evening of the same day, faced with a besiegement that made it impossible to replenish weapons and ammunition and to communicate with other resistance forces, the 27 Brigade could not keep on fighting and decided to temporarily disband. Some of its members joined Chen Tsuan-di's guerilla force in Meishan, Chiayi; some just returned to their homes. At around 11 p.m., after the members had buried their weapons, the 27 Brigade was officially disbanded. (Page 221)
44. On March 14, the government army stationed in Chiayi City started to attack Douliou, battling on the street with the remains of Chen Tsuan-di's guerilla force (a public order team that was led by the director of Douliou Township Chien An Hospital, Chen Tsuan-di, and was not part of the 27 Brigade). Outnumbered by its rivals, Chen Tsuan-di fled with his guerilla force to Meishan, Chiayi. On March 16, the government army (8th Company, Regiment 436) pressed to the east of Meishan, where it battled fiercely with about 200 remaining insurgents. The battle ended with 10 guerillas being shot dead and with 20 rifles, two machine guns, one grenade launcher and one mountain gun being captured. Two days after the battle, another company of the government army (7th Company, Regiment 436) also engaged in a tense fight with approximately 100 guerillas, killing about 60 insurgents, arresting 12 and capturing a load of ammunition. On March 19, Chen Tsuan-di retreated to the mountainous area with his troops in preparation for long-lasting guerilla warfare, taking away all the weapons, ammunition, food and bullock carts that belonged to the nearby residents. Chen Tsuan-di urged those who joined the resistance from other places to hide in the mountains for a year-long operational plan. On March 20, the 21st Division and the 22nd Division were concerned about the remaining rebels hiding in the mountains, so a company (8th Company, Regiment 436) was sent to Meishan, from which the remaining guerillas were forced to flee, leaving behind a load of weapons and ammunition after several hours of fierce battle.
 Due to its intimidating terrain, the Meishan and Changhu areas were easy to defend but hard to attack. Later, even though the government army had sent troops to these areas and killed many of the remaining guerillas, it could still not eradicate the insurgents. Even after Wei Tao-ming assumed the role of chairman of the Taiwan Provincial Government on May 16 and announced the lifting of martial law as well as the end of "village cleansing," and after the Taiwan Garrison Command turned the areas designated for military crackdown into security areas, the remnants of Chen Tsuan-di's guerilla force were fighting in Meishan and Changhu. (Page 221)
45. By March 21, the Keelung Military Fortress had more or less completed the military crackdown mission. According to data, from February 28 to March 10, the weapons and ammunition that it captured from the rebels consisted of six light machine guns (all required fixing) and 139 rifles (most required fixing). During this period, the Fortress used: 34643 rifle bullets, 39897 light machine gun bullets, 5183 pistol bullets, 9592 heavy machine gun bullets, 549 grenades, and 35 pieces of pounder ammunition. The ammunition used in the operation consisted of as many as 100000 bullets, which shows that the military crackdown by the Keelung Military Fortress was extremely severe. Given the amount of ammunition used, it is unlikely that the number of casualties was only about 100 people. The true number is still awaiting investigation. (Page 237)
 It would seem that the Keelung Military Fortress allowed its soldiers to execute suspects as they wished in their own designated areas. Examples include: Kuo Chang-yuan and six others, who were murdered in front of the Toucheng Matsu Temple; the Badu Railway Station Massacre; the executions of Chen Cheng-yue, Chang Yun-chang, Chao Tong (all three from Luodong), Yang Yuan-ting (from Keelung), Hsu Jih-sheng, Hsu Chia-chang, Hsu Shih-ming, Chien Te-fa, Chen Chin-pi, Tian Wen-kuan and Shi Chin-jong (all seven from Jinshan). The families of the victims confirmed that these individuals were publicly executed without due legal process, which means that no list of the suspects or reports were left, making it hard for the general public to believe the official death tolls. When soldiers raided the streets, anyone who did not escape in time was shot dead on the spot or detained without a legitimate reason. However, those who were willing to use money or valuables to bribe the soldiers were set free. Many people were tortured and tormented to death. Six Taiwanese compatriot organizations in Shanghai summarized the news reports and hearsay in a joint statement, writing: "Soldiers in Keelung penetrated people's feet with metal wires and tied them up in groups of three or five. If it was just one person, he would be put in a sack before being thrown out to sea. It was recently reported that floating bodies were visible on the sea surface near Keelung." And: "Soldiers in Keelung cut off the ears, noses and genitals of about 20 young students before stabbing them to death." Many interviewees said they had also witnessed horrible scenes like those described in the statement while trying to find the bodies of their family members. (Page 237)
46. According to the summary report presented by the Taiwan Garrison Command in November, 1947, there were 1800 suspects arrested. (Page 261)
47. On April 30, 1947, the Taiwan Garrison Command released a report indicating that 3022 people had turned themselves in. (Page 261)
48. The February 28 Incident is the most tragic massacre in Taiwan's history, with thousands or potentially tens of thousands of casualties. The victims ranged from elites to common people. Countless numbers were murdered without any justifiable reason, which has resulted in a widespread unforgiveness held by victims' families and society toward the incident. This unfortunate event caused by manmade factors has led to the Taiwanese independence movement, the rise of left-leaning ideologies and conflict between people who already lived in Taiwan before the war (and their offspring) and people who moved to Taiwan from China after the war (and their offspring). The consequences of the incident have seriously impacted the harmony and future development of Taiwanese society. (Preface 2)
49. The last words of Kuo Chang-yuan, the director of Yilan Public Hospital, were: "The land I was born to is not my ancestral country, where I shall return after death. Death and life are decided by Heaven, about which I do not have any second thoughts." (Lee Shiao-feng, Taiwanese elites who disappeared in the February 28 Incident, p. 170.)

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5. Civilian casualties and victims of the massacre

The first group of victims were those officially determined guilty. Since the government regarded the February 28 Incident as treasonous, it was inevitable that anyone who took part in the organized insurgence and rioted would be included in the so-called "blacklist" (Footnote 51) before they were arrested and sentenced. However, an investigation shows that many malpractices were discovered in relation to the identification of who was involved and the application of due process of law. Firstly, most participants believed that they had not had any intention of overturning the regime and only advocated the reform of Taiwanese politics. It was not surprising that people who were convicted of "attempting to subvert the government" could not accept the government's justifications. Secondly, some of the victims were arrested secretly and the cause of their death could not be confirmed. Was it an execution that was carried out after the trial in accordance with the conviction? Or was it revenge instigated by their enemies? The families of the victims did not know the answers and hence have lived in sorrow since the massacre. In 2007, a report investigating responsibility for the massacre was published, confirming that Chiang Kai-shek, the chairman of the Nationalist government at the time, should be mainly held responsible for the losses of the February 28 Incident.

The second group of victims were those who did violate martial law. It was understandable that the Nationalist government declared martial law because of the civil war. However, Taiwanese compatriots had not experienced the rule of martial law in the past and did not understand what martial law was. Many local people who did not speak the national language Mandarin or other local languages of China were shot dead on their way to school or work during curfew hours, simply because they did not understand the soldiers' verbal warnings (Footnote 52). The way these people were treated was extremely unjust and unpardonable.

The third group of victims were those killed by immoral soldiers (Footnote 53). After the founding of the Republic of China in 1912, the country had been torn apart by incessant military conflicts. Eight years of fighting against Japanese invasion had a particularly great impact on military education, resulting in failure to reform the military administration and an ill-disciplined army. Therefore, countless wrongdoings and malfeasance (Footnote 54) emerged during the military crackdown in Taiwan. The most common was using one's position in the government to revenge for something personal. Some people were killed because of disagreements; others were murdered after being robbed of their possessions (Footnote 55). Although commanders of the government's army tried to educate their soldiers and correct their behaviors (Footnote 56), illegality was still hard to eradicate. In addition, due to policies of rewarding those who reported suspects secretly (Footnote 57) or identified gangsters (Footnote 58) to the government, many innocent people were also unjustly treated due to some personal grievances and wrongly killed in the end. Some people were deliberately set up and put to death by the government, such as those victims who died in Yuanshan (Footnote 59) on March 8, 1947.

Footnotes:

50.  The organizations that victims joined included the Settlement Committee, Taiwan Political Construction Association, Taiwan Autonomy Youth Alliance, Three People's Principles Youth Corps, newspapers, and communist groups. It goes without saying that the organizations that were most greatly impacted by the incident were political ones, especially those that had previously criticized politics or taken part in political activities. (Page 266)
51. According to the Name List of Criminals that Chen Yi presented to Chairman Chiang Kai-shek on March 13, 1947, there were 20 fugitives that participated in the February 28 Incident, who were Wang Tien-teng (member of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly), Hsu Cheng (lecturer at Yanping College, member of the Working Committee of Taiwan Province of the Chinese Communist Party), Lee Jen-kuei (Taipei City Council member), Hsu Chun-ching (Taipei City Council member), Tan Him, Lim Bo-seng (professor at National Taiwan University), Sung Fei-ju (the director of People's Herald News), Ai Lu-sheng (the founder of the Great Light Post), Juan Chao-ji (the General Manager of Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News), Wu Chin-lien (the Chief Editor of Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News), Liao Chin-ping, Huang Chao-sheng (Taipei City Council member), Lin Lien-Chung (member of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly), Wang Ming-chao (a staff member of the Taiwan Province Railway Management Commission), Si Kang-lam, Lee Ruei-han (lawyer), Lee Ruei-feng (lawyer), Chang Kuang-tsu (the head of gangsters in Taipei), Horiuchi Kinjo (a technologist at the Industrial Research Institute), and Uesaki Torasaburo. According to the official archive, Chang Kuang-tsu, an influential gangster in Taipei, was indicted for being the culprit who instigated the killing of people from other provinces and led his subordinates to assist in the rebellion. Horiuchi and Uesaki were believed to be Japanese spies. The other 17 people on the list were targeted for conspiring in the rebellion. These 17 people went missing after being arrested by the government's army soon after it entered Taipei on March 9. The majority of these 17 people joined one or two political organizations. Six of them, Wang Tien-teng, Lee Jen-kuei, Hsu Chun-ching, Liao Chin-ping, Huang Chao-sheng and Lin Lien-Chung (Taichung), joined the Settlement Committee. Seven of them, Wang Tien-teng, Lee Jen-kuei, Tan Him, Wu Chin-lien, Liao Chin-ping, Huang Chao-sheng and Si Kang-lam, joined the Taiwan Political Construction Association (and some also joined the Settlement Committee at the same time). In addition, Wang Tien-teng also joined the Three People's Principles Youth Corps and assumed the role of director at the Taipei Branch of the Corps in Taiwan. On March 11 and 13, respectively, Chen Yi declared the Settlement Committee and Taiwan Political Construction Association were illegal organizations, before he ordered them to disband and indicted their members for participating in rebellious activities. However, whether or not these two organizations were actually involved in rebellious activities was not put on trial, meaning the due process of law was lacking. Moreover, almost half of the people on the list, Hsu Cheng, Sung Fei-ju, Ai Lu-sheng, Juan Chao-ji, Wang Ming-chao, Lee Ruei-han and Lee Ruei-feng (eight in total), did not belong to the above-mentioned political organizations. The so-called "rebellion" was also unclearly defined (Page 267). According to the archive, only Tan Him was put on trial and sentenced to the death penalty among the above-mentioned fugitives (Page 271).
52. Chen Yi urged the public to restore education and economic activities. However, some obedient students went back to school and were accidentally killed by soldiers. Many Taiwanese people who were milk delivery workers, newspaper delivery workers, telecommunication workers, vegetable vendors and rickshaw-pullers, were also accidentally killed just because they did not understand the regulations of martial law……According to interviews, the main reason these people were killed was because most Taiwanese people had not experienced the rule of martial law before and did not understand it and because the majority of Taiwanese people did not speak Mandarin and could not communicate with soldiers (Page 294).
53. The corrupt political atmosphere also led to unscrupulous government officials taking the opportunity to retaliate against private individuals for personal reasons. One of the most sensational examples was the murder of Wu Hong-chi, a High Court judge, and seven other people…….At midnight on March 15, multiple gunshots were heard near Nangang Bridge. The next morning, the bodies of Wu Hong-chi and seven other people were discovered near the bridge (Page 295). The official explanation said that "an assassination group was formed by gangsters in the city of Taipei, dedicated to killing military officers, people from other Chinese provinces and the officials of Taiwanese background who used their power to abuse other people. This group has started its actions and possibly killed those eight people who died near Nangang Bridge……" There was also an unofficial explanation of the assassination group: it was based at the addiction rehab center on Baoan Street and formed by gangsters who were hired by the regime……to kill dissidents. Both the public and Wu's family believed that Wu died as a result of personal vengeance……Wu was honest and forthright. He often criticized the wickedness of the legal system and often chastised his colleagues for their wrongdoings, which might have offended some people. The prosecutor whose surname was Wang was believed to be suspicious. Wu's wife claimed that on the name card that her husband left behind, a character "Wang" had been clearly etched out using a nail, which seemed to be a hint that the prosecutor Wang was the murderer (Page 297). The murder of Ong Iok-lim was probably triggered by a personal vengeance from a government official. Ong Iok-lim was the first prosecutor of Taiwanese background during the Japanese colonial period. After the Second World War, Ong Iok-lim worked as a prosecutor at the Hsinchu District Prosecutors Office……Ong Iok-lim was a man of integrity and impartiality by nature who had prosecuted many corrupt officials. Among them, the most famous was the Hsinchu City Mayor Kuo Shao-tsung who was involved in the misappropriation of milk powder donated by the United States. As soon as Ong Iok-lim found that the culprit of this scandal was the Hsinchu City Mayor Kuo Shao-tsung, he went to arrest him. Unexpectedly, the director of the Hsinchu City Police Department ordered his fellow policemen to encircle the prosecutor and take away his arrest warrant. Afterwards, Ong Iok-lim's superior was surprisingly injudicious and wanted to hold him accountable for the loss of the arrest warrant. Outraged by this treatment, Ong Iok-lim resigned from the post of prosecutor and became a teacher at Jianguo High School in Taipei. It was said that after the arrival of the additional government's army, Kuo Shao-tsung took the opportunity to revenge himself and sent police to Taipei to arrest Ong Iok-lim and executed him. (Page 299)
54. During the February 28 Incident, Taiwanese people not only fought against the Chief Executive's Office, but also attacked immigrants who had moved from China after the Second World War. Because of this, the Nationalist government's army took retaliatory actions against Taiwanese people. The recently arrived troops from China were known for their lack of discipline and ethics, which was evidenced by endless instances of unfathomable crimes. The archive of all sorts of news coverage and interviews proves that the government's army started its indiscriminate massacre in Taiwan after landing in Keelung on March 8. The Taiwan Garrison Command at some point even gave its clerical workers pistols and authorized them to pull the trigger for self-defense. The Nationalist government's army was also ordered to kill all traitors and rebels. Some soldiers even showed off their shooting skills by targeting civilians. When the government's army entered the city of Taipei, anyone who did not speak Mandarin was shot dead, which resulted in the streets being scattered with corpses from March 8 to 13 (Page 294).
55. For example, on March 10, somewhere on Changchun Road in Taipei came a group of soldiers who wanted to rob people of their money, watches or personal belongings. Surprisingly, their unlawful behaviors actually resulted in the death of many local people. (Page 295)
56. On the morning of March 11, the Nationalist government's army declared the rule of marital law after it entered Tainan. When soldiers were checking pedestrians near the railway station, Tu Ping-chang (a private from the 7th Company of the 3rd Battalion, Independent Corps of the 21st Army) confiscated without authorization a few thousand Taiwan dollars and a watch from a Taiwanese person's pockets. When the deputy leader of the battalion noticed the wrongdoing, he not only returned the money and the watch back to that Taiwanese person, but also stripped Tu Ping-chang of his private's uniform and executed him on the spot (Page 255).
57. In order to fully accomplish the mission, the Taiwan Garrison Command further published a reward and punishment notice, which stipulated that anyone who reported criminals or informed the government of people secretly owning weapons would be rewarded a prize that ranged from 1,000 to 10,000 Taiwan dollars; while anyone who hid intelligence and did not report to the government would be prosecuted for being a conspirator (Page 214). Therefore, some ill-intentioned people (both Taiwanese and recent immigrants from China) took the opportunity to get rid of their enemies and get some money (Page 303).
58. The heads of villages were forced to report a certain number of gangsters in their home villages. If not, they would be severely punished. This led many village heads who were frightened by the potential punishment to randomly report innocent villagers, resulting in many unnecessary deaths, such as people from Beitou District (Page 303). Some village heads who did not want to engage in such unethical practice were killed. Yu Chu-gen, a village head from Jinguashi, Ruifang, was one of the victims. After the Nationalist government's army entered Jinguashi, he was forced to hand in guns and a list of gangsters from his village. Yu Chu-gen refused to give in, saying that "our village is very peaceful and simple and has never taken part in the incident." In the end, he was tortured to near death before being executed (Page 306).
59. It is said that the Yuanshan Massacre on March 8 was orchestrated by Ko Yuan-fen and executed by Lin Ting-li and Hsu Te-huei. According to Liao, the deputy leader of the Chung Yi Service Squad, he had brought more than a hundred students to Yuanshan to take over guns, which would be used for maintaining public order. However, after encountering gunshot from soldiers, these students tried to surround the soldiers and poured water on them. The students' actions may have infuriated the soldiers, who took revenge on them in the evening of March 8. More than a hundred students were killed. The next morning on March 9, Ko Yuan-fen took Yang Liang-kung to the square in front of the Yuanshan Army warehouse to identify about a hundred (or about twenty according to a different source) corpses of the so-called rebels that the Nationalist government's soldiers claimed to have killed the previous night. It was said that Yang Liang-kung was suspicious of Ko Yuan-fen's claims and said to his colleagues that it was very strange that only high school students who were about 18 or 19 years old were killed and there were no signs of fighting nearby (Page 210).

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6. Compensation at the time

Soon after the social unrest had ended and public order restored, the Chief Executive's Office launched a compensatory program (Footnote 60) at the end of March, giving relief funds to government officials and teachers and their dependants and domestic workers who had experienced loss of life and property, and helping them to overcome the hardship in their lives. However, this job was not done satisfactorily. There were many reasons for this, including a) the compensatory program was only targeted at government officials, teachers and their dependants and domestic workers, and it did not cover the losses that the general public experienced; b) not all of the compensatory program was reasonable, resulting in some people who endured great losses but only received a disproportionately small compensation, and some people who experienced not much loss but applied for an exceedingly large compensation; c) due to the scarcity of the relief fund, some ill-intentioned government officials and teachers pretended to raise funds from the general public (especially wealthy people), but actually they were extorting money for their personal use (Footnote 61). This left an extremely bad impression on Taiwanese people. Furthermore, because not many government officials or teachers were compensated, the general public and the families of victims thought that the government had not started any compensatory program dedicated to the losses of either Taiwanese people or immigrants coming from China after the Second World War. Therefore, many people requested that the government should draft the compensatory measures as soon as possible.

Footnotes:

60.  In order to compensate the government officials and teachers that belonged to the Chief Executive's Office and its subsidiary departments, the Chief Executive's Office announced nine articles of Compensatory measures dedicated to compensate government officials and teachers of the Chief Executive's Office and its subsidiary departments for their losses in the February 28 Incident. The complete content of the measures was as follows:
 Article 1: The compensation or relief for the losses endured by government officials and teachers of the Chief Executive's Office and its subsidiary departments is undertaken in accordance with these regulations.
 Article 2: The range of compensation and relief is limited to death, injury and loss of personal belongings.
 Article 3: The deceased is given a single payment of 200,000 Taiwan dollars as relief for the funeral expenses. This article is also applied to the spouse, direct blood relatives, and servants.
 Article 4: All medical expenses for the injured are reimbursed at the actual cost upon production of a hospital receipt. Those who have not been hospitalized for further treatment and have been certified by his or her direct superior can receive a relief fund of 5,000 Taiwan dollars if it is a minor injury and 50,000 Taiwan dollars if it is a serious injury. The seriousness of the injury is evaluated as stipulated in the Criminal Code. This article is not applicable to those whose medical expenses have already been paid by the government. This article is applicable to the spouse, direct blood relatives or servants of government officials.
 Article 5: Relief for the loss of personal belongings is primarily focused on clothing and bedding. If there is a loss of clothing, the relief fund is 10,000 Taiwan dollars for a set of clothes and the number is limited to two sets, one for summer and one for winter. The relief fund for bedding is 20,000 Taiwan dollars for a set and the number is limited to one set.
 Article 6: Those who have experienced particularly severe injury or loss of personal belongings can be granted special relief funding after their competent authority provides the details of the injury and possession losses for further approval on a case-by-case basis.
 Article 7: If the issuance of relief funds that are mentioned in Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 for funeral expenses, for compensation, or for the loss of personal belongings falls under the responsibility of provincial level departments, it should be reimbursed by the provincial government; if it falls under municipal level departments, it should be reimbursed by local governments; if it falls under state-owned enterprises, it should be reimbursed by the enterprises themselves. All the issuance of relief funds should be accompanied by receipts that will be submitted to the Chief Executive's Office for future reference.
 Article 8: Applications for relief funds must be verified by the section chiefs and the heads of the departments of all the levels above. If there is any fraudulence, the managers of all the levels who have attested the authenticity of the application will be severely punished.
 Article 9: This regulation is in effect from the date of announcement. (Page 370)
61. On June 15, 1947, all Taiwanese newspapers published a letter written by Yang Liang-kung, the Control Yuan's investigator responsible for the Fujian and Taiwan area, demanding that the Taiwan Provincial Government ban all municipal government officials from requesting donations from private individuals and civil organizations, and that local councils should be prevented from using any excuse to seek donations from the public, which is perceived as extortion in reality. Many government officials used their own position to frame private individuals who did not cooperate. Therefore, the Taiwan Provincial Government ordered that all officials from all departments could not use the losses in the February 28 Incident as an excuse to seek donations from the public. If any officials continued to use their positions to extort money from the public by threatening to frame them, they would be severely punished. The evidence above shows that government officials at the time did use the February 28 Incident as an excuse to extort money from the public. (Page 397)

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7. Comment and Analysis on the Key Figures

The purpose of this report is to illustrate the truth of the incident. There is no intention to hold anyone accountable. However, the actions that several key figures took in the incident cannot be ignored.

Although Chen Yi intended to promote good governance upon arrival in Taiwan (Footnote 62) and was trying to use political measures to resolve the crisis at the beginning of the February 28 Incident (Footnote 63), he requested the central government to dispatch troops for suppressing the social unrest (Footnote 64) after realizing that he no longer could control the development of the situation (Footnote 65). After the troops landed in Taiwan, Chen Yi, as highest official in charge of the military administration in Taiwan, could not effectively ensure the behaviors of soldiers and policemen who carried out the crackdown were within the bounds of lawfulness (Footnote 66), resulting in things such as "police and soldiers from the Taiwan Garrison Command resorting to retaliatory measures (Footnote 67) to beat up and arrest rebels" and "the ordering of the special force of the military police stationed in Taiwan to secretly arrest the National Assembly members" (Footnote 68). Chen Yi's approach targeted people who were not involved in the incident, causing panic and resentment among the Taiwanese population. However, in the wake of the incident, he only acknowledged that it was all his personal failure and refused to admit that the policies he adopted were at fault, which of course cannot be forgiven by the Taiwanese people.

Ko Yuan-fen, the head of staff of the Taiwan Garrison Command back then, believed that the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee was a conspiracy (Footnote 69) to weaken the role of the government, therefore he adopted policies of infiltration and divide and rule when dealing with the committee, hoping to punish its members after the incident escalated (Footnote 70). It was clear that Ko Yuan-fen was ill-intentioned from the very start. Pai Tsung-hsi, the defense minister who represented the government to pacify the Taiwanese people (Footnote 71), pointed out (Footnote 72) that Ko Yuan-fen's attitude in dealing with the incident was "he would rather kill ninety-nine innocent people than leave one real rebel at large." The result was many innocent people were killed in the military crackdown, triggering widespread panic among the Taiwanese population. Because of this, Pai Tsung-hsi believed that "Ko Yuan-fen was a reckless and impatient person who abused his office, made many mistakes in dealing with the incident, and refused to reflect on his failure because of his stubborn nature." Pai Tsung-hsi, therefore, suggested that Ko Yuan-fen needed to be dismissed from his position as severe punishment in order to appease the public's anger.

Peng Meng-chi, the Commander of the Kaohsiung Fortress Headquarters at the time of the incident, suddenly resorted to military crackdown at 2 p.m. on March 6 (Footnote 73), preventing the social turmoil from escalating. From the perspective of the government, Peng Meng-chi had achieved greatly. However, from the perspective of Kaohsiung citizens, Peng Meng-chi's decision to indiscriminately machine-gun local people, causing great casualty in local communities, made his status disputable.. After the incident, to people's surprise, Peng Meng-chi was promoted to head of the Taiwan Garrison Command, which caused deep fear and uneasiness among Taiwanese people.

What Chang Mu-tao, the head of the 4th Military Police Regiment, did at the time was very controversial. He first invited Wei-Chuan to mediate the disputes between the government and the public and encouraged him to join the Settlement Committee to proceed with divide and rule tactics. Secondly, when the reinforcement troops of the government's army landed in Taiwan at midday on March 8, Chang Mu-tao continued to lie to the members of the Settlement Committee (Footnote 74) that if the public did not try to disarm soldiers, the government would not adopt any military operations against Taiwanese people. Chang's intention was to reduce their vigilance, so that people who originally wanted to escape would stay where they were. Therefore, these people became easy targets for the soldiers after the reinforcement troops landed. In addition, Chang Mu-tao's military police subordinates also arrested many people at many different places after the rule of military law was declared, causing a lot of controversy. When Pai Tsung-hsi, the defense minister, came to Taiwan to try to appease the Taiwanese public, he once ordered that all the arrests should only be carried out by the Taiwan Garrison Command. However, military police corps continued to arrest civilians (Footnote 75), which showed that Chang Mu-tao's defiance of the order of his superior was very blatant.

Furthermore, intelligence workers in Taiwan were also believed to have misled the government. After the outbreak of the incident, the National Bureau of Investigation and Statistics and the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (Footnote 76) both exaggerated the seriousness of the incident, claiming that some people were not purely advocating political reforms, but were conspiring to rebel against the regime, seek Taiwanese independence, and overturn the government. They also exaggerated the casualty of their mainland Chinese compatriots and the number of people who joined the riots. Therefore, Chairman Chiang Kai-shek was convinced that the situation was dire and thus organized the 21st Division to clamp down on the social unrest in Taiwan. Although Chairman Chiang had reiterated that soldiers should not engage in any form of retaliation against Taiwanese people, his subordinates did not listen to his order.

Without doubt, Chiang Kai-shek played an undeniable role in the settlement of the February 28 Incident. Chiang Kai-shek, as the head of the country, was certainly responsible for sending troops to clamp down on insurgencies. However, we cannot ignore questions such as whether or not the decision of military crackdown was made in due process, and whether there were any abuses in delivering the decision. Judging from literature from different sources, what the Settlement Committee did was only to demand a high level of autonomy for Taiwan as a whole, and there was no intention of rebelling against the central government. Unfortunately, Chiang Kai-shek was preoccupied with military operation in the Chinese Civil War and did not have time to verify the intelligence he received. He also blindly trusted Chen Yi and accepted his request for more enforcement troops in Taiwan. All of the above-mentioned inevitably led to a conclusion that Chiang Kai-shek was culpable due to his oversight over this matter. Even if Chiang Kai-shek understood the truth afterwards, the historical mistakes could not be overturned. Furthermore, it was also a shame that some soldiers did not avoid retaliation against the locals and committed breaches of discipline during the military crackdown. Although Chiang Kai-shek repeated his emphasis on military discipline and banned retaliatory activities (Footnote 77), he could not prevent misconducts from happening. In the aftermath of the incident, government officials of Taiwanese heritage such as Qiu Nian-tai and Tsai Pei-huo suggested the government to punish those who were guilty of dereliction of duty so that the public's anger could be appeased. But Chiang Kai-shek did not accept the proposal and left the historical trauma undealt with for a long time, which was further evidence of his lack of consideration.

Footnotes:

62.  When Chen Yi arrived in Taiwan on October 24, 1945, he rested a bit at Songshan Airport before he announced his policies, saying that he "came to Taiwan to make contributions, not to be a government official. I have confidence in building Taiwan and resolve to launch political reform and eradicate corruption and bad governance. I demand the cooperation of all Taiwanese compatriots in working on the construction of a new Taiwan." (Page 4)
63. At the beginning of the incident, Chen Yi did not take a tough stance on it, partly because there were not sufficient soldiers stationed on the island to respond to the social unrest and partly because he as Taiwan's Chief Executive did not want any scandal to undermine his political status and prestige (See Footnote 21 for more details). Therefore, it was likely that Chen Yi was trying to play down the seriousness of the conflict or even gloss over it. (Page 202)
64. On March 6, Chen Yi prepared a detailed report on the incident for Chairman Chiang Kai-shek and appointed Lee Yi-chung, the director of the Chinese Nationalist Party's Taiwan Province Division, to fly to Nanjing on March 7 to present it in detail to Chiang in person. The letter particularly emphasized that after the outbreak of the incident, the "treacherous party" (Chinese Communist Party) members, pro-Japanese gentry from the former colonial time, and hooligans had taken the opportunity to stir up anti-Chinese and anti-government sentiments. They seized firearms from the army and police and besieged local government buildings, which "showed that it was less an ordinary mass movement than well-planned, well-organized rebellion." Therefore, it should be of no doubt that participants needed to be severely punished. Chen Yi believed that "if he had eradicated the pro-Japanese gentry and had strengthened the armed force in Taiwan when he first assumed the office, the incident would not have deteriorated to the current situation." In order to mitigate the damage caused by the incident and solve the problem completely, Chen Yi proposed a few measures: firstly, in terms of politics, the government should change the feudalist ideology harbored by a majority of Taiwanese people, as well as restructure the Chief Executive's Office into the Taiwan Provincial Government and experiment with democratic elections of county and city mayors, so that Taiwanese people could have more trust in the government. Secondly, "the affiliates of the treacherous party must be forcibly annihilated and must not be allowed to exist." Chen Yi believed that only after the well-trained, two well-equipped divisions of the government's army were dispatched to Taiwan could the government have sufficient strength to deal with the treacherous party members and to exterminate the rebellious attempts to gain Taiwanese independence…The reason many members of Taiwanese intelligentsia were arrested and murdered one after another during the military crackdown could be understood from this letter. (Page 204)
65. However, the later development of the situation was not expected by Chen Yi. It turned out that the political discontent and economic despair that Taiwanese people had put up with for about a year had already reached a tipping point. The Settlement Committee realized it could take advantage of the public's anger and thus announced a series of demands consisting of political and economic requests, which were found unacceptable by Chen Yi. One of the reasons was that the institution of the Chief Executive's Office with all-encompassing power was designed and proposed by Chen Yi. Now Chen Yi's administration was on the brink of total disintegration, dealing a heavy blow to his political prestige and status. (Page 202)
66. According to the archive, Chairman Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Yi were opposed to the retaliatory policies. On March 10, Chen Yi told Hsu Shih-hsien, the director of the Department of Martial Law, and Ko Yuan-fen, the Chief of Staff, that many soldiers were found to have humiliated Taiwanese people and leaders of platoons and companies must constantly keep a watch on their soldiers to stop these sorts of behaviors. On the same day, Ko Yuan-fen also requested his subordinates to follow this order. On March 11, Hsu Shih-hsien made a report, saying that since the declaration of martial law, a total of 135 civilians had been arrested. Problems were usually found after interrogation, meaning that the "real reasons these people were arrested were extremely different to the reality." The suspects were either seriously injured or robbed of their belongings by soldiers while being escorted. Therefore, Hsu Shih-hsien suggested Chen Yi should make distinction between good and bad people to avoid implicating the innocent. He also urged Chen Yi to order his subordinate soldiers and officers "not to recklessly retaliate against local people," which showed that things like indiscriminate arrest, killing and robbery were not uncommon at the time. This was also confirmed by victims during oral history interviews. (Page 300)
67. According to the report that the Military Police Command and Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics presented to Chairman Chiang Kai-shek on March 12, the retaliatory operation was soon started after the government's army arrived in Taiwan on March 9 and 10. The Investigation and Statistics Department of the Chinese Nationalist Party's branch in Taiwan also suggested the government should seize the opportunity to eradicate the rebels and sent the list of wanted people to the Taiwan Garrison Command. On the evening of March 10, the government started to purge the "traitors in the cities." (Page 213)
68. Chen Yi ordered the Military Police's Special Investigations Branch in Taiwan to secretly arrest Lin Lien-chung (member of the National Assembly), Lin Kuei-tuan, Lee Ruei-feng, and the most wanted fugitive Tseng Bi-chung. Chiang Wei-chuan had already absconded. (Page 214)
69. During the night of February 28, Ko Yuan-fen, the Chief of Staff, also wrote in his diary that "the outbreak of this incident was, of course, incited by some traitors from within. However, we failed to take much precaution to avoid it because of our political unpreparedness, lack of sufficient attention to the mass movement, and the failure to manage and lead the crowds, all of which were the biggest mistakes that our party and our army had ever made." (Page 200)
70. On March 4, Ko Yuan-fen wrote in his diary that "after careful consideration, I have decided to prepare militarily as soon and thoroughly as possible. I will resort to military crackdown immediately after evidence of their treasonous behaviors is released." (Page 201)
71. On March 28, Pai Tsung-hsi instructed six measures for dealing with the aftermath of the February 28 Incident. 1) In terms of people who have been arrested, the government is required to provide a list during Pai Tsung-hsi's visit containing the responsible agencies and number and names of people it has incarcerated or executed. Except for those who have committed serious crimes, those who have been incarcerated should be treated leniently. 2) In terms of arresting criminals, only communists and culprits of the incident can be arrested, responsible agencies can only arrest people after they are directed to do so by the Taiwan Garrison Command, and suspects should be put on trial as soon as they are arrested. 3) In terms of dealing with students, all students need to go back to school immediately. After resuming school, students cannot be arrested unless they are communists. If they are found of any misconduct, they will be punished by school authorities in accordance with school rules. 4) The crackdown operation should be carried out by city and county government staff members and assisted by the government's army. 5) Injured government officials and teachers and civilians who do not have clothing and food should be aided urgently. 6) Military discipline should be strictly maintained. (Page 215)
72. Peng Meng-chi, Recollection of the February 28 Incident in Taiwan Province, Page 45. (Page 413)
73. After Peng Meng-chi dispatched troops to conduct the military crackdown in the afternoon of March 6, he telegraphed Chen Yi, who later scolded him, saying that the problems in Taiwan should be solved politically instead. Chen Yi said to Peng Meng-chi that he should be held accountable for the deterioration of the situation in Kaohsiung in the last few days as he had acted recklessly. Chen Yi ordered Peng Meng-chi to retreat all his troops back to the battalion and wait for further notice within two days after the reception of the telegraph. After Peng Meng-chi successfully clamped down the resistance in Kaohsiung, he sent another telegraph to Chen Yi, explaining the reason behind his military operation and requesting permission to execute Tu Guang-ming and the other two leaders of the local rebellion. After this telegraph was sent, the Taiwan Garrison Command replied immediately, saying that Peng Meng-chi should be complimented for his appropriate handling of the situation and granting approval for his execution requests. The reason Chen Yi changed his attitude was because he wanted to placate Peng Meng-chi who was in charge of the military crackdown in southern Taiwan. (Page 229)
74. At midday on March 8, Chang Mu-tao, the leader of the Military Police Corps, met with members of the Settlement Committee, saying that "the political reforms demanded by Taiwanese people were legitimate and the central government would definitely not dispatch troops to Taiwan." Chang also urged the Taiwanese compatriots "not to provoke the central government" and swore on his life that the central government would absolutely not launch any warfare on the island (Page 72). In fact, during the incident, Ko Yuan-fen, Chang Mu-tao and other intelligence workers had already made all kinds of preparations in Taipei to accommodate the imminent military operation. The enforcement troops had already landed in Keelung in the afternoon of the same day (March 8). (Page 206)
75. On March 31, the Taiwan Garrison Command followed Pai Tsung-hsi's instructions to notify all the troops on the island that they could not arrest suspects without receiving an order from the Command and that if they had to arrest someone urgently, they needed to inform the Command as soon as possible. However, on April 4, the 4th Military Police Regiment sought permission from the Taiwan Garrison Command to perform its tasks as it wished based on the legal authorities of military police as military prosecutors and judiciary police. (Page 216)
76. On March 1... before dawn, the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics received an urgent telegraph from its investigative office in Taiwan reporting the February 28 Incident. After that, the Bureau received urgent telegraphs twice a day. Yeh Hsiu-Feng, the director of the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, suggested Chiang Kai-shek to send three well-trained army divisions to Taiwan. The Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics deliberately exaggerated the seriousness of the incident. For example, it claimed in its telegraph on March 5 that most participants of the rebellion were samurais that had been employed by the Japanese army from overseas and that there were approximately 120,000 of them in Taiwan. (Page 203)
77. On March 12, the Military Police Command and the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics reported to Chiang Kai-shek that Chen Yi arbitrarily retaliated against Taiwanese people after the landing of the enforcement troops. On March 13, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Chen Yi urgently, saying, "please strictly forbid all the military personnel from engaging in retaliation or you will be prosecuted for insubordination." Chiang's tone was extremely stern and severe. On the same day, Chen Yi also sent an urgent telegraph back to Chiang, saying even though he had already banned military personnel from retaliation, he would continue to firmly remind his subordinates. On March 14, Chen Yi once again ordered all the military personnel not to engage in any retaliation. Although the same message had been repeated again and again, retaliation against local Taiwanese people was still common in the military, which was very baffling. (Page 300)

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Conclusion

The February 28 Incident is indeed one of the major tragedies in the history of modern Taiwan, and is the result of the interaction of many factors. In the previous 50 years of Japanese colonial rule, the Japanese had deliberately designed an isolation policy that created a schism between the Taiwanese people and China. Moreover, with the deliberate implementation of Japanese education, the ideas and values of the Taiwanese people had become obviously different to the Chinese mainlanders. On the other side of Formosa Strait, the Chinese officialdom and population were also extremely unfamiliar with the situation in Taiwan. Overwhelmed by the deteriorating situation of the anti-communist warfare on the Chinese mainland, the Nationalist government was unable to pay as much attention to Taiwan as it should have. And the Chief Executive did not consider the public opinions on the island and chose to suppress Taiwanese people's political rights. Moreover, officials' incompetence and widespread corruption deepened the public's dissatisfaction with the government. Given Taiwan was severely damaged during the Second World War (Footnote 78), the fact that the Nationalist government was unable to support Taiwan's reconstruction (Footnote 79) and complete the restoration in the short term (Footnote 80) due to its turbulent political situation and incessant warfare against the Chinese Communist Party in China was not generally understood by the Taiwanese people. Therefore, the outbreak of the tragedy was caused by both subjective factors and objective factors, which were not something that could be fully controlled by the Chief Executive.

Following investigative studies conducted by many parties, an approximate outline of the truth of the February 28 Incident can already be drawn. Unfortunately, an accurate number of the casualties in the incident could not be ascertained after thorough collection of information, interviews, and statistical analysis. During the interviews, our research fellows could deeply feel the trauma and sorrow that the families of the victims have experienced for decades. Their helplessness, grief, and expectations are not only difficult for us to forget, but also something that the Taiwanese authorities should not ignore. We must not forget history as it can guide us in the future. We should learn the sorrowful lessons of this tragic incident and prevent the future occurrence of such a dramatic schism. It is hoped that the Taiwanese authorities do not avoid accountability for the inappropriate crackdown, and do give compensations to the innocent victims of the February 28 Incident. Meanwhile, we also hope people from all walks of life can understand the special situation of the time, that the trauma inflicted by the tragedy can be soothed with forgiveness and peacefulness, and that a better future can be together worked toward.

Footnotes:

78.  At the end of the Second World War, Taiwan was constantly bombed by the Allies, resulting in considerable damage to Taipei, Keelung, Hsinchu, Chiayi and Kaohsiung. For example, Keelung, which was bombed 25 times from October 1944 to the end of the war in 1945, was most severely bombed as it was in the fortified region. "The total bombed area was 3,051,000 square meters and 56 percent of the city was damaged. 5,056 buildings were ruined in the bombing and 9,030 buildings were estimated to have stood before the war, which means 56 percent of the buildings were damaged." In addition, the roads and waterways were also damaged to a similar degree. Manufacturing, mining, and electricity facilities were among the most seriously damaged. In terms of electricity, before the takeover of the Nationalist government, the power supply had already dropped to about 30,000 kWh, which was less than one third of that in 1943. Also, the acquisition of raw materials was not easy and talents were hard to find. Therefore, in the early days of the new regime, the Chief Executive's Office was planning to ask Japanese industrial and mining technicians to stay in Taiwan to maintain production activities. However, after the objection of the U.S. government, they had to be repatriated. This was why the production level was difficult to restore to the pre-war status in the short run. (Page 5)
79. As the Chinese Civil War was constantly escalating, a nationwide economic crisis broke out. The rise in prices, disorder in society, and widespread panic among the Chinese population were reasons the central Nationalist government could not dedicate itself to properly managing Taiwan. (Page 27)
80. After the war, the whole world was working on reconstruction from the debris. Inflation was haunting the globe, and China was no exception. The Taiwanese economy was increasingly unstable after being implicated in the escalation of anti-communist warfare in China. Back then, Taiwan encountered various problems, including insufficient industrial raw materials, damage to production capabilities, a lack of transport facilities, fiscal difficulties, and an inability to replenish the loss of technicians. (Page 23)

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行政院《「二二八事件」研究報告》 摘要

(Jump to English version of the text)

前言

行政院為了「對解嚴前不敢觸及卻已造成台灣社會不安的『二二八事件』進行研究、調查工作，以資政府處理『二二八事件』善後問題參考之用」，於民國八十年一月成立「研究二二八事件小組」，委員有陳重光、葉明勳、李雲漢、遲景德、張玉法、何景賢、陳三井和賴澤涵等八位先生，由陳重光和葉明勳兩位先生擔任召集人，而由賴澤涵先生擔任總主筆。另聘請黃富三、吳文星、黃秀政、許雪姬和賴澤涵五位教授擔任執筆工作；另有陳美妃、簡榮聰、方惠芳三位為兼任研究員，分別協助黃富三、黃秀政和許雪姬三位教授，即所謂「工作小組」。

「上述執筆人員本著學術良心和超黨派的立場，從事檔案文獻研究和口述歷史工作」，時間雖然只有一年，卻能大量參考官方第一手的資料，訪問數以百計的見證人，並據以有系統且客觀的分析事件的始末。

「在蒐集資料方面，除了徵集台灣現有之政府檔案外，研究人員並分赴海外及大陸地區，蒐集相關之珍貴檔案，例如美國史丹福大學胡佛研究所檔案館所藏George H. Kerr先生所捐贈的『二二八事件』檔案、英國公共檔案局（Public Record Office）的淡水領事館檔案，以及南京第二歷史檔案館的資料...等。研究小組所獲資料之豐富，在當前海內外進行此一問題之研究計劃中，堪稱無出其右。」

「『二二八事件』調查報告在民國八十一年二月二十（二）日公布後，雖在某些枝節上有見仁見智的看法，但尚能為社會大眾所接受。」執筆人復參考更進一步之資料，對研究報告加以修改或補充，至八十三年二月二十日，由時報文化出版企業股份有限公司出版。此即是《「二二八事件」研究報告》之由來。

《「二二八事件」研究報告》做為認識二二八事件主要的參考資料，固然是非常適合的。但全書五百零四頁，對忙碌的現代人來說，份量是重了些。研究報告的「結論」，自四○五頁至四一二頁，對二二八事件有一個簡要的描述與檢討，讀者可以很快的就瞭解事件的演變與前因後果。因此本會特別選為參考資料的主幹，分為八節，並以附註加強說明。附註之內容除有特別說明外，亦都是引自研究報告。相信在一個小時之內，就可以讓讀者對二二八事件有一個通盤的概念。當然，如果想詳細瞭解整個的事件，還是要參考原書。

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一、發生的背景

「二二八大屠殺事件」（說明1）於二次戰後（說明2）後不到一年半之時間發生，其背景極為錯綜複雜，並非單一因素所能解釋的。首先，由於長達五十年的日本殖民統治，台灣人對中國的政治制度與社會現況，均缺乏了解，因而於1945年末，期望落空（說明3）。其次，在政治方面，行政長官制度（說明4），確有諸多缺失，而官箴（說明5）、軍紀欠佳（說明6），政治參與和待遇也極不公平（說明7）。在經濟方面，由於不當之管制政策（說明8），百業蕭條（說明9），物價飛漲（說明10），失業嚴重。在社會方面，復員返鄉的前台籍日軍軍人（說明11），就職無路，一文莫名，因而逐漸形成一股不滿政府的暗潮。此外，行政長官陳儀個性剛愎（說明12），以致下情不能上達，官民關係惡劣。由於以上種種因素，有識之士早已預感危機之瀕臨（說明13），然而，長官公署猶渾然不覺（說明14）。

說明：

1. 《「二二八事件」研究報告》的時間斷限，原則上係自民國三十六年二月二十七日緝煙事件發生，以迄五月十六日清鄉結束為止。（前言）
2. 民國三十四年。
3. 台人長期在日人封鎖下，對祖國情形所知不多，因此台人處處拿日據時期的軍、政、經、社會等方面與戰後中國政府所治理者相比較，在強烈的對比下，情緒上反而感到祖國不如日人，轉生輕視鄙夷之心理。此外，有些大陸來台者對台灣婦女騙婚、欠缺現代知識之生活習慣的差距，不同社會背景產生之價值觀與道德觀之差異， 加上語言的溝通不良，均加深了省籍的鴻溝。台人初對祖國期望過高，不久即由失望而轉為輕視。（頁二七）
4. 依「台灣省行政長官公署組織條例」，行政長官公署受中央之委託，得辦理中央行政。行政長官對在台之中央各機關有指揮監督之權，並可在職權範圍內發布署令及制定單行規章，同時身兼台灣省警備總司令，可見行政長官制係集本省司法、立法、軍事、行政等大權於一身的一元化領導。行政長官由國民政府特任，此與各省的委員制不同。各省的省府實行合議制，委員與省主席同為簡任官; 而台灣省行政長官公署之各處（秘書處、民政、教育、財政、農林、工礦、交通、警務、會計處）及秘書長都是行政長官的幕僚人員，均是簡派。此外，設有法制委員會、宣傳委員會及考核設計委員會。至於銀行貨幣系統也與國內不同。…「陳儀」認為應維持台幣及台灣金融機構使自成系統，並阻止法幣在台灣流通，這樣才不致「使台灣像大陸各省那樣法幣氾濫成災，物價暴跌的現象。」因此，，陳儀主張「先保持安定，才能促進繁榮，所以要發行獨立的新台幣，使台灣不受大陸法幣的影響。」此一主張在其來台之前，獲得蔣主席的首肯，並面囑宋子文照辦，因之，當時有意來台設立分行的四行二局（中央銀行、中國銀行、交通銀行、農民銀行、中央信託局及郵政總局）遂無法在台灣設立，財政部也公布「台灣與內地通匯管理辦法」，規定除「中央銀行及被委託之銀行外，其餘銀行皆不准辦理台幣與法幣兌換業務。」（頁六）不少台人認為國民政府此一設計仍將台人視同殖民地之人民，因而對政府相當不滿（頁四）
5. 官員不僅平日不是在為民服務，遇事還要擺出官架子，並層層推諉，敷衍了事，這些缺點與日據時官員敬業要行政重效率成為強烈的對比。（頁二十）　政治上缺乏效率，官僚作風又盛，這些現象均是日據時期台人未嘗經驗的，短短的一年半，行政長官公署的表現真是遠不如日人。而公務員涉足酒家、不守紀律及貪污的事件，報紙的登載不絕，例如民國三十六年二月十二日《台灣新生報》社論（談營私舞弊問題）所載的舞弊案數目頗為驚人，指出不少公務員常涉足都市中的舞場、茶館、酒樓和賭場，各機關冗員太多，人民對公務員的印象欠佳。至於貪污案件不僅出現在一般公務員，連檢察官、法院院長，甚至教師都貪污。而士兵不守法、乘車購物不給錢是常見的事，甚至有公然搶劫者。不少貪污超過千萬元以上。（頁二一）
6. 駐台軍隊軍紀欠佳，軍人並常向「民眾強買勒借，乃至姦污婦女，動輒開槍傷人。給一塊錢硬要買五個雞蛋（值五元），市場上糾紛司空見慣。」至於搶劫、偷竊的事，更時有所聞（頁二三）
7. 就政治上言，日據時期台人無論在行政上、專業上及技術上均難獲公平地位。台灣光復，不少台人抱有幻想，以為此後應可自治……其實不然，長官公署的九個重要處會十八位正副處長中，只有一位副處長是台人。十七位縣市長中僅台北市長游彌堅、新竹縣長劉啟光、高雄市長黃仲圖（原為連謀）、高雄縣長謝東閔（二二八事件發生時為黃達平）為台人，但悉數均返自重慶「半山」，並不受台人歡迎。…更令台人不服者，莫過於「同工而不同酬」的待遇，以及台人不易謀得公家機構之職。（頁十九）
8. 島嶼地區的經濟，對外的貿易十分重要，如果島嶼地區不靠貿易，則必須具備相當豐富的資源，但台灣並未完全具備這個條件，因此仍需對外貿易。但陳儀似未看清此一情勢，他到台灣之後，即著手實行經濟的統制…雖然他知道這會引起商人的反對，但陳儀認為他是為公不是為私，他所要「追求的不是要肥少數人的腰包，而是要使台灣人民的食、穿、用等民生問題逐步獲得解決。」這種態度顯示其頗嚮往社會主義思想，加上他剛毅固執的個性，使得他的經濟政策受到極大的批評與反彈，而成為後來「二二八事件的」導火線之一。（頁七）
 由於台灣行政的特殊化，長官公署相當排斥外來者，拒絕四行二局或任何私立銀行到台灣設立經營，因而使「官警貿易企業以外的民間貿易企業一律停頓」; 亦使得中國大陸的政府銀行以「通匯問題」採抵制台灣的封鎖政策，台灣因而走上自我封鎖的局面。結果，造成台灣與中國大陸之間船票、機票不能出售，海關無法課稅，船不准出口，台灣貨運無法暢通；　加上長官公署的統制政策，政府自營貿易，以及匯率的不定，使商人裹足不前，因而各地貨物運台銷售困難，外貨不能到台，而台灣貨物也不能外銷的自我封鎖。（頁二五）
 曾有台胞於民國三十五年一月十日向行政院請願，要求「中央明令取消與民爭利之貿易公司，及類似性質各種中間剝削機構，取消各種戰時統治法令，以疏民困。」足見人民對陳儀統制政策之不滿。（頁二二）
9. （陳儀）除繼續日人在台的專賣制度而設置專賣局之外，又設了控制省內外運輸的貿易局，幾乎壟斷了台灣的民生貿易與工業各層面，一般私人企業無法發展，造成人民更多的不滿與失望。因此，「二二八事件」發生時，這兩機構便成為改革者要求廢除的目標。（頁二六）
10. 台灣經濟危機的造成，主要源於通貨膨脹，物價飛漲，尤其是糧價居高不下。台灣原以產米著稱於世，日據時期，「因受戰爭的影響」，致糧食生產銳減…台灣光復後…民國三十五年初，台灣已嚴重缺乏糧食…米價一直飛漲，以致有人言物價之高冠於全國。許多地方發生饑荒，甚至連台中、台南等產米地區亦發生騷擾事件。失業者日多，強盜白天公然搶劫，小偷所在多有。（頁二三）
 台灣的物價飛漲，從民國三十四年十月底到民國三十五年十二月上漲了一百倍，糧食問題尤其嚴重。（頁二五）
 米一斤原來只賣一點五元，但民國三十五年初台北的米價就漲到十元以上，到三十六年二月，以漲到一斤三十二元，此為台人過去所未曾遭遇的生活經驗，因而台人大為不滿。（頁八）
11. 原台籍日本兵…有十餘萬人。（頁一一八）
12. 陳儀過分信任其部屬，演成縱容部下，且被不肖屬下包圍，時為台北市商會理事長之蔣渭川，即曾當面批評陳儀:「長官深居內院，被自稱官民橋樑的少數投機分子，和萬惡官僚等所包圍，社會民情無從而知，上情亦不能下達。」（頁一二）
13. 台灣光復不到三個月，已有不少台人批評陳儀在台的許多做法不當。民國三十五年初，台灣的情況惡化已相當嚴重，引起當時中外人士的極度關切，閩台通訊社已經呼籲政府應對台灣的問題加以重視。上海的《密勒士評論報》刊載（台灣退後五十年）一文，並說:「五個月以後（台灣）可能是中國的愛爾蘭。」…美國在台領事館於三十五年底給其駐華大使和國務院的報告也說:「台灣已在叛亂之點了。」迨至三十六年初，敏銳的觀察者已感到局勢的嚴重，例如上海《觀察》雜誌在台特約記者，於民國三十六年二月二日事件前預言「今日台灣危機四伏，岌岌可危，是隨時可能發生騷動或暴亂的。」可見中外人士都感到台灣實已瀕臨爆發變亂的邊緣。（頁十）
14.  政治、經濟等各方面已讓台人大失所望，但陳儀為了粉飾太平而將駐台的政府軍內調大陸剿共，台灣的兵力頓呈空虛局面; 激進分子遂以為必可推翻陳儀政府，乃大膽鼓動民眾反抗政府。（頁二五）

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二、屠殺事件之爆發

「二二八大屠殺事件」源自緝私員與憲警單位因緝私煙處理失當（說明15），始導致二月二十八日部分台北市民之請願示威，並罷工、罷市（說明16）。又因當日發生公署衛兵槍擊請願民眾事件（說明17），紛亂一發不可收拾，乃由請願懲兇一變而為對抗公署（說明18），進而激化為省籍衝突（說明19）。此一抗爭與衝突，迅即蔓延全島，使原本單純的治安事件變質為政治運動，地方領袖乘機要求全面改革，部分地區並因接收軍警武器（說明20），以致發生武裝衝突。

說明：

15.  「二二八大屠殺事件」導火線源自一意外的圓環緝煙事件，事情的經過大致如下: 民國三十六年二月二十七日上午十一時左右，專賣局接到密報…:淡水港有走私船運入火柴、香煙五十餘箱等情事，專賣局乃派葉得根、鍾延洲、趙子健、劉超群、盛鐵夫、傅學通六名查緝員，會同警察大隊所派四名警察前往查緝，但當他們抵達淡水時，僅查獲私煙五箱。不久，又據密報人說:這些走私貨已移到台北市南京西路的天馬茶房（太平町，今之延平北路）附近，按此a是台北最大的私貨集中地。查緝人員與警察先到太平町附近的小香園進晚餐，以便就近訪查。下午七時三十分，當他們到達天馬茶房時，私販早已逃散，僅查獲一位四十歲寡婦林江邁的公私煙，遂將其全部公私煙和現金加以沒收。 林江邁幾乎下跪苦苦地哀求說:「如果全部沒收的話，我就沒飯吃了，至少把錢和專賣局製的香煙還給我吧．…。」但查緝人員不予理會。當時圍觀的民眾很多，紛紛加入求情的行列。林江邁情急，進而抱住查緝員不放。其中一查緝員「葉得根」 ，用槍管打她的頭，致林婦的頭顱鮮血直流 。 目睹此景的群眾極為氣憤，乃將查緝員包圍，並高喊「阿山（外省人)不講理」、「豬仔太可惡」、「還給香煙」等情緒激動的話。查緝員見勢不妙，連忙逃走，但群眾卻緊追不捨。其中一查緝員傅學通為求脫身，乃向群眾開槍，不幸誤射當時在自宅樓下觀熱鬧的市民陳文溪（年約二十歲，次日死亡）。查緝員逃至永樂町（西寧）派出所，後轉至警察總局（中山堂旁），激憤的民眾將查緝員的卡車玻璃搗毀，並將卡車推倒於道旁，然後包圍派出所要求交出兇手繩之以法。專賣局業務委員會常務委員李炯支與業務會第四組組長楊子才聞報，於九時許趕往現場處理。當時約有百餘民眾聚集，見二人卡車抵達，均趨前欲加毆打，李、楊乃轉至台北市警察局。群眾尾隨而至，並已聚集達六、七百人。李、楊兩人表示將會懲辦查緝員，惟群眾要求將肇事人交出。兩人不得已，會同北市警察局長陳松堅，將查緝員六人送往憲兵隊看管。但民眾不滿，要求立即將六名查緝員逮捕。李、楊兩人以「刑罪罰惡，律有明文，未予擅便答覆」為由，一再解釋，但始終未獲得諒解。 群眾得知查緝員被送至憲兵隊(台灣新生報社對面)後，乃擁至包圍，要求交出兇手。張慕陶團長嚴詞拒絕，並令一排憲兵上前擺出射擊姿勢，群眾見狀乃躲進新生報騎樓。在場的見證人周傳枝稱:時任《台灣新生報》日文版主編吳金鍊好奇地出來探視，見到周氏，即微笑打招呼。周氏問:「有鑼沒有？」吳氏答:「有」，並轉身入內取出銅鑼。於是，雨一稍停，鑼聲叮噹響起來，群眾又包圍憲兵隊。又有青年在街上敲鑼大叫:「台灣人趕緊出來報仇」，「不出來的不是蕃薯」，徹夜大聲叫罵。部分民眾則到台灣新生報要求刊登此事，主編吳金鍊因奉有「台灣省行政長官公署宣傳委員會」不得刊登事件消息的命令，而加以拒絕。民眾威脅將以汽油燒報社。吳金鍊不得已請社長李萬居出面。李氏答應刊登，民眾始離開報社。次日，該報即以五號字刊登百字左右之報導。（頁四八）　於是，由緝私引起的傷人、殺人事件點燃了累積一年多的怒火，群眾燒車、包圍警察局、憲兵隊，要求立刻處決兇犯。在得不到滿意答覆的情況下，群眾久聚不散，終於引發了次日的擴大衝突。（頁五一）
16. 二月二十八日上午九時，民眾因緝私傷害人命事件未獲解決，乃沿街打鑼，通告罷市，市民、商店立予響應，相繼關門。一批民眾遊行至太平町二丁目派出所前，派出所主管黃某欲加制止。民眾因黃某平時藉勢凌人，將其圍打，並搗毀所內玻璃、物品等。　隨後，遊行民眾越聚越多，十時許，衝入位於本町（今重慶南路）之肇事單位專賣局台北分局，發現局內有緝私員。群眾以為其中之一是昨夜之兇手，乃將他與另一警員圍毆致死，又毆傷四人，並將局裡所存之火柴、煙、酒及一輛汽車與七、八輛腳踏車拋至街上焚燒，至次日仍未全熄。當時圍觀民眾達二、三千人，憲警隨即趕到，但也知難而退，不敢處理。......十二時許，民眾又擁向南門專賣局總局，要求懲兇，但因憲警事先有防備，僅打破玻璃而已。......民眾由於向專賣局總局請願未遂，乃轉往長官公署。．．．．．．此外，專賣局南門工廠亦被搗毀。專賣局引起的民怨於此可窺一斑。（頁五一）
17. 下午一時許，有一批四、五百人的群眾，以鑼鼓為前鋒，並有人喊叫、呼口號，由火車站向長官公署前進。有謂民眾因市面缺米，聽說公署有食米可領，乃一呼四應，尾隨而至，聲勢浩大。但群眾至中山路路口，尚未到公署廣場前，即為配備整齊之士兵舉槍阻擋。不久，槍聲響起，民眾奔逃，有人傷亡倒地。此即公署衛兵開槍事件，也是局勢惡化之關鍵所在。（頁五二）
18. 公署開槍事件發生後，官民對立之勢已不可避免，而二次戰後所積累的省籍矛盾隨之爆發。於是，省民在對抗公署的同時，也對外省人進行一連串的暴力行動--「打阿山」。 二十八日下午二時許，民眾聚會於台北公園（今二二八和平公園），隨後進佔公園內的台灣廣播電台，向全省廣播。內容主要為批判政府貪污現象、米糧外運、民不聊生等，並號召民眾起而驅逐各地的貪官汙吏以求自存。惟亦有謂板橋轉播站因抵制而未予轉播，消息只在台北地區流傳。無論確否，本省幅員小，交通方便，次日，全台各地先後知悉台北「二二八衝突」，亂事乃蔓延全島，而懲兇要求也升高為政治抗爭行動。 下午三點，警備總司令部鑒於情勢危急，宣布戒嚴，並遣派武裝軍警巡邏市區，且開槍掃射。然而，民眾仍再包圍專賣總局、鐵路警察署、交通局等，而與軍警發生衝突，不少民眾、學生因而喪生。據警總「通報」，下午時刻，群眾千餘人在郵政總局聚會，軍警驅逐不散，乃發生衝突，民眾傷亡十數人。（頁五四）
19. 民眾也遷怒外省人，濫施報復。本町正華旅社與虎標永安堂首先遭殃，不但門窗玻璃被搗碎，物品亦被搬出焚燬。下午五時許，榮町貿易局所開設之新台公司（台北最大的百貨公司）亦被搗毀，貨物被搬出焚燒，有乘機偷竊者則遭毒打。 民眾凡具有汽車、卡車，均叫下乘客毒打，再將車推至台北車站、圓環夜市附近，予以燒燬。據估計，被燒車輛約有十餘輛。民眾不僅燬物，也對外省人不分青紅皂白地屈辱毆打。 在本町、台北車站、台北公園、榮町、永樂町、太平町、萬華等地，均有不少外省人無端挨打。新竹縣長朱文伯與台北市地政局長遭羞辱或痛毆。一般認為，這是一年半以來的積怨所爆發出來的盲目排斥外省人暴動。於是，無辜的小公務員及其眷屬、來台旅行或經商的外省人成了代罪羔羊。許多聳人聽聞的暴行也傳出了。…當時任職於聯合國救濟總署的汪彝定先生曾目睹此類現象，但他指稱，大多是被棒打或棍擊，尚未見武士刀; 攻擊婦孺老人的現象不太多，強姦只偶有傳聞。據聞，外省人被打死者至少有十五人，有些被木棍打成癱瘓。（頁五五）
20. 憲兵團長張慕陶亦指台灣局勢已演變至「叛國奪權階段」，地方政府完全失卻統馭能力，暴民已收繳各地軍警武器，總數在四千枝以上，而指責陳儀「似尚未深悉事態之嚴重，猶粉飾太平。」（頁二Ｏ三）

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三、衝突之擴大

台北市是這場政治風暴的中心，這場風暴隨後蔓延至全島各地，而台北市的「二二八事件處理委員會（說明21）」與各地的分會，則是這場政治紛爭的主角。紛亂期間，平時不得民心的地方官吏固然紛紛棄職走避，即有意維持秩序並願與處委會合作之官員，迫於形勢，不得不暫時躲避，以保安全。台北市的處委會與各地的分會，分別擔負整合民意、維持秩序與進行政治改革的重任，並負責與行政長官公署之間的溝通（說明22），一度幾乎取代公署與各地政府的功能（說明23），然處委會本身意見紛紜，令出多門，各地亦無統一的行政綱領可資遵循，因而未能充分發揮安定政局的功能。

事件爆發後，由於各地衝突不斷擴大，部分地區中共及其同路人乃乘機介入，如台中地區主導「三二事件（說明24）」的謝雪紅和楊克煌。謝氏不僅召開「市民大會」，利用示威群眾，全面接管台中市的官方機構，更利用青年學生組織 「二七部隊（說明25）」，以武裝力量為後盾，澈底爭取民主政治，在處委會的議會路線之外，另闢一條武裝路線。

嘉義地區則自三月二日事件（說明26）發生後，就顯現出與其他地方不同的特質。第一，各地民眾曾組成武裝隊伍，參加攻擊紅毛埤軍械庫及水上飛機場的軍事行動（說明27），惟參加者大半是烏合之眾; 第二，嘉義地區不少社會人士支持這些行動，因而孫志俊市長認為嘉義地區「戰事進行之激烈，與公教人員損害之慘重，堪稱為全省之冠」。

高雄地區在三月三日起民情騷動，群眾逐漸有激烈的行動，圍攻一○五後方醫院與憲兵隊等地（說明28）。高雄要塞司令彭孟緝認為此舉已形同叛亂，待機出兵。三月六日下午二時，彭孟緝扣留上山談判的代表（說明29），以迅速的行動出兵鎮壓（說明30），雖使高雄地區紛擾不安的局面穩定下來，但軍事攻擊行動造成高雄市政府內（說明31）、火車站前（說明32）無辜民眾的傷亡。而事後的清鄉，逮捕一千五百名嫌疑「人犯」，且部分人犯被公開槍決，可說是衝突創傷久久未能癒合的重要原因。

說明：

21.  三月一日，台北市參議會為反映民意，邀請台籍國大代表、省參議員、國民參政員，於上午十時在中山堂召開大會，成立「緝煙血案調查委員會」，會中決議推派台灣省參議會議長黃朝琴、台北市參議會議長周延壽、台灣省參議員王添灯、國民參政員林忠等為代表，晉見長官，提出數項要求，即解除戒嚴令、釋放被捕市民、軍警不許開槍、官民共組處理委員會，並由陳儀向全省廣播。陳儀全予接受，並認為應定名為「二二八事件處理委員會」較妥，而此即該委員會得名之由來。（頁五七）
 處委會一面強化本身之職能，一面亦展開宣傳工作。六日下午，處委會在中山堂補開正式成立大會，王添灯任會議主席，即席選出常務委員，計有:國民參政員:林獻堂、陳逸松; 國民大會代表:李萬居、連震東、林連宗、黃國書; 台北市參議員:周延壽、潘渠源，簡聖堉、徐春卿、吳春霖；　省等參議員：王添灯、黃朝琴、蘇維樑、黃純青、林為恭、郭國基。另選出候補常務委員洪火煉、吳國信（頁六六）
22. 七日上午，陳儀致函處委會，謂各方代表紛紛，意見繁雜，應先交處委會討論綜合後，再向公署提出。（頁七Ｏ）
23. 三日至五日，全省各縣市處委會紛紛成立後，公署權力已被架空。（頁六六）
24. 三月二日上午，台中民眾齊集台中戲院…舉行市民大會。九時，由私立建國工藝職業學校教員楊克煌宣布開會，並報告台北事變發端與人民請願經過，說明台北市的行動與提出要求事項。接著，與會者一致推舉建國工藝職校校長謝雪紅為大會主席。謝氏擔任主席後，「詳述光復以來陳儀暴虐政治的事實與目前台灣的形勢，強調欲解放台灣人民的痛苦，人民必須團結起來，結束國民黨一黨專政，立即實行台灣人民的民主自治。所以必須響應這次台北市民的英勇起義，不怕犧牲，鬥爭到底，爭取澈底的勝利。」謝氏說畢，接著由「台灣省政治建設協會台中分會」 代表巫永昌及律師代表張風謨等相繼發言，「亦為攻擊政府，離間省內外感情之詞」。十時左右，參加群眾為表示擁護起見，決定遊行示威。遊行群眾用消防車，鳴響警笛，呼籲市民響應起義，踴躍參加抵抗運動。全市一時驚天動地，緊張萬分。（頁八四）
25. ［三月六日］謝雪紅為貫徹其政治主張，抗戰到底，乃糾集四百餘青年學生，另在第八部隊內組織「二七部隊」，自任總指揮，以鍾逸人、蔡鐵城分任隊長、參謀等職務，重要幹部有楊克煌、李喬松、古瑞雲等人。其基本隊伍，有以鍾逸人親信黃信卿為首的埔里隊; 以何集淮、蔡伯勳為首的中商隊(隊員中有幾名中共黨員); 以呂煥章（中共黨員）為首的中師隊; 以黃金島為首的警備隊（獨立治安隊）；以李炳崑為首的建國工藝學校學生隊。此外，有林大宜從農村招募當過日軍的農民; 有延平學院的學生;有前日軍砲兵少尉; 有前日軍工兵。還有三五成群去報到的。 「二七部隊」的成立，是謝雪紅以武裝力量反抗地方政府的具體表示，「這支民兵在處理委員會的議會路線之外，又開闢了一條武裝路線。在中南部的武裝鬥爭中，以『二七部隊』的反抗堅持最久。」（頁九一）
26. 三月二日下午三時，由彰化、台中南下的年輕人數十人，來到嘉義火車站與噴水池之間，有一名年紀三、四十歲的人背槍，在街頭喊話，召集市民去燒孫志俊市長的官舍。孫市長見情勢不好，跳出牆外，決定逃往憲兵隊，無如群眾蝟集，緊追在後，狀至危險，幸好遇到市參議員林抱及林文樹，經二人救援，才能安抵憲兵隊。
 在孫市長逃走的同時，街上已有打外省人、包圍警局接收槍枝之行動，由於警察已經陸續離開崗位，市區乃呈現混亂的情況。孫市長於下午五時一面以電話與駐軍聯繫，一面請議長鍾家成出面維持治安與秩序。三月三日召開市民大會，成立了嘉義市「二二八事件處理委員會」，由三民主義青年團嘉義分團籌備處主任陳復志擔任主任委員，兼作戰司令，秘書為李曉芳，以下分設各組、隊。（頁一Ｏ五）
27. 嘉義市「二二八事件處理委員會」在數小時的磋商後，決定接管電台，並藉由廣播來向全市及全台各地「募集志願軍」。在這一呼籲下，布袋、朴子、鹽水、佳里、六腳、番路、斗六、台中、埔里、北港、台南工學院等地人馬陸續前來嘉義應援。當時守在東門町的第二十一師獨立團第一營羅迪光營長在孫市長的要求下進入市區鎮壓，使局面平添變數。由於軍隊有強力的砲火容易造成傷亡，處委會乃派參議員前往憲兵隊談判，欲以和平方式解決，但雙方條件差距太大，沒有談妥。
 是日來嘉各隊約莫三千人開始攻擊憲兵營、紅毛埤第十九軍械庫、水上飛機場及東門町軍營。三日晚九時，市政府被接收，而所有外省籍警察在局長林天綱的率領下也退到東門町。（頁一Ｏ六）
28. 三日，由台北南下的「流氓百數十人」由台南方面分乘卡車進入市區，而台南工學院學生也抵達高雄，高雄的「二二八事件」於焉爆發。先是，一○五後方醫院的獨立團第七連的第一排國軍遭到攻擊，而鹽埕町也聚集了四、五百人，欲攻擊憲兵隊; 毆辱、搶奪外省人及商店之事也不時傳出，市區治安頓呈混亂。是日晚，警察局長童葆昭的座車遭人焚燬，集身到要塞司令部要求保護。凌晨，警局電話線路被切斷、武器被奪，而部分本省籍警察攜械逃散，有的回家不再執行維護治安之責，有的加入民眾的攻擊行動（頁一一五）
29. 六日上午九時，不知是計的市長等七人（議長彭清靠、光明、范滄榕、曾豐明、苓雅區長林界，及台電高雄辦事處主任李佛續）上山，據黃仲圖市長的說法，他擬赴司令部請示制壓辦法，卻為…數十人手持槍刀及手榴彈擁入市府，辱罵市長，其首領光明等提出非法條件，欲向國軍作越軌要求，持械迫市長與參議會議長率代表赴司令部。…當七位代表進入要塞司令部接待室後，彭氏由另一小門入內，雙方繞圓桌而坐，市長、議長分坐彭氏之左右，則坐在彭氏對面，市長拿出和平條九條給彭司令看，彭原意不在談判，只是在拖延時間，因此當即拍桌怒斥…荒謬，並大呼來人。 室外的官兵聞聲而入，將代表等一一搜身。據彭孟緝言，身上有槍，而范、曾兩人身上有手榴彈，除范、曾、三人被逮捕外，其餘的人在衛兵監視下枯坐在原處。（頁一一七）
30. 在彭孟緝指揮下，兵分三路:一路經建國三路; 一路由壽山要塞司令部直下，過鼓山一路及大公路之陸橋向市府; 一路過平交道進入五福四路。每路有三班，各約有一百人。（頁一一九）
31. 六日下午進攻市政府的是守備大隊陳國儒部，由於市政府樓上架設機槍，軍方乃認定在市政府的是暴徒，因此到市政府後並未遵命對空鳴槍示警，而是先丟入手榴彈，然後見人就開槍，在市政府的人根本無法抵抗，死傷慘重，市參議員許秋粽、黃賜、王石定等五、六十人喪命市府。…參議員邱道得奉命勞軍，進入市府時，腳下踩的都是死人，且血流滿地，一如泥濘。（頁一一九）
32. 主攻火車站及第一中學的是二十一師何軍章團第三營，分成二路…抵達車站，當時高雄第一中學畢業生顏再策率領學生，自長春旅社開槍欲驅散前來的軍隊，由於火力不如，乃冒險衝出，被擊中要害，在火車站前的民眾見狀，有的散去，有的躲入地下道中，軍隊掃射了地下道，造成不少傷亡。（頁一一九）

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四、政府之肆應與事件之平復

當事件逐漸蔓延爆發後，陳儀一者鑒於於兵力不足（說明33），二者為維護其權位，本有意淡化處理，以政治手段解決。參與「二二八事件處理委員會」的社會人士，在初期也只為解決緝煙血案（說明34）；但由於長官公署應對無方，使得原本單純的懲兇請願事件，轉變為政治改革運動，更憑藉民氣的高漲，逐步提高其訴求（說明35）。然因各地處委會組織鬆散，遂為中央認是「叛國」的舉動，構成治安機關請兵鎮壓的藉口。政府為何要出兵鎮壓?就現有的檔案、各種文獻及口述資料觀之，顯然當時中央政府的因應之道，深為台灣主政者的意見所左右。蓋事起之初，陳儀、柯遠芬等執掌台灣軍政大權者，並未了解台灣社會當時的情況，故對民眾或處委會之要求均視之為無理取鬧或別具用心。於是，一面運用分化（說明40）、滲透策略，以求化解危機; 繼則誇張衝突之嚴重性，向中央要求派兵，以進行武裝鎮壓。

就政府之文獻觀察，蔣介石主席最初並未主張鎮壓，僅同意派一加強軍團來台，而此係「歸建」(意指軍隊調返原駐地、原單位)，主要目的在於防範。其後，蔣介石接陳儀與各情治單位之請求，轉而視此一事件為「反動暴民」的暴亂，且漠視台人團體之陳情（說明41），決定派兵綏靖。 至於綏靖工作（說明42），大致可分為武力掃蕩和清鄉兩大重點。關於武力掃蕩，由於公署在實施之前已有周詳的計畫和部署，加上各地的動亂，事實上並未如公署宣傳之嚴重，故掃蕩之進行遠較預期迅速，除中部地區「二七部隊」之殘部尚有一些抵抗（說明43）外，其他各地（說明44）幾無戰鬥發生。惟各綏靖分區部隊在執行武力掃蕩之時，確有報復行為，致有民眾無辜傷亡、嫌犯未經審判即就地槍決等情事發生（說明45）。

軍事鎮壓行動之後，繼之進行清鄉工作，其主要目的在於逮捕嫌犯（說明46）、收繳武器軍品、清查戶口、辦理自新（說明47）、取得連保連坐切結等，均如期完成。惟衡諸實況，不少嫌犯係遭羅織入罪或私人挾怨報復，軍憲未詳加查證，即貿然逮捕訊治，因而造成不少冤獄。亦有已定罪者，經請託賄賂，甚或透過特殊關說而得以無事。甚或有些不法軍警藉機勒索敲詐，或順手掠奪私人財物等非法敗行，由是而造成民怨，為社會所詬病。毋庸諱言，此乃當時軍事當局未能有效防範和控制，軍紀教育亦未臻於理想所致，應負造成許多無辜性命犧性的責任。

「二二八大屠殺事件」誠為台灣歷史上的一大悲劇（說明48）。謂其為悲劇，可分為兩方面來看。就受難台人而言，未死於日據時期帝國主義者之摧殘，卻死於他們日夜盼望回歸的「祖國」軍警之鎮壓（說明49）；他們容或批評政府，或提出台人治台等要求，自信並無反叛政府的行為，竟因此被處死，且多數並未經過公開審判的程序，甚或有秘密處決而屍首不存者，此斷非文明社會之作法。甚至有些傷亡者，根本未參加過反政府的行動，只因軍隊肆行掃射而成為冤魂。就二次戰後來台服務的大陸籍人士而言，雖然部分軍人或公職人員有貪污、營私舞弊等劣行，但並非所有來台人員盡皆貪官污吏; 然而在此事件中，部分大陸人士卻成了代罪羔羊，為憤怒群眾盲目攻擊，因而傷亡，其數目雖沒有台人受難者多，但也使得一些來台的公教人員心生恐懼而離開台灣，這些現象使大陸與台灣之間加深了隔閡。不容否認的，一些毆打外省人或曾以武力攻擊機關、機場，甚至傷害人命者，仍應受法律制裁。故並非所有「二二八大屠殺事件」的傷亡人員，均為無辜受害者，必須予以區分。

說明：

33.  就在台兵力觀之，事變前駐台之整編二十一師獨立團與工兵營、三個要塞守備大隊之總兵力僅五、二五一人。其中三個要塞守備大隊一、五三二名，工兵營五一七名，負責台中以北監護勤務:獨立團二、五ＯＯ名，擔任嘉義以南監護勤務; 至於警備總司令部本部所控兵力僅獨立團之一營約七百名，兵力薄弱，不足擔任台北之防戍任務。（頁二Ｏ一）
34. （三月六日）王添宣讀向中外廣播之有關「二二八事件」真相全文，以消除各方之疑慮。主要內容是說明處委會努力的目標是「肅清貪官污吏，爭取本省政治的改革，不是要排斥外省同胞參與改善本省政治。」文中並且提出對事件的處理方式，計有「對於目前的處理」七條，「根本處理二十五條(軍事三條、政治二十二條)，此即聞名的三十二條要求，其條文如下：
 一、對於目前的處理
政府在各地之武裝部隊應自動下令暫時解除武裝武器，交由各地處理委員會及憲兵隊共同保管，以免繼續發生流血衝突事件。
政府武裝部隊武裝解除後，地方之治安由憲兵與非武裝之警察及民眾組織共同負擔。
各地若無政府武裝部隊威脅之時，絕對不應有武裝械鬥行動。對貪官污吏不論其為本省人或外省人，亦只應檢舉轉請處理委員會協同憲警拘拿，依法嚴辦，不應加害而惹出是非。
對於政府改革之意見，可列舉要求條件，向省處理委員會提出，以候全盤解決。
政府切勿再動兵力，或向中央請遣兵力，企圖以武力解決事件，致發生更慘重之流血而受國際干涉。
在政治問題未根本解決之前，政府之一切施策(不論軍事、政治)，須先與處理委員會接洽，以免人民懷疑政府誠意，發生種種誤會。
對於此次事件不應向民間追究責任者，將來亦不得假藉任何口實拘捕此次事件之關係者。對於因此次事件而死傷之人民應從優撫卹。
 二、根本處理
甲、軍事方面
缺乏教育和訓練之軍隊絕對不可使駐台灣。
中央可派員在台徵兵守台。
在內陸之內戰未終息以前，除以守台灣為目的之外，絕對反對在台灣徵兵，以免台灣陷入內戰游渦。
乙、政治方面
制定省自治法，為本省政治最高規範，以便實現國父建國大綱之理想。
縣市長於本年六月以前實施民選，縣市參議會同時改選。
省各處長人選應經省參議會(改選後為省議會)之同意，省參議會關於本年六月以前改選，目前其人選由長官提出，交由省處理委員會審議。
省各廳處長三分之二以上須由在本省居住十年以上者擔任之（最好秘書長、民政、財政、工礦、農林、教育、警務等處長應該如是）。
警務處長及各縣市警察局長應由本省人擔任，省警察大隊及鐵道工礦等警察即刻廢止。
法制委員會委員數半數以上由本省人充任，主任委員由委員互選。
除警察機關之外，不得逮捕人犯。
憲兵除軍隊之犯人外，不得逮捕人犯。
禁止帶有政治性之逮捕拘禁。
非武裝之集合結社絕對自由。
言論、出版、罷工絕對自由，廢止新聞紙發行申請登記制度。
即刻廢止人民團體組織條例。
廢止民意機關選舉辦法。
改進各級民意機關選舉辦法。
實行所得統一累進稅，除奢侈品稅相續稅外，不得徵收任何雜稅。
一切公營事業之主管人由本省人擔任。
設置民選之公營事業監察委員會，日產處理應委任省政府全權處理，各接收工廠工礦應置經營委員會，委員須過半數由本省人充任之。
撤銷專賣局，生活必需品實施配給制度。
撤銷貿易局。
撤銷宣傳委員會。
各地方法院院長、各地方法院首席檢察官全部以本省人充任。
各法院推事、檢察官以下司法人員各半數以上省民充任。（頁六六）
35. 七日下午，處委會召開全體大會，在一片嘈雜聲中，除決議通過原有的三十二條要求外，又增列十條。計軍事方面二條、政治方面八條，此即四十二條要求。其增列之十條條文如下：
本省陸海空軍應儘量採用本省人。
台灣省行政長官公署應改為省政府制度，但未得中央核准前暫由二二　八處理委員會之政務局負責改組，並普選公正賢達人士充任。
處理委員會政務局應於三月十五日以前成立。其產生方法，由各鄉鎮區代表選舉該區候選人一名，然後再由該縣市轄參議會選舉之。其名額如下：台北市二名、台北縣三名、基隆市一名、新竹縣三名、台中市一名、台中縣四名、彰化市一名、嘉義市一名、台南市一名、台南縣四、高雄市一名、高雄縣三名、屏東市一名、澎湖縣一名、花蓮縣一名、台東縣一名，計三十名（實為二十九名）。
勞動營及其他不必要之機構廢止或合併，應由處理委員會政務局檢討決定之。
日產處理事宜應請劃歸省政府自行清理。
警備總司令部應撤銷，以免軍權濫用。
高山同胞之政治經濟地位及應享之利益應切實保障。
本年六月一日起實施勞動保護法。
本省人之戰犯及漢奸嫌疑被拘禁者，要求無條件即時釋放。
送與中央食糖一十五萬噸，要求中央依時估價撥歸台灣省。（頁七十）
36. 一方面，陳儀同意台籍民意代表之要求，由官民合組處委會; 另一方面，陳儀、柯遠芬、張慕陶等人即聯絡蔣渭川等人，分化處委會的領導階層，並以軍統人員許德輝出任忠義服務隊隊長，兼處委會治安組組長; 軍統局台北站站長林頂立被任命為警總的義勇總隊長，以執行「分化奸偽和運用民眾力量來打擊奸偽」之任務。其中，不無黨政軍各派藉機幕後較勁，中統局指蔣渭川、王添為投機者，不斷作搧動; 軍統的柯遠芬則指蔣、王二人為黨部新吸收的惡霸劣紳，而處委會成立之處委員仍以國民黨黨員為多，但省黨部不予導入正軌，反而心存「黃鶴樓上看翻船」。其結果，處委會在多頭運作下，政治訴求不斷升高，於是，軍事鎮壓成了公署名正言順的選擇。（頁二Ｏ一）
37. 「三十二條要求」據日後投共的蘇新稱，是環繞王添身邊的左翼青年所草擬的，如潘欽信、蕭友三、蔡慶榮、蘇新等; 甚至曾獲中共地下黨負責人之同意。…國民參政員陳逸松回憶稱，確有左翼青年為王添寫稿子; 惟台共分子在投奔中共後，多不免強調中共與其本人在二二八事件中之重要性，可信度須打折扣。據參與偵辦「蔡孝乾匪諜案」之一軍統局人士稱，中共當時在台之勢力極小，老台共也不等於中共（頁六九）
38. 據聞，提三十二條要求時，會場有軍統、C.C.（中統）等情治人員活動，如白成枝、呂伯雄屬C.C.，許德輝屬軍統。新增十條有的是軍統、C.C.有意提出以為鎮壓之藉口。如政治項目第二十九條「本省人之戰犯與漢奸即時釋放」，即由國大代表兼台灣鐵道黨部書記長吳國信提出，其他人呼應叫喊通過的。又有謂代表提出之要求僅有十二條，其後之三十二條與追加之十條乃「憲政協會」成員叫喊通過的。（頁七一）
39. 八日，處委會發表聲明，推翻昨日通過之決議案。內稱因參加開會的人數眾多，昨日通過之四十二條件未及推敲，致有不當要求出現，例如「撤銷警備總部、國軍繳械，跡近反叛中央，決非省民公意」等。（頁七二）
40. 事件發生後，據聞，劉啟光主張以武力澈底鎮壓，而參謀長柯遠芬、警備總部調查室主任陳達元、軍統局台灣站長林頂立則主張「以民眾的力量對抗民眾的力量」。柯遠芬並於二月二十八日下令情治人員調查、監視處委會主謀人士。公署一者鑑於台灣兵力單薄，不足鎮壓，二者解決社會運動的最佳方式非外在的壓制，而是內部的分化、瓦解，於是採取第二種策略，即利用蔣渭川領導之「台灣省政治建設協會」勢力，以削弱處委會的力量，並派情治人員打入處委會，相機行事。二月二十八日與三月一日，憲兵第四團團長張慕陶兩度致函蔣渭川，促其「出面收拾殘局」。一日黃昏，柯遠芬亦致函，邀他協助收拾危局。由此可見，公署方面已籌劃好分化的策略。（頁五九）
41. 三日上午處委會議決上電蔣主席報告事件真相，旋於下午四時以台灣省民眾代表大會之名義上電，指控公署放任軍警胡亂開槍，射殺民眾，惹起省民公憤，光復以來政治惡劣，不法橫行，屢經省民要求改善卻一無效果; 籲請中央速派大員來台調處以平民憤，並刻速實行地方自治。同日，台灣旅滬同鄉會理事長李偉光代表上書蔣主席，請求徹查慘案真相，嚴懲慘案造成的法律和道德責任; 以及澄清吏治，以新台人耳目。由上顯示，蔣主席不但充分掌握各方面的情報和看法，同時，亦對省民的意見和期望有所了解。（頁二Ｏ三）
42. 三月十日，陳儀對全省廣播戒嚴令，綏靖工作於焉全面展開。（頁二一一）
43. 十五日，國軍繼續往埔里方面推進，縮小包圍圈。…二七部隊因對外兩條交通要道均遭封鎖，聯絡不便，情勢甚為不利，乃決定派遣陳明忠擔任突襲隊長，兵分三路，夜襲日月潭方面的國軍。另以警備隊長黃金島率一小隊扼守烏牛湳橋，以防腹背受敵。突襲隊與國軍四三六團第二營第四連在日月潭附近發生激戰，國軍頗有傷亡，被迫向水裡坑撤退，但該部隊也傷亡慘重，且彈藥亦快告罄。 翌（十六）日，國軍四三六團第二、三營部分兵力，又與扼守烏牛湳橋的黃金島小隊發生激戰。戰鬥一開始，該小隊由於佔地利之便，曾重創國軍，造成重大傷亡。旋因火力遠不及國軍，作戰經驗也有所不足，乃漸處於劣勢，被國軍火網所包圍，不得已乃由黃金島率一名隊員突破國軍的火力封鎖線，奔回「二七部隊」本部求援。惟隊本部武德殿一片零亂，人心惶惶，僅有十餘人響應。同日晚上，「二七部隊」以武器彈藥無法補給，又兩面受敵，無法與他處部眾聯絡，難以繼續支撐下去，乃決定暫時化整為零，或往嘉義小梅參加陳篡地的游擊隊，或各自回家。深夜十一時，隊員各自埋藏武器後，即宣告解散。（頁二二一）
44. 十四日，（嘉義市）國軍進攻斗六，與「斗六鎮建安醫院院長」陳篡地殘部（斗六警備隊，不屬於二七部隊，見頁一Ｏ二）在斗六鎮上展開市街戰，陳氏因寡不敵眾，乃率領全體隊員逃往嘉義附近的小梅山中。 十六日，國軍四三六團第八連推進至小梅以東地區，與該殘部二百餘人發生激戰，結果擊斃十餘名，奪獲步槍二十枝、重機槍二挺，擲彈筒一具、山砲一門。過了兩日，四三六團第七連亦在小梅附近，與殘眾百餘人發生激戰，擊斃六十餘名，俘十二名（並奪獲一批軍火彈藥）。 十九日起，陳氏為作持久游擊戰，及陸續向山地撤退，並將所有武器彈藥及附近村民之糧食、牛車等悉數帶走。陳氏並號召各地響應者，潛藏深山，實施一年的作戰計話畫。二十日，二十一師以該殘部潛伏山地為慮，再派四三六團第八連進攻小梅附近，激戰數小時，終使其不支逃逸，（並奪獲一批軍火彈藥）。
 小梅、樟湖一帶，地勢險要，易守難攻。其後，國軍雖數度派兵進剿，擊斃不少殘眾，但始終無法澈底加以消滅。至五月十六日，魏道明就任台灣省主席，解除戒嚴，結束清鄉，警備總部亦將各綏靖區改為警備區時，陳篡地殘部仍在小梅、樟湖等地進行游擊戰。（頁二二一）
45. 基隆綏靖司令部…迨至二十一日，掃蕩任務已大致完成。據統計，自二月二十八日至三月十一日，計俘獲輕機槍六挺（全部待修）、步槍一三九枝（大部份待修），用去步槍彈三四、六四三發、輕機槍彈三九、八九七發、手槍彈五、一八三發、重機槍彈九、五九二發、手榴彈五四九個、戰防砲彈三五發。…從使用彈藥數量幾達十萬之譜，顯示基隆要塞司令部乃是以強大的火力強力掃蕩。因此，傷亡數恐非僅約百人，實有待進一步詳查。（頁二三七）
 基隆綏靖部似聽任各分區自行處理案犯，例如頭城媽祖廟前郭章垣七人被槍殺案、八堵車站案，以及羅東陳成岳、張雲昌、趙桐、基隆市楊元丁、金山許日生、許甲長、徐士明、簡德發、陳金埤、田文寬、施金榮等人被槍斃案，據受難家屬表示，均是當地駐軍自行處置的，未經執法人員偵訊審理，故事後一無案犯名冊或處理報告留下，委實難以取信於社會。當士兵沿街掃蕩時，走避不及者都立即被槍殺，或不由分說地被押進拘留所，但賄賂金錢或貴重物品後，即可獲釋。不少人遭刑求、凌虐後處死，台灣旅滬六團體綜合各方之報導和傳聞，聯合提出報告書，指出:「基隆軍隊用鐵絲穿過人民足踝，每三人或五人為一組，捆縛一起，單人則裝入麻袋，拋入海中。基隆海面最近猶有屍首浮出。」又:「基隆軍隊割去青年學生二十人之耳鼻及生殖器，然後用刺刀戳死。」不少受訪者在找尋親人屍體時亦目賭類似的慘狀。（頁二三七）
46. 據民國三十六年十一月間警備司令部之總結報告…被拘捕之人犯共一、八ＯＯ人。（頁二六一）
47. 警總民國三十六年四月三十日公布……自新者三、Ｏ二二人。（頁二六一）
48. 「二二八事件」是台灣史上最慘痛的人間悲劇。當時傷亡者可能數千甚至上萬，上自社會精英份子，下至升斗小民，蒙冤而死者，不知凡幾，因此造成受難家屬及民間對此事件的不能忘懷，此由人為因素造成的不幸事件，導至後來的台獨運動、左傾思想甚至省籍情結的產生，嚴重地影響到台灣社會的和諧，甚或未來的社會發展。（序二）
49. 「宜蘭省立醫院院長郭章垣遺言:『生離祖國，死歸祖國，死生天命，無想無念！』」（李筱峰著，《二二八消失的台灣菁英》，（頁一七Ｏ）

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五、傷亡與受害情況

第一，為官方認定有罪者。政府既認定「二二八大屠殺事件」是一叛國行為，不免將參加抗爭組織者與暴動者一同列入所謂「黑名單」（說明51），加以緝捕、處刑。然而，涉案的認定是否無誤，執行時是否無枉無縱，據調查研究顯示，委實存在不少弊端。首先，絕大部分參與者自認自始即無叛國意圖，僅以改革台灣政治為訴求，卻遭到以「意圖顛覆政府」的罪名處置，自難令其心服。其次，部分受害者係被秘密逮捕