Taiwan Politics Database
www.taiwan-database.net

Other texts and documents

Note: This page presents a collection of selected important texts and documents pertaining to the Taiwan Politics Database. Alternatively, the user can also refer to a PDF file that shows the contents of this page as well—557 pages in A5 format, file size: 8.46 MB (file includes the ROC Constitution); click here to open.
In addition, separate relevant PDF files in A4 format are available for free download as listed below:

  • Selected imported texts and documents. 175 pages, file size 4.2 MB; click here
  • The Hong Kong files—relevant treaties and laws. 157 pages, file size: 3.69 MB; click here
  • Inaugural addresses by ROC Presidents since 1996. 63 pages, file size: 2.5 MB; click here
  • Facts about the "1992 Consensus". 14 pages, file size: 1.6 MB; click here

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◆ Selected important texts and documents

Please note that the texts and documents shown in this page's chapter are listed in chronological order according to the respective publication date. Due to the sheer number of selected texts, this chapter has been subdivided into three time segments.

A full list of all texts and documents in this chapter can be seen below.

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What kind of "selected important texts and documents"?

In the field of international politics, the status of the ROC has long been highly controversial. Most countries in the world acknowledge the so-called "One China" principle (yige Zhongguo yuanze 一個中國原則), i. e. its interpretation by the PRC, according to which "there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is a part of that China". Today less than two dozen states, most of them with no international importance, maintain formal diplomatic relations with the ROC. The existence of the ROC is not only denied internationally but also domestically by pro-independence activists in Taiwan who claim that there was no legal foundation for Taiwan to be put under ROC control in 1945, making the now Taipei-based ROC government a "government-in-exile" (liuwang zhengfu 流亡政府). More details in this context can be found under the headline "Legal aspects of Taiwan in the ROC" of the section Taiwan Province on the page "Local administration".

Most of the texts and documents shown in this page were selected for their significance to the status of China and Taiwan/the PRC and the ROC. Others were picked for their significance in the dispute concerning the Diaoyutai Islands (Diaoyutai lieyu 釣魚台列嶼)—called "Senkaku Islands" (Jian'ge zhudao 尖閣諸島, Japanese pronunciation "Senkaku shotō") by Japan—in the East China Sea which are claimed by the ROC, the PRC, and Japan, or as reference to be used in the controversy about overlapping sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, e. g. the Spratly Islands (nansha qundao 南沙群島). A red star symbol ("★") indicates a text authored—or co-authored—by a PRC government agency or a CCP heavyweight.

All documents are presented in original full text, with two exceptions. Because the Treaty of Versailles and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are far too large to be included here (in fact, UNCLOS is even larger than all other texts in this chapter combined), only parts deemed relevant by the editor were selected—of the Treaty of Versailles which in the original has 440 articles in 15 parts, ten articles are shown, and one article out of the 320 articles in 17 parts of UNCLOS. A scissors symbol ("✄") indicates that most of the document's articles were left out.

As for important quotes like Bill Clinton's "Three No's", Lee Teng-hui's remarks about the "special state-to-state relationship" between the ROC and the PRC, and Colin Powell's statement on "one China" and Taiwan, only the paragraph with the actual wording is displayed here. Additional notes from the editor (i. e. this website's chief researcher) are marked as such and highlighted with a stop sign symbol ("🛑").

The following selected important texts and documents relevant to the status of Taiwan / the ROC are presented in this chapter.

Please note that the topic of Taiwan’s status under international law was the focus of a doctoral thesis written by German law expert Claudius Petzold: “Die völkerrechtliche Stellung Taiwans”, published in 2007 by Nomos Universitätsschriften – Recht, 226 pages (in German), ISBN 978-3-8329-2373-0. The text is available as eBook on the Nomos eLibrary.

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Selected important texts and documents (1895–1950)
Treaty / law / documentYear~ in Chinese
Treaty of Shimonoseki1895 馬關條約
Republic of Formosa—Declaration of Independence1895台灣民主國獨立宣言
Liaotung Convention1895中日遼南條約
Peace Agreement between the Great Powers and China1901辛丑條約
Treaty of Portsmouth1905樸資茅斯條約
Japan's "21 Demands" to China1915日本的《二十一條要求》
Treaty of Versailles ✄1919[No Chinese version]
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States1933[No Chinese version]
The ROC's Declaration of War Against Japan1941中華民國政府對日宣戰布告
Declaration by United Nations1942聯合國共同宣言
Cairo Declaration1942開羅宣言
Convention on International Civil Aviation1944[No Chinese version]
Agreements reached at the Yalta Conference1945[No Chinese version]
Agreement regarding Japan1945蘇聯參加對日作戰的協定
Berlin Declaration1945[No Chinese version]
Potsdam Agreement1945[No Chinese version]
Potsdam Declaration1945波茨坦公告
Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War (Jewel Voice Broadcast)1945終戰詔書
General Order No. 11945一般命令第一號
Japan's First Instrument of Surrender1945日本投降書
Act of Surrender1945降書
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction Note No. 6771946[No Chinese version]

(Jump to Documents 1950–1990)    (Jump to Documents 1990—)

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Treaty of Shimonoseki

Name in Chinese Maguan tiaoyue 馬關條約
Document type Bilateral peace treaty between Qing China and Japan
Year, date 1895, April 17
 Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note   [Next document] 

Treaty of Peace

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of China, desiring to restore the blessings of peace to their countries and subjects and to remove all cause for future complications, have named as their Plenipotentiaries for the purpose of concluding a Treaty of Peace, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan,
 Count ITO Hirobumi, Junii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Paullownia, Minister President of State; and
 Viscount MUTSU Munemitsu, Junii, First Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

And His Majesty the Emperor of China,
 LI Hung-chang, Senior Tutor to the Heir Apparent, Senior Grand Secretary of State, Minister Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports of China, Viceroy of the province of Chili, and Earl of the First Rank; and
 LI Ching-fong, Ex-Minister of the Diplomatic Service, of the Second Official Rank:

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good and proper form, have agreed to the following Articles:—

Article 1 China recognises definitively the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea, and, in consequence, the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China, in derogation of such independence and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the future.
Article 2 China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon:—
(a) The southern portion of the province of Fêngtien within the following boundaries:
The line of demarcation begins at the mouth of the River Yalu and ascends that stream to the mouth of the River An-ping, from thence the line runs to Fêng-huang, from thence to Hai-cheng, from thence to Ying-kow, forming a line which describes the southern portion of the territory. The places above named are included in the ceded territory. When the line reaches the River Liao at Ying-kow, it follows the course of the stream to its mouth, where it terminates. The mid-channel of the River Liao shall be taken as the line of demarcation.
This cession also includes all islands appertaining or belonging to the province of Fêngtien situated in the eastern portion of the Bay of Liao-tung and the northern portion of the Yellow Sea.
(b) The island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa.
(c) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude.
Article 3 The alignment of the frontiers described in the preceding Article, and shown on the annexed map, shall be subject to verification and demarcation on the spot by a Joint Commission of Delimitation, consisting of two or more Japanese and two or more Chinese delegates, to be appointed immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. In case the boundaries laid down in this Act are found to be defective at any point, either on account of topography or in consideration of good administration, it shall also be the duty of the Delimitation Commission to rectify the same.
The Delimitation Commission will enter upon its duties as soon as possible, and will bring its labours to a conclusion within the period of one year after appointment.
The alignments laid down in this Act shall, however, be maintained until the rectifications of the Delimitation Commission, if any are made, shall have received the approval of the Governments of Japan and China.
Article 4 China agrees to pay to Japan as a war indemnity the sum of 200,000,000 Kuping taels; the said sum to be paid in eight instalments. The first instalment of 50,000,000 taels to be paid within six months, and the second instalment of 50,000,000 to be paid within twelve months, after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. The remaining sum to be paid in six equal instalments as follows: the first of such equal annual instalments to be paid within two years, the second within three years, the third within four years, the fourth within five years, the fifth within six years, and the sixth within seven years, after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. Interest at the rate of 5 per centum per annum shall begin to run on all unpaid portions of the said indemnity from the date the first instalment falls due.
China shall, however, have the right to pay by anticipation at any time any or all of the said instalments. In case the whole amount of the said indemnity is paid within three years after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act all interest shall be waived, and the interest for two years and a half or for any less period, if any already paid, shall be included as part of the principal amount of the indemnity.
Article 5 The inhabitants of the territories ceded to Japan who wish to take up their residence outside the ceded districts shall be at liberty to sell their real property and retire. For this purpose a period of two years from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the present Act shall be granted. At the expiration of that period those of the inhabitants who shall not have left such territories shall, at the option of Japan, be deemed to be Japanese subjects.
Each of the two Governments shall, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act, send one or more Commissioners to Formosa to effect a final transfer of that province, and within the space of two months after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act such transfer shall be completed.
Article 6 All Treaties between Japan and China having come to an end as a consequence of war, China engages, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act, to appoint Plenipotentiaries to conclude with the Japanese Plenipotentiaries, a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and a Convention to regulate Frontier Intercourse and Trade. The Treaties, Conventions, and Regulations now subsisting between China and the European Powers shall serve as a basis for the said Treaty and Convention between Japan and China. From the date of the exchange of ratifications of this Act until the said Treaty and Convention are brought into actual operation, the Japanese governments, its officials, commerce, navigation, frontier intercourse and trade, industries, ships, and subjects, shall in every respect be accorded by China most favoured nation treatment.
China makes, in addition, the following concessions, to take effect six months after the date of the present Act:—
First.—The following cities, towns, and ports, in addition to those already opened, shall be opened to the trade, residence, industries, and manufactures of Japanese subjects, under the same conditions and with the same privileges and facilities as exist at the present open cities, towns, and ports of China:
●　Shashih, in the province of Hupeh.
●　Chungking, in the province of Szechwan.
●　Suchow, in the province of Kiangsu.
●　Hangchow, in the province of Chekiang.
The Japanese Government shall have the right to station consuls at any or all of the above named places.
Second.—Steam navigation for vessels under the Japanese flag, for the conveyance of passengers and cargo, shall be extended to the following places:
●　On the Upper Yangtze River, from Ichang to Chungking.
●　On the Woosung River and the Canal, from Shanghai to Suchow and Hangchow.
The rules and regulations that now govern the navigation of the inland waters of China by Foreign vessels shall, so far as applicable, be enforced, in respect to the above named routes, until new rules and regulations are conjointly agreed to.
Third.—Japanese subjects purchasing goods or produce in the interior of China, or transporting imported merchandise into the interior of China, shall have the right temporarily to rent or hire warehouses for the storage of the articles so purchased or transported without the payment of any taxes or extractions whatever.
Fourth.—Japanese subjects shall be free to engage in all kinds of manufacturing industries in all the open cities, towns, and ports of China, and shall be at liberty to import into China all kinds of machinery, paying only the stipulated import duties thereon.
All articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in China shall, in respect of inland transit and internal taxes, duties, charges, and exactions of all kinds, and also in respect of warehousing and storage facilities in the interior of China, stand upon the same footing and enjoy the same privileges and exemptions as merchandise imported by Japanese subjects into China.
In the event additional rules and regulations are necessary in connexion with these concessions, they shall be embodied in the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation provided for by this Article.
Article 7 Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding Article, the evacuation of China by the armies of Japan shall be completely effected within three months after the exchange of the ratificatioins of the present Act.
Article 8 As a guarantee of the faithful performance of the stipulations of this Act, China consents to the temporary occupation by the military forces of Japan of Weihaiwei, in the province of Shantung.
Upon payment of the first two instalments of the war indemnity herein stipulated for and the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce and navigation, the said place shall be evacuated by the Japanese forces, provided the Chinese Government consents to pledge, under suitable and sufficient arrangements, the Customs revenue of China as security for the payment of the principal and interest of the remaining instalments of the said indemnity. In the event that no such arrangements are concluded, such evacuation shall only take place upon the payment of the final instalment of said indemnity.
It is, however, expressly understood that no such evacuation shall take place until after the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.
Article 9 Immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act, all prisoners of war then held shall be restored, and China undertakes not to ill-treat or punish prisoners of war so restored to her by Japan. China also engages to at once release all Japanese subjects accused of being military spies or charged with any other military offences. China further engages not to punish in any manner, nor to allow to be punished, those Chinese subjects who have in any manner been compromised in their relations with the Japanese army during the war.
Article 10 All offensive military operations shall cease upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act.
Article 11 The present Act shall be ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of China, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Chefoo on the 8th day of the 5th month of the 28th year of MEIJI, corresponding to the 14th day of the 4th month of the 21st year of KUANG HSÜ.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same and affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

DONE in Shimonoseki, in duplicate, this 17th day of the fourth month of the 28th year of MEIJI, corresponding to the 23rd day of the 3rd month of the 21st year of KUANG HSÜ.

Count Ito Hirobumi (Junii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Paullownia; Minister President of State; Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan)

Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu (Junii, First Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure; Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan)

Li Hung-chang (Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China; Senior Tutor to the Heir Apparent; Senior Grand Secretary of State; Minister Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports of China; Viceroy of the province of Chili; Earl of the First Rank)

Li Ching-fong (Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China; Ex-Minister of the Diplomatic Service, of the Second Official Rank)

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馬關條約

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———

大清帝國大皇帝陛下及大日本帝國大皇帝陛下為訂立和約，俾兩國及其臣民重修和平，共用幸福，且杜絕將來紛紜之端， 大清帝國大皇帝陛下特簡大清帝國欽差頭等全權大臣太子太傅文華殿大學士北洋通商大臣直隸總督一等肅毅伯爵李鴻章、 大清帝國欽差全權大臣二品頂戴前出使大臣李經方、大日本帝國大皇帝陛下特簡大日本帝國全權辦理大臣內閣總理大臣從二位勳一等伯爵伊藤博文、 大日本帝國全權辦理大臣外務大臣從二位勳一等子爵陸奧宗光為全權大臣，彼此校閱所奉諭旨，認明均屬妥實無闕。會同議定各條款，開列於左：

第一款 中國認明朝鮮國確為完全無缺之獨立自主國，故凡有虧損其獨立自主體制，即如該國向中國所修貢獻典禮等，嗣後全行廢決。
第二款 中國將管理下開地方之權，並將該地方所有堡壘軍器工廠及一切屬公對象，永遠讓與日本。
一、 下開劃界以內之奉天省南邊地方以鴨綠江溯該江以抵安平河口，又以該河口劃至鳳凰城、海城、及營口而止，劃成折線以南地方。所有前開各城市，皆包括在劃界線內。該線抵營口之遼河後，及順流至海口止，彼此以河中心為界。遼東灣南岸及黃海北岸，在奉天所屬諸島亦一併在所讓界內。
二、 臺灣全島及所有附屬各島嶼。
三、 澎湖列島，即英國格林尼次東經百十九度起至百二十度止，及北緯三十三度起至二十四度之間諸島嶼。
第三款 前款所載及黏附本國之地圖所劃疆界，俟本約批准互換之後，兩國應各 選派官員二名以上，為公同劃定疆界委員，就地踏勘，確定劃界。若遇本國 所約疆界於地形或地理所關有礙難不便等情，各該委員等當妥為參酌更改。各該委員等當從速辦理界務，以期奉委之後限一年竣事，但遇各該委員等有 所更定劃界，兩國政府未經認準以前，應據本約所定劃界為正。
第四款 中國約將庫平銀二萬萬兩交與日本，作為賠償軍費。該款分作八次交完。 第一次五千萬兩，應在本約批准互換六個月內交清。第二次五千萬兩，應在本約批准互換後十二個月內交清。款平分六次，遞年交納，其法列下：第一次平分遞年之款，於兩年內交清。第二次於三年內交清，第三次於四年內交清，第四次於五年內交清，第五次於六年內交清，第六次於七年內交清。其年分均以本約批准互換之後起算。又第一次賠款交清後，未經交完之款，應按年加每百抽五之息，但無論何時應賠之款或全數或幾分，先期交清，均聽中國之便。如從條約批准互換之日起三年之內能全數還清，除將已付息金或兩年半或不及兩年半於應付本銀扣還外，仍全數免息。
第五款 本約批准互換之後，限兩年之內，日本準中國讓與地方人民願遷居讓與地方之外者，任便變賣所有產業退去界外，但限滿之後尚未遷徙者，酌宜視為日本臣民。又臺灣一省應於本約批准互換後，兩國立即各派大臣至臺灣，限於本約批准後兩個月交接清楚。
第六款 中日兩國所有約章，因此次失和，自屬廢決。中國約俟本約批准之後速派全權大臣與日本所派全權大臣，會同訂立通商行船條約，及陸路通商章程。兩國新訂約章，應以中國與泰西交國見行約章為本。又本國批准互換之日起，新訂約章未經實行之前，所有日本官吏臣民及商業工藝行船船隻陸路通商等，與中國最為優待之國禮護視，一律無異。
中國約將下開讓與各款，以兩國全權大臣押蓋印日起，六個月後方可照辦。
第一、見今中國已開通商口岸之外，應準添設下開各處，立為通商口岸以便日本臣民往來僑寓，從事商業工藝製作。所有添設口岸，均照向開通商 海口或向開內地鎮市章程一體辦理， 應得優例及利益等，亦當一律享受。
 （一）湖北省荊州府沙市。
 （二）四川省重慶府。
 （三）江蘇省蘇州府。
 （四）浙江省杭州府。日本政府得派遣領事官於前開各口駐紮。
第二、日本輪船得駛入下開各口，附搭行客裝運貨物：
 （一）從湖北省宜昌溯長江以至四川省重慶府。
 （二）從上海駛進吳淞江及運河以至蘇州府杭州府。中日兩國未經商定行船章程以前，上開各口行船務依外國船隻駛入 中國內地水路見行章程照行。
第三、日本臣民在中國內地購買工貨件，若自生之物，或將進口商貨運往內地之物，欲暫行存棧，除勿庸攳鈔派徵一切旅費外，得暫租棧房存貨。
第四、日本臣民得在中國通商口岸城邑任便從事各項工藝製造，又得將各項機器任便裝運進口，只交所定進口稅。日本臣民在中國製造一切貨物，其於內地運送稅，內地稅鈔課什派，以及中國內地沾及寄存棧房之益即照日臣民運入中國之貨物一體辦理，至應優例豁除，亦莫不相同。
嗣後如有因以上加讓之事應增章程規條，即載入本款所稱之行船通商條約內。
第七款 日本軍隊見駐中國境內者，應於本約批准互換之後三個月內撤回，但須照次款所定辦理。
第八款 中國為保證認真實行約內所訂各款，聽允日本軍隊暫佔守山東省威海衛。又於中國將本約所定第一、第二兩次賠款交清，通商行船亦經批准互換之後，中國政府與日本政府確定周全妥善辦法，將通商口岸關稅作為剩款並息之抵押，日本可允撤回軍隊。倘中國不即確定抵押辦法則未經交清末次賠款之前，日本仍不撤回軍隊。
第九款 本約批准互換之後，兩國應將是時所有俘虜盡數交還。中國約將由日本遣還俘虜，並不加以虐待若或置於罪戾。中國約將認為軍事間諜或被嫌逮係之日本臣民，即行釋放，並約此次交仗之所有關涉日本軍隊之中國臣民，概予寬貸，並飭有司不得擅為逮係。
第十款 本約批准互換日起，應按兵息戰。
第十一款 自本約奉大清國大皇帝陛下及日本帝國大皇帝陛下批准之後，定於光緒二十一年四月十四日，即日本明治二十八年五月初八日，在煙臺互換。

為此兩國全權大臣署名蓋印，以昭信守。

大清帝國欽差頭等全權大臣太子太傅文華殿大學士北洋通商大臣直隸總督一等肅毅伯爵 李鴻章（押印）
大清帝國欽差全權大臣二品頂戴前出使大臣 李經芳（押印）

大日本帝國全權辦理大臣內閣總理大臣從二位一等伯爵 伊藤 博文（押印）
大日本帝國全權辦理大臣外務大臣從二位勳一等子爵 陸奧 宗光（押印）

光緒二十一年三月二十三日訂於下之關繕寫兩分。
明治二十八年四月十七日

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Treaty of Shimonoseki (Maguan tiaoyue 馬關條約; title in Japanese: Shimonoseki Jōyaku 下関条約) was signed at Shimonoseki (下關) on April 17, 1895 and entered into force on May 8, 1895 by the exchange of the instruments of ratification at Chefoo (芝罘).

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Republic of Formosa—Declaration of Independence

Name in Chinese Taiwan minzhuguo duli xuanyan 台灣民主國獨立宣言
Document type Political statement by Taiwanese gentry
Year, date 1895, May 25
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

The Japanese have affronted China by annexing our territory of Formosa, and the supplications of us, the People of Formosa, at the portals of the Throne have been made in vain. We now learn that the Japanese slaves are about to arrive.

If we suffer this, the land of our hearths and homes will become the land of savages and barbarians, but if we do not suffer it, our condition of comparative weakness will certainly not endure long. Frequent conferences have been held with the Foreign Powers, who all aver that the People of Formosa must establish their independence before the Powers will assist them.

Now, therefore, we, the People of Formosa, are irrevocably resolved to die before we will serve the enemy. And we have in Council determined to convert the whole island of Formosa into a Republican state, and that the administration of all our State affairs shall be organized and carried on by the deliberations and decisions of Officers publicly elected by us the People.

But as in this new enterprise there is needed, as well for the resistance of Japanese aggression as for the organization of the new administration, a man to have chief control, in whom authority shall centre, and by whom the peace of our homesteads shall be assured—therefore, in view of the respect and admiration in which we have long held the Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Tang Ching Sung, we have in Council determined to raise him to the position of President of the Republic.

An official seal has been cut, and on the second day of fifth moon, at the ssu hour [9 a.m. 25 May], it will be publicly presented with all respect by the notables and people of the whole of Formosa. At early dawn on that day, all of us, notables and people, farmers and merchants, artizans and tradesmen, must assemble at the Tuan Fang Meeting House, that we may in grave and solemn manner inaugurate this undertaking.

Let there be neither delay nor mistake.
A Declaration of the whole of Formosa.
[Seal in red as follows] An announcement by the whole of Formosa

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《台灣民主國獨立宣言》

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

照得日本欺淩中國，索臺灣一島，台民兩次電奏，勢難挽回。知倭奴不日即將攻入。

吾等如甘受，則吾土吾鄉歸夷狄所有。如不甘受，防備不足故，斷難長期持續。屢與列強折衝，無人肯援，台民惟有自主。

台民願人人戰死而失台，決不願拱手而讓台。台民公議自立為民主之國。決定國務由公民公選官吏營運。

為達計畫且抵抗倭奴侵略。新政府機構中樞必須有人主持，確保鄉里和平。素敬仰巡撫承宣布政使唐景崧，會議決定推舉為臺灣民主國大總統。

初二日公同刊刻印信，全臺灣紳民上呈。當日拂曉，士農工商公集籌防局，開始嚴肅此壯舉。

乞勿遲誤
以全台之民佈告之。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

In Japanese, the Republic of Formosa (Taiwan minzhuguo 臺灣民主國) is called Taiwan minshu koku (台湾民主国), and its Declaration of Independence (Taiwan minzhuguo duli xuanyan 臺灣民主國獨立宣言) is called Taiwan minshu koku dokuritsu sengen (台湾民主国独立宣言).
 More information about the short-lived "Republic of Formosa" can be found on the page "Introduction Taiwan / ROC", please click here.

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Liaotung Convention

Name in Chinese Zhong Ri Liaonan tiaoyue 中日遼南條約
Document type Bilateral treaty between Qing China and Japan
Year, date 1895, Nov. 8
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His Majesty the Emperor of China and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, desiring to conclude a Convention for the retrocession by Japan of all of the southern portion of the province of Fêngtien to the sovereignty of China, have for that purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of China, LI HUNG-CHANG, Minister Plenipotentiary, Senior Tutor of the Heir Apparent, Senior Grand Secretary of State and Earl of the First Rank, and
 His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Baron HAYASHI TADASU, Shoshii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Grand Officer of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary,
 who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, which were found to be in good and proper form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

Article 1 Japan retrocedes to China in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern portion of the province of Fêngtien, which was ceded to Japan under Article 2 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki on the 23rd day of the 3rd month of the 21st year of KUANG HSÜ, corresponding to the 17th day of the 4th month of the 28th year of MEIJI, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon at the time the retroceded territory is completely evacuated by the Japanese forces in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of this Convention, that is to say, the southern portion of the province of Fêngtien from the mouth of the River Yalu to the mouth of the River An-ping, thence to Feng-huang-ch'ên, thence to Hai-ch'êng and thence to Ying-kow; also all cities and towns to the south of this boundary and ail islands appertaining or belonging to the province of Fêngtien situated in the eastern portion of the Bay of Liaotung and in the northern part of the Yellow Sea. Article 3 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki is in consequence suppressed, as are also the provisions in the same Treaty with reference to the conclusion of a Convention to regulate frontier intercourse and trade.
Article 2 As compensation for the southern portion of the province of Fêngtien, the Chinese Government engage to pay to the Japanese Government 30,000,000 Kuping taels on or before the 30th day of the 9th month of the 21st year of KUANG HSÜ, corresponding to the 16th day of the 11th month of the 28th year of MEIJI.
Article 3 Within three months from the day on which China shall have paid to Japan the compensatory indemnity of 30,000,000 Kuping taels provided for in Article 2 of this Convention, the retroceded territory shall be completely evacuated by the Japanese forces.
Article 4 China engages not to punish in any manner, nor to allow to be punished, those Chinese subjects who have in any manner been compromised in connection with the occupation by the Japanese forces of.the retroceded territory.
Article 5 The present Convention is signed in duplicate in the Chinese, Japanese, and English languages. All these texts have the same meaning and intention, but in case of any differences of interpretation between the Chinese and Japanese texts, such differences shall be decided by reference to the English text.
Article 6 The present Convention shall be ratified by His Majesty the Emperor of China and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Peking within 21 days from the present date.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same and affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

DONE in Peking this 22nd day of the 9th month of the 21st year of KUANG HSÜ, corresponding to the 8th day of the 11th month of the 28th year of MEIJI.

LI HUNG-CHANG, [L.S.]———Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China
Senior Tutor to the Heir Apparent
Senior Grand Secretary of State
Earl of the First Rank

Baron HAYASHI TADASU, [L.S.]———Shoshii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure
Grand Officer of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun
Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan

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《中日遼南條約》

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

大清國大皇帝陛下、大日本國大皇帝陛下欲締結條約，由日本國交還奉天省南邊地方，一切仍歸中國管理。大清國大皇帝陛下持簡欽差全權大臣太子太傅文華殿大學士一等肅毅伯爵李鴻章；

大日本國大皇帝陛下特簡欽差駐紮北京全權大臣正四位勳一等男爵林董；

均作為全權大臣，互示所奉文憑妥當，議定各條開列于左：

第一款日本國將光緒二十一年三月二十三日，即明治二十八年四月十七日，訂立下之關條約第二款中國讓與日本國管理之奉天省南邊地方，即從鴨綠江口抵安平河口至鳳凰城、海城及營口而止，以南各城市邑以及遼東灣東岸、黃海北岸奉天所屬諸島嶼，並照本約第三款所定，日本國軍隊一律撤回之時，該地方內所有堡壘、軍器工廠及一切所屬公物件，永遠交還中國。因此下之關條約第三款，並擬訂立陸路通商章程之事，作為罷論。
第二款中國約，為酬報交還奉天省南邊地方，將庫平銀三千萬兩，迨于光緒二十一年九月二十日，即明治二十八年十-月十六日，交與日本國政府。
第三款中國將本約第二款所定之酬款庫平銀三千萬兩交與日本國政府，自是日起，五個月以內，日本國軍隊從該交還地方-律撤回。
第四款中國約，日本國軍隊佔踞之間，所有關涉該國軍隊之中國臣民概予寬貸，並飭有司不得擱為逮係。
第五款本約繕寫漢文、日本文及英文各二份，校對無偽，署名蓋印，漢文與日本文遇有解譯字義不同之處，以英文為憑。
第六款本約欽奉大清國大皇帝陛下，大日本國大皇帝陛下批准，自署名蓋印之日起二十一日內，在北京互換。

為此兩國全權大臣署名蓋印，以昭信守。

大清帝國欽差全權大臣太子太傅文華殿大學土。一等肅毅伯爵 李鴻章
大日本帝國欽差駐紮北京全權大臣正四位勳一等男爵 林董

光緒二十一年九月二十二日
明治二十八年十一月初八日
訂於北京

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Liaotung Convention (Liaodong tiaoyue 遼東條約 or Liaodong xieyi 遼東協議) was signed in Beijing on Nov. 8, 1895 and is also known under the following names: Fengtian Peninsula Return Treaty (Fengtian bandao huanfu tiaoyue 奉天半島還付條約), Sino-Japanese Liao-south Treaty (Zhong Ri Liaonan tiaoyue 中日遼南條約), or Treaty of Peking (Beijing tiaoyue 北京條約); in Japanese: Treaty Concerning Fengtien Peninsula Return (Hōten hantō kanpu ni kansuru jōyaku 奉天半島還付に関する条約).

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Peace Agreement between the Great Powers and China

Name in Chinese xinchou tiaoyue 辛丑條約
Document type Multilateral agreement forced on the Qing
Year, date 1901, Sept. 7
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

Boxer Protocol, signed in Peking on Sept. 7, 1901

The Plenipotentiaries
—of Germany, M. Alfons Mumm (Freiherr von Schwarzenstein);
—of Austria-Hungary, Baron Moritz Czikann von Wahlborn;
—of Belgium, Maurice Joostens;
—of Spain, M. Bernardo J. de Cólogan;
—of the United States, Mr. William W. Rockhill;
—of France, M. Paul Beau;
—of Great Britain, Sir Ernest Satow;
—of Italy, Marquis Salvago Raggi;
—of Japan, M. Jutaro Komura 小村 壽太郎;
—of the Netherlands, M. Fridolin Marinus Knobel;
—of Russia, M. Michael de Giers;
and the Plenipotentiaries of China,
 His Highness Yi-K'uang 奕劻, Prince of the First Rank; Ch'ing, President of the Board of Foreign Affairs; and
 His Excellency Li Hung-chang 李鴻章, Count of the First Rank; Su-Yi, Tutor of the Heir Apparent; Grand Secretary of the Wen-Hua Throne Hall, Minister of Commerce, Superintendent of Trade for the North, Governor-General of Chihli,
 have met for the purpose of declaring that China has complied with the conditions laid down in the note of the 22nd December, 1900, and which were accepted in their entirety by His Majesty the Emperor of China in a Decree dated the 27th December, 1900.

Article 1 1) By an Imperial Edict of the 9th June last, Tsai-Feng, Prince of the First Rank, Chün, was appointed Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of China, and directed in that capacity to convey to His Majesty the German Emperor the expression of the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China and of the Chinese Government at the assassination of his Excellency the late Baron von Ketteler, German Minister.
 Prince Chün left Peking on the 12th July last to carry out the orders which had been given him.
2) The Chinese Government has stated that it will erect on the spot of the assassination of his Excellency the late Baron von Ketteler, commemorative monument worthy of the rank of the deceased, and bearing an inscription in the Latin, German, and Chinese languages which shall express the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China for the murder committed.
 The Chinese Plenipotentiaries have informed his Excellency the German Plenipotentiary, in a letter dated the 22nd July last, that an arch of the whole width of the street would be erected on the said spot, and that work on it was begun on the 25th June last.
Article 2 1) Imperial Edicts of the 13th and 21st February, 1901, inflicted the following punishments on the principal authors of the attempts and of the crimes committed against the foreign Governments and their nationals:—
 Tsa-Ii, Prince Tuan, and Tsai-Lan, Duke Fu-kuo, were sentenced to be brought before the Autumnal Court of Assize for execution, and it was agreed that if the Emperor saw fit to grant them their lives, they should be exiled to Turkestan, and there imprisoned for life, without the possibility of commutation of these punishments.
 Tsai Hsün, Prince Chuang, Ying-Nien, President of the Court of Censors, and Chao Shu-chiao, President of the Board of Punishments, were condemned to commit suicide.
 Yü Hsien, Governor of Shansi, Chi Hsiu, President of the Board of Rites, and Hsü Cheng-yu, formerly Senior Vice-President of the Board of Punishments, were condemned to death.
 Posthumous degradation was inflicted on Kang Yi, Assistant Grand Secretary, President of the Board of Works, Hsü Tung, Grand Secretary, and Li Ping-heng, former Governor-General of Szu-chuan.
 Imperial Edict of the 13th February last rehabilitated the memories of Hsu Yung-yi, President of the Board of War; Li Shan, President of the Board of Works; Hsu Ching Cheng, Senior Vice-President of the Board of Civil Office; Lien Yuan, Vice-Chancellor of the Grand Council; and Yuan Chang, Vice-President of the Court of Sacrifices, who had been put to death for having protested against the outrageous breaches of international law of last year.
 Prince Chuang committed suicide on the 21st February last; Ying Nien and Chao Shu-chiao on the 24th February; Yu Hsien was executed on the 22nd February; Chi Hsiu and Hsü Cheng-yu on the 26th February; Tung Fu-hsiang, General in Kan-su, has been deprived of his office by Imperial Edict of the 13th February last, pending the determination of the final punishment to be inflicted on him.
 Imperial Edicts, dated the 29th April and 19th August, 1901, have inflicted various punishments on the provincial officials convicted of the crimes and outrages of last summer.
2) An Imperial Edict, promulgated the 19th August, 1901, ordered the suspension of official examinations for five years in all cities where foreigners were massacred or submitted to cruel treatment.
Article 3 So as to make honourable reparation for the assassination of Mr. Sugiyama, Chancellor of the Japanese Legation, His Majesty the Emperor of China, by an Imperial Edict of the 18th June, 1901, appointed Na T'ung, Vice-President of the Board of Finances, to be his Envoy Extraordinary, and specially directed him to convey to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan the expression of the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China and of his Government at the assassination of Mr. Sugiyama.
Article 4 The Chinese Government has agreed to erect an expiatory monument in each of the foreign or international cemeteries which were desecrated, and in which the tombs were destroyed.
 It has been agreed with the Representatives of the Powers that the Legations interested shall settle the details for the erection of these monuments, China bearing all the expenses thereof, estimated at 10,000 taels, for the cemeteries at Peking and in its neighbourhood, and at 5,000 taels for the cemeteries in the provinces. The amounts have been paid, and the list of these cemeteries is inclosed herewith.
Article 5 China has agreed to prohibit the importation into its territory of arms and ammunition, as well as of materials exclusively used for the manufacture of arms and ammunition.
 An Imperial Edict has been issued on the 25th August, forbidding said importation for a term of two years. New Edicts may be issued subsequently extending this by other successive terms of two years in case of necessity recognized by the Powers.
Article 6 By an Imperial Edict dated the 29th May, 1901, His Majesty the Emperor of China agreed to pay the Powers an indemnity of 450,000,000 of Haikwan taels.
 This sum represents the total amount of the indemnities for States, Companies, or Societies, private individuals and Chinese, referred to in Article 6 of the note of the 22nd December, 1900.
1) These 450,000,000 constitute a gold debt calculated at the rate of the Haikwan tael to the gold currency of each country, as indicated below:—
   Haikwan tael =  Marks 3.055
Austro-Hungary crown 3.595
Gold dollar 0.743
Francs 3.740
£ sterling 3s.
Yen 1.407
Netherlands florin 1.796
Gold rouble (17.434 dolias fine) 1.412 
 This sum in gold shall shall bear interest at 4 per cent. per annum, and the capital shall be reimbursed by China in thirty-nine years in the manner indicated in the annexed plan of amortization. Capital and interest shall be payable in gold or at the rates of exchange corresponding to the dates at which the different payments fall due.
 The amortization shall commence the 1st January, 1902, and shall finish at the end of the year 1940. The amortizations are payable annually, the first payment being fixed on the 1st January, 1903.
 Interest shall run from the 1st July, 1901, but the Chinese Government shall have the right to pay off within a term of three years, beginning January 1902, the arrears of the first six months ending the 31st December, 1901, on condition, however, that it pays compound interest at the rate of 4 per cent. a year on the sums the payment of which shall have been thus deferred.
 Interest shall be payable semi-annually, the first payment being fixed on the 1st July, 1902.
2) The service of the debt shall take place in Shanghai in the following manner:—
 Each Power shall be represented by a Delegate on a Commission of bankers authorized to receive the amount of interest and amortization which shall be paid to it by the Chinese authorities designated for that purpose, to divide it among the interested parties, and to give a receipt for the same.
3) The Chinese Government shall deliver to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps at Peking a bond for the lump sum, which shall subsequently be converted into fractional bonds bearing the signature of the Delegates of the Chinese Government designated for that purpose. This operation and all those relating to issuing of the bonds shall be performed by the above-mentioned Commission, in accordance with the instructions which the Powers shall send their Delegates.
4) The proceeds of the revenues assigned to the payment of the bonds shall be paid monthly to the Commission.
5) The revenues assigned as security for the bonds are the following:—
  a) The balance of the revenues of the Imperial Maritime Customs, after payment of the interest and amortization of preceding loans secured on these revenues, plus the proceeds of the raising to 5 per cent. effective of the present tariff of maritime imports, including articles until now on the free list, but exempting rice, foreign cereals, and flour, gold and silver bullion and coin.
 b) The revenues of the native Customs, administered in the open ports by the Imperial Maritime Customs.
 c) The total revenues of the salt gabelle, exclusive of the fraction previously set aside for other foreign loans.
6) The raising of the present tariff on imports to 5 per cent. effective is agreed to on the conditions mentioned below. It shall be put in force two months after the signing of the present Protocol, and no exceptions shall be made except for merchandize in transit not more than ten days after the said signing.
  a) All duties levied on imports ad valorem shall be converted as far as possible and as soon as may be into specific duties.
 This conversion shall be made in the following manner:—
 The average value of merchandize at the time of their landing during the three years 1897, 1898, and 1899, that is to say, the market price less the amount of import duties and incidental expenses, shall be taken as the basis for the valuation of merchandize.
 Pending the result of the work of conversion, duties shall be levied ad valorem.
 b) The beds of the Rivers Whangpoo and Peiho shall be improved with the financial participation of China.
Article 7 The Chinese Government has agreed that the quarter occupied by the Legations shall be considered as one specially reserved for their use and placed under their exclusive control, in which Chinese shall not have the right to reside, and which may be made defensible.
 The limits of this quarter have been fixed as follows on the annexed plan.
 ● On the east, Ketteler Street (10, 11, 12).
 ● On the north, the line, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
 ● On the west, the line 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
 ● On the south, the line 12—1, drawn along the exterior base of the tartar wall, and following the line of the bastions.
 In the Protocol annexed to the letter of the 16th January, 1901, China recognized the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the said quarter for the defence of its Legation.
Article 8 The Chinese Government has consented to raze the forts of Taku, and those which might impede free communication between Peking and the sea. Steps have been taken for carrying this out.
Article 9 The Chinese Government conceded the right to the Powers in the Protocol annexed to the letter of the 16th January, 1901, to occupy certain points, to be determined by an Agreement between them for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea. The points occupied by the Powers are:—
 Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tien-tsin, Chun-liang-Cheng, Tong-ku, Lu-tai, Tong-shan, Lan-chou, Chang-li, Chin-wang Tao, Shan-hai Kuan.
Article 10 The Chinese Government has agreed to post and to have published during two years in all district cities the following Imperial Edicts:—
1) Edict of the ist February, 1901, prohibiting for ever under pain of death, membership in any anti-foreign society.
2) Edicts of the 13th and 21st February, 29th April and 19th August, 1901, enumerating the punishments inflicted on the guilty.
3) Edict of the 19th August, 1901, prohibiting examinations in all cities where foreigners were massacred or subjected to cruel treatment.
4) Edicts of the ist February, 1901, declaring all Governors-General, Governors, and provincial or local officials responsible for order in their respective districts, and that in case of new anti-foreign troubles or other infractions of the Treaties which shall not be immediately repressed and the authors of which shall not have been punished, these officials shall be immediately dismissed without possibility of being given new functions or new honours.
 The posting of these Edicts is being carried on throughout the Empire.
Article 11 The Chinese Government has agreed to negotiate the amendments deemed necessary by the foreign Governments to the Treaties of Commerce and Navigation and the other subjects concerning commercial relations with the object of facilitating them.
 At present, and as a result of the stipulation contained in Article 6 concerning the indemnity, the Chinese Government agrees to assist in the improvement of the courses of the Rivers Peiho and Whang-poo, as stated below.—
1) The works for the improvement of the navigability of the Peiho, begun in 1898 with the co-operation of the Chinese Government, have been resumed under the direction of an International Commission. As soon as the Administration of Tien-tsin shall have been handed back to the Chinese Government it will be in a position to be represented on this Commission, and will pay each year a sum of 60,000 Haikwan taels for maintaining the works.
2) A Conservancy Board, charged with the management and control of the works for straightening the Whangpoo and the improvement of the course of that river, is hereby created.
 The Board shall consist of members representing the interests of the Chinese Government and those of foreigners in the shipping trade of Shanghai.
 The expenses incurred for the works and the general management of the undertaking are estimated at the annual sum of 460,000 Haikwan taels for the first twenty years. This sum shall be supplied in equal portions by the Chinese Government and the foreign interests concerned.
Article 12 An Imperial Edict of the 24th July, 1901, reformed the Office of Foreign Affairs, Tsung-li Yamen, on the lines indicated by the Powers, that is to say, transformed it into a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wai Wu Pu, which takes precedence over the six other Ministries of State; the same Edict appointed the principal Members of this Ministry.
 An agreement has also been reached concerning the modification of Court ceremonial as regards the reception of foreign Representatives, and has been the subject of several notes from the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, the substance of which is embodied in a Memorandum herewith annexed.
 Finally, it is expressly understood that as regards the declarations specified above and the annexed documents originating with the foreign Plenipotentiaries, the French text only is authoritative.
 The Chinese Government having thus complied to the satisfaction of the Powers with the conditions laid down in the above-mentioned note of the 22nd December, 1900, the Powers have agreed to accede to the wish of China to terminate the situation created by the disorders of the summer of 1900. In consequence thereof, the foreign Plenipotentiaries are authorized to declare in the names of their Governments that, with the exception of the Legation guards mentioned in Article VII, the international troops will completely evacuate the city of Peking on the 17th September, 1901, and, with the exception of the localities mentioned in Article IX, will withdraw from the Province of Chihli on the 22nd September, 1901.

The present final Protocol has been drawn up in twelve identical copies, and signed by all the Plenipotentiaries of the contracting countries. One copy shall be given to each of the foreign Plenipotentiaries, and one copy shall be given to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries.

(Signed) A. VON MUMMB. J. DE CÓLOGAN ERNEST SATOW 
F. M. KNOBELM. CZIKANNW. W. ROCKHILL
SALVAGO RAGGI M. DE GIERSM. JOOSTENS
P. BEAUJUTARO KOMURA [小村 壽太郎]
(Signed)YI K'UANG [奕劻]LI HUNG-CHANG [李鴻章]

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辛丑條約

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

一九○一年九月七日，光緒二十七年七月二十五日，北京。

大清欽命全權大臣便宜行事總理外務部事務和碩慶親王；
大清欽差全權大臣便宜行事太子太傅文華殿大學士北洋大臣直隸總督部堂一等肅毅伯 李鴻章；

大德欽差駐扎中華便宜行事大臣 穆默；
大奧欽差駐扎中華便宜行事全權大臣 齊乾
大比欽差駐扎中華便宜行事全權大臣 姚士登；
大日欽差駐扎中華全權大臣 葛絡乾；
大美國欽差特辦議和事宜全權大臣 柔克義；
大法欽差全權大臣駐扎中國京都總理本國事務便宜行事 鮑渥；
大英欽差便宜行事全權大臣 薩道義；
大義欽差駐扎中華大臣世襲侯爵 薩爾瓦葛；
大日本國欽差全權大臣 小村 壽太郎；
大和欽差駐扎中華便宜行事全權大臣 克羅伯；
大俄欽命全權大臣 內廷大夫 格爾思；

今日會同聲明，核定大清國按西曆一千九百年十二月二十二日，即中曆光緒二十六年十一月初一日文內各款，當經大清國大皇帝于西曆一千九百年十二月二十七日，即中曆光緒二十六年十一月初六日，降旨全行照允，足適諸國之意妥辦（附件一）。

第一款 （一） 大德國欽差男爵克大臣被戕害一事，前於西曆本年六月初九日，即中曆四月二十三日奉諭旨附件二，欽派醇親王載澧為頭等專使大臣，赴大德國大皇帝前，代表大清國大皇帝暨國家惋惜之意。醇親王已遵旨於西曆本年七月十二日，即中曆五月二十七日自北京起程。
（二） 大清國國家業已聲明，在遇害處所豎立銘志之碑，與克大臣品位相配，列敘大清國大皇帝惋惜凶事之旨，書以辣丁德漢各文。前於西曆本年七月二十二日，即中曆六月初七日，經大清國欽差全權大臣，文致大德國欽差全權大臣附件三，現於遇害處所，建立牌坊一座，足滿街衢，已於西曆本年六月二十五日，即中曆五月初十日興工。
第二款 （一） 懲辦傷害諸國國家及人民之首禍諸臣，將西曆本年二月十三、二十一等日，即中曆上年十二月二十五、本年正月初三等日，先後降旨所定罪名開列於後附件四、五、六：端郡王載漪、輔國公載瀾均定斬監候罪名，又約定，如皇上以為應加恩貸其一死，即發往新疆永遠監禁，永不減免。莊親王載勳、都察院左都禦史英年、刑部尚書趙舒翹均定為賜令自盡。山西巡撫毓賢、禮部尚書啟秀、刑部左侍郎徐承煜均定為即行正法。協辦大學士·吏部尚書剛毅、大學士徐桐、前四川總督李秉衡均已身故，追奪原官，即行革職。又兵部尚書徐用儀、戶部尚書立山、吏部左侍郎許景澄、內閣學士兼禮部侍郎銜聯元、太常寺卿袁昶，因上年力駁殊悖諸國義法極惡之罪被害，於西曆本年二月十三日，即中曆上年十二月二十五日，奉上諭開復原官，以示昭雪附件七。莊親王載勳已於西曆本年二月二十一日，即中曆正月初三日；英年趙舒翹已於二十四日，即初六日，均自盡。毓賢已於二十二日，即初四日，啟秀徐承煜已於二十六日，即初八日，均正法。又西曆本年二月十三日，上諭將甘肅提督董福祥革職，俟應得罪名定讞懲辦。西曆本年四月二十九、六月初三、八月十九等日，即中曆三月十一、四月十七、七月初六等日，先後降旨將上年夏間凶慘案內，所有承認獲咎之各外省官員分別懲辦。
（二） 西曆本年八月十九日，即中曆二十七年七月初六日，上諭將諸國人民遇害被虐之城鎮，停止文武各等考試五年附件八。

第三款 因大日本國使館書記生杉山彬被害，大清國大皇帝從優榮之典，已於西曆本年六月十八日，即中曆五月初三日，降旨簡派戶部侍郎那桐為專使大臣，赴大日本國大皇帝前，代表大清國大皇帝及國家惋惜之意附件九。
第四款 大清國國家允定在於諸國被汙瀆及挖掘各墳塋，建立滌垢雪侮之碑，已與諸國全權大臣會同商定，其碑由各該國使館督建，並由中國國家付給估算各費銀兩。京師一帶每處一萬兩，外省每處五千兩，此項銀兩業已付清。茲將建碑之墳塋，開列清單附後附件十。
第五款 大清國國家允定不準將軍火暨專為製造軍火各種器料運入中國境內，已於西曆本年八月二十五日，即中曆二十七年七月十二日，降旨禁止進口二年，嗣後如諸國以為有仍應續禁之處，亦可降旨將二年之限續展附件十一。
第六款 按照西曆本年五月二十九日，即中曆四月十二日上諭，大清國大皇帝允定，付諸國償款海關銀四百五十兆兩。此款系西曆一千九百年十二月二十二日，即中曆光緒二十六年十一月初一日條款內第六款所載之各國各會各人及中國人民之賠償總數附件十二。
（甲） 此四百五十兆系照海關銀兩市價易為金款，此市價按諸國各金錢之價易金如左：海關銀一兩，即德國三馬克零五五，即奧國三克勒尼五九五，即美國圓零七四二，即法國三佛郎克七五，即英國三先零，即日本一圓四零七，即荷蘭國一弗樂林七九六，即俄國一魯布四一二，俄國魯布按金平算，即十七多理亞四二四。此四百五十兆按年息四厘，正本由中國分三十九年按後附之表各章清還附件十三。本息用金付給，或按應還日期之市價易金付給，還本於一千九百零二年正月初一日起，一千九百四十年終止。還本各款應按每屆一年付還，初次定於一千九百零三年正月初一日付還，利息由一千九百零一年七月初一日起算。惟中國國家亦可將所欠首六個月至一千九百零一半十二月三十一日之息，展在自一千九百零二年正月初一日起，於三年內付還。但所展息款之利，亦應按年四厘付清。又利息每屆六個月付給，初次定於一千九百零二年七月初一日付給。
（乙） 此欠款一切事宜，均在上海辦理如後，諸國各派銀行董事一名，會同將所有由該管之中國官員付給之本利總數收存，分給有干涉者，該銀行出付回執。
（丙） 由中國國家將全數保票一紙，支付駐京諸國欽差領銜大臣手內。此保票以後分作零票，每票上各由中國特派之官員畫押。此節以及發票一切事宜，應由以上所述之銀行董事，各遵本國飭令而行。
（丁） 付還保票財源各進款，應每月給銀行董事收存。
（戊） 所定承擔保票之財源開列於後：一、新關各進款俟前已作為擔保之借款各本利付給之後餘剩者，又進口貨稅增至切實值百抽五，將所增之數加之，所有向例進口免稅各貨，除外國運來之米及各雜色糧面，並金銀以及金銀各錢外，均應列入切實值百抽五貨內。二、所有常關各進款，在各通商日岸之常關均歸新關管理。三、所有鹽政各進項，除歸還前泰西借款一宗外，餘剩一併歸入。至進口貨稅增至切實值百抽五，諸國現允可行，惟須二端：一、將現在照估價抽收進口各稅，凡能改者，皆當急速改為按件抽稅幾何。定辦改稅一層如後：為估算貨價之基，應以一千八百九十七、八、九三年卸貨時各貨牽算價值，乃開除進口稅及雜費總數之市價。其未改以前各該稅，仍照估價徵收。二、北河黃浦兩水路均應改善，中國國家即應撥款相助。增稅一層，俟此條款畫押日兩個月後，即行開辦。除在此畫押日期後至遲十日已在途間之貨外，概不得免抽。

第七款 大清國國家允定各使館境界以為專與住用之處，並獨由使館管理，中國民人概不准在界內居住，亦可自行防守。使館界線於附件之圖上標明如後附件十四：東面之線系崇文門大街，圖上十、十一、十二等字，北面圖上系五、六、七、八、九、十等字之線，西面圖上系一、二、三、四、五等字之線，南面圖上系十二、一等字之線，此線循城牆南址隨城垛而畫。按照西曆一千九百零一年正月十六日，即中曆上年十一月二十六日文內後附之條款，中國國家應允諸國分應自主，常留兵隊分保使館。
第八款 大清國國家應允將大沽炮臺及有礙京師至海通道之各礮台，一律削平，現已設法照辦。
第九款 按照西曆一千九百零一年正月十六日，即中曆上年十一月二十六日文內後附之條款，中國國家應允由諸國分應主辦會同酌定數處，留兵駐守，以保京師至海通道無斷絕之虞。今諸國駐守之處，系黃村郎坊楊村天津軍糧城坡沽炮臺唐山灤州昌黎秦皇島山海關。
第十款 大清國國家允定兩年之久，在各府廳州縣將以後所述之上諭頒行佈告：
一、 西曆本年二月初一日，即中曆上年十二月十三日，上諭以永禁或設或入與諸國仇敵之會，違者皆斬附件十五。
二、 西曆本年二月十三、二十一、四月二十九、八月十九等日，即中曆上年十二月二十五、本年正月初三、三月十一、七月初六等日，上諭一道，犯罪之人如何懲辦之處，均一一載明。
三、 西曆本年八月十九日，即中曆七月初六日，上諭以諸國人民遇害被虐各城鎮，停止文武各等考試。
四、 西曆本年二月初一日，即中曆上年十二月十三日，上諭以各省督撫文武大吏暨有司各官，於所屬境內均有保平安之責。如複滋傷害諸國人民之事，或再有違約之行，必須立時彈壓懲辦，否則該管之員，即行革職，永不敘用，亦不得開脫別給獎敘附件十六。以上諭旨，現於中國全境慚次張貼。
第十一款 大清國國家允定將通商行船各條約內，諸國視為應行商改之處，及有關通商各他事宜，均行議商，以期妥善簡易。現按照第六款賠償事宜，約定中國國家應允襄辦改善北河黃浦兩水路，其襄辦各節如左：
一、 北河改善河道，在一千八百九十八年會同中國國家所興各工，近由諸國派員重修，一俟治理天津事務交還之後，即可由中國國家派員與諸國所派之員會辦。中國國家應付海關銀每年六萬兩，以養其工。
二、 現設立黃浦河道局，經管整理改善水道各工，所派該局各員，均代中國暨諸國保守在滬所有通商之利益。預估後二十年該局各工及經營各費，應每年支用海關銀四十六萬兩，此數平分，半由中國國家付給，半由外國各干涉者出資。該局員差並權責及進款之詳細各節，皆於後附檔內列明附件十七。
第十二款 西曆本年七月二十四日，即中曆六月初九日，降旨將總理各國事務衙門，按照諸國酌定改為外務部，班列六部之前，此上諭內已簡派外務部各王大臣矣附件十八。且變通諸國欽差大臣覲見禮節，均已商定，由中國全權大臣屢次照會在案，此照會在後附之節略內述明附件十九。
茲特為議明以上所述各語，及後附諸國全權大臣所發之文牘，均系以法文為憑。大清國國家既如此，按以上所述，西曆一千九百年十二月二十二日，即中曆光緒二十六年十一月初一日文內存款，足適諸國之意妥辦，則中國願將一千九百年夏間變亂所生之局勢完結，諸國亦照允隨行。是以諸國全權大臣，現奉各本國政府之命，代為聲明，除第七款所述之防守使館兵隊外，諸國兵隊即於西曆一千九百零一年九月十七日，即中曆光緒二十七年八月初五日，全由東城撤退；並除第九款所述各處外，亦於西曆一千九百零一年九月二十二日，即中曆光緒二十七年八月初十日由直隸省撤退。

今將以上條款繕定同文十二份，均由諸中國全權大臣畫押，諸國全權大臣各存一份，中國全權大臣收存一份。

一千九百零一年九月初七日
光緒二十七年七月二十五日
在北京定立

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

In Chinese, the Boxer Protocol is also called Peking Protocol (Beijing yidingshu 北京議定書), likewise in Japanese: Pekin giteisho 北京議定書.

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Treaty of Portsmouth

Name in Chinese Puzimaosi tiaoyue 樸資茅斯條約
Document type Bilateral peace treaty between Russia and Japan
Year, date 1905, Sept. 5
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

The Emperor of Japan on the one part, and the Emperor of all the Russias, on the other part, animated by a desire to restore the blessings of peace, have resolved to conclude a treaty of peace, and have for this purpose named their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say, for his Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Baron Komura Jutaro, Jusami, Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, and his Excellency Takahira Kogoro, Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, his Minister to the United States, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, his Excellency Sergius Witte, his Secretary of State and President of the Committee of Ministers of the Empire of Russia, and his Excellency Baron Roman Rosen, Master of the Imperial Court of Russia, his Majesty's Ambassador to the United States, who, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good and due form, and concluded the following articles:

The Imperial Government of Japan, on its part, undertakes that the proprietary rights of Russian subjects in the territory above referred to shall be perfectly respected.
Article 1 There shall henceforth be peace and amity between their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias, and between their respective States and subjects.
Article 2 The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military and economical interests engages neither to obstruct nor interfere with measures for guidance, protection and control which the Imperial Government of Japan may find necessary to take in Korea. It is understood that Russian subjects in Korea shall be treated in exactly the same manner as the subjects and citizens of other foreign Powers; that is to say, they shall be placed on the same footing as the subjects and citizens of the most favoured nation. It is also agreed that, in order to avoid causes of misunderstanding, the two high contracting parties will abstain on the Russian-Korean frontier from taking any military measure which may menace the security of Russian or Korean territory.
Article 3 Japan and Russia mutually engage:
First. — To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, in conformity with the provisions of the additional article I annexed to this treaty, and,
Second. — To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria now in occupation, or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the territory above mentioned.
The Imperial Government of Russia declares that it has not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in the impairment of Chinese sovereignty, or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.
Article 4 Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce or industry of Manchuria.
Article 5 The Imperial Russian Government transfers and assigns to the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Talien and the adjacent territorial waters, and all rights, privileges and concessions connected with or forming part of such lease, and it also transfers and assigns to the Imperial Government of Japan all public works and properties in the territory affected by the above-mentioned lease.
The two contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.
Article 6 The Imperial Russian Government engages to transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, without compensation and with the consent of the Chinese Government, the railway between Chang-chunfu and Kuanchangtsu and Port Arthur, and all the branches, together with all the rights, privileges and properties appertaining thereto in that region, as well as all the coal mines in said region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway. The two high contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Government of China mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.
Article 7 Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and nowise for strategic purposes. It is understood that this restrictiction does not apply to the railway in the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.
Article 8 The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia with the view to promote and facilitate intercourse and traffic will as soon as possible conclude a separate convention for the regulation of their connecting railway services in Manchuria.
Article 9 The Imperial Russian Government cedes to the Imperial Government of Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern portion of the Island of Saghalin and all the islands adjacent thereto and the public works and properties thereon. The fiftieth degree of north latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded territory. The exact alignment of such territory shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the additional article II annexed to this treaty.
Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct in their respective possessions on the Island of Saghalin or the adjacent islands any fortification or other similar military works. They also respectively engage not to take any military measures which may impede the free navigation of the Strait of La Perouse and the Strait of Tartary.
Article 10 It is reserved to Russian subjects, inhabitants of the territory ceded to Japan, to sell their real property and retire to their country, but if they prefer to remain in the ceded territory they will be maintained protected in the full exercise of their industries and rights of property on condition of submitting to the Japanese laws and jurisdiction. Japan shall have full liberty to withdraw the right of residence in or to deport from such territory of any inhabitants who labor under political or administrative disability. She engages, however, that the proprietary rights of such inhabitants shall be fully respected.
Article 11 Russia engages to arrange with Japan for granting to Japanese subjects rights of fishery along the coasts of the Russian possession in the Japan, Okhotsk and Bering Seas.
It is agreed that the foregoing engagement shall not affect rights already belonging to Russian or foreign subjects in those regions.
Article 12 The treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and Russia having been annulled by the war the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia engage to adopt as a basis for their commercial relations pending the conclusion of a new treaty of commerce and navigation the basis of the treaty which was in force previous to the present war, the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing of the most favoured nation, in which are included import and export duties, customs formalities, transit and tonnage dues and the admission and treatment of agents, subjects and vessels of one country in the territories of the other.
Article 13 As soon as possible after the present treaty comes in force all prisoners of war shall be reciprocally restored. The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia shall each appoint a special commissioner to take charge of the prisoners. All prisoners in the hands of one Government shall be delivered to and be received by the commissioner of the other Government or by his duly authorized representative in such convenient numbers and at such convenient ports of the delivering State as such delivering State shall notify in advance to the commissioner of the receiving State.
The Governments of Japan and Russia shall present each other as soon as possible after the delivery of the prisoners is completed with a statement of the direct expenditures respectively incurred by them for the care and maintenance of the prisoner from the date of capture or surrender and up to the time of death or delivery. Russia engages to repay as soon as possible after the exchange of statement as above provided the difference between the actual amount so expended by Japan and the actual amount similarly disbursed by Russia.
Article 14 The present treaty shall be ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias. Such ratification shall be with as little delay as possible, and in any case no later than fifty days from the date of the signature of the treaty, to be announced to the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia respectively through the French Minister at Tokio and the Ambassador of the United States at St. Petersburg, and from the date of the latter of such announcements shall in all its parts come into full force. The formal exchange of ratifications shall take place at Washington as soon as possible.
Article 15 The present treaty shall be signed in duplicate in both the English and French languages. The texts are in absolute conformity, but in case of a discrepancy in the interpretation the French text shall prevail.

Sub-Articles

In conformity with the provisions of articles 3 and 9 of the treaty of the peace between Japan and Russia of this date the undersigned plenipotentiaries have concluded the following additional articles:

SUB-ARTICLE TO ARTICLE 3

The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia mutually engage to commence the withdrawal of their military forces from the territory of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately after the treaty of peace comes into operation, and within a period of eighteen months after that date the armies of the two countries shall be completely withdrawn from Manchuria, except from the leased territory of the Liaotung Peninsula. The forces of the two countries occupying the front positions shall first be withdrawn.

The high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria. The number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per kilometre and within that maximum number the commanders of the Japanese and Russian armies shall by common accord fix the number of such guards to be employed as small as possible while having in view the actual requirements.

The commanders of the Japanese and Russian forces in Manchuria shall agree upon the details of the evacuation in conformity with the above principles and shall take by common accord the measures necessary to carry out the evacuation as soon as possible, and in any case not later than the period of eighteen months.

SUB-ARTICLE TO ARTICLE 9

As soon as possible after the present treaty comes into force a committee of delimitation composed of an equal number of members is to be appointed by the two high contracting parties which shall on the spot mark in a permanent manner the exact boundary between the Japanese and Russian possessions on the Island of Saghalin. The commission shall be bound so far as topographical considerations permit to follow the fiftieth parallel of north latitude as the boundary line, and in case any deflections from that line at any points are found to be necessary compensation will be made by correlative deflections at other points. It shall also be the duty of the said commission to prepare a list and a description of the adjacent islands included in the cession, and finally the commission shall prepare and sign maps showing the boundaries of the ceded territory. The work of the commission shall be subject to the approval of the high contracting parties.

The foregoing additional articles are to be considered ratified with the ratification of the treaty of peace to which they are annexed.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and affixed seals to the present treaty of peace.

Done at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, this fifth day of the ninth month of the thirty-eighth year of the Meiji, corresponding to the twenty-third day of August, one thousand nine hundred and five (September 5, 1905).

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樸資茅斯條約

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

正約

日本國皇帝陛下及全俄國皇帝陛下，欲使兩國及兩國之人民回復平和之幸福，決定訂立講和條約，是以日本國皇帝陛下特派外務部大臣從三位勳一等男爵小村壽太郎及駐紮美國待命全權公使從三份勳一等高平小五郎，全俄國皇帝陛下特派內閣總理大臣威特及駐紮美國特命全權大使俄國御前大臣羅善，為全權委員，各將所奉全權文憑校閱，認明懼屬妥善，會上訂立各條款開列於下：

第一條 日本國至帝陛下與全俄國皇帝陛下間，及兩國並兩國臣民間，當和平親睦。
第二條 俄國政府承認日本國于韓國之政治軍事經濟上均有卓絕之利益，加指導保護監理等事，日本政府視為必要者即可措置，不得阻礙干涉。在韓國之俄國臣民，均應按照最惠國之臣民一律看待，不得歧視。
兩締約國為避一切誤解之原因起見，彼此同意于俄韓兩國交界間不得執軍事上之措置，致侵迫俄韓兩國領土之安全。
第三條 日俄兩國互相約定各事如下；
一、 除遼東半島租借權所及之地域不計外， 所有在滿洲之兵，當按本條約附約第一款所定，由兩國同時全數撤退；
二、 除前記之地域外，現被日俄兩國軍隊佔領及管理之滿洲全部，交還中國接收，施行政務；俄國政府聲明在滿洲之領土上利益，或優先的讓與，或專屬的讓與，有侵害中國主權及有違機會均等主義各，一概無之。
第四條 日俄兩國彼此約定，凡中國在滿洲為發達商務工業起見，所有一切辦法列國視為當然者，不得阻礙。
第五條 俄國政府以中國政府之允許，將旅順口、大連灣並其附近領土領水之租借權內一部份之一切權利及所讓與者，轉移與日本政府，俄國政府又將該租界疆域內所造有一切公共營造物及財產，均移讓於日本政府。
兩締約國互約，前條所定者，須商請中國政府允諾。
日本政府允將居住前開各地內之俄國臣民之財產權，當完全尊重。
第六條 俄國政府允將由長春(寬城子)至旅順口之鐵路及一切支路，並在該地方鐵道內所附屬之一切權利財產，以及在該處鐵道內附屬之一切煤礦，或為鐵道利益起見所經營之一切煤礦，不受補償，且以清國政府允許者均移讓於日本政府。
兩締約國互約前條所定者，須商請中國政府承諾。
第七條 日俄兩國約在滿洲地方，各自經營專以商工業為目的之鐵道，決不經營以軍事為目的之鐵道。
但遼東半島租借權效力所及地域之鐵道不在此限。
第八條 日本政府及俄國政府，為圖來往輸運均臻便捷起見，妥訂滿洲接續鐵道營業章程，務須從速另訂別約。
第九條 俄國政府允將庫頁島南部及其附近一切島嶼，並各該處之一切公共營造物及財產之主權，永遠讓與日本政府；其讓與地域之北方境界，以北緯五十度為起點，至該處確界須按照本條約附約第二條所載為准。
日俄兩國彼此商允在庫頁島及其附近島嶼之各自所屬領地內，不築造堡壘及類於堡壘之軍事上工作物；又兩國約定凡軍事上之措置有礙于宗穀海峽及韃靼海峽航行自由者，不得施設。
第十條 居住於讓與日本國地域內之俄國人民， 可出賣財產，退還本國；若仍欲留住該地域時，當服從日本國之法律及管轄權。至該住民經營事業行使財產，當由日本國完全保護，其有不安本分者，日本國亦當撤回其居住權並放逐之，但該住民之財產當完全尊重。
第十一條 俄國當與口本國協定允准日木國臣民在日本海、鄂霍次克海、白今海之俄國所屬沿岸一帶有經營漁業之權。
前項約束，經雙方同意，不得影響於俄國及週邊臣民在彼處應有之權利。
第十二條 日俄通商航海條約，因此次戰爭作廢，日本國政府及俄國政府允諾以開戰前所施行之條約為本，另訂通商航海新約；其未定以前，所有進口稅、出口稅、關章、子口稅、船鈔，並代表臣民船舶，由此國進彼國領土或由彼國進此國領土時之許可及待遇，均照相待最優之國辦理。
第十三條 本條約一經施行，速將一切俘虜彼此交還，由日俄兩政府各派接收俘虜之特別委員一名專司其事，彼此送還時，應由交犯國將在該國某處口岸可交還人數若干， 預先知照收犯國，即由兩國專派員或該員所派之有權代表員照以前通知之口岸人數，彼此交收。
日俄兩國政府一俟交還俘虜完畢後，將虜犯自被擄或投降之日起至死亡或交換之日止，所有因照管：及留養該犯之一切費用細帳互相交換後，俄國政府應將日本實用數目中，除去俄國實用數目，尚差若干，當由俄國從速償還日本。
第十四條 本條約當由日本國皇帝陛下及全俄國皇帝陛下批准，從速在華盛頓互換，自簽字之日起，無論如何當於五十日以內，由駐紮日本之法國公使及駐紮俄國之美國大使，各通知駐在國政府，宣佈之後，本條約即全部生效。
第十五條 本條約繕就英文法文各兩本，分別簽字，其本文雖全然符合，設有解釋不同之處，以法文為准。為此兩國全權委員署名蓋印，以昭信守。

明治三十八年九月五日
俄曆一九O五年八月二十三日

小村 壽太郎 高平 小五郎 威特 [Witte] 羅善 [Rosen]
在樸資茅斯

附約

日俄兩國按照本口所訂講和條約第三條及第九條所載，由兩國全權委員另立附約如下，

第一條 此條應附於正約第三條。日俄兩國政府彼此商允，一候講和條約施行後即將滿洲地域內軍隊同時開始撤退；自講和條約施行之日起，以十八個月為限，所有兩國在滿洲之軍隊除遼東半島租借地外，一律撤退。
兩國佔領陣地之前敵軍隊當先行撤退。
兩訂約國可留置守備兵保護滿洲各自之鐵道線路，至守備兵人數，每一公里不過十五名之數，由此數內，日俄兩國軍司令官可因時酌減，以至少足用之數為率。
滿洲之日本國及俄國軍司令官，可遵照以上所定，協商撤兵細目，並以必要之方法從速實行撤兵，無論如何不得逾十八個月之限。
第二條 此條應附正約第九條。兩訂約國一俟本約施行後須從速各派數目相等之劃界委員，將庫頁島之俄日兩國所屬確界劃清，以垂久遠。劃界委員應就地形以北緯五十度為境界線，倘遇有不能直劃必須偏出緯度以外時，則偏出緯度若干，當另在他處偏入緯度內若干以補償之。至讓界附近之島嶼，該委員等應備表及詳細書，並將所劃讓地界線繪圖簽名，呈由兩訂約國政府批准。

以上所增條款，當其附屬之講和正約批准時准。

明治三十八年九月五日
俄曆一九O五年八月二十三日

小村壽太郎 高平小五郎 威特 [Witte] 羅善 [Rosen]
在樸資茅斯

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

In Japanese, the Treaty of Portsmouth is called Pōtsumasu Jōyaku ポーツマス条約 or Nichi Ro Kōwa Jōyaku 日露講和条約.

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————————————————————

Japan's "21 Demands" to China

Name in Chinese Riben de ershiyi tiao yaoqiu 日本的《二十一條要求》
Document type Coercive policy statement by Japan against the ROC
Year, date 1915, Jan. 18
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's notes  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

Group I

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous to maintain the general peace in the Far East and to strengthen the relations of amity and good neighbourhood existing between the two countries, agree to the following articles:

Article 1 The Chinese Government engage to give full assent to all matters that the Japanese government may hereafter agree with the German Government respecting the disposition of all the rights, interests and concessions, which, in virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possesses vis-à-vis China in relation to the province of Shantung.
Article 2The Chinese Government engage that, within the province of Shantung or along its coast, no territory or island will be ceded or leased to any other Power, under any pretext whatever.
Article 3The Chinese Government agree to Japan's building a railway connecting Chefoo or Lungkow with the Kiaochou Tsinanfu Railway.
Article 4The Chinese Government engage to open of their own accord, as soon as possible, certain important cities and towns in the Province of Shantung for the residence and commerce of foreigners. The places to be so opened shall be decided upon in a separate agreement.

Group II

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, in view of the fact that the Chinese Government has always recognized the predominant position of Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:

Article 1 The two contracting Parties mutually agree that the term of the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the term respecting the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to a further period of 99 years respectively.
Article 2 The Japanese subjects shall be permitted in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to lease or own land required either for erecting buildings for various commercial and industrial uses or for farming.
Article 3 The Japanese subjects shall have liberty to enter, reside, and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and to carry on business of various kinds commercial, industrial, and otherwise.
Article 4 The Chinese Government grant to the Japanese subjects the right of mining in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. As regards the mines to be worked, they shall be decided upon in a separate agreement.
Article 5 The Chinese Government agree that the consent of the Japanese Government shall be obtained in advance: (1) whenever it is proposed to grant to other nationals the right of constructing a railway or to obtain from other nationals the supply of funds for constructing a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and (2) whenever a loan is to be made with any other Power, under security of the taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.
Article 6 The Chinese Government engage that whenever the Chinese Government need the service of political, financial, or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or in Eastern Inner Mongolia, Japan shall first be consulted.
Article 7 The Chinese Government agree that the control and management of the Kirin-Chungchun Railway shall be handed over to Japan for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this treaty.

Group III

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, having regard to the close relations existing between Japanese capitalists and the Han-Yeh-Ping Company and desiring to promote the common interests of the two nations, agree to the following articles:

Article 1 The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Han-Yeh-Ping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations, and that, without the consent of the Japanese Government, the Chinese Government shall not dispose or permit the Company to dispose of any right or property of the Company.
Article 2 The Chinese Government engage that, as a necessary measure for protection of the invested interests of Japanese capitalists, no mines in the neighbourhood of those owned by the Han-Yeh-Ping Company shall be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by anyone other than the Said Company; and further that whenever it is proposed to take any other measure which may likely affect the interests of the said Company directly or indirectly, the consent of the said Company shall first be obtained.

Group IV

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China, agree to the following article:

Article 1 The Chinese Government engage not to cede or lease to any other Power any harbour or bay on or any island along the coast of China.

Group V

Article 1 The Chinese Central Government to engage influential Japanese as political, financial, and military advisers.
Article 2 The Chinese Government to grant the Japanese hospitals, temples, and schools in the interior of China the right to own land.
Article 3 In the face of many police disputes which have hitherto arisen between Japan and China, causing no little annoyance the police in localities (in China), where such arrangement: are necessary, to be placed under joint Japanese and Chinese administration, or Japanese to be employed in police office in such localities, so as to help at the same time the improvement of the Chinese Police Service.
Article 4 China to obtain from Japan supply of a certain quantity of arms, or to establish an arsenal in China under joint Japanese and Chinese management and to be supplied with experts and materials from Japan.
Article 5 In order to help the development of the Nanchang-Kiukiang Railway, with which Japanese capitalists are so closely identified, and with due regard to the negotiations which have been pending between Japan and China in relation to the railway question in South China, China to agree to give to Japan the right of constructing a railway to connect Wuchang with the Kiukiang-Nanchang and Hangchou and between Nanchang and Chaochou.
Article 6 In view of the relations between the Province of Fukien and Formosa and of the Agreement respecting the non-alienation of that province, Japan to be consulted first whenever foreign capital is needed in connection with the railways, mines, and harbour works (including dockyards) in the Province of Fukien.
Article 7 China to grant to Japanese subjects the right of preaching in China.

[Jan. 18, 1915]

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日本的《二十一條要求》

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

第一號，關於日本繼承德國在山東的特權，共四款：

1. 日本政府擬向德國政府協定之所有德國關於山東省依據條約或其他關係對中國政府享有一切權力利益讓與等項處分，中國政府概行承認。
2.凡山東省內並沿海一帶土地及各島嶼，無論以何項名目，概不讓與或租借與他國。
3.日本建造由煙臺或龍口接連膠濟路線之鐵路。
4.中國政府從速自開山東省內各主要城市作為商埠。

第二號，關於「日本國在南滿洲及東部內蒙古享有優越地位」，共七款：

1. 兩訂約國互相約定，將旅順、大連租借期限並南滿洲及安奉兩鐵路期限，均展至九十九年為期。
2.日本臣民在南滿洲及東部內蒙古營造商工業應用房廠，或為耕作，可得其須要土地之租借權和所有權。
3.日本臣民得在南滿洲及東部內蒙古任便居住往來，並經營商工業各項生意。
4.中國政府允將南滿洲及東部內蒙古各礦開採權，許與日本臣民。
5.中國政府如准許他國在南滿洲及東部蒙古建造鐵路或以該地區課稅作抵押他國借款時，應先經日本政府同意而後辦理。
6.如中國政府在南滿洲及東部內蒙古聘用政治、財政、軍事各顧問教習，必須先嚮日本商議。
7.中國政府允將吉長鐵路管理經營事宜委任日本政府，其年限自本約畫押之日起，以九十九年為限。

第三號，關於漢冶萍公司，共二款：

1. 俟將來機會相當，將漢冶萍公司作為兩國合辦事業，未經日本政府之同意，所有該公司一切權力產業，中國政府不得自行處分，亦不得使該公司任意處分。
2.所有屬於漢冶萍公司各礦之附近礦山，如未經該公司同意，一概不准該公司以外之人開採。

第四號，關於「切實保全中國領土」一款：

1. 中國政府允准，所有中國沿岸港灣及島嶼，概不讓與或租與他國。

第五號，共七款：

1. 在中國中央政府，須聘用有力之日本人充當政治、財政、軍事等項顧問（該條袁世凱未直接同意，由段祺瑞執政時通過）。
2.所有在中國內地所設日本醫院、寺院、學校等，概允其土地所有權。
3.須將必要地方之警察作為中日合辦，或在此等地方之警察署內須聘用多數日本人，以資全面籌畫改良中國警察機關。
4.由日本採辦一定數量之軍械（譬如在中國政府所需軍械之半數以上），或在中國設立日中合辦之軍械廠，聘用日本技師，並採買日本材料。
5.允將接連武昌與九江、南昌之鐵路，及南昌至杭州、南昌至潮州各鐵路之建築權，許與日本國。
6.福建省內籌辦鐵路、開礦及整頓海口（船廠在內），如需外國資本時，先嚮日本協商。
7.允認日本人在中國有布教之權。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTES ===============

In Japanese the Twenty-One Demands are called Taika Nijūikkajō Yōkyū 対華二十一ヵ条要求.

Negotiations between Japan and China’s Yuan Shikai administration in the aftermath of the Twenty-One Demands resulted in an agreement which did not include the demands in Group 5, signed on May 25, 1915 under the name "Sino-Japanese Agreement" (Zhong Ri xinyue 中日新約) aka "Treaties of the Fourth Year of the Republic" (min si tiaoyue 民四條約), comprising

  • the "Treaty Respecting the Province of Shandong" (guanyu Shandong zhi tiaoyue 關於山東之條約),
  • the "Treaty Respecting Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia" (guanyu nan Manzhou ji dongbu Neimenggu zhi tiaoyue 關於南滿洲及東部內蒙古之條約),
  • the "Exchange of Notes Respecting the Matter of Hanyehping" (guanyu Hanyeping shixiang zhi huanwen 關於漢冶萍事項之換文),
  • the "Exchange of Notes Respecting the Restoration of the Leased Territory of Jiaozhou Bay" (guanyu jiaohuan Jiaoao zhi huanwen 關於交還膠澳之換文), and
  • the "Exchange of Notes Respecting the Fujian Question" (guanyu Fujian shixiang zhi huanwen 關於福建事項之換文).

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Treaty of Versailles ✄

Name in Chinese  Fanersai tiaoyue 凡爾賽條約 / Fanersai heyue 凡爾賽和約 
Document type Multilateral peace treaty
Year, date 1919, June 28
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[...]

Part IV: German rights and interests outside Germany

[...]

Section II. China

Article 128 Germany renounces in favour of China all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on September 7, 1901, and from all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto. She likewise renounces in favour of China any claim to indemnities accruing thereunder subsequent to March 14, 1917.
Article 129 From the coming into force of the present Treaty the High Contracting Parties shall apply, in so far as concerns them respectively:
1. The Arrangement of August 29, 1902, regarding the new Chinese customs tariff;
2. The Arrangement of September 27, 1905, regarding Whang-Poo (黄浦), and the provisional supplementary arrangement of April 4, 1912. China, however, will no longer be bound to grant to Germany the advantages or privileges which she allowed Germany under these Arrangements.
Article 130 Subject to the provisions of Section VIII of this Part, Germany cedes to China all the buildings, wharves and pontoons, barracks, forts, arms and munitions of war, vessels of all kinds, wireless telegraphy installations and other public property belonging to the German Government, which are situated or may be in the German Concessions at Tientsin (天津) and Hankow (漢口) or elsewhere in Chinese territory. It is understood, however, that premises used as diplomatic or consular residences or offices are not included in the above cession, and, furthermore, that no steps shall be taken by the Chinese Government to dispose of the German public and private property situated within the so-called Legation Quarter (東交民巷) at Peking (北京) without the consent of the Diplomatic Representatives of the Powers which, on the coming into force of the present Treaty, remain Parties to the Final Protocol of September 7, 1901.
Article 131 Germany undertakes to restore to China within twelve months from the coming into force of the present Treaty all the astronomical instruments which her troops in 1900-1901 carried away from China, and to defray all expenses which may be incurred in effecting such restoration, including the expenses of dismounting, packing, transporting, insurance and installation in Peking.
Article 132 Germany agrees to the abrogation of the leases from the Chinese Government under which the German Concessions at Hankow and Tientsin are now held. China, restored to the full exercise of her sovereign rights in the above areas, declares her intention of opening them to international residence and trade. She further declares that the abrogation of the leases under which these concessions are now held shall not affect the property rights of nationals of Allied and Associated Powers who are holders of lots in these concessions.
Article 133 Germany waives all claims against the Chinese Government or against any Allied or Associated Government arising out of the internment of German nationals in China and their repatriation. She equally renounces all claims arising out of the capture and condemnation of German ships in China, or the liquidation, sequestration or control of German properties, rights and interests in that country since August 14, 1917. This provision, however, shall not affect the rights of the parties interested in the proceeds of any such liquidation, which shall be governed by the provisions of Part X (Economic Clauses) of the present Treaty.
Article 134 Germany renounces in favour of the Government of His Britannic Majesty the German State property in the British Concession at Shameen (沙面) at Canton (廣州). She renounces in favour of the French and Chinese Governments conjointly the property of the German school situated in the French Concession at Shanghai (上海).

[...]

Section VIII. Shantung

Article 156 Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title and privileges particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow (膠州), railways, mines and submarine cables which she acquired in virtue of the Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung (山東). All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway (膠濟鐵路), including its branch lines together with its subsidiary property of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and material for the exploitation of the mines, are and remain acquired by Japan, together with all rights and privileges attaching thereto. The German State submarine cables from Tsingtao (青島) to Shanghai and from Tsingtao to Chefoo (芝罘), with all the rights, privileges and properties attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and encumbrances.
Article 157 The movable and immovable property owned by the German State in the territory of Kiaochow, as well as all the rights which Germany might claim in consequence of the works or improvements made or of the expenses incurred by her, directly or indirectly, in connection with this territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and encumbrances.
Article 158 Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and documents of every kind, wherever they may be, relating to the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial or other, of the territory of Kiaochow. Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of all treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the rights, title or privileges referred to in the two preceding Articles.

[...]

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Treaty of Versailles (in French: Traité de Versailles, in Chinese: Fanersai tiaoyue 凡爾賽條約 or Fanersai heyue 凡爾賽和約, in Japanese Verusaiyu Jōyaku ヴェルサイユ条約) was signed on June 28, 1919 during the Paris Peace Conference which took place between Jan. 18, 1919 and Jan. 21, 1920. Members of the Chinese delegation included Lou Tseng-tsiang 陸徵祥, Wellington Koo 顧維鈞, Thomas Wang 王正廷, Alfred Sao-ke Sze 施肇基, Wei Chen-zu 魏宸組, and Tsao Ju-lin 曹汝霖, leading members of the large Japanese delegation were Marquess Saionji Kinmochi 西園寺 公望, Baron Makino Nobuaki 牧野 伸顕, Viscount Chinda Sutemi 珍田 捨巳, Matsui Keishirō 松井 慶四郎, and Ijuin Hikokichi 伊集院 彦吉. Signatories were the German Reich, the Allied Powers (France, the British Empire, Italy, Japan, and the United States) and other countries including Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hejaz (= today's Saudi Arabia), Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Siam (= today's Thailand), Uruguay, and Yugoslavia as as well as Australia, Canada, South Africa, India, and New Zealand as part of the British Empire. China's representatives refused to sign the treaty because many former German concessions in China were not returned but handed to Japan instead.

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Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States

Name in Chinese Mengteweiduo guojia quanli yiwu gongyue 蒙特維多國家權利義務公約
Document type Multilateral treaty
Years, dates 1933, Dec. 26 (signed); 1934, Dec. 26 (entered into force)
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Signed at Montevideo, 26 December 1933
Entered into Force, 26 December 1934
Article 8 reaffirmed by Protocol, 23 December 1936

Convention on the Rights and Duties of States

This treaty was signed at the International Conference of American States in Montevideo, Uruguay on December 26, 1933. It entered into force on December 26, 1934. The treaty discusses the definition and rights of statehood.

The Governments represented in the Seventh International Conference of American States:

Wishing to conclude a Convention on Rights and Duties of States, have appointed the following Plenipotentiaries:

Honduras: MIGUEL PAZ BARAONA; AUGUSTO C. COELLO; LUIS BOGRAN

United States of America: CORDELL HULL; ALEXANDER W. WEDDELL; J. REUBEN CLARK; J. BUTLER WRIGHT; SPRUILLE BRADEN; Miss SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE

El Salvador: HECTOR DAVID CASTRO; ARTURO RAMON AVILA; J. CIPRIANO CASTRO

Dominican Republic: TULIO M. CESTERO

Haiti: JUSTIN BARAU; FRANCIS SALGADO; ANTOINE PIERRE-PAUL; EDMOND MANGONES

Argentina: CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS; JUAN F. CAFFERATA; RAMON S. CASTILLO; CARLOS BREBBIA; ISIDORO RUIZ MORENO; LUIS A. PODESTA COSTA; RAUL PREBISCH; DANIEL ANTOKOLETZ

Venezuela: CESAR ZUMETA; LUIS CHURTON; JOSE RAFAEL MONTTLLA

Uruguay: ALBERTO MANE; JUAN JOSE AMEZAGA; JOSE G. ANTUNA; JUAN CARLOS BLANCO; Senora SOFIA A. V. DE DEMICHELI; MARTIN R. ECHEGOYEN; LUIS ALBERTO DE HERRERA; PEDRO MANINI RIOS; MATEO MARQUES CASTRO; RODOLFO MEZZERA; OCTAVIO MORAT; LUIS MORQUIO; TEOFILO PINEYRO CHAIN; DARDO REGULES; JOSE SERRATO; JOSE PEDRO VARELA

Paraguay: JUSTO PASTOR BENITEZ; GERONIMO RIART; HORACIO A. FERNANDEZ; Senorita MARIA F. GONZALEZ

Mexico: JOSE MANUEL PUIG CASAURANC; ALFONSO REYES; BASILIO VADILLO; GENARO V. VASQUEZ; ROMEO ORTEGA; MANUEL J. SIERRA; EDUARDO SUAREZ

Panama: J. D. AROSEMENA; EDUARDO E. HOLGUIN; OSCAR R. MULLER; MAGIN PONS

Bolivia: CASTO ROJAS; DAVID ALVESTEGUI; ARTURO PINTO ESCALIER

Guatemala: ALFREDO SKINNER KLEE; JOSE GONZALEZ CAMPO; CARLOS SALAZAR; MANUEL ARROYO

Brazil: AFRANIO DE MELLO FRANCO; LUCILLO A DA CUNHA BUENO; FRANCISCO LUIS DA SILVA CAMPOS; GILBERTO AMADO; CARLOS CHAGAS; SAMUEL RIBEIRO

Ecuador: AUGUSTO AGUIRRE APARICIO; HUMBERTO ALBORNOZ; ANTONIO PARRA; CARLOS PUIG VILASSAR; ARTURO SCARONE

Nicaragua: LEONARDO ARGUELLO; MANUEL CORDERO REYES; CARLOS CUADRA PASOS

Colombia: ALFONSO LOPEZ; RAIMUNDO RIVAS; JOSE CAMACEO CARRENO

Chile: MIGUEL CRUCHAGA TOCORNAL; OCTAVIO SENORET SILVA; GUSTAVO RIVERA; JOSE RAMON GUTIERREZ; FELIX NIETO DEL RIO; FRANCISCO FIGUEROA SANCHEZ; BENJAMIN COHEN

Peru: ALFREDO SOLE Y MURO; FELIPE BARREDA LAOS; LUIS FERNAN CISNEROS

Cuba: ANGEL ALBERTO GIRAUDY; HERMINIO PORTELL VILA; ALFREDO NOGUEIRA

Who, after having exhibited their Full Powers, which were found to be in good and due order, have agreed upon the following:

Article 1 The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
Article 2 The federal state shall constitute a sole person in the eyes of international law.
Article 3 The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts.
The exercise of these rights has no other limitation than the exercise of the rights of other states according to international law.
Article 4 States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity in their exercise. The rights of each one do not depend upon the power which it possesses to assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence as a person under international law.
Article 5 The fundamental rights of states are not susceptible of being affected in any manner whatsoever.
Article 6 The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law. Recognition is unconditional and irrevocable.
Article 7 The recognition of a state may be express or tacit. The latter results from any act which implies the intention of recognizing the new state.
Article 8 No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.
Article 9 The jurisdiction of states within the limits of national territory applies to all the inhabitants.
Nationals and foreigners are under the same protection of the law and the national authorities and the foreigners may not claim rights other or more extensive than those of the nationals.
Article 10 The primary interest of states is the conservation of peace. Differences of any nature which arise between them should be settled by recognized pacific methods.
Article 11 The contracting states definitely establish as the rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure. The territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever even temporarily.
Article 12 The present Convention shall not affect obligations previously entered into by the High Contracting Parties by virtue of international agreements.
Article 13 The present Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uruguay shall transmit authentic certified copies to the governments for the aforementioned purpose of ratification. The instrument of ratification shall be deposited in the archives of the Pan American Union in Washington, which shall notify the signatory governments of said deposit. Such notification shall be considered as an exchange of ratifications.
Article 14 The present Convention will enter into force between the High Contracting Parties in the order in which they deposit their respective ratifications.
Article 15 The present Convention shall remain in force indefinitely but may be denounced by means of one year's notice given to the Pan American Union, which shall transmit it to the other signatory governments. After the expiration of this period the Convention shall cease in its effects as regards the party which denounces but shall remain in effect for the remaining High Contracting Parties.
Article 16 The present Convention shall be open for the adherence and accession of the States which are not signatories. The corresponding instruments shall be deposited in the archives of the Pan American Union which shall communicate them to the other High Contracting Parties.

In witness whereof, the following Plenipotentiaries have signed this Convention in Spanish, English, Portuguese and French and hereunto affix their respective seals in the city of Montevideo, Republic of Uruguay, this 26th day of December, 1933.

Reservations

The Delegation of the United States of America, in signing the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, does so with the express reservation presented to the Plenary Session of the Conference on December 22, 1933, which reservation reads as follows:

The Delegation of the United States, in voting "yes" on the final vote on this committee recommendation and proposal, makes the same reservation to the eleven articles of the project or proposal that the United States Delegation made to the first ten articles during the final vote in the full Commission, which reservation is in words as follows:

"The policy and attitude of the United States Government toward every important phase of international relationships in this hemisphere could scarcely be made more clear and definite than they have been made by both word and action especially since March 4. I [Secretary of State Cordell Hull, chairman of U.S. delegation] have no disposition therefore to indulge in any repetition or rehearsal of these acts and utterances and shall not do so. Every observing person must by this time thoroughly understand that under the Roosevelt Administration the United States Government is as much opposed as any other government to interference with the freedom, the sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes of the governments of other nations.

"In addition to numerous acts and utterances in connection with the carrying out of these doctrines and policies, President Roosevelt, during recent weeks, gave out a public statement expressing his disposition to open negotiations with the Cuban Government for the purpose of dealing with the treaty which has existed since 1903. I feel safe in undertaking to say that under our support of the general principle of non-intervention as has been suggested, no government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt Administration. I think it unfortunate that during the brief period of this Conference there is apparently not time within which to prepare interpretations and definitions of these fundamental terms that are embraced in the report. Such definitions and interpretations would enable every government to proceed in a uniform way without any difference of opinion or of interpretations. I hope that at the earliest possible date such very important work will be done. In the meantime in case of differences of interpretations and also until they (the proposed doctrines and principles) can be worked out and codified for the common use of every government, I desire to say that the United States Government in all of its international associations and relationships and conduct will follow scrupulously the doctrines and policies which it has pursued since March 4 which are embodied in the different addresses of President Roosevelt since that time and in the recent peace address of myself on the 15th day of December before this Conference and in the law of nations as generally recognized and accepted".

The delegates of Brazil and Peru recorded the following private vote with regard to article 11: "That they accept the doctrine in principle but that they do not consider it codifiable because there are some countries which have not yet signed the Anti-War Pact of Rio de Janeiro 4 of which this doctrine is a part and therefore it does not yet constitute positive international law suitable for codification".

Honduras: M. PAZ BARAONA; AUGUSTO C. COELLO; Luls BOGRXN

United States of America: ALEXANDER W. WEDDELL; J. BUTLER WRIGUT

El Salvador: HECTOR DAVID CASTRO; ARTURO R. AVILA

Dominican Republic: TULIO M. CESTERO

Haiti: J. BARAU; F. SALGADO; EDMOND MANGONES; A. PRRE. PAUL

Argentina: CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS; JUAN F. CAFFERATA; RAMON S. CASTILLO; I. Rulz MORENO; L. A. PODESTA COSTA; D. ANTOKOLETZ

Venezuela: LUIS CHURION; J. R. MONTILLA

Uruguay: A. MANE; JOSE PEDRO VARELA; MATEO MARQuEs CASTRO; DARDO REGULES; SOFIA ALVAREZ VIGNOLI DE DEMICIIELI; TEOFILO PINEYRO CHAIN; LUIS A. DE HERRERA; MARTIN R. EcnEcoYEN; JOSE G. ANTUNA; J. C. BLANCO; PEDRO MANINI RIOS; RODOLFO MEZZERA; OCTAVTO MORATO; LUIS MOROQUIO; JOSE SERRATO

Paraguay: JUSTO PASTOR BENITEZ; MARIA F. GONZALEZ

Mexico: B. VADILLO; M. J. STERRA; EDUARDO SUAREZ

Panama: J. D. AROSEMENA; MAGIN PONS; EDUARDO E. HOLGUIN

Guatemala: M. ARROYO

Brazil: LUCILLO A. DA CUNHA BUENO; GILBERTO AMADO

Ecuador: A. AGUIRRE APARICIO; H. ALBORNOZ; ANTONIO PARRA V.; C. PUIG V.; ARTURO SCARONE

Nicaragua: LEONARDO ARGUELLO; M. CORDERO REYES; CARLOS CUADRA PASOS

Colombia: ALFONSO LOPEZ; RAIMUNDO RIVAS

Chile: MIGUEL CRUCHAGA; J. RAMON GUTIERREZ; F. FIGUEROA; F. NIETO DEL RIO; B. COHEN

Peru: (with the reservation set forth) ALFREDO SOLF Y MURO

Cuba: ALBERTO GIRAUDY; HERMINIO PORTELL VILA; ING. NOGUEIRA

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The "Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States" is translated as Mengteweiduo guojia quanli yiwu gongyue 蒙特維多國家權利義務公約 in Chinese.

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The ROC's Declaration of War Against Japan

Name in Chinese Zhonghua minguo zhengfu dui Ri xuanzhan bugao 中華民國政府對日宣戰布告
Document type Official declaration of war issued by the ROC government against Japan
Year, date 1941, Dec. 9
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(December 9, 1941)

Japan's national policy has always aimed at the domination of Asia and mastery of the Pacific. For more than four years China has resolutely resisted Japan's aggression, regardless of suffering and sacrifice, in order not only to maintain her national independence and freedom but also to uphold international law and justice and to promote world peace and human happiness.

China is a peace-loving nation. In taking up arms in self-defense, China entertained the hope that Japan might yet realise the futility of her plans of conquest. Throughout the struggle all the other powers have shown the utmost forbearance likewise in the hope that Japan might one day repent and mend her ways in the interest of peace in the entire Pacific region.

Unfortunately Japan's aggressive capacities prove to be incorrigible. After her long and fruitless attempt to conquer China, Japan, far from showing any signs of penitence, has treacherously launched an attack on China's friends, the United States and Great Britain, thus extending the theater of her aggressive activities and making herself the arch-enemy of justice and world peace.

This latest act of aggression on the part of Japan lays bare her insatiable ambitions and has created a situation that no nation which believes in international good faith and human decency can tolerate.

The Chinese Government hereby formally declares war on Japan. The Chinese Government further declares that all treaties, conventions, agreements and contracts regarding relations between China and Japan are and remain null and void.

1941, December 9. Chairman, Lin Sen

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中華民國政府對日宣戰布告

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

（1941年12月9日）

日本軍閥夙以征服亞洲，并獨霸太平洋為其國策。數年以來，中國不顧一切犧牲，繼續抗戰，其目的不僅在保衛中國之獨立生存，實欲打破日本之侵略野心，維護國際公法、正義及人類福利与世界和平，此中國政府屢經聲明者也。

中國為酷愛和平之民族，過去四年余之神圣抗戰，原期侵略者之日本于遭受實際之懲創后，終能反省。在此時期，各友邦亦极端忍耐，冀其悔禍，俾全太平洋之和平，得以維持。不料強暴成性之日本，執迷不悟，且更悍然向我英、美諸友邦幵釁，擴大其戰爭侵略行動，甘為破壞全人類和平与正義之戎首，逞其侵略無厭之野心。舉凡尊重信義之國家，咸屬忍無可忍。茲特正式對日宣戰，昭告中外，所有一切條約、協定、合同，有涉及中、日間之關系者，一律廢止，特此布告。

中華民國三十年十二月九日 主席　林森

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Declaration by United Nations

Name in Chinese lianheguo gongtong xuanyan 聯合國共同宣言
Document type Multilateral treaty
Year, date 1942, Jan. 1
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(Subscribing to the Principles of the Atlantic Charter, January 1, 1942)

A Joint Declaration by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia.

The Governments signatory hereto,

Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter.

Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world,

DECLARE:

(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war.

(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.

The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.

DONE at Washington

January First, 1942

[The signatories to the Declaration by United Nations are as listed above.]

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聯合國共同宣言

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

美利堅合衆國、大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國、蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯盟、中國、澳大利亞、比利時、加拿大、哥斯達黎加、古巴、捷克斯洛伐克、多米尼加共和國、薩爾瓦多、希臘、危地馬拉、海地、洪都拉斯、印度、盧森堡、荷蘭、新西蘭、尼加拉瓜、挪威、巴拿馬、波蘭、南非聯邦和南斯拉夫各國的聯合宣言。

本宣言簽字國政府，對于1941年8月14日美利堅合衆國總統和大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國首相多座聯合宣言稱爲大西洋憲章內所載宗旨與原則的共同方案也已表示贊同，

深信完全戰勝它們的敵對國對于保衛生命、自由、獨立和宗教自由並對于保全其本國和其他各國的人權和正義非常重要，同時它們現在正對力圖征服世界的野蠻和殘暴的力量從事共同的鬥爭，

茲宣告：

（一） 每一征服各自保證對各該政府作戰的三國同盟成員國及其附從者使用其全部資源，不論軍事的或經濟的。

（二） 每一政府各自保證瘀斑宣言簽字國合作，並不與敵人締結單獨停戰協定或協約。

現在或可能將在戰勝希特勒主義的鬥爭中給予物質上援助和貢獻的其他國家得加入上述宣言。

於1942年1月1日訂於華盛頓。

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Cairo Declaration

Name in Chinese Kailuo xuanyan 開羅宣言
Document type Non-binding radio announcement
Year, date 1943, Dec. 1
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(Jump to Yalta Agreement)    (Jump to Potsdam Agreement)

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Mr. Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa. The following general statement was issued:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.

"The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

"With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

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開羅宣言

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

羅斯福總統、蔣委員長、邱吉爾首相、偕同各該國軍事與外交顧問人員，在北非舉行會議，業已完畢，茲發表概括之聲明如下：

三國軍事方面人員關於今後對日作戰計畫，已獲得一致意見，我三大盟國決心以不鬆弛之壓力從海陸空各方面加諸殘暴之敵人，此項壓力已經在增長之中。我三大盟國此次進行戰爭之目的，在於制止及懲罰日本之侵略，三國決不為自己圖利，亦無拓展領土之意思。三國之宗旨，在剝奪日本自從一九一四年第一次世界大戰開始後在太平洋上所奪得或佔領之一切島嶼；在使日本所竊取於中國之領土，例如東北四省(2)、臺灣、澎湖群島等，歸還中華民國；其他日本以武力或貪欲所攫取之土地，亦務將日本驅逐出境；我三大盟國稔知朝鮮人民所受之奴隸待遇，決定在相當時期，使朝鮮自由與獨立。根據以上所認定之各項目標，並與其他對日作戰之聯合國(3)目標相一致，我三大盟國將堅忍進行其重大而長期之戰爭，以獲得日本之無條件投降。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Cairo Conference was attended by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and ROC President Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 and took place Nov. 22–26, 1943. The Cairo Declaration (also called "Cairo Communique") was not a treaty, was not signed, and was released via radio broadcast on Dec. 1, 1943. It is called Kairo sengen カイロ宣言 in Japanese.

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Convention on International Civil Aviation

Name in Chinese guoji minyong hangkong gongyue 國際民用航空公約 / Zhijiage gongyue 芝加哥公約
Document type Multilateral treaty
Year, date 1944, Dec. 7
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Preamble
Part I. Air Navigation
Part II. The International Civil Aviation Organization 		   Part III. International Air Transport
Part IV. Final Provisions
Signature of Convention

Done at Chicago on the 7th Day of December 1944

Preamble

WHEREAS the future development of international civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can become a threat to the general security; and

WHEREAS it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that cooperation between nations and peoples upon which the peace of the world depends;

THEREFORE, the undersigned governments having agreed on certain principles and arrangements in order that international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically;

Have accordingly concluded this Convention to that end.

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Part I. Air Navigation

CHAPTER 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION

Article 1

Sovereignty The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.

Article 2

Territory For the purposes of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State.

Article 3

Civil and
state aircraft		 (a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to state aircraft.
 (b) Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be state aircraft.
 (c) No state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the terms thereof.
 (d) The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.

Article 4

Misuse of
civil aviation		Each contracting State agrees not to use civil aviation for any purpose inconsistent with the alms of this Convention.

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CHAPTER II: FLIGHT OVER TERRITORY OF CONTRACTING STATES

Article 5

Right of non-scheduled flight Each contracting State agrees that all aircraft of the other contracting States, being aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air services shall have the right, subject to the observance of the terms of this Convention, to make flights into or in transit nonstop across its territory and to make stops for non-traffic purposes without the necessity of obtaining prior permission, and subject to the right of the State flown over to require landing. Each contracting State nevertheless reserves the right, for reasons of safety of flight, to require aircraft desiring to proceed over regions which are inaccessible or without adequate air navigation facilities to follow prescribed routes, or to obtain special permission for such flights.
 Such aircraft, if engaged in the carriage of passengers, cargo, or mail for remuneration or hire on other than scheduled international air services, shall also, subject to the provisions of Article 7, have the privilege of taking on or discharging passengers, cargo, or mail, subject to the right of any State where such embarkation or discharge takes place to impose such regulations, conditions or limitations as it may consider desirable.

Article 6

Scheduled
air services		No scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization of that State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or authorization.

Article 7

Cabotage Each contracting State shall have the right to refuse permission to the aircraft of other contracting States to take on in its territory passengers, mail and cargo carried for remuneration or hire and destined for another point within its territory. Each contracting State undertakes not to enter into any arrangements which specifically grant any such privilege on an exclusive basis to any other State or an airline of any other State, and not to obtain any such exclusive privilege from any other State.

Article 8

Pilotless aircraft No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall be flown without a pilot over the territory of a contracting State without special authorization by that State and in accordance with the terms of such authorization. Each contracting State undertakes to insure that the flight of such aircraft without a pilot in regions open to civil aircraft shall be so controlled as to obviate danger to civil aircraft.

Article 9

Prohibited areas  (a) Each contracting State may, for reasons of military necessity or public safety, restrict or prohibit uniformly the aircraft of other States from flying over certain areas of its territory, provided that no distinction in this respect is made between the aircraft of the State whose territory ls involved, engaged in international scheduled airline services, and the aircraft of the other contracting States likewise engaged. Such prohibited areas shall be of reasonable extent and location so &s not to lnterfered unnecessarily with air navigation. Descriptions of such prohibited areas in the territory of a contracting State, as well as any subsequent alterations therein, shall be communicated as soon as possible to the other contracting States and to the International Civil Aviation Organization.
 (b) Each contracting State reserves also the right, in exceptional circumstances or during a period of emergency, or in the interest of public safety, and with immediate effect, temporarily to restrict or prohibit flying over the whole or any part of its territory, on condition that such restriction or prohibition shall be applicable without distinction of nationality to aircraft of all other States.
 (c) Each contracting State, under such regulations as it may prescribe, may require any aircraft entering the areas contemplated in subparagraphs (a) or (b) above to effect a landing as soon as practicable thereafter at some designated airport within its territory.

Article 10

Landing at customs airport Except in a case where, under the terms of this Convention or a special authorization, aircraft are permitted to cross the territory of a contracting State without landing, every aircraft which enters the territory of a contracting State shall, if the regulations of that State so require, land at an airport designated by that State for the purpose of customs and other examination. On departure from the territory of a contracting State, such aircraft shall depart from a similarly designated customs airport. Particulars of all designated customs airports shall be published by the State and transmitted to the International Civil Aviation Organization established under Part II of this Convention for communication to all other contracting States.

Article 11

Applicability of air regulations Subject to the provisions of this Convention, the laws and regulations of a contracting State relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to the aircraft of all contracting States without distinction as to nationality, and shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entering or departing from or while within the territory of that State.

Article 12

Rules of
the air		Each contracting State undertakes to adopt measures to insure that every aircraft flying over or maneuvering within its territory and that every aircraft carrying its nationality mark, wherever such aircraft may be, shall comply with the rules and regulations relating to the flight and maneuver of aircraft there in force. Each contracting State undertakes to keep its own regulations in these respects uniform, to the greatest possible extent, with those established from time to time under this Convention. Over the high seas, the rules in force shall be those established under this Convention. Each contracting State undertakes to insure the prosecution of all persons violating the regulations applicable.

Article 13

Entry and clearance regulations The laws and regulations of a contracting State as to the admission to or departure from its territory of passengers, crew or cargo of aircraft, such as regulations relating to entry, clearance, immigration, passports, customs, and quarantine shall be complied with by or on behalf of such passengers, crew or cargo upon entrance into or departure from, or while within the territory of that State.

Article 14

Prevention
of spread of disease		Each contracting State agrees to take effective measures to prevent the spread by means of air navigation of cholera, typhus (epidemic), smallpox, yellow fever, plague, and such other communicable diseases as the contracting States shall from time to time decide to designate, and to that end contracting States will keep in close consultation with the agencies concerned with international regulations relating to sanitary measures applicable to aircraft. Such consultation shall be without prejudice to the application of any existing international convention on this subject to which the contracting States may be parties.

Article 15

Airport and similar charges Every airport in a contracting State which is open to public use by its national aircraft shall likewise, subject to the provisions of Article 68, be open under uniform conditions to the aircraft of all the other contracting States. The like uniform conditions shall apply to the use, by aircraft of every contracting State, of all air navigation facilities, including radio and meteorological services, which may be provided for public use for the safety and expedition of air navigation.
 Any charges that may be imposed or permitted to be imposed by a contracting State for the use of such airports and air navigation facilities by the aircraft of any other contracting State shall not be higher,
 (a) As to aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air services, than those that would be paid by its national aircraft of the same class engaged in similar operations, and
 (b) As to aircraft engaged in scheduled international air services, than those that would be paid by its national aircraft engaged in similar international air services.
 All such charges shall be published and communicated to the International Civil Aviation Organization: provided that, upon representation by an interested contracting State, the charges imposed for the use of airports and other facilities shall be subject to review by the Council, which shall report and make recommendations thereon for the consideration of the State or States concerned. No fees, dues or other charges shall be imposed by any contracting State in respect solely of the right of transit over or entry into or exit from its territory of any aircraft of a contracting State or persons or property thereon.

Article 16

Search of aircraft The appropriate authorities of each of the contracting States shall have the right, without unreasonable delay, to search aircraft of the other contracting States on landing or departure, and to inspect the certificates and other documents prescribed by this Convention.

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CHAPTER III: NATIONALITY OF AIRCRAFT

Article 17

Nationality
of aircraft		Aircraft have the nationality of the State in which they are registered.

Article 18

Dual registrationAn aircraft cannot be validly registered in more than one State, but its registration may be changed from one State to another.

Article 19

National laws governing registrationThe registration or transfer of registration of aircraft in any contracting State shall be made in accordance with its laws and regulations.

Article 20

Display of marksEvery aircraft engaged in international air navigation shall bear its appropriate nationality and registration marks.

Article 21

Report of registrationsEach contracting State undertakes to supply to any other contracting State or to the International Civil Aviation Organization, on demand, information concerning the registration and ownership of any particular aircraft registered in that State. In addition, each contracting State shall furnish reports To the International Civil Aviation Organization, under such regulations as the latter may prescribe, giving such pertinent date as can be made available concerning the ownership and control of aircraft registered in that State and habitually engaged in international air navigation. The data thus obtained by the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be made available by it on request to the other contracting States.

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CHAPTER IV: MEASURES TO FACILITATE AIR NAVIGATION

Article 22

Facilitation of formalitiesEach contracting State agrees to adopt all practicable measures, through the issuance of special regulations or otherwise, to facilitate and expedite navigation by aircraft between the territories of contracting States, and to prevent unnecessary delays to aircraft, crews, passengers and cargo, especially in the administration of the laws relating to immigration, quarantine, customs and clearance.

Article 23

Customs and immigration proceduresEach contracting State undertakes, so far as it may find practicable, to establish customs and immigration procedures affecting international air navigation in accordance with the practices which may be established or recommended from time to time, pursuant to this Convention. Nothing in this Convention shell be construed as preventing the establishment of customs-free airports.

Article 24

Customs duty (a) Aircraft on a flight to, from, or across the territory of another contracting State shall be admitted temporarily free of duty, subject to the customs regulations of the State. Fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment and aircraft stores on board an aircraft of a contracting State, on arrival in the territory of another contracting State and retained on board on leaving the territory of that State shall be exempt from customs duty, inspection fees or similar national or local duties and charges. This exemption shall not apply to any quantities or articles unloaded, except in accordance with the customs regulations of the State, which may require that they shall be kept under customs supervision.
 (b) Spare parts and equipment imported into the territory of a contracting State for incorporation in or use on an aircraft of another contracting State engaged in international air navigation shall be admitted free of customs duty, subject to compliance with the regulations of the State concerned, which may provide that the articles shall be kept under customs supervision and control.

Article 25

Aircraft in distressEach contracting State undertakes to provide such measures of assistance to aircraft in distress in its territory as it may find practicable, and to permit, subject to control by its own authorities, the owners of the aircraft or authorities of the State in which the aircraft is registered to provide such measures of assistance as may be necessitated by the circumstances. Each contracting State, when undertaking search for missing aircraft, will collaborate in coordinated measures which may be recommended from time to time pursuant to this Convention.

Article 26

Investigation of accidentsIn the event of an accident to an aircraft of a contracting State occurring in the territory of another contracting State, and involving death or serious injury, or indicating serious technical defect in the aircraft or air navigation facilities, the State in which the accident occurs will institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the accident, in accordance, so far as its laws permit, with the procedure which may be recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization. The State in which the aircraft is registered shall be given the opportunity to appoint observers to be present at the inquiry and the State holding the inquiry shall communicate the report and findings in the matter to that State.

Article 27

Exemption from seizure on patent claims (a) While engaged in international air navigation, any authorized entry of aircraft of a contracting State into the territory of another contracting State or authorized transit across the territory of such State with or without landings shall not entail any seizure or detention of the aircraft or any claim against the owner or operator thereof or any other interference therewith by or on behalf of such State or any person therein, on the ground that the construction, mechanism, parts, accessories or operation of the aircraft is an infringement of any patent, design, or model duly granted or registered in the State whose territory is entered by the aircraft, it being agreed that no deposit of security in connection with the foregoing exemption from seizure or detention of the aircraft shall in any case be required in the State entered by such aircraft.
 (b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this Article shall also be applicable to the storage of spare parts and spare equipment for the aircraft and the right to use and install the same in the repair of an aircraft of a contracting State in the territory of any other contracting State, provided that any patented part or equipment so stored shall not be sold or distributed internally in or exported commercially from the contracting State entered by the aircraft.
 (c) The benefits of this Article shall apply only to such States, parties to this Convention, as either (1) are parties to the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and to any amendments thereof; or (2) have enacted patent laws which recognize and give adequate protection to inventions made by the nationals of the other States parties to this Convention.

Article 28

Air navigation facilities and standard systemsEach contracting State undertakes, so far as it may find practicable, to:
 (a) Provide, in its territory, airports, radio services, meteorological services and other air navigation facilities to facilitate international air navigation, in accordance with the standards and practices recommended or established from time to time, pursuant to this Convention;
 (b) Adopt and put into operation the appropriate standard systems of communications procedure, codes, markings, signals, lighting and other operational practices and rules which may be recommended or established from time to time, pursuant to this Convention;
 (c) Collaborate in international measures to secure the publication of aeronautical maps and charts in accordance with standards which may be recommended or established from time to time, pursuant to this Convention.

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CHAPTER V: CONDITIONS TO BE FULFILLED WITH RESPECT TO AIRCRAFT

Article 29

Documents carried in aircraftEvery aircraft of a contracting State, engaged in international navigation, shall carry the following documents in conformity with the conditions prescribed in this Convention:
 (a) Its certificate of registration;
 (b) Its certificate of airworthiness;
 (c) The appropriate licenses for each member of the crew;
 (d) Its journey log book;
 (e) If it is equipped with radio apparatus, the aircraft radio station license;
 (f) If it carries passengers, a list of their names and places of and destination;
 (g) If it carries cargo, a manifest and detailed declarations of the cargo.

Article 30

Aircraft radio equipment (a) Aircraft of each contracting State may, in or over the territory of other contracting States, carry radio transmitting apparatus only if a license to install and operate such apparatus has been issued by the appropriate authorities of the State in which the aircraft is registered. The use of radio transmitting apparatus in the territory of the contracting State whose territory is flown over shall be in accordance with the regulations prescribed by that State.
 (b) Radio transmitting apparatus may be used only by members of the flight crew who are provided with a special license for the purpose, issued by the appropriate authorities of the State in which the aircraft is registered.

Article 31

Certificates of airworthinessEvery aircraft engaged in international navigation shall be provided with a certificate of airworthiness issued or rendered valid by the State in which it is registered.

Article 32

Licenses of personnel (a) The pilot of every aircraft and the other members of the operating crew of every aircraft engaged in international navigation shall be provided with certificates of competency and licenses issued or rendered valid by the State in which the aircraft is registered.
 (b) Each contracting State reserves the right to refuse to recognize, for the purpose of flight above its own territory, certificates of competency and licenses granted to any of its nationals by another contracting State.

Article 33

Recognition of certificates and licensesCertificates of airworthiness and certificates of competency and licenses issued or rendered valid by the contracting State in which the aircraft is registered, shall be recognized as valid by the other contracting States, provided that the requirements under which such certificates or licenses were issued or rendered valid are equal to or above the minimum standards which may be established from time to time pursuant to this Convention.

Article 34

Journey log booksThere shall be maintained in respect of every aircraft engaged in international navigation a Journey log book in which shall be entered particulars of the aircraft, its crew and of each Journey, in such form as may be prescribed from time to time pursuant to this Convention.

Article 35

Cargo restrictions (a) No munitions of war or implements of war may be carried in or above the territory of a State in aircraft engaged in international navigation, except by permission of such State. Each State shall determine by regulations what constitutes munitions of war or implements of war for the purposes of this Article, giving due consideration, for the purposes of uniformity, to such recommendations as the International Civil Aviation Organization may from time to time make.
 (b) Each contracting State reserves the right, for reasons of public-order and safety, to regulate or prohibit the carriage in or above its territory of articles other than those enumerated in paragraph (a): provided that no distinction is made in this respect between its national aircraft engaged in international navigation and the aircraft of the other States so engaged; and provided further that no restriction shell be imposed which may interfere with the carriage and use on aircraft of apparatus necessary for the operation or navigation of the aircraft or the safety of the personnel or passengers.

Article 36

Photographic apparatusEach contracting State may prohibit or regulate the use of photographic apparatus in aircraft over its territory.

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CHAPTER VI: INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES

Article 37

Adoption of international proceduresEach contracting State undertakes to collaborate standards and 1in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation.
 To this end the International Civil Aviation Organization shall adopt and amend from time to time, as may be necessary, international standards and recommended practices and procedures dealing with:
 (a) Communications systems and air navigation aids, including ground marking;
 (b) Characteristics of airports and landing strips;
 (c) Rules of the air and air traffic control practices;
 (d) Licensing of operating and mechanical personnel;
 (e) Airworthiness of aircraft;
 (f) Registration and identification of aircraft;
 (g) Collection and exchange of meteorological information;
 (h) Log books;
 (i) Aeronautical maps and charts;
 (j) Customs and immigration procedures;
 (k) Aircraft in distress and investigation of accidents;
 and such other matters concerned with the safety, regularity, and efficiency of air navigation as may from time to time appear appropriate.

Article 38

Departures from international standards and proceduresAny State which finds it impracticable to comply in all respects with any such international standard or procedure, or to bring its own regulations or practices into full accord with any international standard or procedure after amendment of the latter, or which deems it necessary to adopt regulations or practices differing in any particular respect from those established by an international standard, shall give immediate notification to the International Civil Aviation Organization of the differences between its own practice and that established by the international standard. In the case of amendments to international standards, any State which does not make the appropriate amendments to its own regulations or practices shall give notice to the Council within sixty days of the adoption of the amendment to the international standard, or indicate the action which it proposes to take. In any such case, the Council shall make immediate notification to all other states of the difference which exists between one or more features of an international standard and the corresponding national practice of that State.

Article 39

Endorsement of certificates and licenses (a) Any aircraft or part thereof with respect to which there exists an 1ntérnational standard of airworthiness or performance, and which failed in any respect to satisfy that standard at the time of its certification, shall have endorsed on or attached to its airworthiness certificate a complete enumeration of the details in respect of which it so failed.
 (b) Any person holding a license who does not satisfy in full the conditions laid down in the international standard relating to the class of license or certificate which he holds shall have endorsed on or attached to his license a complete enumeration of the particulars in which he does not satisfy such conditions.

Article 40

Validity of endorsed certificates
and licenses		No aircraft or personnel having certificates or licenses so endorsed shall participate in international navigation, except with the permission of the State or States whose territory is entered. The registration or use of any such aircraft, or of any certificated aircraft part, in any State other than that in which it was originally certificated shall be at the discretion of the State into which the aircraft or part is imported.

Article 41

Recognition
of existing standards of airworthiness		The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to aircraft and aircraft equipment of types of which the prototype is submitted to the appropriate national authorities for certification prior to a date three years after the date of adoption of an international standard of airworthiness for such equipment.

Article 42

Recognition
of existing standards of competency		The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to personnel whose licenses are originally issued of personnel prior to a date one year after initial adoption of an international standard of qualification for such personnel; but they shall in any case apply to all personnel whose licenses remain valid five years after the date of adoption of such standard.

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Part II. The International Civil Aviation Organization

CHAPTER VII: THE ORGANIZATION

Article 43

Name and compositionAn organization to be named the International Civil Aviation Organization is formed by the Convention. It is made up of an Assembly, a Council, and such other bodies as may be necessary.

Article 44

ObjectivesThe aims and objectives of the Organization are to develop the principles and techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and development of international air transport so as to:
 (a) Insure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world;
 (b) Encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for peaceful purposes;
 (c) Encourage the development of airways, airports, and air navigation facilities for international civil aviation;
 (d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport;
 (e) Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competition;
 (f) Insure that the rights of contracting States are fully respected and that every contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines;
 (g) Avoid discrimination between contracting States;
 (h) Promote safety of flight in international air navigation;
 (i) Promote generally the development of all aspects of international civil aeronautics.

Article 45

Permanent
seat		The permanent seat of the Organization shall be at such place as shall be determined at the final meeting of the Interim Assembly of the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization set up by the Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago on December 7, 1944. The seat may be temporarily transferred elsewhere by decision of the Council.

Article 46

First meeting of AssemblyThe first meeting of the Assembly shall be summoned by the Interim Council of the above-mentioned Provisional Organization as soon as the Convention has come Into force, to meet at a time and place to be decided by the Interim Council.

Article 47

Legal
capacity		The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each contracting State such legal capacity as may be necessary for the performance of its functions. Full Juridical personality shall be granted wherever compatible with the constitution and laws of the State concerned.

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CHAPTER VIII: THE ASSEMBLY

Article 48

Meetings of Assembly and voting (a) The Assembly shall meet annually and shall be convened by the Council at a suitable time and place. Extraordinary meetings of the Assembly may be held at any time upon the call of the Council or at the request of any ten contracting States addressed to the Secretary General.
 (b) All contracting States shall have an equal right to be represented at the meetings of the Assembly and each contracting State shall be entitled to one vote. Delegates representing contracting States may be assisted by technical advisers who may participate in the meetings but shall have no vote.
 (c) A majority of the contracting States is required to constitute a quorum for the meetings of the Assembly. Unless otherwise provided in this Convention, decisions of the Assembly shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast.

Article 49

Powers and duties of AssemblyThe powers and duties of the Assembly shall be
 (a) Elect at each meeting its President and other officers;
 (b) Elect the contracting States to be represented on the Council, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IX;
 (c) Examine and take appropriate action on the reports of the Council and decide on any matter referred to it by the Council;
 (d) its own rules of procedure and establish such subsidiary commissions as it may consider to be necessary or desirable;
 (e) Vote an annual budget and determine the financial arrangements of the Organization, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XII;
 (f) Review expenditures and approve the accounts of the Organization;
 (g) Refer, at its discretion, to the Council, to subsidiary commissions, or to any other body any matter within its sphere of action;
 (h) Delegate to the Council the powers and authority necessary or desirable for the discharge of the duties of the Organization and revoke or modify the delegations of authority at any time;
 (i) Carry out the appropriate provisions of Chapter XIII;
 (j) Consider proposals for the modification or amendment of the provisions of this Convention and, if of the proposals, recommend them to the contracting States in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXI;
 (k) Deal with any matter within the sphere of action of the Organization not specifically assigned to the Council.

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CHAPTER IX: THE COUNCIL

Article 50

Composition and election
of Council		 (a) The Council shall be a permanent body responsible to the Assembly. It shall be composed of twentyone contracting States elected by the Assembly. An election shall be held at the first meeting of the Assembly and thereafter every three years, and the members of the Council so elected shall hold office until the next following election.
 (b) In electing the members of the Council, the Assembly shall give adequate representation to (1) the States of chief importance in air transport; (2) the States not otherwise included which make the largest contribution to the provision of facilities for international civil air navigation; and (3) the States not otherwise included whose designation will insure that all the major geographic areas of the world are represented on the Council. Any vacancy on the Council shall be filled by the as soon as possible; any contracting State so elected to the Council shall hold office for the unexpired portion of its predecessor's term of office.
 (c) No representative of a contracting State on the Council shall be actively associated with the operation of an international air service or financially interested in such a service.

Article 51

President of CouncilThe Council shall elect its President for a term of three years. He may be reelected. He shall have no vote. The Council shall elect from among its members one or more Vice Presidents who shall retain their right to vote when serving as acting President. The President need not be selected from among the representatives of the members of the Council but, if a representative is elected, his seat shall be deemed vacant and it shall be filled by the State which he represented. The dutles of the President shall be; to:
 (a) Convene meetings of the Council, the Air Transport Committee, and the Air Navigation Commission;
 (b) Serve as representative of the Council; and
 (c) Carry out on behalf of the Council the functions which the Council assigns to him.

Article 52

Voting in CouncilDecisions by the Council shall require approval by a majority of its members. The Council may delegate authority with respect to any particular matter to a committee of its members., Decisions of any committee of the Council may be appealed to the Council by any interested contracting State.

Article 53

Participation without a voteAny contracting State may participate, without a vote, in the consideration by the Council and by its committees and commissions of any question which especially affects its interests. No member of the Council shell vote in the consideration by the of a dispute to which it is a party.

Article 54

Mandatory functions of CouncilThe Council shall:
 (a) Submit annual reports to the Assembly;
 (b) Carry out the directions of the Assembly and discharge the duties and obligations which are laid on it by this Convention;
 (c) Determine its organization and rules of procedure;
 (d) Appoint and define the duties of an Air Transport Committee, which shall be chosen from among the representatives of the members of the Council, and which shall be responsible to it;
 (e) Establish an Air Navigation Commission, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X;
 (f) Administer the finances of the Organization in accordance with the provisions of Chapters XII end XV;
 (g) Determine the emoluments of the President of the Council;
 (h) Appoint a chief executive officer who shall be called the Secretary General, and make provision for the appointment of such other personnel as may be necessary, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XI;
 (i) Request, collect, examine and publish information relating to the advancement of air navigation and the operation of international air services, including information about the costs of operation and particulars of subsidies paid to airlines from public funds;
 (j) Report to contracting States any infraction of this Convention, as well as any failure to carry out recommendations or determinations of the Council;
 (k) Report to the Assembly any infraction of this Convention where a contracting State has failed to take appropriate action within a reasonable time after notice of the infraction;
 (l) Adopt, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VI of this Convention, international standards and recommended practices; for convenience, designate them as Annexes to this Convention; and notify all contracting States of the action taken;
 (m) Consider recommendations of the Air Navigation Commission for amendment of the Annexes and take action in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XX;
 (n) Consider any matter relating to the Convention which any contracting State refers to it.

Article 55

Permissive functions of CouncilThe Council may:
 (a) Where appropriate and as experience may show to be desirable, create subordinate air transport commissions on a regional or other basis and define groups of states or airlines with or through which it may deal to facilitate the carrying out of the alms of this Convention;
 (b) Delegate to the Air Navigation Commission duties additional to those set forth in the Convention and revoke or modify such delegations of authority at any time;
 (c) Conduct research into all aspects of air transport and air navigation which are of international importance, communicate the results of its research to the contracting States, and facilitate the exchange of information between contracting States on air transport and air navigation matters;
 (d) Study any matters affecting the organization and operation of international air transport, including the international ownership and operation of international air services on trunk routes, and submit to the Assembly plans in relation thereto;
 (e) Investigate, at the request of any contracting State, any situation which may appear to present avoidable obstacles to the development of international air navigation; and, after such investigation, issue such reports as may appear to it desirable.

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CHAPTER X: AIR NAVIGATION COMMISSION

Article 56

Nomination and appointment of CommissionThe Air Navigation Commission shall be composed of twelve members appointed by the Council from among persons nominated by contracting States. These persons shall have suitable qualifications and experience in the science and practice of aeronautics. The Council shall request all contracting States to submit nominations. The President of the Air Navigation Commission shall be appointed by the Council.

Article 57

Duties of CommissionThe Air Navigation Commission shall:
 (a) Consider, and recommend to the Council for adoption, modifications of the Annexes to this Convention;
 (b) Establish technical subcommissions on which any contracting State may be represented, if it so desires;
 (c) Advise the Council concerning the collection and communication to the contracting States of all information which it considers necessary and useful for the advancement of air navigation.

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CHAPTER XI: PERSONNEL

Article 58

Appointment of personnelSubject to any rules laid down by the Assembly and to the provisions of this Convention, the Council shall determine the method of appointment and of termination of appointment, the training, and the salaries, allowances, and conditions of service of the Secretary General and other personnel of the Organization, and may employ or make use of the services of nationals of any contracting State.

Article 59

International character of personnelThe President of the Council, the Secretary General, and other personnel shall not seek or receive instructions in regard to the discharge of their responsibilities from any authority external to the Organization. Each contracting State undertakes fully to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the personnel and not to seek to influence any of its nationals in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 60

Immunities and privileges of personnelEach contracting State undertakes, so far as possible under its constitutional procedure, to accord to the President of the Council, the Secretary General, and the other personnel of the Organization, the immunities and privileges which are accorded to corresponding personnel of other public international organizations. If a general international agreement on the immunities and privileges of international civil servants is arrived at, the immunities and privileges accorded to the President, the Secretary General, and the other personnel of the Organization shall be the immunities and privileges accorded under that general international agreement.

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CHAPTER XII: FINANCE

Article 61

Budget and apportionment of expensesThe Council shall submit to the Assembly an annual budget, annual statements of accounts and estimates of all receipts and expenditures. The Assembly shall vote the budget with whatever modification it sees fit to prescribe, and, with the exception of assessments under Chapter XV to States consenting thereto, shall apportion the expenses of the Organization among the contracting States on the basis which it shall from time to time determine.

Article 62

Suspension of voting powerThe Assembly may suspend the voting power in the Assembly and in the Council of any contracting State that falls to discharge within a reasonable period its financial obligations to the Organization.

Article 63

Expenses of delegations
and other representatives		Each contracting State shall bear the expenses of its own delegation to the Assembly and the remuneration, travel, and other expenses of any person whom it appoints to serve on the Council, and of its nominees or representatives on any subsidiary committees or commissions of the Organization.

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CHAPTER XIII: OTHER INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 64

Security arrangementsThe Organization may, with respect to air matters within its competence directly affecting world security, by vote of the Assembly enter into appropriate arrangements with any general organization set up by the nations of the world to preserve peace.

Article 65

Arrangements with other international bodiesThe Council, on behalf of the Organization, may enter into agreements with other international bodies for the maintenance of common services and for common arrangements concerning personnel and, with the approval of the Assembly, may enter into such other arrangements as may facilitate the work of the Organization.

Article 66

Functions relating
to other agreements		 (a) The Organization shall also carry out the functions placed upon it by the International Air Services Transit Agreement and by the International Air Transport Agreement drawn up at Chicago on December 7, 1944, in accordance with the terms and conditions therein set forth.
 (b) Members of the Assembly and the Council who have not accepted the International Air Services Transit Agreement or the International Air Transport Agreement drawn up at Chicago on December 7, 1944 shall not have the right to vote on any questions referred to the Assembly or Council under the provisions of the relevant Agreement.

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Part III. International Air Transport

CHAPTER XIV: INFORMATION AND REPORTS

Article 67

File reports
with Council		Each contracting State undertakes that its international airlines shall, in accordance with requirements laid down by the Council, file with the Council traffic reports, cost statistics and financial statements showing among other things all receipts and the sources thereof.

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CHAPTER XV: AIRPORTS AND OTHER AIR NAVIGATION FACILITIES

Article 68

Designation
of routes and airports		Each contracting State may, subject to the provisions of this Convention, designate the route to be followed within its territory by any international air service and the airports which any such service may use.

Article 69

Improvement of air navigation facilitiesIf the Council is of the opinion that the airports or other air navigation facilities, including radio and meteorological services, of a contracting State are not reasonably adequate for the safe, regular, efficient, and economical operation of international air services, present or contemplated, the Council shall consult with the State directly concerned, and other States affected, with a view to finding means by which the situation may be remedied, and may make recommendations for that purpose. No contracting State shall be guilty of an infraction of this Convention if it falls to carry out these recommendations.

Article 70

Financing of
air navigation facilities		A contracting State, in the circumstances arising under the provisions of Article 69, may conclude in arrangement with the Council for giving effect to such recommendations, The State may elect to bear all of the costs involved in any such arrangement. If the State does not so elect, the Council may agree, at the request of the State, to provide for all or a portion of the costs.

Article 71

Provision and maintenance of facilities by CouncilIf a contracting State so requests, the Council may agree to provide, man, maintain, and administer any or all of the airports and other air navigation facilities, including radio and meteorological services, required in its territory for the safe, regular, efficient and economical operation of the international air services of the other contracting States, and may specify just and reasonable charges for the use of the facilities provided.

Article 72

Acquisition or use of landWhere land is needed for facilities financed in whole or in part by the Council at the request of a contracting State, that State shall either provide the land itself, retaining title if it wishes, or facilitate the use of the land by the Council on Just and reasonable terms and in accordance with the laws of the State concerned.

Article 73

Expenditure and assessment of fundsWithin the limit of the funds which may be made available to it by the Assembly under Chapter XII, the Council may make current expenditures for the purposes of this Chapter from the general funds of the Organization. The Council shell assess the capital funds required for the purposes of this Chapter in previously agreed proportions over a reasonable period of time to the contracting States consenting thereto whose airlines use the facilities. The Council may also assess to States that consent any working funds that are required.

Article 74

Technical assistance and utilization of revenuesWhen the Council, at the request of a contracting State, advances funds or provides airports or other facilities in whole or in part, the arrangement may provide, with the consent of that State, for technical assistance in the supervision and operation of the airports and other facilities, and for the payment, from the revenues derived from the operation of the airports and other facilities, of the operating expenses of the airports and the other facilities, and of interest and amortization charges.

Article 75

Taking over of facilities from CouncilA contracting State may at any time discharge any obligation into which it has entered under Article 70, and take over airports and other facilities which the Council has provided in its territory pursuant to the provisions of Articles 71 and 72, by paying to the Council an amount which in the opinion of the Council is reasonable in the circumstances. If the State considers that the amount fixed by the Council is unreasonable it may appear to the Assembly against the decision of the Council and the Assembly may confirm or amend the decision of the Council.

Article 76

Return of fundsFunds obtained by the Council through reimbursement under Article 75 and from receipts of interest and amortization payments under Article 74 shall, in the case of advances originally financed by States under Article 73, be returned to the States which were originally assessed in the proportion of their assessments, so determined by the Council.

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CHAPTER XVI: JOINT OPERATING ORGANIZATIONS AND POOLED SERVICES

Article 77

Joint operating organizations permittedNothing in this Convention shall prevent two or more contracting states from constituting joint air transport operating organizations or international operating agencies and from pooling their air services on any routes or in any regions, but such organizations or agencies and such pooled services shall be subject to all the provisions of this Convention, including those relating to the registration of agreements with the Council. The Council shall determine in what manner the provisions of this Convention relating to nationality of aircraft shall apply to aircraft operated by international operating agencies.

Article 78

Function of CouncilThe Council may suggest to contracting States concerned that they form joint organizations to operate air services on any routes or in any regions.

Article 79

Participation
in operating organizations		A State may participate in joint operating organizations or in pooling arrangements, either through its government or through an airline company or companies designated by its government. The companies may, at the sole discretion of the State concerned, be state-owned or partly state-owned or privately owned.

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Part IV. Final Provisions

CHAPTER XVII: OTHER AERONAUTICAL AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS

Article 80

Paris and Habana ConventionsEach contracting State undertakes, immediately upon the coming into force of this Convention, to give notice of denunciation of the Convention relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation signed at Paris on October 13, 1919 or the Convention on Commercial Aviation signed at Habana on February 20, 1928, if it is a party to either. As between contracting States, this Convention supersedes the Conventions of Paris and Habana previously referred to.

Article 81

Registration
of existing agreements		All aeronautical agreements which are in existence on the coming into force of this Convention, and which are between a contracting State and any other State or between an airline of a contracting State and any other State or the airline of any other State, shall be forthwith registered with the Council.

Article 82

Abrogation of inconsistent arrangementsThe contracting States accept this Convention as abrogating all obligations and understandings between them which are inconsistent with its terms, and undertake not to enter into any such obligations and understandings. A contracting State which, before becoming a member of the Organization has undertaken any obligations toward a non-contracting State or a national of a contracting State or of a non-contracting State inconsistent with the terms of this Convention, shall take immediate steps to procure its release from the obligations. If an airline of any contracting State has entered into any such inconsistent obligations, the State of which it is a national shall use its best efforts to secure their termination forthwith and shall in any event cause them to be terminated as soon as such action can lawfully be taken after the coming into force of this Convention.

Article 83

Registration
of new arrangements		Subject to the provisions of the preceding Article, any contracting State may make arrangements not inconsistent with the provisions of this Convention. Any such arrangement shall be forthwith registered with the Council, which shall make it public as soon as possible.

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CHAPTER XVIII: DISPUTES AND DEFAULT

Article 84

Settlement
of disputes		If any disagreement between two or more contracting States relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention and its Annexes cannot be settled by negotiation, it shall, on the application of any State concerned in the disagreement, be decided by the Council. No member of the Council shall vote in the consideration by the Council of any dispute to which it is a party. Any contracting State may, subject to Article 85, appeal from the decision of the Council to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal agreed upon with the other parties to the dispute or to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Any such appeal shall be notified to the Council within sixty days of receipt of notification of the decision of the Council.

Article 85

Arbitration procedureIf any contracting State party to a dispute in which the decision of the Council is under appeal has not accepted the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the contracting States parties to the dispute cannot agree on the choice of the arbitral tribunal, each of the contracting States parties to the dispute shall name a single arbitrator who sshall name an umpire. If either contracting State party to the dispute falls to name an arbitrator within a period of three months from the date of the appeal, an arbitrator shall be named on behalf of that State by the President of the Council from a list of qualified and available persons maintained by the Council. If, within thirty days, the arbitrators cannot agree on an umpire, the President of the Council shall designate an umpire from the list previously referred to. The arbitrators and the umpire shall then Jointly constitute an arbitral tribunal. Any arbitral tribunal established under this or the preceding Article shall settle its own procedure and give its decisions by majority vote, provided that the Council may determine procedural questions in the event of any delay which in the opinion of the Council is excessive.

Article 86

AppealsUnless the Council decides otherwise, any decision by the Council on whether an international airline is operating in conformity with the provisions of this Convention shall remain in effect unless reversed on appeal. On any other matter, decisions of the Council shall, if appealed from, be suspended until the appeal is decided. The decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice and of an arbitral tribunal shall be final and binding.

Article 87

Penalty for non-conformity of airlineEach contracting State undertakes not to allow the operation of an airline of a contracting State through the airspace above its territory if the Council has decided that the airline concerned is not conforming to a final decision rendered in accordance with the previous Article.

Article 88

Penalty for non-conformity by StateThe Assembly shall suspend the voting power in the Assembly and in the Council of any contracting State that is found in default under the provisions of this Chapter.

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CHAPTER XIX: WAR

Article 89

War and emergency conditionsIn case of war, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the freedom of action of any of the contracting States affected, whether as belligerents or as neutrals, The same principle shall apply in the case of any contracting State which declares a state of national emergency and notifies the fact to the Council.

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CHAPTER XX: ANNEXES

Article 90

Adoption and amendment of Annexes (a) The adoption by the Council of the Annexes described in Article 54, subparagraph (1), shall require the vote of two-thirds of the Council at a meeting called for that purpose and shall then be submitted by the Council to each contracting State. Any such Annex or any amendment of an Annex shall become effective within three months after its submission to the contracting States or at the end of such longer period of time as the Council may prescribe, unless in the meantime a majority of the contracting States register their disapproval with the Council.
 (b) The Council shall immediately notify all contracting States of the coming into force of any Annex or amendment thereto.

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CHAPTER XXI: RATIFICATIONS, ADHERENCES, AMENDMENTS, AND DENUNCIATIONS

Article 91

Ratification of Convention (a) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America, which shall give notice of the date of the deposit to each of the signatory and adhering States.
 (b) As soon as this Convention has been ratified or adhered to by twenty-six States it shall come into force between them on the thirtieth day after deposit of the twenty-sixth instrument. It shall come into force for each State ratifying thereafter on the thirtieth day after the deposit of its instrument of ratification.
 (c) It shall be the duty of the Government of the United States of America to notify the government of each of the signatory and adhering States of the date on which this Convention comes into force.

Article 92

Adherence to Convention (a) This Convention shall be open for adherence by members of the United Nations and States associated with them, and States which remained neutral during the present world conflict.
 (b) Adherence shall be effected by a notification addressed to the Government of the United States of America and shall take effect as from the thirtieth day from the receipt of the notification by the Government of the United States of America, which shall notify all the contracting States.

Article 93

Admission of other StatesStates other than those provided for in Articles 91 and 92(a) may, subject to approval by any general international organization set up by the nations of the world to preserve peace, be admitted to participation in this Convention by means of a four-fifths vote of the Assembly and on such conditions as the Assembly may prescribe: provided that in each case the assent of any State invaded or attacked during the present war by the State seeking admission shall be necessary.

Article 94

Amendment of Convention (a) Any proposed amendment to this Convention must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly and shall then come into force in respect of States which have ratified such amendment when ratified by the number of contracting States specified by the Assembly., The number so specified shall not be less than two-thirds of the total number of contracting States.
 (b) If in its opinion the amendment is of such a nature as to Justify this course, the Assembly in its resolution recommending adoption may provide that any State which has not ratified within a specified period after the amendment has come into force shall thereupon cease to be a member of the Organization and a party to the Convention.

Article 95

Denunciation of Convention (a) Any contracting State may give notice of denunciation of this Conventlon three years after its coming into effect by notification addressed to the Government of the United States of America, which shall at once inform each of the contracting States.
 (b) Denunciation shall take effect one year from the date of the receipt of the notification and shall operate only as regards the State effecting the denunciation.

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CHAPTER XXII: DEFINITIONS

Article 96

 For the purpose of this Convention the expression:
 (a) "Air service" means any scheduled air service performed by aircraft for the public transport of passengers, mail or cargo.
 (b) "International air service" means an air service which passes through the air space over the territory of more than one State.
 (c) "Airline" means any air transport enterprise offering or operating an international air service.
 (d) "Stop for non-traffic purposes" means a landing for any purpose other than taking on or discharging passengers, cargo or mail.

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Signature of Convention

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned plenipotentiaries, having been duly authorized, sign this Convention on behalf of their respective governments on the dates appearing opposite their signatures.

DONE at Chicago the seventh day of December 1944, in the English language. A text drawn up in the English, French, and Spanish languages, each of which shall be of equal authenticity, shall be open for signature at Washington, D. C. Both texts shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America, and certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to the governments of all the States which may sign or adhere to this Convention.

FOR AFGHANISTAN:A. Hosayn AZIZ
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA:		Arthur S. DRAKEFORD
FOR BELGIUM:Vicomte du PARC
FOR BOLIVIA:Alfredo PACHECO
FOR BRAZIL:Fernando LOBO
FOR CANADA:Herbert James SYMINGTON
FOR CHILE:Rafael SÁENZ
Gregorio BISQUERT
Raúl MAGALLANES BARROS
FOR CHINA:CHANG Kia-ngau 張嘉璈
FOR COLOMBIA:Gonzalo RESTREPO JARAMILLO
FOR COSTA RICA:Francisco de P. GUTIÉRREZ ROSS
FOR CUBA:Guillermo BELT RAMÍREZ
FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA:Vladimír Ladislav Dionýz Svetozárov HURBAN
FOR DENMARK :Henrik KAUFFMANN
FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC:Charles A. MCLAUGHLIN
FOR ECUADOR:José Antonio CORREA ESCOBAR
Francisco GÓMEZ JURADO
FOR EGYPT:Mahmoud HASSAN
Mohamed ROUSHDY
Mohamed A. KHALIFA
FOR EL SALVADOR:Felipe VEGA GÓMEZ
FOR ETHIOPIA:Leul Ras IMRU Haile Selassie
FOR FRANCE:Max HYMANS
Claude LEBEL
André BOURGES
Pierre LOCUSSOL
FOR GREECE:Demetrios T. Noti BOTZARIS
Alexander J. ARGYROPOULOS
FOR GUATEMALA:Oscar MORALES LÓPEZ
FOR HAITI:G. Edouard ROY
FOR HONDURAS:Emilio P. LEFEBVRE
FOR ICELAND:Thor THORS
FOR INDIA:Gurunath V. BEWOOR
FOR IRAN:Mohammed SHAYESTEH
FOR IRAQ:Ali JAWDAT
FOR IRELAND:Robert BRENNAN
John LEYDON
John J. HEARNE
Timothy J. O'DRISCOLL
FOR LEBANON:Camille CHAMOUN
Faouzi EL-HOSS
FOR LIBERIA:Walter F. WALKER
FOR LUXEMBOURG:Hugues LE GALLAIS
FOR MEXICO:Pedro A. CHAPA
FOR THE NETHERLANDS:F. H. COPES van HASSELT
F. C. ARONSTEIN
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF NEW ZEALAND: Daniel Giles SULLIVAN
FOR NICARAGUA:Richard E. FRIZELL
FOR NORWAY:Wilhelm Munthe de MORGENSTIERNE
FOR PANAMA: 

The Delegation of the Republic of Panama signs this Convention ad referendum, and subject to the following reservations:
 1. Because of its strategic position and responsibility in the protection of the means of communication in its territory, which are of the utmost importance to world trade, and vital to the defense of the Western Hemisphere, the Republic of Panama reserves the right to take, with respect to all flights through the air space above territory, all measures which in its judgment may be proper for its own security or the protection of said means of communication.
 2. The Republic of Panama understands that the technical annexes to which reference is made in the Convention constitute recommendations only, and not binding obligations.

FOR PARAGUAY:Celso Ramon VELÁZQUEZ
FOR PERU:Armando REVOREDO
José S. KOECHLIN
Luis ALVARADO
Federico ELGUERA
Guillermo VAN OORDT LEÓN
FOR THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH:Jaime HERNÁNDEZ
Urbano Alviar ZAFRA
Joseph H. FOLEY
FOR POLAND:Zbyslaw CIOLKOSZ
Dr. Henryk J. GÓRECKI
Stefan J. KONORSKI
Witold A. URBANOWICZ
Ludwik H. GOTTLIEB
FOR PORTUGAL:Mario de FIGUEREDO
Alfredo DELESQUE DOS SANTOS CINTRA
Duarte CALHIEROS
Vasco VIEIRA GARIN
FOR THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA:Douglas David FORSYTH
FOR SPAIN:Esteban TERRADAS
Germán BARAIBAR
Duarte CALHEIROS
FOR SWEDEN:Ragnar KUMLIN
FOR SWITZERLAND:Charles BRUGGMANN
FOR SYRIA:Noureddeen KAHALE
FOR THAILAND:Mom Rajawongse SENI PRAMOJ
FOR TURKEY:Sükrü KOCAK
Ferruh SAHINBAS
Orhan H. EROL
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND:		Philip CUNLIFFE-LISTER
(1st Earl of SWINTON)
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:Adolf A. BERLE Jr.
Alfred L. BULWINKLE
Charles A. WOLVERTON
Fiorello H. LaGUARDIA
Edward WARNER
Lloyd Welch POGUE
William A. M. BURDEN
FOR URUGUAY:Carl CARBAJAL
Medardo R. FARÍAS
FOR VENEZUELA:—
FOR YUGOSLAVIA:—

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🛑 EDITOR'S NOTES ===============

The Convention on International Civil Aviation was called guoji minyong hangkong gongyue 國際民用航空公約  or Zhijiage gongyue 芝加哥公約 in Chinese. It went into effect on April 4, 1947, the same day the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was established.

The Convention was signed at the end of the International Civil Aviation Conference which took place from Nov. 1 to Dec. 7, 1944 in Chicago (USA). The table below lists the 55 countries invited to attend the conference plus the US as host country.

Afghanistan
Australia
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Dominican Republic 		 Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador 
Ethiopia
France
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Iceland
India
Iran
Iraq
Ireland		 Lebanon
Liberia
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand 
Nicaragua
Norway
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal		 Saudi Arabia 
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Thailand
Turkey
UK
Uruguay
USA
USSR
Venezuela
Yugoslavia

The official ICAO website lists 52 countries sending delegations to the Chicago conference, and the Convention was signed by 54 countries. Most of the invited countries sent delegates to the conference and signed the Convention, with the following exceptions:

  • No delegates sent by—Saudi Arabia, USSR (both did not sign)
  • No delegates listed by—Denmark, Thailand (both are listed as signatories)
  • No signatures by—Venezuela, Yugoslavia (both had sent delegates)

Additional explanatory remarks concerning the following countries:

  • Denmark: Henrik Kauffmann signed the Convention, but the official ICAO website does not list Danish delegates at the conference (invitation was extended to Denmark’s minister in Washington).
  • Panama: sent delegates—Carlos Icaza (chairman), Inocencio Galindo, Enrique Lefevre, and Narciso E. Garay. Panama was mentioned on the list of signatories (with reservations), but no member of the delegation actually signed with his name.
  • Saudi Arabia: was invited to the Chicago conference but sent no delegates, did not sign the Convention.
  • Soviet Union: was invited to the Chicago conference but sent no delegates, did not sign the Convention.
  • Thailand: Mom Rajawongse Seni Pramoj signed the Convention, but the official ICAO website does not list Thai delegates at the conference (invitation was extended to Thailand’s minister in Washington).
  • Venezuela: sent delegates—Juan de Dios Celis Paredes as (absent) chairman, Francisco J. Sucre as acting chairman, and Julio Bunco Ustáriz, but none of them signed the Convention.
  • Yugoslavia: sent delegates—Vladimir M. Vukmirovic as chairman, Nenad Dj. Mirosavljevic, and Predrag Sopalovic, but none of them signed the Convention.

The Chinese delegation consisted of chairman Chang Kia-ngau 張嘉璈 (1889-1979, Jiangsu), Liu Chieh 劉鍇 (1907-1991, Guangdong) and Mow Pang-tsu 毛邦初 (1904-1987, Shanghai).

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————————————————————

Agreements reached at the Yalta Conference

Name in Chinese Yaerda xieding 雅爾達協定
Document type Trilateral agreement of Allied powers
Year, date 1945, Feb. 11
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

(Jump to Agreement regarding Japan)   (Jump to Potsdam Agreement)   (Jump to Cairo Declaration)

Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference

The Crimea Conference of the heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which took place from Feb. 4 to 11, came to the following conclusions:

I. World organization

It was decided:

1. That a United Nations conference on the proposed world organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25 April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.

2. The nations to be invited to this conference should be:

(a) the United Nations as they existed on 8 Feb., 1945; and

(b) Such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1 March, 1945. (For this purpose, by the term "Associated Nations" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the Conference on world organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e., the Ukraine and White Russia.

3. That the United States Government, on behalf of the three powers, should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

4. That the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations conference should be as follows:

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic invite the Government of -------- to send representatives to a conference to be held on 25 April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco, in the United States of America, to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The above-named Governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks conference and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

C. Voting

"1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.'

"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

"In the event that the Government of -------- desires in advance of the conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments."

Territorial trusteeship:

It was agreed that the five nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to

(a) existing mandates of the League of Nations;

(b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war;

(c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and

(d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be place under trusteeship.

[Begin first section published Feb., 13, 1945.]

II. Declaration of liberated Europe

The following declaration has been approved:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the people of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter — the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live — the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived to them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require,

(a) to establish conditions of internal peace;

(b) to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples;

(c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and

(d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measure necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order, under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

[End first section published Feb., 13, 1945.]

III. Dismemberment of Germany

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. John Winant, and Mr. Fedor T. Gusev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. Zone of occupation for the French and control council for Germany

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be allocated France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.

V. Reparation

The following protocol has been approved:

PROTOCOL

On the Talks Between the Heads of Three Governments at the Crimean Conference on the Question of the German Reparations in Kind

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

(b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

(c) Use of German labor.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied reparation commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives — one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression, the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

"The Moscow reparation commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the Paragraph 2 should be 22 billion dollars and that 50 per cent should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The British delegation was of the opinion that, pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow reparation commission, no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow reparation commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the commission.

VI. Major war criminals

The conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the conference.

[Begin second section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

VII. Poland

The following declaration on Poland was agreed by the conference:

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional of Government National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

"The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favour of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions in territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course of the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference."

VIII. Yugoslavia

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Ivan Subasitch:

(a) That the Tito-Subasitch agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new government formed on the basis of the agreement.

(b) That as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:

(I) That the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and

(II) That legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly; and that this statement should be published in the communiqué of the conference.

IX. Italo-Yogoslav frontier — Italo-Austrian frontier

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

X. Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations

There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with Mr. Molotov in Moscow. Mr. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

XI. Southeastern Europe

The British delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

(a) The Control Commission in Bulgaria.

(b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.

(c) Oil equipment in Rumania.

XII. Iran

Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.

[Begin third section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

XIII. Meeting of the three foreign secretaries

The conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.

These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

[End third section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

XIV. The Montreaux Convention and the Straits

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreaux Convention, and report to their Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.

The forgoing protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the Crimean Conference Feb. 11, 1945.

E. R. Stettinius Jr.     M. Molotov     Anthony Eden

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Agreement regarding Japan

The leaders of the three great powers — the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain — have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved.

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:

(a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;

(b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored;

(c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to maintain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part, the Soviet Union expresses it readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Joseph Stalin     Franklin D. Roosevelt     Winston S. Churchill

February 11, 1945

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

Below are the Chinese and Japanese translations for the term "Yalta Conference".

Chinese Japanese
Yaerda huiyi 雅爾達會議 Yaruta kaidan ヤルタ会談

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蘇聯參加對日作戰的協定（1945 年 2 月 11 日）

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

蘇美英三大國領袖同意，在德國投降及歐洲戰爭結束後兩個月或三個月內蘇聯將參加同盟國方面對日作戰，其條件為：

一. 外蒙古（蒙古人民共和國）的現狀須予維持。

二. 由日本 1904 年背信棄義進攻所破壞的俄國以前權益應須予恢復，即：
 甲、庫頁島及臨近一切島嶼須交還蘇聯；
 乙、大連商港須國際化，蘇聯在該港的優越權益須予保證，蘇聯之租用旅順港為海軍基地須予恢復；
 丙、對擔任通往大連之出路的中東鐵路和南滿鐵路應設立一中蘇合辦的公司以共同經營之。經諒解，蘇聯的優越權益須予保證而中國須保持在滿洲的全部主權。

三. 千島群島須交予蘇聯。

經諒解，有關外蒙古及上述港口鐵路的協定，尚須徵求得蔣介石委員長的同意。根據史達林元帥的提議，美總統將採取措步驟取得該項同意。

三強領袖同意，蘇聯之此項要求須在擊敗日本後毫無問題地予與實現。

蘇聯本身表示準備和中國國民政府簽訂一項中蘇友好同盟協定，俾以其武力協助中國達成自日本枷鎖下解放中國之目的。

約瑟夫 • 史達林
富蘭克林 • D • 羅斯福
溫斯頓 • S • 邱吉爾

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Berlin Declaration

Name in Chinese Bolin xuanyan 柏林宣言
Document type Declaration of the Allied powers (US, UK, France, USSR) assuming supreme authority over Germany
Year, date 1945, June 5
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DECLARATION REGARDING THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY AND THE ASSUMPTION OF SUPREME AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

The German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air have been completely defeated and have surrendered unconditionally and Germany, which bears responsibility for the war, is no longer capable of resisting the will of the victorious Powers. The unconditional surrender of Germany has thereby been effected, and Germany has become subject to such requirements as may now or hereafter be imposed upon her.

There is no central Government or authority in Germany capable of accepting responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country and compliance with the requirements of the victorious Powers.

It is in these circumstances necessary, without prejudice to any subsequent decisions that may be taken respecting Germany, to make provision for the cessation of any further hostilities on the part of the German armed forces, for the maintenance of order in Germany and for the administration of the country, and to announce the immediate requirements with which Germany must comply.

The Representatives of the Supreme Commands of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the French Republic, hereinafter called the "Allied Representatives," acting by authority of their respective Governments and in the interests of the United Nations, accordingly make the following Declaration:

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority. The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of the said authority and powers does not affect the annexation of Germany.

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, will hereafter determine the boundaries of Germany or any part thereof and the status of Germany or of any area at present being part of German territory.

In virtue of the supreme authority and powers thus assumed by the four Governments, the Allied Representatives announce the following requirements arising from the complete defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany with which Germany must comply:

Article 1 Germany, and all German military, naval and air authorities and all forces under German control shall immediately cease hostilities in all theatres of war against the forces of the United Nations on land, at sea and in the air.
Article 2 (a) All armed forces of Germany or under German control, wherever they may be situated, including land, air, anti-aircraft and naval forces, the S.S., S.A. and Gestapo, and all other forces of auxiliary organisations equipped with weapons, shall be completely disarmed, handing over their weapons and equipment to local Allied Commanders or to officers designated by the Allied Representatives.
(b) The personnel of the formations and units of all the forces referred to in paragraph (a) above shall, at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Allied State concerned, be declared to be prisoners of war, pending further decisions, and shall be subject to such conditions and directions as may be prescribed by the respective Allied Representatives.
(c) All forces referred to in paragraph (a) above, wherever they may be, will remain in their present positions pending instructions from the Allied Representatives.
(d) Evacuation by the said forces of all territories outside the frontiers of Germany as they existed on the 31st December, 1937, will proceed according to instructions to be given by the Allied Representatives.
(e) Detachments of civil police to be armed with small arms only, for the maintenance of order and for guard duties, will be designated by the Allied Representatives.
Article 3 (a) All aircraft of any kind or nationality in Germany or German-occupied or controlled territories or waters, military, naval or civil, other than aircraft in the service of the Allies, will remain on the ground, on the water or aboard ships pending further instructions.
(b) All German or German-controlled aircraft in or over territories or waters not occupied or controlled by Germany will proceed to Germany or to such other place or places as may be specified by the Allied Representatives.
Article 4 (a) All German or German-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft, and merchant and other shipping, wherever such vessels may be at the time of this Declaration, and all other merchant ships of whatever nationality in German ports, will remain in or proceed immediately to ports and bases as specified by the Allied Representatives. The crews of such vessels will remain on board pending further instructions.
(b) All ships and vessels of the United Nations, whether or not title has been transferred as the result of prize court or other proceedings, which are at the disposal of Germany or under German control at the time of this Declaration, will proceed at the dates and to the ports or bases specified by the Allied Representatives.
Article 5 (a) All or any of the following articles in the possession of the German armed forces or under German control or at German disposal will be held intact and in good condition at the disposal of the Allied Representatives, for such purposes and at such times and places as they may prescribe:
(i) all arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war materials;
(ii) all naval vessels of all classes, both surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft and all merchant shipping, whether afloat, under repair or construction, built or building;
(iii) all aircraft of all kinds, aviation and anti-aircraft equipment and devices;
(iv) all transportation and communications facilities and equipment, by land, water or air;
(v) all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments;
(vi) all factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions, designed or intended to produce or to facilitate the production or use of the articles, materials, and facilities referred to in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) above or otherwise to further the conduct of war.
(b) At the demand of the Allied Representatives the following will be furnished:
(i) the labour, services and plant required for the maintenance or operation of any of the six categories mentioned in paragraph (a) above; and
(ii) any information or records that may be required by the Allied Representatives in connection with the same.
(c) At the demand of the Allied Representatives all facilities will be provided for the movement of Allied troops and agencies, their equipment and supplies, on the railways, roads and other land communications or by sea, river or air. All means of transportation will be maintained in good order and repair, and the labour, services and plant necessary therefor will be furnished.
Article 6 (a) The German authorities will release to the Allied Representatives, in accordance with the procedure to be laid down by them, all prisoners of war at present in their power, belonging to the forces of the United Nations, and will furnish full lists of these persons, indicating the places of their detention in Germany or territory occupied by Germany. Pending the release of such prisoners of war, the German authorities and people will protect them in their persons and property and provide them with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical attention and money in accordance with their rank or official position.
(b) The German authorities and people will in like manner provide for and release all other nationals of the United Nations who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint, and all other persons who may be confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as a result of any Nazi action, law or regulation which discriminates on the ground of race, colour, creed or political belief.
(c) The German authorities will, at the demand of the Allied Representatives, hand over control of places of detention to such officers as may be designated for the purpose by the Allied Representatives.
Article 7 The German authorities concerned will furnish to the Allied Representatives:
(a) full information regarding the forces referred to in Article 2 (a), and, in particular, will furnish forthwith all information which the Allied Representatives may require concerning the numbers, locations and dispositions of such forces, whether located inside or outside Germany;
(b) complete and detailed information concerning mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air, and the safety lanes in connection therewith. All such safety lanes will be kept open and clearly marked; all mines, minefields and other dangerous obstacles will as far as possible be rendered safe, and all aids to navigation will be reinstated. Unarmed German military and civilian personnel with the necessary equipment will be made available and utilized for the above purposes and for the removal of mines, minefields and other obstacles as directed by the Allied Representatives.
Article 8 There shall be no destruction, removal, concealment, transfer or scuttling of, or damage to, any military, naval, air, shipping, port, industrial and other like property and facilities and all records and archives, wherever they may be situated, except as may be directed by the Allied Representatives.
Article 9 Pending the institution of control by the Allied Representatives over all means of communication, all radio and telecommunication installations and other forms of wire or wireless communications, whether ashore or afloat, under German control, will cease transmission except as directed by the Allied Representatives.
Article 10 The forces, ships, aircraft, military equipment, and other property in Germany or in German control or service or at German disposal, of any other country at war with any of the Allies, will be subject to the provisions of this Declaration and of any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder.
Article 11 (a) The principal Nazi leaders as specified by the Allied Representatives, and all persons from time to time named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives as being suspected of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes or analogous offences, will be apprehended and surrendered to the Allied Representatives.
(b) The same will apply in the case of any national of any of the United Nations who is alleged to have committed an offence against his national law, and who may at any time be named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives.
(c) The German authorities and people will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for the apprehension and surrender of such persons.
Article 12 The Allied Representatives will station forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany as they may determine.
Article 13 (a) In the exercise of the supreme authority with respect to Germany assumed by the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the four Allied Governments will take such steps, including the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, as they deem requisite for future peace and security.
(b) The Allied Representatives will impose on Germany additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements arising from the complete defeat of Germany. The Allied Representatives, or persons or agencies duly designated to act on their authority, will issue proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions for the purpose of laying down such additional requirements, and of giving effect to the other provisions of this Declaration. All German authorities and the German people shall carry out unconditionally the requirements of the Allied Representatives, and shall fully comply with all such proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions.
Article 14 This Declaration enters into force and effect at the date and hour set forth below. In the event of failure on the part of the German authorities or people promptly and completely to fulfill their obligations hereby or hereafter imposed, the Allied Representatives will take whatever action may be deemed by them to be appropriate under the circumstances.
Article 15 This Declaration is drawn up in the English, Russian, French and German languages. The English, Russian and French are the only authentic texts.

BERLIN, GERMANY, June 5, 1945.

Signed at 1800 hours, Berlin time.

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Berlin Declaration (in Chinese: Bolin xuanyan 柏林宣言) was signed by the Allied commanders-in-chief:
 ● Georgy Zhukov for the Soviet Union,
 ● Dwight D. Eisenhower for the United States,
 ● Bernard Montgomery for the United Kingdom, and
 ● Jean de Lattre de Tassigny for France.

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Potsdam Agreement

Name in Chinese Pocitan xieding 波茨坦協定
Document type Trilateral agreement of Allied powers (US, UK, USSR) concerning the post-WWII order
Year, date 1945, Aug. 1
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(Jump to Potsdam Declaration)    (Jump to Yalta Agreement)    (Jump to Cairo Declaration)

(A) Protocol of the Proceedings, August 1, 1945

The Berlin Conference of the three heads of government of the USSR, USA, and UK, which took place from July 17 to August 2, 1945, came to the following conclusions:

I. Establishment of a council of foreign ministers

A. The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements:

(1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United States.

(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London which shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Ministers, and by a small staff of technical advisers.

(ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1st 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time.

(3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.

(ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other Members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.

(iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the Member Governments.

(4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question.

(ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problems under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the State chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem.

B. It was agreed that the three Governments should each address an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council. The text of the approved invitation was as follows:

Council of Foreign Ministers Draft for identical invitation to be sent separately by each of the Three Governments to the Governments of China and France.

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the U. S. S. R. consider it necessary to begin without delay the essential preparatory work upon the peace settlements in Europe. To this end they are agreed that there should be established a Council of the Foreign Ministers of the Five Great Powers to prepare treaties of peace with the European enemy States, for submission to the United Nations. The Council would also be empowered to propose settlements of outstanding territorial questions in Europe and to consider such other matters as member Governments might agree to refer to it.

The text adopted by the Three Governments is as follows:

(Here insert final agreed text of the Proposal)

In agreement with the Governments of the United States and U. S. S. R., His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and U. S. S. R., the United States Government, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Government extend a cordial invitation to the Government of China (France) to adopt the text quoted above and to join in setting up the Council. His Majesty's Government, The United States Government, The Soviet Government attach much importance to the participation of the Chinese Government (French Government) in the proposed arrangements and they hope to receive an early and favourable reply to this invitation.

C. It was understood that the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the text would be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodical consultation between the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom.

D. The Conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the Agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of surrender for Germany, for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the coordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Control Council at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly it was agreed to recommend that the European Advisory Commission be dissolved.

II. The principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period

A. POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.

1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council.

2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are:

(i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:-

(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the SS., SA., SD., and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations and all other military and semi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism;

(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms. ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented.

(ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

(iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.

(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.

4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discriminations on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.

5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.

7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.

8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion.

9. The administration in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:-

(i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation;

(ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;

(iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government;

(iv) for the time being, no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

B. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES.

11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed.

12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.

13. In organizing the German Economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.

14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to:

(a) mining and industrial production and its allocation;

(b) agriculture, forestry and fishing;

(c) wages, prices and rationing;

(d) import and export programs for Germany as a whole;

(e) currency and banking, central taxation and customs;

(f) reparation and removal of industrial war potential;

(g) transportation and communications.

In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions.

15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary:

(a) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament, demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports.

(b) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R.).

(c) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports.

(d) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein.

(e) to control all German public or private scientific bodies research and experimental institutions, laboratories, et cetera connected with economic activities.

16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any break-down in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited.

17. Measures shall be promptly taken:

(a) to effect essential repair of transport;

(b) to enlarge coal production;

(c) to maximize agricultural output; and

(d) to erect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities.

18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.

19. Payment of Reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports.

The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4 (a) and 4 (b) of the Reparations Agreement.

III. Reparations from Germany

1. Reparation claims of the U. S. S. R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U. S. S. R., and from appropriate German external assets.

2. The U. S. S. R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.

3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German external assets.

4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U. S. S. R. from its own zone of occupation, the U. S. S. R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones:

(a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.

(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously.

5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest.

6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 (a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U. S. S. R. in agreed installments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed.

7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect to such equipment as will be determined to he eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6.

8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below.

9. The Governments of the U. K. and U. S. A. renounce all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria.

10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany.

IV. Disposal of the German navy and merchant marine

A. The following principles for the distribution of the German Navy were agreed:

(1) The total strength of the German surface navy, excluding ships sunk and those taken over from Allied Nations, but including ships under construction or repair, shall be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., U. K., and U. S. A.

(2) Ships under construction or repair mean those ships whose construction or repair may be completed within three to six months, according to the type of ship. Whether such ships under construction or repair shall be completed or repaired shall be determined by the technical commission appointed by the Three Powers and referred to below, subject to the principle that their completion or repair must be achieved within the time limits above provided, without any increase of skilled employment in the German shipyards and without permitting the reopening of any German ship building or connected industries. Completion date means the date when a ship is able to go out on its first trip, or, under peacetime standards, would refer to the customary date of delivery by shipyard to the Government.

(3) The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. Not more than thirty submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the U. S. S. R., U. K., and U. S. A. for experimental and technical purposes.

(4) All stocks of armament, ammunition and supplies of the German Navy appertaining to the vessels transferred pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3) hereof shall be handed over to the respective powers receiving such ships.

(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite naval commission comprising two representatives for each government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German warships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German fleet. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than 15th August, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each Delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect German warships wherever they may be located.

(6) The Three Governments agreed that transfers, including those of ships under construction and repair, shall be completed as soon as possible, but not later than 15th February, 1946. The Commission will submit fortnightly reports, including proposals for the progressive allocation of the vessels when agreed by the Commission.

B. The following principles for the distribution of the German Merchant Marine were agreed:-

(1) The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever located, shall be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., the U. K., and the U. S. A. The actual transfers of the ships to the respective countries shall take place as soon as practicable after the end of the war against Japan. The United Kingdom and the United States will provide out of their shares of the surrendered German merchant ships appropriate amounts for other Allied States whose merchant marines have suffered heavy losses in the common cause against Germany, except that the Soviet Union shall provide out of its share for Poland.

(2) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships during the Japanese War period shall fall under the cognizance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority.

(3) While actual transfer of the ships shall be delayed until after the end of the war with Japan, a Tripartite Shipping Commission shall inventory and value all available ships and recommend a specific distribution in accordance with paragraph (1).

(4) German inland and coastal ships determined to be necessary to the maintenance of the basic German peace economy by the Allied Control Council of Germany shall not be included in the shipping pool thus divided among the Three Powers.

(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite merchant marine commission comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German merchant ships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German merchant ships. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than September 1st, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect the German merchant ships wherever they may be located.

V. City of Koenigsberg and the adjacent area

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government to the effect that pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia.

The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above subject to expert examination of the actual frontier.

The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.

VI. War criminals

The Three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London between British, United States, Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes under the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943 have no particular geographical localization. The Three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring these criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of these major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before 1st September.

VII. Austria

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria.

The three governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the city of Vienna.

It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria.

VIII. Poland

A. DECLARATION.

We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their territories and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.

The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens

The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference, has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections.

B. WESTERN FRONTIER OF POLAND.

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north 'end west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories cast of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinamunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

IX. Conclusion on peace treaties and admission to the United Nations Organization

The three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views.

For their part the three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty for Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations.

The three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic governments in these States will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.

The three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

As regards the admission of other States into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;

2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

The three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above.

The three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favour any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.

X. Territorial trusteeship

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the question of trusteeship territories as defined in the decision of the Crimea Conference and in the Charter of the United Nations Organization.

After an exchange of views on this question it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian colonial territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy and that the question of Italian colonial territory would be considered by the September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

XI. Revised allied control commission procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary

The three Governments took note that the Soviet Representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased.

The three Governments agreed that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries would now be undertaken, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries, and accepting as a basis, in respect of all three countries, the Soviet Government's proposals for Hungary as annexed hereto. (Annex I)

XII. Orderly transfer of German populations

The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.

Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem, with special regard to the question of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out having regard to the present situation in Germany.

The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending an examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council.

XIII. Oil equipment in Rumania

The Conference agreed to set up two bilateral commissions of experts, one to be composed of United Kingdom and Soviet Members and one to be composed of United States and Soviet Members, to investigate the facts and examine the documents, as a basis for the settlement of questions arising from the removal of oil equipment in Rumania. It was further agreed that these experts shall begin their work within ten days, on the spot.

XIV. Iran

It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Tehran, and that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September, 1945.

XV. The international zone of Tangier

A proposal by the Soviet Government was examined and the following decisions were reached:

Having examined the question of the Zone of Tangier, the three Governments have agreed that this Zone, which includes the City of Tangier and the area adjacent to it, in view of its special strategic importance, shall remain international.

The question of Tangier will be discussed in the near future at a meeting in Paris of representatives of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France.

XVI. The Black Sea Straits

The Three Governments recognized that the Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present-day conditions.

It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government.

XVII. International inland waterways

The Conference considered a proposal of the U. S. Delegation on this subject and agreed to refer it for consideration to the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

XVIII. European inland transport conference

The British and U. S. Delegations to the Conference informed the Soviet Delegation of the desire of the British and U. S. Governments to reconvene the European Inland Transport Conference and stated that they would welcome assurance that the Soviet Government would participate in the work of the reconvened conference. The Soviet Government agreed that it would participate in this conference.

XIX. Directives to military commanders on allied control council for Germany

The Three Governments agreed that each would send a directive to its representative on the Control Council for Germany informing him of all decisions of the Conference affecting matters within the scope of his duties.

XX. Use of allied property for satellite reparations or war trophies

The proposal (Annex II) presented by the United States Delegation was accepted in principle by the Conference, but the drafting of an agreement on the matter was left to be worked out through diplomatic channels.

XXI. Military talks

During the Conference there were meetings between the Chiefs of Staff of the Three Governments on military matters of common interest.

Annex I

TEXT OF A LETTER TRANSMITTED ON JULY 12 TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U. S. AND U. K. GOVERNMENTS ON THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION IN HUNGARY

In view of the changed situation in connection with the termination of the war against Germany, the Soviet Government finds it necessary to establish the following order of work for the Allied Control Commission in Hungary.

1. During the period up to the conclusion of peace with Hungary the President (or Vice-President) of the ACC will regularly call conferences with the British and American representatives for the purpose of discussing the most important questions relating to the work of the ACC. The conferences will be called once in 10 days, or more frequently in case of need.

Directives of the ACC on questions or principle will be issued to the Hungarian authorities by the President of the Allied Control Commission after agreement on these directives with the English and American representatives.

2. The British and American representatives in the ACC will take part in general conferences of heads of divisions and delegates of the ACC, convoked by the President of the ACC, which meetings will be regular in nature. The British and American representatives will also participate personally or through their representatives in appropriate instances in mixed commissions created by the President of the ACC for questions connected with the execution by the ACC of its functions

3. Free movement by the American and British representatives in the country will be permitted provided that the ACC is previously informed of the time and route of the journeys.

4. All questions connected with permission for the entrance and exit of members of the staff of the British and American representatives in Hungary will be decided on the spot by the President of the ACC within a time limit of not more than one week.

5. The bringing in and sending out by plane of mail, cargoes and diplomatic couriers will be carried out by the British and American representatives on the ACC under arrangements and within time limits established by the ACC, or in special cases by previous coordination with the President of the ACC.

I consider it necessary to add to the above that in all other points the existing Statutes regarding the ACC in Hungary, which was confirmed on January 20, 1945, shall remain in force in the future.

Annex II

USE OF ALLIED PROPERTY FOR SATELITE REPARATIONS OR WAR TROPHIES

1. The burden of reparation and "war trophies" should not fall on Allied nationals.

2. Capital Equipment-We object to the removal of such Allied property as reparations, "war trophies", or under any other guise. Loss would accrue to Allied nationals as a result of destruction of plants and the consequent loss of markets and trading connections. Seizure of Allied property makes impossible the fulfillment by the satellite of its obligation under the armistice to restore intact the rights and interests of the Allied Nations and their nationals.

The United States looks to the other occupying powers for the return of any equipment already removed and the cessation of removals. Where such equipment will not or cannot be returned, the U. S. will demand of the satellite adequate, effective and prompt compensation to American nationals, and that such compensation have priority equal to that of the reparations payment.

These principles apply to all property wholly or substantially owned by Allied nationals. In the event of removals of property in which the American as well as the entire Allied interest is less than substantial, the U. S. expects adequate, effective, and prompt compensation.

3. Current Production-While the U. S. does not oppose reparation out of current production of Allied investments, the satellite must provide immediate and adequate compensation to the Allied nationals including sufficient foreign exchange or products so that they can recover reasonable foreign currency expenditures and transfer a reasonable return on their investment. Such compensation must also have equal priority with reparations.

We deem it essential that the satellites not conclude treaties, agreements or arrangements which deny to Allied nationals access, on equal terms, to their trade, raw materials and industry; and appropriately modify any existing arrangements which may have that effect.

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(B) Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, July 26, 1945

(Jump to Japan's First Instrument of Surrender)

(1)We—The President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.
(2)The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.
(3)The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.
(4)The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.
(5)Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.
(6)There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.
(7)Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.
(8)The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.
(9)The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.
(10)We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.
(11)Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those [industries] which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.
(12)The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.
(13) We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The "Potsdam Agreement" was the result of the Potsdam Conference which took place from July 17 to Aug. 2, 1945 in Germany's Potsdam. The delegations of the three participating powers were represented by US President Harry S. Truman, the British Prime Minister—before July 26 Winston S. Churchill, after that Clement Attlee—and the Premier of the USSR Joseph V. Stalin.

What is shown above as "B) Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender" also became known as "Potsdam Declaration" issued by US President Truman, UK Prime Minister Churchill and ROC Chairman of the Nationalist Government Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石.

Below are the Chinese and Japanese translations for both terms "Potsdam Agreement" and "Potsdam Declaration".

English Chinese Japanese
Potsdam Agreement Pocitan xieding 波茨坦協定 Potsudamu kyōtei ポツダム協定
Potsdam Declaration  Pocitan gonggao 波茨坦公告  Potsudamu sengen ポツダム宣言 

The Chinese translation of the Potsdam Declaration's full text is shown below.

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波茨坦公告（1945 年 7 月 26 日）

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

美、英、中三國政府領袖公告：

（一） 余等：美國總統、中國國民政府主席及英國首相代表余等億萬國民，業經會商，並同意對日本應予以一機會，以結束此次戰事。
（二） 美國、英帝國及中國之龐大陸、海、空部隊，業已增強多倍，其由西方調來之軍隊及空軍，即將予日本以最後之打擊，彼等之武力受所有同盟國之決心之支持及鼓勵，對日作戰，不至其停止抵抗不止。
（三） 德國無效果及無意抵抗全世界激起之自由人之力量，所得之結果，彰彰在前，可為日本人民之殷鑒。此種力量當其對付抵抗之納粹時，不得不將德國人民全體之土地、工業及其生活方式摧殘殆盡。但現在集中對待日本之力量則較之更為龐大，不可衡量。吾等之軍力，加以吾人之堅決意志為後盾，若予以全部實施，必將使日本軍隊完全毀滅，無可逃遁，而日本之本土亦必終歸全部殘毀。
（四） 現時業已到來，日本必須決定一途，其將繼續受其一意孤行計算錯誤，使日本帝國已陷于完全毀滅之境之軍人之統制，即或走向理智之路。
（五） 以下為吾人之條件，吾人決不更改，亦無其他另一方式。猶豫遷延，更為吾人所不容許。
（六） 欺騙及錯誤領導日本人民使其妄欲征服世界者之威權及勢力，必須永久剔除。蓋吾人堅持非將負責之窮兵黷武主義驅出世界，則和平安全及正義之新秩序勢不可能。
（七） 直至如此之新秩序成立時，及直至日本製造戰爭之力量業已毀滅，有確定可信之証據時，日本領土經盟國之指定，必須佔領，俾吾人在此陳述之基本目的得以完成。
（八） 《開羅宣言》之條件必將實施，而日本之主權必將限於本州、北海道、九州、四國及吾人所決定之其他小島之內。
（九） 日本軍隊在完全解除武裝以後，將被允許返其家鄉，得有和平及生產生活之機會。
（十） 吾人無意奴役日本民族或消滅其國家，但對於戰罪人犯，包括虐待吾人俘虜在內，將處以法律之裁判，日本政府必須將阻止日本人民民主趨勢在內之復興及增強之所有障礙予以消除，言論、宗教及思想自由以及對於基本人權之重視必須成立。
（十一）日本將被允許維持其經濟所必需及可以償付貨物賠款之工業，但可以使其重新武裝作戰之工業不在其內。為此目的，可准其獲得原料，以別于統制原料，日本最後參加國際貿易關係當可准許。
（十二）上述目的達到及依據日本人民自由之意志成立一傾向和平及負責之政府后，同盟國佔領軍隊當即撤退。
（十三）吾人通告日本政府立即宣布所有日本武裝部隊無條件投降，並對此種行動誠意實行予以適當之各項保証，除此一途，日本即將迅速完全毀滅。

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Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War (Jewel Voice Broadcast)

Name in Chinese zhongzhan zhaoshu 終戰詔書
Document type Announcement of the Emperor of Japan
Year, date 1945, Aug. 14
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's notes  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

TO OUR GOOD AND LOYAL SUBJECTS:

After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure.

We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration.

To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of Our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by Our Imperial Ancestors and which lies close to Our heart.

Indeed, We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement.

But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone — the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people — the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.

Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should We continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.

We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to Our Allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently cooperated with the Empire towards the emancipation of East Asia.

The thought of those officers and men as well as others who have fallen in the fields of battle, those who died at their posts of duty, or those who met with untimely death and all their bereaved families, pains Our heart night and day.

The welfare of the wounded and the war-sufferers, and of those who have lost their homes and livelihood, are the objects of Our profound solicitude.

The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable.

Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial State, We are always with you, Our good and loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity.

Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion which may engender needless complications, or any fraternal contention and strike which may create confusion, lead you astray and cause you to lose the confidence of the world.

Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith in the imperishability of its sacred land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibility, and of the long road before it.

Unite your total strength, to be devoted to construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitude, foster nobility of spirit, and work with resolution — so that you may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State and keep pace with the progress of the world.

Hirohito [signature and official seal]

August 14, 1945

Prime Minister Baron Kantarō Suzuki (signature)
Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa (signature)
Minister of Justice Matsuzaka Hiromasa (signature)
Army Minister Korechika Anami (signature)
Minister of Munitions Toyoda Teijirō (signature)
Minister of Health Okada Tadahiko (signature)
Minister of State Sakurai Hyōgorō (signature)
Minister of State Sakonji Seizō (signature)
Minister of State Shimomura Hirosi (signature)
Finance Minister Hirose Toyosaku (signature)
Minister of Education Ōta Kōzō (signature)
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Ishiguro Tadaatsu (signature)
Interior Minister Abe Genki (signature)
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister for Greater East Asia Tōgō Shigenori (signature)
Minister of State Yasui Tōji (signature)
Minister of Transport Kobiyama Naoto (signature)

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終戰詔書

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

惟天下之大勢，睹本朝之現狀，欲取非常之措施，收拾時局。茲佈告天下：朕已諭令廷臣通告美、英、支、蘇四國，願受諾其共同宣言。

朕纘承洪緒，錫福生民。曩者，本朝傳檄四方、戰與英美，本求社稷於億萬斯年之舉，兼定東亞安寧平和之意。至如毀別國之宗社、奪領邦之故土，悉非朕意。今征伐已曆四載，雖我將兵驍勇善戰，百官有司勵精圖治，一億眾庶奉公體國，然時局每況愈下，失勢之徵已現。及今，夷軍彈石之殘虐，頻殺無辜，慘害生靈，實難逆料。如若征伐相續，則我生民不存於世，被髮左衽之期重現；如此，則朕何以保全億兆赤子、何面目複見列祖列宗乎？此朕所以敕令廷臣接受聯軍之誥者也。

至若同事業之盟邦，朕遺餘恨也。然念及臣工黔首曝屍於沙場，忠志之士殉國於內外，遺屬之狀慟天，朕五臟為之俱裂。而殘喘之生民，或負戰傷、禍難，或失家業、生計，朕所視之，深為軫念。故日後國朝所受之苦非常，臣民衷情之表勝往；雖時運之所趨，然朕欲忍所難忍、耐所難耐，以開太平于萬世。

朕於茲得護國體，賴爾等忠良之精誠，並與臣民之同在。若夫為情所激、妄滋事端，或同胞相煎、擾亂時局，何至迷途于大道、失信於天下哉？斯之謬誤，朕當深鑒。今誠宜舉國一家，子孫相傳，信神州之不沉，保家國於不滅，念任重而道遠，傾全力於建設，篤守道義，鞏固志操，誓必揚國體之精華，期同步天下之進化。於嚱，咨爾多方，宜悉朕意。

裕仁（簽字蓋章）

昭和二十年八月十四日

內閣總理大臣 男爵 鈴木 貫太郎 （簽字）
海軍大臣 米內 光政 （簽字）
司法大臣 松阪 廣政 （簽字）
陸軍大臣 阿南 惟幾 （簽字）
軍需大臣 豊田 貞次郞 （簽字）
厚生大臣 岡田 忠彥 （簽字）
國務大臣 櫻井 兵五郞 （簽字）
國務大臣 左近司 政三 （簽字）
國務大臣 下村 宏 （簽字）
大藏大臣 廣瀨 豐作 （簽字）
文部大臣 太田 耕造 （簽字）
農商大臣 石黑 忠篤 （簽字）
內務大臣 安倍 源基 （簽字）
外務大臣兼大東亞大臣 東鄕 茂德 （簽字）
國務大臣 安井 藤治（簽字）
運輸大臣 小日山 直登 （簽字）

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTES ===============

The Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War is called "Daitōa-sensō-shūketsu-no-shōsho" (大東亜戦争終結ノ詔書) in Japanese, abbreviated as "Sensō-no-shōsho" (終戦の詔書). "Jewel Voice Broadcast" in Japanese: Gyokuon-hōsō (玉音放送). It was broadcast in Japan's radio network on Aug. 15, 1945.

A brief timeline of events at the end of WWII concerning the Japanese theater is shown directly below (all dates in the year 1945).

July 16Successful test explosion of an atomic bomb in the desert of New Mexico, US (Project Trinity)
July 17The Potsdam Conference begins, attended by US President Truman, UK PM Churchill and Soviet leader Stalin (concludes on Aug. 2)
July 26The Allies define the terms for Japan’s surrender in the Potsdam Declaration
 "Clement Attlee replaces Winston Churchill as British Prime Minister
Aug. 6The US drop an atomic bomb (uranium-filled gun-type fission weapon nicknamed "Little Boy") on Hiroshima 廣島 (Honshu 本州, Japan), killing more than 70,000
Aug. 7The USSR declares war against Japan
Aug. 9The US drop an atomic bomb (plutonium-filled implosion-type nuclear weapon nicknamed "Fat Man") on Nagasaki 長崎 (Kyushu 九州, Japan), killing more than 60,000
 "The USSR begins its invasion of Japanese-occupied Manchuria (Manchukuo)
Aug. 15Japan’s Emperor Hirohito proclaims that Japan accepts the terms in the Potsdam Declaration
Aug. 17The Joint Chiefs of Staff issue the General Order No. 1
Sept. 2Japan’s First Instrument of Surrender is signed at Tokyo Bay
Sept. 9The Act of Surrender is signed by military officials of Japan and the ROC in Nanjing
Oct. 25Official retrocession of Taiwan and Penghu to China with a formal transfer ceremony in Taipei

Please note that the numbers of fatalities caused by the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in above table are rough estimates based on online sources only and do not include long-term deaths due to radiation.

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General Order No. 1

Name in Chinese yiban mingling diyihao 一般命令第一號
Document type Instructions issued by the US to Japan
Year, date 1945, Aug. 17
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

J.C.S. 1467/2
17 August 1945
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
INSTRUMENTS FOR THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN

GENERAL ORDER NO. 1

Note by the Secretaries

General order No. 1 (Enclosure), as approved by the President for issue by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters by direction of the Emperor, is circulated for information.

The President approved it with the understanding that it is subject to change both by further instructions issued through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by changes in matters of detail made by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the light of the operational situation as known by him.

ENCLOSURE (GENERAL ORDER NO. 1) SWNCC21/8

General Order No. 1

MILITARY AND NAVAL

1. The Imperial General Headquarters by direction of the Emperor, and pursuant to the surrender to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of all Japanese armed forces by the Emperor, hereby orders all of its commanders in Japan and abroad to cause the Japanese armed forces and Japanese-controlled forces under their command to cease hostilities at once, to lay down their arms, to remain in their present locations and to surrender unconditionally to commanders acting on behalf of the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as indicated hereafter or as may be further directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Immediate contact will be made with the indicated commanders, or their designated representatives, subject to any changes in detail prescribed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and their instructions will be completely and immediately carried out.

a. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa and French Indo-China north of 16 north latitude shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

b. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 38 north latitude and Karafuto shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.

c. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the Andamans, Nicobars, Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China south of 16 degrees north latitude, Malaya, Borneo, Netherlands Indies, New Guinea, Bismarcks and the Solomons, shall surrender to (the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Command or the Commanding General, Australian Forces—the exact breakdown between Mountbatten and the Australians to be arranged between them and the details of this paragraph then prepared by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers).

d. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the Japanese Mandated Islands, Ryukyus, Bonins, and other Pacific Islands shall surrender to the Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet.

e. The Imperial General Headquarters, its senior commanders, and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the main islands of Japan, minor islands adjacent thereto, Korea south of 38 north latitude, and the Philippines shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific.

f. The above indicated commanders are the only representatives of the Allied Powers empowered to accept surrenders and all surrenders of Japanese Forces shall be made only to them or to their representatives.

The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters further orders its commanders in Japan and abroad to disarm completely all forces of Japan or under Japanese control, wherever they may be situated and to deliver intact and in safe and good condition all weapons and equipment at such time and at such places as may be prescribed by the Allied Commanders indicated above. (Pending further instructions, the Japanese police force in the main islands of Japan will be exempt from this disarmament provision. The police force will remain at their posts and shall be held responsible for the preservation of law and order. The strength and arms of such a police force will be prescribed.)

2. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt of this order, complete information with respect to Japan and all areas under Japanese control as follows:

(a) Lists of all land, air and anti-aircraft units showing locations and strengths in officers and men.

(b) Lists of all aircraft, military, naval and civil giving complete information as to the number, type, location and condition of such aircraft.

(c) Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine and auxiliary naval craft in or out of commission and under construction giving their position, condition and movement.

(d) Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled merchant ships of over 100 gross tons, in or out of commission and under construction, including merchant ships formerly belonging to any of the United Nations which are now in Japanese hands, giving their position condition and movement.

(e) Complete and detailed information, accompanied by maps, showing location and layouts of all mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air and the safety lanes in connection therewith.

(f) Locations and descriptions of all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, anti-aircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas.

(g) Locations of all camps and other places of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees.

3. Japanese armed forces and civil aviation authorities will insure that all Japanese military, naval and civil aircraft remain on the ground on the water or abroad ship until further notification of the disposition to be made of them.

4. Japanese or Japanese-controlled naval or merchant vessels of all types will be maintained without damage and will undertake no movement pending instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Vessels at sea will immediately render harmless and throw overboard explosives of all types. Vessels not at sea will immediately remove explosives of all types to safe storage ashore.

5. Responsible Japanese or Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities will insure that:

a. All Japanese mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea and air, wherever located, be removed according to instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

b. All aids to navigation be reestablished at once.

c. All safety lanes be kept open and clearly marked pending accomplishment of a. above.

6. Responsible Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities will hold intact and in good condition pending further instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the following:

a. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war material (except as specifically prescribed in Section 4 of this order).

b. All land, water and air transportation and communication facilities and equipment.

c. All military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, anti-aircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments.

d. All factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions designed or intended to produce or facilitate the production or use of all implements of war and other material and property used by or intended for use by any military or paramilitary organizations in connection with their operations.

7. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt of this order, complete lists of all the items specified in paragraph a, b and d of Section 6 above, indicating the numbers, types and locations of each.

8. The manufacture and distribution of all arms, ammunition and implements of war will cease forthwith.

9. With respect to United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of Japanese or Japanese-controlled authorities:

a. The safety and well-being of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees will be scrupulously preserved to include the administrative and supply services essential to provide adequate food shelter, clothing and medical care until such responsibility is undertaken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers;

b. Each camp or other place of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees together with its equipment, stores, records, arms and ammunition will be delivered immediately to the command of the senior officer or designated representative of the prisoner of war and civilian internees;

c. As directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, prisoners of war and civilian internees will be transported to places of safety where they can be accepted by allied authorities;

d. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters will furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of the receipt of this order, complete lists of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees, indicating their location.

10. All Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities shall aid and assist the occupation of Japan and Japanese-controlled areas by forces of the Allied Powers.

11. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and appropriate Japanese officials shall be prepared on instructions from Allied occupation commanders to collect and deliver all arms in the possession of the Japanese civilian population.

12. This and all subsequent instructions issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or other allied military authorities will be scrupulously and promptly obeyed by Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil officials and private persons. Any delay or failure to comply with the provisions of this or subsequent orders and any action which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers determines to be detrimental to the Allied Powers, will incur drastic and summary punishment at the hands of allied military authorities and the Japanese Government.

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一般命令第一號

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一、 日本帝國大本營遵奉日本天皇之指示，下令「所有日本軍隊」向盟軍最高統帥（麥克阿瑟元帥）投降。茲令所有日本帝國內外之司令官，使在其指揮之下之日本軍隊以及日本管制之軍隊，立刻停止戰鬥行為、放下武器、駐在其現時所在之地點，並向代表美國、中國、英國、蘇聯之司令官，如下列指定或如盟軍最高統帥所追加指定者，無條件投降。應立即連繫指定之司令官或其指定之代表，並接受盟軍最高統帥對於詳細規定的指示變更，各司令官及其代表之命令應馬上完全地執行。

甲、 在中國（滿洲除外）、台灣及北緯十六度以北之法屬印度支那境內的日軍高階司令官及所有陸、海、空軍及輔助部隊應向蔣介石統帥投降。

乙、 在滿洲、北緯三十八度以北之朝鮮半島部份及庫頁島境內之日軍高階司令官及所有陸、海、空軍及輔助部隊應向遠東蘇軍總司令官投降。

丙、 在安達曼群島、尼科巴群島、緬甸、泰國、北緯十六度以南之法屬印度支那、馬來亞、婆羅洲、荷屬印度、新幾內亞、俾斯麥群島及所罗门群岛境內之日軍高階司令官及所有陸、海、空軍及輔助部隊應向東南亞盟軍司令部最高統帥或澳大利亞軍隊之司令官投降，蒙巴頓與澳軍之確實劃分，由其自行商定後，再由盟軍最高統帥對於此節詳細規定。

丁、 在日本委任統治各島、琉球群島、小笠原群島及其他太平洋島嶼之日軍高階司令官及所有陸、海、空軍及輔助部隊應向美國太平洋艦隊總司令投降。

戊、 日本帝國大本營在日本主要島嶼、附近各小島、北緯三十八度以南之朝鮮半島及菲律賓之日軍高階司令官及所有陸、海、空軍及輔助部隊應向美國太平洋艦隊陸軍總司令投降。

己、 上述各指定司令官為唯一授權接受投降之同盟國代表，所有日本軍隊應只向彼等或其代表投降。

日本帝國大本營且命令其在日本及國外之各司令官，將日軍部隊及在日本策劃下之部隊，無論在何地點完全解除武器，並在同盟國司令官所指定之時間及地點，將所有武器及裝備完整與安全的繳出（在日本本土之日本警察，在另有命令以前，得免受此項解除武裝之規定。警察部隊各留崗位，並應負責維持法律與秩序。此類警察部隊之人數及武裝另行規定之）。

二、 日本帝國大本營應在收到此命令（若干日）內，以關於日本及在日本管制下各地區之全部情報供給盟軍最高統帥，如下：

甲、 關於一切陸上、空中及防空單位之明細表，說明此類官佐士兵之地點與人數。

乙、 所有陸軍、海軍和民用飛機之數量、型式、位置及狀態的完整資料明細表。

丙、 日本帝國及日本帝國控制下之所有海軍艦艇明細表，如水上及潛艇和輔導海軍艦艇，無論其係服役中、非服役中或建造中，均須提出其位置、狀態和航行資料。

丁、 日本帝國及日本帝國控制下總噸數超過一百噸之商船明細表（包括以往曾屬於同盟國，但現為日本帝國權力範圍內者），無論其係服役中、非服役中或建造中，均須提出其位置、狀態和航行資料。

戊、 現出所有地雷、水雷及其他對陸、海、空造成行動障礙之障礙物的位置與佈局，以及與上述相關之安全通道的完整、詳細且附有地圖之資料。

己、 包含機場、水上飛機基地、防空設施、港口及海軍基地、油庫、常設與臨時的陸上及海岸防禦碉堡、要塞及其他設防區在內之所有軍事設施和建築之位置及說明。

庚、 所有同盟國俘虜及被拘留平民之收容所或其他拘留場所的位置。

三、 在接獲進一步部署的通知之前，日軍及民間航空當局之一切日本帝國陸、海軍及民用航空機，須確實停留於其所在之陸上、海上及艦上之定點。

四、 在接獲盟軍最高統帥指示之前，日本帝國或日本帝國控制下之所有型式的海軍艦艇或商船，須毫無損傷地加以保存且不得加以移動。至於航海中之船舶須立即放下武器使其無害，並將所有種類之爆炸物拋入海中，而非航海中之船舶則須立即將所有種類之爆炸物移至岸上安全貯藏處所。

五、 日本帝國及日本帝國控制下負有責任之軍事政府及民間政府，須確實執行下列事項：

甲、 所有日本帝國內埋藏地雷、水雷及其他對陸、海、空行動之障礙物，無其位於任何地點，均須依盟軍最高統帥之指示予以去除。

乙、 立即修復所有便於航海之設施。

丙、 在前項實施完成之前，須開放且明白標示所有安全通路。

六、 日本帝國及日本帝國控制下負有責任之軍事政府及民間政府，在接獲盟軍最高統帥進一步指示之前，應將下列事物保持原狀且儘量維持良好狀態。

甲、 所有種類之武器、彈藥、爆炸物、軍用裝備、貯藏品、軍需品、軍用器材，及一切軍用物資（除本命令第四項之特別規定外）。

乙、 所有陸上、水上及空中運輸和通訊設施與設備。

丙、 所有機場、水上飛機基地、防空設施、港口及海軍基地、油庫、常設與臨時的陸上及海岸防禦碉堡，要塞及其他設防區，包含所有這些防禦設施、軍事設施和建築之圖面。

丁、 所有工廠、製造場所、工作場所、研究所、實驗所、試驗所、技術數據、專利、設計、圖面及發明，以用來設計或意圖製造、或促成生產，做為提供任何軍事機關或準軍事組織運作所使用的，或意圖使用的所有軍用器材與其他物資，及做為物業用途。

七、 日本帝國大本營於接獲本命令後，應毫無延遲就上面第六項甲、乙、丁中指定之所有項目，將其關於各自數量、型式及位置之完整明細表，提供給盟軍最高統帥。

八、 所有兵器、彈藥及軍用器材之製造及分配應立即終止。

九、 關於日本帝國或日本帝國控制下之政權掌握之同盟國俘虜及被拘留平民：

甲、 須嚴謹的維持所有同盟國俘虜及被拘留平民之安全及福祉，至盟軍最高統帥接替其責任為止，須提供包括充足的食物、住所、服裝及醫療在內之必要的管理及補給業務。

乙、 應立即將同盟國俘虜及被拘留平民所在之收容所及其他拘留所之設備、貯藏品、記錄、武器及彈藥，移交給俘虜及被拘留平民裡面的高階軍官或指定之代表，並置於其指揮之下。

丙、 依盟軍最高統帥所指示之地點，將俘虜及被拘留平民運送至同盟國當局能交接之安全處所。

丁、 日本帝國大本營於接獲本命令之後，應毫無延遲地將所有同盟國俘虜及被拘留平民所在地點之明細表，提供給盟軍最高統帥。

十、 所有日本帝國及日本帝國統治下之軍事政府及民間政府，應協助同盟國軍隊佔領日本帝國及日本帝國統治地域。

十一、 日本帝國大本營及日本帝國軍官應做成準備，在同盟國佔領軍司令官有所指示之際，收集且移交一般日本帝國國民所有之一切武器。

十二、 日本帝國及日本帝國統治下之軍部、行政官員及無官職人員，應嚴格且迅速服從本命令及爾後盟軍最高統帥或其他同盟國軍事當局所發出之一切指示，若有遲延或不遵守本命令和爾後任何命令之規定者，以及被盟軍最高統帥認定為係對同盟國有害之行為時，同盟國軍事當局及日本帝國政府將立即加以嚴懲。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

General Order No. 1 was General Douglas MacArthur's first order to the forces of the Empire of Japan following the surrender of Japan, and its final form was approved by US President Harry S. Truman on Aug. 17, 1945. It instructed Japanese forces to surrender to designated Allied commanders, reveal all current military deployments, and preserve military equipment for later disarmament. General Order No. 1 became known to the world when it was announced at the Japanese Surrender Ceremony on Sept. 2, 1945, being issued by Japan's Imperial General Headquarters that day. Please note that this document is also often referred to as "SCAP General Order No. 1", SCAP standing for "Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers" or "Supreme Command of Allies in the Pacific" (in Chinese: zhu Ri mengjun zongsiling 駐日盟軍總司令, in Japanese: rengō kokugun saikō shireikan sōshireibu 連合国軍最高司令官総司令部). Some sources use the heading "Surrender Order of the Imperial General Headquarters of Japan".

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Japan's First Instrument of Surrender

Name in Chinese Riben toujiangshu 日本投降書
Document type Official surrender of the Japanese leadership
Year, date 1945, Sept. 2
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(Jump to Potsdam Declaration)

We, acting by command of and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions set forth in the declaration issued by the Heads of the Governments of the United States, China, and Great Britain on 26 July 1945 at Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which four powers are hereafter referred to as the Allied Powers.

We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese armed forces and all armed forces under the Japanese control wherever situated.

We hereby command all Japanese forces wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilites forthwith, to preserve and save from damage all ships, aircraft, and military and civil property and to comply with all requirements which my be imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by agencies of the Japanese Government at his direction.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Headquarters to issue at once orders to the Commanders of all Japanese forces and all forces under Japanese control wherever situated to surrender unconditionally themselves and all forces under their control.

We hereby command all civil, military and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, and orders and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority and we direct all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their non-combatant duties unless specifically relieved by him or under his authority.

We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever actions may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representative of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that Declaration.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to liberate all allied prisoners of war and civilian internees now under Japanese control and to provide for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to places as directed.

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender.

Signed at TOKYO BAY, JAPAN at 0904 I on the SECOND day of SEPTEMBER, 1945

Mamoru Shiegemitsu (By Command and on Behalf of the Emperor of Japan and the Japanese Government)
Yoshijiro Umezu (By Command and on Behalf of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters)

Accepted at TOKYO BAY, JAPAN at 0903 I on the SECOND day of SEPTEMBER, 1945, for the United States, Republic of China, United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and in the interests of the other United Nations at war with Japan.

Douglas MacArthur (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers)
Chester W. Nimitz (United States Representative)
Hsu Yung-ch'ang (Republic of China Representative)
Bruce Fraser (United Kingdom Representative)
Kuzma Derevyanko (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Representative)
Thomas Blamey (Commonwealth of Australia Representative)
Lawrence Moore Cosgrave (Dominion of Canada Representative)
Philippe Leclerc de Hauteclocque (Provisional Government of the French Republic Representative)
Conrad E. L. Helfrich (Kingdom of the Netherlands Representative)
Leonard M. Isitt (Dominion of New Zealand Representative)

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日本投降書

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餘等茲對合衆國、中華民國及大不列顛帝國，各國政府首腦于1945年7月26日於波茨坦宣佈，爾後由蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯邦之參加宣言條款，並根據日本國政府、天皇及日本帝國大本營之命令代表受諾之；右述四國以後稱之爲聯合國。

餘等此佈告，無論日本帝國、大本營及任何地方所有之日本國軍隊與日本國所支配下之一切軍隊，悉對聯合國無條件投降。

餘等茲命令任何地方之一切日本國軍隊及日本國臣民，即刻停止敵對行為，保存所有船舶及軍用財產，且防止損毀，並服從聯合國最高司令官及其指示，對日本國政府之各機關所課之一切要求應予以應諾。

餘等此命令日本帝國大本營，對於任何地方之一切日本國軍隊，及由日本國支配下之一切軍隊指揮官，速即發佈其本身或其支配下之一切軍隊無條件投降之命令。

餘等茲對所有官廳、陸軍及海軍之職員，命令其遵守且施行聯合國最高司令官為實施此投降之檔,認為適當而由其自己發出或根據其委任發出之一切佈告及指示,且命令右開職員除由聯合國最高司令官，或根據其事務委任與解除其任務以外均須留於各自原有地位，且仍繼續行使各個之非戰鬥任務。

余等茲為天皇、日本國政府及其繼續者，承約切實履行波茨坦宣言之條款，發佈為實施該宣言之聯合國最高司令官及其他特派聯合國代表要求之一切命令，且實施一切措置。

餘等茲對日本國政府及日本帝國大本營命令，即速解放現由日本國支配下,所有聯合國俘虜及被拘留者，且執行對彼等之保護，津貼給養及對指定地點迅速運輸等措置。

天皇及日本國政府統治國家之權，限置於為實施投降條款採用認為適當措置之聯合國最高司令官之限制下。

1945年9月2日午前9時4分于東京灣密蘇裏號艦上簽字之，並根據大日本帝國天皇陛下及日本國政府之命令且以其名義。

根據日本帝國大本營之命令且以其名義   重光 葵   梅津 美治郎

1945年9月2日午前9時4分於東京灣爲合衆國、中華民國、聯合王國及蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯邦及與日本國存在戰爭狀態之其他聯合國之利益受諾之。

聯合國最高司令官   道格拉斯 • 麥克阿瑟 元帥
合衆國代表   尼米茲 元帥
中華民國代表   徐永昌 上將
聯合王國代表   福拉塞 上將
蘇維埃社會主義共和國代表   狄裏夫揚柯 中將
澳大利亞聯邦代表   布萊梅
加拿大代表   哥斯格洛夫
法蘭西代表   萊克勒
荷蘭代表   赫夫裏區
新西蘭代表   依西特

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

In Japanese, this document is called "Nipponno kōfuku bunsho" (日本の降伏文書). It was signed during a formal ceremony which took place on the deck of the battleship USS Missouri, marking the end of hostilities in WWII.

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Act of Surrender

Name in Chinese jiangshu 降書
Document type Surrender of Japan to the ROC
Year, date 1945, Sept. 9
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1. The Emperor of Japan, the Japanese government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, having recognized the complete military defeat of the Japanese military forces by the Allied forces and having surrendered unconditionally to the Supreme Commander for the Allied powers.

2. The Supreme Commander for the Allied powers directed by his General Order No. 1 that the senior commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces of Japan within China excluding Manchuria, Formosa and French Indo-China north of 16 degrees north latitude shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

3. We, the Japanese Commanders of all Japanese forces and auxiliaries in the areas named above, also recognizing the complete military defeat of the Japanese military forces by the Allied forces, hereby surrender unconditionally all of the forces under our command to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

4. All the Japanese forces hereby surrendered will cease hostilities and will remain at the stations they now occupy. They are now non-combatant troops and in due course will be demobilized.

5. They will assemble, preserve without damage, and turn over to the forces specified by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, all arms, ammunition, equipment, supplies, records, information and other assets of any kind belonging to the Japanese forces. Pending specific instructions, all Japanese aircraft, naval units, and merchant ships in the areas named above will be held without damage where they are at present located.

6. All the Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees now under Japanese control in the areas named above will be liberated at once and the Japanese forces will provide protection, care, maintenance, and transportation to places as directed.

7. Henceforth, all the Japanese forces, hereby surrendered, will be subject to the control of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Their movements and activities will be dictated by him, and they will obey only the orders and proclamations issued, or authorised, by him, or the orders of their Japanese commanders based upon his instructions.

8. This act of surrender and all subsequent orders and proclamations of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to the surrender forces will be issued at once to the appropriate subordinate commanders and forces and it will be the responsibility of all Japanese commanders and forces to see that such proclamations and orders are immediately and completely complied with.

9. For any failure or delay, by any member of the forces surrendered hereby to act in accordance with this act of surrender or future orders or proclamations of the Generalissimo, he will summarily and drastically punish both the violator and his responsible commanders.

Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, Signatory under orders of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and Commander of the Japanese Forces in Central China. (Signature and official seal)

Signed at 9.00 a.m. on Sept. 9 in the 20th year of Showa (1945 AD) in Nanjing, Republic of China.

The Representative of the Republic of China, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the other Allied Forces at war with Japan, accepted this act of surrender at 9.00 a.m. on Sept. 9 in the 34th year of the Republic of China (1945 AD) in Nanjing, Republic of China.

Army General Ho Ying-chen, Special Envoy of Supreme Commander in the China Theatre Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Army. (Signature and official seal)

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降書

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一、日本帝國政府及日本帝國大本營已向聯合國最高統帥無條件投降。

二、聯合國最高統帥第一號命令規定在「中華民國（東三省除外）臺灣與越南北緯十六度以北地區內之日本全部陸、海、空軍與輔助部隊應向蔣委員長投降」。

三、吾等在上述區域內之全部日本陸海空軍及輔助部隊之將領，願率領所屬部隊，向蔣委員長無條件投降。

四、本官當立即命令所有上第二款所述區域內之全部日本陸、海、空各級指揮官，及其所屬部隊與所控制之部隊，向蔣委員長特派受降代表中國戰區中國陸軍總司令何應欽上將及何應欽上將指定之各地區受降主官投降。

五、投降之全部日本陸、海、空軍立即停止敵對行動，暫留原地待命，所有武器、彈藥、裝具、器材、補給品、情報資料、地圖、文獻檔案及其他一切資產等，當暫時保管。所有航空器及飛機場一切設備，艦艇、船舶、車輛、碼頭、工廠、倉庫及一切建築物，以及現在上第二款所述地區內日本陸、海、空軍或其控制之部隊所有或所控制之軍用或民用財產，亦均保持完整，全部待繳於蔣委員長及其代表何應欽上將所指定之部隊及政府機關代表接收。

六、上第二款所述區域內日本陸、海、空軍所俘聯合國戰俘及拘留之人民，立予釋放，並保護送至指定地點。

七、自此以後，所有上第二款所述區域內之日本陸、海、空軍當即服從蔣委員長之節制，並接受蔣委員長及其代表何應欽上將所頒發之命令。

八、本官對本降書所列各款及蔣委員長與其代表何應欽上將以後對投降日軍所頒發之命令，當立即對各級軍官及士兵轉達遵照，上第二款所述地區之所有日本軍官佐士兵，均須負完全履行此項命令之責。

九、投降之日本陸、海、空軍任何人員，對於本降書所列各款及蔣委員長與其代表何應欽上將嗣後所授之命令，倘有未能履行或遲延情事，各級負責官長及違反命令者願受懲罰。

奉日本帝國政府及日本帝國大本營命簽字人中國派遣軍總司令官陸軍大將 岡村 寧次（簽字蓋章）

昭和二十年（公曆一九四五年）九月九日午前九時零分簽字於中華民國南京。

代表中華民國、美利堅合眾國，大不列顛聯合王國、蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯邦，並為對日本作戰之其他聯合國之利益，接受本降書於中華民國三十四年（公曆一九四五年）九月九日午前九時零分簽字於中華民國南京。

中國戰區最高統帥特級上將蔣中正特派代表中國陸軍總司令陸軍一級上將 何應欽（簽字蓋章）

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Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction Note No. 677

Name in Chinese lianhe guomengjun zuigao silingbu xunling di liuqiqi hao 聯合國盟軍最高司令部訓令第 677 號
Document type Memorandum for the government of Japan
Year, date 1946, Jan. 20
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Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS of Supreme Commander for Allied Powers
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

APO 500
20 January 1946
AG 091 (29 Jan 46) GS
(SCAPIN - 677)

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.
THROUGH: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.
SUBJECT: Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan.

1. The Imperial Japanese Government is directed to cease exercising, or attempting to exercise, governmental or administrative authority over any area outside of Japan, or over any government officials and employees or any other persons within such areas.

2. Except as authorized by this Headquarters, the Imperial Japanese Government will not communicate with government officials and employees or with any other persons outside of Japan for any purpose other than the routine operation of authorized shipping, communications and weather services.

3. For the purpose of this directive, Japan is defined to include the four main islands of Japan (Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku) and the approximately 1,000 smaller adjacent islands, including the Tsushima Islands and the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands north of 30° North Latitude (excluding Kuchinoshima Island); and excluding (a) Utsuryo (Ullung) Island, Liancourt Rocks (Take Island) and Quelpart (Saishu or Cheju) Island, (b) the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands south of 30° North Latitude (including Kuchinoshima Island), the Izu, Nanpo, Bonin (Ogasawara) and Volcano (Kazan or Iwo) Island Groups, and all the other outlying Pacific Islands [including the Daito (Ohigashi or Oagari) Island Group, and Parece Vela (Okino-tori), Marcus (Minami-tori) and Ganges (Nakano-tori) Islands], and (c) the Kurile (Chishima) Islands, the Habomai (Hapomaze) Island Group (including Suisho, Yuri, Akiyuri, Shibotsu and Taraku Islands) and Shikotan Island.

4. Further areas specifically excluded from the governmental and administrative jurisdiction of the Imperial Japanese Government are the following: (a) all Pacific Islands seized or occupied under mandate or otherwise by Japan since the beginning of the World War in 1914, (b) Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, (c) Korea, and (d) Karafuto.

5. The definition of Japan contained in this directive shall also apply to all future directives, memoranda and orders from this Headquarters unless otherwise specified therein.

6. Nothing in this directive shall be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate determination of the minor islands referred to in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration.

7. The Imperial Japanese Government will prepare and submit to this Headquarters a report of all governmental agencies in Japan the functions of which pertain to areas outside a statement as defined in this directive. Such report will include a statement of the functions, organization and personnel of each of the agencies concerned.

8. All records of the agencies referred to in paragraph 7 above will be preserved and kept available for inspection by this Headquarters.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER: H. W. Allen
Colonel, AGD.
Asst. Adjutant General

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Selected important texts and documents (1950–1990)
Treaty / law / documentYear~ in Chinese
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees1951 關於難民地位的公約
San Francisco Peace Treaty1951[No Chinese version]
Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan1952中華民國與日本國間和平條約
Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty1954中美共同防禦條約
The US Congress Formosa Resolution1955[No Chinese version]
★ PRC Defense Minister Peng Dehuai’s Proclamation to Taiwan Compatriots1958中華人民共和國國防部告臺灣同胞書
Legal Problems Regarding Formosa and the Offshore Islands1958[No Chinese version]
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan1960[No Chinese version]
Czyzak Memorandum1961[No Chinese version]
UN Resolution 16681961聯合國決議一六六八號
Okinawa Reversion Agreement1971[No Chinese version]
Starr Memorandum1971[No Chinese version]
UN Resolution 27581971聯合國決議二七五八號
★ Shanghai Communiqué1972中華人民共和國和美利堅合眾國聯合公報（《上海公報》）
★ Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the PRC1972中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府聯合聲明（《中日聯合聲明》）
★ Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the PRC1978中華人民共和國和日本國和平友好條約（《中日和平友好條約》）
★ Joint Communiqué of the US and the PRC (Normalization Communiqué)1979美國──中華人民共和國建立外交關係的聯合公報（《關係正常化公報》）
★ Message to Compatriots in Taiwan1979告台灣同胞書
Taiwan Relations Act1979台灣關係法
Nagoya Resolution1979[No Chinese version]
Lausanne Agreement1981[No Chinese version]
★ Chairman Ye Jianying’s Elaborations on Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan To Motherland and Peaceful Unification1981葉劍英向新華社記者發表的談話
The "Six Assurances" to Taiwan ROC1982雷根總統的『六項保證』
★ Joint Communiqué of the PRC and the US1982中華人民共和國和美利堅合衆國聯合公報（《八一七公報》）
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [Article 121] ✄1982聯合國海洋法公約，第一二一條
★ Deng Xiaoping’s “Six Conceptions”1983鄧小平論以『一國兩制』解決台灣問題
National Security Law During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion1987動員戡亂時期國家安全法

(Jump to Documents 1895–1950)    (Jump to Documents 1990—)

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Convention relating to the Status of Refugees

Name in Chinese guanyu nanmin diweide gongyue 關於難民地位的公約
Document type Multilateral treaty by the United Nations
Years, dates 1951, July 28 (adopted); 1954, April 22 (entry into force)
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Adopted 28 July 1951 by United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under General Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 1950
Entry into force: 22 April 1954, in accordance with Article 43

Preamble

The High Contracting Parties,

Considering that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 by the General Assembly have affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination,

Considering that the United Nations has, on various occasions, manifested its profound concern for refugees and endeavoured to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms,

Considering that it is desirable to revise and consolidate previous international agreements relating to the status of refugees and to extend the scope of and the protection accorded by such instruments by means of a new agreement,

Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation,

Expressing the wish that all States, recognizing the social and humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees, will do everything within their power to prevent this problem from becoming a cause of tension between States,

Noting that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is charged with the task of supervising international conventions providing for the protection of refugees, and recognizing that the effective co-ordination of measures taken to deal with this problem will depend upon the co-operation of States with the High Commissioner,

Have agreed as follows:

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Chapter I. General Provisions

Article 1 - Definition of the term "refugee"

A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee" shall apply to any person who:
(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization;
Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organization during the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of refugee being accorded to persons who fulfil the conditions of paragraph 2 of this section;
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term "the country of his nationality" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national.

B. (1) For the purposes of this Convention, the words "events occurring before 1 January 1951" in article 1, section A, shall be understood to mean either (a) "events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951"; or (b) "events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951"; and each Contracting State shall make a declaration at the time of signature, ratification or accession, specifying which of these meanings it applies for the purpose of its obligations under this Convention.
(2) Any Contracting State which has adopted alternative (a) may at any time extend its obligations by adopting alternative (b) by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

C. This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A if:
(1) He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; or
(2) Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily reacquired it; or
(3) He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality; or
(4) He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution; or
(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality;
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A (1) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of nationality;
(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, able to return to the country of his former habitual residence;
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A (1) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to return to the country of his former habitual residence.

D. This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.
When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention.

E. This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country.

F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;
(b) He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
(c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 2 - General obligations

Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which require in particular that he conform to its laws and regulations as well as to measures taken for the maintenance of public order.

Article 3 - Non-discrimination

The Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin.

Article 4 - Religion

The Contracting States shall accord to refugees within their territories treatment at least as favourable as that accorded to their nationals with respect to freedom to practise their religion and freedom as regards the religious education of their children.

Article 5 - Rights granted apart from this Convention

Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights and benefits granted by a Contracting State to refugees apart from this Convention.

Article 6 - The term "in the same circumstances"

For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the same circumstances" implies that any requirements (including requirements as to length and conditions of sojourn or residence) which the particular individual would have to fulfil for the enjoyment of the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by him, with the exception of requirements which by their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling.

Article 7 - Exemption from reciprocity

1. Except where this Convention contains more favourable provisions, a Contracting State shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to aliens generally.
2. After a period of three years' residence, all refugees shall enjoy exemption from legislative reciprocity in the territory of the Contracting States.
3. Each Contracting State shall continue to accord to refugees the rights and benefits to which they were already entitled, in the absence of reciprocity, at the date of entry into force of this Convention for that State.
4. The Contracting States shall consider favourably the possibility of according to refugees, in the absence of reciprocity, rights and benefits beyond those to which they are entitled according to paragraphs 2 and 3, and to extending exemption from reciprocity to refugees who do not fulfil the conditions provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3.
5. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 apply both to the rights and benefits referred to in articles 13, 18, 19, 21 and 22 of this Convention and to rights and benefits for which this Convention does not provide.

Article 8 - Exemption from exceptional measures

With regard to exceptional measures which may be taken against the person, property or interests of nationals of a foreign State, the Contracting States shall not apply such measures to a refugee who is formally a national of the said State solely on account of such nationality. Contracting States which, under their legislation, are prevented from applying the general principle expressed in this article, shall, in appropriate cases, grant exemptions in favour of such refugees.

Article 9 - Provisional measures

Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Contracting State, in time of war or other grave and exceptional circumstances, from taking provisionally measures which it considers to be essential to the national security in the case of a particular person, pending a determination by the Contracting State that that person is in fact a refugee and that the continuance of such measures is necessary in his case in the interests of national security.

Article 10 - Continuity of residence

1. Where a refugee has been forcibly displaced during the Second World War and removed to the territory of a Contracting State, and is resident there, the period of such enforced sojourn shall be considered to have been lawful residence within that territory.
2. Where a refugee has been forcibly displaced during the Second World War from the territory of a Contracting State and has, prior to the date of entry into force of this Convention, returned there for the purpose of taking up residence, the period of residence before and after such enforced displacement shall be regarded as one uninterrupted period for any purposes for which uninterrupted residence is required.

Article 11 - Refugee seamen

In the case of refugees regularly serving as crew members on board a ship flying the flag of a Contracting State, that State shall give sympathetic consideration to their establishment on its territory and the issue of travel documents to them or their temporary admission to its territory particularly with a view to facilitating their establishment in another country.

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Chapter II. Juridical Status

Article 12 - Personal status

1. The personal status of a refugee shall be governed by the law of the country of his domicile or, if he has no domicile, by the law of the country of his residence.
2. Rights previously acquired by a refugee and dependent on personal status, more particularly rights attaching to marriage, shall be respected by a Contracting State, subject to compliance, if this be necessary, with the formalities required by the law of that State, provided that the right in question is one which would have been recognized by the law of that State had he not become a refugee.

Article 13 - Movable and immovable property

The Contracting States shall accord to a refugee treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, as regards the acquisition of movable and immovable property and other rights pertaining thereto, and to leases and other contracts relating to movable and immovable property.

Article 14 - Artistic rights and industrial property

In respect of the protection of industrial property, such as inventions, designs or models, trade marks, trade names, and of rights in literary, artistic and scientific works, a refugee shall be accorded in the country in which he has his habitual residence the same protection as is accorded to nationals of that country. In the territory of any other Contracting States, he shall be accorded the same protection as is accorded in that territory to nationals of the country in which he has his habitual residence.

Article 15 - Right of association

As regards non-political and non-profit-making associations and trade unions the Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country, in the same circumstances.

Article 16 - Access to courts

1. A refugee shall have free access to the courts of law on the territory of all Contracting States.
2. A refugee shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he has his habitual residence the same treatment as a national in matters pertaining to access to the courts, including legal assistance and exemption from cautio judicatum solvi.
3. A refugee shall be accorded in the matters referred to in paragraph 2 in countries other than that in which he has his habitual residence the treatment granted to a national of the country of his habitual residence.

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Chapter III. Gainful Employment

Article 17 - Wage-earning employment

1. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage-earning employment.
2. In any case, restrictive measures imposed on aliens or the employment of aliens for the protection of the national labour market shall not be applied to a refugee who was already exempt from them at the date of entry into force of this Convention for the Contracting State concerned, or who fulfils one of the following conditions:
(a) He has completed three years' residence in the country;
(b) He has a spouse possessing the nationality of the country of residence. A refugee may not invoke the benefit of this provision if he has abandoned his spouse;
(c) He has one or more children possessing the nationality of the country of residence.
3. The Contracting States shall give sympathetic consideration to assimilating the rights of all refugees with regard to wage-earning employment to those of nationals, and in particular of those refugees who have entered their territory pursuant to programmes of labour recruitment or under immigration schemes.

Article 18 - Self-employment

The Contracting States shall accord to a refugee lawfully in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage on his own account in agriculture, industry, handicrafts and commerce and to establish commercial and industrial companies.

Article 19 - Liberal professions

1. Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory who hold diplomas recognized by the competent authorities of that State, and who are desirous of practising a liberal profession, treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances.
2. The Contracting States shall use their best endeavours consistently with their laws and constitutions to secure the settlement of such refugees in the territories, other than the metropolitan territory, for whose international relations they are responsible.

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Chapter IV. Welfare

Article 20 - Rationing

Where a rationing system exists, which applies to the population at large and regulates the general distribution of products in short supply, refugees shall be accorded the same treatment as nationals.

Article 21 - Housing

As regards housing, the Contracting States, in so far as the matter is regulated by laws or regulations or is subject to the control of public authorities, shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances.

Article 22 - Public education

1. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education.
2. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees treatment as favourable as possible, and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, with respect to education other than elementary education and, in particular, as regards access to studies, the recognition of foreign school certificates, diplomas and degrees, the remission of fees and charges and the award of scholarships.

Article 23 - Public relief

The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the same treatment with respect to public relief and assistance as is accorded to their nationals.

Article 24 - Labour legislation and social security

1. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the same treatment as is accorded to nationals in respect of the following matters;
(a) In so far as such matters are governed by laws or regulations or are subject to the control of administrative authorities: remuneration, including family allowances where these form part of remuneration, hours of work, overtime arrangements, holidays with pay, restrictions on work, minimum age of employment, apprenticeship and training, women's work and the work of young persons, and the enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining;
(b) Social security (legal provisions in respect of employment injury, occupational diseases, maternity, sickness, disability, old age, death, unemployment, family responsibilities and any other contingency which, according to national laws or regulations, is covered by a social security scheme), subject to the following limitations:
2. The right to compensation for the death of a refugee resulting from employment injury or from occupational disease shall not be affected by the fact that the residence of the beneficiary is outside the territory of the Contracting State.
3. The Contracting States shall extend to refugees the benefits of agreements concluded between them, or which may be concluded between them in the future, concerning the maintenance of acquired rights and rights in the process of acquisition in regard to social security, subject only to the conditions which apply to nationals of the States signatory to the agreements in question.
4. The Contracting States will give sympathetic consideration to extending to refugees so far as possible the benefits of similar agreements which may at any time be in force between such Contracting States and non-contracting States.

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Chapter V. Administrative Measures

Article 25 - Administrative assistance

1. When the exercise of a right by a refugee would normally require the assistance of authorities of a foreign country to whom he cannot have recourse, the Contracting States in whose territory he is residing shall arrange that such assistance be afforded to him by their own authorities or by an international authority.
2. The authority or authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 shall deliver or cause to be delivered under their supervision to refugees such documents or certifications as would normally be delivered to aliens by or through their national authorities.
3. Documents or certifications so delivered shall stand in the stead of the official instruments delivered to aliens by or through their national authorities, and shall be given credence in the absence of proof to the contrary.
4. Subject to such exceptional treatment as may be granted to indigent persons, fees may be charged for the services mentioned herein, but such fees shall be moderate and commensurate with those charged to nationals for similar services.
5. The provisions of this article shall be without prejudice to articles 27 and 28.

Article 26 - Freedom of movement

Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of residence and to move freely within its territory subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances.

Article 27 - Identity papers

The Contracting States shall issue identity papers to any refugee in their territory who does not possess a valid travel document.

Article 28 - Travel documents

1. The Contracting States shall issue to refugees lawfully staying in their territory travel documents for the purpose of travel outside their territory, unless compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require, and the provisions of the Schedule to this Convention shall apply with respect to such documents. The Contracting States may issue such a travel document to any other refugee in their territory; they shall in particular give sympathetic consideration to the issue of such a travel document to refugees in their territory who are unable to obtain a travel document from the country of their lawful residence.
2. Travel documents issued to refugees under previous international agreements by Parties thereto shall be recognized and treated by the Contracting States in the same way as if they had been issued pursuant to this article.

Article 29 - Fiscal charges

1. The Contracting States shall not impose upon refugees duties, charges or taxes, of any description whatsoever, other or higher than those which are or may be levied on their nationals in similar situations.
2. Nothing in the above paragraph shall prevent the application to refugees of the laws and regulations concerning charges in respect of the issue to aliens of administrative documents including identity papers.

Article 30 - Transfer of assets

1. A Contracting State shall, in conformity with its laws and regulations, permit refugees to transfer assets which they have brought into its territory, to another country where they have been admitted for the purposes of resettlement.
2. A Contracting State shall give sympathetic consideration to the application of refugees for permission to transfer assets wherever they may be and which are necessary for their resettlement in another country to which they have been admitted.

Article 31 - Refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge

1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.
2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country.

Article 32 - Expulsion

1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order.
2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the purpose before competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the competent authority.
3. The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable period within which to seek legal admission into another country. The Contracting States reserve the right to apply during that period such internal measures as they may deem necessary.

Article 33 - Prohibition of expulsion or return ("refoulement")

1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (" refouler ") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.

Article 34 - Naturalization

The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.

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Chapter VI. Executory and Transitory Provisions

Article 35 - Co-operation of the national authorities with the United Nations

1. The Contracting States undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention.
2. In order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, to make reports to the competent organs of the United Nations, the Contracting States undertake to provide them in the appropriate form with information and statistical data requested concerning:
(a) The condition of refugees,
(b) The implementation of this Convention, and
(c) Laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force relating to refugees.

Article 36 - Information on national legislation

The Contracting States shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the laws and regulations which they may adopt to ensure the application of this Convention.

Article 37 - Relation to previous conventions

Without prejudice to article 28, paragraph 2, of this Convention, this Convention replaces, as between Parties to it, the Arrangements of 5 July 1922, 31 May 1924, 12 May 1926, 30 June 1928 and 30 July 1935, the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 and the Agreement of 15 October 1946.

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Chapter VII. Final Clauses

Article 38 - Settlement of disputes

Any dispute between Parties to this Convention relating to its interpretation or application, which cannot be settled by other means, shall be referred to the International Court of Justice at the request of any one of the parties to the dispute.

Article 39 - Signature, ratification and accession

1. This Convention shall be opened for signature at Geneva on 28 July 1951 and shall thereafter be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It shall be open for signature at the European Office of the United Nations from 28 July to 31 August 1951 and shall be re-opened for signature at the Headquarters of the United Nations from 17 September 1951 to 31 December 1952.
2. This Convention shall be open for signature on behalf of all States Members of the United Nations, and also on behalf of any other State invited to attend the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons or to which an invitation to sign will have been addressed by the General Assembly. It shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. This Convention shall be open from 28 July 1951 for accession by the States referred to in paragraph 2 of this article. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 40 - Territorial application clause

1. Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that this Convention shall extend to all or any of the territories for the international relations of which it is responsible. Such a declaration shall take effect when the Convention enters into force for the State concerned.
2. At any time thereafter any such extension shall be made by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and shall take effect as from the ninetieth day after the day of receipt by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of this notification, or as from the date of entry into force of the Convention for the State concerned, whichever is the later.
3. With respect to those territories to which this Convention is not extended at the time of signature, ratification or accession, each State concerned shall consider the possibility of taking the necessary steps in order to extend the application of this Convention to such territories, subject, where necessary for constitutional reasons, to the consent of the Governments of such territories.

Article 41 - Federal clause

In the case of a Federal or non-unitary State, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the legislative jurisdiction of the federal legislative authority, the obligations of the Federal Government shall to this extent be the same as those of parties which are not Federal States;
(b) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the legislative jurisdiction of constituent States, provinces or cantons which are not, under the constitutional system of the Federation, bound to take legislative action, the Federal Government shall bring such articles with a favourable recommendation to the notice of the appropriate authorities of States, provinces or cantons at the earliest possible moment;
(c) A Federal State Party to this Convention shall, at the request of any other Contracting State transmitted through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, supply a statement of the law and practice of the Federation and its constituent units in regard to any particular provision of the Convention showing the extent to which effect has been given to that provision by legislative or other action.

Article 42 - Reservations

1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1, 3, 4, 16 (1), 33, 36-46 inclusive.
2. Any State making a reservation in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article may at any time withdraw the reservation by a communication to that effect addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 43 - Entry into force

1. This Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the day of deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or accession.

Article 44 - Denunciation

1. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention at any time by a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Such denunciation shall take effect for the Contracting State concerned one year from the date upon which it is received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. Any State which has made a declaration or notification under article 40 may, at any time thereafter, by a notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, declare that the Convention shall cease to extend to such territory one year after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General.

Article 45 - Revision

1. Any Contracting State may request revision of this Convention at any time by a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall recommend the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.

Article 46 - Notifications by the Secretary-General of the United Nations

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all Members of the United Nations and non-member States referred to in article 39:
(a) Of declarations and notifications in accordance with section B of article 1;
(b) Of signatures, ratifications and accessions in accordance with article 39;
(c) Of declarations and notifications in accordance with article 40;
(d) Of reservations and withdrawals in accordance with article 42;
(e) Of the date on which this Convention will come into force in accordance with article 43;
(f) Of denunciations and notifications in accordance with article 44;
(g) Of requests for revision in accordance with article 45.

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention on behalf of their respective Governments.
 Done at Geneva, this twenty-eighth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-one, in a single copy, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic and which shall remain deposited in the archives of the United Nations, and certified true copies of which shall be delivered to all Members of the United Nations and to the non-member States referred to in article 39.

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關於難民地位的公約

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

  序言
第一章   一般規定
第二章   法律上地位
第三章   有利可圖的職業活動 		   第四章   福利
第五章   行政措施
第六章   執行和過渡規定
第七章   最後條款

通過日期
1951 年 7 月 28 日

經由 聯合國難民和無國籍狀態全權代表會議 1951 年 7 月 28 日通過並開放給各國簽字、批准和加入 按照第 43 條規定，於 1954 年 4 月 22 日生效

序言

締約各方，

考慮到聯合國憲章和聯合國大會於一九四八年十二月十日通過的世界人權宣言確認人人享有基本權利和自由不受歧視的原則，

考慮到聯合國在各種場合表示過它對難民的深切關懷，並且竭力保證難民可以最廣泛地行使此項基本權利和自由，

考慮到通過一項新的協定來修正和綜合過去關於難民地位的國際協定並擴大此項檔的範圍及其所給予的保護是符合願望的，

考慮到庇護權的給予可能使某些國家負荷過分的重擔，並且考慮到聯合國已經認識到這一問題的國際範圍和性質，因此，如果沒有國際合作，就不能對此問題達成滿意的解決，

表示希望凡認識到難民問題的社會和人道性質的一切國家，將盡一切努力不使這一問題成為國家之間緊張的原因，

注意到聯合國難民事務高級專員對於規定保護難民的國際公約負有監督的任務，並認識到為處理這一問題所採取措施的有效協調，將依賴於各國和高級專員的合作，

茲議定如下：

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第一章 一般規定

第一條 “難民”一詞的定義

（一）本公約所用“難民”一詞適用於下列任何人：
 （甲）根據一九二六年五月十二日和一九二八年六月三十日的協定、或根據一九三三年十月二十八日和一九三八年二月十日的公約、以及一九三九年九月十四日的議定書、或國際難民組織約章被認為難民的人；
國際難民組織在其執行職務期間所作關於不合格的決定，不妨礙對符合於本款（乙）項條件的人給予難民的地位。
 （乙） 由於一九五一年一月一日以前發生的事情並因有正當理由畏懼由於種族、宗教、國籍、屬於其一社會團體或具有某種政治見解的原因留在其本國之外，並且由於此項畏懼而不能或不願受該國保護的人；或者不具有國籍並由於上述事情留在他以前經常居住國家以外而現在不能或者由於上述畏懼不願返回該國的人。
以于具有不止一國國籍的人，“本國”一詞是指他有國籍的每一國家。如果沒有實在可以發生畏懼的正當理由而不受他國籍所屬國家之一的保護時，不得認其缺乏本國的保護。

（二）
 （甲）本公約第一條（一）款所用“一九五一年一月一日以前發生的事情”一語，應瞭解為：（子）“一九五一年一月一日以前在歐洲發生的事情”；或者(醜)“一九五一年一月一日以前在歐洲或其他地方發生的事情”；締約各國應於簽字、批准、或加入時聲明為了承擔本公約的義務，這一用語應作何解釋。
 （乙）已經採取上述（子）解釋的任何締約國，可以隨時向聯合國秘書長提出通知，採取（醜）解釋以擴大其義務。

（三）如有下列各項情況，本公約應停止適宜於上述（甲）款所列的任何人：
 （甲） 該人已自動接受其本國的保護；或者
 （乙）該人於喪失國籍後，又自動重新取得國籍；或者
 （丙）該人已取得新的國籍，並享受其新國籍國家的保護；或者
 （丁）該人已在過去由於畏受迫害而離去或躲開的國家內自動定居下來；或者
 （戊）該人由於被認為是難民所依據的情況不復存在而不能繼續拒絕受其本國的保護；
但本項不適用於本條（一）款（甲）項所列的難民，如果他可以援引由於過去曾受迫害的重大理由以拒絕受其本國的保護；
 （己）該人本無國籍，由於被認為是難民所依據的情況不復存在而可以回到其以前經常居住的國家內；
但本項不適用於本條（一）款（甲）項所列的難民，如果他可以援引由於過去曾受迫害的重大理由以拒絕受其以前經常居住國家的保護。

（四）本公約不適用於目前從聯合國難民事務高級專員以外的聯合國機關或機構獲得保護或援助的人。
當上述保護或援助由於任何原因停止而這些人的地位還沒有根據聯合國大會所通過的有關決議明確解決時，他們應在事實上享受本公約的利益。

（五）本公約不適用於被其居住地國家主管當局認為具有附著于該國國籍的權利和義務的人。

（六）本公約規定不適用於存在著重大理由足以認為有下列情事的任何人：
 （甲） 該人犯了國際檔中已作出規定的破壞和平罪、戰爭罪、或危害人類罪；
 （乙）該人在以難民身分進入避難國以前，曾在避難國以外犯過嚴重的非政治性罪行；
 （丙）該人曾有違反聯合國宗旨和原則的行為並經認為有罪。

第二條 一般義務

一切難民對其所在國負有責任，此項責任特別要求他們遵守該國的法律和規章以及為維護公共秩序而採取的措施。

第三條 不受歧視

締約各國應對難民不分種族、宗教、或國籍，適用本公約的規定。

第四條 宗教

締約各國對在其領土內的難民，關於舉行宗教儀式的自由以及對其子女施加宗教教育的自由方面，應至少給予其本國國民所獲得的待遇。

第五條 與本公約無關的權利

本公約任何規定不得認為妨礙一個締約國並非由於本公約而給予難民的權利和利益。

第六條 “在同樣情況下”一詞的意義

本公約所用“在同樣情況下”一詞意味著凡是個別的人如果不是難民為了享受有關的權利所必需具備的任何要件（包括關於旅居或居住的期間和條件的要件），但按照要件的性質，難民不可能具備者，則不在此例。

第七條 相互條件的免除

（一）除本公約載有更有利的規定外，締約國應給予難民以一般外國人所獲得的待遇。
（二）一切難民在居住期滿三年以後，應在締約各國領土內享受立法上相互條件的免除。
（三）締約各國應繼續給予難民在本公約對該國生效之日他們無需在相互條件下已經有權享受的權利和利益。
（四）締約各國對無需在相互條件下給予難民根據第（二）、（三）兩款他們有權享受以外的權利和利益，以及對不具備第（二）、（三）兩款所規定條件的難民亦免除相互條件的可能性，應給予有利的考慮。
（五）第（二）、（三）兩款的規定對本公約第十三、十八、十九、二十一和二十二條所指權利和利益，以及本公約並未規定的權利和利益，均予適用。

第八條 特殊措施的免除

關於對一外國國民的人身、財產、或利益所得採取的特殊措施，締約各國不得對形式上為該外國國民的難民僅僅因其所屬國籍而對其適用此項措施。締約各國如根據其國內法不能適用本條所表示的一般原則，應在適當情況下，對此項難民給予免除的優惠。

第九條 臨時措施

本公約的任何規定並不妨礙一締約國在戰時或其他嚴重和特殊情況下對個別的人在該締約國斷定該人確為難民以前，並且認為有必要為了國家安全的利益應對該人繼續採取措施時，對他臨時採取該國所認為對其國家安全是迫切需要的措施。

第十條 繼續居住

（一）難民如在第二次世界大戰時被強制放逐並移至締約一國的領土並在其內居住，這種強制留居的時期應被認為在該領土內合法居住期間以內。
（二）難民如在第二次世界大戰時被強制逐出締約一國的領土，而在本公約生效之日以前返回該國準備定居，則在強制放逐以前和以後的居住時期，為了符合於繼續居住這一要求的任何目的，應被認為是一個未經中斷的期間。

第十一條 避難海員

對於在懸掛締約一國國旗的船上正常服務的難民，該國對於他們在其領土內定居以及發給他們旅行證件或者暫時接納他們到該國領土內，特別是為了便利他們在另一國家定居的目的，均應給予同情的考慮。

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第二章 法律上地位

第十二條 個人身分

（一）難民的個人身分，應受其住所地國家的法律支配，如無住所，則受其居住地國家的法律支配。
（二）難民以前由於個人身分而取得的權利，特別是關於婚姻的權利，應受到締約一國的尊重，如必要時應遵守該國法律所要求的儀式，但以如果他不是難民該有關的權利亦被該國法律承認者為限。

第十三條 動產和不動產

締約各國在動產和不動產的取得及與此有關的其他權利，以及關於動產和不動產的租賃和其他契約方面，應給予難民盡可能優惠的待遇，無論如何，此項待遇不得低於在同樣情況下給予一般外國人的待遇。

第十四條 藝術權利和工業財產

關於工業財產的保護，例如對發明、設計或模型、商標、商號名稱、以及對文學、藝術、和科學作品的權利，難民在其經常居住的國家內，應給以該國國民所享有的同樣保護。他在任何其他締約國領土內，應給以他經常居住國家的國民所享有的同樣保護。

第十五條 結社的權利

關於非政治性和非營利性的社團以及同業公會組織，締約各國對合法居留在其領土內的難民，應給以一個外國的國民在同樣情況下所享有的最惠國待遇。

第十六條 向法院申訴的權利

（一）難民有權自由向所有締約各國領土內的法院申訴。
（二）難民在其經常居住的締約國內，就向法院申訴的事項，包括訴訟救助和免予提供訴訟擔保在內，應享有與本國國民相同的待遇。
（三）難民在其經常居住的國家以外的其他國家內，就第（二）款所述事項，應給以他經常居住國家的國民所享有的待遇。

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第三章 有利可圖的職業活動

第十七條 以工資受償的雇傭

（一）締約各國對合法在其領土內居留的難民，就從事工作以換取工資的權利方面，應給以在同樣情況下一個外國國民所享有的最惠國待遇。
（二）無論如何，對外國人施加的限制措施或者為了保護國內勞動力市場而對雇傭外國人施加限制的措施，均不得適用於在本公約對有關締約國生效之日已免除此項措施的難民，亦不適用於具備下列條件之一的難民：
 （甲）已在該國居住滿三年；
 （乙）其配偶具有居住國的國籍，但如難民已與其配偶離異，則不得援引本項規定的利益；
 （丙）其子女一人或數人具有居住國的國籍。
（三）關於以工資受償的雇傭問題，締約各國對於使一切難民的權利相同于本國國民的權利方面，應給予同情的考慮，特別是對根據招工計畫或移民入境辦法進入其領土的難民的此項權利。

第十八條 自營職業

締約各國對合法在其領土內的難民，就其自己經營農業、工業、手工業、商業以及設立工商業公司方面，應給以盡可能優惠的待遇，無論如何，此項待遇不得低於一般外國人在同樣情況下所享有的待遇。

第十九條 自由職業

（一）締約各國對合法居留於其領土內的難民，凡持有該國主管當局所承認的文憑並願意從事自由職業者，應給以盡可能優惠的待遇，無論如何，此項待遇不得低於一般外國人在同樣情況下所享有的待遇。
（二）締約各國對在其本土以外而由其負責國際關係的領土內的難民，應在符合其法律和憲法的情況下，盡極大努力使這些難民定居下來。

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第四章 福利

第二十條 定額供應

如果存在著定額供應制度，而這一制度是適用于一般居民並調整著缺銷產品的總分配，難民應給以本國國民所享有的同樣待遇。

第二十一條 房屋

締約各國對合法居留於其領土內的難民，就房屋問題方面，如果該問題是由法律或規章調整或者受公共當局管制，應給以盡可能優惠的待遇，無論如何，此項待遇不得低於一般外國人在同樣情況下所享有的待遇。

第二十二條 公共教育

（一）締約各國應給予難民凡本國國民在初等教育方面所享有的同樣待遇。
（二）締約各國就初等教育以外的教育，特別是就獲得研究學術的機會、承認外國學校的證書、文憑、和學位、減免學費、以及發給獎學金方面，應對難民給以盡可能優惠的待遇，無論如何，此項待遇不得低於一般外國人在同樣情況下所享有的待遇。

第二十三條 公共救濟

締約各國對合法居住在其領土內的難民，就公共救濟和援助方面，應給以凡其本國國民所享有的同樣待遇。

第二十四條 勞動立法和社會安全

（一）締約各國對合法居留在其領土內的難民，就下列各事項，應給以本國國民所享有的同樣待遇：
（甲）報酬，包括家庭津貼――如此種津貼構成報酬一部分的話、工作時間、加班辦法、假日工資、對帶回家去工作的限制、雇傭最低年齡、學徒和訓練，女工和童工、享受共同交涉的利益，如果這些事項由法律或規章規定，或者受行政當局管制的話；
（乙）社會安全（關於雇傭中所受損害、職業病、生育、疾病、殘廢、年老、死亡、失業、家庭負擔或根據國家法律或規章包括在社會安全計畫之內的任何其他事故的法律規定），但受以下規定的限制：
 （一）對維持既得權利和正在取得的權利可能作出適當安排；
 （二）居住地國的法律或規章可能對全部由公共基金支付利益金或利益金的一部或對不符合于為發給正常退職金所規定資助條件的人發給津貼，制訂特別安排。

（二）難民由於雇傭中所受損害或職業病死亡而獲得的補償權利，不因受益人居住地在締約國領土以外而受影響。

（三）締約各國之間所締結或在將來可能締結的協定，凡涉及社會安全既得權利或正在取得的權利，締約各國應以此項協定所產生的利益給予難民，但以符合對有關協定各簽字國國民適用的條件者為限。

（四）締約各國對以締約國和非締約國之間隨時可能生效的類似協定所產生的利益儘量給予難民一事，將予以同情的考慮。

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第五章 行政措施

第二十五條 行政協助

（一）如果難民行使一項權利時正常地需要一個對他不能援助的外國當局的協助，則難民居住地的締約國應安排由該國自己當局或由一個國際當局給予此項協助。
（二）第一款所述當局應將正常地應由難民的本國當局或通過其本國當局給予外國人的檔或證明書給予難民，或者使這種文件或證明書在其監督下給予難民。
（三）如此發給的檔或證書應代替由難民的本國當局或通過其本國當局發給難民的正式檔，並應在沒有相反證據的情況下給予證明的效力。
（四）除對貧苦的人可能給予特殊的待遇外，對上述服務可以徵收費用，但此項費用應有限度，並應相當於為類似服務向本國國民徵收的費用。
（五）本條各項規定對第二十七條和第二十八條並不妨礙。

第二十六條 行動自由

締約各國對合法在其領土內的難民，應給予選擇其居住地和在其領土內自由行動的權利，但應受對一般外國人在同樣情況下適用的規章的限制。

第二十七條 身分證件

締約各國對在其領土內不持有有效旅行證件的任何難民，應發給身分證件。

第二十八條 旅行證件

（一）締約各國對合法在其領土內居留的難民，除因國家安全或公共秩序的重大原因應另作考慮外，應發給旅行證件，以憑在其領土以外旅行。本公約附件的規定應適用於上述證件。締約各國可以發給在其領土內的任何其他難民上述旅行證件。締約各國特別對於在其領土內而不能向其合法居住地國家取得旅行證件的難民發給上述旅行證件一事，應給予同情的考慮。
（二）根據以前國際協定由此項協定締約各方發給難民的旅行證件，締約各方應予承認，並應當作根據本條發給的旅行證件同樣看待。

第二十九條 財政徵收

（一）締約各國不得對難民徵收其向本國國民在類似情況下徵收以外的或較高于向其本國國民在類似情況下徵收的任何種類捐稅或費用。
（二）前款規定並不妨礙對難民適用關於向外國人發給行政檔包括旅行證件在內的法律和規章。

第三十條 資產的移轉

（一）締約國應在符合於其法律和規章的情況下，准許難民將其攜入該國領土內的資產，移轉到難民為重新定居目的而已被准許入境的另一國家。
（二）如果難民申請移轉不論在何地方的並在另一國家重新定居所需要的財產，而且該另一國家已准其入境，則締約國對其申請應給予同情的考慮。

第三十一條 非法留在避難國的難民

（一）締約各國對於直接來自生命或自由受到第一條所指威脅的領土未經許可而進入或逗留于該國領土的難民，不得因該難民的非法入境或逗留而加以刑罰，但以該難民毫不遲延地自行投向當局說明其非法入境或逗留的正當原因者為限。
（二）締約各國對上述難民的行動，不得加以除必要以外的限制，此項限制只能于難民在該國的地位正常化或難民獲得另一國入境准許以前適用。締約各國應給予上述難民一個合理的期間以及一切必要的便利，以便獲得另一國入境的許可。

第三十二條 驅逐出境

（一）締約各國除因國家安全或公共秩序理由外，不得將合法在其領土內的難民驅逐出境。
（二）驅逐難民出境只能以按照合法程式作出的判決為根據。除因國家安全的重大理由要求另作考慮外，應准許難民提出有利於其自己的證據，向主管當局或向由主管當局特別指定的人員申訴或者為此目的委託代表向上述當局或人員申訴。
（三）締約各國應給予上述難民一個合理的期間，以便取得合法進入另一國家的許可。締約各國保留在這期間內適用它們所認為必要的內部措施的權利。

第三十三條 禁止驅逐出境或送回（“推回”）

（一）任何締約國不得以任何方式將難民驅逐或送回（“推回”）至其生命或自由因為他的種族、宗教、國籍、參加某一社會團體或具有某種政治見解而受威脅的領土邊界。
（二）但如有正當理由認為難民足以危害所在國的安全，或者難民已被確定判決認為犯過特別嚴重罪行從而構成對該國社會的危險，則該難民不得要求本條規定的利益。

第三十四條 入籍

締約各國應盡可能便利難民的入籍和同化。它們應特別盡力加速辦理入籍程式，並盡可能減低此項程式的費用。

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第六章 執行和過渡規定

第三十五條 國家當局同聯合國的合作

（一）締約各國保證同聯合國難民事務高級專員辦事處或繼承該辦事處的聯合國任何其他機關在其執行職務時進行合作，並應特別使其在監督適用本公約規定而行使職務時獲得便利。

（二）為了使高級專員辦事處或繼承該辦事處的聯合國任何其他機關向聯合國主管機關作出報告，締約各國保證于此項機關請求時，向它們在適當形式下提供關於下列事項的情報和統計資料：
 （甲）難民的情況，
 （乙）本公約的執行，以及
 （丙）現行有效或日後可能生效的涉及難民的法律、規章和法令。

第三十六條 關於國內立法的情報

締約各國應向聯合國秘書長送交它們可能採用為保證執行本公約的法律和規章。

第三十七條 對以前公約的關係

在不妨礙本公約第二十八條第二款的情況下，本公約在締約各國之間代替一九二二年七月五日、一九二四年五月三十一日、一九二六年五月十二日、一九二八年六月三十日以及一九三五年七月三十日的協議，一九三三年十月二十八日和一九三八年二月十日的公約，一九三九年九月十四日議定書、和一九四六年十月十五日的協定。

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第七章 最後條款

第三十八條 爭端的解決

本公約締約國間關於公約解釋或執行的爭端，如不能以其他方法解決，應依爭端任何一方當事國的請求，提交國際法院。

第三十九條 簽字、批准和加入

（一）本公約應於一九五一年七月二十八日在日內瓦開放簽字，此後交存聯合國秘書長。本公約將自一九五一年七月二十八日至八月三十一日止在聯合國駐歐辦事處開放簽字，並將自一九五一年九月十七日至一九五二年十二月三十一日止在聯合國總部重新開放簽字。
（二）本公約將對聯合國所有會員國，並對應邀出席難民和無國籍人地位全權代表會議或由聯合國大會致送簽字邀請的任何其他國家開放簽字。本公約應經批准，批准書應交存聯合國秘書長。
（三）本公約將自一九五一年七月二十八日起對本條（二）款所指國家開放任憑加入。加入經向聯合國秘書長交存加入書後生效。

第四十條 領土適用條款

（一）任何一國得於簽字、批准、或加入時聲明本公約將適用於由其負責國際關係的一切或任何領土。此項聲明將於公約對該有關國家生效時發生效力。
（二）此後任何時候，這種適用於領土的任何聲明應用通知書送達聯合國秘書長，並將從聯合國秘書長收到此項通知書之日後第九十天起或者從公約對該國生效之日起發生效力，以發生在後之日期為准。
（三）關於在簽字、批准、或加入時本公約不適用的領土，各有關國家應考慮採取必要步驟的可能，以便將本公約擴大適用到此項領土，但以此項領土的政府因憲法上需要已同意者為限。

第四十一條 聯邦條款

對於聯邦或非單一政體的國家，應適用下述規定：
（一）就本公約中屬於聯邦立法當局的立法管轄範圍內的條款而言，聯邦政府的義務應在此限度內與非聯邦國家的締約國相同；
（二）關於本公約中屬於邦、省、或縣的立法管轄範圍內的條款，如根據聯邦的憲法制度，此項邦、省、或縣不一定要採取立法行動的話，聯邦政府應儘早將此項條款附具贊同的建議，提請此項邦、省、或縣的主管當局注意；
（三）作為本公約締約國的聯邦國家，如經聯合國秘書長轉達任何其他締約國的請求時，應就聯邦及其構成各單位有關本公約任何個別規定的法律和實踐，提供一項聲明，說明此項規定已經立法或其他行動予以實現的程度。

第四十二條 保留

（一）任何國家在簽字、批准、或加入時，可以對公約第一、三、四、十六（一）、三十三、以及三十六至四十六（包括首尾兩條在內）各條以外的規定作出保留。
（二）依本條第（一）款作出保留的任何國家可以隨時通知聯合國秘書長撤回保留。

第四十三條 生效

（一）本公約於第六件批准書或加入書交存之日後第九十天生效。
（二）對於在第六件批准書或加入書交存後批准或加入本公約的各國，本公約將於該國交存其批准書或加入書之日後第九十天生效。

第四十四條 退出

（一）任何締約國可以隨時通知聯合國秘書長退出本公約。
（二）上述退出將于聯合國秘書長收到退出通知之日起一年後對該有關締約國生效。
（三）依第四十條作出聲明或通知的任何國家可以在此以後隨時通知聯合國秘書長，聲明公約將于秘書長收到通知之日後一年停止擴大適用于此項領土。

第四十五條 修改

（一）任何締約國可以隨時通知聯合國秘書長，請求修改本公約。
（二）聯合國大會應建議對於上述請求所應採取的步驟，如果有這種步驟的話。

第四十六條 聯合國秘書長的通知

聯合國秘書長應將下列事項通知聯合國所有會員國以及第三十九條所述非會員國：
（一）根據第一條（二）款所作聲明和通知；
（二）根據第三十九條簽字、批准、和加入；
（三）根據第四十條所作聲明和通知；
（四）根據第四十二條聲明保留和撤回；
（五）根據第四十三條本公約生效的日期；
（六）根據第四十四條聲明退出和通知；
（七）根據第四十五條請求修改。
下列簽署人經正式授權各自代表本國政府在本公約簽字，以昭信守。
一九五一年七月二十八日訂于日內瓦，計一份，其英文本和法文本有同等效力，應交存於聯合國檔案庫，其經證明為真實無誤的副本應交給聯合國所有會員國以及第三十九條所述非會員國。

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🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, held at Geneva July 2–25, 1951. The Conference was convened pursuant to resolution 429 (V), adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on Dec. 14, 1950.

China is not listed among the signatories but mentioned under the category "Accession" with the date Sept. 24, 1982. Under the headline "Declarations and Reservations", it says that China is "[subject to] reservations on the following articles:
(1). The latter half of article 14, which reads 'In the territory of any other Contracting State, he shall be accorded the same protection as is accorded in that territory to nationals of the country in which he has his habitual residence.'
(2). Article 16 (3)."

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————————————————————

San Francisco Peace Treaty

Name in Chinese  Jiujinshan heyue 舊金山和約
Document type Multilateral peace treaty with Japan
Years, dates 1951, Sept. 8 (signed); 1952, April 28 (entry into force) 
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Signed at San Francisco, 8 September 1951
Initial entry into force: 28 April 1952

TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN

WHEREAS the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those of nations which, as sovereign equals, cooperate in friendly association to promote their common welfare and to maintain international peace and security, and are therefore desirous of concluding a Treaty of Peace which will settle questions still outstanding as a result of the existence of a state of war between them;

WHEREAS Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations and in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; to strive to realize the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to seek to create within Japan conditions of stability and well-being as defined in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by post-surrender Japanese legislation; and in public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair practices;

WHEREAS the Allied Powers welcome the intentions of Japan set out in the foregoing paragraph;

THE ALLIED POWERS AND JAPAN have therefore determined to conclude the present Treaty of Peace, and have accordingly appointed the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, who, after presentation of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

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CHAPTER I———PEACE

Article 1

(a) The state of war between Japan and each of the Allied Powers is terminated as from the date on which the present Treaty comes into force between Japan and the Allied Power concerned as provided for in Article 23.

(b) The Allied Powers recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters.

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CHAPTER II———TERRITORY

Article 2

(a) Japan recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.

(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.

(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.

(d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations Mandate System, and accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of 2 April 1947, extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan.

(e) Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals or otherwise.

(f) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.

Article 3

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 deg. north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

Article 4

(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this Article, the disposition of property of Japan and of its nationals in the areas referred to in Article 2, and their claims, including debts, against the authorities presently administering such areas and the residents (including juridical persons) thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and residents, and of claims, including debts, of such authorities and residents against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and such authorities. The property of any of the Allied Powers or its nationals in the areas referred to in Article 2 shall, insofar as this has not already been done, be returned by the administering authority in the condition in which it now exists. (The term nationals whenever used in the present Treaty includes juridical persons.)

(b) Japan recognizes the validity of dispositions of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to directives of the United States Military Government in any of the areas referred to in Articles 2 and 3.

(c) Japanese owned submarine cables connection Japan with territory removed from Japanese control pursuant to the present Treaty shall be equally divided, Japan retaining the Japanese terminal and adjoining half of the cable, and the detached territory the remainder of the cable and connecting terminal facilities.

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CHAPTER III———SECURITY

Article 5

(a) Japan accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular the obligations

(i) to settle its international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

(ii) to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;

(iii) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action.

(b) The Allied Powers confirm that they will be guided by the principles of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations in their relations with Japan.

(c) The Allied Powers for their part recognize that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements.

Article 6

(a) All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty, and in any case not later than 90 days thereafter. Nothing in this provision shall, however, prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which have been or may be made between one or more of the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other.

(b) The provisions of Article 9 of the Potsdam Proclamation of 26 July 1945, dealing with the return of Japanese military forces to their homes, to the extent not already completed, will be carried out.

(c) All Japanese property for which compensation has not already been paid, which was supplied for the use of the occupation forces and which remains in the possession of those forces at the time of the coming into force of the present Treaty, shall be returned to the Japanese Government within the same 90 days unless other arrangements are made by mutual agreement.

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CHAPTER IV———POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CLAUSES

Article 7

(a) Each of the Allied Powers, within one year after the present Treaty has come into force between it and Japan, will notify Japan which of its prewar bilateral treaties or conventions with Japan it wishes to continue in force or revive, and any treaties or conventions so notified shall continue in force or by revived subject only to such amendments as may be necessary to ensure conformity with the present Treaty. The treaties and conventions so notified shall be considered as having been continued in force or revived three months after the date of notification and shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. All such treaties and conventions as to which Japan is not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated.

(b) Any notification made under paragraph (a) of this Article may except from the operation or revival of a treaty or convention any territory for the international relations of which the notifying Power is responsible, until three months after the date on which notice is given to Japan that such exception shall cease to apply.

Article 8

(a) Japan will recognize the full force of all treaties now or hereafter concluded by the Allied Powers for terminating the state of war initiated on 1 September 1939, as well as any other arrangements by the Allied Powers for or in connection with the restoration of peace. Japan also accepts the arrangements made for terminating the former League of Nations and Permanent Court of International Justice.

(b) Japan renounces all such rights and interests as it may derive from being a signatory power of the Conventions of St. Germain-en-Laye of 10 September 1919, and the Straits Agreement of Montreux of 20 July 1936, and from Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923.

(c) Japan renounces all rights, title and interests acquired under, and is discharged from all obligations resulting from, the Agreement between Germany and the Creditor Powers of 20 January 1930 and its Annexes, including the Trust Agreement, dated 17 May 1930, the Convention of 20 January 1930, respecting the Bank for International Settlements; and the Statutes of the Bank for International Settlements. Japan will notify to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris within six months of the first coming into force of the present Treaty its renunciation of the rights, title and interests referred to in this paragraph.

Article 9

Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas.

Article 10

Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China, including all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on 7 September 1901, and all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto, and agrees to the abrogation in respect to Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes and documents.

Article 11

Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan, and will carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan. The power to grant clemency, to reduce sentences and to parole with respect to such prisoners may not be exercised except on the decision of the Government or Governments which imposed the sentence in each instance, and on recommendation of Japan. In the case of persons sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, such power may not be exercised except on the decision of a majority of the Governments represented on the Tribunal, and on the recommendation of Japan.

Article 12

(a) Japan declares its readiness promptly to enter into negotiations for the conclusion with each of the Allied Powers of treaties or agreements to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis.

(b) Pending the conclusion of the relevant treaty or agreement, Japan will, during a period of four years from the first coming into force of the present Treaty

(1) accord to each of the Allied Powers, its nationals, products and vessels

(i) most-favoured-nation treatment with respect to customs duties, charges, restrictions and other regulations on or in connection with the importation and exportation of goods;

(ii) national treatment with respect to shipping, navigation and imported goods, and with respect to natural and juridical persons and their interests — such treatment to include all matters pertaining to the levying and collection of taxes, access to the courts, the making and performance of contracts, rights to property (tangible and intangible), participating in juridical entities constituted under Japanese law, and generally the conduct of all kinds of business and professional activities;

(2) ensure that external purchases and sales of Japanese state trading enterprises shall be based solely on commercial considerations.

(c) In respect to any matter, however, Japan shall be obliged to accord to an Allied Power national treatment, or most-favoured-nation treatment, only to the extent that the Allied Power concerned accords Japan national treatment or most-favoured-nation treatment, as the case may be, in respect of the same matter. The reciprocity envisaged in the foregoing sentence shall be determined, in the case of products, vessels and juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, any non-metropolitan territory of an Allied Power, and in the case of juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, any state or province of an Allied Power having a federal government, by reference to the treatment accorded to Japan in such territory, state or province.

(d) In the application of this Article, a discriminatory measure shall not be considered to derogate from the grant of national or most-favoured-nation treatment, as the case may be, if such measure is based on an exception customarily provided for in the commercial treaties of the party applying it, or on the need to safeguard that party's external financial position or balance of payments (except in respect to shiping and navigation), or on the need to maintain its essential security interests, and provided such measure is proportionate to the circumstances and not applied in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.

(e) Japan's obligations under this Article shall not be affected by the exercise of any Allied rights under Article 14 of the present Treaty; nor shall the provisions of this Article be understood as limiting the undertakings assumed by Japan by virtue of Article 15 of the Treaty.

Article 13

(a) Japan will enter into negotiations with any of the Allied Powers, promptly upon the request of such Power or Powers, for the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements relating to international civil air transport.

(b) Pending the conclusion of such agreement or agreements, Japan will, during a period of four years from the first coming into force of the present Treaty, extend to such Power treatment not less favourable with respect to air-traffic rights and privileges than those exercised by any such Powers at the date of such coming into force, and will accord complete equality of opportunity in respect to the operation and development of air services.

(c) Pending its becoming a party to the Convention on International Civil Aviation in accordance with Article 93 thereof, Japan will give effect to the provisions of that Convention applicable to the international navigation of aircraft, and will give effect to the standards, practices and procedures adopted as annexes to the Convention in accordance with the terms of the Convention.

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CHAPTER V———CLAIMS AND PROPERTY

Article 14

(a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the same time meet its other obligations.

Therefore,

1. Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question. Such arrangements shall avoid the imposition of additional liabilities on other Allied Powers, and, where the manufacturing of raw materials is called for, they shall be supplied by the Allied Powers in question, so as not to throw any foreign exchange burden upon Japan.

2. (I) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (II) below, each of the Allied Powers shall have the right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of all property, rights and interests of

(a) Japan and Japanese nationals,

(b) persons acting for or on behalf of Japan or Japanese nationals, and

(c) entities owned or controlled by Japan or Japanese nationals,

which on the first coming into force of the present Treaty were subject to its jurisdiction. The property, rights and interests specified in this subparagraph shall include those now blocked, vested or in the possession or under the control of enemy property authorities of Allied Powers, which belong to, or were held or managed on behalf of, any of the persons or entities mentioned in (a), (b) or (c) above at the time such assets came under the controls of such authorities.

(II) The following shall be excepted from the right specified in subparagraph (I) above:

(i) property of Japanese natural persons who during the war resided with the permission of the Government concerned in the territory of one of the Allied Powers, other than territory occupied by Japan, except property subjected to restrictions during the war and not released from such restrictions as of the date of the first coming into force of the present Treaty;

(ii) all real property, furniture and fixtures owned by the Government of Japan and used for diplomatic or consular purposes, and all personal furniture and furnishings and other private property not of an investment nature which was normally necessary for the carrying out of diplomatic and consular functions, owned by Japanese diplomatic and consular personnel;

(iii) property belonging to religious bodies or private charitable institutions and used exclusively for religious or charitable purposes;

(iv) property, rights and interests which have come within its jurisdiction in consequence of the resumption of trade and financial relations subsequent to 2 September 1945, between the country concerned and Japan, except such as have resulted from transactions contrary to the laws of the Allied Power concerned;

(v) obligations of Japan or Japanese nationals, any right, title or interest in tangible property located in Japan, interests in enterprises organized under the laws of Japan, or any paper evidence thereof; provided that this exception shall only apply to obligations of Japan and its nationals expressed in Japanese currency.

(III) Property referred to in exceptions (i) through (v) above shall be returned subject to reasonable expenses for its preservation and administration. If any such property has been liquidated the proceeds shall be returned instead.

(IV) The right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of property as provided in subparagraph (I) above shall be exercised in accordance with the laws of the Allied Power concerned, and the owner shall have only such rights as may be given him by those laws.

(V) The Allied Powers agree to deal with Japanese trademarks and literary and artistic property rights on a basis as favourable to Japan as circumstances ruling in each country will permit.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.

Article 15

(a) Upon application made within nine months of the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned, Japan will, within six months of the date of such application, return the property, tangible and intangible, and all rights or interests of any kind in Japan of each Allied Power and its nationals which was within Japan at any time between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945, unless the owner has freely disposed thereof without duress or fraud. Such property shall be returned free of all encumbrances and charges to which it may have become subject because of the war, and without any charges for its return. Property whose return is not applied for by or on behalf of the owner or by his Government within the prescribed period may be disposed of by the Japanese Government as it may determine. In cases where such property was within Japan on 7 December 1941, and cannot be returned or has suffered injury or damage as a result of the war, compensation will be made on terms not less favourable than the terms provided in the draft Allied Powers Property Compensation Law approved by the Japanese Cabinet on 13 July 1951.

(b) With respect to industrial property rights impaired during the war, Japan will continue to accord to the Allied Powers and their nationals benefits no less than those heretofore accorded by Cabinet Orders No. 309 effective 1 September 1949, No. 12 effective 28 January 1950, and No. 9 effective 1 February 1950, all as now amended, provided such nationals have applied for such benefits within the time limits prescribed therein.

(c) (i) Japan acknowledges that the literary and artistic property rights which existed in Japan on 6 December 1941, in respect to the published and unpublished works of the Allied Powers and their nationals have continued in force since that date, and recognizes those rights which have arisen, or but for the war would have arisen, in Japan since that date, by the operation of any conventions and agreements to which Japan was a party on that date, irrespective of whether or not such conventions or agreements were abrogated or suspended upon or since the outbreak of war by the domestic law of Japan or of the Allied Power concerned.

(ii) Without the need for application by the proprietor of the right and without the payment of any fee or compliance with any other formality, the period from 7 December 1941 until the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned shall be excluded from the running of the normal term of such rights; and such period, with an additional period of six months, shall be excluded from the time within which a literary work must be translated into Japanese in order to obtain translating rights in Japan.

Article 16

As an expression of its desire to indemnify those members of the armed forces of the Allied Powers who suffered undue hardships while prisoners of war of Japan, Japan will transfer its assets and those of its nationals in countries which were neutral during the war, or which were at war with any of the Allied Powers, or, at its option, the equivalent of such assets, to the International Committee of the Red Cross which shall liquidate such assets and distribute the resultant fund to appropriate national agencies, for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families on such basis as it may determine to be equitable. The categories of assets described in Article 14(a)2(II)(ii) through (v) of the present Treaty shall be excepted from transfer, as well as assets of Japanese natural persons not residents of Japan on the first coming into force of the Treaty. It is equally understood that the transfer provision of this Article has no application to the 19,770 shares in the Bank for International Settlements presently owned by Japanese financial institutions.

Article 17

(a) Upon the request of any of the Allied Powers, the Japanese Government shall review and revise in conformity with international law any decision or order of the Japanese Prize Courts in cases involving ownership rights of nationals of that Allied Power and shall supply copies of all documents comprising the records of these cases, including the decisions taken and orders issued. In any case in which such review or revision shows that restoration is due, the provisions of Article 15 shall apply to the property concerned.

(b) The Japanese Government shall take the necessary measures to enable nationals of any of the Allied Powers at any time within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned to submit to the appropriate Japanese authorities for review any judgment given by a Japanese court between 7 December 1941 and such coming into force, in any proceedings in which any such national was unable to make adequate presentation of his case either as plaintiff or defendant. The Japanese Government shall provide that, where the national has suffered injury by reason of any such judgment, he shall be restored in the position in which he was before the judgment was given or shall be afforded such relief as may be just and equitable in the circumstances.

Article 18

(a) It is recognized that the intervention of the state of war has not affected the obligation to pay pecuniary debts arising out of obligations and contracts (including those in respect of bonds) which existed and rights which were acquired before the existence of a state of war, and which are due by the Government or nationals of Japan to the Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers, or are due by the Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers to the Government or nationals of Japan. The intervention of a state of war shall equally not be regarded as affecting the obligation to consider on their merits claims for loss or damage to property or for personal injury or death which arose before the existence of a state of war, and which may be presented or re-presented by the Government of one of the Allied Powers to the Government of Japan, or by the Government of Japan to any of the Governments of the Allied Powers. The provisions of this paragraph are without prejudice to the rights conferred by Article 14.

(b) Japan affirms its liability for the prewar external debt of the Japanese State and for debts of corporate bodies subsequently declared to be liabilities of the Japanese State, and expresses its intention to enter into negotiations at an early date with its creditors with respect to the resumption of payments on those debts; to encourage negotiations in respect to other prewar claims and obligations; and to facilitate the transfer of sums accordingly.

Article 19

(a) Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of the war or out of actions taken because of the existence of a state of war, and waives all claims arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of any of the Allied Powers in Japanese territory prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty.

(b) The foregoing waiver includes any claims arising out of actions taken by any of the Allied Powers with respect to Japanese ships between 1 September 1939 and the coming into force of the present Treaty, as well as any claims and debts arising in respect to Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of the Allied Powers, but does not include Japanese claims specificially recognized in the laws of any Allied Power enacted since 2 September 1945.

(c) Subject to reciprocal renunciation, the Japanese Government also renounces all claims (including debts) against Germany and German nationals on behalf of the Japanese Government and Japanese nationals, including intergovernmental claims and claims for loss or damage sustained during the war, but excepting (a) claims in respect of contracts entered into and rights acquired before 1 September 1939, and (b) claims arising out of trade and financial relations between Japan and Germany after 2 September 1945. Such renunciation shall not prejudice actions taken in accordance with Articles 16 and 20 of the present Treaty.

(d) Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of occupation under or in consequence of directives of the occupation authorities or authorized by Japanese law at that time, and will take no action subjecting Allied nationals to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts or omissions.

Article 20

Japan will take all necessary measures to ensure such disposition of German assets in Japan as has been or may be determined by those powers entitled under the Protocol of the proceedings of the Berlin Conference of 1945 to dispose of those assets, and pending the final disposition of such assets will be responsible for the conservation and administration thereof.

Article 21

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 25 of the present Treaty, China shall be entitled to the benefits of Articles 10 and 14(a)2; and Korea to the benefits of Articles 2, 4, 9 and 12 of the present Treaty.

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CHAPTER VI———SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 22

If in the opinion of any Party to the present Treaty there has arisen a dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaty, which is not settled by reference to a special claims tribunal or by other agreed means, the dispute shall, at the request of any party thereto, be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice. Japan and those Allied Powers which are not already parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice will deposit with the Registrar of the Court, at the time of their respective ratifications of the present Treaty, and in conformity with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council, dated 15 October 1946, a general declaration accepting the jurisdiction, without special agreement, of the Court generally in respect to all disputes of the character referred to in this Article.

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CHAPTER VII———FINAL CLAUSES

Article 23

(a) The present Treaty shall be ratified by the States which sign it, including Japan, and will come into force for all the States which have then ratified it, when instruments of ratification have been deposited by Japan and by a majority, including the United States of America as the principal occupying Power, of the following States, namely Australia, Canada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. The present Treaty shall come into force of each State which subsequently ratifies it, on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

(b) If the Treaty has not come into force within nine months after the date of the deposit of Japan's ratification, any State which has ratified it may bring the Treaty into force between itself and Japan by a notification to that effect given to the Governments of Japan and the United States of America not later than three years after the date of deposit of Japan's ratification.

Article 24

All instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America which will notify all the signatory States of each such deposit, of the date of the coming into force of the Treaty under paragraph (a) of Article 23, and of any notifications made under paragraph (b) of Article 23.

Article 25

For the purposes of the present Treaty the Allied Powers shall be the States at war with Japan, or any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, provided that in each case the State concerned has signed and ratified the Treaty. Subject to the provisions of Article 21, the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits on any State which is not an Allied Power as herein defined; nor shall any right, title or interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision of the Treaty in favour of a State which is not an Allied Power as so defined.

Article 26

Japan will be prepared to conclude with any State which signed or adhered to the United Nations Declaration of 1 January 1942, and which is at war with Japan, or with any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, which is not a signatory of the present Treaty, a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty, but this obligation on the part of Japan will expire three years after the first coming into force of the present Treaty. Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.

Article 27

The present Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America which shall furnish each signatory State with a certified copy thereof.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this eighth day of September 1951, in the English, French, and Spanish languages, all being equally authentic, and in the Japanese language.

For Argentina: Hipólito J. PAZ

For Australia: Percy C. SPENDER

For Belgium: Paul VAN ZEELAND SILVERCRUYS

For Bolivia: Luis GUACHALLA

For Brazil: Carlos MARTINS, A. DE MELLO-FRANCO

For Cambodia: PHLENG

For Canada: Lester B. PEARSON, R.W. MAYHEW

For Ceylon: J.R. JAYEWARDENE, G.C.S. COREA, R.G. SENANAYAKE

For Chile: F. NIETO DEL RÍO

For Colombia: Cipríano RESTREPO JARAMILLO, Sebastián OSPINA

For Costa Rica: J. Rafael OREAMUNO, V. VARGAS, Luis DOBLES SÁNCHEZ

For Cuba: O. GANS, L. MACHADO, Joaquín MEYER

For the Dominican Republic: V. ORDÓÑEZ, Luis F. THOMEN

For Ecuador: A. QUEVEDO, R.G. VALENZUELA

For Egypt: Kamil A. RAHIM

For El Salvador: Héctor DAVID CASTRO, Luis RIVAS PALACIOS

For Ethiopia: Men YAYEJIJRAD

For France: SCHUMANN, H. BONNET, Paul-Émile NAGGIAR

For Greece: A.G. POLITIS

For Guatemala: E. CASTILLO A., A.M. ORELLANA, J. MENDOZA

For Haiti: Jacques N. LÉGER, Gust. LARAQUE

For Honduras: J.E. VALENZUELA, Roberto GÁLVEZ B., Raúl ALVARADO T.

For Indonesia: Ahmad SUBARDJO

For Iran: A.G. ARDALAN

For Iraq: A.I. BAKR

For Laos: SAVANG

For Lebanon: Charles MALIK

For Liberia: Gabriel L. DENNIS, James ANDERSON, Raymond HORACE, J. Rudolf GRIMES

For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg: Hugues LE GALLAIS

For Mexico: Rafael DE LA COLINA, Gustavo DÍAZ ORDAZ, A.P. GASGA

For the Netherlands: D.U. STIKKER, J.H. VAN ROIJEN

For New Zealand: C. BERENDSEN

For Nicaragua: G. SEVILLA SACASA, Gustavo MANZANARES

For Norway: Wilhelm Munthe MORGENSTERNE

For Pakistan: ZAFRULLAH KHAN

For Panama: Ignacio MOLINO, José A. REMON, Alfredo ALEMÁN, J. CORDOVEZ

For Peru: Luis Oscar BOETTNER

For the Republic of the Philippines: Carlos P. RÓMULO, J.M. ELIZALDE, Vicente FRANCISCO, Diosdado MACAPAGAL, Emiliano T. TIRONA, V.G. SINCO

For Saudi Arabia: Asad AL-FAQIH

For Syria: F. EL-KHOURI

For Turkey: Feridun C. ERKIN

For the Union of South Africa: G.P. JOOSTE

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Herbert MORRISON, Kenneth YOUNGER, Oliver FRANKS

For the United States of America: Dean ACHESON, John Foster DULLES, Alexander WILEY, John J. SPARKMAN

For Uruguay: José A. MORA

For Venezuela: Antonio M. ARAUJO, R. GALLEGOS M.

For Viet-Nam: TRAN Van Huu 陳文友, T. VINH, D. THANH, BUU KINH

For Japan: Shigeru YOSHIDA 吉田 茂, Hayato IKEDA 池田 勇人, Gizo TOMABECHI 苫米地 義三, Niro HOSHIJIMA 星島 二郎, Muneyoshi TOKUGAWA 徳川 宗敬, Hisato ICHIMADA 一万田 尚登

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

Neither the ROC nor the PRC were invited to the San Francisco Peace Conference which took place Sept. 4–8, 1951, and neither were parties to the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT). The ROC concluded a separate peace treaty with Japan in 1952 (see below). Of the 51 nations that had sent delegates to the conference, three (Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union) did not sign the SFPT, India and Burma were not present at the conference at all.

Below see the translations for the term "San Francisco Peace Treaty" in Chinese and for the term "Treaty of Peace with Japan" in Japanese.

Chinese Japanese
Jiujinshan heyue 舊金山和約 Nippon kokutono heiwa jōyaku 日本国との平和条約

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————————————————————

Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan

Name in Chinese Zhonghua minguo yu Riben guojian heping tiaoyue 中華民國與日本國間和平條約
Document type Bilateral peace treaty between the ROC and Japan
Year, dates 1952, April 28 (signed); 1952, Aug. 5 (entry into force)
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Signed at Taipei on April 28, 1952

Entered into force on August 5, 1952, by the exchange of the instruments of ratification at Taipei

Treaty of Peace

The Republic of China and Japan,
 Considering their mutual desire for good neighbourliness in view of their historical and cultural ties and geographical proximity;
 Realising the importance of their close cooperation to the promotion of their common welfare and to the maintenance of international peace and security;
 Recognising the need for a settlement of problems that have arisen as a result of the existence of a state of war between them;
 Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace and have accordingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries,

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China: Mr. YEH KUNG-CHAO;

The Government of Japan: Mr. ISAO KAWADA

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

Article 1 The state of war between the Republic of China and Japan is terminated as from the date on which the present Treaty enters into force.
Article 2 It is recognised that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace which Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on 8 September 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the San Francisco Treaty), Japan has renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratley Islands and the Paracel Islands.
Article 3 The disposition of property of Japan and its nationals in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores), and their claims, including debts, against the authorities of the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and the residents thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and residents and their claims, including debts, against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between the Government of the Republic of China and the Government of Japan. The terms nationals and residents include juridical persons.
Article 4 It is recognised that all treaties, conventions, and agreements concluded before 9 December 1941 between Japan and China have become null and void as a consequence of the war.
Article 5 It is recognised that under the provisions of Article 10 of the San Francisco Treaty, Japan has renounced all special rights and its interests in China, including all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on 7 September 1901, and all annexes, notes, and documents supplementary thereto, and has agreed to the abrogation in respect to Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes, and documents.
Article 6 (a) The Republic of China and Japan will be guided by the principles of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations in their mutual relations.
(b) The Republic of China and Japan will cooperate in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, will promote their common welfare through friendly cooperation in the economic field.
Article 7 The Republic of China and Japan will endeavour to conclude, as soon as possible, a treaty or agreement to place their trading, maritime, and other commercial relations, on a stable and friendly basis.
Article 8 The Republic of China and Japan will endeavour to conclude, as soon as possible, an agreement relating to civil air transport.
Article 9 The Republic of China and Japan will endeavour to conclude, as soon as possible, an agreement providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas.
Article 10 For the purposes of the present Treaty, nationals of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all the inhabitants and former inhabitants of Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and their descendents who are of the Chinese nationality in accordance with the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores); and juridical persons of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all those registered under the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores).
Article 11 Unless otherwise provided for in the present Treaty and the documents supplementary thereto, any problem arising between the Republic of China and Japan as a result of the existence of a state of war shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of the San Francisco Treaty.
Article 12 Any dispute that may arise out of the interpretation or application of the present Treaty shall be settled by negotiation or other pacific means.
Article 13 The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Taipei as soon as possible. The present Treaty shall enter into force as from the date on which such instruments of ratification are exchanged.
Article 14 The present Treaty shall be in the Chinese, Japanese, and English languages. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at Taipei, this Twenty Eighth day of the Fourth month of the Forty First year of the REPUBLIC OF CHINA, corresponding to the Twenty Eighth day of the Fourth month of the Twenty Seventh year of SHOWA of Japan and to the Twenty Eighth day of April in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty Two.

YEH KUNG-CHAO, [L.S.] Minister of Foreign Affairs and Plenipotentiary
 of the Republic of China

ISAO KAWADA, [L.S.] Minister of Foreign Affairs and Plenipotentiary
 of Japan

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中華民國與日本國間和平條約

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

【中華民國與日本國間和平條約：>民國四十一年四月二十八日簽訂，民國四十一年八月五日互換批准書，民國四十一年八月五日生效】

中華民國與日本國
鑒於兩國由於其歷史文化關係及領土鄰近而產生之相互睦鄰願望；
了解兩國之密切合作對於增進其共同福利及維持世界和平與安全，均屬重要；
均認由於兩國間戰爭狀態之存在而引起之各項問題，亟待解決；
爰經決定締結和平條約，並為此各派全權代表如左：

中華民國總統閣下：葉公超先生；
日本國政府：河田烈先生；

各該全權代表經將其所奉全權證書提出互相校閱，認為均屬妥善，爰議定條款如左：

第一條 中華民國與日本國間之戰爭狀態，自本約發生效力之日起，即告終止。
第二條 茲承認依照公曆一千九百五十一年九月八日在美利堅合眾國金山市簽訂之對日和平條約（以下簡稱金山和約）第二條，日本國業已放棄對於臺灣及澎湖群島以及南沙群島及西沙群島之一切權利、權利名義與要求。

第三條 關於日本國及國民在臺灣及澎湖之財產及其對於在臺灣及澎湖之中華民國當局及居民所作要求(包括債權在內)之處置，及該中華民國當局及居民在日本國之財產及其對於日本國及日本國國民所作要求(包括債權在內)之處置，應由中華民國政府與日本國政府間另商特別處理辦法。本約任何條款所用「國民」及「居民」等名詞，均包括法人在內。
第四條 茲承認中國與日本國間在中華民國三十年即公曆一千九百四十一年十二月九日以前所締結之一切條約、專約及協定，均因戰爭結果而歸無效。
第五條 茲承認依照金山和約第十條之規定，日本國業已放棄在中國之一切特殊權利及利益。包括由於中華民國紀元前十一年即公曆一千九百零一年九月七日在北京簽訂之最後議定書與一切附件及補充之各換文暨文件所產生之一切利益與特權；並已同意就關於日本國方面廢除該議定書、附件、換文及文件。
第六條 （甲）中華民國與日本國在其相互之關係上，願各遵聯合國憲章第二條之各項原則
（乙）中華民國與日本國願依聯合國憲章之原則彼此合作，並特願經由經濟方面之友好合作，促進兩國之共同福利。
第七條 中華民國與日本國願儘速商訂一項條約或協定，藉以將兩國貿易、航業及其他商務關係，置於穩定與友好之基礎上。
第八條 中華民國與日本國願儘速商訂一項關於民用航空運輸之協定。
第九條 中華民國與日本國願儘速締結一項為規範或限制捕魚、及保存暨開發公海漁業之協定。
第十條 就本約而言，中華民國國民應認為包括依照中華民國在臺灣及澎湖所已施行或將來可能施行之法律規章而具有中國國籍之一切臺灣及澎湖居民及前屬臺灣及澎湖之居民及其後裔；中華民國法人應認為包括依照中華民國在臺灣及澎湖所已施行或將來可能施行之法律規章所登記之一切法人。
第十一條 除本約及其補充文件另有規定外，凡在中華民國與日本國間因戰爭狀態存在之結果而引起之任何問題，均應依照金山和約之有關規定予以解決。
第十二條 凡因本約之解釋或適用可能發生之任何爭執，應以磋商或其他和平方式解決之。
第十三條 本約應予批准，批准文件應儘速在臺北互換。本約應自批准文件互換之日起發生效力。
第十四條 本約應分繕中文、日文及英文。遇有解釋不同，應以英文本為準。

為此，雙方全權代表各於本約簽字蓋印，以昭信守。

本約共繕二份，於中華民國四十一年四月二十八日即日本國昭和二十七年四月二十八日即公曆一千九百五十二年四月二十八日訂於臺北。

中華民國代表 葉公超（蓋印）
日本國代表 河田 烈（蓋印）

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan/Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (abbrev. Zhong Ri heping tiaoyue 中日和平條約 or Zhong Ri heyue 中日和約) is commonly also known as the Treaty of Taipei (Taibei heyue 台北和約); in Japanese: Nippon kokuto Chuka minkoku tono aidano heiwa jōyaku 日本国と中華民国との間の平和条約.

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Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty

Name in Chinese Zhong Mei gongtong fangyu tiaoyue 中美共同防禦條約
Document type Bilateral treaty between the ROC and the US
Years, dates 1954, Dec. 4 (signed); 1955, March 3 (ratifications exchanged and entry into force)
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Treaty signed at Washington December 2, 1954;
Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of America February 9, 1955;
Ratified by the President of the United States of America February 11,1955;
Ratified by the Republic of China February 15, 1955;
Ratifications exchanged at Taipei March 3, 1955;
Proclaimed by the President of the United States of America April 1,1955;
Entered into force March 3, 1955.
And exchange of notes
Signed at Washington December 10, 1954

By THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China was signed at Washington on December 2, 1954 by their respective plenipotentiaries, the original of which Treaty in the English and Chinese languages is word for word as follows:

Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the West Pacific Area,

Recalling with mutual pride the relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side by side against imperialist aggression during the last war,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the West Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the West Pacific Area,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1 The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
Article 2 In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

Article 3 The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with each other in the development of economic progress and social well-being and to further their individual and collective efforts toward these ends.
Article 4 The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty.
Article 5 Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it world act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
Article 6 For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms "territorial" and "territories" shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores: and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction. The provisions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.
Article 7 The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government of the United Stares of America accepts, the right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement.
Article 8 This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 9 This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of China in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Taipei.
Article 10 This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate, in the English and Chinese languages, at Washington on this second day of December of the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty-four, corresponding to the second day of the twelfth month of the Forty-third year of the Republic of China.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: John Foster Dulles

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA: George K. C. Yeh

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美利堅合眾國、中華民國共同防禦條約

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

本條約締約國

茲重申其對聯合國憲章之宗旨與原則之信心，及其與所有人民及政府和平相處之願望，並欲增強西太平洋區域之和平結構；

以光榮之同感，追溯上次大戰期間，兩國人民為對抗帝國主義侵略，而在相互同情與共同理想之結合下，團結一致併肩作戰之關係；

願公開正式宣告其團結之精誠，及為其自衛而抵禦外來武裝攻擊之共同決心，俾使任何潛在之侵略者不存有任一締約國在西太平洋區域立於孤立地位之妄想；並

願加強兩國為維護和平與安全而建立集體防禦之現有努力，以待西太平洋區域安全制度之發展；

茲議訂下列各條款。

第一條 本條約締約國承允依照聯合國憲章之規定，以不危及國際和平安全與正義之和平方法，解決可能牽涉兩國之任何國際爭議，並在其國際關係中，不以任何與聯合國宗旨相悖之方式，作武力之威脅或使用武力。
第二條 為期更有效達成本條約之目的起見，締約國將個別並聯合以自助及互助之方式，維持並發展其個別及集體之能力，以抵抗武裝攻擊，及由國外指揮之危害其領土完整與政治安定之共產顛覆活動。
第三條 締約國承允加強其自由制度，彼此合作以發展其經濟進步與社會福利，並為達到此等目的，而增加其個別與集體之努力。
第四條 締約國將經由其外交部部長或其代表，就本條約之實施隨時會商。
第五條 每一締約國承認對在西太平洋區域內任一締約國領土之武裝攻擊，即將危及其本身之和平與安全。茲並宣告將依其憲法程序採取行動，以對付此共同危險。
任何此項武裝攻擊及因而採取之一切措施，應立即報告聯合國安全理事會。此等措施應於安全理事會採取恢復並維持國際和平與安全之必要措施時予以終止。
第六條 為適用於第二條及第五條之目的，所有『領土』等辭，就中華民國而言，應指台灣與澎湖；就美利堅合眾國而言，應指西太平洋區域內在其管轄下之各島嶼領土。第二條及第五條之規定，並將適用於共同協議所決定之其他領土。
第七條 中華民國政府給予，美利堅合眾國政府接受，依共同協議之決定，在台灣澎湖及其附近，為其防衛所需而部署美國陸海空軍之權利。
第八條 本條約並不影響，且不應被解釋為影響，締約國在聯合國憲章下之權利及義務，或聯合國為維持國際和平與安全所負之責任。
第九條 本條約應由美利堅合眾國與中華民國各依其憲法程序以批准，並將於在台北互換批准書之日起發生效力。
第十條 本條約應無限期有效。任一締約國得於廢約之通知送達另一締約國一年後，予以終止。

為此，下開各全權代表爰於本條約簽字，以昭信守。
本條約用英文及中文各繕二份。
公曆一千九百五十四年十二月二日
中華民國四十三年十二月二日訂於華盛頓。

美利堅合眾國代表：約翰‧福斯特‧杜勒斯【John Foster Dulles】
中華民國代表：葉公超

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The US Congress Formosa Resolution

Name in Chinese yijiuwuwu nian Taiwan jueyi'an 1955 年台灣決議案
Document type Resolution by the US Congress
Year, dates 1955, Jan. 25 (approved by House); 1955, Jan. 28 (approved by Senate)
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[Approved by House vote 409-3 on January 25, 1955 and by Senate vote 85-3 on January 28, 1955]

U.S. Congressional Authorization for the President to Employ the Armed Forces of the United States to Protect Formosa, the Pescadores, and Related Positions and Territories of That Area

Whereas the primary purpose of the United States, in its relations with all other nations, is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and Whereas certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China are now under armed attack, and threats and declarations have been and are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores,

Whereas such armed attack if continued would gravely endanger the peace and security of the West Pacific Area and particularly of Formosa and the Pescadores; and

Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and

Whereas the President of the United States on January 6, 1955, submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification a Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China, which recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against territories, therein described, in the region of Formosa and the Pescadores, would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the parties to the treaty:

Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

In Chinese, the Formosa Resolution by the US Congress (Meiguo guohui 美國國會) is called Taiwan jueyi'an 台灣決議案 or Fuermosha jueyi'an 福爾摩沙決議案. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed it into law on Jan. 29, 1955. It was repealed by the US Congress on Oct. 26, 1974.

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PRC Defense Minister Peng Dehuai’s Proclamation to Taiwan Compatriots

Name in Chinese Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guofangbu gao Taiwan tongbaoshu 中華人民共和國國防部告臺灣同胞書
Document type Propaganda speech by PRC heavyweight
Year, date 1958, Oct. 6
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

The Minister of Defense’s [Peng Dehuai] Proclamation to Taiwan Compatriots

(October 6, 1958)

Military and Civilian Compatriots on Taiwan, Penghu [Islands], Jinmen, Mazu:

We are all Chinese; of the thirty-six stratagems, Peace is the best. The battle for Jinmen is of a punitive nature. Your leaders have for a long time been too outrageous, directing aircraft to fly all over the mainland, reaching as far as Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Xikang, Qinghai, where they scattered leaflets, dropped spies, bombed Fujian, and harassed Jiangsu and Zhejiang. This is beyond intolerable. Therefore, we fired a few cannons, to get your attention.

Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu are Chinese territory. On this point you agree, as can be seen in your leader’s statements, and they are definitely not American territory. Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu are part of China, and not a separate country. There is only one China in the world, there are not two Chinas. On this point you also agree, as can be seen in your leader’s statements. Your leader has signed a military agreement with the Americans, which is one-sided, we don’t accept it, and it ought to be invalidated.

The Americans will certainly one day abandon you, don’t you believe it? The giant that is history will bear evidence to this. The clue is already exposed in Dulles’ September 30 interview. Can you not shiver, standing in your position? After all, American imperialism is our common enemy. 130,000 soldiers and civilians on Jinmen are running out of supplies, suffering from cold and hunger. They cannot go on in this condition. For humanitarian reasons, I have already ordered the front lines in Fujian [to observe] a one week temporary cease fire, starting on October 6, so that you can completely and freely transport supplies, on the condition that there is no American convoy. If there is a convoy then it won’t apply.

This war between us has already been going on for more than thirty years and still hasn’t ended, and that is not good. We propose holding negotiation, to achieve a peaceful settlement. Several years ago Premier Zhou [Enlai] had already told you about this. This is China’s internal affair, a problem between our two sides, it isn’t a bilateral problem involving the United States and China. The U.S. occupation of Taiwan, Penghu, and the Taiwan Straits – that is a bilateral problem between the United States and China, which ought to be resolved through negotiations between the two countries, and there are currently talks being held in Warsaw.

The Americans will have to leave one day, there is no alternative. It would be in the Americans’ interest to leave earlier, because they would retain the initiative. Leaving later won’t be good [for them] because they will be forced. Why did an Eastern Pacific country come to the Western Pacific? The Western Pacific is the Western Pacific people’s Western Pacific, just the same as the Eastern Pacific is the Eastern Pacific people’s Eastern Pacific, this is just common sense, and the Americans ought to understand it. There is no war between the People’s Republic of China and the United States, so there is no so-called cease-fire. To talk about a cease-fire where there is no fire, isn’t it plain nonsense? Friends on Taiwan, there are the fires of war between us, which ought to stop, and be extinguished. This will require negotiations. Of course, to fight for another thirty years would be no big deal, but ultimately it would be preferable to come to an early peaceful resolution. Please, it’s up to you to decide where you want to go.

[Peng Dehuai, Minister of Defense, PRC]

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中華人民共和國國防部告臺灣同胞書

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中華人民共和國國防部告臺灣同胞書（作者：毛澤東）

1958 年 10 月 6 日

發佈機關：中華人民共和國國防部部長 彭德懷

臺灣、澎湖、金門、馬祖軍民同胞們：

我們都是中國人。三十六計，和為上計。金門戰鬥，屬於懲罰性質。你們的領導者們過去長時期間太倡狂了，命令飛機向大陸亂鑽，遠及雲、貴、川、康、青海，發傳單，丟特務，炸福州，擾江浙。是可忍，孰不可忍？因此打一些炮，引起你們注意。

台、澎、金、馬是中國領土，這一點你們是同意的，見之于你們領導人的文告，確實不是美國人的領土。台、澎、金、馬是中國的一部分，不是另一個國家。世界上只有一個中國，沒有兩個中國。這一點，也是你們同意的，見之于你們領導人的文告。你們領導人與美國人訂立軍事協定，是片面的，我們不承認，應予廢除。

美國人總有一天肯定要拋棄你們的。你們不信嗎？歷史巨人會要出來作證明的。杜勒斯九月三十日的談話，端倪已見。站在你們的地位，能不寒心？歸根結底，美帝國主義是我們的共同敵人。十三萬金門軍民，供應缺乏，饑寒交迫，難為久計。為了人道主義，我已命令福建前線，從十月六日起，暫以七天為期，停止炮擊，你們可以充分地自由地輸送供應品，但以沒有美國人護航為條件。如有護航，不在此例。

你們與我們之間的戰爭，三十年了，尚未結束，這是不好的。建議舉行談判，實行和平解決。這一點，周恩來總理在幾年前已經告訴你們了。這是中國內部貴我兩方有關的問題，不是中美兩國有關的問題。美國侵佔台澎與臺灣海峽，這是中美兩方有關的問題，應當由兩國舉行談判解決，目前正在華沙舉行。

美國人總是要走的，不走是不行的。早走于美國有利，因為它可以取得主動。遲走不利，因為它老是被動。一個東太平洋國家，為什麼跑到西太平洋來了呢？西太平洋是西太平洋人的西太平洋，正如東太平洋是東太平洋人的東太平洋一樣。這一點是常識，美國人應當懂得。中華人民共和國與美國之間並無戰爭，無所謂停火。無火而談停火，豈非笑話？臺灣的朋友們，我們之間是有戰火的，應當停止，並予熄滅。這就需要談判。當然，再打三十年，也不是什麼了不起的大事，但是究竟以早日和平解決較為妥善。何去何從，請你們酌定。

中華人民共和國國防部部長 彭德懷

一九五八年十月六日上午一時

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The English version of this document was made possible with support from the Chun & Jane Chiu Family Foundation (headquartered in Santa Clara, CA 95054, USA in the name of Chiu Chun-pang).

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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Legal Problems Regarding Formosa and the Offshore Islands

Name in Chinese  N/A
Document type Policy memorandum and background analysis 
Year, date 1958, Dec. 22
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(Jump to Czyzak Memorandum—1961)    (Jump to Starr Memorandum—1971)

By Ely Maurer
Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs 1

Since August 23, when the Chinese Communists began their massive bombardment of Quemoy, no item has received as much coverage in the world press as the problems of Formosa and the offshore islands. We are now in a period of relative calm. However, in the 4 months that have elapsed since August 23 considerable discussion and world anxiety have been generated by the matter. In this discussion there have been intertwined elements of policy and of law. I do not intend here to go into the policy issues. I appreciate the opportunity you have afforded me to take up the legal problems. With respect to the questions of law these involve a blend of national and international aspects.

Before going into the legal problems it is desirable to review briefly the geographical and historical background of Formosa and the offshore islands.

Background

Formosa, or Taiwan, is an island about 100 miles from the mainland of China. It has an area equal to that of Maryland and a population of about 10 million people, comprising 8.5 million persons of Chinese descent, 1.5 million mainland Chinese, and 100,000 aborigines. Close to and westward of Formosa are the Pescadores Islands, or Penghus. I shall use the term “Formosa” hereafter as also covering these islands.

Close to the mainland of China, in the vicinity of the city of Amoy and about 5 miles away, is the Quemoy group of islands consisting mainly of Big Quemoy, Little Quemoy, and the two tiny Tan Islands.

About 120 miles up the mainland coast and in the vicinity of Foochow and about 10 miles off the coast is the Matsu group of islands.

Both these groups are in the control of the Republic of China. I shall hereafter speak of them as the offshore islands. These islands have been for a very long time under Chinese sovereignty.

Since the middle of the 17th century and up to 1895 Formosa was a part of the Chinese Empire. In 1895 under the Treaty of Shimonoseki China ceded Formosa to Japan. In the Cairo conference in November 1943 the United States, United Kingdom, and China declared it was their “purpose” that Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores “shall be restored to the Republic of China.” Thereafter in August 1945 in the Potsdam conference the United States, United Kingdom, and China declared that “the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out.” This Potsdam declaration was subsequently adhered to by the U.S.S.R. On September 2, 1945, the Japanese Government, in the instrument of surrender, accepted the provisions of the declaration. The Supreme Allied Commander for the Allied Powers then issued Directive No. 1, under which the Japanese Imperial Headquarters issued General Order No. 1 requiring Japanese commanders in Formosa to surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China. Since September 1945 the United States and the other Allied Powers have accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over the island. In article 2 of the Japanese Peace Treaty, which entered into force April 28, 1952, Japan renounced all “right, title and claim” to Formosa. Neither this agreement nor any other agreement thereafter has purported to transfer the sovereignty of Formosa to China.

In the meantime, since the end of the war in 1945, the Chinese Communists had been engaged in open hostilities with the Republic of China. On October 1, 1949, they proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Two days later the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with this regime. The Chinese Communists made their first attempt to capture Quemoy in late 1949 and were repulsed with heavy losses by the Chinese Government on October 27. The Chinese Government had been transferring its offices to Taipei, Formosa, and early in December 1949 Taipei became the provisional capital of the Republic of China.

On January 5, 1950, President Truman, in a public statement regarding Formosa, declared that the United States had no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory, did not seek any special privileges therein, and would not pursue a course which would lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. 2 However, when the Communists attacked the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950, President Truman issued a public statement noting that the Communists had made clear their intent to use armed invasion and war for purposes of conquest and had defied the Security Council of the United Nations. 3 He thereupon ordered the Seventh Fleet “to prevent any attacks on Formosa” and as a corollary called upon the Chinese Government to cease all operations against the mainland. In addition he stated that “The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.”

On August 24, 1950, the Chinese Communist regime sent a telegram to the President of the United Nations Security Council calling President Truman's action “a direct armed aggression on the territory of China and a total violation of the United Nations Charter.” In a statement on the same day the State Department said the United States would welcome the United Nations consideration of the problem, and on September 21 we formally asked that it be put on the agenda of the General Assembly. The United States made this request at a time when there seemed to be a reasonable prospect that peace and security could be restored in Korea. When these hopes were destroyed by Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, the United States on November 15 asked that consideration of the Formosa question be deferred. In the meantime the Soviet Union had initiated resolutions in the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations condemning the United States for alleged “armed invasion” of Formosa. The General Assembly never endorsed the charges, and they were dropped. The Security Council defeated the Soviet resolution on November 30 by a vote of 9 to 1.

In July of 1954, at the time when the Geneva Accords were being negotiated to end hostilities in Indochina, the Chinese Communist regime launched a massive propaganda campaign for the “liberation of Taiwan.” On September 3 the Chinese Communists began a heavy bombardment of the island of Quemoy, and military attacks spread to coastal islands including the Tachen Islands to the north. Against this background the United States–Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty was signed on December 2, 1954. 4 The territorial coverage of the treaty in respect of China was limited to Formosa. The treaty was accompanied by an exchange of notes of December 10 5 by which the United States and the Republic of China undertook not to use force from the Formosa area or the offshore islands except by joint agreement or in self-defense. It might be pointed out that these defensive arrangements merely formalized and did not in any way extend the United States undertaking for the defense of Formosa going back to June 1950.

The Peiping regime propaganda campaign was stepped up throughout December and January, and the Chinese Communists launched heavy aerial bombardment on the coastal islands and invaded and seized Ichiang Island. These actions were accompanied by broadcast declarations that the actions were preliminary to the taking of Formosa. Following these attacks President Eisenhower on January 24, 1955, requested a resolution from Congress publicly establishing the authority of the President to employ United States forces as he deemed necessary to secure and protect Formosa from armed attack. This joint resolution was passed January 29. 6 The United States also supported in the United Nations Security Council a New Zealand proposal for the consideration of the question of hostilities in the offshore-island area. However, the Peiping regime refused the invitation of the Security Council to be present and participate in the discussion. The Chinese Communists said that the New Zealand resolution was not within the competence of the United Nations because the liberation of Formosa and other coastal islands was a matter of “sovereign right” and an internal affair.

In several statements made in 1955 the President and the Secretary of State reiterated the desire of the United States to find a peaceful solution to the tension in the Formosa area, and ambassadorial talks were opened in Geneva in 1955 with the Chinese Communists relating to this subject as well as other topics. However, these conversations proved abortive since the Chinese Communists refused to agree to a proposal which concerned renunciation of force in the Formosa area.

During the period from February 1955 up to August 23 of this year the Chinese Communist attacks on the Republic of China were relatively infrequent. Then on August 23 the Chinese Communists commenced a massive bombardment of the Quemoy Islands, once again resorting to armed force and precipitating a grave situation in the Formosan Straits. From the beginning of the attacks the United States has shown a desire for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in the Formosa Straits. When the Chinese Communists on September 6 stated a willingness to resume the suspended ambassadorial talks at Geneva, the United States welcomed the prospect. Since that time the United States has, in talks now taking place in Warsaw, been seeking to obtain a cessation of Chinese Communist attacks.

On October 5 the Chinese Communists announced a 1-week suspension of the bombardment, conditional on the discontinuance of the United States escort activities. The Department of State issued a statement welcoming the Communist move and expressing the hope it foreshadowed a permanent end to the attacks. 7 At the end of the week the Chinese Communists extended their cease-fire for another 2 weeks. However, on October 20, justifying their action on alleged escorting activities, the Chinese Communists resumed bombardment but announced shortly thereafter that bombardment of certain areas on Quemoy would only take place on odd numbered days. Since that time bombardment has greatly diminished.

As a result of meetings between Secretary Dulles and Chiang Kai-shek pursuant to article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty a joint communique was issued on October 23. 8 In this communique it was recognized that under the present conditions the defense of the offshore islands is “closely related” to the defense of Formosa. Further, the Republic of China stated that the “principal means” of restoring freedom to its people on the mainland is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's “three people's principles” and “not the use of force.”

This then brings us up to the present. On the basis of this background we can now go into the legal issues presented.

National Legal Problems

The legal problems concerning Formosa and the offshore islands break down into two main subdivisions: (a) the legal problems with respect to the authority of the Executive under United States law, and (b) the authority of the United States Government under international law. It may be best to consider the national aspect first.

In January 1955, in a period in which the Chinese Communists were taking menacing actions with respect to the offshore islands and Formosa and after we had signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, the President sent a message to Congress urging a resolution by Congress authorizing him, if necessary, to take military action in the Formosa area. The message recited that Formosa constituted a part of the vital island chain of defenses of the United States and free nations in the Western Pacific. The President alluded to Quemoy as “one of the natural approaches to Formosa” and said that attacks upon the offshore islands have been asserted by the Chinese Communists themselves to be “a prelude to the conquest of Formosa.” The President then said:

  But, unhappily, the danger of armed attack directed against that area compels us to take into account closely related localities and actions which, under current conditions, might determine the failure or success of such an attack. The authority that may be accorded by the Congress would be used only in situations which are recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries to, an attack against the main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores.

After serious debate Congress passed House Joint Resolution 159 (Public Law 4, 84th Congress, 1st session, chapter 4). This resolution reads in pertinent part:

  ... the President of the United States be and he is hereby authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

In the light of the above, let us first take up the question of the authority of the President to take military action to defend Formosa. In this connection it should be recalled that under article V of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Government of China it is provided that an armed attack on the territories of one of the parties would be dangerous to the other party's peace and security and the other party declare that it would act to meet the common danger “in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Under article VI the term “territories” in respect to the Republic of China is limited to Formosa (and the Pescadores). Thus if an armed attack took place on Formosa the question might arise as to the content of the phrase “in accordance with its constitutional processes.” It might be argued that it is only Congress which could take action under the constitutional provision giving it the power to declare war. However, as is well known, it is considered that the President has a large power to take military action in emergency situations for the defense of the United States without awaiting action by Congress. In the present situation, House Joint Resolution 159 eliminates any problem on this score since, in the words of the President's message, the resolution clearly and publicly establishes the authority of the President to take military action in the defense of Formosa as he deems necessary.

The second question concerns the authority of the President to take action to defend the offshore islands. The Mutual Defense Treaty does not cover in its territorial scope the offshore islands, and there is no commitment therein of United States action in their defense. However, House Joint Resolution 159 authorizes the President to protect “such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands” and to take “such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.” What is the meaning of this clause?

It has been argued that the phrase “related positions and territories” refers only to areas that are necessary from the standpoint of military tactics for the defense of Formosa. Thus, this argument runs, the President has only the power to defend Quemoy if Quemoy in a military sense is essential to the defense of Formosa, so that if Quemoy fell the defense of Formosa would be tactically impossible. The argument continues that, since Quemoy is not essential in this sense, the President has no authority to defend it.

It is our view that the language with respect to the offshore islands, read in its natural sense and with relation to the background message of the President and the debate in Congress, permits a broader meaning. (1) The word “related” would seem logically to cover the situation where the position or territory in question is not “essential” to the defense of Formosa but one in which the loss of the position or territory would make that defense harder or more difficult. (2) More importantly, the word “related” would appear to cover the situation in which the offshore islands are part and parcel of a general plan for the seizure of Formosa or preliminary thereto. In the present situation it is evident from the innumerable statements issued by the Chinese Communists that they view their whole action with respect to the offshore islands as related in this way to the “liberation” of Formosa. (3) Further, it is improper in our view to give a too physical interpretation to the word “related.” In this connection it might be pointed out that the offshore islands constitute an extremely important psychological element in the will to resist of the defenders of Formosa. In this sense the loss of the offshore islands is quite clearly related to the defense of Formosa. (4) Fourthly, emphasis should be given to the language “such related positions” as “he judges to be required or appropriate” in assuring the defense of Formosa. Implicit in this language is that discretion is lodged in the President to determine what related positions are required or appropriate in the defense of Formosa. (5) Fifthly, it should be emphasized the President has also power to take “such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate” in the defense of Formosa, and this is not tied down to any phrase as to “related positions.”

Considering the cumulative effect of all these points and taking into account the inherent constitutional powers of the President, it is our view that the President has an extremely broad latitude of decision with respect to taking action to defend the offshore islands. In this connection it will be recalled that in the joint communique issued on October 23 at Taipei, at the conclusion of the Dulles-Chiang discussions, it was stated that “It was recognized that under the present conditions the defense of the Quemoys, together with the Matsus, is closely related” to the defense of Formosa.

International Legal Problems

On the international front it is best to examine the problem of Formosa separately from the problem of the offshore islands.

In giving the historical background of Formosa it has been pointed out that at Cairo the Allies stated it was their purpose to restore Formosa to Chinese sovereignty and that at the end of the war the Republic of China receive the surrender of Japanese forces on Formosa. It has also been pointed out that under the Japanese Peace Treaty Japan renounced all right, title, and claim to Formosa. However, neither in that treaty nor in any other treaty has there been any definitive cession to China of Formosa. The situation is, then, one where the Allied Powers still have to come to some agreement or treaty with respect to the status of Formosa. Any action, therefore, of the Chinese Communist regime to seize Formosa constitutes an attempt to seize by force territory which does not belong to it. Such a seizure is prohibited by international law and the United Nations Charter as an attempt to settle a claim to territory by force. It would thus appear that the United States is within its legal rights in taking action to defend Formosa.

With respect to the offshore islands the situation is admittedly somewhat different. There is no question that these islands are a part of the state of China. It may be admitted further that these islands are close to the mainland of China. However, the offshore islands have been in the possession and effective control of the Government of the Republic of China since its inception, except for the period of the Japanese war. Since 1949 a status quo has come into existence vis-a-vis the Peiping regime. It is this status quo which the Chinese Communists have threatened with the menace of armed force. It is our view that we have here in fact a situation comparable to that which obtained in Korea preceding the invasion of south Korea by north Korea. In other words, the action of the Chinese Communists in taking warlike measures is an effort to change the status quo and to gain additional territory by force in violation of the prohibitions of the United Nations Charter.

It has been urged that this is essentially a civil war and therefore it is improper for the United States to participate with the Government of the Republic of China in defense of the offshore islands. It should first be pointed out that it is too narrow to look upon the conflict merely as a civil war. Even as early as the end of the war with Japan the Soviet Union, in violation of its treaty with the Chinese Nationalists, turned over large stores of equipment and in other ways furnished material aid to the Chinese Communists. Since that time the Soviet Union has continued giving large assistance to the Chinese Communist regime. Thus much of the ammunition, artillery, and planes that are at present being used by that regime derive from Russian sources. And the Soviet Union is allied by military treaty with the Chinese regime. On the other hand the United States has vital interests in the Formosa area and is allied with the Republic of China in a Mutual Defense Treaty and has agreements to supply arms for defensive purposes. In the circumstances it seems fair to say that we are here involved in what is realistically an international dispute which the Communist regime is attempting to settle by force.

Further with respect to the argument that this is a civil war, it will be recalled that this was the same argument that was made by Vishinsky regarding the north Korean invasion of south Korea. It was an argument however which the United Nations paid no heed to but, instead, viewed the action of the north Koreans as one of aggression which came under the ban of the United Nations Charter. Secretary Dulles has summarized the situation forcefully in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly on September 18. 9 He said:

  1. The Chinese Communist regime has never during its 9 years of existence exercised authority over Taiwan, the Penghus, or the Quemoy or Matsu Islands.

  2. The Chinese Communist regime is now attempting to extend its authority to these areas by the use of naked force.

  The issue is thus a simple one: armed conquest.

  In 1950 the United Nations met that issue squarely. By overwhelming vote it found that the attack of north Korea to “unify” Korea was armed aggression. It condemned the Chinese Communist regime as an aggressor because of its part in that armed attack.

  I do not ignore the argument that today's Chinese Communist attack is a “civil war” operation. Mr. Vishinsky made a parallel argument in 1950. He told us that the war in Korea was purely a “civil war” and that outsiders who intervened were “aggressors.” The United Nations overwhelmingly rejected that contention. ...

  The fact is that, when one regime attempts by force to take additional territory which has long been under the authority of another government, recognized as such by a respectable part of the world community, that is a use of force which endangers world order.

On this phase of the matter it is our view, then, that the United States would be justified from an international standpoint in cooperating with the Republic of China in the defense of the offshore islands and Formosa.

Recognition of Communist China

Related to the problems of Formosa and the offshore islands is the question of the recognition policy of the United States. The United States Government has been criticized for its failure to recognize the Chinese Communist regime, some commentators taking the view that, since the Communist regime controls the great mass of mainland China as well as its 600 million inhabitants, the United States must accord recognition. It is the view of the United States Government that international law does not require one government to accord diplomatic recognition to another government. It is our view that the matter of diplomatic recognition is one solely to be determined as the national interest dictates, and in this case on an examination of all facets of the subject the United States Government believes that it would be contrary to our national interest to accord recognition. The various considerations involved in reaching this conclusion were spelled out in press release No. 459 of August 11, 1958, issued by the State Department. 10 This press release embodied the text of a memorandum sent by the Department to its missions abroad.

It is true that, in reviewing whether we should extend recognition, the United States Government, in this as well as in previous administrations, has looked to certain factors which are generally considered significant. These factors are (1) whether the government in question is in control of a certain territory, (2) whether the government reflects the will of the nation substantially declared, (3) whether the government is prepared to honor its international obligations. While the United States examines these factors, we do not view recognition as required upon a satisfactory finding with respect to these factors. Even if that were our view, there is serious question whether the Chinese Communist regime can in any way be considered to reflect the will of the nation; and there is no doubt, in view of flagrant past treaty violations and violations of the United Nations Charter and violations of international law and in view of statements made by the Chinese Communist regime about disregarding preexisting treaties, that the Chinese Communist regime is not prepared to honor its international obligations. Thus, even on this view, the Chinese Communists are not entitled to recognition.

As Secretary Dulles has pointed out, however, our failure to recognize the Chinese Communist regime has not meant that we refuse to deal with them where it is essential to our purpose and inures to our benefit. Thus we are at present carrying on conversations in Warsaw as we have carried on conversations in Geneva; we dealt with them in the Korean armistice negotiations; we dealt with them with respect to the cease-fires in Indochina; and we are prepared to deal with them whenever we believe it to be in the interest of the United States to do so.

Territorial Sea

As a collateral legal issue related to the Formosa Straits area there has arisen the question of the extent of the territorial sea. The Chinese Communist regime in a declaration dated September 4, 1958 declared their territorial sea to extend to 12 miles. In addition, their declaration indicated that they viewed the baselines from which the 12 miles were to be calculated as being points connecting basepoints on the mainland and on certain islands offshore. On the ground of this declaration they considered all the waters around the Quemoys and Matsus and areas well into the Formosa Straits as being internal or territorial waters, and they have charged the United States forces with more than 40 intrusions of such internal or territorial waters by warships and aircraft. The United States position on this matter is quite clear. The United States only recognizes the Government of the Republic of China; and as far as the United States is concerned the declaration of the Chinese Communist regime has therefore no force or validity. In addition the United States considers that international law recognizes only a 3-mile limit, that it is not possible for a country by unilateral action to take unto itself that which is the common property of all nations, and that this is, moreover, in violation of the universally accepted principle of the freedom of the high seas. The United States position finds support in the report of the United Nations International Law Commission 11 wherein it is stated that “international law does not require states to recognize a breadth [of territorial sea] beyond 3 miles.”

Further, a country is not free to choose whether its territorial sea will be measured from the lowwater mark on the coast, which is the normal baseline, or whether it will use straight baselines connecting salient points or offshore islands. While article 4 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 12 adopted by the recent Geneva Conference on Law of the Sea permits the establishment of straight baselines in localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, it is clear that the Chinese coast along which the straight lines described in the statement of September 4 are drawn does not conform to the geographic conditions which are set forth in article 4. There is even less legal basis for drawing straight baselines from outermost points on a group of islands and claiming waters thereby included as internal waters. Similar attempts by other countries to claim, as internal waters, large areas of high seas within groups of islands or archipelagoes have been protested by many countries. The straight baselines described in the statement of September 4, 1958, are accordingly regarded by the United States as completely arbitrary and without any basis in recognized international law.

Another problem has been raised in the press with respect to United States escort activities of vessels of the Republic of China. Heretofore the United States vessels have avoided entering the territorial sea around Quemoy and the other offshore islands. The question has been raised whether in so doing we have been giving some implied recognition to the claim of the Chinese Communist regime as to its right to this territorial sea. Nothing could be further from the fact. Since the Government of the Republic of China is in effective control of Quemoy and the other offshore islands, we consider that it has the right to the territorial sea around these islands, just as it has the right to the territorial sea around Formosa. Moreover, just as our warships have, with the consent of the Government of the Republic of China, moved through the territorial sea of Formosa, so similarly with the consent of the Government of the Republic of China they could move through the territorial sea of Quemoy and the other offshore islands. There is no question that the Government of the Republic of China would be willing to give the United States such permission with respect to Quemoy and the offshore islands. However, the United States has thought it best as a matter of policy to keep United States warships in what are clearly international waters near Quemoy and the other offshore islands.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is our view that from a national and international standpoint the President may properly use United States armed forces for the defense of Formosa and the offshore islands; the United States is not required to recognize the Chinese Communist regime; the declaration by the Chinese Communist regime regarding a 12-mile territorial sea has no validity.

Footnotes

1 Address made before Washington Chapter of the Federal Bar Association at Washington, D. C., on Nov. 20 (press release 723 dated Nov. 28).
2 BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1950, p. 79.
3 Ibid., July 3, 1950, p. 5.
4 For background and text, see ibid., Dec. 13, 1954, p. 895.
5 Ibid., Jan. 24, 1955, p. 152.
6 For President Eisenhower’s message to Congress and text of the resolution, see ibid., Feb., 7, 1955, p. 211.
7 Ibid., Oct. 27, 1958, p. 650.
8 For text of the communique and a statement by Secretary Dulles, see ibid., Nov. 10, 1958, p. 721.
9 Ibid., Oct. 6, 1958, p. 525.
10 Ibid., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 385.
11 U. N. doc. A/3159.
12 BULLETIN of June 30, 1958, p. 1111.

(Source: Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1017, pp. 1005-1011; dated Dec. 22, 1958)

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Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan

Name in Chinese Meilijian hezhongguo yu Ribenguo zhi anquan baozhang tiaoyue 美利堅合眾國與日本國之安全保障條約
Document type Bilateral treaty between the US and Japan
Year, date 1960, Jan. 19
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Japan and the United States of America,

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,

Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

Article 1 The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.
Article 2 The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.
Article 3 The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.
Article 4 The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.
Article 5 Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
Article 6 For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.
Article 7 This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 8 This Treaty shall be ratified by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.
Article 9 The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.
Article 10 This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area. However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in duplicate at Washington in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.

FOR JAPAN: Nobusuke Kishi 岸 信介, Mitsujiro Ishii 石井 光次郎, Koichiro Asakai 朝海 浩一郎, Aiichiro Fujiyama 藤山 愛一郎, Tadashi Adachi 足立 正

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Christian A. Herter, J. Graham Parsons, Douglas MacArthur 2nd

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan is called as follows in Chinese and Japanese:

Chinese Japanese
Meilijian hezhongguo yu Ribenguo zhi anquan baozhang tiaoyue 美利堅合眾國與日本國之安全保障條約, abbrev. Mei Ri anbao tiaoyue 美日安保條約 Nippon kokuto Amerika gasshū koku tono aidano sōgo kyōryoku oyobi anzen hoshō jōyaku 日本国とアメリカ合衆国との間の相互協力及び安全保障条約

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Czyzak Memorandum

Name in Chinese  Qizake beiwanglu 齊紮克備忘錄
Document type Policy memorandum and background analysis 
Year, date 1961, Feb. 3
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(Jump to Starr Memorandum—1971)    (Jump to Maurer Analysis—1958)

US Department of State

Memorandum from the Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs (L/FE - John J. Czyzak) to Mr. Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser

February 3, 1961

Subject: "Legal Status of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores Islands (Penghu)"

History of status of Formosa and the Pescadores

Prior to the Korean Hostilities

From the middle of the 17th century to 1895, Formosa and the Pescadores were part of the Chinese Empire. China then ceded these islands to Japan in 1895 in the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

When China declared war on Japan on December 9, 1941, she also declared that all treaties concerning the relations between China and Japan "are and remain null and void".

In the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the United States, Great Britain and China stated it to be their purpose that "all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as ... Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China". These same three governments on July 26, 1945 issued the Potsdam Proclamation declaring that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine". On August 8, 1945 the Soviet Union adhered to the Potsdam Proclamation. In the Instrument of Surrender signed September 2, 1945, the Japanese Government accepted its provisions.

Pursuant to Japanese Imperial General Headquarters General Order No. 1 issued at the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Japanese commanders in Formosa surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek "acting on behalf of the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". Continuously since that time, the Government of the Republic of China has occupied and administered Formosa and the Pescadores and subsequent to the surrender declared Formosa to be a part of China. Although there is no indication that the United States ever received official notification of such declaration, it can be said that the United States was aware of the fact that the Republic of China treated Formosa as a part of China. The view of the United States government in the post-war period, however, was typified by a statement on April 11, 1947 of Acting Secretary Acheson that the transfer of sovereignty over Formosa to China "has not yet been formalized". Sovereignty, it would appear, remained in Japan.

After a prolonged period of civil strife, the Chinese Communists succeeded in driving the Government of the Republic of China off the Chinese mainland. On October 1, 1949 the Chinese Communists proclaimed the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China. The seat of the Government of the Republic of China was transferred to Formosa, and in early December 1949, Taipei became its provisional capital.

The Korean Conflict

The outbreak of hostilities in Korea on June 25, 1950 brought to the fore the question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores. President Truman, in ordering the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, stated that "the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations".

[On August 25, 1950] the United States replied to the United Nations Security Council that

"The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the allied forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the Island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now."

By a letter dated September 20, 1950, the United States requested that the question of Formosa be placed on the agenda of the fifth session of the U.N. General Assembly. In an explanatory note of September 21, the United States, citing the Cairo and Potsdam declarations and the Japanese surrender, stated nevertheless:

"Formal transfer of Formosa to China was to await the conclusion of peace with Japan or some other appropriate formal act."

Consideration of this item by the General Assembly was eventually postponed.

Meanwhile the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council condemning the United States for acts of aggression and intervention in the internal affairs of China. The USSR also proposed for inclusion on the agenda of the fifth regular session of the General Assembly the question of "American aggression against China". In both cases the USSR asserted that Taiwan was an inalienable part of the territory of China. The U.S. delegate in Committee One, John Foster Dulles, answered the Soviet complaint of aggression in part as follows:

"In connection with this whole question of Formosa, I think it is wise for us to bear in mind that Formosa is still affected with an international interest. It is a former Japanese colony in the process of detachment. The United States certainly is entitled to some voice in the determination of the future of Formosa, because if it were not for the tremendous military effort and the great sacrifice which the United States made in that area of the world, none of us here today would be sitting around talking about Formosa.

"The United States, as one of the principal victors in the war against Japan, has a legitimate voice in what President Truman referred to as the "determination of the future status of Formosa," which he says, "must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan or consideration by the United Nations."

The Security Council defeated the Soviet resolution, and the General Assembly failed to endorse the charges against the U.S.

Japanese Peace Treaty

In September and October 1950, the United States proposed in a brief statement to the members of the Far Eastern Commission general principles for a Peace Treaty with Japan.

In an aide memoire dated November 20, 1950, the USSR commented:

"2. By the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943 . . . and the Potsdam Agreement of July 26, 1945 . . . the question of returning Formosa and the Pescadores to China was decided. In a similar manner the Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945 . . . decided the questions of returning the southern part of Sakhalin Island and the adjacent islands to the Soviet Union and handing over to her the Kurile Islands."

The United States replied in an aide memoire dated December 27, 1950:

" ... 2. The Cairo Declaration of 1943 stated the purpose to restore 'Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores to the Republic of China.' That declaration, like other wartime declarations such as those of Yalta and Potsdam, was in the opinion of the United States Government subject to any final peace settlement where all relevant factors should be considered ... "

From September 4 to 8, 1951 a conference for the conclusion and signature of a Treaty of Peace with Japan was held at San Francisco. China was not represented at the Conference because of the disagreement among the participants as to who actually represented the government of that country. Reflecting this disagreement is Article 2 of the Peace Treaty as it was signed on September 8 which reads in its pertinent part:

"(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores."

John Foster Dulles, U.S. delegate at the Conference, commented on this provision in Article 2:

"Some Allied Powers suggested that Article 2 should not merely delimit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam, but specify precisely the ultimate disposition of each of the ex-Japanese territories. This, admittedly, would have been neater. But it would have raised questions as to which there are now no agreed answers. We had either to give Japan peace on the Potsdam surrender terms or deny peace to Japan while the allies quarrel about what shall be done with what Japan is prepared, and required, to give up. Clearly, the wise course was to proceed now, so far as Japan is concerned, leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international solvents other than this treaty."

The delegate of the United Kingdom remarked:

"The treaty also provides for Japan to renounce its sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. The treaty itself does not determine the future of these islands."

The USSR refused to sign the Treaty. It objected, among other things, to the provision regarding Formosa and the Pescadores:

" ... this draft grossly violates the indisputable rights of China to the return of integral parts of Chinese territory; Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Paracel and other islands ... the draft contains only a reference to the renunciation by Japan of its rights to these territories but intentionally omits any mention of the further fate of these territories."

It is clear from these and other statements made at San Francisco, that sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores was not considered to have finally been determined by the Peace Treaty.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations also took this view. In its Report on the Treaty dated February 14, 1952, the Committee stated:

"It is important to remember that Article 2 is a renunciatory article and makes no provision for the power or powers which are to succeded Japan in the possession of and sovereignty over the ceded territory.

"During the negotiation of the Treaty some of the Allied Powers expressed the view that Article 2 of the treaty should not only relieve Japan of its sovereignty over the territories in question but should indicate specifically what disposition was to be made of each of them. The committee believes, however, that this would have been an unwise course to pursue. It might have raised differences among the allies which would have complicated and prolonged the conclusions of the peace. Under the circumstances it seems far better to have the treaty enter into force now, leaving to the future the final disposition of such areas as South Sakhalin and the Kuriles."

Although China was not a party to the San Francisco Treaty, a separate Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan was signed in Taipei on April 28, 1952. Article II of that treaty provided:

"It is recognized that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco in the United States of America on September 8, 1951 ... Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands."

Article 25 of the Treaty stated that the Treaty shall not confer any rights, title or benefits on any state not a party to the Treaty.

Chinese Mutual Defense Treaty and the Formosa Resolution

Against the background of a massive Chinese Communist propaganda campaign for the "liberation" of Taiwan, supplemented by military action against Quemoy and other offshore islands, the United States and the Republic of China signed a Mutual defense Treaty on December 2, 1954. The first paragraph of Article V of the Treaty reads:

"Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

Article VI provides that for the purpose of Article V the term "territories" shall mean in respect to the Republic of China, "Taiwan and the Pescadores". In an exchange of notes accompanying the Treaty, there appears the statement, "The Republic of China effectively controls both the territory described in Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Defense . . . and other territory".

In its report on the Treaty, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations briefly discussed the question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores:

"By the peace treaty of September 8, 1951, signed with the United States and other powers, Japan renounced 'all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.' The treaty did not specify the nation to which such right, title and claim passed. Although the Republic of China was not a signatory to the Treaty, it and the parties at the conference expressly recognized that it did not dispose finally of Formosa and the Pescadores . . . .

"Secretary Dulles informed the committee that the reference in Article V to 'the territories of either of the Parties' was language carefully chosen to avoid denoting anything one way or another as to their sovereignty.

"It is the view of the committee that the coming into force of the present treaty will not modify or affect the existing legal status of Formosa and the Pescadores. The treaty appears to be wholly consistent with all actions taken by the United States in this matter since the end of World War II, and does not introduce any basically new element in our relations with the territories in question . . . .

"To avoid any possibility of misunderstanding on this aspect of the treaty, the committee decided it would be useful to include in this report the following statement: It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or sovereignty of the territories to which it applies."

The question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores was again discussed on January 24, 1955, before a joint executive session of the Senate committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, in connection with the Formosa Resolution. It is understood that during the course of these hearings, Secretary Dulles indicated that sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores was not considered to have been transferred to the Republic of China in the Japanese Peace Treaty and that the question of sovereignty over these islands was not yet finally determined.

Discussion

It may be well at this time to examine the various legal theories outlined [in] this memorandum regarding the status of Formosa and the Pescadores in the light of the historical analysis set forth above.

1. The most tenable theory regarding the status of Formosa and the Pescadores is that sovereignty over the islands has not yet been finally determined. The Cairo and Potsdam declarations were statements of intention on the part of the Allied Powers that the islands would return to "the Republic of China". Chiang Kai-shek was authorized by the Allied Powers to take the surrender of the Japanese on the islands, and the Government of the Republic of China has continued to occupy and administer the islands ever since. This surrender by Japan of Formosa and the Pescadores, although providing a legal basis for the continued occupation and administration of the islands by the Government of the Republic of China, would not appear to have effected a transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of China.

Because of differences among the Allied Powers as to who represented China, no agreement on the disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores could be reached in the Japanese Peace Treaty. That the San Francisco Peace Treaty was intended to divest Japan of its sovereignty over the islands without transferring that sovereignty to any other country is abundantly clear from the record. There does not appear to have occurred anything subsequent to the Peace Treaty which can be said to have effected a transfer of that sovereignty.

An analogy to the status of Formosa as described may be found in the case of Cuba after the Spanish-American War. By Article I of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, Spain relinquished "all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba". Although the treaty named the United States as occupying power for the relinquished territory, it did not specify to whom sovereignty was to be transferred.

It may be well to point out that the legal status of the offshore islands, the Quemoy and Matsu groups, is different from that of Formosa and the Pescadores as described here. The offshore islands, although like Formosa and the Pescadores under the control of the Republic of China, have always been considered as part of "China". As Secretary Dulles explained:

"The legal position is different . . . , by virtue of the fact that technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been settled. That is because the Japanese Peace Treaty merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to these islands. But the future title is not determined by the Japanese Peace Treaty nor is it determined by the Peace Treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and Japan. Therefore the juridical status of these islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, is different from the juridical status of the offshore islands which have always been Chinese territory."

The usual way in which a formal transfer of territory is effected under international law is by cession, which typically consists of an agreement between the ceding and acquiring state. No such cession has occurred here. As has been seen, the Republic of China did declare the islands to be a part of China subsequent to the surrender, and such declaration might be considered an annexation of this territory. However, in view of the fact that Chiang Kai-shek, in accepting the Japanese surrender, was acting on behalf of the Allied Powers, it may be questioned whether any such attempted annexation would have validity in international law. Normally, military occupation does not have the effect of transferring sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant. Furthermore, the whole history of the San Francisco and Sino-Japanese Peace Treaties casts doubt on this interpretation.

... it has been contended that the transfer of Formosa and the Pescadores to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki was null and void in that these islands had been taken away from China at that time by force, contrary to international law. However, it is generally accepted that international law as it existed at that time disregarded "the effect of coercion in the conclusion of a treaty imposed by the victor upon the vanquished State" [I Oppenheim, International Law 891 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955)].

On February 11, 1945, at Yalta, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin agreed that the USSR would enter the war against Japan on condition, among others, that the southern part of Sakhalin and all the islands adjacent to it "shall be returned to the Soviet Union" and that the Kurile Islands "shall be handed over the Soviet Union". The Yalta agreement like the Cairo declaration has been considered by the United States to be a statement of intention rather than as creating binding international commitments.

The question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores must be viewed in the light of a parallel question regarding the Kurile Islands, the southern portions of Sakhalin and certain islands adjacent to it. Pursuant to the same instrument which directed Chiang Kai-shek to accept the Japanese surrender on Formosa and the Pescadores, the Soviet Union accepted the Japanese surrender on these islands had has continuously thereafter controlled and administered them. The USSR purported to annex the islands by a decree of February 2, 1946. The United States Government has maintained, however, that the USSR does not possess sovereignty over them.

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UN Resolution 1668

Name in Chinese lianheguo jueyi yiliuliuba hao 聯合國決議一六六八號
Document type Resolution by the United Nations
Year, date 1961, Dec. 15
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

(Jump to UN Resolution 2758—1971)

United Nations

General Assembly—Sixteenth Session

1668 (XVI). Representation of China in the United Nations.

The General Assembly,

Noting that a serious divergence of views exists among Member States concerning the representation of a founder Member who is named in the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling that this matter has been described repeatedly in the General Assembly by all segments of opinion as vital and crucial and that on numerous occasions its inclusion in the agenda has been requested under rule 15 of the Assembly's rules of procedure as an item of an important and urgent character,

Recalling further the recommendation contained in its resolution 396 (V) of 14 December 1950 that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case,

Decides, in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations, that any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question.

1080th plenary meeting,

15 December 1961.

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聯合國決議一六六八號

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

大會第十六屆會

一六六八（十六）．中國在聯合國之代表權問題

大會，

鑒於各會員國對於列名於聯合國憲章之一創始會員國之代表權問題，意見極度懸殊，

憶及此一問題會一再在大會被各方意見指為重大而有決定性之問題，且屢經依據大會議事規則第十五條作為重要而緊急之項目請求列入議程，

復憶大會一九五０年十二月十四日決議案三九六（五）中建議，凡遇主張有權代表某一會員國出席聯合國之政府不止一個當局，而該問題又成為聯合國爭執之點時，則此問題應依憲章宗旨原則並就個別情形，予以審議，

茲決議依照聯合國憲章第十八條之規定，任何改變中國代表權之提案為一重要問題。

一九六一年十二月十五日，

第一０八０次全體會議。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

According to records provided by the United Nations, voting summary was as follows: 61 Yes, 34 No, 7 Abstentions, 2 Non-voting. Total voting membership was 104. The following list shows the voting summary in detail.

Yes No Abstentions Non-voting
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Republic 
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo (Brazzaville)
Congo (Leopoldville)
Costa Rica
Dahomey
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Federation of Malaya
France
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Iceland
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Japan
Jordan
Laos
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Mauritania
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
South Africa
Spain
Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Upper Volta
Uruguay
Venezuela		 Afghanistan
Albania
Bulgaria
Burma
Byelorussian SSR
Cambodia
Ceylon
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Ethiopia
Finland
Ghana
Guinea
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iraq
Mali
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Norway
Poland
Romania
Sudan
Sweden
Syria
Tunisia
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
United Arab Republic 
Yemen
Yugoslavia		 Austria
Cyprus
Nigeria
Pakistan
Sierra Leone 
Somalia
Tanganyika		 Gabon
Togo

 
* * * SEE ALSO * * *

🔴 "Other texts and documents", UN Resolution 2758: Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations (1971)
🔴 "Foreign relations of the ROC", ROC representatives to the United Nations (UN)

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Okinawa Reversion Agreement

Name in Chinese Chongsheng guihuan xieding 沖繩歸還協定
Document type Bilateral treaty between the US and Japan
Year, date 1971, June 17
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Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands

Washington and Tokyo (simultaneously), 17th June, 1971

The United States of America and Japan

Noting that the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Japan reviewed together on November 19, 20, and 21, 1969 the status of the Ryukyu Islands the Daito Islands, referred to as "Okinawa" in the Joint Communique between the President and the Prime Minister issued on November 21, 1969, and agreed that the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan should enter immediately into consultations regarding the specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of these islands to Japan;

Noting that the two Governments have conducted such consultations and have reaffirmed that the reversion of these islands to Japan be carried out on the basis of the said Joint Communique;

Considering the United States of America desires, with respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, to relinquish in favour of Japan all rights and interests under Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the City of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, and thereby to have relinquished all its rights and interests in all territories under the said Article; and Considering further that Japan is willing to assume full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands;

Therefore, have agreed as follows:

Article 1 1. With respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, as defined in paragraph 2 below, the United States of America relinquishes in favour of Japan all rights and interests under Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the City of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, effective as of the date of entry into force of this Agreements. Japan, as of such date, assumes full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the said islands.
2. For the purpose of this Agreement, the term "the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands" means all the territories and their territorial waters with respect to which the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction was accorded to the United States of America under Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan other than those with respect to which such right has already been returned to Japan in accordance with the Agreement concerning the Amami Islands and the Agreement concerning Nanpo Shoto and Other Islands signed between the United States of America and Japan, respectively on December 24, 1953 and April 5, 1968.
Article 2 It is confirmed that treaties, conventions and other agreements concluded between the United States of America and Japan, including, but without limitation, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, and its related arrangements and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of American and Japan signed at Tokyo on April 2,1953, become applicable to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement.
Article 3 1. Japan will grant the United States of America on the date of entry into force of this Agreement the use of facilities and areas in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in accordance with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan signed at Washington on January 19, 1960 and its related arrangements.
2. In the application of Article lV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of the United States Armed Forces in Japan signed on January 19, 1960, to the facilities and areas the use of which will be granted in accordance with paragraph I above to the United States of America on the date of entry into force of this Agreement, it is understood that the phrase "the condition in which they were at the time they became available to the United States Armed Forces" in paragraph I of the said Article IV refers to the condition in which the facilities and areas first came into the use of the United States Armed Forces, and that the term "improvements" in paragraph 2 of the said Article includes those made prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement.
Article 4 1. Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nations against the United States of America and its nationals and against the local authorities of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of the United States of America in these islands, or from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of the United States of America having had any effect upon these islands, prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement.
2. The waiver in paragraph 1 above does not, however, include claims of Japanese nationals specifically recognized in the laws of the United States of America or the local laws of these islands applicable during the period of United States administration of these islands. The Government of the United States of America is authorised to maintain its duly empowered officials in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in order to deal with and settle such claims on and after the date of entry into force of this Agreement in accordance with the procedures to be established in consultation with the Government of Japan.
3. The Government of the United States of America will make ex gratia contributions for restoration of lands to the nationals of Japan whose lands in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands were damaged prior to July 1, 1950, while placed under the use of United States authorities, and were released from their use after June 30, 1961 and before the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Such contributions will be made in an equitable manner in relation under High Commissioner Ordinance Number 60 of 1967 to claims for damages done prior to July 1, 1950 to the lands released prior to July 1, 1961.
4. Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of the United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands under or in consequence of directives of the United States or local authorities, authorised by existing law during that period, and will take no action subjecting the United States nationals or the residents of these islands to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts of omissions.
Article 5 1. Japan recognizes the validity of, and will continue in full force and effect, final judgements in civil cases rendered by any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement, provided that such recognition or continuation would not be contrary to public policy.
2. Without in any way adversely affecting the substantive rights and positions of the litigants concerned, Japan will assume jurisdiction over and continue judgement and execution of any civil case pending as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement in any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.
3. Without in any way adversely affecting the substantive rights of the accused or suspect concerned, Japan will assume jurisdiction over, and may continue or institute proceedings with respect to, any criminal cases with which any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands is seized as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement or would have been seized had the proceedings been instituted prior to such date.
4. Japan may continue the execution of any final judgements rendered in criminal cases by any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.
Article 6 1. The properties of the Ryukyu Electric Power Corporation, the Ryukyu Domestic Water Corporation and the Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation shall be transferred to the Government of Japan on the date of entry into force of this Agreement, and the rights and obligations of the said Corporations shall be assumed by the Government of Japan on that date on conformity with the laws and regulations of Japan.
2. All other properties of the Government of the United States of America, existing in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement and located outside the facilities and areas provided on that date in accordance with Article III of this Agreement, shall be transferred to the Government of Japan on that date, except for those that are located on the lands returned to the landowners concerned before the date of entry into force of this Agreement and for those the title to which will be retained by the Government of the United States of America after that date with the consent of the Government of Japan.
3. Such lands in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands reclaimed by the Government of the United States of America and such other reclaimed lands acquired by it in these islands are held by the Government of the United States of America as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement become the property of the Government of Japan on that date.
4. The United States of America is not obliged to compensate Japan or its nationals for any alteration made prior to the date of entry into force of this agreement to the lands upon which the properties transferred to the Government of Japan under paragraphs I and 2 above are located.
Article 7 Considering, inter alia, that United States assets are being transferred to the Government of Japan under Article VI of this Agreement, that the Government of the United States of America is carrying out the return of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands to Japan in a manner consistent with the policy of the Government of Japan as specified in paragraph 8 of the Joint Communique of November 21,1969, and that the Government of the United States of America will bear extra costs, particularly in the area of employment after reversion, the Government of Japan will pay to the Government of the United States of America in United States dollars a total amount of three hundred and twenty million United States dollars (U.S. $320,000,000) over a period of five years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Of the said amount, the Government of Japan will pay one hundred million United States dollars (U.S. $100,000,000) within one week after the date of entry into force of this Agreement and the remainder in four equal annual instalments in June of each calendar year subsequent to the year in which this Agreement enters into force.
Article 8 The Government of Japan consents to the continued operation by the Government of the United States of America of the Voice of America relay station on Okinawa island for a period of five years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement in accordance with the arrangements to be concluded between the two Governments. The two Governments shall enter into consultation two years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement on future operation of the Voice of America on Okinawa Island.
Article 9 This Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Tokyo. This Agreement shall enter into force two months after the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Washington and Tokyo, this seventeenth day of June, 1971, in duplicate in the English and Japanese language, both equally authentic.

For the United States of America: WILLIAM P. ROGERS

For Japan: KIICHI AICHI 愛知 揆一

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The U.S. reverted the islands to Japan on May 15, 1972.

The Okinawa Reversion Agreement is called as follows in Chinese and Japanese:

Chinese Japanese
Chongsheng guihuan xieding 沖繩歸還協定 Okinawa henkan kyōtei 沖縄返還協定

The full formal title (Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands) translates to Japanese as follows: Ryūkyū shotō oyobi Daitō shotō ni kansuru Nippon kokuto Amerika gasshū koku tono aidano kyōtei 琉球諸島及び大東諸島に関する日本国とアメリカ合衆国との間の協定.

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Starr Memorandum

Name in Chinese  Sida beiwanglu 斯塔備忘錄
Document type Policy memorandum and background analysis 
Year, date 1971, July 13
 [Next document]  [Previous document] 

(Jump to Czyzak Memorandum—1961)    (Jump to Maurer Analysis—1958)

US Department of State

Memorandum from the Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asia and the Pacific (L/EA - Robert I. Starr) to the Director of the Office of Republic of China Affairs (Charles T. Sylvester)

July 13, 1971

Subject: "Legal Status of Taiwan"

You have asked for a comprehensive memorandum analyzing the question of the legal status of Taiwan in terms suitable for Congressional presentation. Attached is a paper that should serve this purpose. It is drawn mainly from the February 3, 1961 Czyzak memorandum, and contains no sensitive information or reference to classified documents.

Concurrence: L – Mr. Salans

L:L/EA:RIStarr:cdj: 7/13/71 ex 28900

Legal Status of Taiwan

Prior to the Korean Hostilities

From the middle of the 17th century to 1895, Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores (Penghu) were part of the Chinese Empire. China then ceded these islands to Japan in 1895 in the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shimonoseki.

In the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the United States, Great Britain, and China stated it to be their purpose that "all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as…Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China". These same three governments on July 26, 1945 issued the Potsdam Proclamation declaring that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine". On August 8, 1945 the Soviet Union adhered to the Potsdam Proclamation. By an Imperial Rescript of September 2, 1945, the Japanese Emperor accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, and in the Instrument of Surrender signed on the same date, the Japanese Government "and their successors" undertook to carry out the provisions of the Declaration.

Pursuant to Japanese Imperial General Headquarters General Order No. 1, issued at the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Japanese commanders in Formosa surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek "acting on behalf of the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". Continuously since that time, the Government of the Republic of China has occupied and exercised authority over Formosa and the Pescadores.

The view of the U.S. in the intermediate post-war period was typified by a statement on April 11, 1947 of then Acting Secretary of State Acheson, in a letter to Senator Ball, that the transfer of sovereignty over Formosa to China "has not yet been formalized".

After a prolonged period of civil strife the Chinese Communists succeeded in driving the Government of the Republic of China off the Chinese mainland. On October 1, 1949 the Chinese Communists proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The seat of the Government of the Republic of China was transferred to Formosa, and in early December 1949, Taipei became its provisional capital.

Shortly thereafter, President Truman, in a statement of January 5, 1950, referred to a U.N. General Assembly Resolution of December 8, 1949, (Res. 291(IV)) which called on all states to refrain from "(a) seeking to acquire spheres of influence or to create foreign controlled regimes within the territory of China; (b) seeking to obtain special rights or privileges within the territory of China". He said:

"A specific application of the foregoing principles is seen in the present situation with respect to Formosa …

"The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time… the United States Government will no pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China."

The Korean Conflict

The outbreak of hostilities in Korea on June 25, 1950 brought to the fore the question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores. President Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, and as a corollary called upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all operations against the mainland. In addition, he stated that "the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations".

On August 24, 1950 the United States explained its position to the United Nations Security Council in the following terms:

"The action of the United States was expressly to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the allied forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the Island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now."

By a letter dated September 20, 1950, the United States requested that the question of Formosa be placed on the agenda of the fifth session of the U.N. General Assembly. In an explanatory note of September 21, the United States, citing the Cairo and Potsdam declarations and the Japanese surrender, stated nevertheless:

"Formal transfer of Formosa to China was to await the conclusion of peace with Japan or some other appropriate formal act."

That note also stated:

"The Government of the United States has made it abundantly clear that the measures it has taken with respect to Formosa were without prejudice to the long-term political status of Formosa, and the United States has no territorial ambitions and seeks no special position of privilege with respect to Formosa. The United States believes further that the future of Formosa and of the nearly eight million people inhabited there should be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."

Japanese Peace Treaty

From September 4 to 8, 1951 a conference for the conclusion and signature of a Treaty of Peace was held at San Francisco. China was not represented at the Conference because of the disagreement among the participants as to who actually represented the government of that country. Reflecting this disagreement is article 2 of the Peace Treaty, which reads in its pertinent part:

"(b) Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores."

John Foster Dulles, U.S. delegate at the Conference, commented on this provision in article 2:

"Some Allied Powers suggested that article 2 should not merely delimit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam, but specify precisely the ultimate disposition of each of the ex-Japanese territories. This, admittedly, would have been neater. But it would have raised questions as to which there are now no agreed answers. We had either to give Japan peace on the Potsdam Surrender Terms or deny peace to Japan while the allies quarrel about what shall be done with what Japan is prepared, and required, to give up. Clearly, the wise course was to proceed now, so far as Japan is concerned, leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international solvents other than this treaty."

The delegate of the United Kingdom remarked:

"The treaty also provides for Japan to renounce its sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. The treaty itself does not determine the future of these islands."

The USSR refused to sign the Treaty. It objected, among other things, to the provision regarding Formosa and the Pescadores:

"…this draft grossly violates the indisputable rights of China to the return of integral parts of Chinese territory: Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Paracel and other islands…. The draft contains only a reference to the renunciation by Japan of its rights to these territories but intentionally omits any mention of the further fate of these territories."

It is clear from these and other statements made at San Francisco, that although the Treaty provision constituted an appropriate act of renunciation by Japan, the future status of Formosa and the Pescadores was not considered to have finally been determined by the Peace Treaty.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations also took this view. In its Report on the Treaty dated February 14, 1952, the Committee stated:

"It is important to remember that article 2 is a renunciatory article and makes no provision for the power or powers which are to succeed Japan in the possession of and sovereignty over the ceded territory.

"During the negotiation of the Treaty some of the Allied Powers expressed the view that article 2 of the treaty should not only relieve Japan of its sovereignty over the territories in question but should indicate specifically what disposition was to be made of each of them. The committee believes, however, that this would have complicated and prolonged the conclusion of the peace. Under the circumstances it seems far better to have the treaty enter into force now, leaving to the future the final disposition of such areas as South Sakhalin and the Kuriles."

Although China was not a party to the San Francisco Treaty, a separate Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan was signed in Taipei on April 28, 1952. Article II of that treaty provided:

"It is recognized that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco in the united States of America on September 8, 1951…, Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores)…."

Explaining this provision to the Legislative Yuan, Foreign Minister Yeh of the Republic of China stated that under the San Francisco Peace Treaty "no provision was made for the return [of these islands] to China." He continued:

"Inasmuch as these territories were originally owned by us and as they are now under our control and, furthermore, Japan has renounced in the Sino-Japanese peace treaty these territories under the San Francisco Treaty of Peace, they are, therefore, in fact restored to us."

At another point, Foreign Minister Yeh stated that "no provision has been made either in the San Francisco Treaty of Peace as to the future of Taiwan and Penghu". During the interpellations of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in the Legislative Yuan, the Foreign Minister was asked, "What is the status of Formosa and the Pescadores?" He replied:

"Formosa and the Pescadores were formerly Chinese territories. As Japan has renounced her claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, only China has the right to take them over. In fact, we are controlling them now, and undoubtedly they constitute a part of our territories. However, the delicate international situation makes it that they do not belong to us. Under present circumstances, Japan has no right to transfer Formosa an the Pescadores to us; nor can we accept such a transfer from Japan even if she so wishes… In the Sino-Japanese peace treaty, we have made provisions to signify that residents including juristic persons of Formosa and the Pescadores bear Chinese nationality, and this provision may serve to mend any future gaps when Formosa and the Pescadores are restored to us."

Chinese Mutual Defense Treaty

Against the background of a Chinese Communist propaganda campaign in July, 1954 for the "liberation" of Taiwan, supplemented in September, 1954 by military action against Quemoy and other offshore islands, the United States and the Republic of China signed a Mutual Defense Treaty on December 2, 1954. The first paragraph of Article V of the Treaty reads:

"Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

Article VI provides that for the purpose of Article V the term "territories" shall mean in respect to the Republic of China, "Taiwan and the Pescadores". In an exchange of notes accompanying the Treaty, there appears the statement, "The Republic of China effectively controls both the territory described in Article VI of the Treaty… and other territory".

In its report on the Treaty, the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations discussed the question of the true status of Formosa and the Pescadores:

"By the peace treaty of September 8, 1951, signed with the United States and other powers, Japan renounced 'all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.' The treaty did not specify the nation to which such right, title and claim passed. Although the Republic of China was not a signatory to the Treaty, it recognized that it did not dispose finally of Formosa and the Pescadores ….

"…he (Secretary Dulles) informed the committee that the reference in article V to 'the territories of either of the Parties' was language carefully chosen to avoid denoting anything one way or the other as to their sovereignty.

"It is the view of the committee that the coming in to force of the present treaty will not modify or affect the existing legal status of Formosa and the Pescadores. The treaty appears to be wholly consistent with all actions taken by the United States in this matter since the end of World War II, and does not introduce any basically new element in our relations with the territories in question. Both by act and by implication we have accepted the Nationalist Government as the lawful authority on Formosa."

To avoid any possibility of misunderstanding on this aspect of the treaty, the committee decided it would be useful to include in this report to following statement: "It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or sovereignty of the territories to which it applies."

In presenting the Committee's report to the Senate on February 9, 1955, Senator Walter George referred to the question of the legal status of Taiwan: "The view was advance during committee's consideration of the treaty that it may have the effect of recognizing that the government of Chiang Kai-shek has sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores."

On the one hand, reference was made to the Cairo Declaration which stated that Japan was to be stripped of her island territories in the Pacific and that territories stolen from the Chinese such as Formosa and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic of China. On the other hand, reference was made to the fact that while Japan renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, such title was not conveyed to any nation. After full exploration of this matter with Secretary Dulles, the committee decided that this treaty was not a competent instrument to resolve doubts about sovereignty over Formosa. It agreed to include in its report the following statement:

"It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the present treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or the sovereignty of the territories referred to in article VI.

In other words, so far as the United States in concerned, it is our understanding that the legal status of the territories referred to in article VI, namely, Formosa and the Pescadores – whatever their status may be – is not altered in any way by the conclusion of this treaty."

Quemoy and Matsu

It may be well to note the special status of the offshore islands, the Quemoy and Matsu groups, in contrast to that of Formosa and the Pescadores as described here. The offshore islands have always been considered as part of "China". As Secretary Dulles explained in 1954:

"The legal position is different..., by virtue of the fact that technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been settled. That is because the Japanese Peace Treaty merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to these islands. But the future title is not determined by the Japanese Peace Treaty nor is it determined by the Peace Treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and Japan. Therefore the juridical status of these islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, is different from the juridical status of the offshore islands which have always been Chinese territory."

Recent Restatement of the United States Position

The position of the United States was set forth by the States Department in connection with the 1970 Hearings before the Subcommittee on the United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (91st Cong., 2d Sess.):

"Legal Status of Taiwan as Defined in Japanese Peace Treaty and Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty

"Article 2 of the Japanese Peace treaty, signed on September 8, 1951 at San Francisco, provides that 'Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores'. The same language was used in Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace between China and Japan signed on April 28, 1952. In neither treaty did Japan cede this area to any particular entity. As Taiwan and the Pescadores are not covered by any existing international disposition, sovereignty over the area is an unsettled question subject to future international resolution. Both the Republic of China and the Chinese Communists disagree with this conclusion and consider that Taiwan and the Pescadores are part of the sovereign state of China. The United States recognized the Government of the Republic of Taiwan as legitimately occupying and exercising jurisdiction over Taiwan and the Pescadores."

The future relationship of Taiwan to mainland China and the resolution of disputes dividing the governments in Taipei and Peking involve issues that the United States cannot resolve. We have made clear that our primary concern is that these issues should be resolved by peaceful means, without resort to the use of force. Until such a resolution is achieved we may continue to deal respectively with the government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of China on matters affecting mutual interests, accepting the practical situation as we find it.

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UN Resolution 2758

Name in Chinese lianheguo jueyi erqiwuba hao 聯合國決議二七五八號
Document type Resolution by the United Nations
Year, date 1971, Oct. 25
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's notes  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

(Jump to UN Resolution 1668—1961)

United Nations

General Assembly—Twenty-sixth Session

2758 (XXVI). Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations

The General Assembly,

Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China is essential both for the protection of the Charter of the United Nations and for the cause that the United Nations must serve under the Charter,

Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council,

Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.

1976th plenary meeting,

25 October 1971.

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聯合國決議二七五八號

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

大會第二十六屆會

二七五八（二十六）．恢復中華人民共和國在聯合國的合法權利

大會，

回顧聯合國憲章的原則，

考慮到，恢復中華人民共和國的合法權利對於維護聯合國憲章和聯合國組織根據憲章所必須從事的事業都是必不可少的，

承認中華人民共和國政府的代表是中國在聯合國組織的唯一合法代表，中華人民共和國是安全理事會五個常任理事國之一，

決定：恢復中華人民共和國的一切權利，承認她的政府的代表為中國在聯合國組織的唯一合法代表並立即把蔣介石的代表從它在聯合國組織及其所屬一切機構中所非法佔據的席位上驅逐出去。

一九七一年十月二十五日，

第一九七六次全體會議。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTES ===============

According to records provided by the United Nations, voting summary was as follows: 76 Yes, 35 No, 17 Abstentions, 3 Non-voting. Total voting membership was 131. The following list shows the voting summary in detail, ROC diplomatic allies at the time being highlighted with a red asterisk (*).

Yes No Abstentions Non-voting
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Austria
Belgium *
Bhutan
Botswana *
Bulgaria
Burma
Burundi
Byelorussian SSR
Cameroon
Canada
Ceylon
Chile
Congo (Brazzaville)
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Democratic Yemen
Denmark
Ecuador *
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Ghana
Guinea
Guyana
Hungary
Iceland
India
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Kenya
Kuwait
Laos
Libyan Arab Republic * 
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mexico *
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Netherlands
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Peru *
Poland
Portugal *
Romania
Rwanda *
Senegal *
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Somalia
Sudan
Sweden
Syrian Arab Republic
Tanzania
Togo *
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
United Kingdom
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Zambia		 Australia *
Bolivia *
Brazil *
Central African Republic * 
Chad *
Congo (Leopoldville) *
Costa Rica *
Dahomey *
Dominican Republic *
El Salvador *
Gabon *
Gambia *
Guatemala *
Haiti *
Honduras *
Ivory Coast *
Japan *
Khmer Republic
Lesotho *
Liberia *
Madagascar *
Malawi *
Malta *
New Zealand *
Nicaragua *
Niger *
Paraguay *
Philippines *
Saudi Arabia *
South Africa
Swaziland *
United States *
Upper Volta *
Uruguay *
Venezuela *		 Argentina *
Bahrain
Barbados *
Colombia *
Cyprus *
Fiji
Greece *
Indonesia
Jamaica *
Jordan *
Lebanon *
Luxembourg * 
Mauritius
Panama *
Qatar
Spain *
Thailand *		 China
Maldives * 
Oman

On the day of the vote the ROC maintained diplomatic relations with 59 states, 56 of them UN members, but only 33 allies supported keeping the ROC on China's UN seat, 23 allies denying the ROC support in the vote by voting Yes, abstaining or not participating in the vote.

10 ROC diplomatic allies voted Yes (i. e. in favour of the PRC and against the ROC): Belgium, Botswana, Ecuador, Libya, Mexico, Peru, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, and Togo. All of them cut official ties with the ROC before the end of September 1978.

12 ROC diplomatic allies abstained: Argentina, Barbados, Colombia, Cyprus, Greece, Jamaica, Jordan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Panama, Spain, and Thailand. All of them (except Panama) cut official ties with the ROC before the end of February 1980; Panama did so on June 13, 2017.

The Maldives were an ROC diplomatic ally (until April 15, 1972) but are listed as non-voting.

Two UN members which did not maintain formal diplomatic relations with the ROC at the time but supported the ROC by voting No were the Khmer Republic (today's Cambodia) and South Africa.

The voting list did not include three additional ROC diplomatic allies—South Korea became a UN member on Sept. 17, 1991 (cut official ties with the ROC on Aug. 24, 1992); Vietnam joined the UN on Sept. 20, 1977 (South Vietnam cut official ties with the ROC on April 30, 1975); and the Vatican is not a UN member but an observer since April 6, 1964.

It should be pointed out that the text of the UN Resolution 2758 does not mention Taiwan at all, so it doesn't support Beijing's claim that Taiwan 'is part of the PRC'.

* * * SEE ALSO * * *

🔴 "Other texts and documents", UN Resolution 1668: Representation of China in the United Nations (1961)
🔴 "Foreign relations of the ROC", ROC representatives to the United Nations (UN)

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Shanghai Communiqué

Name in Chinese Zhonghua renmin gongheguo han Meilijian hezhongguo lianhe gongyue 中華人民共和國和美利堅合眾國聯合公報（《上海公報》）
Document type Joint statement by the leaderships of the US and the PRC
Year, date 1972, Feb. 28
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

(Jump to Normalization Communiqué—1979)    (Jump to 817 Communiqué—1982)

1. President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

2. President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tsetung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

3. During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

4. President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

5. The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

6. The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution—this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal: big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea". It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the Indo-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

7. The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to reexamine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Viet Nam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favours the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

8. There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

9. With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

  • progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
  • both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
  • neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
  • neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

10. Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

11. The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined".

12. The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

13. Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

14. The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

15. The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

16. President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

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中華人民共和國和美利堅合眾國聯合公報（《上海公報》）

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

（1972 年 2 月 28 日）

1. 應中華人民共和國總理周恩來的邀請，美利堅合眾國總統理查德.尼克松自一九七二年 二月二十一日至二月二十八日訪問了中華人民共和國。陪同總統的有尼克松夫人、美國國務卿威廉.羅杰斯、總統助理亨利.基辛格博適和其他美國官員。

2. 尼克松總統于二月二十一日會見了中國共產黨主席毛澤東。兩位領導人就中美關係和國際事務認真、坦率地交換了意見。

3. 訪問中，尼克松總統和周恩來總理就美利堅合眾國和中華人民共和國關係正常化以及 雙方關心的其他問題進行了廣泛、認真和坦率的討論。此外，國務卿威廉.羅杰斯和外 交部長姬鵬飛也以同樣精神進行了會談。

4. 尼克松總統及其一行訪問了北京，參觀了文化、工業和衣業項目，還訪問了杭州和 上海，在那裡繼續同中國領導人進行討論，並參觀了類似的項目。

5. 中華人民共和國和美利堅合眾國領導人經過這麼多年一直沒有接觸之後，現在有機會 坦率地互相介紹彼此對各種問題的觀點，對此，雙方認為是有益的。他們回顧了經歷著重大變化和巨大動盪的國際形勢，闡明了各自的立場和態度。

6. 中國方面聲明：那裡有壓迫，那裡就有反抗。國家要獨立，民族要解放，人民要革命， 已成為不可抗拒的歷史潮流。國家不分大小，應該一律平等，大國不應欺負小國，強國 不應欺負弱國。中國決不做超級大國，並且反對任何霸權主權和強權政治。中國方面表示：堅決支持一切被壓迫人民和被壓迫民族除爭取自由、解放的鬥爭，各國人民有權按 照自已的意願，選擇本國的社會制度，有權維護本國獨立、主權和領土完整，反對外來 侵略、干涉、控制和顛覆。一切外國軍隊都應撤回本國去。中國方面表示：堅決支持 越南、查莫、柬埔寨三國人民為實現自己的目標所作的努力，堅決支持越南南方共和臨時革命政府的七點建議以及在今年二月對其中兩個關鍵問題的說明和印度支那人民最高級會議聯合聲明；堅決支持朝鮮民主主義人民共和國政府一九七一年四月十二日 提出的朝鮮和平統一的八點方案和取消"聯合國韓國統一復興委員會"的主張；堅決反對日本軍國主義的復活和對外擴張，堅決支持日本人民要求建立一個獨立、民主、 和平和中立的日本的願望；堅決主張印度和巴基斯坦按照聯合國關於印巴問題的決議，立即把自己的軍隊全部撤回到本國境內以及查莫和克什米爾停火線的各自一方，堅決 支持巴基斯坦政府和人民維護獨立、主權的鬥爭以及查莫和克什米爾人民爭取自決權的鬥爭。

7. 美國方面聲明：為了亞洲和世界的和平，需要對緩和當前的緊張局勢和消除衝突的基本 原因作出努力。美國將致力於建立公正而穩定的和平。這種和平是公正的，因為它滿足 各國人民和各國爭取自由和進步的願望。這種和平是穩定的，因為它消除外來侵略的 危險。美國支持全世界各國人民在沒有外來壓力和干預的情況下取得個人自由和社會 進步。美國相信，改善具有不同意勢形態的國與國之間的聯繫，以便減少由於事故、 錯誤估計或誤會而引起的對峙的危險，有助於緩和緊張局勢的努力。各國應該互相尊重 並願進行和平競賽，讓行動作出最後判斷。任何國家都不應自稱一慣正確，各國都要 準備為了共同的利益重新檢查自己的態度。美國強調：應該允許印度支那各國人民在 不受外來干涉的情況下決定自己的命運；美國一慣的首要目標是談判解決。越南共和國 和美國在一九七二年一月二十七日提出的八點建議提供了實現這個目標的基礎；在談判得不到解決時，美國預計在符合印度支那每個國家自決這一目標的情況下以這個地區 最終撤出所有美國軍隊。美國將保持其與大韓民國的密切聯繫和對它的支持；美國將 支持大韓民國為謀求在朝鮮半島緩和緊張局勢和增加聯繫的努力。美國最高度地珍視同 日本的友好關係，並將繼續發展現存的緊密紐帶。按照一九七一年十二月廿一日聯合國 安全理事會的決議，美國贊成印度和巴基斯坦之間的停火繼續下去，並把全部軍事力量 撤至本國境內以及查漠和克什米爾停火線的各自一方；美國支持南亞各國人民和平地、 不受軍事威脅地建設自己的未來的權力，而不使這個地區成為大國競爭的目標。

8. 中美兩國的社會制度和對外政策有著本質的區別。但是，雙方同意，各國不論社會制度 如何，都應根據尊重各國主權和領土完整、不侵犯別國、不干涉別國內政、平等互利、 和平共處的原則來處理國與國之間的關係。國際爭端因在此基礎上予以解決，而不訴諸 武力和武力威脅。美國和中華人民共和國準備在它們的相互關係中實行這些原則 。

9. 考慮到國際關係的上述這些原則，雙方聲明：

── 中美兩國關係走向正常化是符合所有國家的利益的；

── 雙方都希望減少國際軍事衝突的危險；

── 任何一方都不應該在亞洲－太平洋地區謀求霸權，每一方都反對任何其他國家或國家集團建立這種霸權的努力；

── 任何一方都不准備代表任何第三方進行談判，也不准備同對方達成針對其他國家的協定或諒解。

10. 雙方都認為，任何大國與另一大國進行勾結反對其他國家，或者大國在世界上劃分利益範圍，那都是違背世界各國人民利益的。

11. 雙方回顧了中美兩國之間長期存在的嚴重爭端。中國方面重申自己的立場；台灣問題是 阻礙中美兩國關係正常化的關鍵問題；中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府； 台灣是中國的一個省，早已歸還祖國；解放台灣是中國內政，別國無權干涉；全部美國武裝力量和軍事設施必須從台灣撤走。中國政府堅決反對任何旨在製造"一中一台"，"一個中國、兩個政府"、"兩個中國"、"台灣獨立"和鼓吹"台灣地位未定"的 活動。

12. 美國方面聲明：美國認識到，在台灣海峽兩邊的所有中國人都認為只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部份。美國政府對這一立場不提出異議。它重申它對由中國人自己和平解決台灣問題的關心。考慮到這一前景，它確認從台灣撤出全部美國武裝力量和軍事設施的最終目標。在此期間，它將隨著這個地區緊張局勢的緩和逐步減少它在台灣的武裝力量 和軍事設施。雙方同意，擴大兩國人民之間的瞭解是可取的。為此目的，它們就科學、技術、文化、 體育和新聞等方面的具體領域進行了討論。在這些領域中進行人民之間的聯繫和交流將會是互相有利的。雙方各自承諾對進一步發展這種聯繫和交流提供便利。

13. 雙方把雙邊貿易看作是另一個可以帶來互利的領域，並一致認為平等互利的經濟關係 是符合兩國人民的利益的。它們同意為逐步發展兩國間的貿易提供便利。

14. 雙方同意，它們將通過不同渠道保持接觸，包括不定期地派遣美國高級代表前來北京， 就促進兩國關係正常化進行具體磋商並繼續就共同關心的問題交換意見。

15. 雙方希望，這次訪問的成果將為兩國關係開闢新的前景。雙方相信，兩國關係正常化 不僅符合中美兩國人民的利益，而且會對緩合亞洲及世界緊張局勢作出貢獻。

16. 尼克松總統、尼克松夫人及美方一行對中華人民共和國政府和人民給予他們有禮貌的款待，表示感謝 。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the PRC

Name in Chinese Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu han Ribenguo zhengfu lianhe shengming (Zhong Ri lianhe shengming) 中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府聯合聲明（《中日聯合聲明》）
Document type Joint statement by the leaderships of Japan and the PRC
Year, date 1972, Sept. 29
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

September 29, 1972

Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier of the State Council Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from September 25 to September 30, 1972. Accompanying Prime Minister Tanaka were Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ohira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido and other government officials.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung met Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on September 27. They had an earnest and friendly conversation.

Prime Minister Tanaka and Minister for Foreign Affairs Ohira had an earnest and frank exchange of views with Premier Chou En-lai and Minister for Foreign Affairs Chi Peng-fei in a friendly atmosphere throughout on the question of the normalization of relations between Japan and China and other problems between the two countries as well as on other matters of interest to both sides, and agreed to issue the following Joint Communique of the two Governments:

Japan and China are neighbouring countries, separated only by a strip of water with a long history of traditional friendship. The peoples of the two countries earnestly desire to put an end to the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The realization of the aspiration of the two peoples for the termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between Japan and China will add a new page to the annals of relations between the two countries.

The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself. Further, the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations between the two countries from the stand of fully understanding "the three principles for the restoration of relations" put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.

In spite of the differences in their social systems existing between the two countries, the two countries should, and can, establish relations of peace and friendship. The normalization of relations and development of good-neighbourly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the interests of the two peoples and will contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and peace in the world.

1. The abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of China is terminated on the date on which this Joint Communique is issued.

2. The Government of Japan recognizes that Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.

3. The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Postsdam Proclamation.

4. The Government of Japan and the Government of People's Republic of China have decided to establish diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to take all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of the functions of each other's embassy in their respective capitals in accordance with international law and practice, and to exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.

5. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.

6. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to establish relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

The two Governments confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Japan and China shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.

7. The normalization of relations between Japan and China is not directed against any third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

8. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, the two Governments will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace and friendship.

9. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to further promoting relations between the two countries and to expanding interchanges of people, the two Governments will, as necessary and taking account of the existing non-governmental arrangements, enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding agreements concerning such matters as trade, shipping, aviation, and fisheries.

Done at Peking, September 29, 1972

Prime Minister of Japan, Tanaka Kakuei

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Ohira Masayoshi

Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Zhou Enlai

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Ji Pengfei

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中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府聯合聲明（《中日聯合聲明》）

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

（1972 年 9 月 29 日）

日本國內閣總理大臣田中角榮應中華人民共和國國務院總理周恩來的邀請，於一九七二年九月二十五日至九月三十日訪問了中華人民共和國。陪同田中角榮總理大臣的有大平正芳外務大臣、二階堂進內閣官房長官以及其他政府官員。

毛澤東主席于九月二十七日會見了田中角榮總理大臣。雙方進行了認真、友好的談話。 周恩來總理、姬鵬飛外交部長和田中角榮總理大臣、大平正芳外務大臣，始終在友好氣氛中，以中日兩國邦交正常化問題為中心，就兩國間的各項問題，以及雙方關心的其他問題，認真、坦率地交換了意見，同意發表兩國政府的下述聯合聲明：

中日兩國是一衣帶水的鄰邦，有著悠久的傳統友好的歷史。兩國人民切望結束迄今存在於兩國間的不正常狀態。戰爭狀態的結束，中日邦交的正常化，兩國人民這種願望的實現，將揭開兩國關係史上新的一頁。

日本方面痛感日本國過去由於戰爭給中國人民造成的重大損害的責任，表示深刻的反省。日本方面重申站在充分理解中華人民共和國政府提出的"複交三原則"的立場上，謀求實現日中邦交正化這一見解。中國方面對此表示歡迎。

中日兩國儘管社會制度不同，應該而且可以建立和平友好關係。兩國邦交正常化，發展兩國的睦鄰友好關係，是符合兩國人民利益的，也是對緩和亞洲緊張局勢和維護世界和平的貢獻。

（一）自本聲明公佈之日起，中華人民共和國和日本國之間迄今為止的不正常狀態宣告結束。

（二）日本國政府承認中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府。

（三）中華人民共和國政府重申：臺灣是中華人民共和國領土不可分割的一部分。日本國政府充分理解和尊重中國政府的這一立場，並堅持遵循波茨坦公告第八條的立場。

（四）中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府決定自一九七二年九月二十九日起建立外交關係。兩國政府決定，按照國際法和國際慣例，在各自的首都為對方大使館的建立和履行職務採取一切必要的措施，並儘快互換大使。

（五）中華人民共和國政府宣佈：為了中日兩國人民的友好，放棄對日本國的戰爭賠償要求。

（六）中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府同意在互相尊重主權和領土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉內政、平等互利、和平共處各項原則的基礎上，建立兩國間持久的和平友好關係。 根據上述原則和聯合國憲章的原則，兩國政府確認，在相互關係中，用和平手段解決一切爭端，而不訴諸武力和武力威脅。

（七）中日邦交正常化，不是針對第三國的。兩國任何一方都不應在亞洲和太平洋地區謀求霸權，每一方都反對任何其他國家或集團建立這種霸權的努力。

（八）中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府為了鞏固和發展兩國間的和平友好關係，同意進行以締結和平友好條約為目的的談判。

（九）中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府為進一步發展兩國間的關係和擴大人員往來，根據需要並考慮到已有的民間協定，同意進行以締結貿易、航海、航空、漁業等協定為目的的談判。

日本國內閣總理大臣 田中 角榮（簽字）

日本國外務大臣 大平 正芳（簽字）

中華人民共和國國務院總理 周恩來（簽字）

中華人民共和國外交部長 姬鵬飛（簽字）

一九七二年九月二十九日於北京

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

In Japanese, the "Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the PRC" is called as follows: Nippon koku seifuto Chūgoku jimmin kyōwakoku seifuno kyōdō seimei 日本国政府と中華人民共和国政府の共同声明.

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the PRC

Name in Chinese Zhonghua renmin gongheguo han Ribenguo heping youhao tiaoyue 中華人民共和國和日本國和平友好條約（《中日和平友好條約》）
Document type Bilateral peace treaty between the PRC and Japan
Year, date 1978, Aug. 12
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

Japan and the People's Republic of China,

Recalling with satisfaction that since the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China issued a Joint Communique in Peking on September 29, 1972, the friendly relations between the two Governments and the peoples of the two countries have developed greatly on a new basis.

Confirming that the above-mentioned Joint Communique constitutes the basis of the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries and that the principles enunciated in the Joint Communique should be strictly observed.

Confirming that the principles of the Charter of the United Nations should be fully respected.

Hoping to contribute to peace and stability in Asia and in the world.

For the purpose of solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries.

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace and Friendship and for that purpose have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

● Japan: Minister for Foreign Affairs Sunao Sonoda

● People's Republic of China: Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1 1. The Contracting Parties shall develop relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.
2. The Contracting Parties confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, they shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.
Article 2 The Contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
Article 3 The Contracting parties shall, in the good-neighbourly and friendly spirit and in conformity with the principles of equality and mutual benefit and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, endeavor to further develop economic and cultural relations between the two countries and to promote exchanges between the peoples of the two countries.
Article 4 The present Treaty shall not affect the position of either Contracting Party regarding its relations with third countries.
Article 5 1. The present Treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification which shall take place at Tokyo. The present Treaty shall remain in force for ten years and thereafter shall continue to be in force until terminated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2.
2. Either Contracting Party may, by giving one year's written notice to the other Contracting Party, terminate the present Treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE in duplicate, in the Japanese and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic, at Peking, this twelfth day of August, 1978.

For the People's Republic of China: Huang Hua (signature)

For Japan: Sunao Sonoda (signature)

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中華人民共和國和日本國和平友好條約（《中日和平友好條約》）

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

（1978 年 8 月 12 日）

1972年中日邦交正常化後，雙方在政治、經濟等方面的交流發展很快。在此背景下，兩國要求儘早展開和平友好條約談判的呼聲日益高漲。1975 年 1 月，中日兩國進行了預備性談判，並達成兩點共識。但是，由於雙方在某些特定問題上始終無法達成一致，談判一度擱淺。

隨著國際局勢和中日兩國國內形勢的變化，締約談判出現轉機。1978 年 7 月，中斷了兩年多的中日締約談判在北京重新舉行。經歷多輪艱苦談判後，中國外交部長黃華與日本外相園田直 8 月 12 日在北京正式簽訂《中日和平友好條約》。10 月 23 日，中國國務院副總理鄧小平訪問日本期間，兩國互換《中日和平友好條約》批准書，條約正式生效。

中華人民共和國和日本國滿意地回顧了自一九七二年九月二十九日中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府在北京發表聯合聲明以來，兩國政府和兩國人民之間的友好關係在新的基礎上獲得很大的發展；確認上述聯合聲明是兩國間和平友好關係的基礎，聯合聲明所表明的各項原則應予嚴格遵守；確認聯合國憲章的原則應予充分尊重；希望對亞洲和世界的和平與安定作出貢獻；為了鞏固和發展兩國間的和平友好關係；決定締結和平友好條約，為此各自委派全權代表如下：

中華人民共和國委派外交部長 黃華；

日本國委派外務大臣 園田 直。

雙方全權代表互相校閱全權證書，認為妥善後，達成協議如下：

第一條 一、締約雙方應在互相尊重主權和領土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉內政、平等互利、和平共處各項原則的基礎上，發展兩國間持久的和平友好關係。
二、根據上述各項原則和聯合國憲章的原則，締約雙方確認，在相互關係中，用和平手段解決一切爭端，而不訴諸武力和武力威脅。
第二條 締約雙方表明：任何一方都不應在亞洲和太平洋地區或其他任何地區謀求霸權，並反對任何其他國家或國家集團建立這種霸權的努力。
第三條 締約雙方將本著睦鄰友好的精神，按照平等互利和互不干涉內政的原則，為進一步發展兩國之間的經濟關係和文化關係，促進兩國人民的往來而努力。
第四條 本條約不影響締約各方同第三國關係的立場。
第五條 一、本條約須經批准，自在東京交換批准書之日起生效。本條約有效期為十年。十年以後，在根據本條第二款的規定宣佈終止以前，將繼續有效。
二、締約任何一方在最初十年期滿時或在其後的任何時候，可以在一年以前，以書面預先通知締約另一方，終止本條約。

雙方全權代表在本條約上簽字蓋章，以昭信守。

本條約於一九七八年八月十二日在北京簽訂，共兩份，每份都用中文和日文寫成，兩種文本具有同等效力。

中華人民共和國全權代表　黃華（簽字）

日本國全權代表　園田 直（簽字）

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

In Japanese, the "Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the PRC" is called as follows: Nippon kokuto Chūgoku jimmin kyōwakoku tono aidano heiwa yūkō jōyaku 日本国と中華人民共和国との間の平和友好条約.

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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Joint Communiqué of the US and the PRC (Normalization Communiqué)

Name in Chinese Meiguo Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jianli waijiao guanxide lianhe gongbao (guanxi zhengchanghua gongbao) 美國──中華人民共和國建立外交關係的聯合公報（《關係正常化公報》）
Document type Joint statement of the US and the PRC
Year, date 1979, Jan. 1
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

(Jump to Shanghai Communiqué—1972)    (Jump to 817 Communiqué—1982)

January 1, 1979

(The communiqué was released on December 15, 1978, in Washington and Beijing.)

1. The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.

2. The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

3. The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué and emphasize once again that:

4. Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.

5. Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

6. Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

7. The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

8. Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange Ambassadors and establish Embassies on March 1, 1979.

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美國──中華人民共和國建立外交關係的聯合公報（《關係正常化公報》）

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

一九七九年一月一日

1. 中華人民共合國和美利堅合眾國商定自一九七九年一月一日起互相承認並建立外交關係。

2. 美利堅合眾國承認中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府。在此範圍內，美國人民將同台灣人民保持文化、商務和其他非官方關係。

3. 中華人民共和國和美利堅合眾國重申上海公報中雙方一致同意的各項原則，並再次強調。

4. 雙方都希望減少國際軍事衝突的危險。

5. 任何一方都不應該在亞洲-太平洋地區以及世界上任何地區謀求霸權，每一方都反對 任何其他國家或國家集團建立這種霸權的努力。

6. 任何一方都不準備代表任何第三方進行談判，也不準備同對方達成針對其他國家的 協議或諒解。

7. 美利堅合眾國政府承認中國的立場，即只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部份。

8. 雙方認為，中美關係正常化不僅符合中國人民和美國人民的利益，而且有助於亞洲 和世界的和平事實。

中華人民共和國和美利堅合眾國將於一九七九年三月一日互派大使並建立大使館。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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Message to Compatriots in Taiwan

Name in Chinese gao Taiwan tongbaoshu 告台灣同胞書
Document type Propaganda pamphlet by PRC leadership
Year, date 1979, Jan. 1
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

January 1, 1979

(The Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress at its Fifth Plenary Session on December 26, 1978 adopted after discussion a message to compatriots in Taiwan.)

Dear Compatriots in Taiwan:

Today is New Year's Day 1979. We hereby extend our cordial and sincere greetings to you on behalf of the people of all nationalities on the mainland of our motherland.

As an old saying goes, "When festival times come round people think all the more of their loved ones." On this happy occasion as we celebrate New Year's Day, our thoughts turn all the more to our kith and kin, our old folks, our brothers and sisters, in Taiwan. We know you have the motherland and your kinsfolk on the mainland in mind too. This mutual feeling of many years standing grows with each passing day. From the day when Taiwan was unfortunately separated from the motherland in 1949, we have not been able to communicate with or visit each other, our motherland has not been able to achieve reunification, relatives have been unable to get together, and our nation, country and people have suffered greatly as a result. All Chinese compatriots and people of Chinese descent throughout the world look forward to an early end to this regrettable state of affairs.

The Chinese nation is a great nation. It accounts for almost a quarter of the world's population and has a long history and brilliant culture, and its outstanding contributions to world civilization and human progress are universally recognized. Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times. The Chinese nation has great vitality and cohesion. Throughout its history, foreign invasions and internal strife have failed to split our nation permanently. Taiwan's separation from the motherland for nearly 30 years has been artificial and against our national interests and aspirations, and this state of affairs must not be allowed to continue. Every Chinese, in Taiwan or on the mainland, has a compelling responsibility for the survival, growth and prosperity of the Chinese nation. The important task of reunifying our motherland, on which hinges the future of the whole nation, now lies before us all; it is an issue no one can evade or should try to. If we do not quickly set about ending this disunity so that our motherland is reunified at an early date, how can we answer our ancestors and explain to our descendants? This sentiment is shared by all. Who among the descendants of the Yellow Emperor wishes to go down in history as a traitor?

Radical changes have taken place in China's status in the world over the past 30 years. Our country's international prestige is rising constantly and its international role becomes ever more important. The people and governments of almost all countries place tremendous hopes on us in the struggle against hegemonism and in safeguarding peace and stability in Asia and the world as a whole. Every Chinese is proud to see the growing strength and prosperity of our motherland. If we can end the present disunity and join forces soon, there will be no end to our contributions to the future of mankind. Early reunification of our motherland is not only the common desire of all the people of China, including our compatriots in Taiwan, but the common wish of all peace-loving peoples and countries the world over.

Reunification of China today is consonant with popular sentiment and the general trend of development. The world in general recognizes only one China, with the government of the People's Republic of China as its sole legal government. The recent conclusion of the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the normalization of relations between China and the United States show still more clearly that no one can stop this trend. The present situation in the motherland, one of stability and unity, is better than ever. The people of all nationalities on the mainland are working hard with one will for the great goal of the four modernizations. It is our fervent hope that Taiwan returns to the embrace of the motherland at an early date so that we can work together for the great cause of national development. Our state leaders have firmly declared that they will take present realities into account in accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the motherland and respect the status quo on Taiwan and the opinions of people in all walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures in settling the question of reunification so as not to cause the people of Taiwan any losses. On the other hand, people in all walks of life in Taiwan have expressed their yearning for their homeland and old friends, stated their desire "to identify themselves with and rejoin their kinsmen," and raised diverse proposals which are expressions of their earnest hope for an early return to the embrace of the motherland. As all conditions now are favourable for reunification and everything is set, no one should go against the will of the nation and against the trend of history.

We place hopes on the 17 million people on Taiwan and also the Taiwan authorities. The Taiwan authorities have always taken a firm stand of one China and have been opposed to an independent Taiwan. We have this stand in common and it is the basis for our co-operation. Our position has always been that all patriots belong to one family. The responsibility for reunifying the motherland rests with each of us. We hope the Taiwan authorities will treasure national interests and make valuable contributions to the reunification of the motherland.

The Chinese government has ordered the People's Liberation Army to stop the bombardment of Jinmen (Quemoy) and other islands as from today. A state of military confrontation between the two sides still exists along the Taiwan Straits. This can only breed man-made tension. We hold that first of all this military confrontation should be ended through discussion between the government of the People's Republic of China and the Taiwan authorities so as to create the necessary prerequisites and a secure environment for the two sides to make contacts and exchanges in whatever area.

The prolonged separation has led to inadequate mutual understanding between the compatriots on the mainland and on Taiwan and various inconveniences for both sides. Since overseas Chinese residing in faraway foreign lands can return for visits and tours and hold reunions with their families, why can't compatriots living so near, on the mainland and on Taiwan, visit each other freely? We hold that there is no reason for such barriers to remain. We hope that at an early date transportation and postal services between both sides will be established to make it easier for compatriots of both sides to have direct contact, write to each other, visit relatives and friends, exchange tours and visits and carry out academic, cultural, sports and technological interchanges.

Economically speaking, Taiwan and the mainland of the motherland were originally one entity. Unfortunately, economic ties have been suspended for many years. Construction is going ahead vigorously on the motherland and it is our wish that Taiwan also grows economically more prosperous. There is every reason for us to develop trade between us, each making up what the other lacks, and carry out economic exchanges. This is mutually required and will benefit both parties without doing any harm to either.

Dear compatriots in Taiwan,

The bright future of our great motherland belongs to us and to you. The reunification of the motherland is the sacred mission history has handed to our generation. Times are moving ahead and the situation is developing. The earlier we fulfil this mission, the sooner we can jointly write an unprecedented, brilliant page in the history for our country, catch up with advanced powers and work together with them for world peace, prosperity and progress. Let us join hands and work together for this glorious goal!

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告台灣同胞書

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

中華人民共和國全國人大常委會告台灣同胞書

（一九七九年一月一日，第五屆全國人民代表大會常務委員會於一九七八年十二月二十六日舉行第五次會議討論通過）

親愛的台灣同胞：

今天是一九七九年元旦。我們代表祖國大陸的各族人民，向諸位同胞致以親切的問候和衷心的祝賀。

昔人有言："每逢佳節倍思親"。在這歡度新年的時刻，我們更加想念自己的親骨肉——台灣的父老兄弟姐妹。我們知道，你們也無限懷念祖國和大陸上的親人。這種綿延了多少歲月的相互思念之情與日俱增。自從一九四九年台灣同祖國不幸分離以來，我們之間音訊不通，來往斷絕，祖國不能統一，親人無從團聚，民族、國家和人民都受到了巨大的損失。所有中國同胞以及全球華裔，無不盼望早日結束這種令人痛心的局面。

我們中華民族是偉大的民族，占世界人口近四分之一，享有悠久的歷史和優秀的文化，對世界文明和人類發展的卓越貢獻，舉世共認。台灣自古就是中國不可分割的一部分。中華民族是具有強大的生命力和凝聚力的。儘管歷史上有過多少次外族入侵和內部紛爭，都不曾使我們的民族陷於長久分裂。近三十年台灣同祖國的分離，是人為的，是違反我們民族的利益和願望的，決不能再這樣下去了。每一個中國人，不論是生活在台灣的還是生活在大陸上的，都對中華民族的生存、發展和繁榮負有不容推諉的責任。統一祖國這樣一個關係全民族前途的重大任務，現在擺在我們大家的面前，誰也不能回避，誰也不應回避。如果我們還不儘快結束目前這種分裂局面，早日實現祖國的統一，我們何以告慰于列祖列宗？何以自解於子孫後代？人同此心，心同此理，凡屬黃帝子孫，誰願成為民族的千古罪人？

近三十年來，中國在世界上的地位已發生根本變化。我國國際地位越來越高，國際作用越來越重要。各國人民和政府為了反對霸權主義、維護亞洲和世界的和平穩定，幾乎莫不對我們寄予極大期望。每一個中國人都為祖國的日見強盛而感到自豪。我們如果儘快結束目前的分裂局面，把力量合到一起，則所能貢獻於人類前途者，自更不可限量。早日實現祖國統一，不僅是全中國人民包括台灣同胞的共同心願，也是全世界一切愛好和平的人民和國家的共同希望。

今天，實現中國的統一，是人心所向，大勢所趨。世界上普遍承認只有一個中國，承認中華人民共和國政府是中國唯一合法的政府。最近中日和平友好條約的簽定，和中美兩國關係正常化的實現，更可見潮流所至，實非任何人所得而阻止。目前祖國安定團結，形勢比以往任何時候都好。在大陸上的各族人民，正在為實現四個現代化的偉大目標而同心戮力。我們殷切期望台灣早日歸回祖國，共同發展建國大業。我們的國家領導人已經表示決心，一定要考慮現實情況，完成祖國統一大業，在解決統一問題時尊重台灣現狀和台灣各界人士的意見，採取合情合理的政策和辦法，不使台灣人民蒙受損失。台灣各界人士也紛紛抒發懷鄉思舊之情，訴述"認同回歸"之願，提出種種建議，熱烈盼望早日回到祖國的懷抱。時至今日，種種條件都對統一有利，可謂萬事俱備，任何人都不應當拂逆民族的意志，違背歷史的潮流。

我們寄希望於一千七百萬台灣人民，也寄希望於台灣當局。台灣當局一貫堅持一個中國的立場，反對台灣獨立。這就是我們共同的立場，合作的基礎。我們一貫主張愛國一家。統一祖國，人人有責。希望台灣當局以民族利益為重，對實現祖國統一的事業作出寶貴的貢獻。

中國政府已經命令人民解放軍從今天起停止對金門等島嶼的炮擊。台灣海峽目前仍然存在著雙方的軍事對峙，這只能製造人為的緊張。我們認為，首先應當通過中華人民共和國政府和台灣當局之間的商談結束這種軍事對峙狀態，以便為雙方的任何一種範圍的交往接觸創造必要的前提和安全的環境。

由於長期隔絕，大陸和台灣的同胞互不瞭解，對於雙方造成各種不便。遠居海外的許多僑胞都能回國觀光，與家人團聚。為什麼近在咫尺的大陸和台灣的同胞卻不能自由來往呢？我們認為這種藩籬沒有理由繼續存在。我們希望雙方儘快實現通航通郵，以利雙方同胞直接接觸，互通訊息，探親訪友，旅遊參觀，進行學術文化體育工藝觀摩。

台灣和祖國大陸，在經濟上本來是一個整體。這些年來，經濟聯繫不幸中斷。現在，祖國的建設正在蓬勃發展，我們也希望台灣的經濟日趨繁榮。我們相互之間完全應當發展貿易，互通有無，進行經濟交流。這是相互的需要，對任何一方都有利而無害。

親愛的台灣同胞：

我們偉大祖國的美好前途，既屬於我們，也屬於你們。統一祖國，是歷史賦於我們這一代人的神聖使命。時代在前進，形勢在發展。我們早一天完成這一使命，就可以早一天共同創造我國空前未有的光輝燦爛的歷史，而與各先進強國並駕齊驅，共謀世界的和平、繁榮和進步。讓我們攜起手來，為這一光榮目標共同奮鬥！

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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Taiwan Relations Act

Name in Chinese Taiwan guanxifa 台灣關係法
Document type US law
Year, dates 1979, April 10 (approved); 1979, Jan. 1 (effective)
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

Public Law 96-8 96th Congress

An Act:

To help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

Section 1.

This Act may be cited as the "Taiwan Relations Act".

FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF POLICY

Section 2.

(a) The President—having terminated governmental relations between the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, the Congress finds that the enactment of this Act is necessary—

(1) to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; and

(2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan.

(b) It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area;

(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;

(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;

(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;

(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and

(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

(c) Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the United States in human rights, especially with respect to the human rights of all the approximately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.

IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY WITH REGARD TO TAIWAN

Section 3.

(a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

(b) The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.

(c) The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.

APPLICATION OF LAWS; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Section 4.

(a) The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect the application of the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan, and the laws of the United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979.

(b) The application of subsection (a) of this section shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

(1) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with such respect to Taiwan.

(2) Whenever authorized by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to conduct or carry out programs, transactions, or other relations with respect to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized to conduct and carry out, in accordance with section 6 of this Act, such programs, transactions, and other relations with respect to Taiwan (including, but not limited to, the performance of services for the United States through contracts with commercial entities on Taiwan), in accordance with the applicable laws of the United States.

(3) (A) The absence of diplomatic relations and recognition with respect to Taiwan shall not abrogate, infringe, modify, deny, or otherwise affect in any way any rights or obligations (including but not limited to those involving contracts, debts, or property interests of any kind) under the laws of the United States heretofore or hereafter acquired by or with respect to Taiwan.

(B) For all purposes under the laws of the United States, including actions in any court in the United States, recognition of the People's Republic of China shall not affect in any way the ownership of or other rights or interests in properties, tangible and intangible, and other things of value, owned or held on or prior to December 31, 1978, or thereafter acquired or earned by the governing authorities on Taiwan.

(4) Whenever the application of the laws of the United States depends upon the law that is or was applicable on Taiwan or compliance therewith, the law applied by the people on Taiwan shall be considered the applicable law for that purpose.

(5) Nothing in this Act, nor the facts of the President's action in extending diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, the absence of diplomatic relations between the people on Taiwan and the United States, or the lack of recognition by the United States, and attendant circumstances thereto, shall be construed in any administrative or judicial proceeding as a basis for any United States Government agency, commission, or department to make a finding of fact or determination of law, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, to deny an export license application or to revoke an existing export license for nuclear exports to Taiwan.

(6) For purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Taiwan may be treated in the manner specified in the first sentence of section 202(b) of that Act.

(7) The capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued in courts in the United States, in accordance with the laws of the United States, shall not be abrogated, infringed, modified, denied, or otherwise affected in any way by the absence of diplomatic relations or recognition.

(8) No requirement, whether expressed or implied, under the laws of the United States with respect to maintenance of diplomatic relations or recognition shall be applicable with respect to Taiwan.

(c) For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United States, the Congress approves the continuation in force of all treaties and other international agreements, including multilateral conventions, entered into by the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and in force between them on December 31, 1978, unless and until terminated in accordance with law.

(d) Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization.

OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION

Section 5.

(a) During the three-year period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, the $1,000 per capita income restriction in insurance, clause (2) of the second undesignated paragraph of section 231 of the reinsurance, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall not restrict the activities of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in determining whether to provide any insurance, reinsurance, loans, or guaranties with respect to investment projects on Taiwan.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, in issuing insurance, reinsurance, loans, or guaranties with respect to investment projects on Taiwan, the Overseas Private Insurance Corporation shall apply the same criteria as those applicable in other parts of the world.

THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF TAIWAN

Section 6.

(a) Programs, transactions, and other relations conducted or carried out by the President or any agency of the United States Government with respect to Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be conducted and carried out by or through—

(1) The American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia, or

(2) such comparable successor nongovernmental entity as the President may designate, (hereafter in this Act referred to as the "Institute").

(b) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to enter into, perform, enforce, or have in force an agreement or transaction relative to Taiwan, such agreement or transaction shall be entered into, performed, and enforced, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, by or through the Institute.

(c) To the extent that any law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the District of Columbia, or of any State or political subdivision thereof in which the Institute is incorporated or doing business, impedes or otherwise interferes with the performance of the functions of the Institute pursuant to this Act; such law, rule, regulation, or ordinance shall be deemed to be preempted by this Act.

SERVICES BY THE INSTITUTE TO UNITED STATES CITIZENS ON TAIWAN

Section 7.

(a) The Institute may authorize any of its employees on Taiwan—

(1) to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, affidavit, or deposition, and to perform any notarial act which any notary public is required or authorized by law to perform within the United States;

(2) To act as provisional conservator of the personal estates of deceased United States citizens; and

(3) to assist and protect the interests of United States persons by performing other acts such as are authorized to be performed outside the United States for consular purposes by such laws of the United States as the President may specify.

(b) Acts performed by authorized employees of the Institute under this section shall be valid, and of like force and effect within the United States, as if performed by any other person authorized under the laws of the United States to perform such acts.

TAX EXEMPT STATUS OF THE INSTITUTE

Section 8.

(a) The Institute, its property, and its income are exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States (except to the extent that section 11(a)(3) of this Act requires the imposition of taxes imposed under chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, relating to the Federal Insurance Contributions Act) or by State or local taxing authority of the United States.

(1) For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the Institute shall be treated as an organization described in sections 170(b)(1)(A), 170(c), 2055(a), 2106(a)(2)(A), 2522(a), and 2522(b).

FURNISHING PROPERTY AND SERVICES TO AND OBTAINING SERVICES FROM THE INSTITUTE

Section 9.

(a) Any agency of the United States Government is authorized to sell, loan, or lease property (including interests therein) to, and to perform administrative and technical support functions and services for the operations of, the Institute upon such terms and conditions as the President may direct. Reimbursements to agencies under this subsection shall be credited to the current applicable appropriation of the agency concerned.

(b) Any agency of the United States Government is authorized to acquire and accept services from the Institute upon such terms and conditions as the President may direct. Whenever the President determines it to be in furtherance of the purposes of this Act, the procurement of services by such agencies from the Institute may be effected without regard to such laws of the United States normally applicable to the acquisition of services by such agencies as the President may specify by Executive order.

(c) Any agency of the United States Government making funds available to the Institute in accordance with this Act shall make arrangements with the Institute for the Comptroller General of the United States to have access to the; books and records of the Institute and the opportunity to audit the operations of the Institute.

TAIWAN INSTRUMENTALITY

Section 10.

(a) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to render or provide to or to receive or accept from Taiwan, any performance, communication, assurance, undertaking, or other action, such action shall, in the manner and to the. extent directed by the President, be rendered or Provided to, or received or accepted from, an instrumentality established by Taiwan which the President determines has the necessary authority under the laws applied by the people on Taiwan to provide assurances and take other actions on behalf of Taiwan in accordance with this Act.

(b) The President is requested to extend to the instrumentality established by Taiwan the same number of offices and complement of personnel as were previously operated in the United States by the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979.

(c) Upon the granting by Taiwan of comparable privileges and immunities with respect to the Institute and its appropriate personnel, the President is authorized to extend with respect to the Taiwan instrumentality and its appropriate; personnel, such privileges and immunities (subject to appropriate conditions and obligations) as may be necessary for the effective performance of their functions.

SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH THE INSTITUTE

Section 11.

(a) (1) Under such terms and conditions as the President may direct, any agency of the United States Government may separate from Government service for a specified period any officer or employee of that agency who accepts employment with the Institute.

(2) An officer or employee separated by an agency under paragraph (1) of this subsection for employment with the Institute shall be entitled upon termination of such employment to reemployment or reinstatement with such agency (or a successor agency) in an appropriate position with the attendant rights, privileges, and benefits with the officer or employee would have had or acquired had he or she not been so separated, subject to such time period and other conditions as the President may prescribe.

(3) An officer or employee entitled to reemployment or reinstatement rights under paragraph (2) of this subsection shall, while continuously employed by the Institute with no break in continuity of service, continue to participate in any benefit program in which such officer or employee was participating prior to employment by the Institute, including programs for compensation for job-related death, injury, or illness; programs for health and life insurance; programs for annual, sick, and other statutory leave; and programs for retirement under any system established by the laws of the United States; except that employment with the Institute shall be the basis for participation in such programs only to the extent that employee deductions and employer contributions, as required, in payment for such participation for the period of employment with the Institute, are currently deposited in the program's or system's fund or depository. Death or retirement of any such officer or employee during approved service with the Institute and prior to reemployment or reinstatement shall be considered a death in or retirement from Government service for purposes of any employee or survivor benefits acquired by reason of service with an agency of the United States Government.

(4) Any officer or employee of an agency of the United States Government who entered into service with the Institute on approved leave of absence without pay prior to the enactment of this Act shall receive the benefits of this section for the period of such service.

(b) Any agency of the United States Government employing alien personnel on Taiwan may transfer such personnel, with accrued allowances, benefits, and rights, to the Institute without a break in service for purposes of retirement and other benefits, including continued participation in any system established by the laws of the United States for the retirement of employees in which the alien was participating prior to the transfer to the Institute, except that employment with the Institute shall be creditable for retirement purposes only to the extent that employee deductions and employer contributions, as required, in payment for such participation for the period of employment with the Institute, are currently deposited in the system' s fund or depository.

(c) Employees of the Institute shall not be employees of the United States and, in representing the Institute, shall be exempt from section 207 of title 18, United States Code.

(1) For purposes of sections 911 and 913 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, amounts paid by the Institute to its employees shall not be treated as earned income. Amounts received by employees of the Institute shall not be included in gross income, and shall be exempt from taxation, to the extent that they are equivalent to amounts received by civilian officers and employees of the Government of the United States as allowances and benefits which are exempt from taxation under section 912 of such Code.

(2) Except to the extent required by subsection (a)(3) of this section, service performed in the employ of the Institute shall not constitute employment for purposes of chapter 21 of such Code and title II of the Social Security Act.

REPORTING REQUIREMENT

Section 12.

(a) The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress the text of any agreement to which the Institute is a party. However, any such agreement the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States shall not be so transmitted to the Congress but shall be transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President.

(b) For purposes of subsection (a), the term "agreement" includes—

(1) any agreement entered into between the Institute and the governing authorities on Taiwan or the instrumentality established by Taiwan; and

(2) any agreement entered into between the Institute and an agency of the United States Government.

(c) Agreements and transactions made or to be made by or through the Institute shall be subject to the same congressional notification, review, and approval requirements and procedures as if such agreements and transactions were made by or through the agency of the United States Government on behalf of which the Institute is acting.

(d) During the two-year period beginning on the effective date of this Act, the Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House and Senate House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of Foreign Relations the Senate, every six months, a report describing and reviewing economic relations between the United States and Taiwan, noting any interference with normal commercial relations.

RULES AND REGULATIONS

Section 13.

The President is authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act. During the three-year period beginning on the effective date speaker of this Act, such rules and regulations shall be transmitted promptly to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Such action shall.not, however, relieve the Institute of the responsibilities placed upon it by this Act.'

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Section 14.

(a) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and other appropriate committees of the Congress shall monitor—

(1) the implementation of the provisions of this Act;

(2) the operation and procedures of the Institute;

(3) the legal and technical aspects of the continuing relationship between the United States and Taiwan; and

(4) the implementation of the policies of the United States concerning security and cooperation in East Asia.

(b) Such committees shall report, as appropriate, to their respective Houses on the results of their monitoring.

DEFINITIONS

Section 15.

For purposes of this Act—

(1) the term "laws of the United States" includes any statute, rule, regulation, ordinance, order, or judicial rule of decision of the United States or any political subdivision thereof; and

(2) the term "Taiwan" includes, as the context may require, the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores, the people on those islands, corporations and other entities and associations created or organized under the laws applied on those islands, and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing authorities (including political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities thereof).

AUTHORIZATION OF APPRIATIONS

Section 16.

In addition to funds otherwise available to carry out the provisions of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State for the fiscal year 1980 such funds as may be necessary to carry out such provisions. Such funds are authorized to remain available until expended.

SEVERABILITY OF PROVISIONS

Section 17.

If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section 18.

This Act shall be effective as of January 1, 1979. Approved April 10, 1979.

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台灣關係法

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

(本譯文僅供參考，引用請以原始英文條文為依歸)

January 1, 1979

台灣關係法

Public Law 96-8 96th Congress

An Act

本法乃為協助維持西太平洋之和平、安全與穩定，並授權繼續維持美國人民與在台灣人民間之商業、文化及其他關係，以促進美國外交政策，並為其他目的。

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

簡稱———第一條：

本法律可稱為「臺灣關係法」

政策的判定及聲明———第二條：

（甲）由於美國總統已終止美國和臺灣統治當局（在 1979 年 1 月 1 日前美國承認其為中華民國）間的政府關係，美國國會認為有必要制訂本法：

　（一）有助於維持西太平洋地區的和平、安全及穩定；

　（二）授權繼續維持美國人民及臺灣人民間的商務、文化及其他各種關係，以促進美國外交政策的推行。

（乙）美國的政策如下：

　（一）維持及促進美國人民與臺灣之人民間廣泛、密切及友好的商務、文化及其他各種關係；並且維持及促進美國人民與中國大陸人民及其他西太平洋地區人民間的同種關係；

　（二）表明西太平洋地區的和平及安定符合美國的政治、安全及經濟利益，而且是國際關切的事務；

　（三）表明美國決定和「中華人民共和國」建立外交關係之舉，是基於臺灣的前途將以和平方式決定這一期望；

　（四）任何企圖以非和平方式來決定臺灣的前途之舉 -- 包括使用經濟抵制及禁運手段在內，將被視為對西太平洋地區和平及安定的威脅，而為美國所嚴重關切；

　（五）提供防禦性武器給臺灣人民；

　（六）維持美國的能力，以抵抗任何訴諸武力、或使用其他方式高壓手段，而危及臺灣人民安全及社會經濟制度的行動。

（丙）本法律的任何條款不得違反美國對人權的關切，尤其是對於臺灣地區一千八百萬名居民人權的關切。玆此重申維護及促進所有臺灣人民的人權是美國的目標。

美國對臺灣政策的實行———第三條：

（甲）為了推行本法第二條所明訂的政策，美國將使臺灣能夠獲得數量足以使其維持足夠的自衛能力的防衛物資及技術服務；

（乙）美國總統和國會將依據他們對臺灣防衛需要的判斷，遵照法定程序，來決定提供上述防衛物資及服務的種類及數量。對臺灣防衛需要的判斷應包括美國軍事當局向總統及國會提供建議時的檢討報告。

（丙）指示總統如遇臺灣人民的安全或社會經濟制度遭受威脅，因而危及美國利益時，應迅速通知國會。總統和國會將依憲法程序，決定美國應付上述危險所應採取的適當行動。

法律的適用和國際協定———第四條：

（甲）缺乏外交關係或承認將不影嚮美國法律對臺灣的適用，美國法律將繼續對臺灣適用，就像 1979 年 1 月 1 日之前，美國法律對臺灣適用的情形一樣。

（乙）前項所訂美國法律之適用，包括下述情形，但不限於下述情形：

　（一）當美國法律中提及外國、外國政府或類似實體、或與之有關之時，這些字樣應包括臺灣在內，而且這些法律應對臺灣適用；

　（二）依據美國法律授權規定，美國與外國、外國政府或類似實體所進行或實施各項方案、交往或其他關係，美國總統或美國政府機構獲准，依據本法第六條規定，遵照美國法律同樣與臺灣人民進行或實施上述各項方案、交往或其他關係（包括和臺灣的商業機構締約，為美國提供服務）。

　（三）１ 美國對臺灣缺乏外交關係或承認，並不消除、剝奪、修改、拒絕或影響以前或此後臺灣依據美國法律所獲得的任何權利及義務（包括因契約、債務關係及財產權益而發生的權利及義務）。

　２為了各項法律目的，包括在美國法院的訴訟在內，美國承認「中華人民共和國」之舉，不應影響臺灣統治當局在 1978 年 12 月 31 日之前取得或特有的有體財產或無體財產的所有權，或其他權利和利益，也不影響臺灣當局在該日之後所取得的財產。

　（四）當適用美國法律需引據遵照臺灣現行或舊有法律，則臺灣人民所適用的法律應被引據遵照。

　（五）不論本法律任何條款，或是美國總統給予「中華人民共和國」外交承認之舉、或是臺灣人民和美國之間沒有外交關係、美國對臺灣缺乏承認、以及此等相關情勢，均不得被美國政府各部門解釋為，依照 1954 年原子能法及 1978 年防止核子擴散法， 在行政或司法程序中決定事實及適用法律時，得以拒絕對臺灣的核子輸出申請，或是撤銷已核准的輸出許可證。

　（六）至於移民及國籍法方面，應根據該法 202 項 (b) 款規定對待臺灣。

　（七）臺灣依據美國法律在美國法院中起訴或應訴的能力，不應由於欠缺外交關係或承認，而被消除、剝奪、修改、拒絕或影響。

　（八）美國法律中有關維持外交關係或承認的規定，不論明示或默示，均不應對臺灣適用。

（丙）為了各種目的，包括在美國法院中的訴訟在內，國會同意美國和(美國在 1979 年 1 月 1 日前承認為中華民國的)臺灣當局所締結的一切條約和國際協定(包括多國公約)，至 1978 年 12 月 31 日仍然有效者，將繼續維持效力，直至依法終止為止。

（丁）本法律任何條款均不得被解釋為，美國贊成把臺灣排除或驅逐出任何國際金融機構或其他國際組織。

美國海外私人投資保證公司———第五條：

（甲）當本法律生效後三年之內，1961 年援外法案 231 項第2段第2款所訂國民平均所得一千美元限制。將不限制美國海外私人投資保證公司活動，其可決定是否對美國私人在臺投資計畫提供保險、再保險、貸款或保證。

（乙）除了本條 (A.) 項另有規定外，美國海外私人投資保證公司在對美國私人在臺投資計畫提供保險、再保險、貸款或保證時，應適用對世界其他地區相同的標準。

美國在台協會———第六條：

（甲）美國總統或美國政府各部門與臺灣人民進行實施的各項方案、交往或其他關係，應在總統指示的方式或範圍內，經由或透過下述機構來進行實施：

　（一）美國在台協會，這是一個依據哥倫此亞特區法律而成立的一個非營利法人：

　（二）總統所指示成立，繼承上述協會的非政府機構。（以下將簡稱「美國在台協會」為「該協會」。）

（乙）美國總統或美國政府各部門依據法律授權或要求，與臺灣達成、進行或實施協定或交往安排時，此等協定或交往安排應依美國總統指示的方式或範圍，經由或透過該協會達成、進行或實施。

（丙）該協會設立或執行業務所依據的哥倫比亞特區、各州或地方政治機構的法律、規章、命令，阻撓或妨礙該協會依據本法律執行業務時，此等法律、規章、命令的效力應次於本法律。

該協會對在臺美國公民所提供的服務———第七條：

（甲）該協會得授權在臺雇員：

　（一）執行美國法律所規定授權之公證人業務，以採錄證詞，並從事公證業務：

　（二）擔任已故美國公民之遺產臨時保管人：

　（三）根據美國總統指示，依照美國法律之規定，執行領事所獲授權執行之其他業務，以協助保護美國人民的利益。

（乙）該協會雇員獲得授權執行之行為有效力，並在美國境內具有相同效力，如同其他人獲得授權執行此種行為一樣。

該協會的免稅地位———第八條：

該協會、該協會的財產及收入，均免受美國聯邦、各州或地方稅務當局目前或嗣後一切課稅。

對該協會提供財產及服務、以及從該協會獨得之財產及服務———第九條：

（甲）美國政府各部門可依總統所指定條件，出售、借貸或租賃財產（包括財產利益）給該協會，或提供行政和技術支援和服務，供該協會執行業務。此等機構提供上述服務之報酬，應列入各機構所獲預算之內。

（乙）美國政府各部門得依總統指示的條件，獲得該協會的服務。當總統認為，為了實施本法律的宗旨有必要時，可由總統頒佈行政命令，使政府各部門獲得上述服務，而不顧上述部門通常獲得上述服務時，所應適用的法律。

（丙）依本法律提供經費給該協會的美國政府各部門，應和該協會達成安排，讓美國政府主計長得查閱該協會的帳冊記錄，並有機會查核該協會經費動用情形。

臺灣機構———第十條：

（甲）美國總統或美國政府各機構依據美國法律授權或要求，向臺灣提供，或由臺灣接受任何服務、連絡、保證、承諾等事項，應在總統指定的方式及範圍內，向臺灣設立的機構提供上述事項，或由這一機構接受上述事項。此一機構乃總統確定依臺灣人民適用的法律而具有必需之權力者，可依據本法案代表臺灣提供保證及採取其他行動者。

（乙）要求總統給予臺灣設立的機構相同數目的辨事處及規定的全體人數，這是指與 1979 年 1 月 1 日以前美國承認為中華民國的台灣當局在美國設立的辦事處及人員相同而言。

（丙）根據臺灣給予美國在臺協會及其適當人員的特權及豁免權，總統已獲授權給予臺灣機構及其適當人員有效履行其功能所需的此種特權及豁免權（要視適當的情況及義務而定）。

公務人員離職受雇於協會———第十一條：

（甲）（一）依據總統可能指示的條件及情況，任何美國政府機構可在一特定時間內，使接受服務於美國在臺協會的任何機構職員或雇員脫離政府職務。

　（二）任何根據上述 (1.) 節情況離開該機構而服務於該協會的任何職員或雇員，有權在終止於協會的服務時，以適當的地位重新為原機構（或接替的機構）雇用或復職，該職員或雇員並保有如果末在總統指示的期間及其他情況下離職所應獲得的附帶權利、特權及福利。

　（三）在上述 (2.) 項中有權重新被雇用或復職的職員或雇員，在繼續不斷為該協會服務期間，應可繼續參加未受雇於該協會之前所參加的任何福利計劃，其中包括因公殉職、負傷或患病的補償；衛生計劃及人壽保險；年度休假、病假、及其他例假計劃；美國法律下任何制度的退休安排。此種職員或雇員如果在為該協會服務期間，及重為原機構雇用或復職之前死亡或退休，應視為在公職上死亡或退休。

　（四）任何美國政府機構的職員或雇員，在本法案生效前享准保留原職而停薪情況進入該協會者，在服務期間將獲受本條之下的各項福利。

（乙）美國政府任何機構在臺灣雇用外國人員者，可將此種人員調往該協會，要自然增加其津貼、福利及權利，並不得中斷其服務，以免影響退休及其他福利，其中包括繼續參加調往該協會前，法律規定的退休制度。

（丙）該協會的雇用人員不是美國政府的雇用的人員，其在代表該協會時，免於受美國法典第 18 條 207 項之約束。

（丁）（一）依據一九五四年美國國內稅法 911 及 913 項，該協會所付予雇用人員之薪水將不視為薪資所得。該協會雇用人員所獲之薪水應予免稅，其程度與美國政府的文職人員情況同。

　（二）除了前述 (A.) (3.) 所述範圍，受雇該協會所作的服務，將不構成社會安全法第二條所述之受雇目的。

有關報告之規定———第十二條：

（甲）國務卿應將該協會為其中一造的任何協定內容全文送交國會。但是，如果總統認為立即公開透露協定內容會危及美國的國家安全，則此種協定不應送交國會，而應在適當的保密命令下，送交參院及眾院的外交委員會，僅於總統發出適當通知時才得解除機密。

（乙）為了 (A.) 段所述的目的，「協定」一詞包括

　（一）該協會與臺灣的治理當局或臺灣設立之機構所達成的任何協定；

　（二）該協會與美國各機構達成的任何協定。

（丙）經由該協會所達成的協定及交易，應接受同樣的國會批准、審查、及認可，如同這些協定是經由美國各機構達成一樣，該協會是代表美國政府行事。

（丁）在本法案生效之日起的兩年期間，國務卿應每六個月向眾院議長及參院外交委員會提出一份報告，描述及檢討與臺灣的經濟關係，尤其是對正常經濟關係的任何干預。

規則與章程———第十三條：

授權總統規定適於執行本法案各項目的的規則與章程。在本法案生效之日起三年期間，此種規則與章程應立即送交眾院議長及參院外交委員會。然而，此種規則章程不得解除本法案所賦予該協會的責任。

國會監督———第十四條：

（甲）眾院外交委員會，參院外交委員會及國會其他適當的委員會將監督：

　（一）本法案各條款的執行；

　（二）該協會的作業及程序；

　（三）美國與臺灣繼續維持關係的法律及技術事項；

　（四）有關東亞安全及合作的美國政策的執行。

（乙）這些委員會將適當地向參院或眾院報告監督的結果。

定義———第十五條：

為本法案的目的

（甲）「美國法律」一詞，包括美國任何法規、規則、章程、法令、命令、美國及其政治分支機構的司法程序法；

（乙）「臺灣」一詞將視情況需要，包括臺灣及澎湖列島，這些島上的人民、公司及根據適用於這些島嶼的法律而設立或組成的其他團體及機構，1979 年 1 月 1 日以前美國承認為中華民國的臺灣治理當局，以及任何接替的治理當局（包括政治分支機構、機構等）。

撥款之授權———第十六條：

除了執行本法案各條款另外獲得的經費外，本法案授權國務卿在 1980 會計年度撥用執行本法案所需的經費。此等經費已獲授權保留運用，直到用盡為止。

條款效力———第十七條：

如果本法案的任何條款被視為無效，或條款對任何人或任何情況的適用性無效，則本法案的其他部份，以及此種條款適用於其他個人或情況的情形，並不受影響。

生效日期———第十八條：

本法案應於 1979 年 1 月 1 日生效。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

Additional information concerning the Taiwan Relations Act can be found on relevant page of the US Congress; please click here.

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Nagoya Resolution

Name in Chinese  Mingguwu jueyi 名古屋決議
Document type Policy announcement by the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
Year, date 1979, Oct. 25
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RESOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Nagoya, 25th October 1979

The People’s Republic of China:

Name: Chinese Olympic Committee

NOC anthem, flag and emblem: flag and anthem of People’s Republic of China.
The emblem submitted to and approved by the Executive Board.

Constitution: In order.

Committee based in Taipei:

Name: Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee

NOC anthem, flag and emblem: Other than that used at present and which must be approved by the Executive Board of the IOC.

Constitution: to be amended in conformity with IOC rules by 1st January 1980.
 FLAG 
 EMBLEM 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
  
CHINESE TAIPEI

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Nagoya Resolution represents a decision by the IOC Executive Board allowing teams both from Taiwan/the ROC and China/the PRC to participate in future Olympic Games, with precise specifications for admissible flag, emblem, and team name. The resolution was published in English and French, but no officially authorized Chinese version was released. More information concerning the name issue can be found here.

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Lausanne Agreement

Name in Chinese  Luosang xieyi 洛桑協議
Document type Agreement between the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the CTOT
Year, date 1981, March 23
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AGREEMENT between the INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, Lausanne
and the CHINESE TAIPEI OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, Taipei

Agreement has been reached on this twenty-third day of March Nineteen Hundred and Eighty One (1981) between the International Olympic Committee (hereinafter called the IOC) and the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (hereinafter called the CTOC or the NOC as the case may be) that both parties (hereinafter collectively called “the parties”) agree to settle their differences on the following understandings terms and conditions:

WHEREAS
Understandings by the parties

a) All rules, by-laws, instructions and other regulations governing the Olympic Movement are contained in the Olympic Charter with the amendments approved by the 82nd IOC Session, as attached to this Agreement (exhibit 1).

b) Rule 24 F. of the Olympic Charter reads as follows:
“The flag and the emblem used by an NOC at the Olympic Games shall be submitted to and approved by the IOC Executive Boards.”

c) Rule 30, 1st paragraph of the Olympic Charter reads as follows:
“Since only NOCs recognised by the IOC may enter competitors in the Olympic Games, a country without an NOC must form such a Committee and have it recognised by the IOC before it is permitted to take part in the Olympic Games.”

d) Rule 3 of the Olympic Charter reads as follows:
“The Olympic Games take place every four years. They unite Olympic competitors of all countries in fair and equal competition.
“The International Olympic Committee (IOC) shall secure the widest possible audience for the Olympic Games.
“No discrimination in them is allowed against any country or person on grounds of race, religion or politics.”

NOW BOTH PARTIES HEREBY AGREE as follows:

-1-

The name of the NOC shall be CHINESE TAIPEI OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, and is as such hereby approved by the IOC.
-2-

The CTOC hereby submits its flag and emblem as per attached specimens (exhibits 2 and 3) which are hereby approved by the IOC.
-3-

The IOC hereby confirms to the CTOC that the latter is entitled to participate in the future Olympic Games as well as other activities sponsored by the IOC like every recognised National Olympic Committee, with the same status and the same full rights, in compliance with the Olympic Charter.
-4-

The IOC will assist the CTOC in its application for and/or reinstatement of membership in the various international federations affiliated to the IOC.

Signed in Lausanne, on March 23rd, 1981.

INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC
COMMITTEE		   CHINESE TAIPEI OLYMPIC
COMMITTEE
*signature* *signature*

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The Lausanne Agreement was signed by IOC chairman Juan Antonio Samaranch and CTOT president Shen Chia-ming 沈家銘 in English. No official Chinese-language version was published.

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Ye Jianying’s “Nine-Point Policy”

Name in Chinese Ye Jianying xiang xinhuashe jizhe fabiaode tanhua 葉劍英向新華社記者發表的談話
Document type Policy elaborations by PRC heavyweight
Year, date 1981, Sept. 30
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

Articles & Documents

Interview With Xinhua Correspondent

Chairman Ye Jianying’s Elaborations on Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan To Motherland and Peaceful Unification

Ye Jianying, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, in an interview with a Xinhua correspondent on September 30, 1981, elaborated on the policy concerning the return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of China’s peaceful reunification.
The full text of his statement follows:

Today, on the eve of the 32nd anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China and at the approach of the 70th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, I wish, first of all, to extend my festive greetings and cordial regards to the people of all, to extend my festive greetings and cordial regards to the people of all nationalities throughout the country, including the compatriots in Taiwan, Xianggang (Hong Kong) and Aomen (Macao), and Chinese nationals residing in foreign countries.

On New Year’s Day 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress issued a message to the compatriots in Taiwan, in which it proclaimed the policy of striving to reunify the motherland peacefully. The message received warm support and active response from the people of all nationalities throughout China, including the compatriots in Taiwan, Xianggang and Aomen, and those residing abroad. A relaxed atmosphere has set in across the Taiwan Straits. Now, I would taken this opportunity to elaborate on the policy concerning the return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of peaceful reunification:

  1. In order to bring an end to the unfortunate separation of the Chinese nation as early as possible, we propose that talks be held between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang of China on a reciprocal basis so that the two parties will co-operate for the third time to accomplish the great cause of national reunification. The two sides may first send people to meet for an exhaustive exchange of views.
  2. It is the urgent desire of the people of all nationalities on both sides of the straits to communicate with each other, reunite with their families and relatives, develop trade and increase mutual understanding. We propose that the two sides make arrangements to facilitate the exchange of mails, trade, air and shipping services, family reunions and visits by relatives and tourists as well as academic, cultural and sports exchanges, and reach an agreement there upon.
  3. After the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and it can retain its armed forces. The Central Government will not interfere with local affairs on Taiwan.
  4. Taiwan’s current socio-economic system will remain unchanged, so will its way of life and its economic and cultural relations with foreign countries. There will be no encroachment on the proprietary rights and lawful right of inheritance over private property, houses, land and enterprises, or on foreign investments.
  5. People in authority and representative personages of various circles in Taiwan may take up posts of leadership in national political bodies and participate in running the state.
  6. When Taiwan’s local finance is in difficulty, the Central Government may subsidize it as is fit for the circumstances.
  7. For people of all nationalities and public figures of various circles in Taiwan who wish to come and settle on the mainland, it is guaranteed that proper arrangements will be made for them, that there will be no discrimination against them, and that they will have the freedom of entry and exit.
  8. Industrialists and businessmen in Taiwan are welcome to invest and engage in various economic undertakings on the mainland, and their legal rights, interests and profits are guaranteed.
  9. The reunification of the motherland is the responsibility of all Chinese. We sincerely welcome people of all nationalities, public figures of all circles and all mass organizations in Taiwan to make proposals and suggestions regarding affairs of state through various channels and in various ways.

Taiwan’s return to the embrace of the motherland and the accomplishment of the great cause of national reunification is a great and glorious mission history has bequeathed on our generation. China’s reunification and prosperity is in the vital interest of the Chinese people of all nationalities-not only those on the mainland, but those in Taiwan as well. It is also in the interest of peace in the Far East and the world.

We hope that our compatriots in Taiwan will give full play to their patriotism and work energetically for the early realization of the great unity of our nation and share the honor of it. We hope that our compatriots in Xianggang and Aomen and Chinese nationals residing abroad will continue to act in the role of a bridge and contribute their share to the reunification of the motherland.

We hope that the Kuomintang authorities will stick to their one-China position and their opposition to “two Chinas” and that they will put national interests above everything else, forget previous will and join hands with us in accomplishing the great cause of national reunification and the great goal of making China prosperous and strong, so as to win glory for our ancestors, being benefit to our posterity and write a new and glorious page in the history of the Chinese nation!

(Xinhua News Agency, September 30, 1981, Beijing)
Source: Beijing Review 1981, No. 40 (October 5 edition), p. 10-11; retrieved from Taiwan Info

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葉劍英向新華社記者發表的談話

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

（1981 年 9 月 30 日）

今天是中華人民共和國 32 周年國慶前夕，又欣逢辛亥革命 70 周年紀念日即將來臨之際，我首先向全國各族人民，包括台灣同胞、港澳同胞以及國外僑胞致以節日祝賀和親切問候。

1979 年元旦，全國人民代表大會常務委員會發表《告台灣同胞書》，宣佈了爭取和平統一祖國的大政方針，得到全中國各族人民，包括台灣同胞、港澳同胞以及國外僑胞的熱烈擁護和積極回應。台灣海峽出現了和緩氣氛。現在，我願趁此機會進一步闡明關於台灣回歸祖國，實現和平統一的方針政策：

（一）為了儘早結束中華民族陷於分裂的不幸局面，我們建議舉行中國共產黨和中國國民黨兩黨對等談判，實行第三次合作，共同完成祖國統一大業。雙方可先派人接觸，充分交換意見。
（二）海峽兩岸各族人民迫切希望互通音訊、親人團聚、開展貿易、增進瞭解。我們建議雙方共同為通郵、通商、通航、探親、旅遊以及開展學術、文化、體育交流提供方便，達成有關協議。
（三）國家實現統一後，台灣可作為特別行政區，享有高度的自治權，並可保留軍隊。中央政府不干預台灣地方事務。
（四）台灣現行社會、經濟制度不變，生活方式不變，同外國的經濟、文化關係不變。私人財產、房屋、土地、企業所權、合法繼承權和外國投資不受侵犯。
（五）台灣當局和各界代表人士，可擔全國性政治機構的領導職務，參與國家管理。
（六）台灣地方財政遇有困難時，可由中央政府酌情補助。
（七）台灣各族人民、各界人士願回祖國大陸定居者，保證妥善安排，不受歧視，來去自由。
（八）歡迎台灣工商界人士回祖國大陸投資，興辦各種經濟事業，保證其合法權益和利潤。
（九）統一祖國，人人有責。我們熱誠歡迎台灣各族人民、各界人士、民眾團體通過各種管道、採取各種方式提供建議，共商國事。

台灣回歸祖國，完成統一大業是我們這一代人光榮、偉大的歷史使命。中國的統一和富強，不僅是祖國大陸各族人民的根本利益所在，同樣是台灣各族同胞的根本利益所在，而且有利於遠東和世界和平。
我們希望廣大台灣同胞，發揚愛國主義精神，積極促進全民族大團結早日實現，共用民族榮譽。希望港澳同胞、國外僑胞繼續努力，發揮橋樑作用，為統一祖國貢獻力量。
我們希望國民黨當局堅持「一個中國」、反對「兩個中國」的立場，以民族大義為重，捐棄前嫌，同我們攜起手來，共同完成統一祖國大業，實現振興中華的宏圖，為列祖列宗爭光，為子孫後代造福，在中華民族歷史上譜寫新的光輝篇章。
中央政府門戶網站　來源：新華社

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

Ye Jianying 葉劍英 (1897-1986) was a Communist military leader and between March 1978 and June 1983 chairman of the standing committee of the National People's Congress (quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui weiyuanzhang 全國人民代表大會常務委員會委員長), i. e. at the time the PRC's head of state—a ceremonial position but less powerful than the post of chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission (zhonggong zhongyang junshi weiyuanhui 中共中央軍事委員會, abbrev. CCP CMC).

The formal term of Ye Jianying’s “Nine-Point Policy” is “Nine Principles for the Peaceful Reunification with Taiwan” (youguan heping tongyi Taiwan de jiutiao fangzhen zhengce 有關和平統一台灣的九條方針政策, abbrev. Ye jiutiao 葉九條), in English it is also often referred to as “Ye’s Nine Principles” or “Nine-Article Statement”. On Jan. 11, 1982 Deng Xiaoping revealed to foreign guests that Ye’s Nine-Point Policy actually means “One Country, Two Systems” (yiguo liangzhi 一國兩制, abbrev. 1C2S) and would also apply to the issue of Hong Kong. In this context Deng on June 26, 1983 explained his “Six Conceptions for the Peaceful Reunification” (guanyu shixian Taiwan han zuguo dalu heping tongyide liutiao gouxiang 關於實現台灣和祖國大陸和平統一的六條構想, abbrev. Deng liutiao 鄧六條) which are shown further below.

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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The "Six Assurances" to Taiwan ROC

Name in Chinese Leigen zongtongde "liuxiang baozheng" 雷根總統的『六項保證』
Document type Oral message by POTUS Ronald Reagan for ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo
Year, date 1982, July 14
 Jump to Chinese version   [Next document]  [Previous document] 

On July 14, 1982, James Lilley, at the time director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the US's nominally unofficial representative body in Taiwan, called on ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國. In US President Ronald Reagan's name, Lilley delivered orally—not in writing—six assurances regarding US policy toward Taiwan. Lilley explained:

The United States...

  • had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to the Republic of China;
  • had not agreed to hold prior consultations with the PRC regarding arms sales to the Republic of China;
  • would not play a mediation role between the PRC and the Republic of China;
  • would not revise the Taiwan Relations Act;
  • had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and
  • would not exert pressure on the Republic of China to enter into negotiations with the PRC.

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雷根總統的『六項保證』

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

1）美國未同意在對我軍售上，設定結束期限；

2）美方對北京要求就對我軍售事與其事先諮商事未予同意；

3）美方無意扮演任何我與中國大陸間調解人的角色；

4）美方將不同意修改〈台灣關係法〉；

5）美方並未改變其對台灣主權的一貫立場；

6）美方不會對我施加壓力與北京進行談判。

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Joint Communiqué of the PRC and the US

Name in Chinese Zhonghua renmin gongheguo han Meilijian hezhongguo lianhe gongbao (bayiqi gongbao) 中華人民共和國和美利堅合衆國聯合公報（《八一七公報》）
Document type Joint statement by the US and the PRC
Year, date 1982, Aug. 17
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

(Jump to Shanghai Communiqué—1972)    (Jump to Normalization Communiqué—1979)

August 17, 1982

  1. In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America, the United States of America recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. Within that context, the two sides agreed that the people of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between China and the United States were normalized.
  2. The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side stated that it would raise the issue again following normalization. Recognizing that this issue would seriously hamper the development of China-United States relations, they have held further discussions on it, during and since the meetings between Premier Zhao Ziyang and President Ronald Reagan and between Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua and Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. in October 1981.
  3. Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding China-United States relations. These principles were confirmed in the Shanghai Communiqué of February 28, 1972 and reaffirmed in the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on January 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically state that these principles continue to govern all aspects of their relations.
  4. The Chinese Government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair. The Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued By China on January 1, 1979 promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification of the motherland. The Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981 represented a further major effort under this fundamental policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.
  5. The United States Government attaches great importance to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." The United States Government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question as indicated in China's Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued on January 1, 1979 and the Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981. The new situation which has emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also provides favourable conditions for the settlement of China-United States differences over United States arms sales to Taiwan.
  6. Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue.
  7. In order to bring about, over a period of time, a final settlement of the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan, which is an issue rooted in history, the two Governments will make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to the through settlement of this issue.
  8. The development of United States–China relations is not only in the interests of the two peoples but also conducive to peace and stability in the world. The two sides are determined, on the principle of equality and mutual benefit, to strengthen their ties in the economic, cultural, educational, scientific, technological and other fields and make strong, joint efforts for the continued development of relations between the Governments and peoples of the United States and China.
  9. In order to bring about the healthy development of United States–China relations, maintain world peace and oppose aggression and expansion, the two Governments reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique and the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. The two sides will maintain contact and hold appropriate consultations on bilateral and international issues of common interest.

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中華人民共和國和美利堅合衆國聯合公報（《八一七公報》）

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

（1982 年 8 月 17 日）

一、在中華人民共和國政府和美利堅合衆國政府發表的一九七九年一月一日建立外交關係的聯合公報中，美利堅合衆國承認中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府，並承認中國的立場，即只有一個中國，臺灣是中國的一部分。在此範圍內，雙方同意，美國人民將同臺灣人民繼續保持文化、商務和其他非官方關係。在此基礎上，中美兩國關係實現了正常化。
二、美國向臺灣出售武器的問題在兩國談判建交的過程中沒有得到解決。雙方的立場不一致，中方聲明在正常化以後將再次提出這個問題。雙方認識到這一問題將會嚴重妨礙中美關係的發展，因而在趙紫陽總理與羅納德·雷根總統以及黃華副總理兼外長與亞歷山大·黑格國務卿于一九八一年十月會見時以及在此以後，雙方進一步就此進行了討論。
三、互相尊重主權和領土完整、互不干涉內政是指導中美關係的根本原則。一九七二年二月二十八的上海公報確認了這些原則。一九七九年一月一日生效的建交公報又重申了這些原則。雙方強調聲明，這些原則仍是指導雙方關係所有方面的原則。
四、中國政府重申，臺灣問題是中國的內政。一九七九年一月一日中國發表的告臺灣同胞書宣佈了爭取和平統一祖國的大政方針。一九八一年九月三十日中國提出的九點方針是按照這一大政方針爭取和平解決臺灣問題的進一步重大努力。
五、美國政府非常重視它與中國的關係，並重申，它無意侵犯中國的主權和領土完整，無意干涉中國的內政，也無意執行 "兩個中國" 或 "一中一台" 政策。美國政府理解並欣賞一九七九年一月一日中國發表的告臺灣同胞書和一九八一年九月三十日中國提出的九點方針中所表明的中國爭取和平解決臺灣問題的政策。臺灣問題上出現的新形勢也爲解決中美兩國在美國售台武器問題上的分歧提供了有利的條件。
六、考慮到雙方的上述聲明，美國政府聲明，它不尋求執行一項長期向臺灣出售武器的政策，它向臺灣出售的武器在性能和數量上將不超過中美建交後近幾年供應的水平，它準備逐步減少它對臺灣的武器出售，並經過一段時間導致最後的解決。在作這樣的聲明時，美國承認中國關於徹底解決這一問題的一貫立場。
七、爲了使美國售台武器這個歷史遺留的問題，經過一段時間最終得到解決，兩國政府將盡一切努力，採取措施，創造條件，以利於徹底解決這個問題。
八、中美關係的發展不僅符合兩國人民的利益，而且也有利於世界和平與穩定。雙方決心本著平等互利的原則，加強經濟、文化、教育、科技和其他方面的聯繫，為繼續發展中美兩國政府和人民之間的關係共同作出重大努力。
九、為了使中美關係健康發展和維護世界和平、反對侵略擴張，兩國政府重申上海公報和建交公報中雙方一致同意的各項原則。雙方將就共同關心的雙邊問題和國際問題保持接觸並進行適當的磋商。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [Article 121] ✄

Name in Chinese lianheguo haiyangfa gongyue, di yieryi tiao 聯合國海洋法公約，第一二一條
Document type Multilateral treaty by the United Nations
Years, dates 1982, Dec. 10 (done); 1994, Nov. 16 (entry into force)
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

(Jump to Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea)    (Jump to 2016 South China Sea Arbitration)

Done at Montego Bay, Jamaica, December 10, 1982

Entered into force November 16, 1994

[...]

Part VIII, Article 121 (Regime of Islands)

1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.

2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.

3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no EEZ or continental shelf.

[...]

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聯合國海洋法公約，第一二一條

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

一九八二年十二月十日訂于蒙特哥灣

[...]

第八部分 島嶼制度

第一二一條

島嶼制度

1. 島嶼是四面環水並在高潮時高於水面的自然形成的陸地區域。

2. 除第3款另有規定外,島嶼的領海、毗連區、專屬經濟區和大陸架應按照本公約適用於其他陸地領土的規定加以確定。

3. 不能維持人類居住或其本身的經濟生活的岩礁,不應有專屬經濟區或大陸架。

[...]

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The complete English text of UNCLOS can be found here.

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Deng Xiaoping’s “Six Conceptions”

Name in Chinese Deng Xiaoping lunyi"yiguo liangzhi" jiejue Taiwan wenti 鄧小平論以『一國兩制』解決台灣問題
Document type Policy elaborations by top PRC leader
Year, date 1983, June 26
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

Meeting with Professor Yang Liyu from Seton Hall University of the US on June 26, 1983, Deng Xiaoping elaborated the concept of “One Country, Two Systems”.

  1. The core of the Taiwan question is the Taiwan question is the reunification has become the common aspiration of both the Communist Party and the Kuomintang and thus has constituted the ground for the third cooperation between the two parties.
  2. While maintaining the one-China policy, the two sides can adopt different systems, but the People’s Republic of China should be the sole representative of China in the international community.
  3. Taiwan’s “absolute autonomy” is not allowed. The “absolute autonomy” actually means two Chinas. There should be some restrictions on autonomy, and the bottom line is that the interest of a unified state must not be harmed.
  4. After reunification, as a special administrative region, Taiwan can adopts systems different from those on the mainland and enjoys privileges, which other provinces and autonomous regions may not share. The region can have the powers of a legislature, judiciary and final adjudication. The region can also have its own army as long as it poses no threat to the mainland. The central government will not send officials. Affairs pertaining to Taiwan’s political parties, government and army shall be managed by Taiwan itself, while the central government will reserve some positions for Taiwan.
  5. Peaceful reunification does not mean the mainland will swallow Taiwan, or vice versa. To reunify China with the “Three People’s Principles” is not practical.
  6. The proper way for peaceful reunification is to hold negotiations between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang on an equal footing. After the two sides reach an agreement, an official announcement can be made. Foreign powers cannot be allowed to interfere with this affair, because it would otherwise mean China has not achieved independence and would only give use to endless future troubles.

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鄧小平論以『一國兩制』解決台灣問題

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

1983 年 6 月 25 日，鄧小平在會見美國西東大學教授楊力宇時，闡述了按照「一國兩制」解決台灣問題、實現國家統一的構想：

（一） 台灣問題的核心是祖國統一。和平統一已成為國共兩黨的共同語言。我們希望國共兩黨共同完成民族統一，大家都對中華民族作出貢獻。
（二） 我們不贊成台灣「完全自治」的提法。自治不能沒有限度，既有限度就不能「完全」。「完全自治」就是「兩個中國」，而不是一個中國。
（三） 制度可以不同，但在國際上代表中國的，只能是中華人民共和國。
（四） 我們承認台灣地方政府在對內政策上可以搞自己的一套。台灣作為特別行政區，雖是地區政府，但同其他省、市以至自治區的地方政府不同，可以有其他省、市、自治區所沒有而為自己所獨有的某些權力，條件是不能損害統一的國家的利益。
 祖國統一後，台灣特別行政區可以有自己的獨立性，可以實行同大陸不同的制度。司法獨立，終審權不須到北京。台灣還可以有自己的軍隊，只是不能構成對大陸的威脅。大陸不派人駐台，不僅軍隊不去，行政人員也不去。台灣的黨、政、軍等系統，都由台灣自己來管。中央政府還要給台灣留出名額。
（五） 和平統一不是大陸把台灣吃掉，當然也不能是台灣把大陸吃掉。所謂「三民主義統一中國」，這不現實。
（六） 要實現統一，就要有個適當方式，所以我們建議舉行兩黨平等會談，實行第三次合作，而不提中央與地方談判。雙方達成協議後，可以正式宣佈。但萬萬不可讓外國插手，那樣只能意味著中國還未獨立，後患無窮。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

Most Chinese sources have omitted the precise numbering which in this version was derived from the website of the PRC embassy in Japan but does not exactly correspond with the numbering shown in the official English version.

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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National Security Law During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion

Name in Chinese dongyuan kanluan shiqi guojia anquanfa 動員戡亂時期國家安全法
Document type ROC law
Year, dates 1987, July 1 (promulgated by ROC president); 1987, July 15 (effective)
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's notes  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

Adopted by the Legislative Yuan on June 23, 1987, promulgated by the President on July 1, 1987, effective as of July 15, 1987.

(Note: This is a translation from the Chinese text of the law. In case of any discrepancy between the Chinese and English texts, the Chinese text shall govern.)

Article 1 The present law is hereby enacted to safeguard national security and maintain social stability during the period of national mobilization for suppression of the Communist rebellion.
Matters for which the present law does not provide shall be governed by other relevant laws.
Article 2 No person may violate the Constitution or advocate Communism or the division of national territory in the exercise of the people’s freedom of assembly and association.
The assembly and association stated in the preceding paragraph shall be governed by laws to be enacted separately.
Article 3 For entry into and exit from the Taiwan Region1, all persons shall apply for permission from the Entry and Exit Service Bureau of the National Police Administration, Ministry of the Interior. A person without permission may not enter into or depart from the Taiwan Region.
Applications for entry or exit permission may be denied if the applicants:
(1) have been sentenced under a final criminal judgment to punishments of imprisonment or greater but have not served or completed the term of sentence, or have been wanted by the judicial authorities, or have been otherwise denied exit permission by the civilian or military judicial authorities; or
(2) have been strongly suspected, on the bases of sufficient factual evidence, to be grave security risks to national security or social stability; or
(3) have been denied entry or exit permission pursuant to other laws.
Applicants denied such permission shall be notified in writing with reasons for denial and with directions appended regarding remedial procedures.
The Ministry of the Interior shall organize a review committee compsed of, inter alia, generally recognized impartial personages to review cases of denial decided pursuant to subparagraph (2), paragraph 2 of the present Article.
Article 4 The police authorities may, when necessary, conduct searches and inspection on the following persons, goods, and transports:
(1) entry and exit passengers and their belongings;
(2) entry and exit vessels, aircraft and other transports;
(3) inland vessels, rafts, aircraft and the passengers and cargo aboard;
(4) sailors, flight crews, fishermen, and other working members of the transports stated in the preceding two subparagraphs, and their belongings.
Article 5 To safeguard coastal defenses, military installations and mountain areas, the Ministry of National Defense may, in consultation with the Ministry of the Interior, designate and declare certain sea coasts, mountain areas or important military facilities as restricted zones.
All persons desiring entry into and exit from the restricted zones stated in the preceding paragraph shall apply for permission from the authorities in charge.
Within these restriced zones stated in paragraph 1, construction may be restricted or prohibited as required by military considerations; the scope of which shall be determined jointly Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, and other related agencies.
Taxes and other levies on the land on which construction is restricted or prohibited shall be reduced or exempted.
Article 6 A person who violated paragraph 1 of Article 3 by entering into or departing from the Taiwan Region without permission shall be punished with imprisonment of not more than three years, detention, and/or a fine of not more than 30,000 yuan.
A person who without justifiable reason refuses or evades searches or inspections conducted pursuant to Article 4 shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than six months, detention, and/or a fine of not more than 5,000 yuan.
Article 7 A person who without reason violates paragraph 2 of Article 5 by entering into or departing from the restricted zones without applying for permission and refuses to leave after having been notified to do so shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than six months, detention, and/or a fine of not more than 5,000 yuan.
A person who without reason violates paragraph 3 of Article 5 concerning prohibited or restricted construction and refuses to comply with instructions to cease construction shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than six months, detention, and/or a fine of not more than 5,000 yuan.
Article 8 Except for military personnel in active military service, no civilian shall be subjected to military trial.
All military personnel in active military service who have committed a criminal offense shall be prosecuted and tried by military judicial authorities unless the criminal offense committed is not provided for under the Criminal Code of the Armed Forces or other special enactments thereof but is provided for under Article 61 of the Criminal Code.
Article 9 Criminal cases regarding civilians who, having been tried or being tried by military courts in areas in which the Chieh-yen2 (Emergency) Decree had been in effect, shall be dealt with according to the following provisions after the termination of the Chieh-yen (Emergency) Decree:
(1) Where military trial proceedings have not been completed, cases undergoing investigation shall be transferred to competent (civilian) public prosecutor for investigation; cases pending trial shall be transferred to a competent (civilian) court for trial.
(2) Where criminal judgments have become final, appeal or interlocutory appeal to a competent (civilian) court shall not be allowed; however, where grounds for retrial or extraordinary appeal exist, applications for retrial or extraordinary appeal may be made pursuant to the law.
(3) Where final criminal judgments have not yet been executed, or are being executed, they shall be transferred to a competent (civilian) public prosecutor for execution under his direction.
Article 10 The enforcement regulations of the present law and the date of its coming into force shall be made and determined respectively by the Executive Yuan.

Translator’s notes:
1. The term “Taiwan Region” refers to Taiwan, the Pescadores, Kinmen (Quemoy), Matsu and other territories currently under the effective control of the Republic of China government.
2. The term “Chieh-yen” is generally but inadequately translated as “martial law”. Under the Republic of China’s legal system, which is continental-European in origin, the Chieh-yen Law and the Chieh-yen Decree are two different matters. The former does not apply unless and until activated by the president’s issuance of the latter. When the Chieh-yen Decree is lifted, the Chieh-yen Law remains on the books but becomes inoperative.

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動員戡亂時期國家安全法

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

中華民國 76 年 06 月 23 日

第一條 動員戡亂時期為確保國家安全，維護社會安定，特制定本法。
本法未規定者，適用其他有關法律之規定。
第二條 人民集會、結社，不得違背憲法或主張共產主義，或主張分裂國土。
前項集會、結社，另以法律定之。
第三條 人民入出境，應向內政部警政署入出境管理局申請許可。未經許可者，不得入出境。
人民申請入出境有左列情形之一者，得不予許可：
一、經判處有期徒刑以上之刑確定尚未執行或執行未畢，或因案通緝中，或經司法或軍法機關限制出境者。
二、有事實足認為有妨害國家安全或社會安定之重大嫌疑者。
三、依其他法律限制或禁止入出境者。
前項不予許可，應以書面敘明理由，通知申請人，並附記不服之救濟程序。
內政部應聘請包括社會公正人士組成審查委員會，審核第二項第二款未經許可事項。
第四條 警察機關於必要時對左列人員、物品及運輸工具得實施檢查：
一、入出境之旅客及其所攜帶之物件。
二、入出境之船舶、航空器或其他運輸工具。
三、航行境內之船筏、航空器及其客貨。
四、前二款運輸工具之船員、機員、漁民或其他從業人員及其所攜帶之物件。
第五條 為確保海防及軍事設施安全，並維護山地治安，得由國防部會同內政部指定海岸、山地或重要軍事設施地區，劃為管制區，並公告之。
人民入出前項管制區，應向該管機關申請許可。
第一項之管制區，為軍事所必需者，得實施限建、禁建；其範圍由國防部會同內政部及有關機關定之。
前項限建或禁建土地之稅捐，應予減免。
第六條 違反第三條第一項規定，未經許可入出境者，處三年以下有期徒刑、拘役或科或併科三萬元以下罰金。
無正當理由，拒絕或逃避依第四條規定所實施之檢查者，處六月以下有期徒刑、拘役或科或併科五千元以下罰金。
第七條 違反第五條第二項未經申請許可，無故入出管制區，經通知離去而不從者，處六月以下有期徒刑、拘役或科或併科五千元以下罰金。
違反第五條第三項禁建、限建之規定，經制止而不從者，處六月以下有期徒刑、拘役或科或併科五千元以下罰金。
第八條 非現役軍人，不受軍事審判。
現役軍人犯罪，由軍法機關追訴審判。但所犯為陸海空軍刑法及其特別法以外之罪，而屬刑法第六十一條所列各罪者，不在此限。
第九條 戒嚴時期戒嚴地域內，經軍事審判機關審判之非現役軍人刑事案件，於解嚴後依左列規定處理：
一、軍事審判程序尚未終結者，偵查中案件移送該管檢察官偵查，審判中案件移送該管法院審判。
二、刑事裁判已確定者，不得向該管法院上訴或抗告。但有再審或非常上訴之原因者，得依法聲請再審或非常上訴。
三、刑事裁判尚未執行或在執行中者，移送該管檢察官指揮執行。
第十條 本法施行細則及施行日期，由行政院定之。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTES ===============

When the National Security Law During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion (dongyuan kanluan shiqi guojia anquanfa 動員戡亂時期國家安全法) was promulgated on July 1, 1987, martial law was still in force in Taiwan. The name of the law was changed to National Security Act (guojia anquanfa 國家安全法) by ROC President Lee Teng-hui on July 29, 1992. Its legislative history is as follows:

  1. Enacted and Promulgated by President Order Hua-Tsung (1)-Yi-Tzu No. 2360 on July 1, 1987.
  2. Amended and promulgated by President Order Hua-Tsung (1)-Yi-Tzu No. 3667 on July 29, 1992.
  3. Amended and promulgated by President Order Hua-Tsung (1)-Yi-Tzu No. 8500027120 on Feb. 5, 1996.
  4. Amended and promulgated by President Order Hua-Tsung (1)-Yi-Tzu No. 10000259741 on Nov. 23, 2011.
  5. Amended and promulgated by President Order Hua-Tsung (1)-Yi-Tzu No. 10200156111 on Aug. 21, 2013.
  6. Amended on July 3, 2009.
  7. Amended on June 8, 2022.

The source for the English text is the Republic of China Yearbook 1989, p. 724-725.

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Selected important texts and documents (1990—)
Treaty / law / documentYear~ in Chinese
Guidelines for National Unification1991 國家統一綱領
February 28 Incident Research Report1992「二二八事件」研究報告
★ The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China [PRC white paper]1993《台灣問題與中國的統一》【中共白皮書】
Bill Clinton's "Three No's"1998克林頓總統的『三不』政策
US Senate Resolution 1071998[No Chinese version]
US House of Representatives Resolution 3011998[No Chinese version]
ROC President Lee Teng-hui's remarks about the "state-to-state relationship" extant between the ROC and the PRC1999李登輝總統關於兩岸『特殊的國與國的關係』
★ The One China Principle and Taiwan Question [PRC white paper]2000《一個中國的原則與台灣問題》【中共白皮書】
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea2002南海各方行為宣言
Colin Powell's statement on "one China" and Taiwan2004鮑威爾關於『一個中國』和台灣
★ The "Anti-Secession Law" of the PRC2005反分裂國家法
East China Sea Peace Initiative Implementation Guidelines2012東海和平倡議推動綱領
South China Sea Arbitration—PCA Press Release2016[No Chinese version]
Guidelines for the New Southbound Policy2016新南向政策網領
New Southbound Policy Promotion Plan2016新南向政策推動計畫
New Southbound Policy Working Plan2016新南向政策工作計畫
Taiwan Travel Act2018[No Chinese version]
Commitment to Taiwan2018[No Chinese version]
★ Xi Jinping’s “Five Points”2019習五條
TAIPEI Act of 20192019[No Chinese version]
Taiwan Assurance Act of 20202020[No Chinese version]
★ The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era [PRC white paper]2022《台灣問題與新時代中國統一事業》【中共白皮書】

(Jump to Documents 1895–1950)    (Jump to Documents 1950–1990)

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Guidelines for National Unification

Name in Chinese guojia tongyi wangling 國家統一綱領
Document type ROC policy guidelines
Year, dates 1991, Feb. 23 (adopted by the National Unification Council); 1991, March 14 (adopted by the Executive Yuan)
 Jump to Chinese version   [Next document]  [Previous document] 

Adopted by the National Unification Council at its third meeting on February 23, 1991, and by the Executive Yuan Council at its 2223rd meeting on March 14, 1991.

I. Foreword

The unification of China is meant to bring about a strong and prosperous nation with a long-lasting, bright future for its people; it is the common wish of Chinese people at home and abroad. After an appropriate period of forthright exchange, cooperation and consultation conducted under the principles of reason, peace, parity, and reciprocity, the two sides of the Taiwan Straits should foster a consensus of democracy, freedom, and equal prosperity and together build anew a unified China. Based on this understanding, these Guidelines have been specially formulated with the express hope that all Chinese throughout the world will work with one mind toward their fulfillment.

II. Goal

To establish a democratic, free and equitably prosperous China.

III. Principles

Both the mainland and Taiwan areas are parts of Chinese territory. Helping to bring about national unification should be the common responsibility of all Chinese people. The unification of China should be for the welfare of all its people and not be subject to partisan conflict. China's unification should aim at promoting Chinese culture, safeguarding human dignity, guaranteeing fundamental human rights, and practicing democracy and the rule of law. The timing and manner of China's unification should first respect the rights and interests of the people in the Taiwan area, and protect their security and welfare. It should be achieved in gradual phases under the principles of reason, peace, parity, and reciprocity.

IV. Process

1. Short term, a phase of exchanges and reciprocity.

(1) To enhance understanding through exchanges between the two sides of the Strait and eliminate hostility through reciprocity; and to establish a mutually benign relationship by not endangering each other's security and stability while in the midst of exchanges and not denying the other's existence as a political entity while in the midst of effecting reciprocity.

(2) To set up an order for exchanges across the Strait, to draw up regulations for such exchanges, and to establish intermediary organizations so as to protect people's rights and interests on both sides of the Strait; to gradually ease various restrictions and expand people-to-people contacts so as to promote the social prosperity of both sides.

(3) In order to improve the people's welfare on both sides of the Strait with the ultimate objective of unifying the nation, in the mainland area economic reform should be carried out forthrightly, the expression of public opinion there should be gradually allowed, and both democracy and the rule of law should be implemented while in the Taiwan area efforts should be made to accelerate constitutional reform and promote national development to establish a society of equitable prosperity.

(4) The two sides of the Strait should end the state of hostility and, under the principle of one China solve all disputes through peaceful means, and furthermore respect, not reject, each other in the international community, so as to move toward a phase of mutual trust and cooperation.

2. Medium term, a phase of mutual trust and cooperation.

(1) Both sides of the Strait should establish official communication channels on equal footing.

(2) Direct postal, transport and commercial links should be allowed and both sides should jointly develop the southeastern coastal area of the Chinese mainland and then gradually extend this development to other areas of the mainland in order to narrow the gap in living standards between the two sides.

(3) Both sides of the Strait should work together and assist each other in taking part in international organizations and activities.

(4) Mutual visits by high-ranking officials on both sides should be promoted to create favourable conditions for consultation and unification.

3. Long term, a phase of consultation and unification

A consultative organization for unification should be established through which both sides, in accordance with the will of the people in both the mainland and Taiwan areas, and while adhering to the goals of democracy, economic freedom, social justice and nationalization of the armed forces, jointly discuss the grand task of unification and map out a constitutional system to establish a democratic, free, and equitably prosperous China.

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國家統一綱領

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

中華民國八十年二月二十三日國家統一委員會第三次會議通過,

中華民國八十年三月十四日行政院第二二二三次會議通過

中華民國九十五年三月一日行政院第二九八０次院會決定「『國家統一綱領』終止適用」函知本院所屬各機關查照

壹、前言

中國的統一，在謀求國家的富強與民族長遠的發展，也是海內外中國人共同的願望。海峽兩岸應在理性、和平、對等、互惠的前提下，經過適當時期的坦誠交流、合作、協商，建立民主、自由、均富的共識，共同重建一個統一的中國。基此認識，特制訂本綱領，務期海內外全體中國人同心協力，共圖貫徹。

貳、目標

建立民主、自由、均富的中國。

參、原則

一、 大陸與台灣均是中國的領土，促成國家的統一，應是中國人共同的責任。

二、 中國的統一，應以全民的福祉為依歸，而不是黨派之爭。

三、 中國的統一，應以發揚中華文化，維護人性尊嚴，保障基本人權，實踐民主法治為宗旨。

四、 中國的統一，其時機與方式，首應尊重台灣地區人民的權益並維護其安全與福祉，在理性、和平、對等、互惠的原則下，分階段逐步達成。

肆、進程

一、 近程－－交流互惠階段

(一) 以交流促進瞭解，以互惠化解敵意；在交流中不危及對方的安全與安定，在互惠中不否定對方為政治實體，以建立良性互動關係。

(二) 建立兩岸交流秩序，制訂交流規範，設立中介機構，以維護兩岸人民權益；逐步放寬各項限制，擴大兩岸民間交流，以促進雙方社會繁榮。

(三) 在國家統一的目標下，為增進兩岸人民福祉：大陸地區應積極推動經濟改革，逐步開放輿論，實行民主法治；台灣地區則應加速憲政改革，推動國家建設，建立均富社會。

(四) 兩岸應摒除敵對狀態，並在一個中國的原則下，以和平方式解決一切爭端，在國際間相互尊重，互不排斥，以利進入互信合作階段。

二、 中程－－互信合作階段

(一) 兩岸應建立對等的官方溝通管道。

(二) 開放兩岸直接通郵、通航、通商，共同開發大陸東南沿海地區，並逐步向其他地區推展，以縮短兩岸人民生活差距。

(三) 兩岸應協力互助，參加國際組織與活動。

(四) 推動兩岸高層人士互訪，以創造協商統一的有利條件。

三、 遠程－－協商統一階段

成立兩岸統一協商機構，依據兩岸人民意願，秉持政治民主、經濟自由、社會公平及軍隊國家化的原則，共商統一大業，研訂憲政體制，以建立民主、自由、均富的中國。

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February 28 Incident Research Report

Name in Chinese "ererba shijian" yanjiu baogao 「二二八事件」研究報告
Document type Official report published by an Ad hoc ROC government agency
Year, date 1992, Feb. 22
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

Foreword

"An investigative study conducted by the Executive Yuan into the February 28 Incident, an incident that no one had dared mention before the end of martial law and that had caused social unease in Taiwan, was to be used by the government as a reference in the settlement of the aftermath of the February 28 Incident." Therefore, in January 1991, the "February 28 Incident Research Group" was established with eight members, Chen Chung-Kuang, Yeh Ming-hsun, Li Yunhan, Chih Ching-Teh, Chang Yu-fa, Marvin Ho, Chen San-ching and Lai Jeh-hang, and with Chen Chung-Kuang and Yeh Ming-hsun as conveners and Lai Jeh-hang as chief writer. Apart from Lai Jeh-hang, the group also invited four other professors, Huang Fu-san, Wu Wenxing, Huang Xiuzheng, and Hsu Hsueh-chi, to join the writers panel. Chen Mei-fei, Chien Jung-tsung and Fang Huifang were part-time researchers, respectively assisting Huang Fu-san, Huang Xiuzheng and Yeh Ming-hsun, the so called "Working Team."

"The above-mentioned authors conducted archive and literature research and oral history recording in accordance with their academic conscience and non-partisan positions." Although the research period was only one year, they were able to gain access to first hand materials from the government and to interview hundreds of witnesses before systematically and objectively analyzing the incident in its entirety.

"When it came to the collection of material, in addition to sourcing from the existing archives of the Taiwanese government, researchers also went to China and other countries to collect relevant data of high value, including documents concerning the February 28 Incident donated by George H. Kerr to Stanford University's Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Tamsui Consulate documents provided by the Public Record Office of the United Kingdom, documents provided by the Second Historical Archives of China in Nanjing, etc. The material obtained by the research team can be counted as some of the richest among all overseas and domestic research programs in relation to this topic.

"After the publication of the February 28 Incident investigation report on February 22, 1992, it was generally accepted by the public in spite of disagreements over some details." Referring to further information, the authors edited and supplemented the original report and had it published by China Times Publishing Co. on February 20, 1994. This was how "Research Report on the February 28 Incident" came into being.

There is no doubt that "Research Report on the February 28 Incident" is the primary source that people should refer to if they wish to understand this incident. However, a total of 504 pages can be quite burdensome for members of our busy modern society. The "Conclusion" chapter of the report, which spans from page 405 to page 412, provides a brief description and review of the February 28 Incident, allowing readers to understand the cause, progression and aftermath of the incident. Therefore, the Memorial Foundation of 228 especially chose this chapter as the core of this article, which is divided into eight sections and supplemented with footnotes to strengthen the clarity of the main text. Footnotes are all quoted from the "Research Report" except where specified otherwise. It is expected that readers of this article can gain a comprehensive idea of the February 28 Incident within an hour. Of course, if you wish to understand the entire incident in more detail, you should refer to the original report.

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1. Background of the incident

The February 28 Massacre (Footnote 1) took place less than a year and a half after the end of the Second World War (Footnote 2). The background of the incident is extremely complicated and cannot be explained in terms of only one factor. First of all, fifty years of Japanese colonial rule led to a general lack of understanding of both the political system and societal circumstances of China. Therefore, disillusionment with the new regime became apparent before the end of 1945 (Footnote 3). Secondly, on the political front, the system of the Chief Executive's Office (Footnote 4) was beset with many defects and problems, including the corrupt and ineffective behaviors of government officials (Footnote 5) and soldiers (Footnote 6), unfair distribution of political resources (Footnote 7), etc. On the economic front, improper policies for controlling the economy (Footnote 8) resulted in an industrial slump (Footnote 9), hyperinflation (Footnote 10) and severe unemployment. On the societal front, Taiwanese veterans who served in the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy (Footnote 11) could find hardly any employment opportunities after returning from the battlefields and ended up destitute, which resulted in the gradual formation of an undercurrent of anti-government sentiment. In addition, the obstinate personality of Chief Executive Chen Yi (Footnote 12) made it impossible for him to understand the feelings of the Taiwanese people, which resulted in the deterioration of the relationship between the government and the people. The above-mentioned factors contributed to a premonition of an imminent crisis among people of insight (Footnote 13) well before the Chief Executive's Office became aware of it (Footnote 14).

Footnotes:

1. The time frame of "Research Report on the February 28 Incident" spans from February 27, 1947, when the conflict around contraband tobacco occurred, to May 16, when the "village purging" ended. [Foreword]
2. 1945
3. Due to the long-time censoring of information, Taiwanese people who lived under Japanese colonial rule did not know much about their Ancestral Country. Because of this, Taiwanese people tended to compare the governance of the Chinese Nationalist government, which extended its rule to Taiwan after the Second World War, with the Japanese colonial government, especially when it came to military, political, economic and societal aspects. Seeing the stark contrast between the two regimes, Taiwanese people started to feel that newcomers from their Ancestral Country were worse than the Japanese and feelings of contempt and disdain were thus rooted in their minds. In addition, the schism between Taiwanese locals and people from different provinces of China was further widened because some people from the Chinese mainland cajoled Taiwanese women into fake marriages, and the lifestyles, values and ethics of the newcomers conflicted with those of the locals due to incompatible social backgrounds and a lack of modern knowledge. Taiwanese people's expectations of this regime that came from their Ancestral Country were too high, and their general disappointment was soon followed by widespread contempt. (Page 27)
4. According to the Taiwan Province Chief Executive's Office Organization Act, the Chief Executive's Office was entrusted by the Central Government to manage its administrative affairs. The Chief Executive had the power to mandate and supervise departments of the Central Government in Taiwan and to issue office orders and separate regulations within the scope of his responsibilities. At the same time, he also assumed post of commander-in-chief of the Taiwan Garrison Command. It can be seen that the Chief Executive's Office system was a form of centralized leadership which placed the judicial, legislative, military, and administrative powers of Taiwan province in the Chief Executive himself. The Chief Executive was appointed by the Central Government, which was different to the directorial system used in other Chinese provinces. The implementation of the directorial system in all provincial governments meant that the members of directorial boards and chairmen were all senior ranking officials; while all the people working for the departments of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office (such as Departments of Secretariat, Civil Affairs, Education, Finance, Agriculture, Forestry, Industry and Mining, Transportation, Police and Accounting) and secretary-generals were all contracted staff members of the Chief Executive himself. In addition, an organic law committee, propaganda committee and assessment and design committee were also set up in Taiwan. The system of banking and currency was also different to China. Chen Yi believed that the Taiwan dollar and Taiwanese financial institutions should maintain their own original systems and the current legal tender of China should be prevented from circulating in Taiwan, so that "Taiwan could avoid the consequences of hyperinflation which was out of control in the Chinese mainland provinces caused by the over-issuing of the legal tender." Therefore, Chen Yi proposed that "the priority was to maintain stability by issuing an independent New Taiwan dollar so that prosperity could be achieved in Taiwan without being affected by the serious depreciation of legal tender used on the mainland." Before Chen Yi came to Taiwan, his proposal was approved by President Chiang Kai-shek, who later personally instructed Soong Tse-ven to implement Chen Yi's idea. Because of this, four banks and two financial entities (Central Bank, Bank of China, Bank of Communications, Farmers Bank, Central Trust of China and General Post Office) that originally intended to set up branches in Taiwan were not allowed to do so. The Ministry of Finance also issued Regulations Concerning the Currency Exchange Between Taiwan and the Mainland, which stipulated that "no banks except the Central Bank and those that are endorsed by the government are allowed to undertake currency exchanges between the Taiwan dollar and the legal tender of China." (Page 6) Many Taiwanese people believed that the financial arrangement of the Nationalist government treated them as if they were being colonized, and they felt discontented with the government. (Page 4)
5. Government officials not only did not serve the citizens on weekdays, but also put on official airs or acted irresponsibly and inattentively when they were approached. These drawbacks dramatically contrasted the diligence and efficiency of officials from the Japanese colonial period. (Page 20) A lack of political efficiency and an overly bureaucratic manner were things that Taiwanese people had not experienced during the Japanese colonial period. Within one year and a half, it became evident that the Taiwan Province Executive's Office was outperformed greatly by its Japanese predecessor. Newspapers often reported that government officials were involved in scandals like going to bars, lack of discipline and corruption. For example, on February 22, 1947, Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News published an editorial opinion piece "On the Problem of Corruption," which not only disclosed a stunning number of corruption cases, but also pointed out the fact that many government officials frequently attended ballrooms, tea houses, restaurants and casinos in the cities, showing that there were too many unnecessary employees in the government, as well as the fact that people's impression of government officials was very poor. Corruption cases were not limited to general officials. Prosecutors, court presidents, and even teachers were found to be corrupt. Soldiers not abiding by the law or not paying when shopping or traveling was very common, and there was even public looting. Many of these corruption cases exceeded 10 million Taiwan dollars in amount. (Page 21)
6. The troops stationed in Taiwan had a poor reputation. Soldiers often "forcibly borrowed money, raped women, and shot and wounded people. It was not uncommon to see soldiers buying five-dollar eggs with only one dollar. Disputes in the markets were commonplace." Robbery and theft were also commonly seen. (Page 23)
7. During the Japanese colonial period, it was difficult for Taiwanese people to gain fair political treatment for administrative, professional and technological advancement. After the Second World War, many Taiwanese people harbored the fantasy of an autonomous Taiwan and believed they should be able to self-rule from then on. To the contrary, among 18 directors and deputy directors from nine important departments of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office, only one deputy director was from Taiwan. Among 17 mayors of cities and counties, only Taipei Mayor You Mijian, Hsinchu County Mayor Liu Qiguang, Kaohsiung Mayor Huang Zhongtu (formerly Lian Mou), and Kaohsiung County Mayor Xie Dongyu (formerly Huang Daping at the time of the February 28 Incident) were Taiwanese, but they were all Puànn-suann-á, meaning officials of Taiwanese heritage who had returned from Chongqing, the former capital of the Chinese Nationalist government, and were not welcome by Taiwanese locals. What made Taiwanese people even more upset was the treatment of "unequal pay for the same work" and the difficulty associated with becoming employed by the government or public institutions. (Page 19)
8. Foreign trade is extremely important to the economy of an island region. If an island region does not rely on foreign trade, it must have a considerable amount of resources. Because Taiwan was not considered to be resource-rich, it still needed to trade with the world. However, Chen Yi did not seem to understand the situation. After he arrived in Taiwan, he began to implement a controlled economy... Although he knew that this would invoke opposition from businesspeople, Chen Yi believed that this economic policy was for the benefit of the public, not for private interests.
 "What Chen Yi wanted to pursue was not to fatten the pockets of a few people but to gradually deal with the livelihood issues facing Taiwanese people in terms of food, clothes, and amenities." Chen Yi's attitude showed his longing for socialist ideas, which, coupled with his obstinate and stubborn character, resulted in considerable criticism and condemnation of his economic policies. This became one of the catalysts triggering the February 28 Incident. (Page 7)
 Because of the uniqueness of Taiwan's administrative arrangement, the Taiwan Province Executive's Office did not welcome influences from outside the island. This mentality was evident in the rejection of Chinese banks seeking to operate in Taiwan, including the above-mentioned "four banks and two financial entities" and other private banks, which "brought a halt to the operation of any private trade enterprises except the ones run by government officials and police." This situation also caused the government banks on the Chinese mainland to use "the currency exchange problem" as an excuse to adopt a blockade policy in retaliation against Taiwan, which made Taiwan become self-isolated. As a result, ferry and air tickets were not allowed to be sold, Taiwanese customs lost tax revenue, and ships were not permitted to leave ports, impeding the transportation of goods to the outside world. In addition, the controlled economy policy implemented by the Taiwan Province Executive's Office, which in reality amounted to the dominance of the government in trade business and an unpredictable exchange rate, demotivated businesspeople. Because of this, shipping and selling goods in Taiwan became difficult, which resulted in a self-isolated situation in which foreign goods could not reach Taiwan and Taiwanese goods could not ship overseas. (Page 25)
 On January 10, 1946, a Taiwanese compatriot petitioned the Executive Yuan that "the Central Government should abolish government-run trade enterprises and any other similar intermediary institutions that compromised the free market and revoke all types of military laws to lighten the load on the people." This showed that the people were dissatisfied with Chen Yi's policy of a controlled economy. (Page 22)
9. (Chen Yi) not only set up the Monopoly Bureau to continue the monopoly system that the Japanese colonial government had implemented in Taiwan, but also controlled the Trade Bureau that managed transportation to and from Taiwan. His regime monopolized almost every aspect of the island's trade and industries, hindering the development of private enterprises and causing discontent and disillusion among locals. Therefore, these two institutions became the target that reform-minded people sought to abolish during the February 28 Incident. (Page 26)
10. The economic crisis in Taiwan was mainly caused by inflation and soaring prices, especially food prices. Taiwan was originally known for its production of rice. During the Japanese colonial period, crop production dropped dramatically "due to the war…" Soon after the Chinese Nationalist government extended its rule to Taiwan in 1946…Taiwan experienced a serious food shortage that was evident in the rocketing price of rice, such that some people at the time believed that the price level in Taiwan was higher than that in any province of China. Famine broke out in many places, and social unrest even occurred in rice production areas, such as in Taichung and Tainan. More and more people lost their jobs over time. Daylight robbery and burglary were everywhere. (Page 23)
 From October 1945 to December 1946, Taiwan's price level had inflated more than a hundredfold. The problem of food prices was particularly serious. (Page 25)
 600 grams of rice originally sold for only 1.5 Taiwan dollars. However, in early 1946, the price for this much rice had already risen to more than 10 Taiwan dollars. On February, 1947, the price reached 32 Taiwan dollars per 600 grams. This was not something that Taiwanese people had experienced before, so they were particularly angry about the food price crisis. (Page 8)
11. About 100,000 Taiwanese servicemen…enlisted in the Imperial Japanese Army or Navy. (Page 118)
12. Surrounded by immoral staff, Chen Yi trusted his subordinates too much and was too permissive with them. Chiang Wei-chuan, the then chairman of the Taipei Chamber of Commerce, once criticized Chen Yi in person, saying that he resided in the deep end of the palace surrounded by corrupt officialdom and a few opportunists who claimed to be the bridge between the government and the people but who knew nothing about society or the people, resulting in a situation where public opinions were blocked from reaching him. (Page 12)
13. Less than three months after Taiwan fell under the rule of the Chinese Nationalist government, many Taiwanese people were already criticizing Chen Yi for his inappropriate approach in Taiwan. In early 1946, the situation in Taiwan had deteriorated dramatically, causing concerns in China and the West. Mintai News Agency urged the government to pay more attention to the problems in Taiwan. Millard's Review from Shanghai published the article "Taiwan moving 50 years backward," saying that "in five months Taiwan would become the ‘Ireland' of China." In early 1946, a report presented by the U.S. Consulate in Taiwan to the U.S. ambassador to China and the U.S. Department of State, wrote, "Taiwan is already on the verge of an armed rebellion." By early 1947, many acute observers had already realized the graveness of the situation. For example, the Taiwan correspondent of a Shanghai magazine The Observers predicted on February 2, 1947, just before the February 28 Incident: "Taiwan is in the middle of a crisis. The situation is precarious. At any time, disturbance or rebellion could occur here." It was clear that many people in China and the West had already seen that Taiwan was on the brink of social upheaval. (Page 10)
14.  In the aspects of politics and the economy, Taiwanese people were greatly disappointed by the government. Nonetheless, Chen Yi, who sought to gloss over the domestic problems in Taiwan, still managed to send the government army stationed on the island to the Chinese mainland to crack down on communist activities, which left Taiwan in a militarily vulnerable position. Because of this, radicals were made to believe that they could definitely overturn Chen Yi's regime and fearlessly encouraged ordinary people to rebel against the government. (Page 25)

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2. The outbreak of the massacre

The February 28 Massacre resulted from the misconduct of contraband investigators and police and military police authorities in regards to contraband tobacco confiscation (Footnote 15), which gave rise to mass petition and protest and strike actions from laborers and shopkeepers in Taipei on February 28 (Footnote 16). An incident in which guards shot at protesters at the headquarters of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office the same day (Footnote 17) meant the unrest was further exacerbated and became unstoppable. The petition for punishing the perpetrators was turned into a fight against the Taiwan Province Executive's Office (Footnote 18). Conflict between Taiwanese locals and people from other Chinese provinces was thus provoked (Footnote 19). Resistance and conflict spread throughout the whole island in no time, transforming an originally quite simple public security incident into a political movement. Local leaders took advantage of this opportunity to demand total reform. Military conflicts broke out in some areas after insurgents took control of weapons that belonged to the military and police (Footnote 20).

Footnotes:

15.  The February 28 Massacre was triggered by an accident regarding contraband tobacco confiscation near Chien-Cheng Circle. An outline of what happened in the incident is as follows. At about 11 a.m. on February 27, 1947, the Monopoly Bureau received an intelligence that around 50 boxes of matches and tobacco had been smuggled in through Tamsui Port. Later, six contraband investigators, Yeh Te-ken, Chung Yen-chou, Chao Tzu-chien, Liu Chao-chun, Sheng Tie-fu and Fu Hsueh-tung, along with four policemen from the local police squad, were sent by the bureau to Tamsui, where they only confiscated five boxes of smuggled goods. Soon after, another intelligence showed that the rest of the smuggled goods had been shipped to somewhere near Tianma Tea House, situated on Taipei's Nanjing West Road (formerly known as Taiheicho, on the current Yanping North Road). This area was renowned for being the largest destination of contraband. The investigators and policemen first went to Hsiao Hsiang Yuan (which was near Taiheicho) for dinner, so that they could proceed with their investigation nearby. At 7:30 p.m., they arrived at Tianma Tea House to discover that the contraband sellers had already left, except for Lin Chiang-mai, a 40-year-old widow who was selling both legal and smuggled cigarettes, which were soon confiscated along with the cash she had. Lin Chiang-mai practically knelt down to beg the investigators and said: "If you confiscate all my belongings, I will have no money to buy food. You should at least return my cash money and the cigarettes produced by the Monopoly Bureau to me…." However, the investigators ignored her request. At the time, there was a crowd of bystanders, many of whom also started to implore the investigators on her behalf. All of a sudden, Lin Chiang-mai frantically grasped at one of the investigators, not letting him go. Seeing this, another investigator, Yeh Te-ken, hit her head with the barrel of his gun, making her head bleed profusely. Witnessing the violent scene, the crowd of bystanders burst into anger and surrounded the investigators, passionately shouting, "A-suann (a derogatory name for Chinese Mainlanders) are too unreasonable," "These pigs are monstrous" and "Return the cigarettes." As soon as the investigators realized they had got themselves into trouble, they tried to escape from the crowd chasing close behind. One investigator called Fu Hsueh-tung pulled his trigger in an attempt to escape, but he accidentally shot Chen Wen-si, a fellow citizen who had been watching the incident in front of his house, who died the next day. Investigators escaped to Eirakuchō (Xinin) Police Station before they went to the Police Headquarters right next to Zhongshan Hall. The angry protesters smashed the glass windows of the investigators' truck and pushed it over on the roadside. Later they surrounded the police station, demanding the murderer to be handed over and brought to justice. After Li Chiung, a member of the Standing Committee of the Monopoly Bureau, and Yang Tzu-tsai, the leader of the fourth group of the sales department, learned of the conflict at about 9 p.m. they rushed to the conflict site, where their truck was attacked by around 100 protesters assembled there. Li and Yang quickly went to the Taipei City Police Station, where a crowd of about 600 to 700 people followed them. Li and Yang promised the protesters that they would punish the investigators, but the crowd insisted that they should hand over the criminals. Li and Yang, accompanied by the director of the Taipei City Police Station, had no choice but to send the six investigators to the Military Police Corps. However, the people were not satisfied with the measure, demanding the six investigators should be arrested immediately. Seeking an excuse to pacify the crowd, Li and Yang kept saying that they were "not authorized to reply to the request because the laws clearly stipulated how to punish the perpetrators and penalize the wrongdoing," but they were not understood. After the protesters learned that the investigators had been sent to the Military Police Corps, located to the opposite of the Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News office, they moved to surround the building, demanding the criminals be handed over. The regiment leader Zhang Mutao firmly denied the request and ordered a platoon of military police soldiers get into shooting position. Seeing this, the protesters hid in the arcade of the Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News office. Chou Chuang-chih, who had witnessed the whole situation, remembered that Wu Chin-lien, the Chief Editor of the Japanese version of Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News, had walked outside to see what was going on out of curiosity before he saw and greeted Chou Chuang-chih smilingly. Chou asked him, "Do you have gongs?" Wu said, "Yes." He went back to the office to fetch copper gongs. Soon after a rainstorm, the gongs were banged loudly and the protesters went on surrounding the Military Police Corps again. There were also some young people shouting out loud "Taiwanese people must get revenge" and "People who don't get revenge are not Taiwanese" while banging their gongs on the streets overnight. Some people went to ask Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News to cover the conflict. The Chief Editor Wu Chin-lien declined the request, saying that the Propaganda Commission of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office had ordered the newspaper not to report on the incident. In response, the protesters threatened to burn down the newspaper with gasoline, which forced Li Wanju, the chief executive officer of Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News, to talk to the protesters. Soon after Li Wanju agreed to publish the news, protesters started to leave the site. The next day, Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News reported on the conflict using number five font size in approximately a hundred words. (Page 48) Following the news coverage, the injuries and killings caused by the anti-contraband operation ignited public anger that had been simmering for over a year. The outraged people went to burn cars and surround the police stations and Military Police Corps, requesting the government execute the perpetrators. Not satisfied with the response from the government, the mass of protesters remained on the site not wanting to leave, which culminated in intensified conflict the following day. (Page 51)
16. On February 28 at 9 a.m., protestors continued to bang their gongs on the streets to announce a shutdown of all commercial activities, as the injuries and killings that had occurred in the anti-contraband operation had not been resolved. Citizens and shops immediately joined the strike and one after another shut their doors. A group of protesters marched to Taihei-cho Ni-chome Police Station, where the police station director, Huang, attempted to stop the rally. Remembering that Huang had been very abusive to the people living in his precinct, the protesters started to attack him and smashed the windows and belongings of the police station. As time passed, more and more people joined the rally, and, at about 10 a.m., they broke into the Taipei branch of the culpable Monopoly Bureau, located in Honmachi (today's Chongqing South Road), to discover a few contraband investigators inside the building. The protesters believed one of the investigators to be the murderer from last night, so they beat him and a policeman to death and injured four other people. They also took the matches, tobacco, alcohol, car and seven or eight bicycles that were stored in the building out to the street and burned them. The fire had not died off completely by the next day. By that time, there were about 2000 to 3000 people watching nearby. Military police and police were sent there in no time, but they did not dare deal with the conflict and eventually left… At midday, the protesters moved to the Monopoly Bureau headquarters located near the South Gate, where they continued to demand the punishment of the murderer. But military police and police authorities had already prepared themselves for the coming protesters so that only windows were broken… Because the protesters' request was not accepted by the Monopoly Bureau headquarters, they later headed to the Taiwan Province Executive's Office…The factory near the South Gate that belonged to the Monopoly Bureau was also damaged by the protesters, which showed how fierce the public resentment toward the Monopoly Bureau was. (Page 51)
17. Around 1 p.m., a rally of about 400 to 500 shouting, chanting protesters was led by the banging gongs to march from Taipei Railway Station to the headquarters of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office. It was said that many people who had suffered the consequences of the market rice shortage followed the march to the headquarters, hearing that rice was being given away there. As a result, the march seemed to become a formidable force, until it was obstructed at the Zhongshan Road intersection by well-equipped soldiers with rifles pointed at the protesters before they reached the square of the headquarters. In no time, waves of bullets forced the protesters to escape, leaving some people wounded or dead on the road. This was the Executive's Office Guard Shooting Incident, which was a key factor in the exacerbation of the whole situation. (Page 52)
18. After the shooting outside the headquarters of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office, large-scale confrontation became inevitable. The clash between Taiwanese locals and new immigrants from China that had been intensifying since the end of the Second World War was turned into violent conflict. While Taiwanese locals were fighting against the government, they also initiated a series of violent actions, "Attack A-suann," targeting the new Chinese immigrants. At around 2 p.m. on February 28, the protesters gathered at Taipei Park (now known as the 228 Peace Memorial Park) before they occupied the Taiwan Radio Station to broadcast to the whole island. While on air, they accused the government of corruption and criticized its forced rice exportation policies and the economic turmoil, as well as urged the public to ostracize the corrupt officials for the sake of self-preservation. However, it is said that the transmission station in Banqiao boycotted the uprising so that the radio proclamation was not passed on to the rest of the island and the message only circulated in the Taipei area. Whether true or not, Taiwan being small in territory meant that its relative ease of travel and communication did not hinder the conflict that occurred in Taipei on February 28 from spreading to the rest of island, where the request for punishing the perpetrators was heightened to a political struggle movement. At 3 p.m., seeing the dire situation, the Taiwan Garrison Command announced the imposition of martial law and sent armed police and soldiers to patrol the streets and machine-gun civilians. Nevertheless, protesters continued surrounding the Monopoly Bureau headquarters, Railway Police Bureau and Department of Transportation and other government agencies, where many civilians, including students, were killed in the conflict with police and soldiers. According to a "briefing" from the Taiwan Garrison Command, more than 1000 people gathered at the General Post Office refused to be dispersed by police and soldiers in the afternoon, and the ensuing clash resulted in the injury or death of about ten people. (Page 54)
19. Taiwanese people also vented their anger at the new immigrants from China, indiscriminately making reprisals against innocent people. Cheng Hwa Travel Agency and Tiger Brand's Yong An Tang, both located at former Honmachi, suffered the first blows. Not only were their windows smashed, their belongings were also moved out to be burned in open fires. At about 5 p.m., Sin Tai Company, the largest department store in Taipei run by the Sakaecho Trade Bureau, was also broken into and its products were taken out for public burning. Anyone who seized the chance to steal would be beaten up. People who were driving cars or trucks were asked to leave behind their vehicles, which were later pushed to Taipei Railway Station and Chien-Cheng Circle and burned. According to data, more than ten vehicles were set on fire. In addition to wreaking havoc, Taiwanese people also indiscriminately attacked new immigrants from China. In Honmachi, Taipei Railway Station, Taipei Park, Sakaecho, Eirakucho, Taiheicho and Wanhua, many new Chinese immigrants were reported to have been attacked by locals for no obvious reason. Hsinchu County Mayor, Wen-bo Chu, and the director of Taipei City Government's Department of Land were both publicly humiliated and beaten up. It is generally believed that these series of riots against new Chinese immigrants were unleashed by an explosion of pent-up anger accumulated in the one year and a half since the end of Second World War. Innocent low-ranking civil servants and their families, and Chinese businesspeople who came to travel or do business in Taiwan, became scapegoats of the public indignation. Many appalling violent acts were also reported… Wang Yi-ting, who served at the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration back then, witnessed these acts himself. But he said in most cases the attacks were done with bats or rod, and he did not see people using samurai swords. Not many assaults were carried out against women or aged people. Rape was not commonly reported. It was said that at least 15 newly-immigrated Chinese people were beaten to death and some others were paralyzed in wooden bat attacks. (Page 55)
20. Zhang Mutao, the leader of the Military Police Corps, also pointed out that the situation in Taiwan was reaching the stage of "treasonous uprising," with local governments completely losing their ability to control. Many police stations and army battalions around Taiwan were disarmed by the rioters, who took away at least 4000 firearms in total. Zhang accused Chen Yi of "seeming not to understand the severity of the situation and of still trying to paint an illusion of peace." (Page 203)

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3. The escalation of the conflict

Taipei City was in the eye of this political storm before it engulfed the whole island. The February 28 Incident Settlement Committee (Footnote 21) in Taipei and its branches in many municipalities were the main actors in the political turmoil. During this period of turbulence, certain government officials who were already despised by the local people before the conflict quit their positions and escaped one by one, which meant that even those government officials who were willing to maintain the public order and cooperate with the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee were forced by the changing situation to temporarily hide away for their safety. The February 28 Incident Settlement Committee in Taipei and its branches in other municipalities all bore heavy responsibility for gathering public opinion, maintaining the public order and promoting political reforms, as well as communicating with the Chief Executive's Office (Footnote 22). This meant that at times they almost replaced the function of the Chief Executive's Office and local governments (Footnote 23). However, there were divergent opinions and conflicting policies within the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee and there were no unified administrative guidelines for its local branches to follow, which resulted in its failure to fully perform its function of pacifying the political situation.

After the outbreak of the incident, conflicts at different places were intensified, which gave the opportunity for the Chinese Communist Party and its allies to interfere politically. For example, Hsieh Hsueh-hung and Yang Ke-huang directed the Taichung area insurgence of the March 2 Incident (Footnote 24). Hsieh Hsueh-hung not only convened an "assembly of citizens" to take advantage of the power of demonstrators in completely taking over official institutions of the Taichung City Government, but also mobilized young people and students to organize the 27 Brigade (Footnote 25), which was a militarized force striving for the complete democratization of Taiwan. The path of armed uprising was thus created beyond the parliamentary approach adopted by the Settlement Committee.

The Chiayi area showed different characteristics from other places following the March 2 Incident (Footnote 26). First of all, local people formed an armed group and joined the military operation attacking an armory near Lantan Lake and Shueishang Airport (Footnote 27). Most of the participants in these actions were not professional soldiers. Secondly, many people in the Chiayi area supported these uprising actions. Because of this, Mayor Sun Chih-chun believed that the intensity of the battle and the casualties of civil servants and teachers were possibly the highest among all municipalities in Taiwan.

From March 3, Kaohsiung had experienced social unrest triggered by furious locals, who took increasingly drastic actions as time went by and later besieged the 105 Military Hospital and the headquarters of the Kaohsiung Military Police Corps (Footnote 28). Peng Meng-Chi, the commander of the Kaohsiung Military Fortress, believed that the besiegement already constituted a rebellion and was ready to resort to military crackdown. On March 6 at around 2 p.m., Peng Meng-Chi detained the delegates of the opposition (Footnote 29) and suppressed the uprising with a swift military operation (Footnote 30), which although stabilized the tumultuous situation in Kaohsiung, resulted in casualties inside the Kaohsiung City Government building (Footnote 31) and outside the railway station (Footnote 32). In the village purging that came afterwards, 1500 suspected "criminals" were arrested, some of whom were even executed in public. This is said to be one of the important reasons the trauma of the conflict could not be properly healed for a long time.

Footnotes:

21.  To reflect public opinion, the Taipei City Council invited Taiwanese members of the National Assembly, the Taiwan Provincial Assembly and the National Political Council to attend the inaugural conference of the Contraband Cigarette Murder Investigation Committee at 10 a.m. on March 1 at Zhongshan Hall. During the conference, a resolution was passed to delegate Huang Chao-chin (the speaker of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly), Chou Yan-shou (member of the Taipei City Council), Wang Tien-teng (member of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly) and Lin Chung (member of the National Political Council) to meet the Chief Executive and make several requests, including the abolishment of martial law, the release of civilians who had been arrested, the refraining of police and soldiers from shooting people, the organization of a settlement committee consisting of both representatives from the government and civil society, and the above-mentioned requests to be broadcast by Chen Yi to the whole population of Taiwan. Chen Yi accepted all the requests and thought that the Committee would be better renamed the "February 28 Incident Settlement Committee," which is how the organization came to have this name. (Page 57)
 The February 28 Incident Settlement Committee on the one hand was trying to strengthen its function, while at the same time to promote itself. On the afternoon of March 6, the Settlement Committee hosted its inaugural conference at Zhongshan Hall chaired by Wang Tien-teng. In the conference, two people from the National Political Council (Lin Hsien-tang, Chen Yi-song), four from the National Assembly (Li Wanju, Lien Chen-tung, Lin Lien-Chung, Huang Kuo-shu), five from the Taipei City Council (Chou Yan-shou, Pan Chu-yuan, Chien Sheng-yu, Hsu Chun-ching, Wu Chun-lin) and six from the Taiwan Provincial Assembly (Wang Tien-teng, Huang Chao-chin, Su Wei-liang, Huang Chun-ching, Lin Wei-gong, Kuo Kuo-chi) were elected as standing members. Hung Huo-lien and Wu Kuo-hsin were placed on the waiting list. (Page 66)
22. On March 7, Chen Yi sent a letter to the Settlement Committee saying the many disputes and competing opinions among all parties in civil society should be discussed and integrated by the Commission before it presented proposals to the Chief Executive's Office. (Page 70)
23. From March 3 to 5, municipal branches of the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee were set up one after another across Taiwan, which indicated that the power of the Chief Executive's Office had been undermined. (Page 66)
24. On the morning of March 2, Taichung locals gathered at the Theater of Taichung to…join a civic assembly. Yang Ke-huang, a faculty member from the private Chienkuo Polytechnic School, hosted the meeting, and made a presentation on the origin of the incident in Taipei and the people's petition activities, as well as explained the political movement in Taipei and the requests made by the protestors. Later, the attendants unanimously chose the principal of Chienkuo Polytechnic School, Hsieh Hsueh-hung, to be the chairperson of the assembly. After assuming this position, Hsieh "described in detail the repressive rule by Chen Yi and the political atmosphere in Taiwan after the end of the Second World War, emphasizing that if Taiwanese people wanted to liberate themselves from the agony, they must unite to end the one-party authoritarian rule of the Chinese Nationalist Party and immediately implement the democratic autonomy of Taiwan. To achieve this, they must join the heroic resistance of the people of Taipei. They must struggle and fight for total victory regardless of the sacrifice that must be made." After Hsieh finished her speech, Wu Yong-chang, representing the Taiwan Political Construction Association, and lawyer Chang Feng-mo also gave speeches, which were considered to "be subversive to the government and provocative of the anti-newcomer sentiments in the Taiwanese population." At about 10 a.m., the attendees of the event decided to demonstrate on the street to show their support for the movement. Protesters turned on the sirens of fire engines to call on the people of Taichung to join the active resistance in this revolution. In no time, Taichung was shaken by the wave of uprising to the point that extreme tension could be felt everywhere in the city. (Page 84)
25. On March 6, Hsieh Hsueh-hung, who wished to thoroughly pursue her political agenda, decided to continue her resistance activity. She mustered around 400 young students to form the 27 Brigade inside the 8th Troop. Hsieh Hsueh-hung assumed the role of the brigade chief commander and appointed Chung Yi-jen and Tsai Tieh-cheng to be captain and chief of staff respectively. Important cadre members included Yang Ke-huang, Li Chiao-sung and Gu Rui-yun. The core troops consisted of the Puli Combat Team, headed by Chung Yi-jen's trusted aide Huang Hsin-chin; the Taichung Commercial School Combat Team, headed by Ho Tsip-huai and Tsai Po-hsun (with some communists as its team members); the Taichung Normal School Combat Team, headed by communist Lu Huan-chang; the Public Security Team, headed by Huang Chin-tao; and the Chienkuo Polytechnic School Combat Team, headed by Li Bing-kun. In addition, members also included farmers who had been enlisted by the Japanese Army; students from Yanping College; former second-lieutenants and engineers from the Japanese Army, and some people who voluntarily joined the fight. The establishment of the 27 Brigade was a manifestation of armed struggle against the local governments. "This militia represented an armed struggle alternative to the parliamentary route of the Settlement Commission. Among all the military resistance forces in central and southern Taiwan, the 27 Brigade was the one that endured the longest." (Page 91)
26. On March 2 at 3 p.m., a couple of dozen young people from Changhua and Taichung headed south to Chiayi Railway Station and Chiayi Fountain Circle. Among them, a rifle-carrying man whose age was about 30 or 40 was shouting on the street, urging his fellow citizens to burn down Mayor Sun Chih-chun's official residence. Seeing the dire situation, Mayor Sun jumped over the wall, having decided to seek refuge at the local military corps. Unfortunately, a large crowd of protesters followed him behind, appearing as a dangerous threat to the mayor's life. He was fortunate to encounter two City Council members, Lin Bao and Lin Wen-shu, who helped him get to the headquarters of the military police corps.
 When Mayor Sun Chih-chun was trying to escape, actions like attacking newcomers from China, surrounding police stations, and taking over weapons could already be seen occurring on the streets. Because police officers had started to leave their posts one after another, the city center was in chaos. At 5 p.m., Mayor Sun Chih-chun tried to contact the garrison on the phone and asked Chiayi City Council Speaker Chung Chia-cheng to maintain the public order. On March 3, the day the assembly of citizens was convened, Chiayi City's branch of the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee was established with Chen Fu-chih (director of the Chiayi branch of the Preparatory Office of the Three People's Principles Youth Corps) as director and combat commander, and Li Hsiao-fang as secretary. Different groups and teams in the Committee were set up under its supervision. (Page 105)
27. After a couple of hours of negotiations, Chiayi City's branch of the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee decided to take over the radio station and broadcast its voluntary soldier recruitment message across the whole of Chiayi City and other places in Taiwan. Responding to this appeal, many people from Budai, Puzi, Yanshui, Jiali, Liujiao, Fanlu, Douliu, Taichung, Puli and Tainan Technical College came to Chiayi to join the movement. Under Mayor Sun's request, Luo Di-guang, the commander of the battalion (1st Battalion, Independent Regiment, 21st Division) stationed at Tomoncho sent his soldiers to crack down on the uprising activity in the city center, which made the development of the situation more uncertain. Given that the powerful weapons held by the government army could easily cause significant casualties, the Chiayi Settlement Committee delegated City Council members to negotiate with the military police corps with the aim of solving the conflict in a peaceful manner. However, both parties could not agree on the terms of a peaceful settlement.
 On the same day, about 3000 volunteers who came to Chiayi to join the resistance force started to attack the Military Police Corps, Lantan Lake 19th Armory, Shueishang Airport and Tomoncho Battalion. On March 3 at 9 p.m., the Chiayi City Government was taken over by the resistance force and all police officers who were recent immigrants from China retreated to Tomoncho under the guidance of Police Chief Lin Tian-gang. (Page 106)
28. On March 3, "hundreds of villains" who had come down from Taipei were brought to the city center on trucks, and students from Tainan Technical College also arrived in Kaohsiung. This was the beginning of Kaohsiung's version of the February 28 Incident. At first, a platoon of the government army (1st Platoon, 7th Company, Independent Regiment) stationed at the 105 Military Hospital was attacked. At the same time, about 400 to 500 people were gathering at Yancheng attempting to attack the military corps. The beating up, humiliation and robbing of new immigrants from China and their businesses was heard of from time to time. The city center of Kaohsiung was in the grips of a severe public security crisis. In the evening, Police Chief Tung Pao-chao sought refuge at the Military Fortress after his car was set on fire by protesters. Before dawn, the police station's telephone line was cut off and its weapons were taken away. Many Taiwanese police officers fled with their guns. Some went home directly, no longer willing to be responsible for maintaining the public order. Some joined the resistance force. (Page 115)
29. On March 6 at 9 a.m., Kaohsiung City Mayor Huang Chung-tu and six other people, Peng Ching-Kao (City Council speaker), Tu Guang-ming, Fan Tsang-rung, Tseng Feng-ming, Lin Chieh (Lingya District mayor) and Li Fo-hsu (director of Taipower Kaohsiung Office) ascended the mountain to the Military Fortress Command in desperation. According to Huang Chung-tu, when he was planning to ask the Military Fortress Command about what the crackdown approach should be, tens of people broke into the City Government Office with guns, knives and grenades, and verbally abused him. The head of the group Tu Guang-ming put forward some illegal requests in an attempt to make unacceptable demands from the government army. He forced the city mayor and City Council speaker at gunpoint to take some members of his group to the Military Fortress Command… After the seven people entered the reception room of the Fortress Command, Commander Peng Meng-Chi walked in through another door. They sat at a round table. The mayor and speaker sat next to Commander Peng, while the other five people sat in front of him. The mayor later produced "nine peace clauses" to the commander. Commander Peng Meng-chi did not intend to negotiate, but to buy some time. He angrily bashed the table with his hand and shouted "ridiculous," before asking soldiers outside the room to come in to search each of the seven people. According to Peng Meng-chi, Tu Guang-ming was found to have a gun and Fan Tsang-rung and Tseng Feng-ming were both found to have grenades. Tu, Fan and Tseng were arrested immediately, while the others waited in the reception room watched by guards. (Page 117)
30. Under the guidance of Peng Meng-chi, his troops were divided onto three routes: one passed through Jianguo 3rd Road; another marched straight down from the Fortress Command on Shoushan, passed Gushan 1st Road and the Dagong Road Bridge, and arrived at the Kaohsiung City Government; the other went past the level crossing and entered Wufu 4th Road. Every route had three squads, consisting of about 100 soldiers in total per route. (Page 119)
31. The military group that was ordered to attack the Kaohsiung City Government building on the afternoon of March 6 was the one led by Chen Guo-ru. Seeing that machine guns were installed on the building, the government army confirmed that those who occupied the Kaohsiung City Government building were insurgents. Because of this, the military group did not follow the order of firing a warning shot in the air. Instead, soldiers threw grenades into the building and shot anyone they could see, which meant that the insurgents could hardly resist the attack and suffered significant casualties. There were 50 to 60 people who lost their lives, including City Council members Hsu Chiu-tsung, Huang Tzu, and Wang Ting-shih… When City Council member Chiu Tao-te stepped into the Kaohsiung City Government building, the floor was covered with corpses and blood as thick as sludge. (Page 119)
32. The troops tasked with the mission of attacking Kaohsiung Railway Station and Kaohsiung Senior High School were led by Ho Chun-Chang (3rd Battalion, 21st Division). The attack was divided into two routes. When the troops arrived at the railway station, a graduate of Kaohsiung Senior High School, Yan Tsai-tse, was leading his fellow students at Chang Chun Hotel to shoot the coming soldiers in an attempt to disperse them. Knowing the inferiority of his side, he risked his life to rush out of the hotel. When Yan Tsai-tse was shot and critically wounded, people in front of the railway station soon started to flee. Some hid in the underground passage, where the military later indiscriminately fired, leading to many deaths and injuries. (Page 119)

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4. The reaction of the government and the settlement of the incident

After the incident had spread and escalated, Chen Yi, who understood the insufficiency of his government's military strength (Footnote 33) and strived to maintain his powerful position, originally intended to downplay the severity of the situation and focus on resolving the conflict with a political approach. At first, the civil society leaders who had participated in the operation of the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee were only concerned with the murder that had occurred in a contraband cigarette operation (Footnote 34). However, the Chief Executive's Office did not handle it well, turning the original simple petition of prosecuting the murderer into a political reform movement that took advantage of the groundswell of public anger to gradually increase its demands from the government (Footnote 35). Due to the loose nature of the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee's organizational structure in Taiwan, the Central Government believed that the Committee was engaged in treasonous activities, which constituted an excuse for military crackdown in the eyes of public security agencies. Why did the government suppress the social unrest militarily? Existing archives, various literature and oral history records that the Central Government's response was deeply influenced by the opinions of those who dominated politics in Taiwan. At the beginning of the incident, Chen Yi and Ko Yuan-fen, who were in charge of the administration and military in Taiwan, did not understand the uniqueness of Taiwanese society, believing that the requests proposed by the Taiwanese people and the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee were unreasonable and disingenuous. As a result, the authorities in Taiwan employed divide and conquer tactics (Footnote 40) and infiltration strategy to try to de-escalate the crisis on the one hand; while constantly exaggerating the severity of the conflict so that they could demand more troops from the Central Government for military crackdown on the other.

As shown in government archives, the chairman of the Nationalist Government Chiang Kai-shek did not advocate a military crackdown at first, instead simply agreeing to dispatch a strengthened corps to Taiwan. The intention was to relocate troops back to where they were originally stationed to prevent the situation from worsening in Taiwan. Later, after Chiang Kai-shek received requests from Chen Yi and intelligence agencies, he changed his attitude to characterize the incident as an insurgency organized by rebels, ignored the petitions from Taiwanese civil society (Footnote 41), and decided to send in troops to clamp down on the resistance movement (Footnote 42). The military crackdown could be roughly divided into two main parts: armed raids and "village cleansing." Due to the thorough planning and military deployment by the Chief Executive's Office and the deliberate exaggeration of the actual situation of the rebellious movement, the armed raids were far more effective than initially expected. Except for some residual resistance from the 27 Brigade in central Taiwan (Footnote 43), confrontations rarely occurred in other parts of the island (Footnote 44). However, when executing the military crackdown in various regions, the government army engaged in retaliatory behavior, resulting in innocent casualties and the shooting of suspects on the spot without trial (Footnote 45).

The military crackdown was followed by "village cleansing," the main objectives of which were to arrest suspects (Footnote 46), confiscate weapons, check on residents, process those who turned themselves in (Footnote 47), and collect "Guarantees to Report Outlaws" from households. All of the above-mentioned tasks were fulfilled in time. However, in reality, many suspects were falsely incriminated or reported by revengeful individuals. Military police and police authorities rushed to arrest and interrogate these suspects without first obtaining sufficient evidence, which resulted in many cases of miscarriages of justice. There were also some convicted criminals who bribed their way out of charges or were helped free from jail by some people with special connections. Some unscrupulous soldiers and police took advantage of the opportunity to blackmail, extort and rob civilians of their personal possessions, causing public resentment to boil. There is little doubt that this was because the military authorities at the time failed to effectively prevent wrongdoing and control the situation, and failed to enforce effective discipline on soldiers. The military authorities should be held responsible for a great number of innocent causalities.

The February 28 Massacre is one of the greatest tragedies in Taiwanese history (Footnote 48). This tragedy can be looked at from two different perspectives. For Taiwanese people who fell victim to the massacre, it was ironic that it was not at the hands of imperialists during the Japanese colonial period that they perished, but at those of a military crackdown by a regime that came from the "ancestral land" to which they had always hoped to return (Footnote 49). They may have criticized the government or advocated for Taiwanese autonomy, actions far from treasonous in their minds, but they were executed by the authorities anyway. Most of the executions occurred after not first being subject to public trial, and secret executions, after which the bodies were carelessly disposed of, were no exception. These practices should have no place in a civilized society. Many victims who did not even participate in the anti-government movement were accidentally shot dead on the street by soldiers. From the perspective of the Chinese immigrants who came to work in Taiwan after the Second World War, although corruption and malfeasance were not uncommon in the army and the public service, not every single recently immigrated Chinese official was corrupt. However, in this incident, some recent immigrants from China became scapegoats, were injured or killed after being blindly attacked by furious mobs. Even though the number of these casualties was not as high as the Taiwanese victims, these attacks so horrified some of the recently immigrated public officials and teachers that they eventually left Taiwan. Cases like this widened the schism between both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Without doubt, those who beat up new immigrants from China, attacked government institutions or airports, or even committed homicide should be subject to legal prosecution. Therefore, not everyone who was injured or killed in the February 28 Massacre was an innocent victim, and must be differentiated.

Footnotes:

33.  In terms of military capacity in Taiwan, there was only a total of 5251 soldiers (an independent regiment and an engineer battalion from the 21st Division and three corps at the Fortress Command) stationed on the island before the incident. The three corps at the Fortress Command had 1532 soldiers; the engineer battalion responsible for protecting the area to the north of Taichung had 517 soldiers; the independent regiment responsible for protecting the area to the south of Chiayi had 2500 soldiers. The headquarters of the Taiwan Garrison Command could only maneuver soldiers from one battalion of the independent regiment, which only had approximately 700 soldiers. A military capacity this weak was not sufficient for the mission of guarding the Taipei area. (Page 201)
34. On March 6, Wang Tien-teng read a report regarding the truth of the February 28 Incident over broadcast radio to a domestic and foreign audience, hoping to eliminate doubt on all sides. The main content of this report was to clarify that the goal of the Settlement Committee was "not to prevent compatriots from other provinces from participating in the improvement of Taiwanese politics, but to remove corrupt officials and strive for political reform in Taiwan." In the report, solutions to the aftermath of the incident were proposed, which included seven articles regarding the "handling of the current situation" and 25 articles regarding "core solutions" (consisting of three military and 22 political solutions). This was the famous "32 Demands." The full proposal is as follows:
A: On the handling of the current situation
 1. The troops of the government army stationed in various places in Taiwan should immediately order their soldiers to temporarily disarm themselves and hand over their weapons to the joint custody of the Settlement Committee local branches and local military corps, so that further bloodshed can be prevented.
 2. After the disarmament of the troops, local public order shall be maintained by military police, unarmed police officers and civil organizations.
 3. When there is no threat from government army troops, no armed fighting is permitted anywhere. If there is a corrupt official, whether he is from Taiwan or other provinces of China, the only action that can be taken is to report him to the Settlement Committee, which will ask the military police and police authorities to arrest the corrupt official. He will be strictly prosecuted according to the law. No one is permitted to resort to any extrajudicial punishment.
 4.　Any suggestions regarding political reform can be written down in a list before being submitted to the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee, which will work on a total resolution.
 5. It is highly advisable that the government should suspend all military operations immediately in Taiwan. The Central Government should not be asked under any circumstances to dispatch troops to Taiwan. Any attempt to solve the incident militarily will only bring more bloodshed, resulting in international intervention.
 6. Before the political problems can be fundamentally resolved, every governmental policy (whether it is military or political) must be discussed with the Settlement Committee. This will prevent people from doubting the sincerity of the government, and avoid any kind of misunderstanding.
 7. Regarding this incident, the government should not hold any member of the public accountable. In the future, there is no excuse for the government to arrest anyone involved in this incident. Victims of this incident should be preferentially compensated.
B: Core solutions
a: Regarding the military
 8. Troops with inadequate education and training are absolutely not allowed to be stationed in Taiwan.
 9. The Central Government can dispatch officials to conscript Taiwanese soldiers for the purpose of protecting Taiwan.
 10. Before the end of the Civil War on the Chinese mainland, any form of conscription in Taiwan is strongly opposed except that which is meant for protecting the island in order to prevent Taiwan from being implicated in the warfare.
b: Regarding political reform
 11. A self-government act should be legislated as the foundation of Taiwanese politics in order to realize the ideas Sun Yat-sen formulated in his Fundamentals of National Reconstruction.
 12. City and county mayors should be democratically elected before June this year. Re-election of city and county council members should be held at the same time.
 13. Candidates for directorships of departments in the Taiwan Provincial Government should be approved by the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, which will be called the "Taiwan Provincial Council" after reorganization. The re-election for the members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly should be held before June this year. For the moment, candidates for department directorships should be suggested by the Chief Executive before they are reviewed by the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee.
 14. More than two thirds of positions for department directors in the Taiwan Provincial Government should be taken by people who have lived in Taiwan for at least 10 years (it is recommended that the same logic be applied to the departments of Secretary General, Civil Administration, Finance, Industry and Mining, Agriculture and Forestry, Education, and Police).
 15. The director positions of the Police Department and all municipal police stations should be given to Taiwanese locals. The provincial Police Squad, Railway Police and Industry and Mining Police should be abolished immediately.
 16. At least half of the members of the Legal Affairs Commission should be Taiwanese locals. The chair of the commission should be elected from among the members.
 17. No other authorities except police authorities can arrest suspects.
 18. Military police can only arrest suspects affiliated to the army.
 19. Any politically-motivated arrest and incarceration is prohibited.
 20. The rights to freedom of unarmed assembly and to freedom of association with others should be absolutely protected.
 21. The rights to freedom of speech, publication, and strike should be absolutely protected. The application registration system for newspaper publications should be abolished.
 22. The Civil Organization Act should be repealed immediately.
 23. The regulation regarding the verification of candidates' qualifications in legislative elections should be repealed.
 24. It is recommended that the legislative election procedure at all levels should be improved.
 25. Uniform progressive taxation should be implemented for all income tax. Besides luxury tax and inheritance tax, no other additional taxes should be imposed.
 26. All the director positions of state-owned enterprises should be taken by Taiwanese people.
 27. Democratically elected monitoring committees should be set up in all state-owned enterprises. The responsibility for dealing with any remaining Japanese-owned properties should be entrusted to the Taiwan Provincial Government. When nationalizing the factories and mines previously owned by the Japanese, administration committees should be set up and more than half of the committee members should be Taiwanese.
 28. The Monopoly Bureau should be abolished. Rationing of life essentials should be implemented.
 29. The Trade Bureau should be abolished.
 30. The Propaganda Commission should be abolished.
 31. The president and chief prosecutor positions of all district courts should be taken by Taiwanese people.
 32. More than half of judicial officers, such as judges and prosecutors, should be Taiwanese citizens. (Page 66)
35. On the afternoon of March 7, the Settlement Committee held a plenary meeting, in which the original 32 demands were passed along with 10 additional demands. Among these 10 demands, two demands about military affairs and eight demands about political affairs completed the so-called "42 Demands." The additional demands are as follows:
 1. The armed forces in Taiwan should recruit as many Taiwanese citizens as possible.
 2. The Chief Executive's Office should be reorganized into the Taiwan Provincial Government. Before this proposal is endorsed by the Central Government, the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee's Political Affairs Bureau should be responsible for the re-organization and the recruitment of judicious and talented people for the future government.
 3. The Political Affairs Bureau should be set up under the Settlement Committee before March 15. One candidate will be chosen by the representatives of each township before he can be elected by the municipal legislative councils. The member quotas for each municipality are as follows: two for Taipei, three for Taipei County, one for Keelung City, three for Hsinchu County, one for Taichung City, four for Taichung County, one for Changhua City, one for Chiayi City, one for Tainan City, four for Tainan County, one for Kaohsiung City, three for Kaohsiung County, one for Pingtung City, one for Penghu County, one for Hualien County, and one for Taitung County, making a total of 30 (actually 29).
 4. The Political Affairs Bureau will be in charge of reviewing and authorizing the abolishment and merging of labor camps and other unnecessary institutions.
 5. The processing of Japanese-owned properties should be entrusted to the Taiwan Provincial Government.
 6. The Taiwan Garrison Command should be abolished so that military power is not abused.
 7. Aboriginal people's political and economic rights and interests should be protected.
 8. Labor protection law should be implemented on June 1 this year.
 9. Taiwanese prisoners of war and traitor suspects who are imprisoned should be released immediately with no conditions attached.
 10. Taiwan should be reimbursed the estimated value of 150000 tons of sugar previously given to the Central Government. (Page 70)
36. On the one hand, Chen Yi agreed with the demands made by the Taiwanese legislative representatives that the Settlement Committee should be set up as a joint effort of the government and civil society. On the other hand, Chen Yi, Ko Yuan-fen and Chang Mu-tao contacted Chiang Wei-chuan in an attempt to sabotage the unity of the Settlement Committee's leadership. National Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (NBIS) agent Hsu Te-huei became the leader of the Chung Yi Service Squad and the head of the Public Order section of the Settlement Committee. The head of the NBIS Taipei Branch Lin Ting-li was appointed by the Taiwan Garrison Command as leader of the Yi Yong Squad, which was set up for the mission of "dividing the unity of rebels and using the power of the people to attack them. Behind the scenes, factions of the Chinese Nationalist Party, the government and the army were allegedly competing with each other for greater power. The party-directed intelligence agency, the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (CBIS) accused Chiang Wei-chuan and Wang Tien-teng of being political opportunists who continued fanning the flames of public fury. Ko Yuan-fen, who represented the NBIS, the Central Government's military intelligence agency, criticized Chiang and Wang for both being bullies recently recruited by the party's headquarters. In the early days of the Settlement Committee, its members were predominantly from the Chinese Nationalist Party. However, the party's office in Taiwan did not try to guide the development of the Settlement Committee. Instead, it chose to watch it decline and fall from the sidelines. As a result, under different influences, the Settlement Committee continued to increase the magnitude of its requests, which later became justification for the Chief Executive's Office decision in favour of military crackdown. (Page 201)
37. According to Su Sin, who later defected to the Chinese Communist Party, the "32 Demands" was drafted by left-wing youth surrounding Wang Tien-teng, such as Pan Tsin-sin, Hsiao You-san, Tsai Ching-jong and Su Sin. Their participation in the drafting was endorsed by the underground leader of the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan… Chen Yi-song, a former member of the National Political Council, said that there were indeed left-wing young people drafting for Wang Tien-teng, but Taiwanese Communist Party members tended to exaggerate their contributions during the February 28 Incident after they defected to China, so the credibility of their claims is questionable. According to a member of the NBIS who investigated the Tsai Hsiao-chien communist spy case, the Chinese Communist Party had a very limited influence in Taiwan at the time and the Taiwanese Communist Party was not the same thing as the Chinese Communist Party. (Page 69)
38. It is said that when the "32 Demands" was proposed, intelligence officers from the NBIS and the CBIS, such as Bai Cheng-chi and Lu Bo-hsiung from the CBIS and Hsu Te-huei from the NBIS, were present. The additional 10 demands, which were used as an excuse for military crackdown by the government, were deliberately suggested by the NBIS and CBIS employees present at the meeting. For example, the 29th political demand that "Taiwanese prisoners of war and traitor suspects who are imprisoned should be released immediately" was suggested by Wu Kuo-hsin, National Assembly member and secretary of the Chinese Nationalist Party's special branch of Taiwan Railways, and was passed with a cheering crowd. It was also heard that there were originally only 12 demands and the other 32 demands and additional 10 demands were passed by an applauding crowd made up by members of the Constitutional Association. (Page 71)
39. On March 8, the Settlement Committee released a statement overturning the resolution passed the day before, saying that too many people participating in the meeting had resulted in the passing of 42 impetuous and inappropriate demands, such as "abolishing the Taiwan Garrison Command and demilitarizing the government army. Demands like these were on the verge of a rebellion against the Central Government and were not in line with the public opinion of Taiwanese people." (Page 72)
40. After the outbreak of the incident, it is said that Liou Chi-Kuang advocated a compete military crackdown and Ko Yuan-fen (the chief of staff of the Taiwan Garrison Command), Chen Ta-yuan (director of the investigative department of the Taiwan Garrison Command), and Lin Ting-li (the head of the NBIS Taipei Branch) suggested "using the people's power to fight against the people's power." On February 28, Ko Yuan-fen ordered intelligence officers to investigate and monitor the major figures inside the Settlement Committee. The Chief Executive's Office understood the government army was not strong enough to deliver a military crackdown and, instead of oppression from outside, the best way to suppress a social movement was to infiltrate the movement to divide and destroy it from within. The Chief Executive's Office soon adopted the latter strategy, taking advantage of Chiang Wei-chuan's Taiwan Political Construction Association to weaken the power of the Settlement Committee by infiltrating it with intelligence officers waiting for an opportunity to undermine its operation. From February 28 to March 1, the commander of the 4th Military Police Regiment wrote to Chiang Wei-chuan twice, urging him to "clear up the mess." On March 1, Ko Yuan-fen also wrote to Chiang Wei-chuan, inviting him to help with the precarious situation. This showed that the Chief Executive's Office had already planned a strategy for infiltration and sabotage of the Settlement Committee. (Page 59)
41. On March 3, the Settlement Committee resolved to telegraph Chairman Chiang Kai-shek, informing him of the truth of the whole incident. On the same day at 4 p.m., a telegraph was sent in the name of the Taiwanese People's Congress, accusing the Chief Executive's Office of allowing soldiers and police to randomly attack civilians and shoot innocent people, of causing public anger among the Taiwanese population, of being permissive of government misconduct and unlawful business, and of ignoring complaints from the Taiwanese people. In the same telegraph, the Taiwanese People's Congress also urged the Central Government to send high officials to investigate in Taiwan so that public anger could be soothed, and demanded local autonomy soon be implemented in Taiwan. On the same day, Li Kuang-wei, the chairman of the Taiwanese Compatriot Association in Shanghai, submitted a request to Chiang Kai-shek, demanding him to seriously investigate the incident, to punish those who were politically and morally responsible for the incident, and to restore Taiwanese people's trust in the government by purging corrupt officials. All the above showed that Chiang Kai-shek not only fully grasped the intelligence and opinions regarding the incident, but also understood the feelings and expectations of Taiwanese people. (Page 203)
42. After Chen Yi announced the implementation of martial law in Taiwan over radio on March 10, the military crackdown was in full swing. (Page 211)
43. On March 15, the government army was advancing toward Puli, narrowing the encirclement… The 27 Brigade was in the very disadvantaged situation of not being able to communicate with the outside world after two major external traffic routes were blockaded. Soon, Chen Ming-chung was delegated as the head of a guerrilla force that was divided into three columns to attack the government army stationed near Sun Moon Lake. At the same time, Huang Chin-tao, head of the Public Security Team, led a squad safeguarding the Wu-niu-lan Bridge in order to prevent the government army from attacking from the back. The guerrilla force engaged in a fierce battle with a troop of the government army (4th Company, 2nd Battalion, Regiment 436) near Sun Moon Lake, which resulted in severe casualties in the government army and forced it to retreat to Shuili. However, running out of ammunition, the 27 Brigade's guerrilla force also suffered a massive casualty toll. The next day (March 16), soldiers from two battalions of the government army (2nd and 3rd Battalion, Regiment 436) engaged in another fierce battle with Huang Chin-tao's squad at Wu-niu-lan Bridge. At first, the squad took advantage of a good location to heavily ambush the government army, causing mass causalities. Due to a lack of sufficient firepower and battle experience, Huang Chin-tao's squad gradually found itself in the dire situation of being besieged by the encroaching troops of the government army. Huang Chin-tao had no choice but to break through the blockage with another fighter, escaping to seek help from the headquarters of the 27 Brigade. But after arriving at the Puli Martial Arts Hall, where the 27 Brigade's headquarters was based, chaos and panic reigned among the rebels, and fewer than 20 people were willing to help. In the evening of the same day, faced with a besiegement that made it impossible to replenish weapons and ammunition and to communicate with other resistance forces, the 27 Brigade could not keep on fighting and decided to temporarily disband. Some of its members joined Chen Tsuan-di's guerilla force in Meishan, Chiayi; some just returned to their homes. At around 11 p.m., after the members had buried their weapons, the 27 Brigade was officially disbanded. (Page 221)
44. On March 14, the government army stationed in Chiayi City started to attack Douliou, battling on the street with the remains of Chen Tsuan-di's guerilla force (a public order team that was led by the director of Douliou Township Chien An Hospital, Chen Tsuan-di, and was not part of the 27 Brigade). Outnumbered by its rivals, Chen Tsuan-di fled with his guerilla force to Meishan, Chiayi. On March 16, the government army (8th Company, Regiment 436) pressed to the east of Meishan, where it battled fiercely with about 200 remaining insurgents. The battle ended with 10 guerillas being shot dead and with 20 rifles, two machine guns, one grenade launcher and one mountain gun being captured. Two days after the battle, another company of the government army (7th Company, Regiment 436) also engaged in a tense fight with approximately 100 guerillas, killing about 60 insurgents, arresting 12 and capturing a load of ammunition. On March 19, Chen Tsuan-di retreated to the mountainous area with his troops in preparation for long-lasting guerilla warfare, taking away all the weapons, ammunition, food and bullock carts that belonged to the nearby residents. Chen Tsuan-di urged those who joined the resistance from other places to hide in the mountains for a year-long operational plan. On March 20, the 21st Division and the 22nd Division were concerned about the remaining rebels hiding in the mountains, so a company (8th Company, Regiment 436) was sent to Meishan, from which the remaining guerillas were forced to flee, leaving behind a load of weapons and ammunition after several hours of fierce battle.
 Due to its intimidating terrain, the Meishan and Changhu areas were easy to defend but hard to attack. Later, even though the government army had sent troops to these areas and killed many of the remaining guerillas, it could still not eradicate the insurgents. Even after Wei Tao-ming assumed the role of chairman of the Taiwan Provincial Government on May 16 and announced the lifting of martial law as well as the end of "village cleansing," and after the Taiwan Garrison Command turned the areas designated for military crackdown into security areas, the remnants of Chen Tsuan-di's guerilla force were fighting in Meishan and Changhu. (Page 221)
45. By March 21, the Keelung Military Fortress had more or less completed the military crackdown mission. According to data, from February 28 to March 10, the weapons and ammunition that it captured from the rebels consisted of six light machine guns (all required fixing) and 139 rifles (most required fixing). During this period, the Fortress used: 34643 rifle bullets, 39897 light machine gun bullets, 5183 pistol bullets, 9592 heavy machine gun bullets, 549 grenades, and 35 pieces of pounder ammunition. The ammunition used in the operation consisted of as many as 100000 bullets, which shows that the military crackdown by the Keelung Military Fortress was extremely severe. Given the amount of ammunition used, it is unlikely that the number of casualties was only about 100 people. The true number is still awaiting investigation. (Page 237)
 It would seem that the Keelung Military Fortress allowed its soldiers to execute suspects as they wished in their own designated areas. Examples include: Kuo Chang-yuan and six others, who were murdered in front of the Toucheng Matsu Temple; the Badu Railway Station Massacre; the executions of Chen Cheng-yue, Chang Yun-chang, Chao Tong (all three from Luodong), Yang Yuan-ting (from Keelung), Hsu Jih-sheng, Hsu Chia-chang, Hsu Shih-ming, Chien Te-fa, Chen Chin-pi, Tian Wen-kuan and Shi Chin-jong (all seven from Jinshan). The families of the victims confirmed that these individuals were publicly executed without due legal process, which means that no list of the suspects or reports were left, making it hard for the general public to believe the official death tolls. When soldiers raided the streets, anyone who did not escape in time was shot dead on the spot or detained without a legitimate reason. However, those who were willing to use money or valuables to bribe the soldiers were set free. Many people were tortured and tormented to death. Six Taiwanese compatriot organizations in Shanghai summarized the news reports and hearsay in a joint statement, writing: "Soldiers in Keelung penetrated people's feet with metal wires and tied them up in groups of three or five. If it was just one person, he would be put in a sack before being thrown out to sea. It was recently reported that floating bodies were visible on the sea surface near Keelung." And: "Soldiers in Keelung cut off the ears, noses and genitals of about 20 young students before stabbing them to death." Many interviewees said they had also witnessed horrible scenes like those described in the statement while trying to find the bodies of their family members. (Page 237)
46. According to the summary report presented by the Taiwan Garrison Command in November, 1947, there were 1800 suspects arrested. (Page 261)
47. On April 30, 1947, the Taiwan Garrison Command released a report indicating that 3022 people had turned themselves in. (Page 261)
48. The February 28 Incident is the most tragic massacre in Taiwan's history, with thousands or potentially tens of thousands of casualties. The victims ranged from elites to common people. Countless numbers were murdered without any justifiable reason, which has resulted in a widespread unforgiveness held by victims' families and society toward the incident. This unfortunate event caused by manmade factors has led to the Taiwanese independence movement, the rise of left-leaning ideologies and conflict between people who already lived in Taiwan before the war (and their offspring) and people who moved to Taiwan from China after the war (and their offspring). The consequences of the incident have seriously impacted the harmony and future development of Taiwanese society. (Preface 2)
49. The last words of Kuo Chang-yuan, the director of Yilan Public Hospital, were: "The land I was born to is not my ancestral country, where I shall return after death. Death and life are decided by Heaven, about which I do not have any second thoughts." (Lee Shiao-feng, Taiwanese elites who disappeared in the February 28 Incident, p. 170.)

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5. Civilian casualties and victims of the massacre

The first group of victims were those officially determined guilty. Since the government regarded the February 28 Incident as treasonous, it was inevitable that anyone who took part in the organized insurgence and rioted would be included in the so-called "blacklist" (Footnote 51) before they were arrested and sentenced. However, an investigation shows that many malpractices were discovered in relation to the identification of who was involved and the application of due process of law. Firstly, most participants believed that they had not had any intention of overturning the regime and only advocated the reform of Taiwanese politics. It was not surprising that people who were convicted of "attempting to subvert the government" could not accept the government's justifications. Secondly, some of the victims were arrested secretly and the cause of their death could not be confirmed. Was it an execution that was carried out after the trial in accordance with the conviction? Or was it revenge instigated by their enemies? The families of the victims did not know the answers and hence have lived in sorrow since the massacre. In 2007, a report investigating responsibility for the massacre was published, confirming that Chiang Kai-shek, the chairman of the Nationalist government at the time, should be mainly held responsible for the losses of the February 28 Incident.

The second group of victims were those who did violate martial law. It was understandable that the Nationalist government declared martial law because of the civil war. However, Taiwanese compatriots had not experienced the rule of martial law in the past and did not understand what martial law was. Many local people who did not speak the national language Mandarin or other local languages of China were shot dead on their way to school or work during curfew hours, simply because they did not understand the soldiers' verbal warnings (Footnote 52). The way these people were treated was extremely unjust and unpardonable.

The third group of victims were those killed by immoral soldiers (Footnote 53). After the founding of the Republic of China in 1912, the country had been torn apart by incessant military conflicts. Eight years of fighting against Japanese invasion had a particularly great impact on military education, resulting in failure to reform the military administration and an ill-disciplined army. Therefore, countless wrongdoings and malfeasance (Footnote 54) emerged during the military crackdown in Taiwan. The most common was using one's position in the government to revenge for something personal. Some people were killed because of disagreements; others were murdered after being robbed of their possessions (Footnote 55). Although commanders of the government's army tried to educate their soldiers and correct their behaviors (Footnote 56), illegality was still hard to eradicate. In addition, due to policies of rewarding those who reported suspects secretly (Footnote 57) or identified gangsters (Footnote 58) to the government, many innocent people were also unjustly treated due to some personal grievances and wrongly killed in the end. Some people were deliberately set up and put to death by the government, such as those victims who died in Yuanshan (Footnote 59) on March 8, 1947.

Footnotes:

50.  The organizations that victims joined included the Settlement Committee, Taiwan Political Construction Association, Taiwan Autonomy Youth Alliance, Three People's Principles Youth Corps, newspapers, and communist groups. It goes without saying that the organizations that were most greatly impacted by the incident were political ones, especially those that had previously criticized politics or taken part in political activities. (Page 266)
51. According to the Name List of Criminals that Chen Yi presented to Chairman Chiang Kai-shek on March 13, 1947, there were 20 fugitives that participated in the February 28 Incident, who were Wang Tien-teng (member of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly), Hsu Cheng (lecturer at Yanping College, member of the Working Committee of Taiwan Province of the Chinese Communist Party), Lee Jen-kuei (Taipei City Council member), Hsu Chun-ching (Taipei City Council member), Tan Him, Lim Bo-seng (professor at National Taiwan University), Sung Fei-ju (the director of People's Herald News), Ai Lu-sheng (the founder of the Great Light Post), Juan Chao-ji (the General Manager of Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News), Wu Chin-lien (the Chief Editor of Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News), Liao Chin-ping, Huang Chao-sheng (Taipei City Council member), Lin Lien-Chung (member of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly), Wang Ming-chao (a staff member of the Taiwan Province Railway Management Commission), Si Kang-lam, Lee Ruei-han (lawyer), Lee Ruei-feng (lawyer), Chang Kuang-tsu (the head of gangsters in Taipei), Horiuchi Kinjo (a technologist at the Industrial Research Institute), and Uesaki Torasaburo. According to the official archive, Chang Kuang-tsu, an influential gangster in Taipei, was indicted for being the culprit who instigated the killing of people from other provinces and led his subordinates to assist in the rebellion. Horiuchi and Uesaki were believed to be Japanese spies. The other 17 people on the list were targeted for conspiring in the rebellion. These 17 people went missing after being arrested by the government's army soon after it entered Taipei on March 9. The majority of these 17 people joined one or two political organizations. Six of them, Wang Tien-teng, Lee Jen-kuei, Hsu Chun-ching, Liao Chin-ping, Huang Chao-sheng and Lin Lien-Chung (Taichung), joined the Settlement Committee. Seven of them, Wang Tien-teng, Lee Jen-kuei, Tan Him, Wu Chin-lien, Liao Chin-ping, Huang Chao-sheng and Si Kang-lam, joined the Taiwan Political Construction Association (and some also joined the Settlement Committee at the same time). In addition, Wang Tien-teng also joined the Three People's Principles Youth Corps and assumed the role of director at the Taipei Branch of the Corps in Taiwan. On March 11 and 13, respectively, Chen Yi declared the Settlement Committee and Taiwan Political Construction Association were illegal organizations, before he ordered them to disband and indicted their members for participating in rebellious activities. However, whether or not these two organizations were actually involved in rebellious activities was not put on trial, meaning the due process of law was lacking. Moreover, almost half of the people on the list, Hsu Cheng, Sung Fei-ju, Ai Lu-sheng, Juan Chao-ji, Wang Ming-chao, Lee Ruei-han and Lee Ruei-feng (eight in total), did not belong to the above-mentioned political organizations. The so-called "rebellion" was also unclearly defined (Page 267). According to the archive, only Tan Him was put on trial and sentenced to the death penalty among the above-mentioned fugitives (Page 271).
52. Chen Yi urged the public to restore education and economic activities. However, some obedient students went back to school and were accidentally killed by soldiers. Many Taiwanese people who were milk delivery workers, newspaper delivery workers, telecommunication workers, vegetable vendors and rickshaw-pullers, were also accidentally killed just because they did not understand the regulations of martial law……According to interviews, the main reason these people were killed was because most Taiwanese people had not experienced the rule of martial law before and did not understand it and because the majority of Taiwanese people did not speak Mandarin and could not communicate with soldiers (Page 294).
53. The corrupt political atmosphere also led to unscrupulous government officials taking the opportunity to retaliate against private individuals for personal reasons. One of the most sensational examples was the murder of Wu Hong-chi, a High Court judge, and seven other people…….At midnight on March 15, multiple gunshots were heard near Nangang Bridge. The next morning, the bodies of Wu Hong-chi and seven other people were discovered near the bridge (Page 295). The official explanation said that "an assassination group was formed by gangsters in the city of Taipei, dedicated to killing military officers, people from other Chinese provinces and the officials of Taiwanese background who used their power to abuse other people. This group has started its actions and possibly killed those eight people who died near Nangang Bridge……" There was also an unofficial explanation of the assassination group: it was based at the addiction rehab center on Baoan Street and formed by gangsters who were hired by the regime……to kill dissidents. Both the public and Wu's family believed that Wu died as a result of personal vengeance……Wu was honest and forthright. He often criticized the wickedness of the legal system and often chastised his colleagues for their wrongdoings, which might have offended some people. The prosecutor whose surname was Wang was believed to be suspicious. Wu's wife claimed that on the name card that her husband left behind, a character "Wang" had been clearly etched out using a nail, which seemed to be a hint that the prosecutor Wang was the murderer (Page 297). The murder of Ong Iok-lim was probably triggered by a personal vengeance from a government official. Ong Iok-lim was the first prosecutor of Taiwanese background during the Japanese colonial period. After the Second World War, Ong Iok-lim worked as a prosecutor at the Hsinchu District Prosecutors Office……Ong Iok-lim was a man of integrity and impartiality by nature who had prosecuted many corrupt officials. Among them, the most famous was the Hsinchu City Mayor Kuo Shao-tsung who was involved in the misappropriation of milk powder donated by the United States. As soon as Ong Iok-lim found that the culprit of this scandal was the Hsinchu City Mayor Kuo Shao-tsung, he went to arrest him. Unexpectedly, the director of the Hsinchu City Police Department ordered his fellow policemen to encircle the prosecutor and take away his arrest warrant. Afterwards, Ong Iok-lim's superior was surprisingly injudicious and wanted to hold him accountable for the loss of the arrest warrant. Outraged by this treatment, Ong Iok-lim resigned from the post of prosecutor and became a teacher at Jianguo High School in Taipei. It was said that after the arrival of the additional government's army, Kuo Shao-tsung took the opportunity to revenge himself and sent police to Taipei to arrest Ong Iok-lim and executed him. (Page 299)
54. During the February 28 Incident, Taiwanese people not only fought against the Chief Executive's Office, but also attacked immigrants who had moved from China after the Second World War. Because of this, the Nationalist government's army took retaliatory actions against Taiwanese people. The recently arrived troops from China were known for their lack of discipline and ethics, which was evidenced by endless instances of unfathomable crimes. The archive of all sorts of news coverage and interviews proves that the government's army started its indiscriminate massacre in Taiwan after landing in Keelung on March 8. The Taiwan Garrison Command at some point even gave its clerical workers pistols and authorized them to pull the trigger for self-defense. The Nationalist government's army was also ordered to kill all traitors and rebels. Some soldiers even showed off their shooting skills by targeting civilians. When the government's army entered the city of Taipei, anyone who did not speak Mandarin was shot dead, which resulted in the streets being scattered with corpses from March 8 to 13 (Page 294).
55. For example, on March 10, somewhere on Changchun Road in Taipei came a group of soldiers who wanted to rob people of their money, watches or personal belongings. Surprisingly, their unlawful behaviors actually resulted in the death of many local people. (Page 295)
56. On the morning of March 11, the Nationalist government's army declared the rule of marital law after it entered Tainan. When soldiers were checking pedestrians near the railway station, Tu Ping-chang (a private from the 7th Company of the 3rd Battalion, Independent Corps of the 21st Army) confiscated without authorization a few thousand Taiwan dollars and a watch from a Taiwanese person's pockets. When the deputy leader of the battalion noticed the wrongdoing, he not only returned the money and the watch back to that Taiwanese person, but also stripped Tu Ping-chang of his private's uniform and executed him on the spot (Page 255).
57. In order to fully accomplish the mission, the Taiwan Garrison Command further published a reward and punishment notice, which stipulated that anyone who reported criminals or informed the government of people secretly owning weapons would be rewarded a prize that ranged from 1,000 to 10,000 Taiwan dollars; while anyone who hid intelligence and did not report to the government would be prosecuted for being a conspirator (Page 214). Therefore, some ill-intentioned people (both Taiwanese and recent immigrants from China) took the opportunity to get rid of their enemies and get some money (Page 303).
58. The heads of villages were forced to report a certain number of gangsters in their home villages. If not, they would be severely punished. This led many village heads who were frightened by the potential punishment to randomly report innocent villagers, resulting in many unnecessary deaths, such as people from Beitou District (Page 303). Some village heads who did not want to engage in such unethical practice were killed. Yu Chu-gen, a village head from Jinguashi, Ruifang, was one of the victims. After the Nationalist government's army entered Jinguashi, he was forced to hand in guns and a list of gangsters from his village. Yu Chu-gen refused to give in, saying that "our village is very peaceful and simple and has never taken part in the incident." In the end, he was tortured to near death before being executed (Page 306).
59. It is said that the Yuanshan Massacre on March 8 was orchestrated by Ko Yuan-fen and executed by Lin Ting-li and Hsu Te-huei. According to Liao, the deputy leader of the Chung Yi Service Squad, he had brought more than a hundred students to Yuanshan to take over guns, which would be used for maintaining public order. However, after encountering gunshot from soldiers, these students tried to surround the soldiers and poured water on them. The students' actions may have infuriated the soldiers, who took revenge on them in the evening of March 8. More than a hundred students were killed. The next morning on March 9, Ko Yuan-fen took Yang Liang-kung to the square in front of the Yuanshan Army warehouse to identify about a hundred (or about twenty according to a different source) corpses of the so-called rebels that the Nationalist government's soldiers claimed to have killed the previous night. It was said that Yang Liang-kung was suspicious of Ko Yuan-fen's claims and said to his colleagues that it was very strange that only high school students who were about 18 or 19 years old were killed and there were no signs of fighting nearby (Page 210).

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6. Compensation at the time

Soon after the social unrest had ended and public order restored, the Chief Executive's Office launched a compensatory program (Footnote 60) at the end of March, giving relief funds to government officials and teachers and their dependants and domestic workers who had experienced loss of life and property, and helping them to overcome the hardship in their lives. However, this job was not done satisfactorily. There were many reasons for this, including a) the compensatory program was only targeted at government officials, teachers and their dependants and domestic workers, and it did not cover the losses that the general public experienced; b) not all of the compensatory program was reasonable, resulting in some people who endured great losses but only received a disproportionately small compensation, and some people who experienced not much loss but applied for an exceedingly large compensation; c) due to the scarcity of the relief fund, some ill-intentioned government officials and teachers pretended to raise funds from the general public (especially wealthy people), but actually they were extorting money for their personal use (Footnote 61). This left an extremely bad impression on Taiwanese people. Furthermore, because not many government officials or teachers were compensated, the general public and the families of victims thought that the government had not started any compensatory program dedicated to the losses of either Taiwanese people or immigrants coming from China after the Second World War. Therefore, many people requested that the government should draft the compensatory measures as soon as possible.

Footnotes:

60.  In order to compensate the government officials and teachers that belonged to the Chief Executive's Office and its subsidiary departments, the Chief Executive's Office announced nine articles of Compensatory measures dedicated to compensate government officials and teachers of the Chief Executive's Office and its subsidiary departments for their losses in the February 28 Incident. The complete content of the measures was as follows:
 Article 1: The compensation or relief for the losses endured by government officials and teachers of the Chief Executive's Office and its subsidiary departments is undertaken in accordance with these regulations.
 Article 2: The range of compensation and relief is limited to death, injury and loss of personal belongings.
 Article 3: The deceased is given a single payment of 200,000 Taiwan dollars as relief for the funeral expenses. This article is also applied to the spouse, direct blood relatives, and servants.
 Article 4: All medical expenses for the injured are reimbursed at the actual cost upon production of a hospital receipt. Those who have not been hospitalized for further treatment and have been certified by his or her direct superior can receive a relief fund of 5,000 Taiwan dollars if it is a minor injury and 50,000 Taiwan dollars if it is a serious injury. The seriousness of the injury is evaluated as stipulated in the Criminal Code. This article is not applicable to those whose medical expenses have already been paid by the government. This article is applicable to the spouse, direct blood relatives or servants of government officials.
 Article 5: Relief for the loss of personal belongings is primarily focused on clothing and bedding. If there is a loss of clothing, the relief fund is 10,000 Taiwan dollars for a set of clothes and the number is limited to two sets, one for summer and one for winter. The relief fund for bedding is 20,000 Taiwan dollars for a set and the number is limited to one set.
 Article 6: Those who have experienced particularly severe injury or loss of personal belongings can be granted special relief funding after their competent authority provides the details of the injury and possession losses for further approval on a case-by-case basis.
 Article 7: If the issuance of relief funds that are mentioned in Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 for funeral expenses, for compensation, or for the loss of personal belongings falls under the responsibility of provincial level departments, it should be reimbursed by the provincial government; if it falls under municipal level departments, it should be reimbursed by local governments; if it falls under state-owned enterprises, it should be reimbursed by the enterprises themselves. All the issuance of relief funds should be accompanied by receipts that will be submitted to the Chief Executive's Office for future reference.
 Article 8: Applications for relief funds must be verified by the section chiefs and the heads of the departments of all the levels above. If there is any fraudulence, the managers of all the levels who have attested the authenticity of the application will be severely punished.
 Article 9: This regulation is in effect from the date of announcement. (Page 370)
61. On June 15, 1947, all Taiwanese newspapers published a letter written by Yang Liang-kung, the Control Yuan's investigator responsible for the Fujian and Taiwan area, demanding that the Taiwan Provincial Government ban all municipal government officials from requesting donations from private individuals and civil organizations, and that local councils should be prevented from using any excuse to seek donations from the public, which is perceived as extortion in reality. Many government officials used their own position to frame private individuals who did not cooperate. Therefore, the Taiwan Provincial Government ordered that all officials from all departments could not use the losses in the February 28 Incident as an excuse to seek donations from the public. If any officials continued to use their positions to extort money from the public by threatening to frame them, they would be severely punished. The evidence above shows that government officials at the time did use the February 28 Incident as an excuse to extort money from the public. (Page 397)

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7. Comment and Analysis on the Key Figures

The purpose of this report is to illustrate the truth of the incident. There is no intention to hold anyone accountable. However, the actions that several key figures took in the incident cannot be ignored.

Although Chen Yi intended to promote good governance upon arrival in Taiwan (Footnote 62) and was trying to use political measures to resolve the crisis at the beginning of the February 28 Incident (Footnote 63), he requested the central government to dispatch troops for suppressing the social unrest (Footnote 64) after realizing that he no longer could control the development of the situation (Footnote 65). After the troops landed in Taiwan, Chen Yi, as highest official in charge of the military administration in Taiwan, could not effectively ensure the behaviors of soldiers and policemen who carried out the crackdown were within the bounds of lawfulness (Footnote 66), resulting in things such as "police and soldiers from the Taiwan Garrison Command resorting to retaliatory measures (Footnote 67) to beat up and arrest rebels" and "the ordering of the special force of the military police stationed in Taiwan to secretly arrest the National Assembly members" (Footnote 68). Chen Yi's approach targeted people who were not involved in the incident, causing panic and resentment among the Taiwanese population. However, in the wake of the incident, he only acknowledged that it was all his personal failure and refused to admit that the policies he adopted were at fault, which of course cannot be forgiven by the Taiwanese people.

Ko Yuan-fen, the head of staff of the Taiwan Garrison Command back then, believed that the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee was a conspiracy (Footnote 69) to weaken the role of the government, therefore he adopted policies of infiltration and divide and rule when dealing with the committee, hoping to punish its members after the incident escalated (Footnote 70). It was clear that Ko Yuan-fen was ill-intentioned from the very start. Pai Tsung-hsi, the defense minister who represented the government to pacify the Taiwanese people (Footnote 71), pointed out (Footnote 72) that Ko Yuan-fen's attitude in dealing with the incident was "he would rather kill ninety-nine innocent people than leave one real rebel at large." The result was many innocent people were killed in the military crackdown, triggering widespread panic among the Taiwanese population. Because of this, Pai Tsung-hsi believed that "Ko Yuan-fen was a reckless and impatient person who abused his office, made many mistakes in dealing with the incident, and refused to reflect on his failure because of his stubborn nature." Pai Tsung-hsi, therefore, suggested that Ko Yuan-fen needed to be dismissed from his position as severe punishment in order to appease the public's anger.

Peng Meng-chi, the Commander of the Kaohsiung Fortress Headquarters at the time of the incident, suddenly resorted to military crackdown at 2 p.m. on March 6 (Footnote 73), preventing the social turmoil from escalating. From the perspective of the government, Peng Meng-chi had achieved greatly. However, from the perspective of Kaohsiung citizens, Peng Meng-chi's decision to indiscriminately machine-gun local people, causing great casualty in local communities, made his status disputable.. After the incident, to people's surprise, Peng Meng-chi was promoted to head of the Taiwan Garrison Command, which caused deep fear and uneasiness among Taiwanese people.

What Chang Mu-tao, the head of the 4th Military Police Regiment, did at the time was very controversial. He first invited Wei-Chuan to mediate the disputes between the government and the public and encouraged him to join the Settlement Committee to proceed with divide and rule tactics. Secondly, when the reinforcement troops of the government's army landed in Taiwan at midday on March 8, Chang Mu-tao continued to lie to the members of the Settlement Committee (Footnote 74) that if the public did not try to disarm soldiers, the government would not adopt any military operations against Taiwanese people. Chang's intention was to reduce their vigilance, so that people who originally wanted to escape would stay where they were. Therefore, these people became easy targets for the soldiers after the reinforcement troops landed. In addition, Chang Mu-tao's military police subordinates also arrested many people at many different places after the rule of military law was declared, causing a lot of controversy. When Pai Tsung-hsi, the defense minister, came to Taiwan to try to appease the Taiwanese public, he once ordered that all the arrests should only be carried out by the Taiwan Garrison Command. However, military police corps continued to arrest civilians (Footnote 75), which showed that Chang Mu-tao's defiance of the order of his superior was very blatant.

Furthermore, intelligence workers in Taiwan were also believed to have misled the government. After the outbreak of the incident, the National Bureau of Investigation and Statistics and the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (Footnote 76) both exaggerated the seriousness of the incident, claiming that some people were not purely advocating political reforms, but were conspiring to rebel against the regime, seek Taiwanese independence, and overturn the government. They also exaggerated the casualty of their mainland Chinese compatriots and the number of people who joined the riots. Therefore, Chairman Chiang Kai-shek was convinced that the situation was dire and thus organized the 21st Division to clamp down on the social unrest in Taiwan. Although Chairman Chiang had reiterated that soldiers should not engage in any form of retaliation against Taiwanese people, his subordinates did not listen to his order.

Without doubt, Chiang Kai-shek played an undeniable role in the settlement of the February 28 Incident. Chiang Kai-shek, as the head of the country, was certainly responsible for sending troops to clamp down on insurgencies. However, we cannot ignore questions such as whether or not the decision of military crackdown was made in due process, and whether there were any abuses in delivering the decision. Judging from literature from different sources, what the Settlement Committee did was only to demand a high level of autonomy for Taiwan as a whole, and there was no intention of rebelling against the central government. Unfortunately, Chiang Kai-shek was preoccupied with military operation in the Chinese Civil War and did not have time to verify the intelligence he received. He also blindly trusted Chen Yi and accepted his request for more enforcement troops in Taiwan. All of the above-mentioned inevitably led to a conclusion that Chiang Kai-shek was culpable due to his oversight over this matter. Even if Chiang Kai-shek understood the truth afterwards, the historical mistakes could not be overturned. Furthermore, it was also a shame that some soldiers did not avoid retaliation against the locals and committed breaches of discipline during the military crackdown. Although Chiang Kai-shek repeated his emphasis on military discipline and banned retaliatory activities (Footnote 77), he could not prevent misconducts from happening. In the aftermath of the incident, government officials of Taiwanese heritage such as Qiu Nian-tai and Tsai Pei-huo suggested the government to punish those who were guilty of dereliction of duty so that the public's anger could be appeased. But Chiang Kai-shek did not accept the proposal and left the historical trauma undealt with for a long time, which was further evidence of his lack of consideration.

Footnotes:

62.  When Chen Yi arrived in Taiwan on October 24, 1945, he rested a bit at Songshan Airport before he announced his policies, saying that he "came to Taiwan to make contributions, not to be a government official. I have confidence in building Taiwan and resolve to launch political reform and eradicate corruption and bad governance. I demand the cooperation of all Taiwanese compatriots in working on the construction of a new Taiwan." (Page 4)
63. At the beginning of the incident, Chen Yi did not take a tough stance on it, partly because there were not sufficient soldiers stationed on the island to respond to the social unrest and partly because he as Taiwan's Chief Executive did not want any scandal to undermine his political status and prestige (See Footnote 21 for more details). Therefore, it was likely that Chen Yi was trying to play down the seriousness of the conflict or even gloss over it. (Page 202)
64. On March 6, Chen Yi prepared a detailed report on the incident for Chairman Chiang Kai-shek and appointed Lee Yi-chung, the director of the Chinese Nationalist Party's Taiwan Province Division, to fly to Nanjing on March 7 to present it in detail to Chiang in person. The letter particularly emphasized that after the outbreak of the incident, the "treacherous party" (Chinese Communist Party) members, pro-Japanese gentry from the former colonial time, and hooligans had taken the opportunity to stir up anti-Chinese and anti-government sentiments. They seized firearms from the army and police and besieged local government buildings, which "showed that it was less an ordinary mass movement than well-planned, well-organized rebellion." Therefore, it should be of no doubt that participants needed to be severely punished. Chen Yi believed that "if he had eradicated the pro-Japanese gentry and had strengthened the armed force in Taiwan when he first assumed the office, the incident would not have deteriorated to the current situation." In order to mitigate the damage caused by the incident and solve the problem completely, Chen Yi proposed a few measures: firstly, in terms of politics, the government should change the feudalist ideology harbored by a majority of Taiwanese people, as well as restructure the Chief Executive's Office into the Taiwan Provincial Government and experiment with democratic elections of county and city mayors, so that Taiwanese people could have more trust in the government. Secondly, "the affiliates of the treacherous party must be forcibly annihilated and must not be allowed to exist." Chen Yi believed that only after the well-trained, two well-equipped divisions of the government's army were dispatched to Taiwan could the government have sufficient strength to deal with the treacherous party members and to exterminate the rebellious attempts to gain Taiwanese independence…The reason many members of Taiwanese intelligentsia were arrested and murdered one after another during the military crackdown could be understood from this letter. (Page 204)
65. However, the later development of the situation was not expected by Chen Yi. It turned out that the political discontent and economic despair that Taiwanese people had put up with for about a year had already reached a tipping point. The Settlement Committee realized it could take advantage of the public's anger and thus announced a series of demands consisting of political and economic requests, which were found unacceptable by Chen Yi. One of the reasons was that the institution of the Chief Executive's Office with all-encompassing power was designed and proposed by Chen Yi. Now Chen Yi's administration was on the brink of total disintegration, dealing a heavy blow to his political prestige and status. (Page 202)
66. According to the archive, Chairman Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Yi were opposed to the retaliatory policies. On March 10, Chen Yi told Hsu Shih-hsien, the director of the Department of Martial Law, and Ko Yuan-fen, the Chief of Staff, that many soldiers were found to have humiliated Taiwanese people and leaders of platoons and companies must constantly keep a watch on their soldiers to stop these sorts of behaviors. On the same day, Ko Yuan-fen also requested his subordinates to follow this order. On March 11, Hsu Shih-hsien made a report, saying that since the declaration of martial law, a total of 135 civilians had been arrested. Problems were usually found after interrogation, meaning that the "real reasons these people were arrested were extremely different to the reality." The suspects were either seriously injured or robbed of their belongings by soldiers while being escorted. Therefore, Hsu Shih-hsien suggested Chen Yi should make distinction between good and bad people to avoid implicating the innocent. He also urged Chen Yi to order his subordinate soldiers and officers "not to recklessly retaliate against local people," which showed that things like indiscriminate arrest, killing and robbery were not uncommon at the time. This was also confirmed by victims during oral history interviews. (Page 300)
67. According to the report that the Military Police Command and Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics presented to Chairman Chiang Kai-shek on March 12, the retaliatory operation was soon started after the government's army arrived in Taiwan on March 9 and 10. The Investigation and Statistics Department of the Chinese Nationalist Party's branch in Taiwan also suggested the government should seize the opportunity to eradicate the rebels and sent the list of wanted people to the Taiwan Garrison Command. On the evening of March 10, the government started to purge the "traitors in the cities." (Page 213)
68. Chen Yi ordered the Military Police's Special Investigations Branch in Taiwan to secretly arrest Lin Lien-chung (member of the National Assembly), Lin Kuei-tuan, Lee Ruei-feng, and the most wanted fugitive Tseng Bi-chung. Chiang Wei-chuan had already absconded. (Page 214)
69. During the night of February 28, Ko Yuan-fen, the Chief of Staff, also wrote in his diary that "the outbreak of this incident was, of course, incited by some traitors from within. However, we failed to take much precaution to avoid it because of our political unpreparedness, lack of sufficient attention to the mass movement, and the failure to manage and lead the crowds, all of which were the biggest mistakes that our party and our army had ever made." (Page 200)
70. On March 4, Ko Yuan-fen wrote in his diary that "after careful consideration, I have decided to prepare militarily as soon and thoroughly as possible. I will resort to military crackdown immediately after evidence of their treasonous behaviors is released." (Page 201)
71. On March 28, Pai Tsung-hsi instructed six measures for dealing with the aftermath of the February 28 Incident. 1) In terms of people who have been arrested, the government is required to provide a list during Pai Tsung-hsi's visit containing the responsible agencies and number and names of people it has incarcerated or executed. Except for those who have committed serious crimes, those who have been incarcerated should be treated leniently. 2) In terms of arresting criminals, only communists and culprits of the incident can be arrested, responsible agencies can only arrest people after they are directed to do so by the Taiwan Garrison Command, and suspects should be put on trial as soon as they are arrested. 3) In terms of dealing with students, all students need to go back to school immediately. After resuming school, students cannot be arrested unless they are communists. If they are found of any misconduct, they will be punished by school authorities in accordance with school rules. 4) The crackdown operation should be carried out by city and county government staff members and assisted by the government's army. 5) Injured government officials and teachers and civilians who do not have clothing and food should be aided urgently. 6) Military discipline should be strictly maintained. (Page 215)
72. Peng Meng-chi, Recollection of the February 28 Incident in Taiwan Province, Page 45. (Page 413)
73. After Peng Meng-chi dispatched troops to conduct the military crackdown in the afternoon of March 6, he telegraphed Chen Yi, who later scolded him, saying that the problems in Taiwan should be solved politically instead. Chen Yi said to Peng Meng-chi that he should be held accountable for the deterioration of the situation in Kaohsiung in the last few days as he had acted recklessly. Chen Yi ordered Peng Meng-chi to retreat all his troops back to the battalion and wait for further notice within two days after the reception of the telegraph. After Peng Meng-chi successfully clamped down the resistance in Kaohsiung, he sent another telegraph to Chen Yi, explaining the reason behind his military operation and requesting permission to execute Tu Guang-ming and the other two leaders of the local rebellion. After this telegraph was sent, the Taiwan Garrison Command replied immediately, saying that Peng Meng-chi should be complimented for his appropriate handling of the situation and granting approval for his execution requests. The reason Chen Yi changed his attitude was because he wanted to placate Peng Meng-chi who was in charge of the military crackdown in southern Taiwan. (Page 229)
74. At midday on March 8, Chang Mu-tao, the leader of the Military Police Corps, met with members of the Settlement Committee, saying that "the political reforms demanded by Taiwanese people were legitimate and the central government would definitely not dispatch troops to Taiwan." Chang also urged the Taiwanese compatriots "not to provoke the central government" and swore on his life that the central government would absolutely not launch any warfare on the island (Page 72). In fact, during the incident, Ko Yuan-fen, Chang Mu-tao and other intelligence workers had already made all kinds of preparations in Taipei to accommodate the imminent military operation. The enforcement troops had already landed in Keelung in the afternoon of the same day (March 8). (Page 206)
75. On March 31, the Taiwan Garrison Command followed Pai Tsung-hsi's instructions to notify all the troops on the island that they could not arrest suspects without receiving an order from the Command and that if they had to arrest someone urgently, they needed to inform the Command as soon as possible. However, on April 4, the 4th Military Police Regiment sought permission from the Taiwan Garrison Command to perform its tasks as it wished based on the legal authorities of military police as military prosecutors and judiciary police. (Page 216)
76. On March 1... before dawn, the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics received an urgent telegraph from its investigative office in Taiwan reporting the February 28 Incident. After that, the Bureau received urgent telegraphs twice a day. Yeh Hsiu-Feng, the director of the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, suggested Chiang Kai-shek to send three well-trained army divisions to Taiwan. The Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics deliberately exaggerated the seriousness of the incident. For example, it claimed in its telegraph on March 5 that most participants of the rebellion were samurais that had been employed by the Japanese army from overseas and that there were approximately 120,000 of them in Taiwan. (Page 203)
77. On March 12, the Military Police Command and the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics reported to Chiang Kai-shek that Chen Yi arbitrarily retaliated against Taiwanese people after the landing of the enforcement troops. On March 13, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Chen Yi urgently, saying, "please strictly forbid all the military personnel from engaging in retaliation or you will be prosecuted for insubordination." Chiang's tone was extremely stern and severe. On the same day, Chen Yi also sent an urgent telegraph back to Chiang, saying even though he had already banned military personnel from retaliation, he would continue to firmly remind his subordinates. On March 14, Chen Yi once again ordered all the military personnel not to engage in any retaliation. Although the same message had been repeated again and again, retaliation against local Taiwanese people was still common in the military, which was very baffling. (Page 300)

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Conclusion

The February 28 Incident is indeed one of the major tragedies in the history of modern Taiwan, and is the result of the interaction of many factors. In the previous 50 years of Japanese colonial rule, the Japanese had deliberately designed an isolation policy that created a schism between the Taiwanese people and China. Moreover, with the deliberate implementation of Japanese education, the ideas and values of the Taiwanese people had become obviously different to the Chinese mainlanders. On the other side of Formosa Strait, the Chinese officialdom and population were also extremely unfamiliar with the situation in Taiwan. Overwhelmed by the deteriorating situation of the anti-communist warfare on the Chinese mainland, the Nationalist government was unable to pay as much attention to Taiwan as it should have. And the Chief Executive did not consider the public opinions on the island and chose to suppress Taiwanese people's political rights. Moreover, officials' incompetence and widespread corruption deepened the public's dissatisfaction with the government. Given Taiwan was severely damaged during the Second World War (Footnote 78), the fact that the Nationalist government was unable to support Taiwan's reconstruction (Footnote 79) and complete the restoration in the short term (Footnote 80) due to its turbulent political situation and incessant warfare against the Chinese Communist Party in China was not generally understood by the Taiwanese people. Therefore, the outbreak of the tragedy was caused by both subjective factors and objective factors, which were not something that could be fully controlled by the Chief Executive.

Following investigative studies conducted by many parties, an approximate outline of the truth of the February 28 Incident can already be drawn. Unfortunately, an accurate number of the casualties in the incident could not be ascertained after thorough collection of information, interviews, and statistical analysis. During the interviews, our research fellows could deeply feel the trauma and sorrow that the families of the victims have experienced for decades. Their helplessness, grief, and expectations are not only difficult for us to forget, but also something that the Taiwanese authorities should not ignore. We must not forget history as it can guide us in the future. We should learn the sorrowful lessons of this tragic incident and prevent the future occurrence of such a dramatic schism. It is hoped that the Taiwanese authorities do not avoid accountability for the inappropriate crackdown, and do give compensations to the innocent victims of the February 28 Incident. Meanwhile, we also hope people from all walks of life can understand the special situation of the time, that the trauma inflicted by the tragedy can be soothed with forgiveness and peacefulness, and that a better future can be together worked toward.

Footnotes:

78.  At the end of the Second World War, Taiwan was constantly bombed by the Allies, resulting in considerable damage to Taipei, Keelung, Hsinchu, Chiayi and Kaohsiung. For example, Keelung, which was bombed 25 times from October 1944 to the end of the war in 1945, was most severely bombed as it was in the fortified region. "The total bombed area was 3,051,000 square meters and 56 percent of the city was damaged. 5,056 buildings were ruined in the bombing and 9,030 buildings were estimated to have stood before the war, which means 56 percent of the buildings were damaged." In addition, the roads and waterways were also damaged to a similar degree. Manufacturing, mining, and electricity facilities were among the most seriously damaged. In terms of electricity, before the takeover of the Nationalist government, the power supply had already dropped to about 30,000 kWh, which was less than one third of that in 1943. Also, the acquisition of raw materials was not easy and talents were hard to find. Therefore, in the early days of the new regime, the Chief Executive's Office was planning to ask Japanese industrial and mining technicians to stay in Taiwan to maintain production activities. However, after the objection of the U.S. government, they had to be repatriated. This was why the production level was difficult to restore to the pre-war status in the short run. (Page 5)
79. As the Chinese Civil War was constantly escalating, a nationwide economic crisis broke out. The rise in prices, disorder in society, and widespread panic among the Chinese population were reasons the central Nationalist government could not dedicate itself to properly managing Taiwan. (Page 27)
80. After the war, the whole world was working on reconstruction from the debris. Inflation was haunting the globe, and China was no exception. The Taiwanese economy was increasingly unstable after being implicated in the escalation of anti-communist warfare in China. Back then, Taiwan encountered various problems, including insufficient industrial raw materials, damage to production capabilities, a lack of transport facilities, fiscal difficulties, and an inability to replenish the loss of technicians. (Page 23)

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行政院《「二二八事件」研究報告》 摘要

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

前言

行政院為了「對解嚴前不敢觸及卻已造成台灣社會不安的『二二八事件』進行研究、調查工作，以資政府處理『二二八事件』善後問題參考之用」，於民國八十年一月成立「研究二二八事件小組」，委員有陳重光、葉明勳、李雲漢、遲景德、張玉法、何景賢、陳三井和賴澤涵等八位先生，由陳重光和葉明勳兩位先生擔任召集人，而由賴澤涵先生擔任總主筆。另聘請黃富三、吳文星、黃秀政、許雪姬和賴澤涵五位教授擔任執筆工作；另有陳美妃、簡榮聰、方惠芳三位為兼任研究員，分別協助黃富三、黃秀政和許雪姬三位教授，即所謂「工作小組」。

「上述執筆人員本著學術良心和超黨派的立場，從事檔案文獻研究和口述歷史工作」，時間雖然只有一年，卻能大量參考官方第一手的資料，訪問數以百計的見證人，並據以有系統且客觀的分析事件的始末。

「在蒐集資料方面，除了徵集台灣現有之政府檔案外，研究人員並分赴海外及大陸地區，蒐集相關之珍貴檔案，例如美國史丹福大學胡佛研究所檔案館所藏George H. Kerr先生所捐贈的『二二八事件』檔案、英國公共檔案局（Public Record Office）的淡水領事館檔案，以及南京第二歷史檔案館的資料...等。研究小組所獲資料之豐富，在當前海內外進行此一問題之研究計劃中，堪稱無出其右。」

「『二二八事件』調查報告在民國八十一年二月二十（二）日公布後，雖在某些枝節上有見仁見智的看法，但尚能為社會大眾所接受。」執筆人復參考更進一步之資料，對研究報告加以修改或補充，至八十三年二月二十日，由時報文化出版企業股份有限公司出版。此即是《「二二八事件」研究報告》之由來。

《「二二八事件」研究報告》做為認識二二八事件主要的參考資料，固然是非常適合的。但全書五百零四頁，對忙碌的現代人來說，份量是重了些。研究報告的「結論」，自四○五頁至四一二頁，對二二八事件有一個簡要的描述與檢討，讀者可以很快的就瞭解事件的演變與前因後果。因此本會特別選為參考資料的主幹，分為八節，並以附註加強說明。附註之內容除有特別說明外，亦都是引自研究報告。相信在一個小時之內，就可以讓讀者對二二八事件有一個通盤的概念。當然，如果想詳細瞭解整個的事件，還是要參考原書。

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一、發生的背景

「二二八大屠殺事件」（說明 1）於二次戰後（說明 2）後不到一年半之時間發生，其背景極為錯綜複雜，並非單一因素所能解釋的。首先，由於長達五十年的日本殖民統治，台灣人對中國的政治制度與社會現況，均缺乏了解，因而於1945年末，期望落空（說明 3）。其次，在政治方面，行政長官制度（說明 4），確有諸多缺失，而官箴（說明 5）、軍紀欠佳（說明 6），政治參與和待遇也極不公平（說明 7）。在經濟方面，由於不當之管制政策（說明 8），百業蕭條（說明 9），物價飛漲（說明 10），失業嚴重。在社會方面，復員返鄉的前台籍日軍軍人（說明 11），就職無路，一文莫名，因而逐漸形成一股不滿政府的暗潮。此外，行政長官陳儀個性剛愎（說明 12），以致下情不能上達，官民關係惡劣。由於以上種種因素，有識之士早已預感危機之瀕臨（說明 13），然而，長官公署猶渾然不覺（說明 14）。

說明：

1. 《「二二八事件」研究報告》的時間斷限，原則上係自民國三十六年二月二十七日緝煙事件發生，以迄五月十六日清鄉結束為止。（前言）
2. 民國三十四年。
3. 台人長期在日人封鎖下，對祖國情形所知不多，因此台人處處拿日據時期的軍、政、經、社會等方面與戰後中國政府所治理者相比較，在強烈的對比下，情緒上反而感到祖國不如日人，轉生輕視鄙夷之心理。此外，有些大陸來台者對台灣婦女騙婚、欠缺現代知識之生活習慣的差距，不同社會背景產生之價值觀與道德觀之差異， 加上語言的溝通不良，均加深了省籍的鴻溝。台人初對祖國期望過高，不久即由失望而轉為輕視。（頁二七）
4. 依「台灣省行政長官公署組織條例」，行政長官公署受中央之委託，得辦理中央行政。行政長官對在台之中央各機關有指揮監督之權，並可在職權範圍內發布署令及制定單行規章，同時身兼台灣省警備總司令，可見行政長官制係集本省司法、立法、軍事、行政等大權於一身的一元化領導。行政長官由國民政府特任，此與各省的委員制不同。各省的省府實行合議制，委員與省主席同為簡任官; 而台灣省行政長官公署之各處（秘書處、民政、教育、財政、農林、工礦、交通、警務、會計處）及秘書長都是行政長官的幕僚人員，均是簡派。此外，設有法制委員會、宣傳委員會及考核設計委員會。至於銀行貨幣系統也與國內不同。…「陳儀」認為應維持台幣及台灣金融機構使自成系統，並阻止法幣在台灣流通，這樣才不致「使台灣像大陸各省那樣法幣氾濫成災，物價暴跌的現象。」因此，，陳儀主張「先保持安定，才能促進繁榮，所以要發行獨立的新台幣，使台灣不受大陸法幣的影響。」此一主張在其來台之前，獲得蔣主席的首肯，並面囑宋子文照辦，因之，當時有意來台設立分行的四行二局（中央銀行、中國銀行、交通銀行、農民銀行、中央信託局及郵政總局）遂無法在台灣設立，財政部也公布「台灣與內地通匯管理辦法」，規定除「中央銀行及被委託之銀行外，其餘銀行皆不准辦理台幣與法幣兌換業務。」（頁六）不少台人認為國民政府此一設計仍將台人視同殖民地之人民，因而對政府相當不滿（頁四）
5. 官員不僅平日不是在為民服務，遇事還要擺出官架子，並層層推諉，敷衍了事，這些缺點與日據時官員敬業要行政重效率成為強烈的對比。（頁二十）　政治上缺乏效率，官僚作風又盛，這些現象均是日據時期台人未嘗經驗的，短短的一年半，行政長官公署的表現真是遠不如日人。而公務員涉足酒家、不守紀律及貪污的事件，報紙的登載不絕，例如民國三十六年二月十二日《台灣新生報》社論（談營私舞弊問題）所載的舞弊案數目頗為驚人，指出不少公務員常涉足都市中的舞場、茶館、酒樓和賭場，各機關冗員太多，人民對公務員的印象欠佳。至於貪污案件不僅出現在一般公務員，連檢察官、法院院長，甚至教師都貪污。而士兵不守法、乘車購物不給錢是常見的事，甚至有公然搶劫者。不少貪污超過千萬元以上。（頁二一）
6. 駐台軍隊軍紀欠佳，軍人並常向「民眾強買勒借，乃至姦污婦女，動輒開槍傷人。給一塊錢硬要買五個雞蛋（值五元），市場上糾紛司空見慣。」至於搶劫、偷竊的事，更時有所聞（頁二三）
7. 就政治上言，日據時期台人無論在行政上、專業上及技術上均難獲公平地位。台灣光復，不少台人抱有幻想，以為此後應可自治……其實不然，長官公署的九個重要處會十八位正副處長中，只有一位副處長是台人。十七位縣市長中僅台北市長游彌堅、新竹縣長劉啟光、高雄市長黃仲圖（原為連謀）、高雄縣長謝東閔（二二八事件發生時為黃達平）為台人，但悉數均返自重慶「半山」，並不受台人歡迎。…更令台人不服者，莫過於「同工而不同酬」的待遇，以及台人不易謀得公家機構之職。（頁十九）
8. 島嶼地區的經濟，對外的貿易十分重要，如果島嶼地區不靠貿易，則必須具備相當豐富的資源，但台灣並未完全具備這個條件，因此仍需對外貿易。但陳儀似未看清此一情勢，他到台灣之後，即著手實行經濟的統制…雖然他知道這會引起商人的反對，但陳儀認為他是為公不是為私，他所要「追求的不是要肥少數人的腰包，而是要使台灣人民的食、穿、用等民生問題逐步獲得解決。」這種態度顯示其頗嚮往社會主義思想，加上他剛毅固執的個性，使得他的經濟政策受到極大的批評與反彈，而成為後來「二二八事件的」導火線之一。（頁七）
 由於台灣行政的特殊化，長官公署相當排斥外來者，拒絕四行二局或任何私立銀行到台灣設立經營，因而使「官警貿易企業以外的民間貿易企業一律停頓」; 亦使得中國大陸的政府銀行以「通匯問題」採抵制台灣的封鎖政策，台灣因而走上自我封鎖的局面。結果，造成台灣與中國大陸之間船票、機票不能出售，海關無法課稅，船不准出口，台灣貨運無法暢通；　加上長官公署的統制政策，政府自營貿易，以及匯率的不定，使商人裹足不前，因而各地貨物運台銷售困難，外貨不能到台，而台灣貨物也不能外銷的自我封鎖。（頁二五）
 曾有台胞於民國三十五年一月十日向行政院請願，要求「中央明令取消與民爭利之貿易公司，及類似性質各種中間剝削機構，取消各種戰時統治法令，以疏民困。」足見人民對陳儀統制政策之不滿。（頁二二）
9. （陳儀）除繼續日人在台的專賣制度而設置專賣局之外，又設了控制省內外運輸的貿易局，幾乎壟斷了台灣的民生貿易與工業各層面，一般私人企業無法發展，造成人民更多的不滿與失望。因此，「二二八事件」發生時，這兩機構便成為改革者要求廢除的目標。（頁二六）
10. 台灣經濟危機的造成，主要源於通貨膨脹，物價飛漲，尤其是糧價居高不下。台灣原以產米著稱於世，日據時期，「因受戰爭的影響」，致糧食生產銳減…台灣光復後…民國三十五年初，台灣已嚴重缺乏糧食…米價一直飛漲，以致有人言物價之高冠於全國。許多地方發生饑荒，甚至連台中、台南等產米地區亦發生騷擾事件。失業者日多，強盜白天公然搶劫，小偷所在多有。（頁二三）
 台灣的物價飛漲，從民國三十四年十月底到民國三十五年十二月上漲了一百倍，糧食問題尤其嚴重。（頁二五）
 米一斤原來只賣一點五元，但民國三十五年初台北的米價就漲到十元以上，到三十六年二月，以漲到一斤三十二元，此為台人過去所未曾遭遇的生活經驗，因而台人大為不滿。（頁八）
11. 原台籍日本兵…有十餘萬人。（頁一一八）
12. 陳儀過分信任其部屬，演成縱容部下，且被不肖屬下包圍，時為台北市商會理事長之蔣渭川，即曾當面批評陳儀:「長官深居內院，被自稱官民橋樑的少數投機分子，和萬惡官僚等所包圍，社會民情無從而知，上情亦不能下達。」（頁一二）
13. 台灣光復不到三個月，已有不少台人批評陳儀在台的許多做法不當。民國三十五年初，台灣的情況惡化已相當嚴重，引起當時中外人士的極度關切，閩台通訊社已經呼籲政府應對台灣的問題加以重視。上海的《密勒士評論報》刊載（台灣退後五十年）一文，並說:「五個月以後（台灣）可能是中國的愛爾蘭。」…美國在台領事館於三十五年底給其駐華大使和國務院的報告也說:「台灣已在叛亂之點了。」迨至三十六年初，敏銳的觀察者已感到局勢的嚴重，例如上海《觀察》雜誌在台特約記者，於民國三十六年二月二日事件前預言「今日台灣危機四伏，岌岌可危，是隨時可能發生騷動或暴亂的。」可見中外人士都感到台灣實已瀕臨爆發變亂的邊緣。（頁十）
14.  政治、經濟等各方面已讓台人大失所望，但陳儀為了粉飾太平而將駐台的政府軍內調大陸剿共，台灣的兵力頓呈空虛局面; 激進分子遂以為必可推翻陳儀政府，乃大膽鼓動民眾反抗政府。（頁二五）

TOP   HOME    [Directory Texts & Documents (1990—)]    [二二八報告]

二、屠殺事件之爆發

「二二八大屠殺事件」源自緝私員與憲警單位因緝私煙處理失當（說明 15），始導致二月二十八日部分台北市民之請願示威，並罷工、罷市（說明 16）。又因當日發生公署衛兵槍擊請願民眾事件（說明 17），紛亂一發不可收拾，乃由請願懲兇一變而為對抗公署（說明 18），進而激化為省籍衝突（說明 19）。此一抗爭與衝突，迅即蔓延全島，使原本單純的治安事件變質為政治運動，地方領袖乘機要求全面改革，部分地區並因接收軍警武器（說明 20），以致發生武裝衝突。

說明：

15.  「二二八大屠殺事件」導火線源自一意外的圓環緝煙事件，事情的經過大致如下: 民國三十六年二月二十七日上午十一時左右，專賣局接到密報…:淡水港有走私船運入火柴、香煙五十餘箱等情事，專賣局乃派葉得根、鍾延洲、趙子健、劉超群、盛鐵夫、傅學通六名查緝員，會同警察大隊所派四名警察前往查緝，但當他們抵達淡水時，僅查獲私煙五箱。不久，又據密報人說:這些走私貨已移到台北市南京西路的天馬茶房（太平町，今之延平北路）附近，按此a是台北最大的私貨集中地。查緝人員與警察先到太平町附近的小香園進晚餐，以便就近訪查。下午七時三十分，當他們到達天馬茶房時，私販早已逃散，僅查獲一位四十歲寡婦林江邁的公私煙，遂將其全部公私煙和現金加以沒收。 林江邁幾乎下跪苦苦地哀求說:「如果全部沒收的話，我就沒飯吃了，至少把錢和專賣局製的香煙還給我吧．…。」但查緝人員不予理會。當時圍觀的民眾很多，紛紛加入求情的行列。林江邁情急，進而抱住查緝員不放。其中一查緝員「葉得根」 ，用槍管打她的頭，致林婦的頭顱鮮血直流 。 目睹此景的群眾極為氣憤，乃將查緝員包圍，並高喊「阿山（外省人)不講理」、「豬仔太可惡」、「還給香煙」等情緒激動的話。查緝員見勢不妙，連忙逃走，但群眾卻緊追不捨。其中一查緝員傅學通為求脫身，乃向群眾開槍，不幸誤射當時在自宅樓下觀熱鬧的市民陳文溪（年約二十歲，次日死亡）。查緝員逃至永樂町（西寧）派出所，後轉至警察總局（中山堂旁），激憤的民眾將查緝員的卡車玻璃搗毀，並將卡車推倒於道旁，然後包圍派出所要求交出兇手繩之以法。專賣局業務委員會常務委員李炯支與業務會第四組組長楊子才聞報，於九時許趕往現場處理。當時約有百餘民眾聚集，見二人卡車抵達，均趨前欲加毆打，李、楊乃轉至台北市警察局。群眾尾隨而至，並已聚集達六、七百人。李、楊兩人表示將會懲辦查緝員，惟群眾要求將肇事人交出。兩人不得已，會同北市警察局長陳松堅，將查緝員六人送往憲兵隊看管。但民眾不滿，要求立即將六名查緝員逮捕。李、楊兩人以「刑罪罰惡，律有明文，未予擅便答覆」為由，一再解釋，但始終未獲得諒解。 群眾得知查緝員被送至憲兵隊(台灣新生報社對面)後，乃擁至包圍，要求交出兇手。張慕陶團長嚴詞拒絕，並令一排憲兵上前擺出射擊姿勢，群眾見狀乃躲進新生報騎樓。在場的見證人周傳枝稱:時任《台灣新生報》日文版主編吳金鍊好奇地出來探視，見到周氏，即微笑打招呼。周氏問:「有鑼沒有？」吳氏答:「有」，並轉身入內取出銅鑼。於是，雨一稍停，鑼聲叮噹響起來，群眾又包圍憲兵隊。又有青年在街上敲鑼大叫:「台灣人趕緊出來報仇」，「不出來的不是蕃薯」，徹夜大聲叫罵。部分民眾則到台灣新生報要求刊登此事，主編吳金鍊因奉有「台灣省行政長官公署宣傳委員會」不得刊登事件消息的命令，而加以拒絕。民眾威脅將以汽油燒報社。吳金鍊不得已請社長李萬居出面。李氏答應刊登，民眾始離開報社。次日，該報即以五號字刊登百字左右之報導。（頁四八）　於是，由緝私引起的傷人、殺人事件點燃了累積一年多的怒火，群眾燒車、包圍警察局、憲兵隊，要求立刻處決兇犯。在得不到滿意答覆的情況下，群眾久聚不散，終於引發了次日的擴大衝突。（頁五一）
16. 二月二十八日上午九時，民眾因緝私傷害人命事件未獲解決，乃沿街打鑼，通告罷市，市民、商店立予響應，相繼關門。一批民眾遊行至太平町二丁目派出所前，派出所主管黃某欲加制止。民眾因黃某平時藉勢凌人，將其圍打，並搗毀所內玻璃、物品等。　隨後，遊行民眾越聚越多，十時許，衝入位於本町（今重慶南路）之肇事單位專賣局台北分局，發現局內有緝私員。群眾以為其中之一是昨夜之兇手，乃將他與另一警員圍毆致死，又毆傷四人，並將局裡所存之火柴、煙、酒及一輛汽車與七、八輛腳踏車拋至街上焚燒，至次日仍未全熄。當時圍觀民眾達二、三千人，憲警隨即趕到，但也知難而退，不敢處理。......十二時許，民眾又擁向南門專賣局總局，要求懲兇，但因憲警事先有防備，僅打破玻璃而已。......民眾由於向專賣局總局請願未遂，乃轉往長官公署。．．．．．．此外，專賣局南門工廠亦被搗毀。專賣局引起的民怨於此可窺一斑。（頁五一）
17. 下午一時許，有一批四、五百人的群眾，以鑼鼓為前鋒，並有人喊叫、呼口號，由火車站向長官公署前進。有謂民眾因市面缺米，聽說公署有食米可領，乃一呼四應，尾隨而至，聲勢浩大。但群眾至中山路路口，尚未到公署廣場前，即為配備整齊之士兵舉槍阻擋。不久，槍聲響起，民眾奔逃，有人傷亡倒地。此即公署衛兵開槍事件，也是局勢惡化之關鍵所在。（頁五二）
18. 公署開槍事件發生後，官民對立之勢已不可避免，而二次戰後所積累的省籍矛盾隨之爆發。於是，省民在對抗公署的同時，也對外省人進行一連串的暴力行動--「打阿山」。 二十八日下午二時許，民眾聚會於台北公園（今二二八和平公園），隨後進佔公園內的台灣廣播電台，向全省廣播。內容主要為批判政府貪污現象、米糧外運、民不聊生等，並號召民眾起而驅逐各地的貪官汙吏以求自存。惟亦有謂板橋轉播站因抵制而未予轉播，消息只在台北地區流傳。無論確否，本省幅員小，交通方便，次日，全台各地先後知悉台北「二二八衝突」，亂事乃蔓延全島，而懲兇要求也升高為政治抗爭行動。 下午三點，警備總司令部鑒於情勢危急，宣布戒嚴，並遣派武裝軍警巡邏市區，且開槍掃射。然而，民眾仍再包圍專賣總局、鐵路警察署、交通局等，而與軍警發生衝突，不少民眾、學生因而喪生。據警總「通報」，下午時刻，群眾千餘人在郵政總局聚會，軍警驅逐不散，乃發生衝突，民眾傷亡十數人。（頁五四）
19. 民眾也遷怒外省人，濫施報復。本町正華旅社與虎標永安堂首先遭殃，不但門窗玻璃被搗碎，物品亦被搬出焚燬。下午五時許，榮町貿易局所開設之新台公司（台北最大的百貨公司）亦被搗毀，貨物被搬出焚燒，有乘機偷竊者則遭毒打。 民眾凡具有汽車、卡車，均叫下乘客毒打，再將車推至台北車站、圓環夜市附近，予以燒燬。據估計，被燒車輛約有十餘輛。民眾不僅燬物，也對外省人不分青紅皂白地屈辱毆打。 在本町、台北車站、台北公園、榮町、永樂町、太平町、萬華等地，均有不少外省人無端挨打。新竹縣長朱文伯與台北市地政局長遭羞辱或痛毆。一般認為，這是一年半以來的積怨所爆發出來的盲目排斥外省人暴動。於是，無辜的小公務員及其眷屬、來台旅行或經商的外省人成了代罪羔羊。許多聳人聽聞的暴行也傳出了。…當時任職於聯合國救濟總署的汪彝定先生曾目睹此類現象，但他指稱，大多是被棒打或棍擊，尚未見武士刀; 攻擊婦孺老人的現象不太多，強姦只偶有傳聞。據聞，外省人被打死者至少有十五人，有些被木棍打成癱瘓。（頁五五）
20. 憲兵團長張慕陶亦指台灣局勢已演變至「叛國奪權階段」，地方政府完全失卻統馭能力，暴民已收繳各地軍警武器，總數在四千枝以上，而指責陳儀「似尚未深悉事態之嚴重，猶粉飾太平。」（頁二Ｏ三）

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三、衝突之擴大

台北市是這場政治風暴的中心，這場風暴隨後蔓延至全島各地，而台北市的「二二八事件處理委員會（說明 21）」與各地的分會，則是這場政治紛爭的主角。紛亂期間，平時不得民心的地方官吏固然紛紛棄職走避，即有意維持秩序並願與處委會合作之官員，迫於形勢，不得不暫時躲避，以保安全。台北市的處委會與各地的分會，分別擔負整合民意、維持秩序與進行政治改革的重任，並負責與行政長官公署之間的溝通（說明 22），一度幾乎取代公署與各地政府的功能（說明 23），然處委會本身意見紛紜，令出多門，各地亦無統一的行政綱領可資遵循，因而未能充分發揮安定政局的功能。

事件爆發後，由於各地衝突不斷擴大，部分地區中共及其同路人乃乘機介入，如台中地區主導「三二事件（說明 24）」的謝雪紅和楊克煌。謝氏不僅召開「市民大會」，利用示威群眾，全面接管台中市的官方機構，更利用青年學生組織 「二七部隊（說明 25）」，以武裝力量為後盾，澈底爭取民主政治，在處委會的議會路線之外，另闢一條武裝路線。

嘉義地區則自三月二日事件（說明 26）發生後，就顯現出與其他地方不同的特質。第一，各地民眾曾組成武裝隊伍，參加攻擊紅毛埤軍械庫及水上飛機場的軍事行動（說明 27），惟參加者大半是烏合之眾; 第二，嘉義地區不少社會人士支持這些行動，因而孫志俊市長認為嘉義地區「戰事進行之激烈，與公教人員損害之慘重，堪稱為全省之冠」。

高雄地區在三月三日起民情騷動，群眾逐漸有激烈的行動，圍攻一○五後方醫院與憲兵隊等地（說明 28）。高雄要塞司令彭孟緝認為此舉已形同叛亂，待機出兵。三月六日下午二時，彭孟緝扣留上山談判的代表（說明 29），以迅速的行動出兵鎮壓（說明 30），雖使高雄地區紛擾不安的局面穩定下來，但軍事攻擊行動造成高雄市政府內（說明 31）、火車站前（說明 32）無辜民眾的傷亡。而事後的清鄉，逮捕一千五百名嫌疑「人犯」，且部分人犯被公開槍決，可說是衝突創傷久久未能癒合的重要原因。

說明：

21.  三月一日，台北市參議會為反映民意，邀請台籍國大代表、省參議員、國民參政員，於上午十時在中山堂召開大會，成立「緝煙血案調查委員會」，會中決議推派台灣省參議會議長黃朝琴、台北市參議會議長周延壽、台灣省參議員王添灯、國民參政員林忠等為代表，晉見長官，提出數項要求，即解除戒嚴令、釋放被捕市民、軍警不許開槍、官民共組處理委員會，並由陳儀向全省廣播。陳儀全予接受，並認為應定名為「二二八事件處理委員會」較妥，而此即該委員會得名之由來。（頁五七）
 處委會一面強化本身之職能，一面亦展開宣傳工作。六日下午，處委會在中山堂補開正式成立大會，王添灯任會議主席，即席選出常務委員，計有:國民參政員:林獻堂、陳逸松; 國民大會代表:李萬居、連震東、林連宗、黃國書; 台北市參議員:周延壽、潘渠源，簡聖堉、徐春卿、吳春霖；　省等參議員：王添灯、黃朝琴、蘇維樑、黃純青、林為恭、郭國基。另選出候補常務委員洪火煉、吳國信（頁六六）
22. 七日上午，陳儀致函處委會，謂各方代表紛紛，意見繁雜，應先交處委會討論綜合後，再向公署提出。（頁七Ｏ）
23. 三日至五日，全省各縣市處委會紛紛成立後，公署權力已被架空。（頁六六）
24. 三月二日上午，台中民眾齊集台中戲院…舉行市民大會。九時，由私立建國工藝職業學校教員楊克煌宣布開會，並報告台北事變發端與人民請願經過，說明台北市的行動與提出要求事項。接著，與會者一致推舉建國工藝職校校長謝雪紅為大會主席。謝氏擔任主席後，「詳述光復以來陳儀暴虐政治的事實與目前台灣的形勢，強調欲解放台灣人民的痛苦，人民必須團結起來，結束國民黨一黨專政，立即實行台灣人民的民主自治。所以必須響應這次台北市民的英勇起義，不怕犧牲，鬥爭到底，爭取澈底的勝利。」謝氏說畢，接著由「台灣省政治建設協會台中分會」 代表巫永昌及律師代表張風謨等相繼發言，「亦為攻擊政府，離間省內外感情之詞」。十時左右，參加群眾為表示擁護起見，決定遊行示威。遊行群眾用消防車，鳴響警笛，呼籲市民響應起義，踴躍參加抵抗運動。全市一時驚天動地，緊張萬分。（頁八四）
25. ［三月六日］謝雪紅為貫徹其政治主張，抗戰到底，乃糾集四百餘青年學生，另在第八部隊內組織「二七部隊」，自任總指揮，以鍾逸人、蔡鐵城分任隊長、參謀等職務，重要幹部有楊克煌、李喬松、古瑞雲等人。其基本隊伍，有以鍾逸人親信黃信卿為首的埔里隊; 以何集淮、蔡伯勳為首的中商隊(隊員中有幾名中共黨員); 以呂煥章（中共黨員）為首的中師隊; 以黃金島為首的警備隊（獨立治安隊）；以李炳崑為首的建國工藝學校學生隊。此外，有林大宜從農村招募當過日軍的農民; 有延平學院的學生;有前日軍砲兵少尉; 有前日軍工兵。還有三五成群去報到的。 「二七部隊」的成立，是謝雪紅以武裝力量反抗地方政府的具體表示，「這支民兵在處理委員會的議會路線之外，又開闢了一條武裝路線。在中南部的武裝鬥爭中，以『二七部隊』的反抗堅持最久。」（頁九一）
26. 三月二日下午三時，由彰化、台中南下的年輕人數十人，來到嘉義火車站與噴水池之間，有一名年紀三、四十歲的人背槍，在街頭喊話，召集市民去燒孫志俊市長的官舍。孫市長見情勢不好，跳出牆外，決定逃往憲兵隊，無如群眾蝟集，緊追在後，狀至危險，幸好遇到市參議員林抱及林文樹，經二人救援，才能安抵憲兵隊。
 在孫市長逃走的同時，街上已有打外省人、包圍警局接收槍枝之行動，由於警察已經陸續離開崗位，市區乃呈現混亂的情況。孫市長於下午五時一面以電話與駐軍聯繫，一面請議長鍾家成出面維持治安與秩序。三月三日召開市民大會，成立了嘉義市「二二八事件處理委員會」，由三民主義青年團嘉義分團籌備處主任陳復志擔任主任委員，兼作戰司令，秘書為李曉芳，以下分設各組、隊。（頁一Ｏ五）
27. 嘉義市「二二八事件處理委員會」在數小時的磋商後，決定接管電台，並藉由廣播來向全市及全台各地「募集志願軍」。在這一呼籲下，布袋、朴子、鹽水、佳里、六腳、番路、斗六、台中、埔里、北港、台南工學院等地人馬陸續前來嘉義應援。當時守在東門町的第二十一師獨立團第一營羅迪光營長在孫市長的要求下進入市區鎮壓，使局面平添變數。由於軍隊有強力的砲火容易造成傷亡，處委會乃派參議員前往憲兵隊談判，欲以和平方式解決，但雙方條件差距太大，沒有談妥。
 是日來嘉各隊約莫三千人開始攻擊憲兵營、紅毛埤第十九軍械庫、水上飛機場及東門町軍營。三日晚九時，市政府被接收，而所有外省籍警察在局長林天綱的率領下也退到東門町。（頁一Ｏ六）
28. 三日，由台北南下的「流氓百數十人」由台南方面分乘卡車進入市區，而台南工學院學生也抵達高雄，高雄的「二二八事件」於焉爆發。先是，一○五後方醫院的獨立團第七連的第一排國軍遭到攻擊，而鹽埕町也聚集了四、五百人，欲攻擊憲兵隊; 毆辱、搶奪外省人及商店之事也不時傳出，市區治安頓呈混亂。是日晚，警察局長童葆昭的座車遭人焚燬，集身到要塞司令部要求保護。凌晨，警局電話線路被切斷、武器被奪，而部分本省籍警察攜械逃散，有的回家不再執行維護治安之責，有的加入民眾的攻擊行動（頁一一五）
29. 六日上午九時，不知是計的市長等七人（議長彭清靠、光明、范滄榕、曾豐明、苓雅區長林界，及台電高雄辦事處主任李佛續）上山，據黃仲圖市長的說法，他擬赴司令部請示制壓辦法，卻為…數十人手持槍刀及手榴彈擁入市府，辱罵市長，其首領光明等提出非法條件，欲向國軍作越軌要求，持械迫市長與參議會議長率代表赴司令部。…當七位代表進入要塞司令部接待室後，彭氏由另一小門入內，雙方繞圓桌而坐，市長、議長分坐彭氏之左右，則坐在彭氏對面，市長拿出和平條九條給彭司令看，彭原意不在談判，只是在拖延時間，因此當即拍桌怒斥…荒謬，並大呼來人。 室外的官兵聞聲而入，將代表等一一搜身。據彭孟緝言，身上有槍，而范、曾兩人身上有手榴彈，除范、曾、三人被逮捕外，其餘的人在衛兵監視下枯坐在原處。（頁一一七）
30. 在彭孟緝指揮下，兵分三路:一路經建國三路; 一路由壽山要塞司令部直下，過鼓山一路及大公路之陸橋向市府; 一路過平交道進入五福四路。每路有三班，各約有一百人。（頁一一九）
31. 六日下午進攻市政府的是守備大隊陳國儒部，由於市政府樓上架設機槍，軍方乃認定在市政府的是暴徒，因此到市政府後並未遵命對空鳴槍示警，而是先丟入手榴彈，然後見人就開槍，在市政府的人根本無法抵抗，死傷慘重，市參議員許秋粽、黃賜、王石定等五、六十人喪命市府。…參議員邱道得奉命勞軍，進入市府時，腳下踩的都是死人，且血流滿地，一如泥濘。（頁一一九）
32. 主攻火車站及第一中學的是二十一師何軍章團第三營，分成二路…抵達車站，當時高雄第一中學畢業生顏再策率領學生，自長春旅社開槍欲驅散前來的軍隊，由於火力不如，乃冒險衝出，被擊中要害，在火車站前的民眾見狀，有的散去，有的躲入地下道中，軍隊掃射了地下道，造成不少傷亡。（頁一一九）

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四、政府之肆應與事件之平復

當事件逐漸蔓延爆發後，陳儀一者鑒於於兵力不足（說明 33），二者為維護其權位，本有意淡化處理，以政治手段解決。參與「二二八事件處理委員會」的社會人士，在初期也只為解決緝煙血案（說明 34）；但由於長官公署應對無方，使得原本單純的懲兇請願事件，轉變為政治改革運動，更憑藉民氣的高漲，逐步提高其訴求（說明 35）。然因各地處委會組織鬆散，遂為中央認是「叛國」的舉動，構成治安機關請兵鎮壓的藉口。政府為何要出兵鎮壓?就現有的檔案、各種文獻及口述資料觀之，顯然當時中央政府的因應之道，深為台灣主政者的意見所左右。蓋事起之初，陳儀、柯遠芬等執掌台灣軍政大權者，並未了解台灣社會當時的情況，故對民眾或處委會之要求均視之為無理取鬧或別具用心。於是，一面運用分化（說明 40）、滲透策略，以求化解危機; 繼則誇張衝突之嚴重性，向中央要求派兵，以進行武裝鎮壓。

就政府之文獻觀察，蔣介石主席最初並未主張鎮壓，僅同意派一加強軍團來台，而此係「歸建」(意指軍隊調返原駐地、原單位)，主要目的在於防範。其後，蔣介石接陳儀與各情治單位之請求，轉而視此一事件為「反動暴民」的暴亂，且漠視台人團體之陳情（說明 41），決定派兵綏靖。 至於綏靖工作（說明 42），大致可分為武力掃蕩和清鄉兩大重點。關於武力掃蕩，由於公署在實施之前已有周詳的計畫和部署，加上各地的動亂，事實上並未如公署宣傳之嚴重，故掃蕩之進行遠較預期迅速，除中部地區「二七部隊」之殘部尚有一些抵抗（說明 43）外，其他各地（說明 44）幾無戰鬥發生。惟各綏靖分區部隊在執行武力掃蕩之時，確有報復行為，致有民眾無辜傷亡、嫌犯未經審判即就地槍決等情事發生（說明 45）。

軍事鎮壓行動之後，繼之進行清鄉工作，其主要目的在於逮捕嫌犯（說明 46）、收繳武器軍品、清查戶口、辦理自新（說明 47）、取得連保連坐切結等，均如期完成。惟衡諸實況，不少嫌犯係遭羅織入罪或私人挾怨報復，軍憲未詳加查證，即貿然逮捕訊治，因而造成不少冤獄。亦有已定罪者，經請託賄賂，甚或透過特殊關說而得以無事。甚或有些不法軍警藉機勒索敲詐，或順手掠奪私人財物等非法敗行，由是而造成民怨，為社會所詬病。毋庸諱言，此乃當時軍事當局未能有效防範和控制，軍紀教育亦未臻於理想所致，應負造成許多無辜性命犧性的責任。

「二二八大屠殺事件」誠為台灣歷史上的一大悲劇（說明 48）。謂其為悲劇，可分為兩方面來看。就受難台人而言，未死於日據時期帝國主義者之摧殘，卻死於他們日夜盼望回歸的「祖國」軍警之鎮壓（說明 49）；他們容或批評政府，或提出台人治台等要求，自信並無反叛政府的行為，竟因此被處死，且多數並未經過公開審判的程序，甚或有秘密處決而屍首不存者，此斷非文明社會之作法。甚至有些傷亡者，根本未參加過反政府的行動，只因軍隊肆行掃射而成為冤魂。就二次戰後來台服務的大陸籍人士而言，雖然部分軍人或公職人員有貪污、營私舞弊等劣行，但並非所有來台人員盡皆貪官污吏; 然而在此事件中，部分大陸人士卻成了代罪羔羊，為憤怒群眾盲目攻擊，因而傷亡，其數目雖沒有台人受難者多，但也使得一些來台的公教人員心生恐懼而離開台灣，這些現象使大陸與台灣之間加深了隔閡。不容否認的，一些毆打外省人或曾以武力攻擊機關、機場，甚至傷害人命者，仍應受法律制裁。故並非所有「二二八大屠殺事件」的傷亡人員，均為無辜受害者，必須予以區分。

說明：

33.  就在台兵力觀之，事變前駐台之整編二十一師獨立團與工兵營、三個要塞守備大隊之總兵力僅五、二五一人。其中三個要塞守備大隊一、五三二名，工兵營五一七名，負責台中以北監護勤務:獨立團二、五ＯＯ名，擔任嘉義以南監護勤務; 至於警備總司令部本部所控兵力僅獨立團之一營約七百名，兵力薄弱，不足擔任台北之防戍任務。（頁二Ｏ一）
34. （三月六日）王添宣讀向中外廣播之有關「二二八事件」真相全文，以消除各方之疑慮。主要內容是說明處委會努力的目標是「肅清貪官污吏，爭取本省政治的改革，不是要排斥外省同胞參與改善本省政治。」文中並且提出對事件的處理方式，計有「對於目前的處理」七條，「根本處理二十五條(軍事三條、政治二十二條)，此即聞名的三十二條要求，其條文如下：
 一、對於目前的處理
政府在各地之武裝部隊應自動下令暫時解除武裝武器，交由各地處理委員會及憲兵隊共同保管，以免繼續發生流血衝突事件。
政府武裝部隊武裝解除後，地方之治安由憲兵與非武裝之警察及民眾組織共同負擔。
各地若無政府武裝部隊威脅之時，絕對不應有武裝械鬥行動。對貪官污吏不論其為本省人或外省人，亦只應檢舉轉請處理委員會協同憲警拘拿，依法嚴辦，不應加害而惹出是非。
對於政府改革之意見，可列舉要求條件，向省處理委員會提出，以候全盤解決。
政府切勿再動兵力，或向中央請遣兵力，企圖以武力解決事件，致發生更慘重之流血而受國際干涉。
在政治問題未根本解決之前，政府之一切施策(不論軍事、政治)，須先與處理委員會接洽，以免人民懷疑政府誠意，發生種種誤會。
對於此次事件不應向民間追究責任者，將來亦不得假藉任何口實拘捕此次事件之關係者。對於因此次事件而死傷之人民應從優撫卹。
 二、根本處理
甲、軍事方面
缺乏教育和訓練之軍隊絕對不可使駐台灣。
中央可派員在台徵兵守台。
在內陸之內戰未終息以前，除以守台灣為目的之外，絕對反對在台灣徵兵，以免台灣陷入內戰游渦。
乙、政治方面
制定省自治法，為本省政治最高規範，以便實現國父建國大綱之理想。
縣市長於本年六月以前實施民選，縣市參議會同時改選。
省各處長人選應經省參議會(改選後為省議會)之同意，省參議會關於本年六月以前改選，目前其人選由長官提出，交由省處理委員會審議。
省各廳處長三分之二以上須由在本省居住十年以上者擔任之（最好秘書長、民政、財政、工礦、農林、教育、警務等處長應該如是）。
警務處長及各縣市警察局長應由本省人擔任，省警察大隊及鐵道工礦等警察即刻廢止。
法制委員會委員數半數以上由本省人充任，主任委員由委員互選。
除警察機關之外，不得逮捕人犯。
憲兵除軍隊之犯人外，不得逮捕人犯。
禁止帶有政治性之逮捕拘禁。
非武裝之集合結社絕對自由。
言論、出版、罷工絕對自由，廢止新聞紙發行申請登記制度。
即刻廢止人民團體組織條例。
廢止民意機關選舉辦法。
改進各級民意機關選舉辦法。
實行所得統一累進稅，除奢侈品稅相續稅外，不得徵收任何雜稅。
一切公營事業之主管人由本省人擔任。
設置民選之公營事業監察委員會，日產處理應委任省政府全權處理，各接收工廠工礦應置經營委員會，委員須過半數由本省人充任之。
撤銷專賣局，生活必需品實施配給制度。
撤銷貿易局。
撤銷宣傳委員會。
各地方法院院長、各地方法院首席檢察官全部以本省人充任。
各法院推事、檢察官以下司法人員各半數以上省民充任。（頁六六）
35. 七日下午，處委會召開全體大會，在一片嘈雜聲中，除決議通過原有的三十二條要求外，又增列十條。計軍事方面二條、政治方面八條，此即四十二條要求。其增列之十條條文如下：
本省陸海空軍應儘量採用本省人。
台灣省行政長官公署應改為省政府制度，但未得中央核准前暫由二二　八處理委員會之政務局負責改組，並普選公正賢達人士充任。
處理委員會政務局應於三月十五日以前成立。其產生方法，由各鄉鎮區代表選舉該區候選人一名，然後再由該縣市轄參議會選舉之。其名額如下：台北市二名、台北縣三名、基隆市一名、新竹縣三名、台中市一名、台中縣四名、彰化市一名、嘉義市一名、台南市一名、台南縣四、高雄市一名、高雄縣三名、屏東市一名、澎湖縣一名、花蓮縣一名、台東縣一名，計三十名（實為二十九名）。
勞動營及其他不必要之機構廢止或合併，應由處理委員會政務局檢討決定之。
日產處理事宜應請劃歸省政府自行清理。
警備總司令部應撤銷，以免軍權濫用。
高山同胞之政治經濟地位及應享之利益應切實保障。
本年六月一日起實施勞動保護法。
本省人之戰犯及漢奸嫌疑被拘禁者，要求無條件即時釋放。
送與中央食糖一十五萬噸，要求中央依時估價撥歸台灣省。（頁七十）
36. 一方面，陳儀同意台籍民意代表之要求，由官民合組處委會; 另一方面，陳儀、柯遠芬、張慕陶等人即聯絡蔣渭川等人，分化處委會的領導階層，並以軍統人員許德輝出任忠義服務隊隊長，兼處委會治安組組長; 軍統局台北站站長林頂立被任命為警總的義勇總隊長，以執行「分化奸偽和運用民眾力量來打擊奸偽」之任務。其中，不無黨政軍各派藉機幕後較勁，中統局指蔣渭川、王添為投機者，不斷作搧動; 軍統的柯遠芬則指蔣、王二人為黨部新吸收的惡霸劣紳，而處委會成立之處委員仍以國民黨黨員為多，但省黨部不予導入正軌，反而心存「黃鶴樓上看翻船」。其結果，處委會在多頭運作下，政治訴求不斷升高，於是，軍事鎮壓成了公署名正言順的選擇。（頁二Ｏ一）
37. 「三十二條要求」據日後投共的蘇新稱，是環繞王添身邊的左翼青年所草擬的，如潘欽信、蕭友三、蔡慶榮、蘇新等; 甚至曾獲中共地下黨負責人之同意。…國民參政員陳逸松回憶稱，確有左翼青年為王添寫稿子; 惟台共分子在投奔中共後，多不免強調中共與其本人在二二八事件中之重要性，可信度須打折扣。據參與偵辦「蔡孝乾匪諜案」之一軍統局人士稱，中共當時在台之勢力極小，老台共也不等於中共（頁六九）
38. 據聞，提三十二條要求時，會場有軍統、C.C.（中統）等情治人員活動，如白成枝、呂伯雄屬C.C.，許德輝屬軍統。新增十條有的是軍統、C.C.有意提出以為鎮壓之藉口。如政治項目第二十九條「本省人之戰犯與漢奸即時釋放」，即由國大代表兼台灣鐵道黨部書記長吳國信提出，其他人呼應叫喊通過的。又有謂代表提出之要求僅有十二條，其後之三十二條與追加之十條乃「憲政協會」成員叫喊通過的。（頁七一）
39. 八日，處委會發表聲明，推翻昨日通過之決議案。內稱因參加開會的人數眾多，昨日通過之四十二條件未及推敲，致有不當要求出現，例如「撤銷警備總部、國軍繳械，跡近反叛中央，決非省民公意」等。（頁七二）
40. 事件發生後，據聞，劉啟光主張以武力澈底鎮壓，而參謀長柯遠芬、警備總部調查室主任陳達元、軍統局台灣站長林頂立則主張「以民眾的力量對抗民眾的力量」。柯遠芬並於二月二十八日下令情治人員調查、監視處委會主謀人士。公署一者鑑於台灣兵力單薄，不足鎮壓，二者解決社會運動的最佳方式非外在的壓制，而是內部的分化、瓦解，於是採取第二種策略，即利用蔣渭川領導之「台灣省政治建設協會」勢力，以削弱處委會的力量，並派情治人員打入處委會，相機行事。二月二十八日與三月一日，憲兵第四團團長張慕陶兩度致函蔣渭川，促其「出面收拾殘局」。一日黃昏，柯遠芬亦致函，邀他協助收拾危局。由此可見，公署方面已籌劃好分化的策略。（頁五九）
41. 三日上午處委會議決上電蔣主席報告事件真相，旋於下午四時以台灣省民眾代表大會之名義上電，指控公署放任軍警胡亂開槍，射殺民眾，惹起省民公憤，光復以來政治惡劣，不法橫行，屢經省民要求改善卻一無效果; 籲請中央速派大員來台調處以平民憤，並刻速實行地方自治。同日，台灣旅滬同鄉會理事長李偉光代表上書蔣主席，請求徹查慘案真相，嚴懲慘案造成的法律和道德責任; 以及澄清吏治，以新台人耳目。由上顯示，蔣主席不但充分掌握各方面的情報和看法，同時，亦對省民的意見和期望有所了解。（頁二Ｏ三）
42. 三月十日，陳儀對全省廣播戒嚴令，綏靖工作於焉全面展開。（頁二一一）
43. 十五日，國軍繼續往埔里方面推進，縮小包圍圈。…二七部隊因對外兩條交通要道均遭封鎖，聯絡不便，情勢甚為不利，乃決定派遣陳明忠擔任突襲隊長，兵分三路，夜襲日月潭方面的國軍。另以警備隊長黃金島率一小隊扼守烏牛湳橋，以防腹背受敵。突襲隊與國軍四三六團第二營第四連在日月潭附近發生激戰，國軍頗有傷亡，被迫向水裡坑撤退，但該部隊也傷亡慘重，且彈藥亦快告罄。 翌（十六）日，國軍四三六團第二、三營部分兵力，又與扼守烏牛湳橋的黃金島小隊發生激戰。戰鬥一開始，該小隊由於佔地利之便，曾重創國軍，造成重大傷亡。旋因火力遠不及國軍，作戰經驗也有所不足，乃漸處於劣勢，被國軍火網所包圍，不得已乃由黃金島率一名隊員突破國軍的火力封鎖線，奔回「二七部隊」本部求援。惟隊本部武德殿一片零亂，人心惶惶，僅有十餘人響應。同日晚上，「二七部隊」以武器彈藥無法補給，又兩面受敵，無法與他處部眾聯絡，難以繼續支撐下去，乃決定暫時化整為零，或往嘉義小梅參加陳篡地的游擊隊，或各自回家。深夜十一時，隊員各自埋藏武器後，即宣告解散。（頁二二一）
44. 十四日，（嘉義市）國軍進攻斗六，與「斗六鎮建安醫院院長」陳篡地殘部（斗六警備隊，不屬於二七部隊，見頁一Ｏ二）在斗六鎮上展開市街戰，陳氏因寡不敵眾，乃率領全體隊員逃往嘉義附近的小梅山中。 十六日，國軍四三六團第八連推進至小梅以東地區，與該殘部二百餘人發生激戰，結果擊斃十餘名，奪獲步槍二十枝、重機槍二挺，擲彈筒一具、山砲一門。過了兩日，四三六團第七連亦在小梅附近，與殘眾百餘人發生激戰，擊斃六十餘名，俘十二名（並奪獲一批軍火彈藥）。 十九日起，陳氏為作持久游擊戰，及陸續向山地撤退，並將所有武器彈藥及附近村民之糧食、牛車等悉數帶走。陳氏並號召各地響應者，潛藏深山，實施一年的作戰計話畫。二十日，二十一師以該殘部潛伏山地為慮，再派四三六團第八連進攻小梅附近，激戰數小時，終使其不支逃逸，（並奪獲一批軍火彈藥）。
 小梅、樟湖一帶，地勢險要，易守難攻。其後，國軍雖數度派兵進剿，擊斃不少殘眾，但始終無法澈底加以消滅。至五月十六日，魏道明就任台灣省主席，解除戒嚴，結束清鄉，警備總部亦將各綏靖區改為警備區時，陳篡地殘部仍在小梅、樟湖等地進行游擊戰。（頁二二一）
45. 基隆綏靖司令部…迨至二十一日，掃蕩任務已大致完成。據統計，自二月二十八日至三月十一日，計俘獲輕機槍六挺（全部待修）、步槍一三九枝（大部份待修），用去步槍彈三四、六四三發、輕機槍彈三九、八九七發、手槍彈五、一八三發、重機槍彈九、五九二發、手榴彈五四九個、戰防砲彈三五發。…從使用彈藥數量幾達十萬之譜，顯示基隆要塞司令部乃是以強大的火力強力掃蕩。因此，傷亡數恐非僅約百人，實有待進一步詳查。（頁二三七）
 基隆綏靖部似聽任各分區自行處理案犯，例如頭城媽祖廟前郭章垣七人被槍殺案、八堵車站案，以及羅東陳成岳、張雲昌、趙桐、基隆市楊元丁、金山許日生、許甲長、徐士明、簡德發、陳金埤、田文寬、施金榮等人被槍斃案，據受難家屬表示，均是當地駐軍自行處置的，未經執法人員偵訊審理，故事後一無案犯名冊或處理報告留下，委實難以取信於社會。當士兵沿街掃蕩時，走避不及者都立即被槍殺，或不由分說地被押進拘留所，但賄賂金錢或貴重物品後，即可獲釋。不少人遭刑求、凌虐後處死，台灣旅滬六團體綜合各方之報導和傳聞，聯合提出報告書，指出:「基隆軍隊用鐵絲穿過人民足踝，每三人或五人為一組，捆縛一起，單人則裝入麻袋，拋入海中。基隆海面最近猶有屍首浮出。」又:「基隆軍隊割去青年學生二十人之耳鼻及生殖器，然後用刺刀戳死。」不少受訪者在找尋親人屍體時亦目賭類似的慘狀。（頁二三七）
46. 據民國三十六年十一月間警備司令部之總結報告…被拘捕之人犯共一、八ＯＯ人。（頁二六一）
47. 警總民國三十六年四月三十日公布……自新者三、Ｏ二二人。（頁二六一）
48. 「二二八事件」是台灣史上最慘痛的人間悲劇。當時傷亡者可能數千甚至上萬，上自社會精英份子，下至升斗小民，蒙冤而死者，不知凡幾，因此造成受難家屬及民間對此事件的不能忘懷，此由人為因素造成的不幸事件，導至後來的台獨運動、左傾思想甚至省籍情結的產生，嚴重地影響到台灣社會的和諧，甚或未來的社會發展。（序二）
49. 「宜蘭省立醫院院長郭章垣遺言:『生離祖國，死歸祖國，死生天命，無想無念！』」（李筱峰著，《二二八消失的台灣菁英》，（頁一七Ｏ）

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五、傷亡與受害情況

第一，為官方認定有罪者。政府既認定「二二八大屠殺事件」是一叛國行為，不免將參加抗爭組織者與暴動者一同列入所謂「黑名單」（說明 51），加以緝捕、處刑。然而，涉案的認定是否無誤，執行時是否無枉無縱，據調查研究顯示，委實存在不少弊端。首先，絕大部分參與者自認自始即無叛國意圖，僅以改革台灣政治為訴求，卻遭到以「意圖顛覆政府」的罪名處置，自難令其心服。其次，部分受害者係被秘密逮捕，而又死因不明。到底係經審判罪名成立而處死?抑或被仇敵藉機殺害?此為受難者家屬引為深痛 。今（2007年）此屠殺事件之責任歸屬報告出爐，確認當時的蔣介石主席應負最大的責任。

第二，為觸犯戒嚴令者。因動亂而頒戒嚴令，本無可厚非，惟由於本省同胞並無戒嚴經驗，不知戒嚴為何物，多數人又不諳國語或大陸其他方言，以致不少民眾在綏靖期間上學、上班或外出工作時因不諳口令，或聽不懂士兵的語言警告而慘遭射殺（說明 52），含冤難伸。

第三，為政風（說明 53）軍紀敗壞下的犧牲者。中華民國（西元1912年）建國後，戰亂不已，抗戰八年對軍隊教育之影響尤大，以致軍政制度和風紀始終未能做到嚴整清明，鎮壓與綏靖期間層出不窮的弊端（說明 54）於焉產生。最常見是公報私仇，其中有因小糾紛惹來殺身之禍者，也有為奪取、勒索財物而置人於死地者（說明 55）。駐軍指揮亦有三令五申，力予矯正者（說明 56），然不法事件仍難根絕。另外，在獎勵密告（說明 57）與指認流氓（說明 58）的政策下，亦造成不少因私怨而被陷害，致遭無辜犧牲者，甚至有設陷阱以誘殺者，如圓山事件（說明 59）即是。

說明：

50.  受害者身分依所參與之團體分，計有處委會、台灣省政治建設協會、台灣自治青年同盟、三民主義青年團、報社、共黨組織等。很明顯地，與政治有關，特別是曾批評政治或參與政治活動之團體，受害最大。（頁二六六）
51. 根據（三十六年三月十三日陳儀呈報蔣主席之＜辦理人犯姓名調查表＞），「二二八事件」之要犯，共有二十人，即王添灯（省參議員）、徐征（私立延平學院教授、中共台灣省工作委員會委員）、李仁貴（台北市參議員）、徐春卿（台北市參議員）、陳炘、林茂生（國立台灣大學教授）、宋斐如（人民導報社長）、艾璐生（大明報發行人）、阮朝日（台灣新生報總經理）、吳金鍊（台灣新生報編輯）、廖進平、黃朝生（台北市參議員）、林連宗（省參議員）、王名朝（台灣省鐵路管理委員會職員）、施江南、李瑞漢（律師）、李瑞峰（律師）、張光祖（台北大流氓首領）、堀內金城（工業研究所技師）、植崎寅三郎。依官方資料，張光祖是台北大流氓，罪名是「策動殺害外省人首要」與「領導爪牙，協助暴亂」，而最後二人是日本間諜，其餘十七人均係陰謀叛亂者。這十七人均在國軍於九日進駐台北後不久被帶走，從此失蹤。十七人中多數參加一、二種政治團體。參加「處委會」者有王添灯、李仁貴、徐春卿、廖進平、黃朝生、林連宗（台中）等六人。參加台灣省政治建設協會者有王添灯、李仁貴、陳炘、吳金鍊、廖進平、黃朝生、施江南（其中有同時出任「處委會」委員者）等七人。另外，王添灯也加入三民主義青年團，並出任台灣區團台北分團幹事長。三月十一、十三日，陳儀先後宣布「處委會」與「政治建設協會」為非法組織，下令予以解散，並以叛亂罪名懲治其成員。然而，該二組織是否涉及叛亂，並未經法院審訊判決，手續上未盡周延。再者，名單中也有近一半的人並不屬於上述政治團體，計有徐征、林茂生、宋斐如、艾璐生、阮朝日、王名朝、李瑞漢、李瑞峰等八人。所謂「叛亂」，其認定標準相當不明確。（頁二六七）據檔案資料，上述主犯中，只有陳炘一人係經由審判手續處死刑的（頁二七一）
52. 陳儀廣播要民眾復學、復市，有些好學生紛紛去上學，反而被士兵誤殺; 還有很多送牛奶、送報、電信、賣菜及拉車的台人，因不懂戒嚴令而被誤殺。…據訪談，主要因為台人無戒嚴經驗，不識其為何物; 加上絕大多數人仍不懂國語，無法與士兵溝通。（頁二九四）
53. 政風不佳也導致不肖官員藉機報復私怨。最聳人聽聞的例子是高等法院推事吳鴻麒等八人之遇害。…三月十五日深夜十二時，南港橋邊聞槍聲數響，次晨即發現（吳鴻麒等）八具屍體。（頁二九五）　官方有一說…「台北市區有不良分子組暗殺團，專以殺害軍官、外省人及靠山（台灣人任政府官吏恃勢凌人者）為對象，並已開始行動，南港橋下八命案或係該團所為」。…民間亦有「暗殺團」之說，但稱其為官方所收買之流氓團體，設於保安街戒煙所…用以對付異己分子。　一般人與吳氏家屬均認為係為人挾怨報復的。…吳氏秉性耿介，常批評法界之黑暗，並奉勸其同僚，可能得罪人。其中王姓檢察官嫌疑不小，吳夫人稱吳氏屍體所留下之名片，有用指甲押刻字跡清晰的「王」字，似暗示王氏所害。（頁二九七）　王育霖之遇害亦可能由於官員公報私怨。王氏…乃日據時期台人第一位檢察官。光復後，王氏出任新竹地檢處檢察官……王氏生性耿介，公正不阿，曾嚴辦不少貪污案。其中以新竹市的「奶粉吞沒案」最有名。王氏發現此案幕後主角是新竹市長郭紹宗，乃前往拘捕。未料，新竹市警察局長反而命令警察將他包圍，並奪走逮捕令。其後，上司竟不辨黑白，欲追究其失去逮捕令之責。王氏一怒，辭去檢察官之職，赴台北建國中學當教員。據稱，國軍抵台後，郭紹宗藉機報仇，派警察至台北將王氏逮捕處刑。（頁二九九）
54. 在事變期間，台人不僅反抗公署，也有毆打傷害外省人之事，因此國軍登陸後，立即採取報復行動。由於當時軍紀不甚理想，許多悖乎常理的惡行乃接二連三發生。各類報導與訪談紀錄均指證，自八日登陸基隆後，國軍即開始濫殺。警總一度發予文員短槍，授權為自衛而開槍，國軍也奉令殺光「叛國造反」者。甚至有以人為獵物，而炫耀其射技者。國軍至台北後，凡不通國語者即予射殺，以致八日至十三日，北市屍體到處可見。（頁二九四）
55. 例如台北市長春路某處，約三月十日，來了一群士兵，只為搶小錢或手錶、財物等，竟置數人於死地。（頁二九五）
56. 十一日上午國軍進入台南後發布戒嚴令，於檢查行人時，在火車站附近，有二十一師獨立團第三營第七連士兵涂平章，擅自沒收一台胞衣袋內台幣約二、三千元及手錶一只。經該營副營長查覺，除將原款及手錶交還台胞外，立將該士兵涂平章剝去軍服，當場槍決。（頁二五五）
57. 警總為澈底達成任務，進一步公布獎懲辦法，規定:凡有檢舉歹徒與密報私藏武器者，發獎金一千至一萬元；隱匿不報者以通謀治罪。（頁二一四）於是有一些不肖分子（本、外省皆有）藉機除去仇敵以發小財。（頁三Ｏ三）
58. 如規定里長或頭人必須報出里中一定數目的流氓，否則嚴懲，導致膽怯者亂點名，平添不少冤魂。如北投區即有數人因此喪命。（頁三Ｏ三）　有些不願昧著良心亂點名者，本人卻遭殃，如瑞芳鎮金瓜石一里長游竹根。國軍進駐金瓜石後，強迫他交出槍械與流氓名單。他答稱：「本鄉民風純樸，不曾參與事件」，而不肯屈從，結果被拷打得奄奄一息後再槍決。（頁三Ｏ六）
59. 據稱八日晚圓山事件是柯遠芬主導，由林頂立、許德輝等人負責執行的。據忠義服務隊副隊長廖氏稱:在事件期間，他曾帶一百多名學生赴圓山接收槍枝，供維持治安之用; 因士兵開槍，乃予以包圍，並用水潑，可能因此激怒他們，以致八日晚遭報復，在那裡死了一百多名學生。九日上午，柯遠芬引楊亮功至圓山陸軍倉庫前廣場，指數百個屍體稱是昨晚被國軍擊斃的暴徒（亦有曰二十幾具）。據稱楊氏頗表懷疑，對隨從人員言，死者均十八、九歲中學生，附近亦無戰鬥跡象。（頁二一Ｏ）

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六、當時之救卹

亂事平定，秩序恢復之後，長官公署隨即於三月底展開善後撫卹（說明 60）工作，對事件中遭受生命財產損失的公教人員及其眷屬、傭工，均發給救濟金，以助其度過生活的難關。然而，此一工作做得並不圓滿，原因是:一、救卹只限公教人員及其眷屬、傭工等，而未及於一般受難的民眾; 二救卹辦法規定不盡合理，有損失頗鉅但礙於規定只能獲小部分的補償，也有損失不大卻虛報而溢領過多的補償者; 三、由於救濟金數額不足，部分不肖公教人員遂假公濟私，向民眾(尤其富戶)需索、訛詐（說明 61），予人以極為惡劣之印象。再者當時獲救卹的公教人員不多，故一般民眾與受難者以為政府對本省、外省人從未救卹，因而要求政府儘速研擬賠償辦法。

說明：

60.  為了救卹台灣省行政長官公署暨所屬各機關公教人員，公署特別在三月二十一日公布「台灣省行政長官公署暨所屬各機關公教人員因二二八事件傷亡損失撫卹救濟辦法」九條：內容如下。
 第一條 台灣省行政長官公署所屬各機關公教人員因二二八事件死傷或遭受損失者，依本辦法撫卹或救濟之。
 第二條 撫卹及救濟之範圍如下:1.死亡。2.受傷。3.物財損失。
 第三條 死亡者一次發給喪葬撫卹費台幣二十萬元。 前項規定於公教人員之配偶，及其直系尊卑親屬，及傭工均適用之。
 第四條 受傷者所有醫藥費，憑醫院收款單據發給，其並未住院治療，經主管長官 證明者，輕傷發給救濟金台幣五千元，重傷台幣五萬元，輕重傷之程度， 以刑法之規定為準，但醫藥費已由政府負擔者，不適用本條之規定。前項規定於公務人員之配偶，及其直系尊卑親屬，及其傭工均適用之。
 第五條 物財損失之救濟，以主要衣著被褥為主，衣服損失，每套發救濟金台幣一萬元，以冬夏各兩套為限，被褥全套發台幣二萬元，以一套為限。
 第六條 凡受傷或損失慘重情形特殊者，得由各該主管機關，列具受傷實情，及損失細數專案呈准，發給特別救濟金。
 第七條 第三條至第六條所稱之喪葬，撫卹，或救濟金之發給，屬於省級機關者，由省開支，屬於縣市地方者，由地方款開支，企業機關由該機關自行開支，均應取得領據列冊報署備查。
 第八條 損害救濟之申請，須經所屬主管股長科長，及各級上官之負責調查證明，如有虛偽，各級主管證明人，一律予以連帶嚴辦。
 第九條 本辦法自公布日施行（頁三七Ｏ）
61. 民國三十六年六月十五日全台各報都刊登閩台監察使楊亮功給省政府的函件，希望省政府嚴令禁止各縣市公務人員向私人及人民團體或民意機關託詞自動捐助，實則索財，稍不遂意，即利用職權陷人於罪之惡行。省政府乃下令所有機關人員不得藉口「二二八」事變損失向民間需索捐助，若再用職權構詞誣陷以達需索之目的，將予嚴處。由上可知，公職人員有假借二二八訛索的情況。（頁三九七）

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七、關鍵人物評析

本報告旨在說明事實之真相，並無判別責任所在的意圖，然對於數位關鍵人物之所作所為，不能不加以檢討。

陳儀蒞台之初，雖有圖治之心（說明 62），事起之初亦希圖以政治手段，化解危機（說明 63），但事態的發展已非其所能控制（說明 64），乃轉而要求中央加派重兵鎮壓（說明 65），大軍抵台後，他身為台灣最高軍政長官，卻未能有效約束軍警人員依法執行綏靖任務（說明 66），以致「警察及警備部軍士施行報復手段（說明 67），毆打及拘捕暴徒」，並令「憲兵駐台特高組秘密逮捕國大代表」等（說明 68），擴大了事件追究之打擊面，引起台民之驚恐與怨恨。然而，事後他只「承認這是他的一次失敗，不承認他的政策有誤」，自然不能為國人所諒解。

當時之台灣省警備總司令部參謀長柯遠芬，在事變初起即以「陰謀論」（說明 69）認定「二二八事件處理委員會」的活動，遣人滲透，實行分化之策，迨事件擴大後再予嚴懲（說明 70），用心殊不正當。奉命代表政府來台宣慰（說明 71）的國防部長白崇禧即曾坦率指出（說明 72），柯氏係以「寧可枉殺九十九個，只要殺死一個真的就可以」的心態處理此一事件。結果是受到報復而傷亡者不少，以致人心惶惶，故白氏認為柯氏「處事躁切，濫用職權，對此次事變舉措尤多失當，且賦性剛愎，不知悔改」，因此建議將柯氏撤職處分，「以示懲戒而平民忿」。

事變發生時之高雄要塞司令彭孟緝，在三月六日下午二時採取斷然鎮壓之手段（說明 73），使南部亂事不致擴大。就政府立場而言，彭氏之功績甚大;然在高雄市民看來，彭氏下令鎮壓，軍人無差別的掃射，造成民眾大量的傷亡，確有疏失可議之處。事件過後，政府竟拔擢其為台灣省警備司令，更造成民間深刻的恐懼與不安。

憲兵第四團團長張慕陶上校當時之行動，亦頗可議。彼先是勸請蔣渭川出面斡旋官民之間的糾紛，慫恿蔣渭川加入處委會，進行分化; 繼則當國軍即將登陸的三月八日中午十二時，猶謊騙處委會委員（說明 74）稱，只要民眾不試圖解除士兵的武裝，則政府將不對台灣採取任何軍事行動，以鬆懈心防，誘使原欲逃命者留原處。故當軍隊登陸進行拘捕時，這些人就成為網中之魚。此外，張慕陶屬下憲兵隊在戒嚴之後，亦四處逮捕人犯，並有不少弊端。國防部長白崇禧來台宣慰時，曾下令往後逮捕人犯應由警總執行，然憲兵隊仍繼續其捕人行動（說明 75），其藐視上級命令，可見一斑。

此外，在台情治人員亦難脫誤導當局之嫌。在事變期間，軍統、中統（說明 76）均渲染事件的嚴重性，指稱參與者並非單純要求政治改革，而懷有叛國、獨立、奪權之重大陰謀，並誇大外省同胞之傷亡，及參加暴動者之人數。蔣主席因此認為事態嚴重，乃派整編第二十一師來台平亂，而蔣主席雖再三嚴令不得對台民施加報復，然屬下終未能遵行。

無疑地，蔣主席在平息「二二八事件」中的角色是眾所矚目的問題。身為國家元首，蔣氏對叛亂活動，自有派兵鎮壓之職權。然而，此項決定有無瑕疵、執行過程有無弊端，卻也不容忽視。據各項資料研判，處委會之所做所為充其量只為求高度自治，並無反叛中央之意，但蔣氏因軍務倥傯，無暇查證，又過度信任陳儀，接受其請兵之要求，不能不說有失察之疵。其後，蔣氏亦了解真相，但歷史的錯誤已鑄，難於挽回。其次，在執行綏靖任務時，報復、違紀事件不少，亦一憾事。固然蔣氏的確曾一再嚴申紀律、禁止報復（說明 77），但終未能防止弊端之發生。而在事後，台籍官僚(如丘念台、蔡培火)曾建議懲治失職者，以平民怨，他也未能接納，以致留下長期的社會傷痕，確有考慮未週之處。

說明：

62.  陳儀於民國三十四年十月二十四日抵台，在松山機場略作休息，然後發表其施政方針，說明他來台灣「不是為做官，而是為做事; 對台灣的建設抱有信心，決心修明政治，鏟除貪污和一切弊政，要求台灣同胞合作，共同努力建設新台灣。」（頁四）
63. 一者由於兵力不足，應變困難，二者身為治台長官任內鬧出大事，於己之政治地位、聲望有損，故陳儀在事變初起時，態度並不甚強硬（參見註二十一），可能企圖大事化小，小事化無。（頁二Ｏ二）
64. 然而，事態的演變頗出陳儀意料之外。原來，台人累積一年餘之政治不滿與經濟困窮已達爆炸點。而處委會見民氣可用，乃進而提出一系列的政治、經濟改革要求，而此決非陳儀所能容忍者。原因是獨攬全權之公署制度原乃其所設計提出的，如今面臨全盤瓦解之命運，對其政治聲望、地位實乃一沉重打擊。（頁二Ｏ二）
65. 三月六日，陳儀向蔣主席提出一關於此次事件之詳細報告，並派省黨部主任委員李翼中於七日飛南京面陳細節。函中特別強調事起之後，奸黨（即共產黨）、日據時代御用紳士及流氓乘機鼓動，排斥外省人，反抗政府，奪取槍械，包圍縣市政府，「可知其決非普通民眾運動可比，顯係有計劃、有組織的叛亂行為」，所以「嚴加懲治應無疑義」。他認為上任之後，「如對於日本時代御用紳士等，澈底剪除; 一面台灣兵力比較雄厚，此次事情不至擴大至此」。為了亡羊補牢，藉此機會完全解決問題，不留下禍根，他提出幾個辦法，第一，在政治方面，應改變多數民眾的「封建思想」; 並改善政治，改組長官公署為省政府及試辦縣市長民選，增進對政府向心力。第二，對於「奸黨亂徒，須以武力消滅，不能容其存在」; 並認為台灣至少須有紀律嚴明、武器精良之國軍二師，方有足夠的實力對付奸黨及消滅希望獨立的叛國舉動…其後綏靖時，各地精英之所以紛遭逮捕和殺害，由此信函可略窺其根由。（頁二Ｏ四）
66. 據檔案資料，蔣主席與陳儀反對報復政策。三月十日，陳儀即下令軍法處徐世賢處長與參謀長柯遠芬稱，有士兵凌辱台人事件多起，飭諭連排長以上人員必須不斷出巡，制止此類行為。同日，柯氏也下令所屬各部遵行。三月十一日，徐世賢處長報稱，自戒嚴至今，各部隊機關拘捕民眾一三五人，經訊問後，發現問題極多，常與「事實大相逕庭」，而解送之人犯「重傷者有之」、「財物被奪者有之」。因此他建議陳儀應分良莠，避免株連無辜; 並下令官兵「不得恣意報復」。可見濫捕、濫殺、劫財之事並非鮮見。訪談中亦印證此事。（頁三ＯＯ）
67. 據三月十二日憲兵司令部與中統局呈蔣主席之報告，三月九、十日國軍到後，當局即展開報復行動，台灣省黨部調查統計室並建議乘機消滅歹徒，並持名冊送呈警總，而於十日晚起，開始肅清「市內奸徒」。（頁二一三）
68. 陳長官亦於十日令憲兵駐台特高組，秘密逮捕國代林連宗、參議員林桂端、李瑞峰、「奸偽首要曾璧中等」，蔣渭川則已潛逃。（頁二一三）
69. （二月二十八）日夜，參謀長柯遠芬亦在日記上寫道：「這次事變的發生自然有奸人從中煽動，但是吾人未能防患未然，政治的鬆懈，群眾運動的沒有注意，沒有確實總握群眾、領導群眾，這是我們黨政軍團最大的失策。」（頁二ＯＯ）
70. 三月四日，柯遠芬在日記上寫道:「我經過周密的考慮後才決定儘速作軍事上萬全的準備。一俟他們叛國罪證公開後，馬上用軍事力量來戡亂。」（頁二Ｏ一）
71. 三月二十八日，白崇禧在台北賓館指示二二八善後六要項: （1）拘捕人犯:現押、已決人犯之人數、姓名及處決機關須在其(即白氏)留台期間呈繳，在押人犯除首要外，從寬處理。（2）逮捕人犯規定：1. 限共產分子與事變之首要主犯；2. 執行逮捕機關以警總命令行之；3. 人犯須速予依法審判、結案。（3）學生：1. 一律即行復課；2. 復課後，除共產分子外，不得逮捕，如有不軌行為，由校方依校規處罰。（4）綏靖工作由縣市政府行政人員辦理，軍隊協助。（5）受傷之公教人員及人民無衣無食者，予以緊急救卹。（6）軍紀須嚴格整飭維持。（頁二一五）
72. 彭孟緝，《台灣省「二二八」事件回憶錄》，頁四五。（頁四一三）
73. 彭孟緝於六日下午出兵綏靖後，電報陳儀，受到陳儀的指責，陳儀指出「台灣問題應由政治途徑解決，聞高雄連日多事，該司令輕舉妄動，應負此次肇事之全責，著自電到二日起，全部撤回兵營，聽候善後解決。」。七日敉平高雄後，彭氏再度向陳氏解釋用兵的原因，且請允許槍決光明等三名「暴徒」首領。此電發出後，警總立刻覆電，稱彭氏「處置得宜，實堪嘉慰」，並允許槍決主犯。陳儀之所以改變態度，原因之一當在安撫彭氏，且南部必須由彭氏主導戡亂之故。（頁二二九）
74. 八日中午，張慕陶團長會晤處委會委員，稱「本省此次要求改革政治，甚為正當，中央一定不會調兵來台。」他又勉全省同胞，「切勿刺激中央」，而「本人決以生命保證，中央決不對台灣用兵」。（頁七二）　事實上，事件期間，柯、張二人及其他情治人員早已在台北進行各項部署，以配合可能的軍事行動，而且援軍在當（八）日下午已登陸基隆了。（頁二Ｏ六）
75. 三月三十一日，警總依(白崇禧)指示通令各部隊機關，非有其命令不得逮捕人犯;有須緊急逮捕者，應隨時呈報。惟四月四日，憲兵第四團呈報警總稱，為免牽制綏靖之執行，請准許憲兵基於具有軍事檢察官與司法警察之職權，逕行執行任務。（頁二一六）
76. 三月一日…凌晨，南京中統局接到台灣調查統計室十萬火急電文，報告「二二八事件」以後每天急電二次。中統局局長葉秀峰向蔣主席建議加派勁旅三師赴台。中統局刻意強調事件之嚴重性，例如五日電稱參加暴動者多屬前日軍徵用之海外回來浪人，全省約計十二萬人。（頁二Ｏ三）
77. 憲兵司令部與中統局三月十二日報告蔣主席，陳儀在國軍登陸後濫行報復。十三日蔣主席以急電諭令陳儀，「請兄負責嚴禁軍政人員施行報復，否則以抗命論罪」，口氣極嚴厲。同日，陳儀也急電回報稱，已嚴禁軍政人員報復，但「自當再行嚴飭」。十四日，陳儀乃再飭所屬軍政人員，嚴禁報復。儘管三申五令，報復事件卻屢出不窮，實令人費解。（頁三ＯＯ）

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結語

「二二八事件」誠然為近代台灣史上之重大悲劇，而此悲劇的造成，乃為諸多因素交互激盪的結果。台民在殖民統治下五十年，日人處心積慮所設計的隔離政策，造成台民對祖國的隔閡，更何況在日人有心的教育下，台民的認知和價值觀，已與大陸民眾有明顯的差距。相對地，大陸民眾及政府官員對台灣情形，亦非常陌生; 加上當時大陸戡亂情勢日趨惡化，政府自無心力對台灣付出更多的關懷，而主政者不能體察民情，反在政治上打壓台籍人士。再者官員無能，貪污情況嚴重，更加深人民對政府的不滿。惟台灣在二次大戰時曾遭到嚴重破壞（說明 78），中國大陸又因政局動盪，戰亂不絕，無力支援台灣（說明 79），復原工作自非短期所能達成（說明 80），此項客觀事實始終未能普遍為台民所了解。故悲劇的發生實亦有當時主觀與客觀因素的存在，亦非主政者所能完全控制。

經由多方的調查研究，「二二八事件」的真相已可描繪出大致的輪廓。遺憾的是，當年的傷亡情形，雖經費力搜集資料，進行訪談及統計分析，始終未能獲得一精確數字。在訪談過程中，研究同仁深深感受到受難家屬數十年來所經歷的夢魘與內心的悲慟，他們的無助、哀怨及期待，是我們難以釋懷，也是當局所不應漠視的。前事不忘，後事之師，吾人當懍於此一不幸事件之慘痛教訓，慎防萁荳相煎之復現。更盼當局不規避當年鎮壓失當之責，對無辜受難者優予矜恤。同時，期望各界人士能體認當年特殊之時局，以寬諒平和的心情撫平此一悲劇所帶來的傷痛，為創造更美好的未來而攜手前進。

說明：

78.  二次大戰末期，台灣迭遭盟軍轟炸，以致台北、基隆、新竹、嘉義、高雄等地受到相當嚴重的破壞。例如基隆，因處「要塞地帶，受炸最烈」，從民國三十三年十月到三十四年被轟炸二十五次，「所炸各町原有面積為三、Ｏ五一、ＯＯＯ平方公尺，毀壞者達百分之五十六，房屋損壞者五、Ｏ五六棟，估計戰前房屋約九、Ｏ三Ｏ棟，破壞達百分之五十六。」此外，道路、水道也遭受相當之破壞; 而工、礦、電力受損尤重，以電力而言，光復前夕供電力已降至三萬餘KWH，不及三十二年的三分之一。加上戰後原料取得不易， 人才難求。因此，光復初期，行政長官公署擬將在台日籍工礦技術人才留下，以維生產，但因美國反對，不得不予以遣返。職是之故，短期內要使台灣恢復戰前的生產水準，自非易事。（頁五）
79. 大陸國共戰事不斷升高，全國性經濟危機發生，物價上漲，社會失序，人心不穩，以致中央政府難以致力經營台灣。（頁二七）
80. 戰後全世界都正從千瘡百孔下進行重建時期，通貨膨脹襲擊全球，中國亦不例外，加上戡亂戰事日益升高，影響所及，台灣的經濟日益困難。當時台灣工業原料不足，生產機構殘破，交通器材缺乏，財政困難，技術人員難以補充。（頁二三）

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🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The February 28 Incident Research Report (ererba shijian yanjiu baogao 二二八事件研究報告) was published on Feb. 22, 1992 by the "Ad Hoc Research Group into the 228 Incident" (xingzhengyuan yanjiu ererba shijian zhuan'an xiaozu 行政院研究二二八事件專案小組) of the ROC Executive Yuan in Chinese and English. Please note that in both the Chinese and the English version the footnotes 36 to 39 and 50 are nowhere mentioned in the text.

The February 28 Incident in 1947 marked the beginning of the White Terror period (baise kongbu 白色恐怖) which lasted until martial law was lifted in July 1987. Other noteworthy texts in connection with this topic are the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of the Communist Rebellion (dongyuan kanluan shiqi linshi tiaokuan 動員戡亂時期臨時條款) and the National Security Law During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion (dongyuan kanluan shiqi guojia anquanfa 動員戡亂時期國家安全法).

For additional information about the February 28 Incident the chief researcher recommends the classic "Formosa Betrayed" by George H. Kerr, published in 1965. Another noteworthy account about the topic is the book "Taiwan 1947: The Uprising against the Kuomintang", written by German-British sinologist, translator and linguist Günter Whittome and published in 1991 by the Institut für Asienkunde (Institute for Asian Studies, abbrev. IfA) in Hamburg, available in English and German. (The IfA was renamed German Institute for Global and Area Studies—abbrev. GIGA—in 2006.)

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The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China

Name in Chinese Taiwan wenti yu Zhongguode tongyi 台灣問題與中國的統一
Document type PRC policy statement / CCP propaganda white paper (baipishu 白皮書)
Year, date 1993, Aug. 31
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(Jump to Second white paper—2000)    (Jump to Third white paper—2022)

Foreword

It is the sacred right of each and every sovereign State and a fundamental principle of international law to safeguard national unity and territorial integrity. The Charter of the United Nations specifically stipulates that the United Nations and its Members shall refrain from any action against the territorial integrity or political independence of any of its Members or any State and shall not intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. The United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations points out that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity, territorial integrity or political independence of a State or country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The modern history of China was a record of subjection to aggression, dismemberment and humiliation by foreign powers. It was also a chronicle of the Chinese people's valiant struggles for national independence and in defense of their state sovereignty, territorial integrity and national dignity. The origin and evolution of the Taiwan question are closely linked with that period of history. For various reasons Taiwan is still separated from the mainland. Unless and until this state of affairs is brought to an end, the trauma on the Chinese nation will not be healed and the Chinese people's struggle for national reunification and territorial integrity will continue.

What is the present state of the Taiwan question? What is the crux of the problem? What are the position and views of the Chinese Government regarding the settlement of this issue? In order to facilitate a better understanding by the international community, it is necessary to elucidate the following points.

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I. Taiwan -- an Inalienable Part of China

Lying off the southeastern coast of the China mainland, Taiwan is China's largest island and forms an integral whole with the mainland.

Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times. It was known as Yizhou or Liuqiu in antiquities. Many historical records and annals documented the development of Taiwan by the Chinese people in earlier periods. References to this effect were to be found, among others, in Seaboard Geographic Gazetteer compiled more than 1,700 years ago by Shen Ying of the State of Wu during the period of the Three Kingdoms. This was the world's earliest written account of Taiwan. Several expeditions, each numbering over ten thousand men, had been sent to Taiwan by the State of Wu (third century A.D.) and the Sui Dynasty (seventh century A.D.) respectively. Since early seventeenth century the Chinese people began to step up the development of Taiwan. Their numbers topped one hundred thousand at the end of the century. By 1893 (19th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu) their population exceeded 2.54 million people in 507,000 or more households. That was a 25-fold increase in 200 years. They brought in a more advanced mode of production and settled the whole length and breadth of Taiwan. Thanks to the determined efforts and hard toil of the pioneers, the development of the island as a whole greatly accelerated. This was the historical fact of how Taiwan, like the other parts of China, came to be opened up and settled by the Chinese people of various nationalities. From the very beginning the Taiwan society derived from the source of the Chinese cultural tradition. This basic fact had not changed even during the half century of Japanese occupation. The history of Taiwan's development is imbued with the blood, sweat, and ingenuity of the Chinese people including the local ethnic minorities.

Chinese governments of different periods set up administrative bodies to exercise jurisdiction over Taiwan. As early as in the mid-12th century the Song Dynasty set up a garrison in Penghu, putting the territory under the jurisdiction of Jinjiang County of Fujian's Quanzhou Prefecture. The Yuan Dynasty installed an agency of patrol and inspection in Penghu to administer the territory. During the mid- and late 16th century the Ming Dynasty reinstated the once abolished agency and sent reinforcements to Penghu in order to ward off foreign invaders. In 1662 (first year of the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi) General Zheng Chenggong (known in the West as Koxinga) instituted Chengtian Prefecture on Taiwan. Subsequently, the Qing government expanded the administrative structure in Taiwan, thereby strengthening its rule over the territory. In 1684 (23rd year of the reign of Emperor Kangxi) a Taiwan-Xiamen Patrol Command and a Taiwan Prefecture Administration were set up under the jurisdiction of Fujian Province. These in turn exercised jurisdiction over three counties on the island: Taiwan (present-day Tainan), Fengshan (present-day Gaoxiong) and Zhuluo (present-day Jiayi). In 1714 (53rd year of the reign of Emperor Kangxi) the Qing government ordered the mapping of Taiwan to determine its size. In 1721 (60th year of the reign of Emperor Kangxi) an office of imperial supervisor of inspecting Taiwan was created and the Taiwan-Xiamen Patrol Command was renamed Prefecture Administration of Taiwan and Xiamen, incorporating the subsequently-created Zhanghua County and Danshui Canton. In 1727 (5th year of the reign of Emperor Yongzheng) the administration on the island was reconstituted as the Prefecture Administration of Taiwan (which was later renamed Prefecture Command for Patrol of Taiwan) and incorporated the new Penghu Canton. The territory then became officially known as Taiwan. In order to upgrade the administration of Taiwan, the Qing government created Taibei Prefecture, Jilong Canton and three counties of Danshui, Xinzhu and Yilan in 1875 (1st year of the reign of Emperor Guangxu). In 1885 (11th year of the reign of Emperor Guangxu), the government formally made Taiwan a full province covering three prefectures and one subprefecture and incorporating 11 counties and 5 cantons. Liu Mingchuan was appointed first Governor of Taiwan. During his tenure of office, railways were laid, mines opened, telegraph service installed, merchant ships built, industries started and new-style schools set up. Considerable social, economic and cultural advancement in Taiwan was achieved as a result.

After the Chinese people's victory in the war against Japanese aggression in 1945, the Chinese government reinstated its administrative authority in Taiwan Province.

Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits carried out a prolonged, unremitting struggle against foreign invasion and occupation of Taiwan. Since the late 15th century Western colonialists started to grab and conquer colonies in a big way. In 1624 (4th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Tianqi) Dutch colonialists invaded and occupied the southern part of Taiwan. Two years later Spanish colonialists seized the northern part of Taiwan. In 1642 (15th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Chongzhen) the Dutch evicted the Spaniards and took over north Taiwan. The Chinese people on both sides of the Straits waged various forms of struggle including armed insurrections against the invasion and occupation of Taiwan by foreign colonialists. In 1661 (18th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Shunzhi) General Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) led an expedition to Taiwan and expelled the Dutch colonialists from the island in the following year.

Japan launched a war of aggression against China in 1894 (20th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu). In the ensuing year, as a result of defeat the Qing government was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, ceding Taiwan to Japan. This wanton betrayal and humiliation shocked the whole nation and touched off a storm of protests. A thousand or more candidates from all 18 provinces including Taiwan who had assembled in Beijing for the Imperial Examination signed a strongly-worded petition opposing the ceding of Taiwan. In Taiwan itself, people wailed and bemoaned the betrayal and went on general strikes. General Liu Yongfu and others of the garrison command stood with Taiwan compatriots and put up a fierce fight against the Japanese landing forces. To support this struggle, people on the mainland, particularly in the southeastern region, showed their solidarity by generous donations or organizing volunteers to Taiwan to fight the Japanese forces. Taiwan compatriots never ceased their dauntless struggle throughout the Japanese occupation. Initially, they formed insurgent groups to wage guerrilla warfare for as long as seven years. When the Revolution of 1911 overthrew the Qing monarchy they in turn lent support to their mainland compatriots by staging more than a dozen armed insurrections. The 1920s and 1930s witnessed surging waves of mass action sweeping across the island against Japanese colonial rule.

In 1937 the Chinese people threw themselves into an all-out war of resistance against Japanese aggression. In its declaration of war against Japan, the Chinese Government proclaimed that all treaties, conventions, agreements, and contracts regarding relations between China and Japan, including the Treaty of Shimonoseki, had been abrogated. The declaration stressed that China would recover Taiwan, Penghu and the four northeastern provinces. After eight years of grueling war against Japanese aggression the Chinese people won final victory and recovered the lost territory of Taiwan in 1945. Taiwan compatriots displayed an outburst of passion and celebrated the great triumph of their return to the fold of the motherland by setting off big bangs of fireworks and performing rites to communicate the event to their ancestors.

The international community has acknowledged the fact that Taiwan belongs to China. The Chinese people's war of resistance against Japanese aggression, being part of the world-wide struggle against Fascism, received extensive support from people all over the world. During the Second World War China, the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and others formed an alliance to oppose the Axis of Germany, Japan and Italy. The Cairo Declaration issued by China, the United States and Great Britain on 1 December 1943 stated: "It is the purpose of the three great Allies that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores [Penghu], shall be restored to China." The Potsdam Proclamation signed by China, the United States and Great Britain on 26 July 1945 (subsequently adhered to by the Soviet Union) reiterated: "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." On 15 August of the same year, Japan declared surrender. The instrument of Japan's surrender stipulated that "Japan hereby accepts the provisions in the declaration issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, China and Great Britain on July 26, 1945 at Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." On 25 October the ceremony for accepting Japan's surrender in Taiwan Province of the China war theater of the Allied powers was held in Taibei. On the occasion the chief officer for accepting the surrender proclaimed on behalf of the Chinese government that from that day forward Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago had again been incorporated formally into the territory of China and that the territory, people, and administration had now been placed under the sovereignty of China. From that point in time forward, Taiwan and Penghu had been put back under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty.

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, 157 countries have established diplomatic relations with China. All these countries recognize that there is only one China and that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China and Taiwan is part of China.

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II. Origin of the Taiwan Question

Taiwan was returned to China de jure and de facto at the end of the Second World War. It became an issue only as an aftermath of the ensuing anti-popular civil war started by Kuomintang, and more especially because of intervention by foreign forces.

Taiwan question and civil war launched by Kuomintang. During the war of resistance against Japanese aggression the Chinese Communist Party and other patriotic groups pressed Kuomintang into a national united front with the Communist Party to fight Japanese imperialist aggression. After victory of the war the two Parties should have joined hands to work for the resurgence of China. But the Kuomintang clique headed by Chiang Kaishek flouted the people's fervent aspirations for peace and for building an independent, democratic and prosperous new China. Relying on U.S. support, this clique tore up the 10 October 1945 agreement between the two Parties and launched an all-out anti-popular civil war. The Chinese people were compelled to respond with a people's liberation war which was to last more than three years under the leadership of the Communist Party. Since the Kuomintang clique had already been spurned by the people of all nationalities for its reign of terror, the government of the "Republic of China" in Nanjing was finally overthrown by the Chinese people. The People's Republic of China was proclaimed on 1 October 1949 and the Government of the new People's Republic became the sole legal government of China. A group of military and political officials of the Kuomintang clique took refuge in Taiwan and, with the support of the then U.S. administration, created the division between the two sides of the Straits.

Taiwan question and responsibility of the United States. Against the backdrop of East-West confrontation in the wake of the Second World War and guided by its conceived global strategy and national interest considerations, the U.S. government gave full support to the Kuomintang, providing it with money, weapons and advisors to carry on the civil war and block the advance of the Chinese people's revolution. However, the U.S. government never achieved its objective. The White Paper on United States Relations with China released by the Department of State in 1949 and Secretary of State Dean Acheson's letter of transmittal to President Harry S. Truman had to admit this. Dean Acheson lamented in his letter: "The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. ... Nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not."

At the time of the founding of the People's Republic of China the then U.S. administration could have pulled itself from the quagmire of China's civil war. But it failed to do so. Instead, it adopted a policy of isolation and containment of New China. When the Korean War broke out, it started armed intervention in the inter-Taiwan Straits relations which were entirely China's internal affairs. On 27 June 1950 President Truman announced: "I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa." Thus the Seventh Fleet invaded the Taiwan Straits and the U.S. 13th Air Force set up base in Taiwan. In December 1954 the U.S. concluded with the Taiwan authorities a so-called mutual defense treaty placing China's Taiwan Province under U.S. "protection". The erroneous policy of the U.S. government of continued interference in China's internal affairs led to prolonged and intense confrontation in the Taiwan Straits area and henceforth the Taiwan question became a major dispute between China and the United States.

In order to ease tension in the Taiwan Straits area and seek ways of solving the dispute between the two countries, the Chinese Government started dialogues with the United States from the mid-1950s onwards. The two countries held 136 sessions of talks at ambassadorial level from August 1955 to February 1970. However, no progress had been made in that period on the key issue of easing and removing tension in the Taiwan Straits area. It was not until late 1960s and early 1970s when the international situation had undergone changes and as New China had gained in strength that the U.S. began to readjust its China policy and the relations between the two countries started a thawing. In October 1971 the United Nations General Assembly adopted at its 26th session Resolution 2758 which restored all the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and expelled the "representatives" of the Taiwan authorities from the U.N. U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China in February 1972 in the course of which the two countries issued a joint communiqu'e?? in Shanghai stating that: "The U.S. side declared: the United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position."

In December 1978 the U.S. Government accepted the three principles proposed by the Chinese Government for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, namely, the United States should sever "diplomatic relations" and abrogate the "mutual defense treaty" with the Taiwan authorities and withdraw U.S. military forces from Taiwan. On 1 January 1979 China and the United States formally established diplomatic relations. The Communiqu'e on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations said that: "The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan ... ... The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." Normalization of Sino-U.S. relations was thus achieved.

Regrettably, however, scarcely three months after the event, a so-called Taiwan Relations Act was passed by the U.S. Congress and signed into law by the President. A domestic legislation of the U.S. as it was, this Act contained many clauses that contravened the communiqu'e? on the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S. and the principles of international law, and seriously prejudiced the rights and interests of the Chinese people. Invoking this legislation, the U.S. Government has continued its arms sales to Taiwan, interference in China's internal affairs and obstruction to Taiwan's reunification with the mainland.

In order to resolve the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the Chinese and the U.S. governments negotiated and reached an agreement on 17 August 1982. A communique? bearing the same date became the third joint communique? governing Sino-U.S. relations. In that communique? the U.S. Government stated that: "It does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution." Yet in the past dozen or more years the U.S. Government has not only failed to implement the communiqu'e? in earnest, but has repeatedly contravened it. In September 1992 the U.S. Government even decided to sell 150 F-16 high-performance fighter aircraft to Taiwan. This action of the U.S. Government has added a new stumbling block in the way of the development of Sino-U.S. relations and settlement of the Taiwan question.

It is clear from the foregoing that the U.S. Government is responsible for holding up the settlement of the Taiwan question. Since the 1970s many Americans of vision and goodwill in or outside the administration have contributed much by way of helping to resolve the differences between China and the U.S. on the Taiwan question. The aforesaid three joint communiqu'e?s testify to their effort and contribution of which the Chinese Government and people are highly appreciative. On the other hand, one cannot fail to note that there are people in the U.S. who still do not want to see a reunified China. They have cooked up various pretexts and exerted influence to obstruct the settlement of the Taiwan question.

The Chinese Government is convinced that the American and the Chinese peoples are friendly to each other and that the normal development of the relations between the two countries accords with the long-term interests and common aspiration of both peoples. Both countries should cherish the three hard-won joint communiqu'e?s guiding the development of bilateral relations. As long as both sides abide by the principles enshrined in those communique?s, respect each other and set store by their overall common interests, it will not be difficult to settle the Taiwan question that has been left over from history and Sino-U.S. relations will surely see steady improvement and development ahead.

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III. The Chinese Government's Basic Position Regarding Settlement of the Taiwan Question

To settle the Taiwan question and achieve national reunification -- this is a sacrosanct mission of the entire Chinese people. The Chinese Government has persistently worked towards this end since the founding of the People's Republic. Its basic position on this question is: peaceful reunification; one country, two systems.

Peaceful reunification; one country, two systems -- how has this position been formulated? The Chinese Government conceived a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question as early as in the 1950s. In May 1955 the late Premier Zhou Enlai said at a NPC Standing Committee meeting that two alternatives were open to the Chinese people for the solution of the Taiwan question -- by resort to war or by peaceful means. The Chinese people would strive for a peaceful solution wherever possible, he affirmed. In April 1956 the late Chairman Mao Zedong put forward thoughts for policymaking such as "peace is the best option", "all patriots are of one family" and "it is never too late to join the ranks of patriots". However, those wishes have not come to fruition for reasons such as interference by foreign forces.

Major changes took place in and outside China in the 1970s. Diplomatic ties were established and relations normalized between China and the United States. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to shift the focus of the work of the Party and the State to the economic modernization programme. In the meantime, people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, compatriots of Hong Kong and Macao as well as overseas Chinese and people of Chinese descent all expressed their fervent hope that the two sides of the Straits would join hands to work for a resurgence of China. It was against this historical background that the Chinese Government formulated the position of "peaceful reunification; one country, two systems". The position takes the overall national interests and the future of the country into consideration. It respects history as well as the prevailing situation. It is realistic and takes care of the interests of all.

On 1 January 1979 the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China issued a message to compatriots in Taiwan, pronouncing the Chinese Government's basic position regarding peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. It called for the holding of talks between the two sides of the Straits to seek an end to the military confrontation. It pledged that in the pursuit of national reunification, the Government "will respect the status quo on Taiwan and the views of people of all walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures".

In a statement on 30 September 1981 the late Chairman Ye Jianying of the NPC Standing Committee further elaborated the policy and principles for the settlement of the Taiwan question. He affirmed that "after the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region" and proposed that talks be held on an equal footing between the ruling Parties on each side of the Straits, namely, the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang.

Referring to Ye Jianying's remarks, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping pointed out on 11 January 1982 that this in effect meant "one country, two systems", i.e., on the premise of national reunification, the main body of the nation would continue with its socialist system while Taiwan could maintain capitalism.

On 26 June 1983 Deng Xiaoping further enunciated the concept of peaceful reunification, stressing that the crucial point was national reunification. He went on to expound the Government's policy on reunification and on the creation of a Taiwan special administrative region.

On 12 October 1992 General Secretary Jiang Zemin of the CPC Central Committee pointed out: "We shall work steadfastly for the great cause, adhering to the principles of peaceful reunification and 'one country, two systems' ... ... We reiterate that the Chinese Communist Party is ready to establish contact with the Chinese Kuomintang at the earliest possible date to create conditions for talks on officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits and gradually realizing peaceful reunification. Representatives from other parties, mass organizations and all circles on both sides of the Taiwan Straits could be invited to join in such talks."

Basic Contents of "peaceful reunification; one country, two systems". This position is an important component of the theory and practice of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and a fundamental state policy of the Chinese Government which will not change for a long time to come. Its basic contents are as follows:

1. Only one China. There is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and the seat of China's central government is in Beijing. This is a universally recognized fact as well as the premise for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question.

The Chinese Government is firmly against any words or deeds designed to split China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It opposes "two Chinas", "one China, one Taiwan", "one country, two governments" or any attempt or act that could lead to "independence of Taiwan". The Chinese people on both sides of the Straits all believe that there is only one China and espouse national reunification. Taiwan's status as an inalienable part of China has been determined and cannot be changed. "Self- determination" for Taiwan is out of the question.

2. Coexistence of two systems. On the premise of one China, socialism on the mainland and capitalism on Taiwan can coexist and develop side by side for a long time without one swallowing up the other. This concept has largely taken account of the actual situation in Taiwan and practical interests of our compatriots there. It will be a unique feature and important innovation in the state system of a reunified China.

After reunification, Taiwan's current socio-economic system, its way of life as well as economic and cultural ties with foreign countries can remain unchanged. Private property, including houses and land, as well as business ownership, legal inheritance and overseas Chinese and foreign investments on the island will all be protected by law.

3. A high degree of autonomy. After reunification, Taiwan will become a special administrative region. It will be distinguished from the other provinces or regions of China by its high degree of autonomy. It will have its own administrative and legislative powers, an independent judiciary and the right of adjudication on the island. It will run its own party, political, military, economic and financial affairs. It may conclude commercial and cultural agreements with foreign countries and enjoy certain rights in foreign affairs. It may keep its military forces and the mainland will not dispatch troops or administrative personnel to the island. On the other hand, representatives of the government of the special administrative region and those from different circles of Taiwan may be appointed to senior posts in the central government and participate in the running of national affairs.

4. Peace negotiations. It is the common aspiration of the entire Chinese people to achieve reunification of the country by peaceful means through contacts and negotiations. People on both sides of the Straits are all Chinese. It would be a great tragedy for all if China's territorial integrity and sovereignty were to be split and its people were to be drawn into a fratricide. Peaceful reunification will greatly enhance the cohesion of the Chinese nation. It will facilitate Taiwan's socio-economic stability and development and promote the resurgence and prosperity of China as a whole.

In order to put an end to hostility and achieve peaceful reunification, the two sides should enter into contacts and negotiations at the earliest possible date. On the premise of one China, both sides can discuss any subject, including the modality of negotiations, the question of what Parties, groups and personalities may participate as well as any other matters of concern to the Taiwan side. So long as the two sides sit down and talk, they will always be able to find a mutually acceptable solution.

Taking into account the prevailing situation on both sides of the Straits, the Chinese Government has proposed that pending reunification the two sides should, according to the principle of mutual respect, complementarity and mutual benefit, actively promote economic cooperation and other exchanges. Direct trade, postal, air and shipping services and two-way visits should be started in order to pave the way for the peaceful reunification of the country.

Peaceful reunification is a set policy of the Chinese Government. However, any sovereign state is entitled to use any means it deems necessary, including military ones, to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Chinese Government is under no obligation to undertake any commitment to any foreign power or people intending to split China as to what means it might use to handle its own domestic affairs.

It should be pointed out that the Taiwan question is purely an internal affair of China and bears no analogy to the cases of Germany and Korea which were brought about as a result of international accords at the end of the Second World War. Therefore, the Taiwan question should not be placed on a par with the situation of Germany or Korea. The Chinese Government has always opposed applying the German or Korean formulas to Taiwan. The Taiwan question should and entirely can be resolved judiciously through bilateral consultations and within the framework of one China.

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IV. Relations Across Taiwan Straits: Evolution and Stumbling Blocks

The present division between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits is a misfortune for the Chinese nation. All the Chinese people are yearning for an early end to this agonizing situation.

In order to enable normal movement of people across the Straits and to achieve reunification of the country, the Chinese Government has made proposals towards this end and, at the same time, adopted measures to step up the development of inter-Straits relations.

On the political plane, policy adjustments have been made with a view to breaking down the mentality of hostility. The Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate have decided respectively that people who had gone to Taiwan would no longer be prosecuted for offenses prior to the founding of the People's Republic of China.

On the military plane, initiatives have been taken to ease military confrontation across the Straits. Shelling of Jinmen and other islands have been discontinued. Some forward defense positions and observation posts along the Fujian coast have been transformed into economic development zones or tourist attractions.

On the economic plane, doors have been flung open to facilitate the flow of goods and people. Businessmen from Taiwan are welcome to invest or trade on the mainland. They are accorded preferential treatment and legal safeguards.

The Chinese Government has also adopted a positive attitude and taken measures to encourage bilateral exchanges and cooperation in areas such as two-way travels, post and communications as well as scientific, cultural, sports, academic and journalistic activities. A non-governmental Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits has been set up and authorized by the Government to liaise with the Straits Exchange Foundation and other relevant non-governmental bodies in Taiwan for the purpose of upholding the legitimate rights and interests of people on both sides and promoting inter-Straits relations.

Such policies and measures of the Chinese Government have won the understanding and support of more and more Taiwan compatriots, compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao as well as overseas Chinese and people of Chinese descent. On their part, Taiwan compatriots have contributed tremendously to the development of inter-Straits relations. In recent years the Taiwan authorities have in turn made readjustments in their policy regarding the mainland. They have taken steps to ease the situation, such as allowing people to visit relatives on the mainland, gradually reducing the restrictions on people-to-people exchanges and contact, expanding indirect trade, permitting indirect investment and cutting red tape in inter-Straits post, telecommunications and bank remittance services. All these are conducive to better interchanges. The past few years have witnessed rapid growth of economic relations and trade as well as increasing mutual visits and sundry exchanges across the Straits. The Wang Daohan--Koo Chen-fu Talks in April 1993 resulted in four agreements, marking a step forward of historic significance in inter-Straits relations. Thus an atmosphere of relaxation prevails in the Taiwan Straits for the first time in the past four decades. This is auspicious to peaceful reunification.

It should be pointed out that notwithstanding a certain measure of easing up by the Taiwan authorities, their current policy vis-a-vis the mainland still seriously impedes the development of relations across the Straits as well as the reunification of the country. They talk about the necessity of a reunified China, but their deeds are always a far cry from the principle of one China. They try to prolong Taiwan's separation from the mainland and refuse to hold talks on peaceful reunification. They have even set up barriers to curb the further development of the interchanges across the Straits.

In recent years the clamours for "Taiwan independence" on the island have become shriller, casting a shadow over the course of relations across the Straits and the prospect of peaceful reunification of the country. The "Taiwan independence" fallacy has a complex social-historical root and international background. But the Taiwan authorities have, in effect, abetted this fallacy by its own policy of rejecting peace negotiations, restricting interchanges across the Straits and lobbying for "dual recognition" or "two Chinas" in the international arena. It should be affirmed that the desire of Taiwan compatriots to run the affairs of the island as masters of their own house is reasonable and justified. This should by no means be construed as advocating "Taiwan independence". They are radically distinct from those handful of "Taiwan independence" protagonists who trumpet "independence" but vilely rely on foreign patronage in a vain attempt to detach Taiwan from China, which runs against the fundamental interests of the entire Chinese people including Taiwan compatriots. The Chinese Government is closely following the course of events and will never condone any manoeuvre for "Taiwan independence".

Certain foreign forces who do not want to see a reunified China have gone out of their way to meddle in China's internal affairs. They support the anti-Communist stance of the Taiwan authorities of rejecting peace talks and abet the secessionists on the island, thereby erecting barriers to China's peaceful reunification and seriously wounding the national feelings of the Chinese people.

The Chinese Government is convinced that Taiwan compatriots want national reunification and that this is also true with most of the political forces in or out of office in Taiwan. The people on both sides of the Straits will overcome all the barriers and stumbling blocks by their joint efforts and ensure a better development of relations across the Straits.

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V. Several Questions Involving Taiwan in International Relations

As has been elucidated in the foregoing, there is only one China in the world, of which Taiwan is an inalienable part. The Government of the People's Republic of China has been recognized by the United Nations and throughout the world as the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people. In the interest of safeguarding state sovereignty and realizing national reunification the Chinese Government has always stood firm on the principle of one China and ensured the interests of Taiwan compatriots in international relations involving Taiwan. The Chinese Government has no doubt that its position will be respected by all other governments and people.

The Chinese Government deems it necessary to reiterate its position and policy on the following matters.

(1) Relations between Taiwan and countries maintaining diplomatic ties with China

All countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China have, in conformity with international law and the principle of one China, undertaken in formal agreement or understanding with the Chinese Government not to establish any ties of an official nature with Taiwan. According to international law, a sovereign state can only be represented by a single central government. As a part of China, Taiwan has no right to represent China in the international community, nor can it establish diplomatic ties or enter into relations of an official nature with foreign countries. Nevertheless, considering the needs of Taiwan's economic development and the practical interests of Taiwan compatriots, the Chinese Government has not objected to non-governmental economic or cultural exchanges between Taiwan and foreign countries.

In recent years the Taiwan authorities have vigorously launched a campaign of "pragmatic diplomacy" to cultivate official ties with countries having diplomatic relations with China in an attempt to push "dual recognition" and achieve the objective of creating a situation of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". The Chinese Government is firmly against this scheme.

It is noted that the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world cherish friendly relations with China and abide by their agreement or understanding with China on the issue of Taiwan. The Chinese Government appreciates this. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that, in disregard of their international credibility, certain countries have breached the undertaking made at the time of the establishment of diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China by evolving official relations with Taiwan, thereby putting a spoke in the wheel of China's reunification. The Chinese Government sincerely hopes that the governments in question will take measures to rectify the situation.

(2) Relations between international organizations and Taiwan

The sovereignty of each State is an integral whole which is indivisible and unsharable. The Government of the People's Republic of China, as the sole legal government of China, has the right and obligation to exercise state sovereignty and represent the whole of China in international organizations. The Taiwan authorities' lobbying for a formula of "one country, two seats" in international organizations whose membership is confined to sovereign states is a manoeuvre to create "two Chinas". The Chinese Government is firmly opposed to such an attempt. Its principled position fully conforms to the fundamental interests of the entire Chinese people including Taiwan compatriots and overseas Chinese. Only on the premise of adhering to the principle of one China and in the light of the nature and statutes of the international organizations concerned as well as the specific circumstances, can the Chinese Government consider the question of Taiwan's participation in the activities of such organizations and in a manner agreeable and acceptable to the Chinese Government.

All the specialized agencies and organizations of the United Nations system are inter-governmental organizations composed of sovereign states. After the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, all the specialized agencies and organizations of the U.N. system have formally adopted resolutions restoring to the People's Republic of China its lawful seat and expelling the "representatives" of the Taiwan authorities. Since then the issue of China's representation in the U.N. system has been resolved once and for all and Taiwan's re-entry is out of the question. However, it should be pointed out that recently some elements of the Taiwan authorities have been clamouring for "returning to the United Nations". Apparently, this is an attempt to split state sovereignty, which is devoid of any legal or practical basis. The Chinese Government is convinced that all governments and organizations of the U.N. system will be alert to this scheme and refrain from doing anything prejudicial to China's sovereignty.

In principle, Taiwan is also ineligible for membership in other categories of inter-governmental organizations. As to regional economic organizations such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Taiwan's participation is subject to the terms of agreement or understanding reached between the Chinese Government and the parties concerned which explicitly prescribe that the People's Republic of China is a full member as a sovereign state whereas Taiwan may participate in the activities of those organizations only as a region of China under the designation of Taipei, China (in ADB) or Chinese Taipei (in APEC). This is only an ad hoc arrangement and cannot constitute a "model" applicable to other inter-governmental organizations or international gatherings.

As regards participation in non-governmental international organizations, the relevant bodies of the People's Republic of China may reach an agreement or understanding with the parties concerned so that China's national organizations would use the designation of China, while Taiwan's organizations may participate under the designation of Taipei, China or Taiwan, China.

(3) Aviation services between Taiwan and countries having diplomatic relations with China

Airspace is an inalienable part of a country's territory. The 1919 Paris Aviation Convention and the 1944 Chicago Convention affirm the principle of complete and exclusive sovereignty of each country over its airspace. Therefore, the opening of aviation services with Taiwan by any airlines, including privately-operated ones, of countries having diplomatic relations with China is a political issue affecting China's sovereignty and cannot be regarded as a non-political transaction. State-run airlines of countries having diplomatic relations with China certainly must not operate air services to Taiwan. Privately-operated airlines must seek China's consent through consultations between their government and the Chinese Government before they can start reciprocal air services with privately-operated airlines of Taiwan. As a matter of fact, according to the afore-said principle the Chinese Government has consented to such services between privately-operated airlines of Britain, Germany, Canada, etc. and their counterparts in Taiwan.

As for countries which already had aviation services with Taiwan before the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, they can negotiate with the Chinese Government to change the official nature of such services so as to be able to continue the operations as privately-run commercial transportation undertakings.

(4) Arms sales to Taiwan by countries having diplomatic relations with China

The Chinese Government has always firmly opposed any country selling any type of arms or transferring production technology of the same to Taiwan. All countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China should abide by the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and refrain from providing arms to Taiwan in any form or under any pretext. Failure to do so would be a breach of the norms of international relations and an interference in China's internal affairs.

All countries, and especially big powers shouldering major responsibilities for world peace, are obligated to strictly abide by the guidelines laid down by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to restrict the proliferation of conventional weapons so as to contribute to maintaining and promoting regional peace and security. However, at a time when relations across the Taiwan Straits are easing up, certain powers have seen fit to renege on their undertakings under international agreements and to flout the Chinese Government's repeated strong representations by making arms sales to Taiwan, thereby whipping up tension between the two sides of the Straits. This not only constitutes a serious threat to China's security and an obstacle to China's peaceful reunification, but also undermines peace and stability in Asia and the world at large. It stands to reason that the Chinese people should voice strong resentment against this conduct.

In international affairs the Chinese Government always pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and adheres to the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful Co-existence. It actively seeks to develop friendly relations with all countries of the world and will never undermine any country's interests nor interfere in its internal affairs. By the same token it expects all other governments to refrain from undermining China's interests or interfering in China's internal affairs and to correctly handle their relations with Taiwan.

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Conclusion

Reunification of the country embodies the fundamental interest of the Chinese nation.

After national reunification the two sides of the Taiwan Straits can pool their resources and make common cause in economic development and work towards China's resurgence. Numerous problems that have been besetting Taiwan would be judiciously resolved within the framework of one China. Taiwan compatriots will share the pride and glory of a great nation with their kith and kin from the other parts of the motherland.

Taiwan question has long been a destabilizing factor in the Asia-Pacific region. Reunification of China will not only bolster the stability and development of the country itself, but also contribute to the further enhancement of the friendly relations and cooperation between China and other countries as well as to peace and development in the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole.

The Chinese Government is confident that it can count on the understanding and support of governments and people of all countries in the pursuit of its just cause of safeguarding its state sovereignty and territorial integrity.

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《台灣問題與中國的統一》【中共白皮書】

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

前言

維護國家統一和領土完整，是每個主權國家的神聖權利，也是國際法的基本原則。聯合國憲章明確規定：聯合國和它的成員國不得侵害任何會員國或國家之領土完整或政治獨立，不得干涉在本質上屬於任何國家國內管轄的事件。聯合國《關於各國依聯合國憲章建立友好關係及合作之國際法原則之宣言》指出：凡以局部或全部破壞國家統一及領土完整或政治獨立為目的之企圖，都是不符合聯合國憲章精神的。

中國近代史是一部被侵略、被宰割、被淩辱的歷史，也是中國人民為爭取民族獨立，維護國家主權、領土完整和民族尊嚴而英勇奮鬥的歷史。台灣問題的産生與發展，都與這段歷史有著緊密的聯絡。由於種種原因，台灣迄今尚處於與大陸分離的狀態。這種狀態一天不結束，中華民族所蒙受的創傷就一天不能癒合，中國人民為維護國家統一和領土完整的鬥爭也一天不會結束。

台灣問題的現狀如何?癥結何在?中國政府解決台灣問題的立場與主張是什麼?為了便於國際社會有一個清楚的了解，有必要就下列問題加以闡述。

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一、台灣是中國不可分割的一部分

台灣地處中國大陸的東南緣，是中國第一大島，同大陸是不可分割的整體。

台灣自古即屬於中國。台灣古稱夷洲、流求。大量的史書和文獻記載了中國人民早期開發台灣的情景。距今一千七百多年以前，三國時吳人沈瑩的《臨海水土志》等對此就有所著述，它們是世界上記述台灣最早的文字。公元三世紀和七世紀，三國孫吳政權和隋朝政府都曾先後派萬餘人去臺。進入十七世紀之後，中國人民在台灣的開拓規模越來越大。十七世紀末，大陸赴臺開拓者超過十萬人。至公元一八九三年(清光緒十九年)時，總數達到五十點七萬餘戶，二百五十四萬餘人。二百年間增長二十五倍。他們帶去先進的生産方式，由南到北，由西及東，篳路藍縷，披荊斬棘，大大加速了台灣整體開發的進程。這一史實説明，台灣和中國其他省區一樣，同為中國各族人民所開拓所定居。台灣社會的發展始終延續著中華文化的傳統，即使在日本侵佔的五十年間，這一基本情況也沒有改變。台灣的開拓發展史，凝聚了包括當地少數民族在內的中國人民的血汗和智慧。

中國歷代政府在台灣先後建立了行政機構，行使管轄權。早在公元十二世紀中葉，宋朝政府即已派兵駐守澎湖，將澎湖地區劃歸福建泉州晉江縣管轄。元朝政府在澎湖設置行政管理機構“巡檢司”。明朝政府於十六世紀中後期，恢復了一度廢止的“巡檢司”，併為防禦外敵侵犯，增兵澎湖。一六六二年(清康熙元年)，鄭成功在台灣設“承天府”。清朝政府逐步在台灣擴增行政機構，加強了對台灣的治理。一六八四年(清康熙二十三年)設“分巡臺廈兵備道”及“台灣府”，下設“台灣”(今台南)、“鳳山”(今高雄)、“諸羅”(今嘉義)三縣，隸屬福建省管轄。一七一四年(清康熙五十三年)，清政府派員測繪台灣地圖，勘丈全境裏數。一七二一年(清康熙六十年)，增設“巡視台灣監察御史”，改“分巡臺廈兵備道”為“分巡臺廈道”。爾後又增設“彰化縣”和“淡水廳”。一七二七年(清雍正五年)，復改“分巡臺廈道”為“分巡台灣道”(後又改為“分巡台灣兵備道”)，增“澎湖廳”，定“台灣”為官方統一的名稱。一八七五年(清光緒元年)，清政府為進一步經營和治理台灣，再增設“台北府”及“淡水”、“新竹”、“宜蘭”三縣和“基隆廳”。一八八五年(清光緒十一年)，清政府正式劃台灣為單一行省，任劉銘傳為首任巡撫，行政區擴為三府一州，領十一縣五廳。劉在任內，鋪鐵路，開礦山，架電線，造商輪，興辦企業，創設新學堂，把台灣社會經濟文化的發展大大向前推進。

一九四五年中國人民抗日戰爭勝利後，中國政府重新恢復了台灣省的行政管理機構。

海峽兩岸中國人為反對外國侵佔台灣進行了長期不懈的鬥爭。十五世紀後期起，西方殖民主義者大肆掠奪殖民地。一六二四年(明天啟四年)，荷蘭殖民者侵佔台灣南部。一六二六年(明天啟六年)，西班牙殖民者入侵台灣北部。一六四二年(明崇禎十五年)，荷蘭又取代西班牙佔領台灣北部。兩岸同胞為反對外國殖民者侵佔台灣進行了包括武裝起義在內的各種方式的鬥爭。一六六一年(清順治十八年)，鄭成功率眾進軍台灣，於次年驅逐了盤踞台灣的荷蘭殖民者。

一八九四年(清光緒二十年)，日本發動侵略中國的“甲午戰爭”。翌年，清政府戰敗，在日本威迫下簽訂喪權辱國的《馬關條約》，割讓台灣。消息傳來，舉國同憤。在北京會試的包括台灣在內的十八省千余舉人“公車上書”，反對割臺。台灣全省“哭聲震天”，嗚鑼罷市。協理台灣軍務的清軍將領劉永福等和台灣同胞一起，與佔領台灣的日軍拼死搏門。中國大陸東南各地居民為支援這一斗爭，或捐輸餉銀，或結隊赴臺，反抗日本侵略。在日本侵佔台灣期間，台灣同胞一直堅持英勇不屈的鬥爭。初期，他們組織義軍，進行武裝遊擊抵抗，前後達七年之久。繼而，在辛亥革命推翻清政府後，他們又匯同大陸同胞一道，先後發起十余次武裝起義。及至本世紀二十和三十年代，島內反抗日本殖民統治的群眾運動更加波瀾壯闊，席捲台灣南北。

一九三七年，中國人民開始了全民族的抗日戰爭。中國政府在《中國對日宣戰佈告》中明確昭告中外：所有一切條約、協定、合同有涉及中日關係者，一律廢止。《馬關條約》自屬廢止之列。這一佈告並鄭重宣佈：中國將“收復台灣、澎湖、東北四省土地”。中國人民經過八年艱苦的抗日戰爭，於一九四五年取得了最後的勝利，收復了失土台灣。台灣同胞鳴放鞭炮，歡欣鼓舞，祭告祖先，慶祝回歸祖國懷抱的偉大勝利。

國際社會公認台灣屬於中國。中國人民的抗日戰爭是世界反法西斯鬥爭的一部分，得到了世界人民的廣泛支持。在第二次世界大戰中，為了反對德、日、意法西斯軸心國，中國與美國、蘇聯、英國、法國等結成同盟國。一九四三年十二月一日，中、美、英三國簽署的《開羅宣言》指出：“三國之宗旨，在剝奪日本自一九一四年第一次世界大戰開始以後在太平洋所奪得或佔領之一切島嶼，在使日本所竊取於中國之土地，例如滿洲、台灣、澎湖列島等，歸還中國。”一九四五年七月二十六日，中、美、英三國簽署(後蘇聯參加)的《波茨坦公告》又重申：“開羅宣言之條件必將實施。”同年八月十五日，日本宣佈投降，《日本投降條款》規定：“茲接受中美英三國共同簽署的、後來又有蘇聯參加的一九四五年七月二十六日的波茨坦公告中的條款。”十月二十五日，同盟國中國戰區台灣省受降儀式於台北舉行，受降主官代表中國政府宣告：自即日起，台灣及澎湖列島已正式重入中國版圖，所有一切土地、人民、政事皆已置於中國主權之下。至此，台灣、澎湖重歸於中國主權管轄之下。

中華人民共和國成立以來，一百五十七個國家先後同中國建立了外交關係，它們都承認只有一個中國，中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府，台灣是中國的一部分。

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二、台灣問題的由來

台灣在第二次世界大戰之後，不僅在法律上而且在事實上已歸還中國。之所以又出現台灣問題，與隨後中國國民黨發動的反人民內戰有關，但更重要的是外國勢力的介入。

台灣問題與國民黨發動的內戰。中國抗日戰爭期間，在中國共産黨和其他愛國力量的推動下，中國國民黨與中國共産黨建立了抗日民族統一戰線，抗擊日本帝國主義的侵略。抗日戰爭勝利後，兩黨本應繼續攜手，共肩振興中華大業，惟當時以蔣介石為首的國民黨集團依仗美國的支持，置全國人民渴望和平與建設獨立、民主、富強的新中國的強烈願望於不顧，撕毀國共兩黨簽訂的《雙十協定》，發動了全國規模的反人民內戰。中國人民在中國共産黨領導下被迫進行了三年多的人民解放戰爭，由於當時的國民黨集團倒行逆施，已為全國各族人民所唾棄，中國人民終於推翻了南京的“中華民國”政府。一九四九年十月一日成立了中華人民共和國，中華人民共和國政府成為中國的唯一合法政府。國民黨集團的一部分軍政人員退據台灣。他們在當時美國政府的支持下，造成了台灣海峽兩岸隔絕的狀態。

台灣問題與美國政府的責任。第二次世界大戰後，在當時東西方兩大陣營對峙的態勢下，美國政府基於它的所謂全球戰略及維護本國利益的考慮，曾經不遺餘力地出錢、出槍、出人，支持國民黨集團打內戰，阻撓中國人民革命的事業。然而，美國政府最終並未達到它自己所希望達到的目的。美國國務院一九四九年發表的《美國與中國的關係》白皮書和艾奇遜國務卿給杜魯門總統的信，都不得不承認這一點。艾奇遜在他的信中説：“中國內戰不祥的結局超出美國政府控制的能力，這是不幸的事，卻也是無可避免的”；“這種結局之所以終於發生，也並不是因為我們少做了某些事情。這是中國內部各種力量的産物，我國曾經設法去左右這些力量，但是沒有效果”。

中華人民共和國誕生以後，當時的美國政府本來可以從中國內戰的泥潭中拔出來，但是它沒有這樣做，而是對新中國採取了孤立、遏制的政策，並且在朝鮮戰爭爆發後武裝干涉純屬中國內政的海峽兩岸關係。一九五○年六月二十七日，美國總統杜魯門發表聲明宣佈：“我已命令第七艦隊阻止對台灣的任何攻擊”。美國第七艦隊侵入了台灣海峽，美國第十三航空隊進駐了台灣。一九五四年十二月，美國又與台灣當局簽訂了所謂《共同防禦條約》，將中國的台灣省置於美國的“保護”之下。美國政府繼續干預中國內政的錯誤政策，造成了台灣海峽地區長期的緊張對峙局勢，台灣問題自此亦成為中美兩國間的重大爭端。

為了緩和台灣海峽地區的緊張局勢，探尋解決中美兩國之間爭端的途徑，中國政府自五十年代中期起，即開始與美國對話。一九五五年八月至一九七○年二月，中美兩國共舉行了一百三十六次大使級會談，但在緩和與消除台灣海峽地區緊張局勢這個關鍵問題上，未取得任何進展。及至六十年代末七十年代初，隨著國際局勢的發展變化和新中國的壯大，美國開始調整其對華政策，兩國關係逐步出現解凍的形勢。一九七一年十月，第二十六屆聯合國大會通過二七五八號決議，恢復中華人民共和國在聯合國的一切合法權利，並驅逐台灣當局的“代表”。一九七二年二月，美國總統尼克松訪問中國，中美雙方在上海發表了聯合公報。公報稱：“美國方面聲明：美國認識到，在台灣海峽兩邊的所有中國人都認為只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分。美國政府對這一立場不提出異議”。

一九七八年十二月，美國政府接受了中國政府提出的建交三原則，即：美國與台灣當局“斷交”、廢除《共同防禦條約》以及從台灣撤軍。中美兩國於一九七九年一月一日正式建立外交關係。中美建交聯合公報聲明：“美利堅合眾國承認中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府。在此範圍內，美國人民將同台灣人民保持文化、商務和其他非官方聯絡”；“美利堅合眾國政府承認中國的立場，即只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分”。自此，中美關係實現正常化。

但遺憾的是，中美建交不過三個月，美國國會竟通過了所謂《與台灣關係法》，並經美國總統簽署生效。這個《與台灣關係法》，以美國國內立法的形式，作出了許多違反中美建交公報和國際法原則的規定，嚴重損害中國人民的權益。美國政府根據這個關係法，繼續向台灣出售武器和干涉中國內政，阻撓台灣與中國大陸的統一。

為解決美國售臺武器問題，中美兩國政府通過談判，於一九八二年八月十七日達成協定，發表了有關中美關係的第三個聯合公報，簡稱“八·一七公報”。美國政府在公報中聲明：“它不尋求執行一項長期向台灣出售武器的政策，它向台灣出售的武器在性能和數量上將不超過中美建交後近幾年供應的水平，它準備逐步減少它對台灣的武器出售，並經過一段時間導致最後的解決。”然而，十多年來美國政府不但沒有認真執行公報的規定，而且不斷發生違反公報的行為。一九九二年九月，美國政府甚至決定向台灣出售一百五十架 F-16 型高性能戰鬥機。美國政府的這一行動，給中美關係的發展和台灣問題的解決增加了新的障礙和阻力。

由上可見，台灣問題直到現在還未得到解決，美國政府是有責任的。自七十年代以來，美國朝野許多有識之士和友好人士，曾經為促使中美之間在台灣問題上的分歧的解決做了大量有益的工作，上述三個聯合公報就包含著他們的努力和貢獻。中國政府和人民對此十分讚賞。然而也不能不看到，美國確也有人至今仍不願看到中國的統一，製造種種藉口，施加種種影響，阻撓台灣問題的解決。

中國政府相信，美國人民與中國人民是友好的。兩國關係的正常發展，是符合兩國人民的長遠利益和共同願望的。中美兩國都應珍視來之不易的指導兩國關係發展的三個聯合公報。只要雙方都能恪守三個公報的原則，相互尊重，以大局為重，歷史遺留下來的台灣問題就不難得到解決，中美關係就一定能不斷獲得改善和發展。

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三、中國政府解決台灣問題的基本方針

解決台灣問題，實現國家統一，是全體中國人民一項莊嚴而神聖的使命。中華人民共和國成立後，中國政府為之進行了長期不懈的努力。中國政府解決台灣問題的基本方針是“和平統一、一國兩制”。

“和平統一、一國兩制”方針的形成。早在五十年代，中國政府就曾設想以和平方式解決台灣問題。一九五五年五月，周恩來總理在全國人民代表大會常務委員會會議上即提出：中國人民解決台灣問題有兩種可能的方式，即戰爭的方式和和平的方式，中國人民願意在可能的條件下，爭取用和平的方式解決問題。一九五六年四月，毛澤東主席又提出：“和為貴”、“愛國一家”、“愛國不分先後”等政策主張。但由於某些外國勢力的干預等原因，這些主張未能付諸實踐。

自七十年代末開始，國際國內形勢發生了一些重要變化：中美建立外交關係，實現了關係正常化；中國共産黨召開十一屆三中全會，決定把黨和國家的工作中心轉移到現代化經濟建設上來。與此同時，海峽兩岸的中國人、港澳同胞以及海外僑胞、華人，都殷切期望兩岸攜手合作，共同振興中華。在這樣的歷史條件下，中國政府出於對整個國家民族利益與前途的考慮，本著尊重歷史、尊重現實、實事求是、照顧各方利益的原則，提出了“和平統一、一國兩制”的方針。

一九七九年一月一日，中華人民共和國全國人民代表大會常務委員會發表《告台灣同胞書》，鄭重宣告了中國政府和平解決台灣問題的大政方針，呼籲兩岸就結束軍事對峙狀態進行商談。表示在實現國家統一時，一定“尊重台灣現狀和台灣各界人士的意見，採取合情合理的政策和辦法”。

一九八一年九月三十日，全國人民代表大會常務委員會委員長葉劍英發表談話，進一步闡明解決台灣問題的方針政策。表示“國家實現統一後，台灣可作為特別行政區，享有高度的自治權”，並建議由兩岸執政的國共兩黨舉行對等談判。

一九八二年一月十一日，中國領導人鄧小平就葉劍英的上述談話指出：這實際上就是“一個國家、兩種制度”，在國家實現統一的大前提下，國家主體實行社會主義制度，台灣實行資本主義制度。

一九八三年六月二十六日，鄧小平進一步發揮了關於實現台灣與大陸和平統一的構想，指出，問題的核心是祖國統一。他還就兩岸統一和設置台灣特別行政區問題，闡明了中國政府的政策。

一九九二年十月十二日，中共中央總書記江澤民指出：“我們堅定不移地按照‘和平統一、一國兩制’的方針，積極促進祖國統一。”“我們再次重申，中國共産黨願意同中國國民黨儘早接觸，以便創造條件，就正式結束兩岸敵對狀態、逐步實現和平統一進行談判。在商談中，可以吸收兩岸其他政黨、團體和各界有代表性的人士參加。”

“和平統一、一國兩制”的基本點。“和平統一、一國兩制”是建設有中國特色的社會主義理論和實踐的重要組成部分，是中國政府一項長期不變的基本國策。這一方針，有以下基本點：

(一)一個中國。世界上只有一個中國，台灣是中國不可分割的一部分，中央政府在北京。這是舉世公認的事實，也是和平解決台灣問題的前提。

中國政府堅決反對任何旨在分裂中國主權和領土完整的言行，反對“兩個中國”、“一中一台”或“一國兩府”，反對一切可能導致“台灣獨立”的企圖和行徑。海峽兩岸的中國人民都主張只有一個中國，都擁護國家的統一，台灣作為中國不可分割的一部分的地位是確定的、不能改變的，不存在什麼“自決”的問題。

(二)兩制並存。在一個中國的前提下，大陸的社會主義制度和台灣的資本主義制度，實行長期共存，共同發展，誰也不吃掉誰。這種考慮，主要是基於照顧台灣的現狀和台灣同胞的實際利益。這將是統一後的中國國家體制的一大特色和重要創造。

兩岸實現統一後，台灣的現行社會經濟制度不變，生活方式不變，同外國的經濟文化關係不變。諸如私人財産、房屋、土地、企業所有權、合法繼承權、華僑和外國人投資等，一律受法律保護。

(三)高度自治。統一後，台灣將成為特別行政區。它不同於中國其他一般省區，享有高度的自治權。它擁有在台灣的行政管理權、立法權、獨立的司法權和終審權；黨、政、軍、經、財等事宜都自行管理；可以同外國簽訂商務、文化等協定，享有一定的外事權；有自己的軍隊，大陸不派軍隊也不派行政人員駐臺。特別行政區政府和台灣各界的代表人士還可以出任國家政權機構的領導職務，參與全國事務的管理。

(四)和平談判。通過接觸談判，以和平方式實現國家統一，是全體中國人的共同心願。兩岸都是中國人，如果因為中國的主權和領土完整被分裂，兵戎相見，骨肉相殘，對兩岸的同胞都是極其不幸的。和平統一，有利於全民族的大團結，有利於台灣社會經濟的穩定和發展，有利於全中國的振興和富強。

為結束敵對狀態，實現和平統一，兩岸應儘早接觸談判。在一個中國的前提下，什麼問題都可以談，包括談判的方式，參加的黨派、團體和各界代表人士，以及台灣方面關心的其他一切問題。只要兩岸坐下來談，總能找到雙方都可以接受的辦法。

鑒於兩岸的現實狀況，中國政府主張在實現統一之前，雙方按照相互尊重、互補互利的原則，積極推動兩岸經濟合作和各項交往，進行直接通郵、通商、通航和雙向交流，為國家和平統一創造條件。

和平統一是中國政府既定的方針。然而，每一個主權國家都有權採取自己認為必要的一切手段包括軍事手段，來維護本國主權和領土的完整。中國政府在採取何種方式處理本國內部事務的問題上，並無義務對任何外國或圖謀分裂中國者作出承諾。

這裡還應指出，台灣問題純屬中國的內政，不同於第二次世界大戰後經國際協議而形成的德國問題和朝鮮問題。因此，台灣問題不能和德國、朝鮮問題相提並論。中國政府歷來反對用處理德國問題、朝鮮問題的方式來處理台灣問題。台灣問題應該也完全可以通過兩岸的協商，在一個中國的架構內求得合理的解決。

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四、台灣海峽兩岸關係的發展及其阻力

台灣海峽兩岸目前的分離狀態，是中華民族的不幸。所有中國人無不殷切盼望早日結束這種令人痛心的局面。

為了實現兩岸人民正常往來和國家統一，中國政府在提出和平統一主張的同時，也採取了一系列推動兩岸關係發展的措施：

政治方面，調整有關政策措施，化解敵對情緒。最高人民法院、最高人民檢察院決定不再追訴去臺人員在中華人民共和國成立前的犯罪行為。

軍事方面，主動緩和海峽兩岸軍事對峙狀態，停止對金門等島嶼的炮擊，並把福建沿海一些前沿陣地、觀察所開闢為經濟開發區和旅遊點。

經濟方面，敞開門戶，促進交流，歡迎臺商來大陸投資和從事貿易活動，併為之提供優惠條件和法律保障。

其他如人員往來、郵電交通以及科技、文化、體育、學術、新聞等方面，中國政府亦持積極態度，採取了相應措施，鼓勵發展兩岸在各個領域的交流與合作。還成立了得到政府授權的民間團體“海峽兩岸關係協會”，同台灣“海峽交流基金會”及有關民間團體建立聯絡，維護兩岸人民的合法權益，推動兩岸關係的發展。

中國政府的對臺政策和措施，得到了越來越多的台灣同胞、港澳同胞和海外僑胞、華人的理解和支持。廣大台灣同胞為發展兩岸關係作出了很大的努力。台灣當局近幾年也相應調整了對大陸的政策，採取了一些鬆動措施，諸如開放島內民眾赴大陸探親，逐步放寬對兩岸民間交流交往的限制，擴大間接貿易，開放間接投資，簡化兩岸同胞通話、通郵、通匯的手續。這些都是有利於相互交往的。近年來，兩岸的經濟貿易迅速發展，人員往來及各項交流活動不斷擴大。一九九三年四月舉行的“汪辜會談”簽訂了四項協議，邁出了兩岸關繫上具有歷史意義的重要一步。台灣海峽出現了四十餘年來前所未有的緩和氣氛，這是有利於和平統一的。

必須指出，台灣當局雖對兩岸關係作了某些鬆動，但其現行大陸政策仍嚴重阻礙著兩岸關係的發展和國家的統一。他們口頭上雖聲稱“中國必須統一”，但行動上卻總是背離一個中國的原則，繼續維持與大陸分離的局面，拒絕就和平統一問題進行商談，甚至設置障礙，限制兩岸交往的進一步發展。

近年來，台灣島內“台獨”活動日形囂張，給兩岸關係的發展和國家和平統一投下了陰影。“台獨”的産生有著複雜的社會歷史根源和國際背景，而台灣當局拒絕和談、限制交往、在國際上推行“雙重承認”和“兩個中國”的政策，又實際上為“台獨”活動提供了條件。應當説，台灣同胞要求當家作主管理台灣的願望是合情合理的、正當的，這不同於“台灣獨立”，更與極少數堅持要走“台獨”道路的人有著根本的區別。極少數“台獨”分子鼓吹“獨立”，甚至投靠外國，妄圖將台灣從中國分裂出去，這是違揹包括台灣同胞在內的全中國人民的根本利益的。中國政府嚴重關注這一事態的發展，對任何製造“台灣獨立”的行徑絕不會坐視不理。

某些國際勢力不希望中國統一，仍千方百計插手中國內政，支持台灣當局的“反共拒和”政策和島內的分裂勢力，為中國的和平統一製造障礙，嚴重傷害了中國人民的民族感情。

中國政府堅信，廣大台灣同胞是要求國家統一的；台灣朝野政治力量的大多數也是主張國家統一的。在兩岸人民共同努力下，上述障礙和阻力一定可以排除，兩岸關係一定可以獲得更好的發展。

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五、國際事務中涉及台灣的幾個問題

如前所述，世界上只有一個中國，台灣是中國不可分割的一部分。中華人民共和國政府作為代表全中國人民的唯一合法政府，得到了聯合國及世界各國的普遍承認。為維護國家主權和實現國家的統一，中國政府在國際事務中處理涉及台灣的問題時，始終堅持一個中國的原則，一貫維護台灣同胞的利益。中國政府相信，這一立場必能贏得各國政府和人民的尊重。在此，中國政府認為有必要就以下幾個問題重申自己的立場和政策。

(一) 與中國建交國同台灣的關係問題。目前，世界上凡與中國建交的國家，均遵照國際法和一個中國的原則，與中國政府就台灣問題達成正式協議或諒解，承諾不與台灣建立任何官方性質的關係。按照國際法，一個主權國家只能有一個中央政府代表這個國家。台灣作為中國的一部分，它在國際上無權代表中國，不能與外國建立外交關係和發展具有官方性質的關係。但考慮到台灣經濟發展的需要和台灣同胞的實際利益，對台灣同外國的民間經濟、文化往來，中國政府不持異議。

近幾年，台灣當局在國際上竭力推行所謂“務實外交”，謀求同一些與中國建交的國家發展官方關係，推行“雙重承認”，達到製造“兩個中國”、“一中一台”的目的。對此，中國政府堅決反對。

應該指出，世界上絕大多數國家都能珍視同中國的友好關係，恪守在台灣問題上和中國達成的協議和諒解，中國政府對此表示讚賞。但也不能不指出，有的國家竟不顧國際信譽，違反與中華人民共和國建交時所作的承諾，同台灣發展官方關係，從而給中國統一事業設置障礙。中國政府衷心希望，有關國家的政府能夠採取措施，糾正這一做法。

(二) 國際組織與台灣的關係問題。每個國家的主權是完整的，既不能分割，也不能分享。中華人民共和國政府作為中國的唯一合法政府，有權利也有義務在國際組織中行使國家主權，代表整個中國。台灣當局企圖在某些只有主權國家才能參加的國際組織中搞所謂“一國兩席”，就是要製造“兩個中國”。中國政府堅決反對這種行徑。這一原則立場完全符合包括台灣同胞和海外僑胞在內的全中國人民的根本利益。只有在堅持一個中國原則立場的前提下，中國政府才可以考慮，根據有關國際組織的性質、章程規定和實際情況，以中國政府同意和接受的某種方式，來處理台灣參加某些國際組織活動的問題。

聯合國系統的所有機構，是由主權國家代表參加的政府間國際組織。在恢復中華人民共和國在聯合國的合法權利後，聯合國系統的所有機構都已通過正式決議，恢復中華人民共和國享有的合法席位，驅逐了台灣當局的“代表”。自此，在聯合國組織中的中國代表權問題已獲得了徹底的解決，根本不存在台灣再加入的問題。需要指出的是，近一個時期來，台灣當局的某些人又為“重返聯合國”而大肆鼓噪。十分明顯，這是一種妄圖割裂國家主權的行徑，它無論在法理上或實際上都是行不通的。中國政府相信各國政府和聯合國系統的組織會識破這一圖謀，不做有損於中國主權的事情。

其他政府間國際組織，原則上台灣也無權參加。至於亞洲開發銀行 (ADB)、亞太經濟合作組織 (APEC) 等地區性經濟組織，台灣的加入係根據中國政府與有關方面達成的協議或諒解，明確規定中華人民共和國作為主權國家參加，台灣只作為中國的一個地區以“中國台北”(英文在亞行為 TAIPEI，CHINA；在亞太經濟合作組織為CHINESETAIPEI)的名稱參加活動。這種做法屬於特殊安排，不能構成其他政府間國際組織及國際活動效倣的“模式”。

在民間性質的國際組織中，中華人民共和國的相應組織同有關方面達成協定或諒解，在中國的全國性組織以中國的名義參加的情況下，台灣的相應組織可以以“中國台北” (TAIPEI，CHINA) 或“中國台灣” (TAIWAN，CHINA) 的名稱參加。

(三) 與中國建交國同台灣通航問題。一個國家的領空是該國領土不可分割的組成部分。一九一九年公佈的《巴黎航空公約》和一九四四年簽署的《芝加哥公約》均確認，每個國家對其領空具有完全的、排他性的主權的原則。因此，凡是同中國建交國家的任何航空公司，即使是私營航空公司與台灣通航，都是涉及中國主權的政治問題，而不是一般的民間關係。與中國建交國家的官方航空公司當然不可與台灣通航，而其民間航空公司如欲同台灣通航，則須由其政府與中國政府磋商。在徵得中國政府同意後，其民間航空公司始可同台灣的私營航空公司互飛。實際上，根據上述原則，中國政府已經同意英、德、加拿大等國的民間航空公司與台灣的私營航空公司通航。

有的國家在與中華人民共和國建交前就同台灣通航的，則可通過與中國政府談判，改變其同台灣通航的官方性質後繼續其民間商業運輸安排。

(四) 與中國建交國向台灣出售武器問題。中國政府一貫堅決反對任何國家向台灣出售任何種類的武器裝備或提供生産武器的技術。凡與中國建交的國家，都應遵循互相尊重主權和領土完整、互不干涉內政的原則，而不以任何形式或藉口向台灣提供武器，否則就是違反國際關係準則，干涉中國內政。

世界各國，尤其是對世界和平事業負有重大責任的大國，理應嚴格遵守聯合國安理會五常任理事國關於限制常規武器擴散的指導原則，為維護和促進地區的和平與安全作出貢獻。然而，在目前台灣海峽兩岸關係日益緩和的形勢下，有的國家竟違背自己在國際協議中的承諾，置中國政府的一再嚴正交涉於不顧，向台灣出售武器，在海峽兩岸之間製造緊張局勢。這不僅是對中國安全的嚴重威脅，為中國的和平統一事業設置障礙，也不利於亞洲和世界的和平與穩定。中國人民當然要強烈反對。

在國際事務中，中國政府一貫奉行獨立自主的和平外交政策，堅持“互相尊重主權和領土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉內政、平等互利、和平共處”五項原則，積極發展同世界各國的友好關係，從不損害別國利益，不干涉別國內政。同樣，中國政府也要求各國政府，不做損害中國利益、干涉中國內政的事情，正確處理與台灣的關係問題。

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結束語

中國的統一是中華民族的根本利益所在。

中國實現統一後，兩岸可攜手合作，互補互助，發展經濟，共同振興中華。原來一直困擾台灣的各種問題，都將在一個中國的架構下得到合理解決。台灣同胞將與祖國其他地區人民一道共享一個偉大國家的尊嚴和榮譽。

長期以來，台灣問題一直是亞洲與太平洋地區一個不穩定的因素。中國的統一，不僅有利於中國本身的穩定和發展，也有利於中國同各國進一步加強友好合作關係，有利於亞太地區乃至全世界的和平與發展。

中國政府相信，在維護自己國家主權與領土完整的正義事業中，一定能夠得到世界各國政府和人民的理解和支持。

國務院新聞辦公室

一九九三年八月 北京

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

This white paper was issued on Aug. 31, 1993 and was the first of altogether three white papers the PRC issued on Taiwan so far. The second white paper on the topic was issued on Feb. 21, 2000, the third on Aug. 10, 2022.

See also the URLs leading to the sources of this white paper in English and Chinese.

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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Bill Clinton's "Three No's"

Name in Chinese Kelindun zongtongde 'san bu' zhengce 克林頓總統的『三不』政策
Document type Official policy statement of the sitting POTUS
Year, date 1998, June 30
 Jump to Chinese version   [Next document]  [Previous document] 

On June 30, 1998, during his nine-day state visit to the PRC, US President Bill Clinton made a statement on his new Taiwan position at the Shanghai Library (上海圖書館):

[...] I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan—one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member of any organization for which statehood is a requirement. [...]

克林頓總統的『三不』政策

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

[...] 這使我有機會在這裡重申我方的臺灣政策，即我們不支持臺灣獨立，不支持兩個中國或一中一台，不支持臺灣加入任何必須由主權國家才能參加的國際組織。[...]

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US Senate Resolution 107

Name in Chinese  yijiujiuba nian canyuan jueyi'an 1998 年參院決議案 
Document type Resolution by the US Senate
Year, date 1998, July 10
 Jump to Editor's note   [Next document]  [Previous document] 

Whereas at no time since the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, has Taiwan been under the control of the People's Republic of China;

Whereas the United States began its long, peaceful, friendly relationship with Taiwan in 1949;

Whereas since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, the policy of the United States has been based on the expectation that the future relationship between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan would be determined by peaceful means;

Whereas in March 1996, the People's Republic of China held provocative military maneuvers, including missile launch exercises in the Taiwan Strait, in an attempt to intimidate the people of Taiwan during their historic, free and democratic presidential election;

Whereas officials of the People's Republic of China refuse to renounce the use of force against democratic Taiwan;

Whereas Taiwan has achieved significant political and economic strength as one of the world's premier democracies and as the nineteenth largest economy in the world;

Whereas Taiwan is the seventh largest trading partner of the United States and imports more than twice as much annually from the United States as does the People's Republic of China; and

Whereas no treaties exist between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan that determine the future status of Taiwan: Now therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),

That Congress—

(1) affirms its longstanding commitment to Taiwan and the people of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8);

(2) affirms its expectation, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and considers any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of grave concern to the United States;

(3) affirms its commitment, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;

(4) affirms its commitment, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, that only the President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of defense articles and services for Taiwan based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan; and

(5) urges the President of the United States to seek a public renunciation by the People's Republic of China of any use of force, or threat to use force, against democratic Taiwan.

The title was amended so as to read: 'Affirming U.S. Commitments Under the Taiwan Relations Act'.

[July 10, 1998]

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

Additional information concerning the US Senate Resolution 107 can be found on relevant page of the US Congress; please click here. The title of this document can be translated to Chinese as follows: Meiguo canyiyuan yilingqi hao gongtong jueyi'an 美國參議院 107 號共同決議案.

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US House of Representatives Resolution 301

Name in Chinese  yijiuiuba nian zhongyuan jueyi'an 1998 年眾院決議案 
Document type Resolution by the US House of Representatives
Year, date 1998, July 20
 Jump to Editor's note   [Next document]  [Previous document] 

Whereas at no time since the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, has Taiwan been under the control of the People's Republic of China;

Whereas the United States began its long, peaceful, friendly relationship with Taiwan in 1949;

Whereas since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, the policy of the United States has been based on the expectation that the further relationship between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan would be determined by peaceful means;

Whereas in March 1996, the People's Republic of China held provocative military maneuvers including missile launch exercises in the Taiwan Strait, in an attempt to intimidate the people of Taiwan during their historic, free, and democratic Presidential election;

Whereas officials of the People's Republic of China refuse to renounce the use of force against democratic Taiwan;

Whereas Taiwan has achieved significant political and economic strength as one of the world's premier democracies and as the 19th largest economy in the world;

Whereas Taiwan is the 7th largest trading partner of the United States;

Whereas no agreements exist between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan that determine the future status of Taiwan; and

Whereas the House of Representatives passed a resolution by a vote of 411-0 in June 1998 urging the President to seek, during his recent summit meeting in Beijing, a public renunciation by the People's Republic of China of any use of force, or threat of use of force, against democratic Taiwan: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That Congress—

(1) affirms its longstanding commitment to Taiwan and the people of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8);

(2) affirms its expectation, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, that the future status of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that the people of both sides of the Taiwan Strait should determine their own future, and considers any effort to determine or influence the future status of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific region and of grave concern to the United States;

(3) affirms its commitment, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services, including appropriate ballistic missile defenses, in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;

(4) affirms its commitment, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, that only the President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of defense articles and services for Taiwan based solely upon their judgment of the defensive needs of Taiwan;

(5) urges the President, once again, to seek a public renunciation by the People's Republic of China of any use of force, or threat of use of force, against the free people of Taiwan; and

(6) affirms its strong support, in accordance with the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act, of appropriate membership for Taiwan in international financial institutions and other international organizations.

[July 20, 1998]

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

Additional information concerning the US Senate Resolution 107 can be found on relevant page of the US Congress; please click here. The title of this document can be translated to Chinese as follows: Meiguo zhongyiyuan sanlingyi hao gongtong jueyi'an 美國眾議院 301 號共同決議案.

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ROC President Lee Teng-hui's remarks about the "state-to-state relationship" extant between the ROC and the PRC

Name in Chinese Li Denghui zongtong guanyu liang'an "teshude guoyuguode guanxi 李登輝總統關於兩岸『特殊的國與國的關係』
Document type Political commentary and policy interpretation by ROC President Lee Teng-hui
Year, date 1999, July 9
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On July 9, 1999, ROC president Lee Teng-hui made a statement on the relations between the ROC and the PRC during an interview with journalists of German broadcasting station Deutsche Welle:

[...] The 1991 constitutional amendments have designated cross-strait relations as a state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship, rather than an internal relationship between a legitimate government and a renegade group, or between a central government and a local government. Thus, the Beijing authorities' characterization of Taiwan as a "renegade province" is historically and legally untrue. [...]

李登輝總統關於兩岸『特殊的國與國的關係』

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

[...] 一九九一年修憲以來，已將兩岸關係定位在國家與國家 ，至少是特殊的國與國的關係，而非一合法政府，一叛亂團體，或一中央政府，一地方政府 的「一個中國」的內部關係。所以，您提到北京政府將台灣視為「叛離的一省」，這完全昧於歷史與法律上的事實。[...]

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The One China Principle and Taiwan Question

Name in Chinese yige Zhongguode yuanze yu Taiwan wenti 一個中國的原則與台灣問題
Document type PRC policy statement / CCP propaganda white paper (baipishu 白皮書)
Year, date 2000, Feb. 21
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(Jump to First white paper—1993)    (Jump to Third white paper—2022)

Foreword

On October 1, 1949, the Chinese people won a great victory in the new democratic revolution and founded the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Kuomintang (KMT) ruling clique retreated from the mainland to entrench in China's Taiwan Province in confrontation with the Central Government with the support of foreign forces. This is the origin of the Taiwan issue. Settlement of the Taiwan issue and realization of the complete reunification of China embody the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. The Chinese government has worked persistently toward this goal in the past 50 years. From 1979, the Chinese government has striven for the peaceful reunification of China in the form of "one country, two systems" with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort. Economic and cultural exchanges and people-to-people contacts between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits have made rapid progress since the end of 1987. Unfortunately, from the 1990s, Lee Teng-hui, the leader of the Taiwan authorities, has progressively betrayed the One-China Principle, striving to promote a separatist policy with "two Chinas" at the core, going so far as to openly describe the cross-Straits relations as "state to state relations, or at least special state to state relations." This action has seriously damaged the basis for peaceful reunification of the two sides, harmed the fundamental interests of the entire Chinese nation including the Taiwan compatriots, and jeopardized peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The Chinese government has consistently adhered to the One-China Principle and resolutely opposed any attempt to separate Taiwan from China. The struggle between the Chinese government and the separatist forces headed by Lee Teng-hui finds its concentrated expression in the question of whether to persevere in the One-China Principle or to create "two Chinas" or "One-China, one Taiwan."

In August 1993, we issued a white paper entitled "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China," which systematically expounds the fact concerning Taiwan as an inalienable part of China, the origin of the Taiwan issue and the Chinese government's basic principles and related policies regarding resolution of the Taiwan question. We deem it necessary here to further explain to the international community the Chinese government's position and policy on the One-China Principle.

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I. The Basis for One China, de Facto and de Jure

The One-China Principle has been evolved in the course of the Chinese people's just struggle to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its basis, both de facto and de jure, is unshakable.

Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. All the facts and laws about Taiwan prove that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. In April 1895, through a war of aggression against China, Japan forced the Qing government to sign the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki, and forcibly occupied Taiwan. In July 1937, Japan launched an all-out war of aggression against China. In December 1941, the Chinese government issued the Proclamation of China's Declaration of War Against Japan, announcing to the world that all treaties, agreements and contracts concerning Sino-Japanese relations, including the Treaty of Shimonoseki, had been abrogated, and that China would recover Taiwan. In December 1943, the Cairo Declaration was issued by the Chinese, U.S. and British governments, stipulating that Japan should return to China all the territories it had stolen from the Chinese, including Northeast China, Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago. The Potsdam Proclamation signed by China, the United States and Britain in 1945 (later adhered to by the Soviet Union) stipulated that "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." In August of that year, Japan declared surrender and promised in its instrument of surrender that it would faithfully fulfill the obligations laid down in the Potsdam Proclamation. On October 25, 1945, the Chinese government recovered Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago, resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan.

On October 1, 1949, the Central People's Government of the PRC was proclaimed, replacing the government of the Republic of China to become the only legal government of the whole of China and its sole legal representative in the international arena, thereby bringing the historical status of the Republic of China to an end. This is a replacement of the old regime by a new one in a situation where the main bodies of the same international laws have not changed and China's sovereignty and inherent territory have not changed therefrom, and so the government of the PRC naturally should fully enjoy and exercise China's sovereignty, including its sovereignty over Taiwan.

Since the KMT ruling clique retreated to Taiwan, although its regime has continued to use the designations "Republic of China" and "government of the Republic of China," it has long since completely forfeited its right to exercise state sovereignty on behalf of China and, in reality, has always remained only a local authority in Chinese territory.

The formulation of the One-China Principle and its basic meaning. On the day of its founding, the Central People's Government of the PRC declared to governments of all countries in the world, "This government is the sole legitimate government representing the entire people of the People's Republic of China. It is ready to establish diplomatic relations with all foreign governments that are willing to abide by the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty." Shortly afterwards, the Central People's Government telegraphed the United Nations, announcing that the KMT authorities had "lost all basis, both de jure and de facto, to represent the Chinese people," and therefore had no right to represent China at all. One principle governing New China's establishment of diplomatic relations with a foreign country is that it recognizes the government of the PRC as the sole legitimate government representing the whole of China, severs or refrains from establishing diplomatic relations with the Taiwan authorities.

These propositions of the Chinese government met with obstruction by the U.S. government. On January 5, 1950, the U.S. President Truman issued a statement, saying that the U.S. and other Allied countries recognized China's exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan Island in the four years since 1945. However, after the start of the Korean War in June 1950, to isolate and contain China the U.S. government not only sent troops to occupy Taiwan, but it also dished out such fallacies as "the status of Taiwan has yet to be determined" and later, step by step, lobbied for "dual recognition" among the international community in order to create "two Chinas." Naturally, the Chinese government resolutely opposed this, insisting that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China. China has evolved the One-China Principle precisely in the course of the endeavor to develop normal diplomatic relations with other countries and the struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The above propositions constitute the basic meaning of the One-China Principle, the crucial point being to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

During the 30 or 40 years after 1949, although the Taiwan authorities did not recognize the legitimate status of the government of the PRC as the representative of the whole of China, they did insist that Taiwan is a part of China and that there is only one China, and opposed "two Chinas" and "Taiwan independence. " This shows that for a long time there has been a common understanding among the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits on the fundamental question that there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory. As far back as October 1958, when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was engaged in the battle to bombard Jinmen, Chairman Mao Zedong declared to the Taiwan authorities, "There is only one China, not two, in the world. You agree with us on this point, as indicated in your leaders' proclamations." In January 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) issued a Message to Taiwan Compatriots, pointing out that "the Taiwan authorities have always stood firm on the one China position and opposed the independence of Taiwan. This is our common stand and our basis for cooperation."

The Chinese government's solemn and reasonable stand for the One-China Principle has gained the understanding and support of more and more countries and international organizations, and the One-China Principle has been gradually accepted by the international community at large. In October 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted at its 26th session Resolution 2758, which expelled the representatives of the Taiwan authorities and restored the seat and all the lawful rights of the government of the PRC in the United Nations. In September 1972, China and Japan signed a Joint Statement, announcing establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and that Japan recognizes the government of the PRC as the only legitimate government of China, fully understands and respects the Chinese government's position that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC, and promises to adhere to the position as prescribed in Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation. In December 1978, China and the U.S. issued the Joint Communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations, in which the U.S. " recognizes the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China" and "acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China. " Up to now, 161 countries have established diplomatic relations with the PRC; they all acknowledge the One-China Principle and promise to handle their relations with Taiwan within the one-China framework.

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II. The One-China Principle--the Basis and Prerequisite for Achieving Peaceful Reunification

The One-China Principle is the foundation stone for the Chinese government's policy on Taiwan. On Comrade Deng Xiaoping's initiative, the Chinese government has, since 1979, adopted the policy of peaceful reunification and gradually evolved the scientific concept of "one country, two systems." On this basis, China established the basic principle of "peaceful reunification, and one country, two systems." The key points of this basic principle and the relevant policies are: China will do its best to achieve peaceful reunification, but will not commit itself to ruling out the use of force; will actively promote people-to-people contacts and economic and cultural exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, and start direct trade, postal, air and shipping services as soon as possible; achieve reunification through peaceful negotiations and, on the premise of the One-China Principle, any matter can be negotiated. After reunification, the policy of "one country, two systems" will be practiced, with the main body of China (Chinese mainland) continuing with its socialist system, and Taiwan maintaining its capitalist system for a long period of time to come. After reunification, Taiwan will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, and the Central Government will not send troops or administrative personnel to be stationed in Taiwan. Resolution of the Taiwan issue is an internal affair of China, which should be achieved by the Chinese themselves, and there is no call for aid by foreign forces. The afore-mentioned principles and policies embody the basic stand and spirit of adhering to the One-China Principle, and fully respect Taiwan compatriots' wish to govern and administer Taiwan by themselves. On January 30, 1995, President Jiang Zemin put forward eight propositions on the development of relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits and the promotion of peaceful reunification of China, explicitly pointing out: "Adhering to the One-China Principle is the basis and prerequisite for peaceful reunification. "

Only by adhering to the One-China Principle can peaceful reunification be achieved. The Taiwan issue is one left over by the Chinese civil war. As yet, the state of hostility between the two sides of the Straits has not formally ended. To safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and realize the reunification of the two sides of the Straits, the Chinese government has the right to resort to any necessary means. Peaceful means would be favourable to the common development of the societies on both sides of the Straits, and to the harmony and unity of the compatriots across the Straits. Peaceful means is therefore the best means. The Chinese government's declaration in 1979 on implementing the principle of peaceful reunification was based on the premise that the Taiwan authorities at that time upheld the principle that there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is a part of China. Meanwhile, the Chinese government took into account the fact that the U.S. government, which for many years had supported the Taiwan authorities, had accepted that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the only legitimate government of China, and saw this acknowledgment as being beneficial to the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. While carrying out the policy of peaceful reunification, the Chinese government always makes it clear that the means used to solve the Taiwan issue is a matter of China's internal affairs, and China is under no obligation to commit itself to rule out the use of force. This is by no means directed against Taiwan compatriots, but against the scheme to create an "independent Taiwan" and against the foreign forces interfering in the reunification of China, and is intended as a necessary safeguard for the striving for peaceful reunification. Resort to force would only be the last choice made under compelling circumstances.

As for Taiwan, upholding the principle of one China indicates that it acknowledges that China's sovereignty and territory are inalienable. In this way, both sides of the Taiwan Straits will have a common basis and premise and may find ways to solve their political differences and realize peaceful reunification through consultation on an equal footing. If Taiwan denies the One-China Principle and tries to separate Taiwan from the territory of China, the premise and basis for peaceful reunification will cease to exist. As for the United States, if it promises to follow a one-China policy, it should earnestly implement the three communiques between the Chinese and U.S. governments and fulfill the series of promises it has made. It should maintain only cultural, commercial and other non-governmental relations with Taiwan; oppose "Taiwan independence," "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" and not to stand in the way of the reunification of China. Acting otherwise will destroy the external conditions necessary for the Chinese government to strive for peaceful reunification.

As for countries in the Asia-Pacific region and other regions in the world, the situation across the Taiwan Straits has always been closely linked with the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Adherence to the policy of one China by countries concerned will be beneficial to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and favourable for China to develop friendly relations with other countries, and therefore conforms to the interests of the Asia-Pacific region and other countries in the world.

The Chinese government is actively and sincerely striving for peaceful reunification. To achieve peaceful reunification, the Chinese government has appealed time and again for cross-Straits negotiations on the basis of equality and the One-China Principle. Taking Taiwan's political reality into full account and out of consideration for the Taiwan authorities' request for the negotiations to be held on an equal footing, we have put forward one proposal after another, such as that the negotiations should be held between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese KMT on a reciprocal basis and that the talks between the two parties may include representatives from all parties and mass organizations of Taiwan, and we have never spoken of negotiations between the "central and local authorities." The Chinese government has also proposed that dialogues may start first, including political dialogues, which may gradually move on to procedural consultations for political talks to solve the name, the topics for discussion and the forms of official talks before political talks are held. Political talks may be carried out step by step. First, negotiations should be held and an agreement reached on an official end to the state of hostility between the two sides under the principle of one China so as to jointly safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and work out plans for the development of the future cross-Straits relations. In January 1998, to seek and expand the political basis for relations between the two sides, the Chinese government explicitly proposed to the Taiwan side that before the realization of reunification and in handling affairs concerning inter-Straits relations, especially during the talks between the two sides, the One-China Principle should be upheld, namely that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is not to be separated. The Chinese government hopes that on the basis of the One-China Principle, the two sides will hold consultations on an equal footing and discuss national reunification together.

To strive for peaceful reunification, the Chinese government has adopted a series of positive policies and measures to promote the comprehensive development of cross-Straits relations. From the end of 1987, when the state of isolation between the two sides was terminated, to the end of 1999, the number of Taiwan compatriots coming to the mainland of China for visiting their relatives, sightseeing or exchanges reached 16 million by turnstile count. The total indirect trade volume between the two sides of the Straits has exceeded US$ 160 billion; the agreed capital to be invested by Taiwan business people in the mainland has exceeded US$ 44 billion, of which US$ 24 billion has been actually used. Great progress has been made in the exchange of mail and telecommunications across the Straits; and some progress has been made in the exchange of air and shipping services too. The NPC and its Standing Committee, the State Council, and local governments have worked out a sequence of laws and regulations to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan compatriots. To properly solve the concrete issues arising from the people-to-people contacts between the two sides through consultations, in November 1992 the mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation reached the common understanding during talks on routine affairs that each of the two organizations should express verbally that "both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the One-China Principle." On this basis, the leaders of these two organizations successfully held the "Wang Daohan-Koo Chen-fu talks" and signed several agreements on protecting the legitimate rights and interests of the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits in April 1993. In October 1998, the leaders of the two organizations met in Shanghai, starting political dialogue across the Straits. The talks between the two organizations were carried out on an equal footing. Practice has proved that on the basis of the One-China Principle, it is entirely possible to find a proper way for holding talks, based on equality, between the two sides. Since Hong Kong and Macao's return to China, people-to-people contacts and exchanges between Hong Kong and Taiwan and between Macao and Taiwan have continued and developed on the basis of the One-China Principle.

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III. The Chinese Government--Staunch Champion for the One-China Principle

Separatist forces in Taiwan are bent on violating the One-China Principle. In 1988, after Lee Teng-hui became the leader of the Taiwan authorities, he publicly stated time and again that the basic policy of the Taiwan authorities was that "there is only one China, not two," and "we have always maintained that China should be reunited, and we adhere to the principle of 'one China.'” However, since the early 1990s, Lee Teng-hui has gradually deviated from the One-China Principle, trumpeting "two governments," "two reciprocal political entities," "Taiwan is already a state with independent sovereignty," and "At the present stage the Republic of China is on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China is on the mainland." Moreover, he went back on his words, saying that "I have never said that there is only one China." In addition, he has connived at and provided support for the separatists who advocate "Taiwan independence" and their activities, thus helping the rapid development of the "Taiwan independence" forces and the spread of the "Taiwan independence" ideology. Under the direction of Lee Teng-hui, the Taiwan authorities have adopted a series of measures toward actual separation. In matters of Taiwan's form of government, the Taiwan authorities are seeking to transform Taiwan into an "independent political entity" through a "constitutional reform," so as to suit the needs of creating "two Chinas." In foreign relations, the Taiwan authorities have spared no effort to carry out the activities for "expanding the international space of survival," with the aim of creating "two Chinas." Since 1993, for seven years running, the Taiwan authorities have maneuvered for participation in the United Nations. In military affairs, the Taiwan authorities have bought large quantities of advanced weapons from foreign countries and sought to join the Theater Missile Defense system (TMD), in an attempt to establish a military alliance of a disguised form with the United States and Japan.

In ideology and culture, the Taiwan authorities have endeavored to obliterate the Chinese awareness of Taiwan compatriots, especially young people, and their identification with the motherland, in order to create misunderstanding of the motherland among Taiwan compatriots and estrange them from her, thus cutting off the ideological and cultural ties between the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. Since 1999, Lee Teng-hui has stepped up his separatist activities. In May, he published the book The Road to Democracy, which advocates the division of China into seven regions, each enjoying "full autonomy." On July 9, he went so far as to publicly distort the cross-Straits relations as "state to state relations, or at least special state to state relations," in an attempt to fundamentally change the status of Taiwan as a part of China, sabotage the relations between both sides of the Taiwan Straits, especially the basis for cross-Straits political dialogues and negotiations, and wreck the foundation for peaceful reunification. Lee Teng-hui has become the general representative of Taiwan's separatist forces, a saboteur of the stability of the Taiwan Straits, a stumbling-block preventing the development of relations between China and the United States, and a troublemaker for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

The Chinese government firmly defends the One-China Principle. The Chinese government and people have always maintained sharp vigilance and fought resolutely against the secessionist activities of the Taiwan separatists, represented by Lee Teng-hui.

After Lee Teng-hui's "private" visit to the United States in June 1995, the Chinese government has waged a resolute struggle against separation and against "Taiwan independence," and made strong protests and representations to the U.S. government for openly allowing Lee Teng-hui to visit the U.S., violating its promises made in the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques, and seriously prejudicing China's sovereignty. This struggle has shown the Chinese government and people's firm resolve and ability to safeguard state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and exerted an important and far-reaching influence. Compatriots in Taiwan have further realized the serious harm "Taiwan independence" can cause. Lee Teng-hui has received a heavy blow for his separatist activities in the international community, so that some of the " Taiwan independence" protagonists have had to abandon certain extremist propositions aimed at division. The international community has further realized the necessity of upholding the one-China policy. The U.S. government has explicitly undertaken not to support "Taiwan independence," not to support "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan," and not to support Taiwan joining any international organization whose membership is restricted to sovereign states.

The Chinese government and people have fought more unremittingly after Lee Teng-hui cooked up his "two states" theory. The relevant department of the Chinese government has clearly stated that the attempt of the Taiwan separatists to implement the "two states" theory in "legal" form was an even more serious and dangerous step toward division and a grave provocation against peaceful reunification. Were the attempt to succeed, it would be impossible for China to achieve peaceful reunification. The struggle against this attempt has grown in momentum with Chinese both at home and abroad condemning the "two states" theory with one voice. Most countries in the world have reaffirmed their position of upholding the One-China Policy. The U.S. government has also reasserted its adherence to the One-China Policy and its commitment to the "Three Non-supports" for Taiwan. Finally, the Taiwan authorities have been compelled to announce that they will not amend their "constitution" and "laws" according to the "two states" theory.

Nevertheless, separatists in Taiwan are still attempting to detach Taiwan "de jure" from China in the name of the "Republic of China" by various forms, including "formulating a new constitution," "amending the constitution," and "explaining the constitution" or through "legislation." Special vigilance should be maintained to the fact that the Taiwan separatists are continually scheming to disrupt the Sino-U.S. relations and provoke conflicts and confrontation between the two nations to achieve their aim of dividing China.

Facts prove that a serious crisis still exists in the situation of the Taiwan Straits. To safeguard the interests of the entire Chinese people including compatriots in Taiwan and maintain the peace and development of the Asia-Pacific region, the Chinese government remains firm in adhering to "peaceful reunification" and "one country, two systems"; upholding the eight propositions put forward by President Jiang Zemin for the development of cross-Straits relations and the acceleration of the peaceful reunification of China; and doing its utmost to achieve the objective of peaceful reunification. However, if a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries, or if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese government will only be forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force, to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and fulfill the great cause of reunification. The Chinese government and people absolutely have the determination and ability to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will never tolerate, condone or remain indifferent to the realization of any scheme to divide China. Any such scheme is doomed to failure.

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IV. Several Questions Involving the One-China Principle in the Cross-Straits Relations

Chinese territory and sovereignty has not been split, and the two sides of the Straits are not two states. The Taiwan authorities support their position on "two Chinas," including the "two states" theory proposed by Lee Teng-hui, with the following arguments:

Since 1949, the territories on either side of the Straits have been divided and governed separately, with neither side having jurisdiction over the other; the government of the PRC has never ruled Taiwan; and since 1991 Taiwan has witnessed a form of government that has nothing to do with that of the Chinese mainland. These arguments are absolutely untenable, and can never lead to the conclusion that Taiwan may declare itself a state under the name of the "Republic of China," or that the two sides of the Straits have been divided into two states. Firstly, state sovereignty is inseparable. The territory is the space in which a state exercises its sovereignty. In the territory of a country there can only be a central government exercising sovereignty on behalf of the state. As we have already said, Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and, after replacing the government of the Republic of China in 1949, the government of the PRC has become the sole legal government of China, enjoying and exercising sovereignty over the whole of China, including Taiwan.

Although the two sides of the Straits remain to be reunified, the long-term existence of this abnormal situation has not imbued Taiwan with a status and rights in international law, nor can it change the legal status of Taiwan as a part of China. The problem now is that the separatists in Taiwan and some foreign anti-China forces seek to change this state of affairs, and it is this that the Chinese government and people are firmly against.

We firmly oppose changing Taiwan's status as a part of China by referendum. The Taiwan separatists' attempt to change Taiwan's status as a part of China by referendum on the pretext that " sovereignty belongs to the people" is futile. Firstly, under both domestic and international laws Taiwan's legal status as a part of Chinese territory is unequivocal, and there can be no premise for using referendum to decide any matter of self-determination. Secondly, the phrase "sovereignty belongs to the people" refers to all the people of state, and not certain people or the people of a certain area. The sovereignty over Taiwan belongs to all the Chinese people including Taiwan compatriots, and not to some of the people in Taiwan. Thirdly, at no time in history has Taiwan been a state in its own right, and since 1945 Taiwan has not been a foreign colony, nor has it been under foreign occupation. The issue of national self-determination, therefore, does not exist. In short, from the time that China recovered Taiwan in 1945, there has been no question at all of changing Taiwan's status as a part of China by holding a referendum. The only future for Taiwan is reunification with the China mainland, and certainly not separation. Any attempt to separate Taiwan from China through so-called referendum would only lead the Taiwan people to disaster.

The "two German states formula" cannot be applied to the settlement of the Taiwan issue. Some people in Taiwan have suggested that cross-Straits relations should be dealt with according to the "two German states formula," since Germany was divided into two states after the Second World War, and was later reunified. This proposal shows a misunderstanding of history and reality. The division of Germany after the war and the temporary division between the two sides of the Straits are questions of a different nature, the difference lying mainly in three aspects. The first is the reasons for, and the nature of, the division. After its defeat in the Second World War in 1945, Germany was divided into zones occupied separately by the four victorious nations of the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union according to a declaration on the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority and the subsequent Potsdam Agreement. The reunification of Germany became a focus of the confrontation in Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war. The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were established in the zones occupied by the U.S., Britain and France, and that occupied by the Soviet Union. Thus Germany was divided into two states. Obviously, the German question arose entirely from external factors, while the Taiwan issue, left over by China's civil war, is a matter of China 's internal affairs. The second aspect is the difference in status between the two under international law. Germany was divided according to a series of international treaties during and after the Second World War, while the Taiwan question involves provisions of the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and other international treaties, stating that Japan must return Taiwan, which it had stolen from China, to the Chinese. The third is the difference between the two in their actual conditions of existence.

Against the backdrop of the confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the two German states had foreign troops stationing in their territories and so were compelled to recognize each other and co-exist in the international community. The Chinese government has always persisted in the principle of one China. Before Lee Teng-hui assumed power, and during his early days in office, the Taiwan authorities recognized only one China and opposed "two Chinas," and the One-China Principle has also been widely accepted by the international community. For these reasons, the Taiwan issue and the German issue cannot be placed in the same category, nor can the "two German states formula" be copied to settle the Taiwan question. Any question can be discussed under the One-China Principle. The Chinese government advocates that the final purpose of cross-Straits negotiations is to achieve peaceful reunification; and that to achieve this purpose, talks should be held based on the principle of one China. However, the proposals for " Taiwan independence," "two Chinas" and "two states," aiming for separation instead of reunification, violate the One-China Principle, and are naturally unacceptable to the Chinese government. Provided that it is within the framework of one China, any question can be discussed, including the various issues that are of concern to the Taiwan side. The Chinese government believes that Taiwan's international space for economic, cultural and social activities compatible with its status, the political status of the Taiwan authorities and other questions can be finally settled in the process of peaceful reunification through political negotiations within this framework.

The so-called controversy about democracy and system is an excuse for obstructing the reunification of China. In recent years the Taiwan authorities have repeatedly declared that " democratization on the China mainland is the key to the reunification of China" and that "the real essence of the cross-Straits issue is a contest between systems." This is an excuse for postponing and resisting reunification, as well as a scheme to deceive compatriots in Taiwan and world opinion. The CPC and the Chinese government have consistently striven to achieve socialist democracy. To achieve peaceful reunification in the form of "one country, two systems," and to allow the two different social systems on both sides of the Straits to coexist without imposing them on one or the other--this is best able to embody the wishes of compatriots on both sides of the Straits and is itself democratic. The different social systems across the Straits, therefore, should not constitute any barrier to peaceful reunification. Moreover, the Chinese government acknowledges the differences between Taiwan on the one hand and Hong Kong and Macao on the other and, after peaceful reunification, is prepared to apply a looser form of the "one country, two systems" policy in Taiwan than in Hong Kong and Macao. It is totally unreasonable and undemocratic for the Taiwan authorities to seek to obstruct reunification on the pretext of the "controversy about democracy and system" and to force the more than 1.2 billion people living on the Chinese mainland to practice the political and economic systems in Taiwan. The demand for democracy should not be used as a reason for refusing reunification. The essence of the difference between the two sides of the Straits on this question lies by no means in the controversy over whether to practice democracy or in the controversy over what system to practice, but rather a controversy over the choice between reunification and separation.

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V. Several Questions Involving Adherence to the One-China Principle in the International Community

The Chinese government has expressed its appreciation to the international community for widely pursuing a one-China policy. In August 1993, we published the white paper The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China. In Chapter V of this document, "Several Questions Involving Taiwan in International Relations," we explained our position and policy on a number of issues, including relations between Taiwan and countries maintaining diplomatic ties with China, relations between international organizations and Taiwan, aviation services between Taiwan and countries having diplomatic relations with China, and arms sales to Taiwan by countries having diplomatic relations with China. Here, we would like to reaffirm our related position and policy.

Taiwan is ineligible for membership of the United Nations and other international organizations whose membership is confined to sovereign states. The United Nations is an inter-governmental international organization composed of sovereign states. After the restoration of the lawful rights of the PRC in the United Nations, the issue of China's representation in the UNO was resolved once and for all and Taiwan's re-entry became totally out of the question. The Taiwan authorities have asserted that Resolution 2758 of the UN resolved only "the problem of China's representation," but not "the problem of Taiwan's representation," and demanded participation in the UN. We will never permit such a separatist act of creating "two Chinas' or "one China, one Taiwan."

All members of the UN should adhere to the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and related UN resolutions, abide by norms governing international relations, including mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and never, in any form, support Taiwan's joining the UN or other international organizations whose membership is confined to sovereign states.

On the basis of the principle of one China, the Chinese government has made arrangements for Taiwan's participation in some inter-governmental international organizations which accept region membership in an agreeable and acceptable way according to the nature, regulations and actual conditions of these international organizations. As a region of China, Taiwan has participated in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) respectively in the names of " Taipei, China" and "Chinese Taipei." In September 1992, the chairman of the council of the predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), stated that Taiwan may participate in this organization as "a separate Taiwan-Penghu-Jinmen-Mazu tariff zone" (abbreviated as Chinese Taipei) after the PRC's entry to GATT. The WTO should persist in the principle defined in the afore-said statement when examining the acceptance of Taiwan's entry to the organization. This is only an ad hoc arrangement and cannot constitute a model applicable to other inter-governmental international organizations or international gatherings.

No country maintaining diplomatic relations with China should provide arms to Taiwan or enter into military alliance of any form with Taiwan. All countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China should abide by the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and refrain from providing arms to Taiwan or helping Taiwan produce arms in any form or under any pretext.

The Taiwan question is the most crucial and most sensitive issue in the relations between China and the U.S. The three Sino-U.S. joint communiques are the basis for the healthy and stable development of relations between the two countries. For over twenty years, the U.S. has promised to adhere to a One-China Policy, which has brought to itself benefits such as the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, the development of Sino-U.S. relations and the relative stability of the Taiwan situation. Regrettably, the U.S. has repeatedly contravened its solemn undertakings to China made in the August 17 Communique and continued its sale of advanced arms and military equipment to Taiwan. Recently, some people in the U.S. Congress have cooked up the so-called Taiwan Security Enhancement Act and are attempting to include Taiwan in the TMD. This is gross interference in China 's internal affairs and a grave threat to China's security, obstructing the peaceful reunification of China and jeopardizing the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. The Chinese government is firmly against such actions.

The Chinese government adheres to the One-China Principle in dealing with Taiwan's contacts with the outside world. The Taiwan authorities have spared no effort to promote "pragmatic diplomacy" in the international arena and enlarge their "international space of survival," the essence of these being to create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." It is only natural that the Chinese government should firmly oppose these. Meanwhile, considering the needs of Taiwan's socio-economic development and the actual benefits of compatriots in Taiwan, the Chinese government has no objection to Taiwan's non-governmental economic and cultural contacts with foreign countries; in fact, on the premise of one China, it has adopted many flexible measures to make Taiwan's economic, trade and cultural contacts with foreign countries more convenient. For example, Taiwan may stay on the International Olympic Committee in the name of "Chinese Taipei." As a matter of fact, Taiwan has maintained extensive economic, trade and cultural relations with many countries and regions in the world. Every year, a million Taiwan compatriots go abroad for travel, business or study, as well as for academic, cultural or sports exchanges, and Taiwan's annual import and export trade volume has exceeded the US$200-billion mark. This has demonstrated that adhering to the One-China Principle has not prevented Taiwan compatriots from engaging in non-governmental international exchanges or affected the needs of Taiwan's normal economic, trade and cultural activities.

The Chinese government safeguards all the justified and lawful rights and interests of Taiwan compatriots abroad. The people of Taiwan are of the same flesh and blood with us. The Chinese government has always worked for safeguarding their justified and lawful rights and interests abroad. Chinese embassies and consulates stationed abroad have always considered it their duties to strengthen their ties with Taiwan compatriots, listen to their suggestions and requests and safeguard their interests, and done everything they can to help them overcome their difficulties. During the Gulf War, the Chinese embassy helped Taiwanese labor service personnel stranded in Kuwait pull out of dangerous places safely. After the big earthquakes in Osaka and Kobe, Japan, the Chinese embassy and consulate general there promptly extended their sympathies to stricken Taiwan compatriots. When the civil war in Cambodia broke out, the Chinese embassy lost no time in helping Taiwanese business people and tourists whose lives and property were seriously imperiled by the war to move to safe places. All the above-mentioned facts reflect the Chinese government's care for Taiwan compatriots. When both sides of the Taiwan Straits are reunified, Taiwan compatriots will, together with people of all ethnic groups in the country, have more possibilities to fully enjoy the dignity and honor of the PRC in the world.

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Conclusion

China has a long history of 5,000 years. The Chinese people have lived and multiplied on this land where all ethnic groups have mixed together, in the course of which they have evolved powerful cohesiveness, and the values of cherishing and safeguarding unity. Over the long course of history, the Chinese nation has witnessed changes of dynasties, transfers of governments, local separatist regimes, and foreign invasions, especially the untold invasions and dismemberment by foreign powers in modern history. However, unity has always been the main trend in the development of Chinese history. After every separation, the country was invariably reunified, only to be followed in its wake by rapid political, economic, cultural, scientific and technological development. Our compatriots in Taiwan have a glorious tradition of patriotism, and have performed brilliant exploits in the struggles against foreign invasions of Taiwan. Since the founding of the PRC, the Chinese people have particularly valued their hard-earned national independence, firmly upheld state sovereignty and territorial integrity and struggled unswervingly for reunification of the motherland. The 5,000-year history and culture have been implanted deeply in the minds of the Chinese people, sprouting the strong national consciousness of the need for national unification.

The Chinese government hopes that the international community will follow the principle of one China now and always and that the U.S. government will earnestly fulfil all the principles concerning the Taiwan issue in the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques, and its solemn promise to uphold the One-China Principle.

As the Chinese government has successively resumed the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao, the people of the whole of China are eager to resolve the Taiwan issue as early as possible and realize the total reunification of the country. They cannot allow the resolution of the Taiwan issue to be postponed indefinitely. We firmly believe that the total reunification of China will be achieved through the joint efforts of the entire Chinese people including compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits and those living overseas.

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《一個中國的原則與台灣問題》【中共白皮書】

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

中華人民共和國
國務院台灣事務辦公室
國務院新聞辦公室
二○○○年二月·北京

目錄

前言

一九四九年十月一日，中國人民取得了新民主主義革命的偉大勝利，建立了中華人民共和國。國民黨統治集團退踞中國的台灣省，在外國勢力的支持下，與中央政府對峙，由此産生了台灣問題。

解決台灣問題，實現中國完全統一，是中華民族的根本利益。五十年來，中國政府為此進行了不懈的奮鬥。一九七九年後，中國政府以極大的誠意、盡最大的努力，爭取以“一國兩制”的方式實現和平統一。自一九八七年底以來，兩岸經濟、文化交流和人員往來有了長足的發展。但是，九十年代以來，台灣當局領導人李登輝逐步背棄一個中國原則，極力推行以製造“兩個中國”為核心的分裂政策，一直髮展到公然主張兩岸關係是“國家與國家，至少是特殊的國與國的關係”，嚴重損害了兩岸和平統一的基礎，危害了包括台灣同胞在內的整個中華民族的根本利益，也危害了亞洲太平洋地區的和平與穩定。中國政府始終如一地堅持一個中國原則，堅決反對任何把台灣從中國分割出去的圖謀。中國政府與以李登輝為首的分裂勢力的鬥爭，集中表現在是堅持一個中國原則還是製造“兩個中國”、“一中一台”的問題上。

我們于一九九三年八月發表了《台灣問題與中國的統一》白皮書，系統地論述了台灣是中國不可分割的一部分、台灣問題的由來、中國政府解決台灣問題的基本方針和有關政策。現在，有必要進一步向國際社會闡述中國政府堅持一個中國原則的立場和政策。

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一、一個中國的事實和法理基礎

一個中國原則是在中國人民捍衛中國主權和領土完整的正義鬥爭中形成的，具有不可動搖的事實和法理基礎。

台灣是中國不可分割的一部分。有關台灣的全部事實和法律證明，台灣是中國領土不可分割的一部分。一八九五年四月，日本通過侵華戰爭，強迫清朝政府簽訂不平等的《馬關條約》，霸佔了台灣。一九三七年七月，日本發動全面侵華戰爭。一九四一年十二月，中國政府在《中國對日宣戰佈告》中昭告各國，中國廢止包括《馬關條約》在內的一切涉及中日關係的條約、協定、合同，並將收復台灣。一九四三年十二月，中美英三國政府發表的《開羅宣言》規定，日本應將所竊取于中國的包括東北、台灣、澎湖列島等在內的土地，歸還中國。一九四五年，中美英三國共同簽署、後來又有蘇聯參加的《波茨坦公告》規定：“開羅宣言之條件必將實施。”同年八月，日本宣佈投降，並在《日本投降條款》中承諾“忠誠履行波茨坦公告各項規定之義務”。十月二十五日，中國政府收復台灣、澎湖列島，重新恢復對台灣行使主權。

一九四九年十月一日，中華人民共和國中央人民政府宣告成立，取代中華民國政府成為全中國的唯一合法政府和在國際上的唯一合法代表，中華民國從此結束了它的歷史地位。這是在同一國際法主體沒有發生變化的情況下新政權取代舊政權，中國的主權和固有領土疆域並未由此而改變，中華人民共和國政府理所當然地完全享有和行使中國的主權，其中包括對台灣的主權。

國民黨統治集團退踞台灣以來，雖然其政權繼續使用“中華民國”和“中華民國政府”的名稱，但它早已完全無權代表中國行使國家主權，實際上始終只是中國領土上的一個地方當局。

一個中國原則的産生和基本涵義。中華人民共和國中央人民政府成立當天即向各國政府宣佈：“本政府為代表中華人民共和國全國人民的唯一合法政府。凡願遵守平等、互利及互相尊重領土主權等項原則的任何外國政府，本政府均願與之建立外交關係。”隨後又致電聯合國，聲明：國民黨當局“已喪失了代表中國人民的任何法律的與事實的根據”，完全無權代表中國。外國承認中華人民共和國政府是代表全中國的唯一合法政府，與台灣當局斷絕或不建立外交關係，是新中國與外國建交的原則。

中國政府的上述主張受到當時美國政府的阻撓。儘管一九五○年一月五日美國總統杜魯門發表聲明，表示美國及其他盟國承認一九四五年以來的四年中國對台灣島行使主權，但是同年六月朝鮮戰爭爆發後，美國政府為了孤立、遏制中國，不僅派軍隊侵佔台灣，而且拋出“台灣地位未定”等謬論，以後又逐步在國際社會策動“雙重承認”，企圖製造“兩個中國”。對此，中國政府理所當然地予以堅決反對，主張和堅持世界上只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分，中華人民共和國政府是代表全中國的唯一合法政府。正是在中國與外國發展正常的外交關係中，在維護中國的主權和領土完整的鬥爭中，産生了一個中國原則。上述主張構成了一個中國原則的基本涵義，核心是維護中國的主權和領土完整。

在一九四九年後的三四十年間，台灣當局雖然不承認中華人民共和國政府代表全中國的合法地位，但也堅持台灣是中國的一部分、只有一個中國的立場，反對製造“兩個中國”和“台灣獨立”。這説明，在一個相當長的時間裏，兩岸的中國人在只有一個中國、台灣是中國領土的一部分這一根本問題上具有共識。早在一九五八年十月，中國人民解放軍在進行炮擊金門的戰鬥時，毛澤東主席就向台灣當局公開指出：“世界上只有一個中國，沒有兩個中國。這一點，也是你們同意的，見之於你們領導人的文告。”一九七九年一月，全國人大常委會發表《告台灣同胞書》，指出“台灣當局一貫堅持一個中國的立場，反對台灣獨立。這就是我們共同的立場，合作的基礎。”

中國政府堅持一個中國原則的嚴正立場和合理主張，贏得了越來越多的國家和國際組織的理解和支持，一個中國原則逐步為國際社會所普遍接受。一九七一年十月，第二十六屆聯合國大會通過2758號決議，驅逐了台灣當局的代表，恢復了中華人民共和國政府在聯合國的席位和一切合法權利。一九七二年九月，中日兩國簽署聯合聲明，宣佈建立外交關係，日本承認中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府，充分理解和尊重中國政府關於台灣是中華人民共和國領土不可分割的一部分的立場，並且堅持遵循《波茨坦公告》第八條規定的立場。一九七八年十二月，中美發表建交公報，美國“承認中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府”；“承認中國的立場，即只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分”。目前，161個國家與中華人民共和國建立了外交關係，它們都承認一個中國原則，並且承諾在一個中國的框架內處理與台灣的關係。

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二、一個中國原則是實現和平統一的基礎和前提

一個中國原則是中國政府對臺政策的基石。經由鄧小平同志的倡導，中國政府自一九七九年開始實行和平統一的方針，並逐步形成了“一國兩制”的科學構想，在此基礎上，確立了“和平統一、一國兩制”的基本方針。這一基本方針和有關政策的要點是：爭取和平統一，但是不承諾放棄使用武力；積極推動兩岸人員往來和經濟、文化等各項交流，早日實現兩岸直接通郵、通航、通商；通過和平談判實現統一，在一個中國原則下什麼都可以談；統一後實行“一國兩制”，中國的主體（中國大陸）堅持社會主義制度，台灣保持原有的資本主義制度長期不變；統一後台灣實行高度自治，中央政府不派軍隊和行政人員駐臺；解決台灣問題是中國的內政，應由中國人自己解決，不需借助外國力量。上述方針和政策，貫徹了堅持一個中國原則的基本立場和精神，也充分尊重了台灣同胞當家作主、管理台灣的願望。江澤民主席在一九九五年一月發表發展兩岸關係、推進祖國和平統一進程的八項主張時，明確指出：“堅持一個中國的原則，是實現和平統一的基礎和前提。”

只有堅持一個中國原則才能實現和平統一。台灣問題是中國內戰遺留下來的問題。迄今，兩岸敵對狀態並未正式結束。為了維護中國的主權和領土完整，為了實現兩岸統一，中國政府有權採用任何必要的手段。採用和平的方式，有利於兩岸社會的共同發展，有利於兩岸同胞感情的融合和團結，是最好的方式。中國政府于一九七九年宣佈實行和平統一的方針時，是基於一個前提，即當時的台灣當局堅持世界上只有一個中國、台灣是中國的一部分。同時，中國政府考慮到長期支持台灣當局的美國政府承認了世界上只有一個中國、台灣是中國的一部分、中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府，這也有利於用和平的方式解決台灣問題。中國政府在實行和平統一方針的同時始終表明，以何種方式解決台灣問題是中國的內政，並無義務承諾放棄使用武力。不承諾放棄使用武力，決不是針對台灣同胞的，而是針對製造“台灣獨立”的圖謀和干涉中國統一的外國勢力，是為爭取實現和平統一提供必要的保障。採用武力的方式，將是最後不得已而被迫作出的選擇。

對台灣而言，堅持一個中國原則，標誌著承認中國的主權和領土不可分割，這就使兩岸雙方有了共同的基礎和前提，可以通過平等協商，找到解決雙方政治分歧的辦法，實現和平統一。如果否認一個中國原則，圖謀將台灣從中國領土中分割出去，那就使和平統一的前提和基礎不復存在。

對美國而言，承諾奉行一個中國政策，就要切實執行中美兩國政府之間的三個公報和美方的一系列承諾，就應當只與台灣保持文化、商務和其他非官方的關係，反對所謂“台灣獨立”、“兩個中國”、“一中一台”，不阻撓中國的統一。反之，就破壞了中國政府爭取和平統一的外部條件。

對於亞太地區和世界其他地區的國家而言，台灣海峽局勢一直與亞太地區的安定密切相關。有關各國堅持一個中國政策，有利於維護亞太地區的和平與穩定，也有利於中國同各國發展友好關係，符合亞太地區乃至世界各國的利益。

中國政府積極地真誠地努力爭取實現和平統一。為了爭取和平統一，中國政府一再呼籲在一個中國原則基礎上舉行兩岸平等談判。充分考慮到台灣的政治現實，為了照顧台灣當局關於平等談判地位的要求，我們先後提出了舉行中國共産黨和中國國民黨兩黨對等談判、兩黨談判可以吸收台灣各黨派團體有代表性的人士參加等主張，而始終不提“中央與地方談判”。中國政府還提出，可先從進行包括政治對話在內的對話開始，逐步過渡到政治談判的程序性商談，解決正式談判的名義、議題、方式等問題，進而展開政治談判。政治談判可以分步驟進行，第一步，先就在一個中國原則下正式結束兩岸敵對狀態進行談判，並達成協定，共同維護中國的主權和領土完整，並對今後兩岸關係發展進行規劃。一九九八年一月，為尋求和擴大兩岸關係的政治基礎，中國政府向台灣方面明確提出，在統一之前，在處理兩岸關係事務中，特別是在兩岸談判中，堅持一個中國原則，也就是堅持世界上只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分，中國的主權和領土完整不容分割。中國政府希望，在一個中國原則基礎上，雙方平等協商，共議統一。

為爭取和平統一，中國政府採取了一系列積極的政策和措施，全面推動兩岸關係發展。自一九八七年底兩岸隔絕狀態被打破後至一九九九年底，到中國大陸從事探親、旅遊、交流的台灣同胞已達1600萬人次；兩岸間接貿易總額超過1600億美元，臺商在中國大陸投資的協議金額及實際到位金額分別超過了440億美元與240億美元；兩岸互通郵政、電信取得了很大進展；兩岸海上、空中通航也取得了局部進展。全國人民代表大會及其常務委員會、國務院、地方政府制定了一系列法律、法規，依法保障台灣同胞的正當權益。為了通過商談妥善解決兩岸同胞交往中所衍生的具體問題，一九九二年十一月，海峽兩岸關係協會與台灣的海峽交流基金會達成在事務性商談中各自以口頭方式錶述“海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國原則”的共識，在此基礎上，兩會領導人于一九九三年四月成功舉行了“汪辜會談”，並簽署了幾項涉及保護兩岸同胞正當權益的協議。一九九八年十月，兩會領導人在上海會晤，開啟了兩岸政治對話。兩會商談是在平等的地位上進行的。實踐證明，在一個中國原則的基礎上，完全可以找到兩岸平等談判的適當方式。香港、澳門回歸中國以來，港臺之間、澳臺之間原有的各種民間往來與交流，在一個中國原則的基礎上繼續保持和發展。

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三、中國政府堅決捍衛一個中國原則

台灣分裂勢力蓄意破壞一個中國原則。一九八八年，李登輝繼任為台灣當局的領導人。當時他多次公開表示，台灣當局的基本政策就是“只有一個中國而沒有兩個中國的政策”；“我們一貫主張中國應該統一，並堅持‘一個中國’的原則”。

但是，從九十年代初開始，李登輝逐步背離一個中國原則，相繼鼓吹“兩個政府”、“兩個對等政治實體”、“台灣已經是個主權獨立的國家”、“現階段是‘中華民國在台灣’與‘中華人民共和國在大陸’”，而且自食其言，説他“始終沒有講過一個中國”。李登輝還縱容、扶持主張所謂“台灣獨立”的分裂勢力及其活動，使“台獨”勢力迅速發展、“台獨”思潮蔓延。在李登輝主導下，台灣當局採取了一系列實際的分裂步驟。在台灣政權體制方面，力圖通過所謂的“憲政改革”將台灣改造成一個“獨立的政治實體”，以適應製造“兩個中國”的需要。在對外關係方面，不遺餘力地進行以製造“兩個中國”為目的的“拓展國際生存空間”活動。一九九三年以來，連續七年推動所謂“參與聯合國”的活動。在軍事方面，大量向外國購買先進武器，謀求加入戰區導彈防禦系統，企圖變相地與美、日建立某種形式的軍事同盟。在思想文化方面，圖謀抹殺台灣同胞、特別是年輕一代的中國人意識和對祖國的認同，挑起台灣同胞對祖國的誤解和疏離感，割斷兩岸同胞的思想和文化紐帶。

一九九九年以來，李登輝的分裂活動進一步發展。五月，他出版《台灣的主張》一書，鼓吹要把中國分成七塊各自享有“充分自主權”的區域。七月九日，他公然將兩岸關係歪曲為“國家與國家，至少是特殊的國與國的關係”，企圖從根本上改變台灣是中國一部分的地位，破壞兩岸關係、特別是兩岸政治對話與談判的基礎，破壞兩岸和平統一的基礎。李登輝已經成為台灣分裂勢力的總代表，是台灣海峽安定局面的破壞者，是中美關係發展的絆腳石，也是亞太地區和平與穩定的麻煩製造者。

中國政府堅決捍衛一個中國原則。對於以李登輝為代表的台灣分裂勢力的種種分裂活動，中國政府和人民一直保持著高度的警惕，並進行了堅決的鬥爭。

一九九五年六月李登輝以所謂“私人”名義訪問美國後，中國政府果斷地開展了反分裂、反“台獨”的鬥爭，並對美國政府公然允許李登輝訪美、違背美國在中美三個聯合公報中所作的承諾、嚴重損害中國主權的行為，提出了強烈的抗議，進行了嚴正的交涉。這場鬥爭顯示了中國政府和人民捍衛國家主權和領土完整的堅強決心和能力，産生了重大和深遠的影響。台灣同胞進一步認識到“台獨”的嚴重危害。李登輝在國際上進行分裂活動受到沉重打擊。部分“台獨”勢力被迫放棄了某些極端的分裂主張。國際社會進一步注意到堅持一個中國政策的必要性，美國政府還明確承諾不支持“台灣獨立”、不支持“兩個中國”或“一中一台”、不支持台灣加入任何必須由主權國家參加的國際組織。

李登輝拋出“兩國論”後，中國政府和人民進行了更加堅決的鬥爭。針對台灣分裂勢力企圖通過所謂“法律”形式落實“兩國論”的活動，中國政府有關部門明確指出，這是一個更加嚴重和危險的分裂步驟，是對和平統一的極大挑釁。如果這一圖謀得逞，中國和平統一將變得不可能。這場鬥爭形成了海內外中國人同聲譴責“兩國論”的強大聲勢。世界上大多數國家重申堅持一個中國政策。美國政府也重申堅持一個中國政策和對台灣“三不支持”的承諾。台灣當局被迫表示不會依照“兩國論”修改所謂“憲法”、“法律”。

但是，台灣分裂勢力仍在企圖以所謂“制憲”、“修憲”、“解釋憲法”或“立法”等多種形式，用所謂“法律”形式實現在“中華民國”名義下把台灣從中國分割出去的圖謀。特別值得警惕的是，台灣分裂勢力一貫圖謀破壞中美關係，挑起中美衝突和對抗，以便實現他們的分裂圖謀。

事實證明，台灣海峽局勢仍然存在著嚴重的危機。為了維護包括台灣同胞在內的全中國人民的利益，也為了維護亞太地區的和平與發展，中國政府仍然堅持“和平統一、一國兩制”方針不變，仍然堅持江澤民主席提出的發展兩岸關係、推進祖國和平統一進程的八項主張不變，仍然盡一切可能爭取和平統一。但是，如果出現台灣被以任何名義從中國分割出去的重大事變，如果出現外國侵佔台灣，如果台灣當局無限期地拒絕通過談判和平解決兩岸統一問題，中國政府只能被迫採取一切可能的斷然措施、包括使用武力，來維護中國的主權和領土完整，完成中國的統一大業。中國政府和人民完全有決心、有能力維護國家主權和領土完整，決不容忍、決不姑息、決不坐視任何分裂中國的圖謀得逞，任何分裂圖謀都是註定要失敗的。

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四、兩岸關係中涉及一個中國原則的若干問題

中國領土和主權沒有分裂，海峽兩岸並非兩個國家。台灣當局支撐其製造“兩個中國”的主張，包括李登輝提出的“兩國論”的所謂理由無非是：一九四九年以後海峽兩岸已經分裂分治且互不隸屬，中華人民共和國政府從未統治過台灣，一九九一年以後台灣也已産生了與中國大陸沒有關係的政權體制。這些理由是根本不能成立的，也絕對不能得出台灣可以“中華民國”的名義自立為一個國家和海峽兩岸已經分裂為兩個國家的結論。第一，國家主權不可分割。領土是國家行使主權的空間。在一個國家的領土上，只能有一個代表國家行使主權的中央政府。如前所述，台灣是中國領土不可分割的一部分，一九四九年中華人民共和國政府取代中華民國政府成為全中國的唯一合法政府，已經享有和行使包括台灣在內的全中國的主權。雖然海峽兩岸尚未統一，但是台灣是中國領土一部分的地位從未改變，由此，中國擁有對台灣的主權也從未改變。第二，國際社會承認只有一個中國、台灣是中國的一部分、中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府。第三，台灣問題長期得不到解決，主要是外國勢力干涉和台灣分裂勢力阻撓的結果。海峽兩岸尚未統一，這種不正常狀態的長期存在，並沒有賦予台灣在國際法上的地位和權利，也不能改變台灣是中國一部分的法律地位。目前的問題是台灣分裂勢力和某些外國反華勢力要改變這種狀況，而這正是中國政府和人民堅決反對的。

堅決反對以公民投票方式改變台灣是中國一部分的地位。台灣分裂勢力以“主權在民”為藉口，企圖以公民投票方式改變台灣是中國一部分的地位，這是徒勞的。首先，台灣是中國領土一部分的法律地位，無論在國內法還是在國際法上，都已經是明確的，不存在用公民投票方式決定是否應自決的前提。其次，“主權在民”是指主權屬於一個國家的全體人民，而不是指屬於某一部分或某一地區的人民。對台灣的主權，屬於包括台灣同胞在內的全中國人民，而不屬於台灣一部分人。第三，歷史上台灣從未曾成為一個國家；一九四五年以後，台灣既不是外國的殖民地，又不處於外國佔領之下，不存在行使民族自決權的問題。總之，自一九四五年中國收復台灣之後，就根本不存在就改變台灣是中國一部分的地位舉行公民投票的問題。台灣的前途只有一條，就是走向與祖國大陸的統一，而決不能走向分裂。任何人以所謂公民投票的方式把台灣從中國分割出去，其結果必將把台灣人民引向災難。

“兩德模式”不能用於解決台灣問題。台灣有些人主張用第二次世界大戰後德國被分裂為兩個國家後又重新統一的所謂“兩德模式”來處理兩岸關係。這是對歷史和現實的誤解。戰後德國的分裂和兩岸暫時分離是兩個不同性質的問題。主要有三點不同：第一，兩者形成的原因、性質不同。一九四五年德國在二戰中戰敗，被美、英、法、蘇四個戰勝國依據《鋻於德國失敗和接管最高政府權力的聲明》及其後的波茨坦協議，分區佔領。冷戰開始後，德國統一問題成為美蘇兩國在歐洲對抗的一個焦點，在美英法佔領區和蘇聯佔領區分別相繼成立了德意志聯邦共和國和德意志民主共和國，德國被分裂為兩個國家。顯然，德國問題完全是由外部因素造成的。而台灣問題則是中國內戰遺留的問題，是內政問題。第二，兩者在國際法上的地位不同。德國的分裂，為二戰期間和戰後一系列國際條約所規定。而台灣問題，則有《開羅宣言》、《波茨坦公告》等國際條約關於日本必須將竊取于中國的台灣歸還中國的規定。第三，兩者存在的實際狀況不同。在美蘇兩國對抗的背景下，兩個德國都分別駐有外國軍隊，被迫相互承認和在國際社會並存。而中國政府始終堅持一個中國原則，李登輝上臺前的台灣當局和李登輝上臺初期也承認一個中國，反對“兩個中國”；一個中國原則也被國際社會所普遍接受。因而，德國問題與台灣問題不能相提並論，更不能照搬“兩德模式”解決台灣問題。

在一個中國原則下，什麼問題都可以談。中國政府主張兩岸談判最終目的是實現和平統一；主張以一個中國原則為談判基礎，是為了保證實現談判的目的。而“台灣獨立”、“兩個中國”、“兩國論”違背了一個中國原則，不是談統一，而是談分裂，當然不可能被中國政府接受。只要在一個中國的框架內，什麼問題都可以談，包括台灣方面關心的各種問題。中國政府相信，台灣在國際上與其身份相適應的經濟的、文化的、社會的對外活動空間，台灣當局的政治地位等等，都可以在這個框架內，通過政治談判，最終在和平統一的過程中得到解決。

所謂“民主和制度之爭”是阻撓中國統一的藉口。近些年來，台灣當局一再聲稱，“大陸的民主化是中國再統一的關鍵”、“兩岸問題的真正本質是制度競賽”。這是拖延和抗拒統一的藉口，是欺騙台灣同胞和國際輿論的伎倆。中國共産黨和中國政府不斷為實現社會主義民主的理想而奮鬥。按照“一國兩制”的方式實現和平統一，允許海峽兩岸兩種社會制度同時存在，互不強加於對方，最能體現兩岸同胞的意願，這本身就是民主的。兩岸不同的社會制度，不應構成和平統一的障礙。而且，中國政府注意到台灣與香港、澳門的不同特點，實現兩岸和平統一之後，在台灣實行“一國兩制”的內容，可以比香港、澳門更為寬鬆。台灣當局企圖以“民主和制度之爭”阻撓統一，妄想居住在中國大陸的十二億多人實行台灣的政治、經濟制度，是毫無道理的，也是不民主的。“要民主”不應成為“不要統一”的理由。兩岸雙方在這個問題上分歧的實質，絕不是要不要民主之爭、實行哪種制度之爭，而是要統一還是要分裂之爭。

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五、在國際社會中堅持一個中國原則的若干問題

中國政府對於國際社會普遍奉行一個中國政策表示讚賞。我們于一九九三年八月發表的《台灣問題與中國的統一》白皮書，在第五部分“國際事務中涉及台灣的幾個問題”中，闡述了在有關與中國建交國同台灣的關係、國際組織與台灣的關係、與中國建交國同台灣通航、與中國建交國向台灣出售武器等問題上的立場和政策。在此，謹重申有關立場和政策。

台灣無權參加聯合國及其他只有主權國家參加的國際組織。聯合國是由主權國家組成的政府間國際組織。中華人民共和國政府在聯合國的合法權利恢復後，聯合國組織中的中國代表權問題已經獲得徹底解決，根本不存在台灣當局加入聯合國的問題。台灣當局聲稱聯合國2758號決議只解決了“中國代表權問題”，沒有解決“台灣的代表權問題”，要求“參與聯合國”。這是製造“兩個中國”、“一中一台”的分裂行徑，是絕對不能允許的。聯合國的所有成員國，都應遵守《聯合國憲章》的宗旨、原則及有關聯合國決議，遵循相互尊重主權和領土完整、互不干涉內政等國際關係準則，不以任何方式支持台灣加入聯合國及只能由主權國家參加的其他國際組織。

對於某些允許地區參加的政府間國際組織，中國政府已經基於一個中國原則，根據有關國際組織的性質、章程和實際情況，以所能同意和接受的方式對台灣的加入問題作出了安排。台灣已作為中國的一個地區，以“中國台北”的名義，分別參加了亞洲開發銀行（英文名稱為 TAI-PEI，CHINA）和亞太經合組織（英文名稱為 CHINESETAIPEI）等組織。一九九二年九月，世界貿易組織的前身關稅及貿易總協定理事會主席聲明指出，在中華人民共和國加入關貿總協定後，台灣可以“台灣、澎湖、金門、馬祖單獨關稅區”（簡稱“中國台北”）的名義參加。世貿組織在審議接納台灣加入該組織時，應堅持上述聲明確定的原則。上述特殊安排，並不構成其他政府間國際組織及國際活動仿傚的模式。

與中國建交的國家不能向台灣出售武器，或與台灣進行任何形式的軍事結盟。凡是與中國建交的國家，都應本著互相尊重主權和領土完整、互不干涉內政的原則，不以任何形式或藉口向台灣出售武器，或幫助台灣生産武器。

台灣問題是中美關係中最核心、最敏感的問題。中美三個聯合公報是兩國關係健康、穩定發展的基礎。二十多年來，美國承諾堅持一個中國政策，為自己帶來了美中建交、兩國關係發展和台灣局勢相對穩定的利益。令人遺憾的是，美國一再違反自己在“八·一七公報”中對中國作出的莊嚴承諾，不斷向台灣出售先進的武器和軍事裝備。現在，美國國會又有人炮製所謂《加強台灣安全法》，還企圖將台灣納入戰區導彈防禦系統。這是對中國內政的粗暴干涉和對中國安全的嚴重威脅，阻礙了中國的和平統一進程，同時也危害了亞太地區乃至世界的和平與穩定。對此，中國政府堅決反對。

中國政府以一個中國原則對待台灣的對外交往活動。台灣當局極力在國際上推行所謂“務實外交”，擴大所謂“國際生存空間”，其實質是製造“兩個中國”、“一中一台”。中國政府理所當然地要堅決反對。同時，考慮到台灣經濟社會發展的需要和台灣同胞的實際利益，中國政府對台灣同外國進行民間性質的經濟、文化往來不持異議；並在一個中國前提下，採取了許多靈活措施，為台灣同外國的經貿、文化往來提供方便。例如，台灣可以“中國台北”的名義繼續留在國際奧委會中。事實上，台灣與世界上許多國家和地區保持著廣泛的經貿和文化聯絡，台灣同胞每年到國外旅遊、經商、求學和進行學術、文化、體育交流活動的人員多達百萬人次，年進出口貿易額高達2000多億美元。這表明，堅持一個中國原則並不影響台灣同胞從事民間的對外交流活動，並未影響台灣正常的經貿、文化活動的需要。

中國政府保障台灣同胞在國外的一切正當、合法權益。台灣人民是我們的骨肉同胞。中國政府一貫致力於維護台灣同胞在國外的正當的、合法的權益。中國駐外國使領館一向把加強與台灣同胞的聯絡、傾聽台灣同胞的意見和要求、保障台灣同胞的利益作為自己的責任，盡可能幫助他們解決困難。在海灣戰爭中，中國使館幫助滯留在科威特的台灣勞務人員安全撤離險境。日本阪神大地震發生後，中國使領館及時撫慰受災的台灣同胞。柬埔寨爆發內戰後，中國使館積極幫助生命財産受到嚴重威脅的台灣商人和旅遊者安全轉移和撤離。上述事例體現了中國政府對台灣同胞的關心和照顧。在海峽兩岸實現統一後，台灣同胞更能夠與全國各族人民一道充分共享中華人民共和國在國際上的尊嚴與榮譽。

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結束語

中國具有五千年悠久歷史。中華民族繁衍生息在中國這塊土地上，各民族相互融合，具有強大的凝聚力，形成了崇尚統一、維護統一的價值觀念。在漫長的歷史過程中，中國雖然經歷過改朝換代、政權更迭，出現過地方割據，遭遇過外敵入侵，特別是近代史上曾飽受外國列強的侵略和瓜分，但統一始終是中國歷史發展的主流，每一次分裂之後都復歸統一，並且都贏來了國家政治、經濟、文化、科技的快速發展。台灣同胞具有光榮的愛國主義傳統，在反抗外國侵略台灣的鬥爭中建立了卓越的功勳。中華人民共和國誕生後，中國人民倍加珍視得來不易的民族獨立，堅決捍衛國家主權和領土完整，併為實現祖國的完全統一而努力奮鬥。中國五千年的歷史和文化深深地在中國人的心中根植了一種強烈的民族意識，這就是中國必須統一。中國政府希望國際社會始終如一地奉行一個中國政策，希望美國政府切實履行中美三個聯合公報關於台灣問題的各項原則和自己作出的堅持一個中國政策的莊嚴承諾。

隨著中國政府相繼對香港、澳門恢復行使主權，全中國人民迫切期望早日解決台灣問題，實現國家的完全統一，不能允許台灣問題再無限期地拖下去了。我們堅信，在包括兩岸同胞和海外僑胞在內的全中國人民的共同努力下，中國的完全統一一定能夠實現。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

This white paper was issued on Feb. 21, 2000 and was the second of altogether three white papers the PRC issued on Taiwan so far. The first white paper on the topic had been issued on Aug. 31, 1993, the third was issued on Aug. 10, 2022.

See also the URLs leading to the sources of this white paper in English and Chinese.

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea

Name in Chinese nanhai gefang xingwei xuanyan 南海各方行為宣言
Document type Multilateral pledge about a code of conduct
Year, date 2002, Nov. 4
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

(Jump to UNCLOS Article 121)    (Jump to 2016 South China Sea Arbitration)

The Governments of the Member States of ASEAN and the Government of the People's Republic of China,

REAFFIRMING their determination to consolidate and develop the friendship and cooperation existing between their people and governments with the view to promoting a 21st century-oriented partnership of good neighbourliness and mutual trust;

COGNIZANT of the need to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious environment in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China for the enhancement of peace, stability, economic growth and prosperity in the region;

COMMITTED to enhancing the principles and objectives of the 1997 Joint Statement of the Meeting of the Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN and President of the People's Republic of China;

DESIRING to enhance favourable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and disputes among countries concerned;

HEREBY DECLARE the following:

1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and other universally recognized principles of international law which shall serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state relations;

2. The Parties are committed to exploring ways for building trust and confidence in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and on the basis of equality and mutual respect;

3. The Parties reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;

4. The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;

5. The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.

Pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes, the Parties concerned undertake to intensify efforts to seek ways, in the spirit of cooperation and understanding, to build trust and confidence between and among them, including:

a. holding dialogues and exchange of views as appropriate between their defense and military officials;

b. ensuring just and humane treatment of all persons who are either in danger or in distress;

c. notifying, on a voluntary basis, other Parties concerned of any impending joint/combined military exercise; and

d. exchanging, on a voluntary basis, relevant information.

6. Pending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the disputes, the Parties concerned may explore or undertake cooperative activities. These may include the following:

a. marine environmental protection;

b. marine scientific research;

c. safety of navigation and communication at sea;

d. search and rescue operation; and

e. combating transnational crime, including but not limited to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in arms.

The modalities, scope and locations, in respect of bilateral and multilateral cooperation should be agreed upon by the Parties concerned prior to their actual implementation.

7. The Parties concerned stand ready to continue their consultations and dialogues concerning relevant issues, through modalities to be agreed by them, including regular consultations on the observance of this Declaration, for the purpose of promoting good neighbourliness and transparency, establishing harmony, mutual understanding and cooperation, and facilitating peaceful resolution of disputes among them;

8. The Parties undertake to respect the provisions of this Declaration and take actions consistent therewith;

9. The Parties encourage other countries to respect the principles contained in this Declaration;

10. The Parties concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective.

Done on the Fourth Day of November in the Year Two Thousand and Two in Phnom Penh, the Kingdom of Cambodia.

For Brunei Darussalam: Mohamed Bolkiah, Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the People's Republic of China: Wang Yi 王毅, Special Envoy and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Kingdom of Cambodia: Hor Namhong, Senior Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

For the Republic of Indonesia: Dr. Hassan Wirayuda, Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Lao People's Democratic Republic: Somsavat Lengsavad, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs

For Malaysia: Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Union of Myanmar: Win Aung, Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Republic of the Philippines: Blas F. Ople, Secretary of Foreign Affairs

For the Republic of Singapore: Prof. S. Jayakumar, Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Kingdom of Thailand: Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai, Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam: Nguyen Dy Nien 阮怡年, Minister of Foreign Affairs

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南海各方行為宣言

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中華人民共和國和東盟各成員國政府，重申各方決心鞏固和發展各國人民和政府之間業已存在的友誼與合作，以促進面向 21 世紀睦鄰互信夥伴關係；

認識到為增進本地區的和平、穩定、經濟發展與繁榮，中國和東盟有必要促進南海地區和平、友好與和諧的環境；

承諾促進 1997 年中華人民共和國與東盟成員國國家元首或政府首腦會晤《聯合聲明》所確立的原則和目標；

希望為和平與永久解決有關國家間的分歧和爭議創造有利條件；

謹發表如下宣言：

一、各方重申以《聯合國憲章》宗旨和原則、1982 年《聯合國海洋法公約》、《東南亞友好合作條約》、和平共處五項原則以及其它公認的國際法原則作為處理國家間關係的基本準則。

二、各方承諾根據上述原則，在平等和相互尊重的基礎上，探討建立信任的途徑。

三、各方重申尊重並承諾，包括 1982 年《聯合國海洋法公約》在內的公認的國際法原則所規定的在南海的航行及飛越自由。

四、有關各方承諾根據公認的國際法原則，包括 1982 年《聯合國海洋法公約》，由直接有關的主權國家通過友好磋商和談判，以和平方式解決它們的領土和管轄權爭議，而不訴諸武力或以武力相威脅。

五、各方承諾保持自我克制，不採取使爭議複雜化、擴大化和影響和平與穩定的行動，包括不在現無人居住的島、礁、灘、沙或其它自然構造上採取居住的行動，並以建設性的方式處理它們的分歧。

在和平解決它們的領土和管轄權爭議之前，有關各方承諾本著合作與諒解的精神，努力尋求各種途徑建立相互信任，包括：

（一） 在各方國防及軍隊官員之間開展適當的對話和交換意見；

（二） 保證對處於危險境地的所有公民予以公正和人道的待遇；

（三） 在自願基礎上向其它有關各方通報即將舉行的聯合軍事演習；

（四） 在自願基礎上相互通報有關情況。

六、在全面和永久解決爭議之前，有關各方可探討或開展合作，可包括以下領域：

（一） 海洋環保；

（二） 海洋科學研究；

（三） 海上航行和交通安全；

（四） 搜尋與救助；

（五） 打擊跨國犯罪，包括但不限於打擊毒品走私、海盜和海上武裝搶劫以及軍火走私。

在具體實施之前，有關各方應就雙邊及多邊合作的模式、範圍和地點取得一致意見。

七、有關各方願通過各方同意的模式，就有關問題繼續進行磋商和對話，包括對遵守本宣言問題舉行定期磋商，以增進睦鄰友好關係和提高透明度，創造和諧、相互理解與合作，推動以和平方式解決彼此間爭議。

八、各方承諾尊重本宣言的條款並採取與宣言相一致的行動。

九、各方鼓勵其他國家尊重本宣言所包含的原則。

十、有關各方重申制定南海行為準則將進一步促進本地區和平與穩定，並同意在各方協商一致的基礎上，朝最終達成該目標而努力。

本宣言於 2002 年 11 月 4 日在柬埔寨王國金邊簽署。

文萊達魯薩蘭國外交大臣 穆罕默德 • 博爾基亞

中華人民共和國外交部副部長兼特使 王毅

柬埔寨王國外交大臣 賀南洪

印度尼西亞共和國外長 維拉尤達

老撾人民民主共和國副總理兼外長 宋沙瓦

馬來西亞外長 賽義德 • 哈米德

緬甸聯邦外長 吳溫昂

菲律賓共和國外長 布拉斯 • 奧普萊

新加坡共和國外長 Ｓ • 賈古瑪

泰王國外長 素拉傑 • 沙田泰

越南社會主義共和國外長 阮怡年

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The text of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was published on the website of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), please click here.

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Colin Powell's statement on "one China" and Taiwan

Name in Chinese Baoweier guanyu "yige Zhongguo" han Taiwan 鮑威爾關於『一個中國』和台灣
Document type Policy statement and interpretation by US secretary of state
Year, date 2004, Oct. 25
 Jump to Chinese version   [Next document]  [Previous document] 

On Oct. 25, 2004, Colin Powell, US Secretary of State [Jan. 2001 to Jan. 2005], stated in an interview with Anthony Yuen (阮次山) of Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV (鳳凰衛視) in Beijing's China World Hotel (中國大飯店):

[...] Our policy is clear, there is only one China. Taiwan is not independent. It does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation, and that remains our policy, our firm policy. [...]

鮑威爾關於『一個中國』和台灣

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[...] 鮑威爾稱，美國的政策是明確的，就是只有一個中國，台灣不是獨立的，不享有作為一個"國家的主權"，那是美國的堅定政策。[...]

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The "Anti-Secession Law" of the PRC

Name in Chinese fan fenlie guojiafa 反分裂國家法
Document type PRC law
Year, date 2005, March 14
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

No. 34

The Anti-Secession Law, adopted at the Third Session of the Tenth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on March 14, 2005, is hereby promulgated and shall go into effect as of the date of promulgation.

Hu Jintao

President of the People's Republic of China

March 14, 2005

Anti-Secession Law

(Adopted at the Third Session of the Tenth National People's Congress on March 14, 2005)

Article 1 This Law is formulated, in accordance with the Constitution, for the purpose of opposing and checking Taiwan's secession from China by secessionists in the name of "Taiwan independence", promoting peaceful national reunification, maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, preserving China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and safeguarding the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation.
Article 2 There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division. Safeguarding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included.
Taiwan is part of China. The state shall never allow the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means.
Article 3 The Taiwan question is one that is left over from China's civil war of the late 1940s.
Solving the Taiwan question and achieving national reunification is China's internal affair, which subjects to no interference by any outside forces.
Article 4 Accomplishing the great task of reunifying the motherland is the sacred duty of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included.
Article 5 Upholding the principle of one China is the basis of peaceful reunification of the country.
To reunify the country through peaceful means best serves the fundamental interests of the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. The state shall do its utmost with maximum sincerity to achieve a peaceful reunification.
After the country is reunified peacefully, Taiwan may practice systems different from those on the mainland and enjoy a high degree of autonomy.
Article 6 The state shall take the following measures to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and promote cross-Straits relations:
(1) to encourage and facilitate personnel exchanges across the Straits for greater mutual understanding and mutual trust;
(2) to encourage and facilitate economic exchanges and cooperation, realize direct links of trade, mail and air and shipping services, and bring about closer economic ties between the two sides of the Straits to their mutual benefit;
(3) to encourage and facilitate cross-Straits exchanges in education, science, technology, culture, health and sports, and work together to carry forward the proud Chinese cultural traditions;
(4) to encourage and facilitate cross-Straits cooperation in combating crimes; and
(5) to encourage and facilitate other activities that are conducive to peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and stronger cross-Straits relations.
The state protects the rights and interests of the Taiwan compatriots in accordance with law.
Article 7 The state stands for the achievement of peaceful reunification through consultations and negotiations on an equal footing between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. These consultations and negotiations may be conducted in steps and phases and with flexible and varied modalities.
The two sides of the Taiwan Straits may consult and negotiate on the following matters:
(1) officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides;
(2) mapping out the development of cross-Straits relations;
(3) steps and arrangements for peaceful national reunification;
(4) the political status of the Taiwan authorities;
(5) the Taiwan region's room of international operation that is compatible with its status; and
(6) other matters concerning the achievement of peaceful national reunification.
Article 8 In the event that the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The State Council and the Central Military Commission shall decide on and execute the non-peaceful means and other necessary measures as provided for in the preceding paragraph and shall promptly report to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.
Article 9 In the event of employing and executing non-peaceful means and other necessary measures as provided for in this Law, the state shall exert its utmost to protect the lives, property and other legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan civilians and foreign nationals in Taiwan, and to minimize losses. At the same time, the state shall protect the rights and interests of the Taiwan compatriots in other parts of China in accordance with law.
Article 10 This Law shall come into force on the day of its promulgation.

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反分裂國家法

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《反分裂國家法》全文發布

2005 年 3 月 14 日第十屆全國人民代表大會第三次會議通過

第一條 為了反對和遏制 "台獨" 分裂勢力分裂國家，促進祖國和平統一，維護臺灣海峽地區和平穩定，維護國家主權和領土完整，維護中華民族的根本利益，根據憲法，制定本法。
第二條 世界上只有一個中國，大陸和臺灣同屬一個中國，中國的主權和領土完整不容分割。維護國家主權和領土完整是包括臺灣同胞在內的全中國人民的共同義務。
臺灣是中國的一部分。國家絕不允許 "台獨" 分裂勢力以任何名義、任何方式把臺灣從中國分裂出去。
第三條 臺灣問題是中國內戰的遺留問題。
解決臺灣問題，實現祖國統一，是中國的內部事務，不受任何外國勢力的干涉。
第四條 完成統一祖國的大業是包括臺灣同胞在內的全中國人民的神聖職責。
第五條 堅持一個中國原則，是實現祖國和平統一的基礎。
以和平方式實現祖國統一，最符合臺灣海峽兩岸同胞的根本利益。國家以最大的誠意，盡最大的努力，實現和平統一。
國家和平統一後，臺灣可以實行不同於大陸的制度，高度自治。
第六條 國家採取下列措施，維護臺灣海峽地區和平穩定，發展兩岸關係：
（一）鼓勵和推動兩岸人員往來，增進瞭解，增強互信；
（二）鼓勵和推動兩岸經濟交流與合作，直接通郵通航通商，密切兩岸經濟關係，互利互惠；
（三）鼓勵和推動兩岸教育、科技、文化、衛生、體育交流，共同弘揚中華文化的優秀傳統；
（四）鼓勵和推動兩岸共同打擊犯罪；
（五）鼓勵和推動有利於維護臺灣海峽地區和平穩定、發展兩岸關係的其他活動。
國家依法保護臺灣同胞的權利和利益。
第七條 國家主張通過臺灣海峽兩岸平等的協商和談判，實現和平統一。協商和談判可以有步驟、分階段進行，方式可以靈活多樣。
臺灣海峽兩岸可以就下列事項進行協商和談判：
（一）正式結束兩岸敵對狀態；
（二）發展兩岸關係的規劃；
（三）和平統一的步驟和安排；
（四）臺灣當局的政治地位；
（五）臺灣地區在國際上與其地位相適應的活動空間；
（六）與實現和平統一有關的其他任何問題。
第八條 "台獨" 分裂勢力以任何名義、任何方式造成臺灣從中國分裂出去的事實，或者發生將會導致臺灣從中國分裂出去的重大事變，或者和平統一的可能性完全喪失，國家得採取非和平方式及其他必要措施，捍衛國家主權和領土完整。
依照前款規定採取非和平方式及其他必要措施，由國務院、中央軍事委員會決定和組織實施，並及時向全國人民代表大會常務委員會報告。
第九條 依照本法規定採取非和平方式及其他必要措施並組織實施時，國家盡最大可能保護臺灣平民和在臺灣的外國人的生命財産安全和其他正當權益，減少損失；同時，國家依法保護臺灣同胞在中國其他地區的權利和利益。
第十條 本法自公佈之日起施行。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

A useful commentary written by German law expert Christoph Henke LL.D. about the PRC's "Anti-Secession Law" can be found here.

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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East China Sea Peace Initiative Implementation Guidelines

Name in Chinese donghai heping changyi tuidong wangling 東海和平倡議推動綱領
Document type Policy directive drafted by the ROC government
Year, date 2012, Sept. 7
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

September 7, 2012

Facing rising concerns posed by the East China Sea situation, President Ma Ying-jeou proposed the East China Sea Peace Initiative on August 5, based on the principle of “safeguarding sovereignty, shelving disputes, pursuing peace and reciprocity, and promoting joint exploration and development.” He called upon all parties concerned to demonstrate restraint and avoid escalating confrontational acts, to shelve controversies and not abandon dialogue, to respect international law and deal with disputes through peaceful means, to seek consensus and draft a East China Sea Code of Conduct, and to establish a mechanism for cooperation on exploring and developing resources in the East China Sea.

These guidelines are proposed to enhance the effectiveness and impact of the East China Sea Peace Initiative.

I. Implementation

The East China Sea Peace Initiative is to be implemented in two stages:

1. Peaceful dialogue and mutually reciprocal negotiation
This stage involves promoting the idea of resolving the East China Sea dispute through peaceful means, and establishing channels for Track I and Track II dialogue and encouraging all parties concerned to address key East China Sea issues via bilateral or multilateral negotiation mechanisms in order to bolster mutual trust and collective benefit.

2. Sharing resources and cooperative development
This stage involves institutionalizing all forms of dialogue and negotiation and encouraging all parties concerned to implement substantive cooperative projects and establish mechanisms for joint exploration and development of resources that form a network of peace and cooperation in the East China Sea area.

II. Key issues

1. Fishing industry—Convening bilateral and multilateral fishing industry meetings and other forms of fishing industry cooperation and exchange, and establishing a mechanism for fishing industry cooperation and administration.

2. Mining industry—Promoting joint exploration in the territorial waters to the north of Taiwan and establishing a mechanism for joint exploration, development and management.

3. Marine science research and maritime environmental protection—Conducting multi-national marine and ecological research projects pertaining to the East China Sea.

4. Maritime security and unconventional security—Implementing bilateral and multilateral law enforcement exchanges and marine rescue agency cooperation, and establishing a collaborative marine security and crime-enforcement mechanism.

5. East China Sea Code of Conduct—Implementing mechanisms for Track I and Track II dialogue and negotiating mechanisms for resolving disputes through peaceful means that will bolster mutual trust and encourage all parties concerned to sign the East China Sea Code of Conduct.

III. Implementation Objectives

In its role as a facilitator of peace in the international community, the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) has proposed the East China Sea Peace Initiative and its implementation guidelines in the sincere hope that all parties concerned replace confrontation with negotiation, and set aside their controversies by means of temporary measures, so as to maintain peace and stability in the region. Over the long run, we can move from three parallel tracks of bilateral dialogue (between Taiwan and Japan, Taiwan and the Chinese mainland, and Japan and the mainland) to one track of trilateral negotiations and realize peace and cooperation in the East China Sea.

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《東海和平倡議推動綱領》

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

101 年 9 月 7 日

面對東海情勢有日漸升高的隱憂，基於「主權在我、擱置爭議、和平互惠、共同開發」之原則，馬英九總統於民國 101 年 8 月 5 日提出「東海和平倡議」，呼籲相關各方：應自我克制，不升高對立行動；應擱置爭議，不放棄對話溝通；應遵守國際法，以和平方式處理爭端；應尋求共識，研訂「東海行為準則」；應建立機制，合作開發東海資源。

為深化「東海和平倡議」之效益與影響，特提出本推動綱領。

一、推動階段

「東海和平倡議」之推動分二個階段，說明如下：

（一）和平對話、互惠協商
本階段在進一步推廣以和平方式處理東海爭議，推動一軌與二軌對話管道之建立，促使各方在東海主要議題以雙邊或多邊協商機制，強化互信與共同利益。

（二）資源共享、合作開發
本階段在藉由各種對話與協商之制度化，促使各方推動實質合作計畫，建立共同開發資源機制，形成以東海為範圍之和平合作網。

二、主要議題

（一）漁業：召開雙邊與多邊漁業會談及其他漁業合作交流，建立漁業合作與管理機制。

（二）礦業：推動在臺灣北部海域之合作探勘，建立合作開發與管理機制。

（三）海洋科學研究與海洋環境保護：執行跨國之東海相關海洋與生態研究計畫。

（四）海上安全與非傳統安全：推動雙邊與多邊執法機關交流及海難救助之合作，建立海上安全及打擊海上犯罪之合作機制。

（五）東海行為準則：推動一軌與二軌對話機制，研議和平解決爭端機制；強化互信，促成相關各方簽署「東海行為準則」。

三、推動目標

中華民國政府身為國際社會上「和平的締造者」角色，在提出「東海和平倡議」及推動綱領後，期盼各方能採取「以協商取代對抗」、「以臨時措施擱置爭議」的方式，維持區域和平與穩定。長期而言，能進一步從現有之「臺日」、「兩岸」、「日陸」三組雙邊對話，邁向多邊協商，落實東海之和平與合作。

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🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The East China Sea Peace Initiative (donghai heping changyi 東海和平倡議, abbrev. ECSPI) was first suggested by ROC President Ma Ying-jeou on Aug. 5, 2012 when he was attending activities commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. The following bilateral exchange with Japan resulted in the signing of the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement (Tai Ri yuye xieyi 台日漁業協議) on April 10, 2013 which gave Taiwanese fishermen the right to operate in a 7,400 km² area around the Diaoyutai Islands; leaders of the negotiating delegations were Liao Liou-yi 廖了以 and Ohashi Mitsuo 大橋 光夫. A bilingual brochure in PDF format, published by the ROC MOFA in December 2012, provided explanations about the ECSPI (click here).

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South China Sea Arbitration—PCA Press Release

Name in Chinese nanhai wenti zhongcai erlingyiliu nian qi yue shier ri caijue 南海問題仲裁 2016 年 7 月 12 日裁决
Document type Verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
Year, date 2016, July 12
 Jump to Editor's note   [Next document]  [Previous document] 

(Jump to UNCLOS Article 121)    (Jump to Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea)

Permanent Court of Arbitration
Peace Palace, Carnegieplein 2,
2517 KJ The Hague, Netherlands 
Telephone: +31 70 302 4165
Facsimile: +31 70 302 4167
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Press Release

THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION
(The Republic of the Philippines v. the People's Republic of China)

The Hague, 12 July 2016

The Tribunal Renders Its Award

A unanimous Award has been issued today by the Tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the "Convention") in the arbitration instituted by the Republic of the Philippines against the People's Republic of China.

This arbitration concerned the role of historic rights and the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, the status of certain maritime features and the maritime entitlements they are capable of generating, and the lawfulness of certain actions by China that were alleged by the Philippines to violate the Convention. In light of limitations on compulsory dispute settlement under the Convention, the Tribunal has emphasized that it does not rule on any question of sovereignty over land territory and does not delimit any boundary between the Parties.

China has repeatedly stated that "it will neither accept nor participate in the arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines." Annex VII, however, provides that the "[a]bsence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings." Annex VII also provides that, in the event that a party does not participate in the proceedings, a tribunal "must satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law." Accordingly, throughout these proceedings, the Tribunal has taken steps to test the accuracy of the Philippines' claims, including by requesting further written submissions from the Philippines, by questioning the Philippines both prior to and during two hearings, by appointing independent experts to report to the Tribunal on technical matters, and by obtaining historical evidence concerning features in the South China Sea and providing it to the Parties for comment.

China has also made clear—through the publication of a Position Paper in December 2014 and in other official statements—that, in its view, the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction in this matter. Article 288 of the Convention provides that: "In the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal." Accordingly, the Tribunal convened a hearing on jurisdiction and admissibility in July 2015 and rendered an Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility on 29 October 2015, deciding some issues of jurisdiction and deferring others for further consideration. The Tribunal then convened a hearing on the merits from 24 to 30 November 2015.

The Award of today's date addresses the issues of jurisdiction not decided in the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility and the merits of the Philippines' claims over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction. The Award is final and binding, as set out in Article 296 of the Convention and Article 11 of Annex VII.

Historic Rights and the 'Nine-Dash Line': The Tribunal found that it has jurisdiction to consider the Parties' dispute concerning historic rights and the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea. On the merits, the Tribunal concluded that the Convention comprehensively allocates rights to maritime areas and that protections for pre-existing rights to resources were considered, but not adopted in the Convention. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that, to the extent China had historic rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished to the extent they were incompatible with the exclusive economic zones provided for in the Convention. The Tribunal also noted that, although Chinese navigators and fishermen, as well as those of other States, had historically made use of the islands in the South China Sea, there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources. The Tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the 'nine-dash line'.

Status of Features: The Tribunal next considered entitlements to maritime areas and the status of features. The Tribunal first undertook an evaluation of whether certain reefs claimed by China are above water at high tide. Features that are above water at high tide generate an entitlement to at least a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, whereas features that are submerged at high tide do not. The Tribunal noted that the reefs have been heavily modified by land reclamation and construction, recalled that the Convention classifies features on their natural condition, and relied on historical materials in evaluating the features. The Tribunal then considered whether any of the features claimed by China could generate maritime zones beyond 12 nautical miles. Under the Convention, islands generate an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and a continental shelf, but "[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf." The Tribunal concluded that this provision depends upon the objective capacity of a feature, in its natural condition, to sustain either a stable community of people or economic activity that is not dependent on outside resources or purely extractive in nature. The Tribunal noted that the current presence of official personnel on many of the features is dependent on outside support and not reflective of the capacity of the features. The Tribunal found historical evidence to be more relevant and noted that the Spratly Islands were historically used by small groups of fishermen and that several Japanese fishing and guano mining enterprises were attempted. The Tribunal concluded that such transient use does not constitute inhabitation by a stable community and that all of the historical economic activity had been extractive. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that none of the Spratly Islands is capable of generating extended maritime zones. The Tribunal also held that the Spratly Islands cannot generate maritime zones collectively as a unit. Having found that none of the features claimed by China was capable of generating an exclusive economic zone, the Tribunal found that it could—without delimiting a boundary—declare that certain sea areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China.

Lawfulness of Chinese Actions: The Tribunal next considered the lawfulness of Chinese actions in the South China Sea. Having found that certain areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, the Tribunal found that China had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone by (a) interfering with Philippine fishing and petroleum exploration, (b) constructing artificial islands and (c) failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone. The Tribunal also held that fishermen from the Philippines (like those from China) had traditional fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal and that China had interfered with these rights in restricting access. The Tribunal further held that Chinese law enforcement vessels had unlawfully created a serious risk of collision when they physically obstructed Philippine vessels.

Harm to Marine Environment: The Tribunal considered the effect on the marine environment of China's recent large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands and found that China had caused severe harm to the coral reef environment and violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species. The Tribunal also found that Chinese authorities were aware that Chinese fishermen have harvested endangered sea turtles, coral, and giant clams on a substantial scale in the South China Sea (using methods that inflict severe damage on the coral reef environment) and had not fulfilled their obligations to stop such activities.

Aggravation of Dispute: Finally, the Tribunal considered whether China's actions since the commencement of the arbitration had aggravated the dispute between the Parties. The Tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the implications of a stand-off between Philippine marines and Chinese naval and law enforcement vessels at Second Thomas Shoal, holding that this dispute involved military activities and was therefore excluded from compulsory settlement. The Tribunal found, however, that China's recent large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands was incompatible with the obligations on a State during dispute resolution proceedings, insofar as China has inflicted irreparable harm to the marine environment, built a large artificial island in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone, and destroyed evidence of the natural condition of features in the South China Sea that formed part of the Parties' dispute.

An expanded summary of the Tribunal's decisions is set out below.

The Tribunal was constituted on 21 June 2013 pursuant to the procedure set out in Annex VII of the Convention to decide the dispute presented by the Philippines. The Tribunal is composed of Judge Thomas A. Mensah of Ghana, Judge Jean-Pierre Cot of France, Judge Stanislaw Pawlak of Poland, Professor Alfred H.A. Soons of the Netherlands, and Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum of Germany. Judge Thomas A. Mensah serves as President of the Tribunal. The Permanent Court of Arbitration acts as the Registry in the proceedings.

Further information about the case may be found at www.pcacases.com/web/view/7, including the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Rules of Procedure, earlier Press Releases, hearing transcripts, and photographs. Procedural Orders, submissions by the Philippines, and reports by the Tribunal's experts will be made available in due course, as will unofficial Chinese translations of the Tribunal's Awards.

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Background to the Permanent Court of Arbitration

The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is an intergovernmental organization established by the 1899 Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. The PCA has 121 Member States. Headquartered at the Peace Palace in The Hague, the Netherlands, the PCA facilitates arbitration, conciliation, fact-finding, and other dispute resolution proceedings among various combinations of States, State entities, intergovernmental organizations, and private parties. The PCA's International Bureau is currently administering 8 interstate disputes, 73 investor-State arbitrations, and 34 cases arising under contracts involving a State or other public entity. The PCA has administered 12 cases initiated by States under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

In July 2013, the Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration appointed the PCA to serve as Registry for the proceedings. The Tribunal's Rules of Procedure provide that the PCA shall "maintain an archive of the arbitral proceedings and provide appropriate registry services as directed by the Arbitral Tribunal." Such services include assisting with the identification and appointment of experts; publishing information about the arbitration and issuing press releases; organizing the hearings at the Peace Palace in The Hague; and the financial management of the case, which involves holding a deposit for expenses in the arbitration, such as to pay arbitrator fees, experts, technical support, court reporters etc. The Registry also serves as the channel of communications amongst the Parties and the Tribunal and observer States.

Photograph: Hearing in session, July 2015, Peace Palace, The Hague. Clockwise from top left: Registrar and PCA Senior Legal Counsel Judith Levine; Judge Stanislaw Pawlak; Professor Alfred H. A. Soons; Judge Thomas A. Mensah (Presiding Arbitrator); Judge Jean-Pierre Cot; Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum; PCA Senior Legal Counsel Garth Schofield; former Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, Mr. Albert F. Del Rosario; former Solicitor General Mr. Florin T. Hilbay, Counsel for the Philippines; Mr. Paul S. Reichler; Professor Philippe Sands; Professor Bernard H. Oxman; Professor Alan E. Boyle; Mr. Lawrence H. Martin.

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SUMMARY OF THE TRIBUNAL'S DECISIONS ON ITS JURISDICTION
AND ON THE MERITS OF THE PHILIPPINES' CLAIMS

1. Background to the Arbitration

The South China Sea Arbitration between the Philippines and China concerned an application by the Philippines for rulings in respect of four matters concerning the relationship between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea. First, the Philippines sought a ruling on the source of the Parties' rights and obligations in the South China Sea and the effect of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("Convention") on China's claims to historic rights within its so-called 'nine-dash line'. Second, the Philippines sought a ruling on whether certain maritime features claimed by both China and the Philippines are properly characterized as islands, rocks, low-tide elevations or submerged banks under the Convention. The status of these features under the Convention determines the maritime zones they are capable of generating. Third, the Philippines sought rulings on whether certain Chinese actions in the South China Sea have violated the Convention, by interfering with the exercise of the Philippines' sovereign rights and freedoms under the Convention or through construction and fishing activities that have harmed the marine environment. Finally, the Philippines sought a ruling that certain actions taken by China, in particular its large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands since this arbitration was commenced, have unlawfully aggravated and extended the Parties' dispute.

The Chinese Government has adhered to the position of neither accepting nor participating in these arbitral proceedings. It has reiterated this position in diplomatic notes, in the "Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines" dated 7 December 2014 ("China's Position Paper"), in letters to members of the Tribunal from the Chinese Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and in many public statements. The Chinese Government has also made clear that these statements and documents "shall by no means be interpreted as China's participation in the arbitral proceeding in any form."

Two provisions of the Convention address the situation of a party that objects to the jurisdiction of a tribunal and declines to participate in the proceedings:

(a) Article 288 of the Convention provides that: "In the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal."

(b) Article 9 of Annex VII to the Convention provides that:

If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral tribunal or fails to defend its case, the other party may request the tribunal to continue the proceedings and to make its award. Absence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before making its award, the arbitral tribunal must satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law.

Throughout these proceedings, the Tribunal has taken a number of steps to fulfil its duty to satisfy itself as to whether it has jurisdiction and whether the Philippines' claims are "well founded in fact and law". With respect to jurisdiction, the Tribunal decided to treat China's informal communications as equivalent to an objection to jurisdiction, convened a Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility on 7 to 13 July 2015, questioned the Philippines both before and during the hearing on matters of jurisdiction, including potential issues not raised in China's informal communications, and issued an Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility on 29 October 2015 (the "Award on Jurisdiction"), deciding some issues of jurisdiction and deferring others for further consideration in conjunction with the merits of the Philippines' claims. With respect to the merits, the Tribunal sought to test the accuracy of the Philippines' claims by requesting further written submissions from the Philippines, by convening a hearing on the merits from 24 to 30 November 2015, by questioning the Philippines both before and during the hearing with respect to its claims, by appointing independent experts to report to the Tribunal on technical matters, and by obtaining historical records and hydrographic survey data for the South China Sea from the archives of the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, the National Library of France, and the French National Overseas Archives and providing it to the Parties for comment, along with other relevant materials in the public domain.

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2. The Parties' Positions

The Philippines made 15 Submissions in these proceedings, requesting the Tribunal to find that:

(1) China's maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, like those of the Philippines, may not extend beyond those expressly permitted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea;

(2) China's claims to sovereign rights jurisdiction, and to "historic rights", with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the so-called "nine-dash line" are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China's maritime entitlements expressly permitted by UNCLOS;

(3) Scarborough Shoal generates no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf;

(4) Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and Subi Reef are low-tide elevations that do not generate entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, and are not features that are capable of appropriation by occupation or otherwise;

(5) Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Philippines;

(6) Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef) are low-tide elevations that do not generate entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, but their low-water line may be used to determine the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Namyit and Sin Cowe, respectively, is measured;

(7) Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef generate no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf;

(8) China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise of the sovereign rights of the Philippines with respect to the living and non-living resources of its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf;

(9) China has unlawfully failed to prevent its nationals and vessels from exploiting the living resources in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines;

(10) China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from pursuing their livelihoods by interfering with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal;

(11) China has violated its obligations under the Convention to protect and preserve the marine environment at Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef and Subi Reef;

(12) China's occupation of and construction activities on Mischief Reef

(a) violate the provisions of the Convention concerning artificial islands, installations and structures;

(b) violate China's duties to protect and preserve the marine environment under the Convention; and

(c) constitute unlawful acts of attempted appropriation in violation of the Convention;

(13) China has breached its obligations under the Convention by operating its law enforcement vessels in a dangerous manner, causing serious risk of collision to Philippine vessels navigating in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal;

(14) Since the commencement of this arbitration in January 2013, China has unlawfully aggravated and extended the dispute by, among other things:

(a) interfering with the Philippines' rights of navigation in the waters at, and adjacent to, Second Thomas Shoal;

(b) preventing the rotation and resupply of Philippine personnel stationed at Second Thomas Shoal;

(c) endangering the health and well-being of Philippine personnel stationed at Second Thomas Shoal; and

(d) conducting dredging, artificial island-building and construction activities at Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef and Subi Reef; and

(15) China shall respect the rights and freedoms of the Philippines under the Convention, shall comply with its duties under the Convention, including those relevant to the protection and preservation of the marine environment in the South China Sea, and shall exercise its rights and freedoms in the South China Sea with due regard to those of the Philippines under the Convention.

With respect to jurisdiction, the Philippines has asked the Tribunal to declare that the Philippines' claims "are entirely within its jurisdiction and are fully admissible."

China does not accept and is not participating in this arbitration but stated its position that the Tribunal "does not have jurisdiction over this case." In its Position Paper, China advanced the following arguments:

– The essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is the territorial sovereignty over several maritime features in the South China Sea, which is beyond the scope of the Convention and does not concern the interpretation or application of the Convention;

– China and the Philippines have agreed, through bilateral instruments and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, to settle their relevant disputes through negotiations. By unilaterally initiating the present arbitration, the Philippines has breached its obligation under international law;

– Even assuming, arguendo, that the subject-matter of the arbitration were concerned with the interpretation or application of the Convention, that subject-matter would constitute an integral part of maritime delimitation between the two countries, thus falling within the scope of the declaration filed by China in 2006 in accordance with the Convention, which excludes, inter alia, disputes concerning maritime delimitation from compulsory arbitration and other compulsory dispute settlement procedures;

Although China has not made equivalent public statements with respect to the merits of the majority of the Philippines' claims, the Tribunal has sought throughout the proceedings to ascertain China's position on the basis of its contemporaneous public statements and diplomatic correspondence.

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3. The Tribunal's Decisions on the Scope of its Jurisdiction

The Tribunal has addressed the scope of its jurisdiction to consider the Philippines' claims both in its Award on Jurisdiction, to the extent that issues of jurisdiction could be decided as a preliminary matter, and in its Award of 12 July 2016, to the extent that issues of jurisdiction were intertwined with the merits of the Philippines' claims. The Tribunal's Award of 12 July 2016 also incorporates and reaffirms the decisions on jurisdiction taken in the Award on Jurisdiction.

For completeness, the Tribunal's decisions on jurisdiction in both awards are summarized here together.

a. Preliminary Matters

In its Award on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal considered a number of preliminary matters with respect to its jurisdiction. The Tribunal noted that both the Philippines and China are parties to the Convention and that the Convention does not permit a State to except itself generally from the mechanism for the resolution of disputes set out in the Convention. The Tribunal held that China's non-participation does not deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction and that the Tribunal had been properly constituted pursuant to the provisions of Annex VII to the Convention, which include a procedure to form a tribunal even in the absence of one party. Finally, the Tribunal rejected an argument set out in China's Position Paper and held that the mere act of unilaterally initiating an arbitration cannot constitute an abuse of the Convention.

b. Existence of a Dispute Concerning Interpretation and Application of the Convention

In its Award on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal considered whether the Parties' disputes concerned the interpretation or application of the Convention, which is a requirement for resort to the dispute settlement mechanisms of the Convention.

The Tribunal rejected the argument set out in China's Position Paper that the Parties' dispute is actually about territorial sovereignty and therefore not a matter concerning the Convention. The Tribunal accepted that there is a dispute between the Parties concerning sovereignty over islands in the South China Sea, but held that the matters submitted to arbitration by the Philippines do not concern sovereignty. The Tribunal considered that it would not need to implicitly decide sovereignty to address the Philippines' Submissions and that doing so would not advance the sovereignty claims of either Party to islands in the South China Sea.

The Tribunal also rejected the argument set out in China's Position Paper that the Parties' dispute is actually about maritime boundary delimitation and therefore excluded from dispute settlement by Article 298 of the Convention and a declaration that China made on 25 August 2006 pursuant to that Article. The Tribunal noted that a dispute concerning whether a State has an entitlement to a maritime zone is a distinct matter from the delimitation of maritime zones in an area in which they overlap. The Tribunal noted that entitlements, together with a wide variety of other issues, are commonly considered in a boundary delimitation, but can also arise in other contexts. The Tribunal held that it does not follow that a dispute over each of these issues is necessarily a dispute over boundary delimitation.

Finally, the Tribunal held that each of the Philippines' Submissions reflected a dispute concerning the Convention. In doing so, the Tribunal emphasized (a) that a dispute concerning the interaction between the Convention and other rights (including any Chinese "historic rights") is a dispute concerning the Convention and (b) that where China has not clearly stated its position, the existence of a dispute may be inferred from the conduct of a State or from silence and is a matter to be determined objectively.

c. Involvement of Indispensable Third-Parties

In its Award on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal considered whether the absence from this arbitration of other States that have made claims to the islands of the South China Sea would be a bar to the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The Tribunal noted that the rights of other States would not form "the very subject-matter of the decision," the standard for a third-party to be indispensable. The Tribunal further noted that in December 2014, Viet Nam had submitted a statement to the Tribunal, in which Viet Nam asserted that it has "no doubt that the Tribunal has jurisdiction in these proceedings." The Tribunal also noted that Viet Nam, Malaysia, and Indonesia had attended the hearing on jurisdiction as observers, without any State raising the argument that its participation was indispensable.

In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal noted that it had received a communication from Malaysia on 23 June 2016, recalling Malaysia's claims in the South China Sea. The Tribunal compared its decisions on the merits of the Philippines' Submissions with the rights claimed by Malaysia and reaffirmed its decision that Malaysia is not an indispensable party and that Malaysia's interests in the South China Sea do not prevent the Tribunal from addressing the Philippines' Submissions.

d. Preconditions to Jurisdiction

In its Award on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal considered the applicability of Articles 281 and 282 of the Convention, which may prevent a State from making use of the mechanisms under the Convention if they have already agreed to another means of dispute resolution.

The Tribunal rejected the argument set out in China's Position Paper that the 2002 China–ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea prevented the Philippines from initiating arbitration. The Tribunal held that the Declaration is a political agreement and not legally binding, does not provide a mechanism for binding settlement, does not exclude other means of dispute settlement, and therefore does not restrict the Tribunal's jurisdiction under Articles 281 or 282. The Tribunal also considered the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and the Convention on Biological Diversity, and a series of joint statements issued by the Philippines and China referring to the resolution of disputes through negotiations and concluded that none of these instruments constitute an agreement that would prevent the Philippines from bringing its claims to arbitration.

The Tribunal further held that the Parties had exchanged views regarding the settlement of their disputes, as required by Article 283 of the Convention, before the Philippines initiated the arbitration. The Tribunal concluded that this requirement was met in the record of diplomatic communications between the Philippines and China, in which the Philippines expressed a clear preference for multilateral negotiations involving the other States surrounding the South China Sea, while China insisted that only bilateral talks could be considered.

e. Exceptions and Limitations to Jurisdiction

In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal considered whether the Philippines' Submissions concerning Chinese historic rights and the 'nine-dash line' were affected by the exception from jurisdiction for disputes concerning "historic title" in Article 298 of the Convention. The Tribunal reviewed the meaning of "historic title" in the law of the sea and held that this refers to claims of historic sovereignty over bays and other near-shore waters. Reviewing China's claims and conduct in the South China Sea, the Tribunal concluded that China claims historic rights to resources within the 'nine-dash line', but does not claim historic title over the waters of the South China Sea. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider the Philippines' claims concerning historic rights and, as between the Philippines and China, the 'nine-dash line'.

In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal also considered whether the Philippines' Submissions were affected by the exception from jurisdiction in Article 298 for disputes concerning sea boundary delimitation. The Tribunal had already found in its Award on Jurisdiction that the Philippines' Submissions do not concern boundary delimitation as such, but noted that several of the Philippines' Submissions were dependent on certain areas forming part of the Philippines' exclusive economic zone. The Tribunal held that it could only address such submissions if there was no possibility that China could have an entitlement to an exclusive economic zone overlapping that of the Philippines and deferred a final decision on its jurisdiction. In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal reviewed evidence about the reefs and islands claimed by China in the South China Sea and concluded that none is capable of generating an entitlement to an exclusive economic zone. Because China has no possible entitlement to an exclusive economic zone overlapping that of the Philippines in the Spratly Islands, the Tribunal held that the Philippines' submissions were not dependent on a prior delimitation of a boundary.

In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal also considered whether the Philippines' Submissions were affected by the exception from jurisdiction in Article 298 for disputes concerning law enforcement activities in the exclusive economic zone. The Tribunal recalled that the exception in Article 298 would apply only if the Philippines' Submissions related to law enforcement activities in China's exclusive economic zone. Because, however, the Philippines' Submissions related to events in the Philippines' own exclusive economic zone or in the territorial sea, the Tribunal concluded that Article 298 did not pose an obstacle to its jurisdiction.

Lastly, in its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal considered whether the Philippines' submissions were affected by the exception from jurisdiction in Article 298 for disputes concerning military activities. The Tribunal considered that the stand-off between Philippine marines on Second Thomas Shoal and Chinese naval and law enforcement vessels constituted military activities and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the Philippines' Submission No. 14(a)-(c). The Tribunal also considered whether China's land reclamation and construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands constituted military activities, but noted that China had repeatedly emphasized the non-military nature of its actions and had stated at the highest level that it would not militarize its presence in the Spratlys. The Tribunal decided that it would not deem activities to be military in nature when China itself had repeatedly affirmed the opposite. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that Article 298 did not pose an obstacle to its jurisdiction.

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4. The Tribunal's Decisions on the Merits of the Philippines' Claims

a. The 'Nine-Dash Line' and China's Claim to Historic Rights in the Maritime Areas of the South China Sea

In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal considered the implications of China's 'nine-dash line' and whether China has historic rights to resources in the South China Sea beyond the limits of the maritime zones that it is entitled to pursuant to the Convention.

The Tribunal examined the history of the Convention and its provisions concerning maritime zones and concluded that the Convention was intended to comprehensively allocate the rights of States to maritime areas. The Tribunal noted that the question of pre-existing rights to resources (in particular fishing resources) was carefully considered during the negotiations on the creation of the exclusive economic zone and that a number of States wished to preserve historic fishing rights in the new zone. This position was rejected, however, and the final text of the Convention gives other States only a limited right of access to fisheries in the exclusive economic zone (in the event the coastal State cannot harvest the full allowable catch) and no rights to petroleum or mineral resources. The Tribunal found that China's claim to historic rights to resources was incompatible with the detailed allocation of rights and maritime zones in the Convention and concluded that, to the extent China had historic rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished by the entry into force of the Convention to the extent they were incompatible with the Convention's system of maritime zones.

The Tribunal also examined the historical record to determine whether China actually had historic rights to resources in the South China Sea prior to the entry into force of the Convention. The Tribunal noted that there is evidence that Chinese navigators and fishermen, as well as those of other States, had historically made use of the islands in the South China Sea, although the Tribunal emphasized that it was not empowered to decide the question of sovereignty over the islands. However, the Tribunal considered that prior to the Convention, the waters of the South China Sea beyond the territorial sea were legally part of the high seas, in which vessels from any State could freely navigate and fish. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that historical navigation and fishing by China in the waters of the South China Sea represented the exercise of high seas freedoms, rather than a historic right, and that there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters of the South China Sea or prevented other States from exploiting their resources.

Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that, as between the Philippines and China, there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources, in excess of the rights provided for by the Convention, within the sea areas falling within the 'nine-dash line'.

b. The Status of Features in the South China Sea

In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal considered the status of features in the South China Sea and the entitlements to maritime areas that China could potentially claim pursuant to the Convention.

The Tribunal first undertook a technical evaluation as to whether certain coral reefs claimed by China are or are not above water at high tide. Under Articles 13 and 121 of the Convention, features that are above water at high tide generate an entitlement to at least a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, whereas features that are submerged at high tide generate no entitlement to maritime zones. The Tribunal noted that many of the reefs in the South China Sea have been heavily modified by recent land reclamation and construction and recalled that the Convention classifies features on the basis of their natural condition. The Tribunal appointed an expert hydrographer to assist it in evaluating the Philippines' technical evidence and relied heavily on archival materials and historical hydrographic surveys in evaluating the features. The Tribunal agreed with the Philippines that Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef are high-tide features and that Subi Reef, Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, and Second Thomas Shoal were submerged at high tide in their natural condition. However, the Tribunal disagreed with the Philippines regarding the status of Gaven Reef (North) and McKennan Reef and concluded that both are high tide features.

The Tribunal then considered whether any of the features claimed by China could generate an entitlement to maritime zones beyond 12 nautical miles. Under Article 121 of the Convention, islands generate an entitlement to an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and to a continental shelf, but "[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf." The Tribunal noted that this provision was closely linked to the expansion of coastal State jurisdiction with the creation of the exclusive economic zone and was intended to prevent insignificant features from generating large entitlements to maritime zones that would infringe on the entitlements of inhabited territory or on the high seas and the area of the seabed reserved for the common heritage of mankind. The Tribunal interpreted Article 121 and concluded that the entitlements of a feature depend on (a) the objective capacity of a feature, (b) in its natural condition, to sustain either (c) a stable community of people or (d) economic activity that is neither dependent on outside resources nor purely extractive in nature.

The Tribunal noted that many of the features in the Spratly Islands are currently controlled by one or another of the littoral States, which have constructed installations and maintain personnel there. The Tribunal considered these modern presences to be dependent on outside resources and support and noted that many of the features have been modified to improve their habitability, including through land reclamation and the construction of infrastructure such as desalination plants. The Tribunal concluded that the current presence of official personnel on many of the features does not establish their capacity, in their natural condition, to sustain a stable community of people and considered that historical evidence of habitation or economic life was more relevant to the objective capacity of the features. Examining the historical record, the Tribunal noted that the Spratly Islands were historically used by small groups of fishermen from China, as well as other States, and that several Japanese fishing and guano mining enterprises were attempted in the 1920s and 1930s. The Tribunal concluded that temporary use of the features by fishermen did not amount to inhabitation by a stable community and that all of the historical economic activity had been extractive in nature. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that all of the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands (including, for example, Itu Aba, Thitu, West York Island, Spratly Island, North-East Cay, South-West Cay) are legally "rocks" that do not generate an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.

The Tribunal also held that the Convention does not provide for a group of islands such as the Spratly Islands to generate maritime zones collectively as a unit.

c. Chinese Activities in the South China Sea

In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal considered the lawfulness under the Convention of various Chinese actions in the South China Sea.

Having found that Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Reed Bank are submerged at high tide, form part of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Philippines, and are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China, the Tribunal concluded that the Convention is clear in allocating sovereign rights to the Philippines with respect to sea areas in its exclusive economic zone. The Tribunal found as a matter of fact that China had (a) interfered with Philippine petroleum exploration at Reed Bank, (b) purported to prohibit fishing by Philippine vessels within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone, (c) protected and failed to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone at Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal, and (d) constructed installations and artificial islands at Mischief Reef without the authorization of the Philippines. The Tribunal therefore concluded that China had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights with respect to its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.

The Tribunal next examined traditional fishing at Scarborough Shoal and concluded that fishermen from the Philippines, as well as fishermen from China and other countries, had long fished at the Shoal and had traditional fishing rights in the area. Because Scarborough Shoal is above water at high tide, it generates an entitlement to a territorial sea, its surrounding waters do not form part of the exclusive economic zone, and traditional fishing rights were not extinguished by the Convention. Although the Tribunal emphasized that it was not deciding sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal, it found that China had violated its duty to respect to the traditional fishing rights of Philippine fishermen by halting access to the Shoal after May 2012. The Tribunal noted, however, that it would reach the same conclusion with respect to the traditional fishing rights of Chinese fishermen if the Philippines were to prevent fishing by Chinese nationals at Scarborough Shoal.

The Tribunal also considered the effect of China's actions on the marine environment. In doing so, the Tribunal was assisted by three independent experts on coral reef biology who were appointed to assist it in evaluating the available scientific evidence and the Philippines' expert reports. The Tribunal found that China's recent large scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands has caused severe harm to the coral reef environment and that China has violated its obligation under Articles 192 and 194 of the Convention to preserve and protect the marine environment with respect to fragile ecosystems and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species. The Tribunal also found that Chinese fishermen have engaged in the harvesting of endangered sea turtles, coral, and giant clams on a substantial scale in the South China Sea, using methods that inflict severe damage on the coral reef environment. The Tribunal found that Chinese authorities were aware of these activities and failed to fulfill their due diligence obligations under the Convention to stop them.

Finally, the Tribunal considered the lawfulness of the conduct of Chinese law enforcement vessels at Scarborough Shoal on two occasions in April and May 2012 when Chinese vessels had sought to physically obstruct Philippine vessels from approaching or gaining entrance to the Shoal. In doing so, the Tribunal was assisted by an independent expert on navigational safety who was appointed to assist it in reviewing the written reports provided by the officers of the Philippine vessels and the expert evidence on navigational safety provided by the Philippines. The Tribunal found that Chinese law enforcement vessels had repeatedly approached the Philippine vessels at high speed and sought to cross ahead of them at close distances, creating serious risk of collision and danger to Philippine ships and personnel. The Tribunal concluded that China had breached its obligations under the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, and Article 94 the Convention concerning maritime safety.

d. Aggravation of the Dispute between the Parties

In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal considered whether China's recent large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands since the commencement of the arbitration had aggravated the dispute between the Parties. The Tribunal recalled that there exists a duty on parties engaged in a dispute settlement procedure to refrain from aggravating or extending the dispute or disputes at issue during the pendency of the settlement process. The Tribunal noted that China has (a) built a large artificial island on Mischief Reef, a low-tide elevation located in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines; (b) caused permanent, irreparable harm to the coral reef ecosystem and (c) permanently destroyed evidence of the natural condition of the features in question. The Tribunal concluded that China had violated its obligations to refrain from aggravating or extending the Parties' disputes during the pendency of the settlement process.

e. Future Conduct of the Parties

Finally, the Tribunal considered the Philippines' request for a declaration that, going forward, China shall respect the rights and freedoms of the Philippines and comply with its duties under the Convention. In this respect, the Tribunal noted that both the Philippines and China have repeatedly accepted that the Convention and general obligations of good faith define and regulate their conduct. The Tribunal considered that the root of the disputes at issue in this arbitration lies not in any intention on the part of China or the Philippines to infringe on the legal rights of the other, but rather in fundamentally different understandings of their respective rights under the Convention in the waters of the South China Sea. The Tribunal recalled that it is a fundamental principle of international law that bad faith is not presumed and noted that Article 11 of Annex VII provides that the "award . . . shall be complied with by the parties to the dispute." The Tribunal therefore considered that no further declaration was necessary.

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

On Jan. 22, 2013, the Republic of the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings against the People's Republic of China (PRC) under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The arbitration concerned the role of historic rights and the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, the status of certain maritime features in the South China Sea, and the lawfulness of certain actions by the PRC in the South China Sea that the Philippines alleged to be in violation of UNCLOS. The PRC adopted a position of non-acceptance and non-participation in the proceedings. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) based in The Hague (Netherlands) served as Registry in this arbitration. Relevant case information is listed on the PCA website (click here), the full texts of the South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016 can be found on that website as well—PCA Case Nº 2013-19 (English, PDF, 501 pages) and its unofficial Chinese translation (南海問題仲裁 2016 年 7 月 12 日裁决非官方翻譯, PDF, 345 pages). For above press release click here. Please note that the PCA ruling in the South China Sea arbitration was rejected by both the PRC and the ROC.

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Guidelines for the New Southbound Policy

Name in Chinese xin nanxiang zhengce wangling 新南向政策網領
Document type Policy guidelines drafted by the ROC government
Year, date 2016, Aug. 16
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

   A. Key goals of the New Southbound Policy
   B. Implementation principles for the New Southbound Policy
   C. Framework for implementation of the New Southbound Policy

The New Southbound Policy is a crucial part of Taiwan’s economic and trade strategy, which aims to redefine Taiwan’s important role in Asia’s development, identify a new direction and a new driving force for a new stage of economic development, and create future value. In light of this, President Tsai Ing-wen convened a meeting on international economic and trade strategy on August 16, 2016. During the meeting, participants approved the adoption of policy guidelines for the New Southbound Policy. The guidelines clearly set forth the guiding principles of the New Southbound Policy and its short-, medium-, and long-term goals. They will also guide action and serve as a framework for implementation.

These guidelines will shape the direction of government undertakings, coalesce resources and forces in our society, and make it clear to the international community (especially the nations of ASEAN and South Asia) that Taiwan has bona fide intentions to push forward with cooperation projects and engage in talks and dialogue, in order to lay a solid foundation for implementing the New Southbound Policy across the board.

The following is a translation of the full text of the guidelines for the New Southbound Policy.

The New Southbound Policy is a crucial part of Taiwan’s economic and trade strategy. As an important member of both Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, Taiwan must respond to changing global conditions and the trend toward regional integration by making appropriate adjustments. The New Southbound Policy has been adopted in order to identify a new direction and a new driving force for a new stage of Taiwan’s economic development, to redefine Taiwan’s important role in Asia’s development, and to create future value. At the same time, via this policy, our government hopes to start up wide-ranging negotiation and dialogue with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia, with an eye to establishing close cooperation and together achieving regional development and prosperity.

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A. Key goals of the New Southbound Policy

1. Overall and long-term goals

(1) Foster links between Taiwan and the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia in the areas of economic and trade relations, science and technology, and culture; share resources, talent, and markets; and create a new cooperation mode that seeks mutual benefits and win-win situations. By these undertakings, we seek to forge a “sense of economic community.”

(2) Establish mechanisms for wide-ranging negotiation and dialogue; form a consensus for cooperation with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia; effectively resolve related problems and disagreements; and gradually build up mutual trust and a sense of community.

2. Short- to mid-term goals

(1) Use a combination of national will, policy incentives, and business opportunities to spur and expand bilateral exchanges in the areas of economic and trade relations, investment, tourism, culture, and talent.

(2) In support of a New Model for Economic Development, encourage industry to adopt a New Southbound strategy in planning their next moves.

(3) Cultivate more people with the skills needed to support the New Southbound Policy, thereby resolving a developmental bottleneck.

(4) Expand multilateral and bilateral negotiation and dialogue to enhance economic cooperation and resolve disputes and disagreements.

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B. Implementation principles for the New Southbound Policy

1. Settle in for the long haul, forge a sense of economic community

Taiwan already has a strong foundation and favourable conditions for implementation of the New Southbound Policy, but we know from experience and actual circumstances that we cannot expect to achieve instant success, for the road ahead is full of challenges. We must be unwavering and firm in purpose, settle in for the long haul, and seek comprehensive development. We must establish strategic partnerships with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia, and gradually forge a sense of economic community. That is how we will bolster our capabilities and overcome a wide variety of difficulties and bottlenecks.

2. Properly define Taiwan’s future role in regional development

Taiwan’s success in economic development came about because our actions were in line with our comparative advantages — outward-looking strategy and strength in contract manufacturing. This earned Taiwan a place in global supply chains and, within Asia, a key role as a provider of capital and technology and an integrator of resources. Faced with a reshuffling of global supply chains and the rise of emerging economies, Taiwan must redefine its role in the process of regional development. We intend to create a New Model for Economic Development based on the core elements of innovation, employment, and equitable distribution. We further intend to bring about new modes of production and new ways of living that will make Taiwan a model for Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. We hope to act as “an innovator, a sharer, and a provider of services.”

3. Pursue a strategy of four key links

(1) Soft power links

Countries throughout the world expend great efforts to maintain good ties with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia. Taiwan’s main strengths, meanwhile, lie in its soft power in areas such as technology, people and culture. Taiwan should pay especially close attention to soft power as a core aspect of its strategy to link up with other countries. We need to take advantage of Taiwan’s broad experience in medical care, education, technology, and agricultural cooperation as well as small and medium enterprises to promote multilateral and bilateral cooperation with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia.

(2) Supply chain links

In the area of trade and investment, there is a high degree of complementarity between Taiwan and the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia. Due to the impact of structural factors, however, some industries in recent years have stopped growing or even gone into decline. To spur trade and investment, we need to first deal with supply chain integration. This integration is needed in such sectors as information and communications technology (ICT), domestic-demand-driven industries, energy and petrochemicals, new agriculture, and financial services. Division of labour and cooperation in next-generation industries and international trade is another area where we need to act early to put the pieces in place, starting with the five major innovative industries, so as to leave ourselves room for multilateral participation and cooperation. Cooperation involving small and medium enterprises should also be included as a key focal point of cooperation.

(3) Linking regional markets

The nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia are spread out across a vast region, and there are pronounced differences among them in terms of level of development, culture, customs, and legal systems. To boost two-way investment and trade and spur more vigorous economic cooperation, we must strengthen linkages among different markets within the region. Accordingly, investing in soft and hard infrastructure and fostering links with regional markets are key to cooperation with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia, and offer immense business opportunities. Taiwan will need to make an active effort, using the resources at its disposal, to take part in the building of infrastructure in the aforementioned areas. We will also have to capitalize on Taiwan’s technical edge in ICT software to promote online links with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia. In addition, we must at the same time push to adjust our legislation in order to expand links with regional markets.

(4) People-to-people links

Travel and tourism are at the core of people-to-people ties, and a catalyst for intercultural exchange and fusion. If we are to establish close ties with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia, promoting people-to-people links is a core task. We should use tourism and cultural resources to promote two-way ties and exchanges, thereby implementing a people-centred New Southbound spirit.

4. Cultivate more people with the skills needed to support the New Southbound Policy

Overcoming a shortage of people with relevant skill sets is key to the success of the New Southbound Policy. We need to cultivate long-term talent and turn out increased numbers of short-term talent so there will be a deeper labour pool to support the New Southbound Policy. The government must invest more resources. It must provide technical and vocational education, stimulate industrial development, and cultivate more “New Southbound personnel” in order to provide companies with the long- and short-term personnel they need. The government must also encourage immigrants in Taiwan to get involved in the “New Southbound” undertaking, and mainstream language instruction to cultivate personnel with expertise in languages relevant to the New Southbound Policy.

5. Pursue institutionalized bilateral and multilateral cooperation

We have consistently pursued the goals of promoting institutionalized economic cooperation with our major trading partners and taking part in the process of regional economic integration. We need to continue working to sign bilateral investment and taxation agreements with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia, and should actively seek to sign economic cooperation agreements or enter into economic cooperation projects with our major trading partners. Doing so will build up a stronger foundation and momentum for our efforts to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

6. Formulate a comprehensive set of coordinated measures and effective risk controls

If the New Southbound Policy is to endure, we need to engage in comprehensive efforts. Government agencies must play their proper roles by planning out the establishment of comprehensive sets of coordinated measures, including deregulation and steps to ensure the free movement of people, goods, and money. We need to provide convenient financing channels, technical support, and plentiful information, and complement these efforts with foreign aid to support implementation of the New Southbound Policy. On another front, we also need to take risk management seriously and be fully aware of the possible political and economic risks associated with the New Southbound Policy. In pursuing links and cooperation with other countries, we need to adopt plans that are appropriate given local political realities and conditions within local Taiwanese expatriate communities. At the same time, we need to establish early warning and response mechanisms for major incidents in order to effectively control risks.

7. Participate actively in international cooperation

The nations of ASEAN and South Asia are important emerging economies. The United States, Japan, and mainland China all have proactive strategies for developing relations with them, and international organizations such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have all expended resources to assist with regional development. Taiwan should take an active part in international cooperation and establish strategic alliances with friendly countries and together with these countries foster links with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia.

8. Comprehensively enhance mechanisms for talks and dialogue

Pursuing the New Southbound Policy and engaging in wide-ranging communication and dialogue with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia are very important tasks. Taiwan should comprehensively enhance mechanisms for negotiation and dialogue. With the office for international economic and trade negotiations to be established under the auspices of the Executive Yuan, we will further strengthen the international negotiating capabilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and similar agencies, so that we can engage in multi-level and comprehensive negotiations and dialogue with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia aimed at eliminating barriers and impediments rooted in systems and policies.

9. Good-faith cross-strait interactions and cooperation

The two sides of the Taiwan Strait both bear a great responsibility for regional peace and development, and share numerous common interests. In seeking economic cooperation with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia, the two sides each have different resources and advantages. By working together we can multiply our strengths. Therefore, we do not rule out the possibility of engaging in negotiation and dialogue with the other side of the Strait on related matters at opportune moments, so that the New Southbound Policy and cross-strait relations can be mutually reinforcing undertakings, and the two sides can together set a model for regional cooperation.

10. Make good use of private-sector organizations and vitality

The New Southbound Policy has to be thoroughly implemented in all aspects of private-sector exchanges, so it is necessary to make good use of private-sector organizations such as academic, research, religious, cultural, artistic, industrial and commercial groups, as well as associations of Taiwan-invested enterprises and NGOs. We need to encourage and help them to take part in New Southbound Policy endeavours so that private-sector firms can bring their energy fully into play and form a vanguard in implementation of the New Southbound Policy.

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C. Framework for implementation of the New Southbound Policy

1. Division of labour among government agencies

The New Southbound Policy is very broad in its impact. The Office of the President, National Security Council, Executive Yuan, and related Cabinet agencies need to adopt policy guidelines addressing their own areas of responsibility. They need to promote related projects and programs, including flagship programs in different fields, and undertake the relevant work with clear plans, procedures and priorities.

2. Establishing a mechanism for liaison with elected officials and local governments

To fully launch and implement the New Southbound Policy requires the support of elected officials and participation of local governments. For this reason, the central government must establish a mechanism for coordination and liaison with the Legislative Yuan and local governments, in order to consolidate collective strengths in support of the New Southbound Policy, so that it will yield positive results for the country.

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新南向政策網領

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

   壹、新南向政策重要目標
   貳、新南向政策行動準則
   參、新南向政策推動架構

新南向政策是整體對外經貿戰略的重要一環，作為亞洲及亞太地區的重要成員，台灣必須因應全球情勢變化及區域整合趨勢，作出相應的調整。啟動新南向政策，是為我國新階段的經濟發展，尋求新的方向和新的動能，並重新定位台灣在亞洲發展的重要角色，創造未來價值；同時，亦藉此開啓我國和東協、南亞及紐澳等國家廣泛的協商和對話，期能建立緊密的合作，共創區域的發展和繁榮。

壹、新南向政策重要目標

一、總體及長程目標

促進台灣和東協、南亞及紐澳等國家的經貿、科技、文化等各層面的連結，共享資源、人才與市場，創造互利共赢的新合作模式，進而建立「經濟共同體意識」。

建立廣泛的協商和對話機制，形塑和東協、南亞及紐澳等國家的合作共識，並有效解決相關問題和分歧，逐步累積互信及共同體意識。

二、短中程目標

結合國家意志、政策誘因及企業商機，促進並擴大貿易、投資、觀光、文化及人才等雙向交流。

配合經濟發展新模式，推動產業新南向戰略佈局。

充實並培育新南向人才，突破發展瓶頸。

擴大多邊和雙邊協商及對話，加強經濟合作，並化解爭議和分歧。

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貳、新南向政策行動準則

一、長期深耕，建立經濟共同體意識

推動新南向政策，台灣已有長期基礎及有利條件，但從過去經驗及外在環境顯示，新南向是不能急功近利、挑戰重重的道路，我們必須一步一腳印，從長期深耕、全方位發展的方向，和東協、南亞及紐澳等國家建立策略性夥伴的關係，並逐步建立「經濟共同體意識」，才能厚植基礎，突破各種困難和瓶頸。

二、適切定位台灣在區域發展的未來角色

過去台灣經濟發展的成就，立基於符合本身比較利益的外向策略及代工生產模式，在全球供應鏈佔有一席之地，並在亞洲扮演資金、技術提供者及資源整合者的關鍵角色。面對全球供應鏈重整及新興市場崛起，台灣在區域發展的角色須重新定位，未來將致力打造經濟發展新模式，以創新、就業、分配為核心元素，形塑新的生產及生活模式，作為亞洲乃至亞太國家典範，扮演「創新者、分享者及服務者」的角色。

三、推動四大連結策略

1. 軟實力連結

東協、南亞及紐澳等國家，都是世界各國經營關係的重點，台灣的最大優勢在科技、人文等軟實力。未來應特別重視以軟實力為核心的連結策略，運用台灣在醫療、教育、科技發展、農業合作、中小企業等廣泛經驗，推動和東協、南亞及紐澳等國家的多邊或雙邊合作事項。

2. 供應鏈連結

在貿易和投資方面，台灣和東協、南亞及紐澳等國家具有高度互補性，但受結構性因素影響，近年若干產業已出現停滯甚至衰退現象，未來要促進貿易和投資，須從供應鏈整合著手，在資通訊、內需產業、能源及石化、新農業、金融服務等領域，建立供應鏈的連結。在下一世代的產業和貿易分工合作方面，亦須及早佈局，從五大創新產業切入，為多邊參與及合作預留空間；中小企業合作也應納為合作重點。

3. 區域市場連結

東協、南亞及紐澳等國家所處地域遼闊，發展程度、文化、習俗、法規制度等差異甚大，要促進雙向投資及貿易，擴大經濟合作動能，必須加強區域內不同市場的連結，因此，投資軟硬體基礎設施，加強區域市場連結，既是和東協、南亞及紐澳等國家合作的關鍵，也是龐大商機。未來須依據我們本身的條件，積極爭取參與該等地區的基礎建設，並運用台灣在資通訊軟體的技術優勢，推動和東協、南亞及紐澳等國家的網路連結。另一方面，應同步推動法規制度的調整，以擴大和區域市場的連結。

4. 人和人連結

觀光旅遊是人民和人民往來的核心，也是不同文化交流融合的催化劑，要建立和東協、南亞及紐澳等國家的緊密關係，推動人與人的連結是核心工程，未來應結合觀光和文化資源，推動雙向往來和交流，落實以人為核心的新南向精神。

四、充實及培育南向人才

新南向政策成功的關鍵，在於突破南向人才短缺的瓶頸，未來須從培育長期人才及充實短期人才，雙管齊下，充裕新南向人才庫。政府應投入更多資源，結合技職教育、產業發展和南向人才培育，提供企業所需的長短期人才，並應鼓勵新住民參與新南向工作，及普及語言訓練，充裕新南向的語言人才。

五、推動雙邊和多邊制度化合作

推動和主要貿易夥伴的制度化經濟合作，參與區域經濟整合，是我們一貫目標及努力的方向。未來應繼續推動和東協、南亞及紐澳等國家簽訂雙邊投資、租稅等協定，並積極和主要貿易夥伴洽簽ECA或個別項目經濟合作，以厚植加入TPP、RCEP的基礎和能量。

六、規劃完整配套及有效控管風險

新南向政策要可長可久，須作綜合性、全方位的努力，政府各部門都要扮演適切角色，規劃建立完整的配套，包括鬆綁法規，暢通人流、物流及金流，提供便利融資管道、技術支援及充分資訊，以及外援配合等，以支援新南向政策工作的落實推動。另一方面，亦須重視風險管理，充分掌握新南向國家可能的政治及經濟風險；推動和個別國家的連結及合作，應依據當地政情及僑情，作適切規劃，同時應建立重大事件預警及應變機制，有效管控各種可能的風險。

七、積極參與國際合作

東協及南亞國家屬新興市場的重要一環，美國、日本、中國大陸等皆有積極性策略拓展和該等國家關係，國際組織包括世銀、亞銀等亦投入資源協助區域發展，台灣應積極參與國際合作，並和友我國家建立策略聯盟關係，共同開拓和東協及南亞國家之各項連結。

八、全面強化協商對話機制

推動新南向政策，展開和東協、南亞及紐澳等國家廣泛的溝通和對話，是非常重要且關鍵的工作，未來應全面強化協商及對話機制，並配合行政院對外經貿談判辦公室成立，結合外交部、經濟部等相關機關，提高對外談判能量，和東協、南亞及紐澳等國家進行多層次、全方位的協商及對話，以排除各種制度性和政策性的障礙及阻力。

九、兩岸善意互動及合作

在區域和平及發展上，海峽兩岸都肩負很大的責任，也存在很多共同的利益，和東協、南亞及紐澳等國家的經濟合作，兩岸各具不同條件和優勢，若相互合作，可以發揮更大的力量。所以，未來不排除在適當時機，和對岸就相關議題及合作事項，展開協商和對話，促使新南向政策和兩岸關係能相輔相成，共創區域合作的典範。

十、善用民間組織及活力

新南向政策須普遍落實在民間各個層面的交流，因此，須善用民間組織包括學術、科研、宗教、文化、藝術、工商團體、台商協會、NGO等，鼓勵及協助其參與新南向工作，讓民間活力可以充分發揮，扮演新南向前鋒的角色。

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參、新南向政策推動架構

一、政府部門分工

新南向政策涉及範圍廣泛，總統府、國安會、行政院、各有關部會，應本於各自權責，擬定政策綱領、整體推動方案、個別工作計畫及各領域的旗艦計畫，有計畫、有步驟、有重點地循序展開相關工作。

二、建立和民意部門及地方政府的協調機制

新南向政策要全面展開、落實推動，亦須有民意部門支持與地方政府的參與及配合，因此，中央政府應建立和立法院及地方政府的協調及連繫機制，結合整體力量，為新南向政策作出積極的貢獻和成果。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The "New Southbound Policy" (xin nanxiang zhengce 新南向政策, abbrev. NSP) is a political concept by ROC President Tsai Ing-wen introduced at the beginning of her first term. It unfolded as follows:

  • 2015, Sept. 22: The NSP is mentioned for the first time by DPP chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen
  • 2016, May 18: The DPP announces plans for the establishment of a New Southbound Policy Office under the ROC Presidential Office
  • 2016, May 20: In her inaugural address, President Tsai elaborates about the NSP
  • 2016, June 15: The New Southbound Policy Office starts operations
  • 2016, Aug. 16: The Guidelines for the New Southbound Policy (xin nanxiang zhengce wangling 新南向政策網領) are announced
  • 2016, Sept. 5: The New Southbound Policy Promotion Plan (xin nanxiang zhengce tuidong jihua 新南向政策推動計畫) is introduced
  • 2016, Dec. 14: The New Southbound Policy Working Plan (xin nanxiang zhengce gongzuo jihua 新南向政策工作計畫) is finalized
  • 2017, Dec. 13: ROC Presidential Office Spokesman Alex Huang 黃重諺 announces that the New Southbound Policy Office is slated to be shut down in 2018
  • 2018, Jan. 1: The New Southbound Policy Office closes
  • 2018, Jan. 28: ROC Premier Lai Ching-te 賴清德 approves the formation of a 10-person New Southbound Policy Task Force (xin nanxiang gongzuo xiaozu 新南向工作小組)
  • 2022, Jan. 5: President Tsai appoints Lin Chia-lung 林佳龍 ambassador-at-large (wurensuo dashi 無任所大使) for digital NSP initiatives

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New Southbound Policy Promotion Plan

Name in Chinese xin nanxiang zhengce tuidong jihua 新南向政策推動計畫
Document type Policy memorandum drafted by the ROC government
Year, date 2016, Sept. 5
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  1. Promote economic collaboration
  2. Conduct talent exchange
  3. Share resources
  4. Forge regional links

The Executive Yuan today (September 5, 2016) unveiled a plan to promote the New Southbound Policy that aims to strengthen Taiwan’s trade and economic ties with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Asian countries, as well as New Zealand and Australia.

Centered on the values of “settling in for the long haul, seeking comprehensive development, and creating mutual benefits,” the plan is based on policy guidelines approved by President Tsai Ing-wen August 16 during a meeting on international economic and trade strategy.

Under the plan, the government will integrate the resources and strengths of the public and private sectors to forge a new mutually beneficial model of cooperation and a sense of economic community with those countries. The plan consists of four main components:

1. Promote economic collaboration:

Rather than regarding ASEAN and South Asia as contract manufacturing bases for exports, Taiwan will forge new partnerships by integrating with those countries’ supply chains, connecting with their domestic demand markets, and cooperating on infrastructure projects.

a. Supply chains:

Based on the capacities and demands of industries in those countries, Taiwan’s competitive industries should integrate with their supply chains. For instance, starting with the five major innovative industries (biomedicine, an Asian Silicon Valley, intelligent machinery, green energy technology and national defense), Taiwan can export or help set up internet-of-things systems for electronic toll collection, smart health care and intelligent school campuses. The government will also set up a Taiwan Desk using local resources to help overseas Taiwanese enterprises form business clusters. A single window for southbound economy and trade expansion will serve as the platform for seeking, creating, integrating and promoting bilateral trade opportunities.

b. Domestic demand markets:

Use cross-border electronic and physical distribution channels to sell quality and affordable products. Export new service industries including education, health, medical care and dining. Shape Taiwan’s industrial brand image.

c. Infrastructure projects:

Create a collaborative platform for exporting infrastructure construction services and turnkey projects. Form export teams on energy, petrochemical and environmental infrastructure. Build strategic alliances with third-country service providers.

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2. Conduct talent exchange:

With a focus on people, deepen bilateral exchange and cultivation of young scholars, students and industry professionals. Share and complement human resources with partner countries.

a. Education ties:

Expand scholarships to draw more students from ASEAN and South Asia. Depending on domestic industry needs, create courses on academia-industry cooperation and foreign youth technical training, and provide job matching services after their graduation. Encourage universities and colleges to set up campuses or courses abroad or offer preparatory programs. Offer elementary and junior high school language courses for new immigrants, and encourage universities and colleges to cultivate more Southeast Asian language experts and regional trade professionals.

b. Industry talent:

Assess and establish a points-based system allowing residency extensions for eligible foreign professional or technical workers in Taiwan, and encourage them to obtain job skills training and professional certification. Promote exchanges of professional talent by protecting social welfare benefits for workers returning to Taiwan, streamline procedures for foreign workers coming to Taiwan, match workers to employers, and help domestic businesses find talent.

c. New immigrants:

Help first-generation immigrants use their linguistic and cultural advantages to obtain work certification and job opportunities (such as language teaching and tourism-related work). Help second-generation immigrants connect with their ancestral countries by encouraging universities to establish appropriate departments or curriculums, and give admission priority to students speaking Southeast Asian languages.

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3. Share resources:

Capitalize on Taiwan’s soft powers to promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation in culture, tourism, medical care, technology, agriculture, and small and medium-sized enterprises. Improve quality of life in partner countries and expand Taiwan’s economic footprint.

a. Health care:

Cooperate with ASEAN, South Asia, New Zealand and Australia on bilateral pharmaceutical certifications and new drug and medical equipment development. Help ASEAN and South Asia cultivate medical care and public health workers.

b. Culture:

Use film, broadcasting and online games to market Taiwan’s cultural brand. Encourage Taiwan’s local governments to engage in exchanges and cooperation with cities in ASEAN, South Asia, New Zealand and Australia.

c. Tourism:

Ease visa requirements for ASEAN and South Asian tourists to Taiwan. Promote Taiwan tourism through different channels, raise the quality and quantity of tour guides, create a Muslim-friendly travel environment.

d. Technology:

Build technology exchange platforms, strengthen international connections at Taiwan’s science parks and research institutes, promote exchanges in smart disaster prevention technologies.

e. Agriculture:

Establish a “Taiwan international agricultural development company” to promote Taiwan’s brand to overseas markets. Provide agricultural technology assistance, expand use of biomaterials and agricultural machinery, improve the business capabilities of partner countries.

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4. Forge regional links:

Systematize bilateral and multilateral cooperation with partner countries, strengthen negotiations and dialogue. Change previous patterns of individual effort and draw on the collective strength of private groups, overseas Taiwanese networks and third countries. Advance regional safety and prosperity.

a. Regional integration:

Actively pursue economic cooperation agreements or individual economic cooperation provisions with India and major ASEAN trade partners. Update and strengthen current bilateral investment and taxation treaties, improve risk management by creating major event alert and emergency response mechanisms.

b. Negotiations and dialogue:

Promote multilevel and all-encompassing negotiations and dialogue with ASEAN, South Asia, New Zealand and Australia. Open dialogue and negotiations with China at a suitable time on relevant topics and cooperation matters.

c. Strategic alliances:

Reallocate foreign aid resources, build a comprehensive foreign aid mechanism, encourage more businesses to participate in local development projects of other countries. Join third countries (such as Japan and Singapore) in efforts to tap markets in ASEAN, South Asia, New Zealand and Australia. Strengthen cooperation between private corporations and nongovernmental organizations.

d. Overseas Taiwanese networks:

Create an overseas Taiwanese database and exchange platform (including for foreign graduates of Taiwan universities, Taiwanese businesses operating abroad, and overseas ethnic Chinese). Connect with overseas ethnic Chinese and overseas Taiwanese business networks and strengthen their links with Taiwanese corporations.

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新南向政策推動計畫

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

   一、經貿合作
   二、人才交流
   三、資源共享
   四、區域鏈結

行政院依據總統於105年8月16日召開之對外經貿戰略會談，通過之「新南向政策」政策綱領，於105年9月5日正式提出「新南向政策推動計畫」。「新南向政策推動計畫」將秉持「長期深耕、多元開展、雙向互惠」核心理念，整合各部會、地方政府，以及民間企業與團體的資源與力量，從「經貿合作」、「人才交流」、「資源共享」與「區域鏈結」四大面向著手，期望與東協、南亞及紐澳等國家，創造互利共贏的新合作模式，建立「經濟共同體意識」。

本推動計畫請行政院經貿談判辦公室負責政策協調及推動執行，務求各相關部會擬訂具體方案與工作項目，並設定KPI，國發會負責管考作業，務必如期如質完成既定目標。以下茲就本案四大工作主軸說明如下：

一、經貿合作

改變過去以東協及南亞為出口代工基地的型態，擴大與夥伴國產業供應鏈整合、內需市場連結及基建工程合作，建立新經貿夥伴關係。

產業價值鏈整合：針對當地產業能量與需求，強化具競爭優勢產業與各國供應鏈之結合，如由五大創新產業切入，輔導電子收費-ETC、智慧醫療、智慧校園等物聯網系統輸出；成立臺灣窗口（Taiwan Desk），連結在地資源，協助臺商在地群聚布局，成立新南向經貿拓展單一窗口，扮演「尋找、開創、整合、促成」雙邊貿易機會之平臺。

內需市場連結：善用跨境電商搭配實體通路，拓銷優質平價消費商品，推動教育、健康、醫療、餐飲等新興服務產業輸出，並型塑臺灣產業品牌形象。

基建工程合作：成立基礎建設及整廠輸出之海外輸出協作平臺，籌組電廠、石化、環保等基礎建設輸出旗艦團隊，尋求與第三國廠商策略聯盟。

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二、人才交流

強調以「人」為核心，深化雙邊青年學者、學生、產業人力的交流與培育，促進與夥伴國人才資源的互補與共享。

教育深耕：擴編臺灣獎學金，吸引東協及南亞學生；配合國內產業需求，建立「產學合作專班」、「外國青年技術訓練班」，並提供學成後媒合就業；鼓勵大學校院赴海外開設分校或專班，或開辦先修銜接教育課程；推動國中小新住民語文教學，鼓勵大學校院強化東南亞語言及區域貿易人才培育。

產業人力：針對來臺從事專門性或技術性工作的外籍移工，研議建立評點制度，符合條件者可延長居留年限，並鼓勵參與技職培訓與報考證照；強化雙向專業人力交流，確保赴外工作人員回臺社福保障之銜接，並簡化來臺申辦程序，強化人才供需媒合，協助國內企業尋才。

新住民力量發揮：協助第一代新住民利用其語言及文化之優勢，取得相關證照與就業（如母語教學、觀光等）；鼓勵大專院校開設南向專業科系或學程，給予具南向語言優勢的學生加分錄取機會，培育第二代新住民為南向種籽。

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三、資源共享

運用文化、觀光、醫療、科技、農業、中小企業等軟實力，爭取雙邊及多邊合作機會，提升夥伴國生活品質，並拓展我國經貿發展縱深。

醫療：促進與東協、南亞及紐澳國家醫藥雙邊認證、新藥及醫材開發合作；協助東協及南亞國家培育醫療衛生人才。

文化：藉由影視、廣播、線上遊戲，行銷臺灣文化品牌；鼓勵地方政府與東協、南亞及紐澳國家，進行城市交流與合作。

觀光：放寬東協及南亞國家來臺觀光簽證；多元宣傳觀光，提高導遊質量，建立穆斯林旅遊之友善環境。

科技：建置科技交流平臺，強化科學園區及法人跨國鏈結，推動智慧災防等技術交流。

農業：成立「台灣國際農業開發（股）公司」，以國家品牌擴展海外市場；提供農技協助，推廣生物性資材及農機具，提升夥伴國經營能力。

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四、區域鏈結

擴大與夥伴國的多邊與雙邊制度化合作，加強協商及對話，並改變過去單打獨鬥模式，善用民間團體、僑民網絡及第三國力量，共同促進區域的安定與繁榮。

區域整合：積極和東協主要貿易夥伴與印度洽簽ECA或個別經濟合作項目；更新及強化已簽訂的雙邊投資及租稅協定，並建立重大事件預警及應變機制，有效掌握可能風險。

協商對話：推動與東協、南亞及紐澳進行多層次、全方位的協定與對話，並於適當時機和對岸就相關議題及合作事項，展開對話及協商。

策略聯盟：調整援外資源配置，完善援外推動機制，擴大業者參與當地國經建計畫；與第三國(如日本、新加坡)協力進軍東協、南亞及紐澳市場，並強化與民間企業及NGO團體合作。

僑民網絡：建立僑民資料庫與交流平臺（包括：留臺畢業生、當地臺商、僑民）；善用在地僑商及臺商經貿網絡，強化與臺灣企業的連結。

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New Southbound Policy Working Plan

Name in Chinese xin nanxiang zhengce gongzuo jihua 新南向政策工作計畫
Document type Detailed policy concept designed by the ROC government
Year, date 2016, Dec. 14
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   Introduction
   1. Economic and Trade Cooperation
   2. Talent Exchange
   3. Resource Sharing
   4. Regional Integration

Introduction

The global and domestic circumstances of Taiwan’s economy have undergone rapid changes in recent years. In the global economy, mainland China is facing many obstacles following three decades of rapid economic development, such as industrial structural transformation, adjustments in laws and institutions, a sharp increase in production costs, and a slowdown in economic growth. Meanwhile, the economies of Southeast and South Asia have continued to expand, raising their consumers’ purchasing power. These countries also actively participate in regional economic integration to maximize their firms’ competitiveness, creating greater business opportunities.

This region has consequently emerged as a bright spot of global economic growth. Currently, the total GDP of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which have a combined population of approximately 620 million, has reached US$2.4 trillion. The six South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan) have a total population of nearly 1.7 billion and a GDP of US$2.7 trillion. According to Global Insight forecasts, the average annual economic growth rates for the ASEAN and South Asian countries will reach 4.9% and 7.4%, respectively, over the next five years (2017-2021), which is notably higher than the global average of 3.1%. Following this economic growth, a new middle class with remarkable purchasing power will gradually emerge in these countries, forming markets full of business opportunities.

Domestically, Taiwan is entering a critical period of industrial transformation and structural adjustment, in which wage growth has stagnated, talented people are in short supply, and economic growth is decelerating. Although Taiwan has previously maintained trade and economic relations with many emerging markets in Asia, most of these relations are based on export processing and related investment, not on the local markets themselves. Moreover, the majority of these export items are manufactured goods with little value added. Due to Taiwan’s difficulties in participating in regional economic integration, these products are greatly affected by tariffs and trade barriers, and Taiwanese companies face severe competition. These problems are hindering Taiwan’s export and economic growth. Taiwan also has a high concentration of trade and outbound investment in mainland China, which poses potential risks to Taiwan’s economy and security.

Under these new circumstances, Taiwan’s strategy for economic and foreign relations in the Asia-Pacific region is to engage in structural adjustment to promote growth and support the transformation of domestic industries. In this context, President Tsai Ing-wen in her inaugural speech on May 20, 2016, highlighted the importance of promoting the New Southbound Policy to improve Taiwan’s stance and versatility in the international economy, stating that Taiwan should step away from relying on a single market, and re-establish ties with the rest of Asia.

On August 16, 2016, President Tsai convened a meeting on international economic and trade strategy, formally adopting the Guidelines for the New Southbound Policy. She positioned the New Southbound Policy as a key component of Taiwan’s overall international economic and trade strategy, asserting that Taiwan should seek out new directions and capacities for a new stage of economic development, and redefine Taiwan’s position in the development of Asia to create value for the future. In response, the Executive Yuan introduced the New Southbound Policy Promotion Plan on September 5 of that year, and consequently directed the Office of Trade Negotiations to coordinate all tasks concerning the New Southbound Policy.

The guidelines elucidate the vision and short- to mid-term goals of the New Southbound Policy. One of these goals entails creating a new model of mutually beneficial cooperation between Taiwan and these 18 countries by promoting links in trade, technology, and culture, as well as by sharing resources, talent, and markets. Another goal is to establish extensive negotiation and dialogue channels to form a consensus for cooperation with countries included in the New Southbound Policy and effectively resolve relevant problems and disagreements, thereby gradually building mutual trust and ultimately forging a sense of economic community.

By achieving these goals, Taiwan will partner with New Southbound Policy target countries to pursue economic prosperity, talent and resource sharing, quality-of-life innovation, and international connection and reciprocity. Therefore, the New Southbound Policy will follow the core ideas of “Settling in for the long haul, comprehensive engagement, and two-way reciprocity”. It will also integrate the resources and efforts of various ministries, local governments, and the private sector to achieve the four objectives of economic and trade cooperation, talent exchange, resource sharing, and regional integration. Moreover, the policy will focus on lateral connections with countries included in the New Southbound Policy to create a new and mutually beneficial model of cooperation and economic community.

It is against this background that the policy pursues four main tasks: In promoting economic and trade cooperation, it aims to facilitate Taiwanese firms moving beyond the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) production model; connecting with countries in the New Southbound Policy area; enhance cooperation among industries and in infrastructure projects; and export integrated systems services.

In terms of talent exchange, the policy aims to adopt a people-centred, two-way exchange strategy while balancing the needs of Taiwan and countries in the New Southbound Policy area. It is not geared toward a unilateral employment of foreign workers, but rather the bilateral fostering of talent, thereby enhancing the complementarities and cooperation of human resources. In resource sharing, the policy aims to maximize the soft power advantages of Taiwan’s medical, cultural, tourism, technology, and agriculture industries, and use them as a stepping stone to establishing and reinforcing relations with New Southbound Policy target countries, thereby creating bilateral or multilateral cooperation opportunities. In regional integration, the policy aims to promote bilateral or multilateral institutionalized cooperation, to elevate the level of negotiations and dialogue between Taiwan and these countries. Moreover, it relies on international cooperation to establish Taiwan’s partnership with these countries.

Overall, the New Southbound Policy is a component of Taiwan’s comprehensive economic and foreign relations strategy to keep abreast of current international and domestic trends. The policy aims not only to diversify trade and economic risks, but also to seek market opportunities, identify new driving forces for Taiwan’s economy, and redefine Taiwan’s role in the international supply chain. Through meaningful participation in international communities, Taiwan intends to help achieve regional peace and prosperity.

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1. Economic and Trade Cooperation

1.1. Policy Orientation

Taiwan has long-standing and strong economic and trade relations with a number of Southeast Asian countries. However, these countries generally serve as production bases for OEM processing, export trade or investment, focusing less on domestic markets. In recent years, many Southeast Asian and South Asian economies have flourished, drastically increasing spending power. These advancements, coupled with the rise of a new middle class, have created domestic markets with immense business potential, emerging as the new focus of global economic growth.

To enable Taiwanese businesses to reap the benefits brought about by the growth of Southeast Asian and South Asian economies, the economic and trade cooperation objective of the New Southbound Policy is to allow Taiwanese companies to transcend their previous export processing models for ASEAN and South Asia, and establish bilateral industrial cooperation and trade exchange models with countries included in the New Southbound Policy, using the markets of the New Southbound countries to expand domestic markets.

From the perspective of foreign investment motivation, Taiwanese businesses should shift from defensive, cost-centred investment strategies to expansive, market-centred strategies. From a strategic perspective, they should shift from processing and manufacturing operations to create own-brand and distribution operations. From a mode of operations perspective, they should shift from a one-product-fits-all production and sales model to one that manufactures and markets products suited to different markets. Moreover, businesses should enhance the added value of their products and services, such as converting single-item products or services into software-hardware integrated systems and package plant export.

In context of the development of local spending and infrastructure as well as the demand for industrial transition, the economic and trade cooperation between Taiwan and New Southbound Policy target countries can be initiated by supporting the integration of industry value chains, domestic market connections, infrastructure construction cooperation, and systems integration services in order to pave the way for the next generation of industrial and trade cooperation. Medium-to-high-income urban consumers should be selected as the target customers in formulating customized marketing strategies that utilize cross-border e-commerce and physical distribution channels to overcome marketing obstructions and promote trade and investment. Moreover, Taiwanese businesses should secure strategic alliances with multinational corporations to compete for infrastructure construction projects and opportunities to collaborate with emerging industries. Taiwanese businesses should also strive to eliminate market entry obstructions by establishing a dedicated service window for collecting market data and establishing interpersonal networks, thereby promoting the mutual prosperity of Taiwan’s economy and the economies of countries included in the New Southbound Policy.

1.2. Policy Objectives

(1)To accurately understand the industrial development conditions, industrial development demands, and opportunities for reciprocal cooperation in New Southbound Policy target countries; establish bilateral dialogue through the involvement of industry associations and corporate bodies; and promote industry cooperation that profits both parties.
(2)To review and adjust existing trade expansion activities, enhance their effectiveness, and ensure cost-effectiveness; utilize and innovate competitive Taiwanese products and services (e.g., agricultural products) to expand marketing activities and pro-actively expand into the domestic markets of countries included in the New Southbound Policy.
(3)To organize exhibitions in major cities to promote the image and products of Taiwan and reinforce the promotion of Taiwan in general exhibitions and marketing events.
(4)To provide sufficient information on industry, investment, trade, and tax laws and regulations in New Southbound Policy target countries to Taiwanese enterprises; and to provide necessary risk management assistance and guidance to enterprises.
(5)To utilize organizational and collective efforts in securing consultation and advisory services or providing construction tenders for competitive infrastructure construction and systems integration export bidding.
(6)To increase the capital and funding for the Import-Export Bank of the ROC and overseas trusts; provide adequate funds (e.g., financing, bonds, securities, and buyer’s credit) to businesses for expanding into overseas markets by utilizing the resources of commercial and government-run banks; as well as encouraging Taiwanese banks to establish branches in countries included in the New Southbound Policy to provide local services to Taiwanese enterprises.

1.3. Operational Guidelines and Specifications

The newly passed or added operational guidelines and projects for 2017 are as follows:

1.3.1. Industry Cooperation and Trade/Economic Expansion

(1)Promoting two-way industry cooperation: This aims to prioritize think tanks and research teams to promote national and industrial development features, and clearly assess cooperation regions and methods, thereby establishing and reinforcing long-term and stable industrial links, promoting two-way industry associations and positive exchanges between think tanks and technical entities, and stipulating official economics and trade discussion outlines. The goal is to garner industry cooperation opportunities with no fewer than four New Southbound target countries, establish industrial exchange platforms and activities, and sign at least one cooperation agreement or memorandum each year.
(2)Engaging in comprehensive trade expansion: This aims to select potential products, such as locally in-demand consumables, machines, tools, and medical equipment, and services, such as digital content, franchises, information services, healthcare, and catering, for overseas expansion, with dispatching interdisciplinary consultation service teams and establishing e-commerce channels as the focus for trade expansion. A marketing centre for Taiwanese products and a machine buyer alliance will be established to foster technical operators in the target market. Innovative marketing methods, such as arranging a Taiwan Industry Day, can be adopted to achieve comprehensive trade expansion. The goal is to provide over 17,500 services to enterprises in e-commerce and e-marketing, creating at least US$420 million in purchasing value. In terms of service expansion, the goal is to serve over 50 enterprises and create at least US$30 million in business value. Moreover, no fewer than three machine buyer alliances will be established to serve no fewer than 300 local alliance members.
(3)Expanding e-commerce in southbound markets: This aims to provide assistance to local e-commerce providers to expand into ASEAN markets and cooperate with local businesses or operate domestically. Assistance will also be provided to e-commerce providers such as PChome, Momo and Uitox in seeking out local distributors or support providers in establishing local cash and material flow service systems and reinforcing local competitiveness. Moreover, local businesses will be aided in integrating into local community operations to improve Taiwanese e-commerce platforms and enhance the popularity and circulation of key products, thereby ensuring the integrity of the cross-border operation ecosystems in ASEAN countries. The goal is to get no fewer than 3,000 products from 200 Taiwanese brands on shelves per year.
(4)Reinforcing the export of agricultural products: This aims to establish the International Taiwan Agriculture Development Company to create an export and supply system that provides stable product quantity and quality. Subsequently, fresh and frozen produce will be the main export products. The goal is to ship fresh and frozen products to the 18 countries included in the New Southbound Policy in 2017 and increase export volume by 10% compared with 2015.
(5)Reinforcing Taiwan’s overall image: The goal is to organize no fewer than four Taiwanese exhibitions in key cities in New Southbound Policy target countries and establish Taiwan boutique displays in at least 11 overseas exhibition events to increase the level of acceptance of Taiwanese products by Southeast Asian customers by 3% per year.
(6)Assisting the expansion of Taiwanese businesses: This aims to establish Taiwanese offices in a number of New Southbound Policy target countries, including Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Myanmar, and India, to provide Taiwanese businesses with information concerning domestic laws, accounting, taxation, and industries. The goal is to provide no fewer than 1,000 investment consultation services, including investment environment safety reports in the countries included in the New Southbound Policy, as well as risk management assistance.

1.3.2. Infrastructure Construction Cooperation and Systems Integration Exports

(1)Promoting infrastructure construction cooperation: This aims to combine five major fields, namely Electronic Toll Collection (ETC), Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) systems, environmental engineering, power plants, and petrochemical plants, with potential businesses to establish an export team. The team aims to provide consultation and advisory services and construction export in New Southbound Policy target countries. The team will establish a construction globalization platform and related meetings to coordinate and overcome the challenges which the construction industry’s offshore operations face. The goal is to secure at least one consultation and advisory contract for international ETC in 2017, at least one consultation and advisory contract for MRT maintenance and electronic ticketing, at least one offshore construction or expansion contract concerning environmental protection or resource mining, at least one contract for the construction of a power plant, and at least one contract for the construction of a petrochemical plant.
(2)Enhancing systems integration exports: This aims to combine seven major fields — namely green transportation, smart logistics, smart healthcare, smart campus technology, e-government, light-emitting diode (LED) technology, and cloud systems — with potential businesses to establish an export team. The goal is to secure at least five contracts in New Southbound Policy target countries; establish four industry alliances for information and communication, engineering, security control, and green energy; and establish three teams to secure government procurement contracts in New Southbound Policy countries.

1.3.3. Financial Support

(1)Augmenting the finance functions of the Import-Export Bank of the ROC: This aims to gradually increase relevant capital to NT$3.2 billion by 2018. The already-established Export Loan Platform for the Systems, Finishing Plant, and Construction Industries will be combined with the financial resources of government-run and commercial banks to enhance the financing services provided to enterprises, provide discount financing and assurance conditions, upgrade insurance premiums, and provide discounts for buyer credit fees. The goal is to secure an approval rate of 4.95% from the Import-Export Bank for loans related to the New Southbound Policy, and achieve an annual assurance quota growth of 2%.
(2)Enhancing the assurance function of overseas trusts and funds: This aims to expand funds and project finance assurances in Southeast Asia to include New Southbound countries. The goal is to increase the limit for each project to US$2 million and achieve an annual assurance quota growth of 6% for offshore credit guarantee funds.
(3)Increase the number of offshore branches of Taiwanese banks: This aims to provide assistance to local banks to establish three offshore branches in New Southbound Policy target countries. The goal is to approve the establishment of three offshore branches each year.

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2. Talent Exchange

2.1. Policy Orientation

Based on geography, the overseas Taiwanese community, and industry development policies, Taiwan’s talent exchanges with ASEAN and South Asian countries have been largely unidirectional. Seldom are these exchanges bilateral. To satisfy the demands of both parties, a people-centred, two-way exchange strategy will be implemented to reinforce education, industrial talent exchange, and supplementation and cooperation between the talent resources of Taiwan and those in ASEAN and South Asian countries. The talent exchange objective of the New Southbound Policy transcends the previous narrow considerations of domestic demand; instead, the policy aims to attract blue-collar workers from the New Southbound countries to satisfy the demands of and promote growth in all countries (for blue- and white-collar workers alike). The policy focuses on two-way exchange to develop lifelong learning plans and environmental measures for talent in both countries. The policy not only aims to enhance the quality of talent in New Southbound countries, but also to foster relevant talent for enterprises in Taiwan, increasing employment and income in Taiwan as well as the New Southbound countries, thereby promoting mutually beneficial relationships.

The success factor of the New Southbound Policy is that it eliminates the talent shortage bottleneck in these countries. By supplying short-term talents and fostering long-term talents, New Southbound countries can develop robust talent pools. There are currently about 590,000 blue-collar workers and 150,000 foreign spouses in Taiwan. These are human resources who should be fully utilized to develop talent in order to manage New Southbound markets and serve as a bridge between Taiwan and the New Southbound countries. Moreover, the policy aims to foster second-generation immigrants in Taiwan to become the candidates to actuate the New Southbound Policy.

In addition, in order to satisfy the demands of industries in Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and South Asia, the policy aims to utilize the technical education advantage of Taiwan to invest in professional talent cultivation and skills training in Southeast Asia and South Asia, including two-way student exchanges, two-way education collaboration, and generalized language training, thereby fostering short- and long-term talents who meet industry requirements.

2.2. Policy Objectives

(1)To provide training to students in New Southbound countries in the areas of Taiwanese experience, technical practices, and communication, thereby increasing acceptance towards the higher education and technical training quality of Taiwan; and to form strong associations through the efforts of Taiwanese associations.
(2)To provide training to students in Taiwan in the areas of economics and trade management, cultural understanding, and ASEAN languages, thereby reinforcing their understanding and acknowledgement of New Southbound countries and fostering talent with an understanding of regional economics and trade as well as relevant laws and regulations.
(3)To assist Taiwanese vendors and companies in cultivating domestic professionals, increasing the human resources in New Southbound enterprises, developing key industries, and enhancing competitiveness.
(4)To make foreign workers and international students into suitable candidates to promote industrial development in Taiwan or manage Taiwanese companies in Southeast Asia, thereby creating a mutually beneficial situation.
(5)To encourage the involvement of Southeast Asian immigrants and urge them to promote their culture, thereby expediting cultural exchanges and strengthening ties between Taiwan and New Southbound countries.

2.3. Operational Guidelines and Specifications

The newly ratified or promoted operational guidelines and specification for 2017 are as follows:

2.3.1. Talent Cultivation

(1)Integrating and increasing scholarships to attract international students: This objective aims to integrate and increase Taiwanese scholarships, Taiwanese language scholarships, short-term research scholarships, government scholarships, the Southern Sunshine Scholarship, and the TEEP scholarships to attract outstanding international students to study in Taiwan. In addition, the aim is to increase elite international student scholarships, outstanding international student scholarships to help colleges and universities establish research institutes, as well as subsidized scholarships for low-income overseas Taiwanese students. The goal is to achieve 10% annual growth in the number of applications for the Taiwan New Southbound Subsidization and Grants program in accordance with the New Southbound Policy, increase the number of students enrolled in technical training courses for international students (the target is 1,400, 1,540, 1,680, and 1,820 for 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively), and multiply the number of students enrolled in technical and vocational courses for international students (the target goal is 1,500 every year between 2017 and 2020).
(2)Encouraging students to study in ASEAN and South Asian countries: The objective is to establish government-sponsored scholarships for New Southbound countries and expand the Pilot Overseas Internship Project to ASEAN and South Asian countries. The goal is to allocate government-sponsored, research, or internship scholarships to no less than 200 students in New Southbound countries.
(3)Establishing the Contact Taiwan recruitment platform and promoting the Taiwan Connection Project: This objective aims to establish the Contact Taiwan recruitment platform to connect foreign and domestic international students with enterprises and help enterprises find the talent they require. Moreover, the Taiwan Connection Project will be promoted in Taiwan to integrate overseas offices, Taiwanese education centres, Taiwanese school teachers, Taiwanese alumni associations, Taiwanese academic seminars, Taiwanese schools in Southeast Asia, and Taiwanese vendor organizations. The goal is to establish 10 new connections through the Taiwan Connection project in 2017.

2.3.2 Industry/Labour Cooperation

(1)Organizing academic-industry cooperation (AIC) and technical training courses: This objective aims to arrange AIC courses (degree courses), short-term technical training courses (non-degree courses), and short-term professional teacher-training courses (non-degree courses) for international students from the New Southbound countries. The goal is to train 1,600, 200, and 200 students in the respective courses by the end of 2017.
(2)Subsidizing internship programs: The goal is to provide subsidies to 500 Taiwanese trainees and interns in Taiwanese companies or multinational corporations in ASEAN and South Asian countries in the fields of commerce, engineering, medicine, agriculture, and education in 2017, as well as scholarships to 120 Taiwanese international trade students interning in companies or institutes in Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and India.
(3)Attracting experienced foreign technical professionals: This objective is aimed at planning and establishing an assessment system for experienced foreign technical professionals and increasing the assessments of southbound developing industries in the Government Cooperation Policy in order to encourage Taiwanese vendors in New Southbound countries to continue operating in Taiwan or expand overseas. The goal is to task the Consultative Group on Transnational Workforce Policy in formulating an assessment system for experienced foreign technical professionals in Taiwan in 2017.
(4)Establishing a business and recruitment information platform for Taiwanese vendors: The goal is to complete the establishment and activation of a business and recruitment information platform for Taiwanese vendors in 2017. The platform will serve as a search engine for foreign workers in Taiwan, enabling them to seek further employment with Taiwanese vendors in New Southbound countries once their work contracts have expired.

2.3.3. Immigrant Training

(1)Fostering second-generation immigrants: This objective aims to organize the Southeast Asian Languages and Industry Credit Program for second-generation immigrants and provide them with internship opportunities. In addition, exchange programs for members of the Southeast Asian Immigrant International Study Camp, subsidization for secondgeneration immigrants to learn more about the key fields and languages of ASEAN and South Asian countries, and postgraduation employment consultation will be provided. The goal is to foster 20 students and encourage no fewer than 200 children of immigrants to travel to their parents’ original countries during summer and winter vacations in 2017.
(2)Fostering immigrant service docents: This objective aims to assist immigrants in becoming docents for providing Southeast Asian language services and promoting language and cultural experience activities. The goal is to foster no fewer than 20 immigrants from four countries (Vietnam, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Thailand) to become service docents, serving no fewer than 300 people in 2017.

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3. Resource Sharing

3.1. Policy Orientation

To create a new development model for Taiwan’s economy and enhance the configuration and diversity of Taiwan’s international economics and trade, it is essential that cooperation with the New Southbound countries be reinforced. Without diplomatic ties with ASEAN countries, South Asian countries, New Zealand, and Australia, Taiwan must utilize its soft power advantages in the fields of medicine, culture, tourism, technology, and agriculture as stepping stones to establish and reinforce relationships with the New Southbound countries and identify bilateral or multilateral cooperation opportunities. Moreover, economic and trade cooperation, talent exchange, and regional integration should be integrated to facilitate the mutual growth of economies, industries, and human resources in Taiwan and the New Southbound countries, maximizing the support of external powers in Taiwan’s structural adjustment, thereby achieving mutually beneficial situations and cocreating regional development and prosperity.

The New Southbound Policy focuses on people-centred concepts and encourages the diversification of exchanges to develop the social and cultural relationships between Taiwan and the New Southbound countries. Moreover, the policy details the utilization of Taiwan’s advantages in medicine, technology, and agriculture to enhance the quality and convenience of life in the New Southbound countries.

The Taiwanese government will assess the needs of the New Southbound countries and integrate the resources of various ministry departments, local governments, and private enterprises and organizations to share its experience in the fields of medicine and public health, agricultural technology, and technology development with the New Southbound countries to create bilateral or multilateral cooperation. The policy further aims to reinforce the interpersonal relationships between Taiwan and New Southbound countries through tourism and cultural exchanges, thereby creating mutually beneficial partnerships with the New Southbound countries.

3.2. Policy Objectives

(1)Medicine: To promote cooperation with the New Southbound countries in terms of medicine, public health, and epidemic prevention, including exchanges and cooperation between medical institutions, medical accreditation, and new medicine or instrument development; foster medical personnel in the New Southbound countries; provide medical services and resources in the New Southbound countries; and assist ASEAN and South Asian countries in epidemic surveys and prevention tasks.
(2)Tourism: To lift visa restrictions and enhance the convenience of visiting Taiwan; extensively uncovering new customers by broadly marketing Taiwan through Taiwanese support groups; foster tourism professionals to help them improve the tourism environment; and maximize the cultural resources of indigenous peoples to promote tribal tours.
(3)Culture: To actively engage in exchanges with the New Southbound countries at various levels; combine the efforts of local governments to expand cultural relationships; reinforce the marketing of Taiwan’s features and cultures; improve cultural exchanges with the southern islands; promote Hakka southbound international exchanges; and promote cultural exchanges with the National Palace Museum.
(4)Agriculture: To assist in improving the agricultural capability of ASEAN and South Asian countries; establish and promote Taiwan’s agricultural network; shape Taiwan into a high-technology agriculture nation and diversely promote Taiwan’s agricultural products, techniques, and services in overseas markets; and negotiate agricultural cooperation and development to ensure food safety.
(5)Technology: To establish a New Southbound technology development strategy in Taiwan; establish a long-term and stable regional research-and-development linking and resource-sharing platform; promote dialogue and cooperation at the executive level; and expand disaster prevention exchanges.

3.3. Operational Guidelines and Specifications

The newly ratified or promoted operational guidelines and specifications for 2017 are as follows:

3.3.1. Medical and Public Health Cooperation

(1)Promoting international cooperation: This objective aims to encourage domestic medical institutes to cooperate with New Southbound countries and international organizations. The objective is to establish top medical education teams in Taiwan and foster seed teachers in New Southbound countries. The goal is to attract five doctors from New Southbound countries to train in Taiwan. This objective also facilitates cooperation between Taiwanese medical institutes and international organizations, such as the ICS Humanitarian Medical Assistance Program organized by the Kaohsiung Medical University Chung-Ho Memorial Hospital, to recruit outstanding surgeons to work in Indonesia. The goal is to increase the number of cooperation instances by 10% every year and expand into different New Southbound countries.
(2)Promoting laboratory accreditation and drug/instrument testing and technical cooperation: The goal is to evaluate the feasibility of mutually accrediting at least two laboratories in the New Southbound countries; establish inspection and technical specifications for medical products and cooperation mechanisms concerning the testing of medical equipment in New Southbound countries, completing standardized testing and comparison of at least one type of medical equipment in the New Southbound countries; and reinforce the food safety net between Taiwan and New Southbound countries.
(3)Promoting the reconciliation of medical regulations: The objective is to research the medical equipment regulations and management systems in New Southbound countries, compare differences in regulations, and create a report concerning suggestions for technical cooperation between Taiwan and the New Southbound countries. The goal is to organize at least one international conference to analyse regulations in 2017, and establish a dedicated medical window with the New Southbound countries to reinforce the professional competency of Taiwanese legal experts on the medical equipment regulations and management systems in the New Southbound countries.
(4)Training medical and health professionals: The goal is to train 15 medical and health professional in New Southbound countries in 2017; collaborate with Taiwanese hospitals in sending teams to New Southbound countries to provide at least 100 professional skills training or education and training courses in 2017; organize competency training courses for global health and epidemic prevention based on GCTF and invite at least 10 ASEAN officials and experts to participate in the courses.
(5)Providing medical and humanitarian support: The goal is to provide national medical services or medical supplies in accordance with the New Southbound Policy at least twice in 2017.
(6)Promoting epidemic prevention cooperation: The objective is to assist New Southbound countries in identifying and diagnosing viruses such as dengue and zika, and other emerging infectious diseases. The goal is to organize at least one training session with at least 20 participants from 10 countries in 2017; establish an information and detection system for infectious diseases and promote the current GIS used in Taiwan to analyse dengue fever and other infectious diseases to other countries; and facilitate the training of epidemiologists in ASEAN and South Asian countries.

3.3.2. Tourism Promotion

(1)Implementing convenient Taiwan visas: This objective is aimed at accelerating the promotion of visa-free travel between Taiwan and ASEAN/South Asian countries; increasing the number of countries eligible for the Online Application for Taiwan Travel Authorization Certificate and the Operating Regulations for Approving Visas to Taiwan for Quality Southeast Asian Tour Groups; and expanding the scope of applicability of e-visas.
(2)Encouraging tourism in Taiwan: This objective aims to utilize Taiwanese vendors, international students, and overseas Taiwanese networks to provide travel information, discounts, and incentives for employees of Taiwanese vendors and students’ family members to visit Taiwan; reinforce the relationship between Taiwan and its international students and overseas Taiwanese students; encourage county and city governments to step up their marketing in southbound markets; urge private unions and associations to organize southbound empowerment activities; promote Muslim-friendly environments; reinforce the relationship between the tourism industry and overseas Taiwanese students as well as facilitating connectivity between them; and arrange delegations or exploration tribal tours to promote Taiwan’s indigenous tourism industry. If an offshore office can be established in Bangkok, Thailand, an estimated 1.8 million, 2 million, and 2.2 million visitors can be attracted to Taiwan in 2017, 2018, and 2019, respectively.

3.3.3. Cultural Exchange

(1)Facilitating cultural exchanges: This objective aims to enhance two-way exchange subsidization for cultural professionals in New Southbound countries, with a goal of engaging in at least 200 art and culture exchanges in 2017; invite international non-profit organizations to establish branches in Taiwan, with a goal of helping at least one Southeast Asian organization establish an offshore office in Taiwan in 2017; establish diplomatic locations in New Southbound cities, with a goal of organizing at least one visitation or exchange activity in each location every year to promote intercity exchanges; reinforce cultural, creative, and industrial exchanges between countries, promote two-way cultural publishing, art group exchange, and film and television cooperation; and organize the Southeast Asia Art Festival.
(2)Improving indigenous cultural exchanges: This objective aims to improve the economics and trade between Taiwan and the indigenous people of New Zealand, tribal tourism, and language revival, with the goal of organizing at least one international indigenous-language conference, arrange at least one film and television exchange with New Zealand’s Maori Television Station, and provide at least 10 indigenous college students with exchange opportunities to New Zealand; establish a permanent organization for re-establishing the Forum of Austronesia Cooperation and Exchange with the goal of organizing an annual International Austronesia Conference and inviting leaders and expert scholars in at least eight Austronesian countries and regions to collectively discuss the development of indigenous societies, thereby advocating Austronesian identity and promoting the development of regional societies and establishing a cooperation platform; construct visitor-friendly museum environments to attract visitors from New Southbound countries to Taiwan and promoting inter-museum exchanges and talent cultivation.
(3)Encouraging Hakka cultural exchanges: This objective is aimed at enhancing the substantial cooperation and exchange of Hakka groups in New Southbound countries, with the goal of dispatching personnel to Southeast Asian regions to promote exchange in 2017; invite scholars and new Hakka immigrants and their children to visit/return to native Hakka regions to collect data and survey the communities; and dispatch domestic Hakka teams to Hakka communities in Southeast Asia to promote community development, local cultural information surveys, and interactive exchanges, with the goal of organizing international cooperation and exchanges with at least 100 participants.

3.3.4. Agricultural Cooperation

(1)Improving agricultural technical cooperation: This objective is aimed at enhancing agricultural operations in ASEAN and South Asian countries through technical cooperation, assistance, and training, and support the Agricultural Development Project, the work of Thailand’s Royal Project Foundation, the Myanmar Agriculture Course, and the Agriculture Development Course, with the goal of increasing training volume by 5% each year.
(2)Improving agricultural production and marketing and storage/logistics cooperation: The objective is to promote two-way cooperation on production, marketing, storage, and logistics in the agricultural industry and enter into cooperation agreements or conventions with Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, Myanmar, India, and Indonesia, with a goal of achieving at least 10 agriculture-related technical cooperation contracts.
(3)Assisting private vendor cooperation: This objective is aimed at establishing at least three demonstration gardens in New Southbound countries in 2017, importing Taiwanese species, fertilizers, and agricultural machinery to achieve largescale cooperation, replenish products in short supply in Taiwan, and ensure food safety.

3.3.5. Technological Cooperation

(1)Analysing technical cooperation strategies: This objective is aimed at systematically exploring standards for new technology research and innovation cooperation between Taiwan and the New Southbound countries, establishing a technical cooperation standards analysis database for six countries, and creating short-, mid-, and long-term promotional strategies, with the goal of providing subsidization for the establishment of at least two research centres and 20 research projects in ASEAN and South Asian countries.
(2)Subsidizing AIC projects: This objective is aimed at subsidizing industrial research projects based on the technical strengths of Taiwan (environmental protection, energy, and ICT) and addressing livelihood and science education issues. The goal is to establish at least two research teams to engage in goal-oriented research projects, and complete the subtitling and voice-overs of at least 20 outstanding science education videos produced by the Ministry of Science and Technology into Southeast Asian languages, which would facilitate the market expansion of relevant Taiwanese industries.
(3)Promoting academic cooperation and resource sharing: This objective is aimed at formulating goal-oriented research projects, establishing regional disaster/epidemic prevention networks to address common regional problems, such as disaster prevention, global science, climate change, and new regional infectious diseases by participating in APEC activities and two-way technical support. The goal is to subsidize at least 12 professional training courses to help an estimated 500 students in New Southbound countries each year, subsidize at least 10 goal-oriented research teams, and attract at least 200 technical professionals in New Southbound countries to participate in research projects in Taiwan.

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4. Regional Integration

4.1. Policy Orientation

Restricted by the international political situation, Taiwan has focused on maintaining long-term economic and trade relations with New Southbound countries, including import and export trade or local investment with Taiwanese businesses.

However, the investment models of Taiwanese businesses largely centre on export processing, greatly limiting the relationship between Taiwanese businesses and local markets/society. Although Taiwan has engaged in a number of government agreements, international cooperation projects, dialogue platforms, and other interactive mechanisms, most of these mechanisms are based on specific fields such as economics and trade or agricultural techniques, highlighting the need for innovation in these fields and models of cooperation.

To reduce costs, many Taiwanese businesses that originally invested in Southeast Asia have gradually shifted to mainland China since the 1990s. The influence of Taiwanese businesses in Southeast Asia has decreased in recent years. By comparison, these countries have become strategic regions for Japan, South Korea, mainland China, Europe, and the United States, all of which have established strong footholds there. Taiwan is thus challenged with competing with various countries despite extremely limited resources.

As a result, Taiwan must reinforce regional integration with Southeast Asian and South Asian countries, and establish bilateral or multilateral systematic cooperation models with these countries, undertaking actions such as entering economic cooperation agreements (ECAs), updating and strengthening existing investment and tax agreements, and prioritizing negotiation and dialogue. Taiwan must also shift the previous solitary models to those that embrace cooperation resource integration and advantage complementarities. Efforts should centre on niche fields, and the mutual benefits shared by Taiwan and the New Southbound countries should be maximized by fostering partnerships with international organizations, utilizing the resources of private organizations and overseas Taiwanese networks, as well as engaging in third-party cooperation.

4.2. Policy Objectives

(1)To deepen substantial relationships through systematised cooperation; enter or update economic cooperation agreements, investment agreements and tax agreements; promote multi-level, multi-faceted dialogues; adjust and improve the allocation of foreign aid; and cooperate with other countries, private companies, and NGOs to expand various substantial relationships.
(2)To establish an overseas Taiwanese database and exchange platform and integrate or expand the functions of Taiwanese businesses and organizations, thereby promoting cooperation between overseas Taiwanese businesses and domestic companies.

4.3. Operational Guidelines and Specifications

The newly ratified or promoted operational guidelines and specifications for 2017 are as follows:

4.3.1. Regional Integration

(1)Promote the signing and updating of bilateral investment agreements: This aims to actively encourage New Southbound countries that have yet to sign an agreement with Taiwan to enter into agreements and reinforce the content of existing agreements with other countries, such as Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and India.
(2)Promote the signing of double taxation avoidance and bilateral economic cooperation agreements.

4.3.2. Regular Consultation Mechanisms

(1)Establish or reinforce bilateral consultation mechanisms: This aims to establish or reinforce the bilateral dialogue mechanisms between Taiwan and New Southbound countries. The goal is to engage in no less than 12 dialogues with New Southbound countries each year, overcome trade obstacles, promote industrial/investment/SME cooperation, and secure no fewer than 20 bilateral cooperation projects.
(2)Organize the Taiwan-ASEAN Dialogue Forum: The goal is to organize at least one forum each year and invite the participation of industry and academic experts from New Southbound countries, thereby forming a regular track oneand-a-half dialogue mechanism.
(3)Promote benign cross-strait interaction and cooperation: This aims to encourage dialogue and negotiation to address specific issues and promote cooperation with mainland China on proper occasions in accordance with overall cross-strait development.

4.3.3. Strategic Alliances

(1)Utilize Taiwan’s foreign aid resources: This aims to promote the Taiwan Digital Opportunity Center (TDOC) project; promote capacity-building cooperation in the areas of agriculture and fishing, solar energy generation, e-commerce, and occupational training. The goal is to establish a TDOC in New Southbound countries each year and increase the number of trainees by 10% each year.
(2)Leverage third-country resources: This aims to leverage Taiwan’s advantages in industrial and operations management to participate in the new strategic plans of global and multinational Japanese businesses, and seize opportunities to promote third-party supply chain cooperation between Taiwanese and Japanese businesses. The goal is to hold matchmaking events and facilitate cooperation or talks among no less than 30 enterprises.
(3)Reinforce cooperation with private organizations: This aims to organize bilateral economic and trade meetings and mutual visits among industrial and commercial organizations in New Southbound countries; encourage Taiwanese NGOs to participate in humanitarian care, environmental protection, and youth exchange activities in New Southbound countries. The goal is to recruit no fewer than 2,200 youth volunteers to participate in overseas activities.

4.3.4 Overseas Taiwanese Networks

(1)Enhance organizational functions of Taiwanese vendors: This aims to establish an overseas Taiwanese database; elucidate the operating and market conditions of Taiwanese businesses; and assist Taiwanese businesses in their recruitment efforts. The goal is to organize no fewer than three regional job fairs for Taiwanese businesses in Southeast Asia each year.
(2)Assist Taiwanese businesses in organizing diverse economic and trade activities: This aims to provide assistance to overseas Taiwanese organizations so as to provide offshore investment counselling, employment training, and other economic and trade services to Taiwanese people in the region. The goal is to organize no fewer than 100 economic and trade events in 2017.
(3)Establish interpersonal exchange networks: This objective aims to promote and establish an interpersonal database for the New Southbound Policy, with the goal of increasing the size of the database by 5% each year; and encourage the establishment of a cooperation and exchange platform linking domestic and overseas Taiwanese.

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   4. 區域鏈結

前言：

近年來國內外經貿局勢快速變遷，就國際情勢來看，中國大陸在歷經 30 年經濟快速發展後，面臨產業結構轉型、法規制度調整、成本快速攀升，及經濟成長趨緩的諸多瓶頸。與此同時，東南亞及南亞國家經濟快速發展，消費能力大幅提升，再加上其積極參與全球區域經濟整合，擴大市場優勢，內需市場商機龐大，已成為全球經濟成長的亮點。目前東協十國之GDP 合計為 2.4 兆美元，人口 6.2 億人；而南亞六國之 GDP規模則為 2.7 兆美元，人口近 17 億人。且根據 Global Insight預估，東協十國及南亞六國未來 5 年(2017-2021 年)平均每年經濟成長率分別達 4.9%及 7.4%，遠高於全球經濟成長率3.1%。在經濟成長下，東協及南亞國家將逐漸產生一群消費力很強的新興中產階級，形成商機龐大的內需市場。

而就國內情勢來看，目前臺灣處於產業升級、結構調整的關鍵時刻，國內面臨薪資成長停滯、人才不足，及經濟成長動能熄火等困境。特別是我國過去雖在亞洲新興市場多有經貿布局，但以加工貿易之出口及投資型態為主，對於內需市場深耕不足；再加上以單項產品出口居多，附加價值較低，在臺灣加入區域整合進程受阻之際，易受關稅障礙影響及面臨後進競爭者競爭，不利於我國出口擴張及經濟成長。此外，臺灣也出現進出口貿易及對外投資過度集中中國大陸的問題，成為國家及經濟穩定發展的潛在風險。

在新的國內外大環境下，我國對於亞太之經貿佈局策略及對外戰略應有結構性的調整，以支援國內產業轉型及經濟成長。基於此，蔡總統於其 520 就職演說中強調要推動「新南向政策」，提升臺灣對外經濟的格局及多元性，告別以往過於依賴單一市場的現象，重新建構臺灣與亞洲的連結。蔡總統於105 年 8 月 16 日召開對外經貿戰略會談，正式提出《新南向政策綱領》，將「新南向政策」定位為我國整體對外經貿戰略的重要一環，要為新階段的經濟發展，尋求新的方向和新的動能，並重新定位臺灣在亞洲發展的重要角色，創造未來價值。行政院也依此於 9 月 5 日提出《新南向政策推動計畫》，且隨之成立經貿談判辦公室，負責統籌與協調「新南向政策」之相關執行工作。

《新南向政策綱領》揭示臺灣推動「新南向政策」之願景及短中長程目標，即要透過促進臺灣和東協、南亞及紐澳等18 個國家的經貿、科技、文化等各層面的連結，共享資源、人才與市場，創造互利共赢的新合作模式；以及透過建立廣泛的協商和對話機制，形塑和新南向國家的合作共識，並有效解決相關問題和分歧，逐步累積互信，進而建立「經濟共同體意識」，使臺灣成為新南向國家經濟發展的繁榮夥伴、人才資源的共享夥伴、生活品質的創新夥伴、及國際鏈結的互惠夥伴。因此，「新南向政策」未來將秉持「長期深耕、多元開展、雙向互惠」核心理念，整合各部會、地方政府，以及民間企業與團體的資源與力量，從「經貿合作」、「人才交流」、「資源共享」與「區域鏈結」四大面向著手，並進行橫向串連，與新南向國家創造互利共贏的新合作模式，逐步建立共同意識。

在上述推動背景與思維下，「新南向政策」希望在「經貿合作」面上可以協助臺商改變代工思維，拓展內需市場，並強化產業合作與經貿拓展、及促進基礎建設工程合作與系統整合服務輸出；在「人才交流」面上可以兼顧雙方的需求，在「以人為本、雙向多元」的交流原則下，由單向引進外籍勞工轉向雙向人才培養，提升臺灣與新南向國家雙邊人才資源的互補與合作；在「資源共享」面上可以發揮醫療、文化、觀光、科技、農業等軟實力優勢，作為我國強化與新南向國家開展夥伴關係的利基，爭取雙邊或多邊合作機會；在「區域鏈結」上，推動雙邊與多邊制度化合作，提升雙方協商對話位階，並透過國際合作來建立與新南向國家之夥伴關係。

整體而言，「新南向政策」是臺灣在國內外新情勢下，全面性經貿及對外戰略之一環，不僅是著眼於分散經貿風險，爭取更多市場商機，更希望尋找臺灣經濟新動能及供應鏈上的新定位，並透過臺灣在國際社會有意義的參與，達到區域和平穩定之目的。

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1. 經貿合作

1.1. 政策方向

我國與東南亞的經貿往來雖然歷史悠久，關係密切，但普遍把這些地區視為生產基地，從事加工出口型貿易或投資，對於當地內需市場較少涉入。近年來東南亞及南亞國家經濟快速發展，消費能力大幅提升，再加上新興中產階級興起，形成商機龐大的內需市場，已成為全球經濟成長的亮點。為協助臺灣廠商可以同享東南亞及南亞國家經濟成長果實，「新南向政策」在經貿合作面上要改變臺灣企業過去以東協及南亞作為生產基地的出口代工型態，轉而與新南向國家建立雙向之產業合作、貿易交流模式，將新南向國家之市場作為我國內需市場之延伸。未來臺商對外投資動機面要從成本導向的防禦型投資轉變為市場導向的擴張性投資；策略面要從代工製造轉向品牌及通路經營；在模式面要從在各國生產或銷售相同產品轉向因地制宜；同時要提高產品或服務的附加價值，如由出口單項產品或服務轉向軟硬整合的系統輸出或整廠輸出。

基於此，經考量當地消費及基礎建設之成長性，以及產業轉型之需求，未來臺灣與新南向國家之經貿合作，將由強化產業價值鏈整合、內需市場連結及基礎建設工程合作與系統整合服務輸出等面向著手，佈局下一世代的產業和貿易分工合作；以中高所得的都市消費者為主要目標客群，擬定客製化拓銷策略，並善用跨境電商搭配實體通路，降低行銷障礙，帶動貿易和投資；同時尋求與跨國企業之策略聯盟，爭取基礎建設工程及新興產業的合作契機。此外也將力求排除市場進入障礙，成立單一服務窗口，進行商情蒐集、人脈連結等工作，促進臺灣與新南向國家經濟的互補共榮。

1.2. 政策目標

（1）精確了解新南向國家產業發展狀況、產業發展需求，以及可與我互補合作之處，透過產業公協會、法人機構之參與，進行雙邊對話，推動雙向互利之產業合作。
（2）檢討調整現有貿易拓展活動，提高其有效性，並使符合成本效益原則；針對我國具有競爭優勢之貨品、服務，包括農產品，運用創新、全方位之拓銷活動，積極開發新南向內需市場。
（3）為提升我國整體及產品形象，應於重點國家之重點城市辦理臺灣形象展，並於一般展覽或促銷推廣活動中，加強展示我國產品之優質形象。
（4）對於臺商在新南向國家之布局，應提供廠商充分之產業、投資與貿易相關法律、稅務等資訊，給予必要之協助，並引導廠商進行風險管理。
（5）選定我國具競爭力之基礎建設工程及系統整合項目，透過組織團隊的方式，以群體的力量，爭取顧問諮詢服務或建案輸出之標案。
（6）增加輸出入銀行及海外信用保證基金之資本或基金規模，必要時可結合公民營銀行資源，充分提供廠商拓展海外市場及進行海外布局所需資金，包括融資、保證、保險及買主徵信等；另，亦應鼓勵本國銀行於新南向國家設立分支機構，提供臺商在地服務。

1.3. 具體工作計畫

106 年擬新增或擴大推動之工作計畫重點如下：

1.3.1. 產業合作與經貿拓展

（1）推動雙邊產業合作：由智庫專業研究優先推動國家產業發展特性，並具體評估合作領域與方式，建立並深化長期穩定產業鏈結關係推動雙邊產業公協會、智庫與技術法人進行實質交流、並列入官方經貿會談架構，目標為與至少4個新南向目標國家洽商產業合作可行性，並進行產業交流平臺與活動，且每年至少簽署1個合作協議或備忘錄等。
（2）進行全方位貿易拓展：在產品上選定內需消費品、機械及工具機、醫材等，在服務業則挑選數位內容、連鎖加盟、資訊服務、健康產業、餐飲業等業者進行海外布局，另透過跨領域顧問服務團隊及建立電子商務通路作為貿易拓展的重點；並透過成立臺灣商品行銷中心與機械買主聯盟，培訓目標市場使用我國工具機產品技術人員及辦理臺灣產業日等創新拓銷方式來進行全方位貿易拓展，目標為在電子商務行銷上，服務17,500以上會員廠商家次，促成至少4億2,000萬美元採購商機；在服務業拓展上，服務50家以上廠商、促成商機至少3,000萬美元；另將建立3個機械買主聯盟，服務當地至少300家聯盟會員廠商。
（3）電商南向市場之拓展：協助國內電商赴東協市場發展，與當地業者合作或落地經營，輔導PChome、momo、Uitox等電商平台找尋當地供應商與支援服務商，並建立當地金、物流服務系統，以強化平台之競爭力；另協助業者結合當地社群操作，提升臺灣電商平台及明星產品知名度和流量，完善東協跨境營運生態體系，每年帶動200家臺灣品牌上架至少3,000項商品。
（4）加強農產輸出：輔導成立臺灣國際農業開發公司，建構供貨穩定及品質確保的農產品外銷供應體系，並選定農糧生鮮冷凍產品出口為主，目標為106年輸銷至新南向18個國家之農糧生鮮冷凍產品出口值較104年成長10%。
（5）強化臺灣整體形象：在新南向國家主要城市辦理至少4個臺灣形象展；至少於11個海外專業展覽活動中設置臺灣精品展示專區，促成東南亞地區消費者對臺灣產品的好感度每年成長3%以上。
（6）協助臺商布局：在新南向國家如印尼、越南、泰國、菲律賓、緬甸、印度等設置臺灣窗口，提供我商有關當地法律、會計、稅務及產業資訊諮詢服務，每年至少提供廠商1,000件投資諮詢服務；提供新南向國家投資環境安全報告，協助廠商進行風險管理。

1.3.2. 基礎建設工程合作與系統整合輸出

（1）推動基礎建設工程合作：選定智慧型交通運輸ETC、都會捷運、環保工程、電廠及石化整廠等5個領域，整合潛力關聯業者並籌組輸出團隊，針對新南向目標國家爭取顧問諮詢服務或建案輸出，並透過召開工程產業全球化平臺會議，協調解決工程產業赴海外遭遇之問題，目標為106年爭取ETC國際輸出顧問諮詢服務至少1件、每年協助爭取1件（或以上）捷運營運維管或電子票證等顧問諮詢服務、協助環境保護資源工程產業重點項目爭取海外建案或拓點1件、爭取輸出1個電力能源整廠輸出建案、爭取輸出1個石化整廠輸出建案。
（2）加強系統整合輸出：選定綠色運輸、智慧物流、智慧健康、智慧校園、電子化政府、LED照明及雲端系統等7個項目，整合潛力關聯業者並籌組輸出團隊，針對新南向目標國家爭取標案至少5案；成立資通訊、工程、安控及綠能等4個產業聯盟，規劃籌組3團系統輸出案源開發團，針對新南向國家爭取政府採購商機。

1.3.3. 金融支援

（1）強化輸出入銀行融資功能：逐步將資本額於 2018 年增至 320 億元；已建置「系統、整廠及工程產業輸出聯貸平台」，結合公民營銀行金融資源，提供廠商所需融資服務；提供優惠融資及保證條件、提高保險費優惠幅度及代辦買主徵信費用折抵保險費等優惠措施，目標為輸銀對新南向政策目標國家貸款核准額度年增率 4.95%、保證額度年增率 2%。
（2）強化海外信保基金保證功能：擴大基金規模；將原東南亞地區專案融資保證擴大為新南向專案融資信用保證，每案上限達 200 萬美元，海外信用保證基金新南向地區之保證融資金額年增率 6%。
（3）增設本國銀行據點：協助本國銀行於新南向國家增設3 個據點，目標為每年核准增設 3 個據點。

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2. 人才交流

2.1. 政策方向

基於地緣、海外華僑與產業發展政策使然，臺灣過去與東協及南亞國家人才交流多為單向，較少進行雙向交流，未來將兼顧雙方需求，在「以人為本、雙向多元」的交流原則下，強化教育、產業人力的交流與合作，並結合新住民及其第二代的力量，提升臺灣與東協及南亞各國雙邊人才資源的互補與合作。換言之，「新南向政策」在人才交流面的思維將跳脫過往只考慮國內需求，自新南向國家引進藍領勞工的思考模式，而是要在兼顧雙方需求與成長、含括白領與藍領工作者，且以雙向交流為目標的前提下，加強雙邊人才的終身成長規劃與環境配套，不僅提升新南向國家的人力素質，為我國企業培育可用人才，更要提高臺灣與新南向國家的就業及薪資，達到互利雙贏的局面。

「新南向政策」成功的關鍵，在於突破新南向人才短缺的瓶頸，未來須從充實短期人才及培育長期人才雙管齊下，充裕新南向人才庫。目前我國有接近 59 萬的藍領外勞，及 15 萬的外籍配偶，未來皆應妥善運用，培養其成為經營新南向市場的尖兵，做為「新南向政策」的連結基礎，同時培育新住民第二代成為新南向種籽。

另為配合國內及東南亞、南亞產業需求，未來將透過我國在技職教育之優勢，投入更多資源於東南亞及南亞專業人才培育及技術訓練。如透過學生雙向交流、雙邊教育合作，以及普及語言訓練，提供企業所需的長短期人才。

2.2. 政策目標

（1）培育及訓練新南向國家青年學子具備「臺灣經驗」、「技術實作」及「華語溝通」能力，增進對我國高等教育及技術訓練品質的認同，並透過留臺組織強化聯繫，形成友我骨幹力量。
（2）培育國內青年學子具備「經貿管理」、「文化理解」及「東協語言」能力，加強對新南向各國的理解與認知，培養我國「知己知彼」之區域經貿、法政等領域專業人才。
（3）協助臺商企業培訓國內幹部，提升新南向企業人力資源，發展重要產業及提升競爭力。
（4）善用外籍勞動力及僑生，培育我國產業發展所需人才或成為臺資企業東南亞中堅幹部，達到雙贏互惠的目標。
（5）鼓勵東南亞新住民文化推廣及參與，促進全民與東南亞新住民之文化交流，厚植與新南向國家友善社會資本。

2.3. 具體工作計畫

106 年擬新增或擴大推動之工作計畫重點如下：

2.3.1. 人才培育

（1）整合及擴增獎學金，吸引僑外學生：整合及擴增臺灣獎學金、華語文獎學金、短期研究獎學金、雙邊官方奬學金、陽光南方奬學金及 TEEP 獎學金（實習），吸引各國指標性優秀青年學子來臺留學或研修；擴增優秀（菁英）僑生獎學金、補助大學校院設置研究所優秀僑生獎學金及清寒僑生助學金，目標為「新南向政策」目標國申請「臺灣新南向獎助金」之總人數每年成長 10％；擴增就讀海外青年技術訓練班學生，106 至 109 年度預計招生目標值為 1,400、1,540、1,680、1,820 人、倍增僑生技職專班學生，106 至 109學年度預計招生目標值均為 1,500 人。
（2）鼓勵留學東協及南亞：成立新南向公費留學獎學金，擴大辦理赴東協及南亞地區實習之新南向學海築夢計畫，每年選送公費、研修或實習獎學金生赴新南向國家至少 200 名。
（3）建置攬才平台，推行臺灣連結：建置 Contact Taiwan對外攬才平臺，辦理國內外僑生與企業媒合會，協助企 業 媒 合 所 需 人 才 ； 推 行 臺 灣 連 結 （ Taiwan Connection）計畫，整合駐外單位、臺灣教育中心、各校華語教師、留臺校友組織、臺灣研究講座、東南亞臺灣學校、臺商組織等，目標為 106 年於新南向重點國家新增 10 個臺灣連結 Taiwan Connection 據點。

2.3.2 產業人力合作

（1）辦理產學合作、技術訓練班：辦理新南向外國學生產學合作專班（學位班），106 年底前培訓 1,600 人、外國青年短期技術訓練班（非學位班）200 人，培 訓新南向專業技術師資短期訓練班（非學位班）200 人。
（2）補助實習計畫：針對商管、工程、醫藥、農業、教育等領域，106 年補助國內青年赴東協及南亞國臺商企業或跨國企業進行見習或實習達 500 人次；提供獎助金培訓 120 名國際貿易相關科系學生赴馬、泰、緬、越、菲、印尼、印度等 7 國之企業、機構實習。
（3）吸收資深外籍技術人員：規劃建立資深外籍技術人員評點制度，並提高新南向重點發展產業於「配合政府政策」評點項目權重，以利新南向臺商繼續將其留臺工作或外派擔任駐地幹部，目標為 106 年完成勞動部跨國勞動力政策協商諮詢小組研商討論及「留用資深外籍技術人員評點制度」訂定發布。
（4）建置臺商營業及求才資訊平台：106 年完成新南向臺商登錄營業及求才資訊平台之建置啟用，供在臺工作外籍勞工查詢運用，以利工作期滿返國後由新南向臺商繼續聘用。

2.3.3. 新住民培力

（1）培育新住民二代：開辦新住民第二代「東南亞語言與產業學分學程」專班，並提供實習機會；辦理東南亞新住民青年國際研習營赴東南亞參訪交流；補助修習重點領域並具東協或南亞國家語言專長之新住民二代，畢業後並協助工作媒合，106 年預計培育 20 名；鼓勵新住民子女利用寒(暑)假回到(外)祖父母家進行相關體驗，106 年底預計完成 200 人參與。
（2）新住民服務大使：協助新住民擔任東南亞語導覽服務及推動語言文化體驗活動，目標 106 年新住民服務大使國籍為 4 國（越南、印尼、緬甸、泰國等），人數為 20 人，被導覽人數 300 人次。

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3. 資源共享

3.1. 政策方向

為打造臺灣經濟發展新模式，提升我國對外經貿的格局與多元性，有必要強化與新南向國家的合作。在我國與東協、南亞及紐澳等國皆無邦交的情況下，需運用及發揮醫療、文化、觀光、科技、農業等軟實力優勢，作為我國強化與新南向國家開展夥伴關係的利基，爭取雙邊或多邊合作機會，並串聯經貿合作、人才交流及區域鏈結面向，一方面協助新南向國家經濟、產業及人力資源的共同成長，另一方面發揮由外部支援臺灣內部經濟結構調整之效益，達到互利雙贏，共創區域發展與繁榮的目標。

「新南向政策」秉持「以人為本」理念，要藉由更全面多元的交流，拉近臺灣與新南向國家在社會、文化上的距離，並透過醫療、科技、農業等優勢為新南向國家人民開創更優質、更便利的生活。未來臺灣將因地制宜，視新南向國家需求，整合各部會、地方政府及民間企業與團體的資源與力量，推展醫療及公共衛生經驗、農業技術、科技發展等雙邊與多邊合作，同時藉由觀光旅遊及文化交流，強化我國與新南向國家人與人的連結，開創與新南向國家互利共贏的新合作夥伴關係。

3.2. 政策目標

（1）醫療：促進與新南向國家於醫療、公共衛生及防疫等方面之合作，包括：醫療機構間之交流合作、醫藥認證及新藥與醫材開發之合作、培訓新南向目標國家醫療衛生人員、提供新南向目標國家醫療服務或醫療物資援助，並協助東協及南亞國家進行疫情調查及防治工作。
（2）觀光：放寬簽證條件限制，便利各國國民來臺旅遊；廣泛開發客源，善用友臺團體，多元行銷臺灣；培育觀光領域人才，改善觀光環境；善用原住民文化淵源，推廣部落旅遊。
（3）文化：積極促進與新南向國家進行各層面之交流；結合地方政府力量，擴展文化聯結；加強行銷臺灣品牌文化；增進南島文化交流；促進客庄南向國際交流；促進故宮文化交流。
（4）農業：協助提升東協及南亞國家農業經營能力；建立推廣我國農業之人脈管道；形塑臺灣農業高科技形象，拓展農業多元產品、技術與服務海外市場與商機；洽談農企業合作開發，確保糧食安全。
（5）科技：建置我國新南向科研發展策略；搭建長期且穩定之區域科研鏈結與資源共享；推動高層對話與合作；擴大災防交流。

3.3. 具體工作計畫

106 年擬新增或擴大推動之工作計畫重點如下：

3.3.1. 醫療及公共衛生合作

（1）推廣國際合作：鼓勵國內醫療機構與新南向國家及國際組織進行醫療合作。一方面在國內組成頂尖醫療教學團隊，培訓新南向國家種子教師，吸引 5 名新南向國家外籍醫師來臺學習，提升當地醫療水準。另一方面透過國際組織進行合作，例如協助高醫大附設醫院辦理「國際外科學會（ICS）人道外科醫療援助計畫」，透過 ICS 世界總會招募全球優秀外科醫師於印尼駐點，目標為合作計畫件數每年增加 10％，未來可於各新南向國家推廣。
（2）推動實驗室認證及藥品醫材檢驗技術合作：評估認證試驗機構互認之可行性，完成新南向國家認可實驗室至少 2 家次；建立獲新南向國家認可之醫材產品檢驗技術規範及醫療器材檢測驗證技術之合作機制，完成1 項新南向國家醫療器材之標準檢測技術及比對；強化我與新南向國家之食藥安全網。
（3）推動醫材法規調和：研究新南向國家醫療器材法規管理制度，並完成法規差異性比較及雙邊技術合作建議報告書，106 年將辦理法規分析國際研討會 1 場次；與新南向國家建立醫材專責窗口，強化我國法規人才對新南向國家醫療器材法規管理制度之專業能力。
（4）醫衛人才培訓：106 年培訓新南向國家 15 位醫療衛生人員；106 年與國內醫療院所合作，前往新南向國家提供專業技能訓練或教育訓練等課至少 100 人次；在臺美「全球合作暨訓練架構」（GCTF）下，就全球衛生及防疫醫療領域辦理能力建構訓練專班，邀請東協國家官員及專家來訪以 10 位為目標。
（5）醫衛人道援助：106 年提供「新南向政策」國家醫療服務或醫療物資援助 2 次。
（6）推動防疫合作：協助新南向國家對登革熱、茲卡病毒等蟲媒或其他新興傳染病原之鑑別診斷量能，目標為舉辦 1 場訓練課程，至少邀請 10 個國家參與，預計訓練 20 人次；建立傳染病資訊化監測系統，將我國目前使用的地理資訊系統（GIS）應用在登革熱及其他傳染病疫情分析模式，推廣至各國；協助訓練東協及南亞國家之流行病學調查人才。

3.3.2. 觀光促進

（1）實行便利來臺簽證措施：加速推動東協十國及南亞六國免簽；放寬適用「東南亞國家人民來臺先行上網查核系統」及「東南亞國家優質團客來臺觀光簽證作業規範」國家；加大放寬電子簽證適用範圍。
（2）鼓勵來臺觀光：善用臺商、留學生及僑生網絡，提供旅遊資訊與優惠，增加臺商員工及學生親屬來臺旅遊誘因；強化與留學生及僑外生連結；鼓勵縣市政府加強南向市場行銷宣傳；聯合民間公、協會辦理南向培力活動；推動穆斯林友善環境；促進觀光產業與僑外生之鏈結與媒合；辦理部落旅遊推介會與踩線團，拓展部落深度旅遊之市場，若能在泰國曼谷增設辦事處，可促進來臺觀光總人數 106 年達 180 萬人次、107年達 200 萬人次、108 年達 220 萬人次。

3.3.3. 文化交流

（1）加強文化交流：增加與新南向國家文化人士雙向交流補助，目標為 106 年專業藝文交流 200 人次；邀請國際非政府組織來臺設點運作，目標為 106 年支持 1 個東南亞組織在臺灣設分部；設立「新南向城市外交鏈結點」，每個鏈結點每年協辦至少一次訪問或交流活動，推動城市交流；加強與各國文化創意產業交流，推廣雙邊文化出版、藝文團體交流與影視合作；辦理東南亞藝術節慶。
（2）增進原住民族文化交流：增進與紐西蘭原住民族貿易經濟、部落旅遊及語言復振等合作事項，目標為每 2年舉辦 1 次原住民族語言國際研討會、每年進行 1 次與紐西蘭毛利電視臺之影視交流、以及提供 10 名原住民籍大專學生赴紐交流；推動重啟南島民族論壇常設組織，且每年召開「南島民族國際會議」，邀請 8 個以上南島區域國家傳統領袖及專家學者等共同研商原住民族社會發展議題，倡議南島族群共同體，促進區域社會共同發展，架構合作平台；營造博物館友善參觀環境，吸引新南向國家人民來臺參訪，促進博物館館際交流與人才培育。
（3）加強客家文化交流：加強與新南向國家客家社團實質合作交流，預計 106 年擬派員至東南亞地區進行交流；結合學者、客庄新住民及其子女，前往其原生母國客庄進行文獻資料蒐整與社區調查；遴派國內客庄社區團隊赴東南亞地區客庄聚落進行社造、在地文化資源調查與互動交流方案，促成國際合作交流參與人次預計達 100 人次。

3.3.4. 農業合作

（1）增進農業技術合作：透過農業技術合作、協助及訓練，提升東協及南亞國家農業經營能力；強化農企業培育發展計畫、泰國皇家基金會計畫、緬甸農業專班、農企業發展研習班，每年培訓人數增加 5%。
（2）增進農業產銷及儲運合作：增進雙邊農業生產、行銷、儲運與物流技術之合作，並與越、泰、菲、澳、緬、印度、印尼等國簽署合作協定或備忘錄之國家，媒合農業技術合作案 10 案。
（3）協助民間業者進行合作：促成農企業者於 106 年至新南向國家建立示範圃計 3 案，且引進臺灣品種、肥料及農機等相關資材，促進更大規模合作，補充我短期供應不足之品項，確保糧食安全。

3.3.5. 科技合作

（1）分析科技合作策略：系統性探討我國與新南向國家科研創新合作之指標，建置 6 個國家之科技合作指標分析資料庫，並建立短中長期推動策略；補助成立 2 個東協及南亞國家研究中心，補助至少 20 件研究計畫。
（2）補助產學合作計畫：以我國技術強項（環保、能源、ICT 等）及有利於民生或科學教育之議題為導向，補助與產業相關之研究計畫，目標為至少 2 組目標導向型研究計畫群；完成至少 20 集東南亞國家字幕、語音之科技部優良科普影片，有助於我國未來相關產業之市場拓展。
（3）學術合作與資源共享：透過參與 APEC 活動及雙邊科技合作，以區域共同問題為主要合作議題，如防災、地球科學、氣候變遷、區域新興感染症等，規劃目標導向型研究計畫，建立區域防災、防疫網絡，目標為補助專業培訓課程至少 12 場，估計培育新南向國家學員每年至少 500 人，補助至少 10 組目標導向型研究計畫群，以及延攬新南向國家科技人才來臺參與研究計畫至少 200 人次。

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4. 區域鏈結

4.1. 政策方向

受限於國際政治情勢，我國與新南向國家間，長期以經貿關係為重心，如進出口貿易或是臺商對當地之投資。但在臺商之投資以加工出口為主要營運模式下，臺灣企業與當地市場及社會的連結十分有限。此外，雖然我國與新南向國家也有部分政府間協議、國際合作計畫、對話平台等互動機制，但均集中於經貿、農業技術等特定領域，亟需進行合作領域與模式之創新。

另一方面，基於成本因素，大量臺商於 1990 年代自東南亞轉向投資中國大陸，臺商於東南亞當地之影響力已較過去弱化，但同時間日本、韓國、中國大陸及歐、美等國皆積極布局，使東南亞及南亞成為各國競逐戰略影響力的區域。在臺灣整體資源有限的條件下，如以單一力量要與各國競爭，勢必面臨艱鉅的挑戰。

基於上述背景，我國針對東南亞、南亞國家必須加強區域鏈結，推動與新南向國家雙邊與多邊制度化合作，如洽簽 ECA或個別經濟合作項目、更新及強化已簽訂的雙邊投資及租稅協定，及提升雙方協商對話位階等。另外，也要改變過去單打獨鬥模式，以整合資源、優勢互補的思維，聚焦於具有利基的領域，透過強化國際組織夥伴關係、善用民間組織及僑民網絡，以及與第三國合作等方式，發揮與新南向國家互惠共利的效益。

4.2. 政策目標

（1）透過制度化合作，深化實質關係；推動洽簽（或更新）經濟合作協定、投資保障協定、租稅協定；推動多層次、全方位之對話；調整援外資源配置，完善援外推動機制；與其他國家、民間企業及 NGO 團體合作，拓展與各國實質關係。
（2）建立僑民資料庫與交流平臺，整合與擴大僑臺商組織之功能，促進海外僑臺商與國內企業合作。

4.3. 具體工作計畫

106 年擬新增或擴大推動之工作計畫重點如下：

4.3.1. 區域整合

（1）推動洽簽、更新雙邊投資協定：對於尚未簽屬協定之新南向國家，將積極推動簽署；對於已簽屬雙邊協定之國家，將檢視其內容，應有必要與泰國、越南、菲律賓、印尼、馬來西亞、印度等國進行更新並強化。
（2）推動洽簽避免雙重課稅協定與雙邊經濟合作協定。

4.3.2. 協商對話

（1）建立或強化雙邊對話機制：建立或強化與新南向國家之雙邊對話機制，每年至少與新南向國家召開 12 次對話；排除貿易障礙，推動產業、投資、中小企業等合作機制，建立 20 個以上雙邊合作案。
（2）辦理「臺灣-東協對話」：每年舉辦 1 次，邀請新南向國家產官學人士參與，拓展成為常態性 1.5 軌對話機制。
（3）兩岸善意互動及合作：配合兩岸整體情勢發展，於適當時機和中國大陸就相關議題及合作事項，展開對話及協商。

4.3.3. 策略聯盟

（1）善用我國援外資源：推動臺灣數位機會中心 (Taiwan Digital Opportunity Center, TDOC) 計畫；推動在農漁業、太陽能光電、電子商務職訓等領域之能力建構合作計畫，每年新增至少一處臺灣數位機會中心，培訓總人數每年成長至少 10%。
（2）結合第三國資源：運用臺灣產業於生產管理、營運管理等優勢，參與全球跨國日系廠商新策略布局，掌握臺日廠商第三國供應鏈合作商機，目標為促成 30 家臺日、商廠商進行商機合作會談。
（3）強化與民間團體合作：與新南向國家之全國性工商團體合辦雙邊經貿聯席會議及經貿訪問團；鼓勵我國NGO 團體積極參與新南向國家人道關懷、環境保護、青年交流等各個領域之活動，青年參與海外志工人次每年至少 2,200 人。

4.3.4 僑民網絡

（1）提升臺商組織功能：建立僑民產業資料庫；盤點掌握僑臺商事業經營及分布概況；協助臺商企業攬才，每年分區辦理 3 場次東南亞臺商企業攬才媒合會。
（2）協助臺商辦理多元經貿活動：輔導海外臺商組織辦理國人赴海外當地投資諮詢、就業實習及其他經貿活動，106 年目標為辦理 100 場次經貿活動。
（3）建立人脈交流網絡：推動建立「新南向政策」人脈資料庫，資料庫規模每年增加 5%；媒促海內外建構連結合作交流平臺。

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Taiwan Travel Act

Name in Chinese Taiwan lüxingfa 台灣旅行法
Document type US law
Year, date 2018, March 16
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Public Law 115-135

115th Congress

Mar. 16, 2018—[H.R.535] - Taiwan Travel Act

An Act

To encourage visits between the United States and Taiwan at all levels, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Taiwan Travel Act".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) The Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), enacted in 1979, has continued for 37 years to be a cornerstone of relations between the United States and Taiwan and has served as an anchor for peace and security in the Western Pacific area.

(2) The Taiwan Relations Act declares that peace and stability in the Western Pacific area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States and are matters of international concern.

(3) The United States considers any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.

(4) Taiwan has succeeded in a momentous transition to democracy beginning in the late 1980s and has been a beacon of democracy in Asia, and Taiwan's democratic achievements inspire many countries and people in the region.

(5) Visits to a country by United States Cabinet members and other high-ranking officials are an indicator of the breadth and depth of ties between the United States and such country.

(6) Since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, relations between the United States and Taiwan have suffered from insufficient high-level communication due to the self-imposed restrictions that the United States maintains on high-level visits with Taiwan.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS; STATEMENT OF POLICY.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States government should encourage visits between officials from the United States and Taiwan at all levels.

(b) Statement of Policy.—It should be the policy of the United States to—

(1) allow officials at all levels of the United States Government, including Cabinet-level national security officials, general officers, and other executive branch officials, to travel to Taiwan to meet their Taiwanese counterparts;

(2) allow high-level officials of Taiwan to enter the United States, under conditions which demonstrate appropriate respect for the dignity of such officials, and to meet with officials of the United States, including officials from the Department of State and the Department of Defense and other Cabinet agencies; and

(3) encourage the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, and any other instrumentality established by Taiwan, to conduct business in the United States, including activities which involve participation by Members of Congress, officials of Federal, State, or local governments of the United States, or any high-level official of Taiwan.

Approved March 16, 2018.

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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 535:

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 164 (2018):
Jan. 9, considered and passed House.
Feb. 28, considered and passed Senate.

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

Additional information concerning the Taiwan Travel Act can be found on relevant page of the US Congress; please click here.

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Commitment to Taiwan

Name in Chinese dui Taiwande chengnuo 對台灣的承諾
Document type Part of the US law "Asia Reassurance Initiative Act" (Yazhou zai baozheng changyifa 亞洲再保證倡議法)
Year, date 2018, Dec. 31
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Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018

[...]

SEC. 209. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.

(a) United States Commitment to Taiwan.—
It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to support the close economic, political, and security relationship between Taiwan and the United States;

(2) to faithfully enforce all existing United States Government commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8), the 3 joint communiques, and the Six Assurances agreed to by President Ronald Reagan in July 1982; and

(3) to counter efforts to change the status quo and to support peaceful resolution acceptable to both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

(b) Arms Sales to Taiwan.—
The President should conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from the People's Republic of China, including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile, survivable, and cost-effective capabilities, into its military forces.

(c) Travel.—
The President should encourage the travel of highlevel United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135).

[...]

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S. 2736:

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 164 (2018):
Dec. 4, considered and passed Senate.
Dec. 12, considered and passed House, amended.
Dec. 19, Senate concurred in House amendment.

DAILY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS (2018):
Dec. 31, Presidential statement.

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The “Commitment to Taiwan” is part of the “Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018” which was signed into law by US President Donald Trump on Dec. 31, 2018. Only Sec. 209 of that law is considered relevant in this context by the chief researcher, hence its other sections are omitted here.

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Xi Jinping’s “Five Points”

Name in Chinese Xi wu tiao 習五條
Document type Policy elaboration by top PRC leader
Year, date 2019, Jan. 2
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

Working Together to Realize Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation and Advance China’s Peaceful Reunification

Speech at the Meeting Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Issuance of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan January 2, 2019

Xi Jinping

Comrades, my compatriots, and friends, today, we are meeting here to solemnly commemorate the 40th anniversary of the issuance of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. As a new year begins, on behalf of the people on the mainland, I extend sincere greetings and best wishes to our compatriots in Taiwan.

It has been 70 years since Taiwan and the mainland were separated. The emergence and evolution of the Taiwan question has, since China entered the modern times, been inextricably interwoven with the history of the Chinese nation. The Opium War of 1840 and ensuing wars of aggression launched by Western powers plunged China into an anguished state of turmoil and foreign threat, with its lands torn apart, and Taiwan fell under foreign occupation that was to last half a century. Wave upon wave, the Chinese people were engaged in an epic struggle to resist foreign invasion, liberate the Chinese nation, and realize the country’s reunification. Our compatriots in Taiwan made a huge contribution to this struggle. In 1945, together with peoples around the world, the Chinese people won victory in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, a part of the global War against Fascism. Taiwan was thus recovered and returned to China. It was not long, however, before the two sides of the Taiwan Straits fell into a special state of protracted political confrontation due to the civil war in China and the interference of foreign forces.

Since 1949, the Communist Party of China, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people have endeavored to pursue the historic mission of resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s complete reunification. Working with our compatriots in Taiwan, we have de-escalated tense confrontation across the Taiwan Straits, improved cross-Straits relations, and set out on a path of peaceful development and continually made breakthroughs in cross-Straits relations.

Over the past 70 years, we have, responding to the longing of people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, ended the absence of contact between the two sides. We have achieved overall direct two-way “three links” (mail, business and transport) and have initiated substantial exchanges, communication, and cooperation between the two sides. Cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation have steadily expanded and grown increasingly closer, and mutual affinity has deepened. Our compatriots in Taiwan have made a major contribution to the mainland’s reform and opening up and they in turn have also shared the mainland’s development opportunities.

Over the past 70 years, we have, acting in a spirit of seeking common ground while setting aside differences and on the basis of the one-China principle, enabled the two sides to reach the “1992 Consensus” that “both sides of the Taiwan Straits belong to one China and will work together toward national reunification.” The two sides have thus initiated consultations and negotiation and promoted cross-Straits party-to-party exchanges. We have opened up a path for promoting the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and realized a historic meeting between leaders of both sides, thus elevating cross-Straits political interactions to a new height.

Over the past 70 years, we have, keeping in mind the changes over time in the growth of cross-Straits relations, proposed the policy of seeking a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question and the well-conceived concept of “one country, two systems”, and established the fundamental guideline of “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems”. On this basis, we have formulated a fundamental strategy of upholding the principle of “one country, two systems” and promoting national reunification. With this we have responded to the call of our time, namely, to promote, in the new era, the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and unite our compatriots in Taiwan to strive for our country’s rejuvenation and peaceful reunification.

Over the past 70 years, we have, holding high the banner of peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit, and on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, forged friendship and strengthened cooperation with other countries and consolidated the international community’s commitment to the one-China principle. More and more countries and people have gained a better understanding of National reunification endeavor and given their support to it.

Over the past 70 years, we have, bearing in mind the overall and long-term interests of the Chinese nation, stood firm in safeguarding China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Rallying all the Chinese people around us, we have resolutely defeated all attempts to create “two Chinas,” “one China, one Taiwan,” or “Taiwan independence,” and have achieved major victories in the fight against the separatist activities for “Taiwan independence”.

As the evolution of cross-Straits relations attests, the historical and legal fact that Taiwan is part of China and the two sides belong to one and same China can never be changed by any force or anyone. We people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are Chinese and share a natural affinity and national identity built of kinship and mutual assistance, a fact that can never be altered by any force or anyone. The tide of our times — the cross-Straits situation moving toward peace and stability and cross-Straits relations continuing to move forward — is a tide that cannot be stopped by any force or anyone. The historical trend toward a stronger China, national rejuvenation, and reunification cannot be stopped by any force or anyone!

Comrades, my compatriots, and friends, by reviewing the past, we can draw inspiration for both the present and the future. Our country must be reunified, and will surely be reunified. This is a historical conclusion drawn from the evolution of cross-Straits relations over the past seven decades; it is also critical to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in the new era. We Chinese on both sides of the Straits, all of us Chinese at home and abroad, should jointly uphold the national interest, follow the historical trend, and work together for the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and China’s peaceful reunification.

First, we should work together to promote China’s rejuvenation and achieve its peaceful reunification.

The rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and reunification of our country are a surging popular trend. It is where the greater national interest lies, and it is what the people desire. We face each other just across a strip of water, yet our two sides are still far apart. The fact that until now, we have not yet been reunified is a wound left by history on the Chinese nation. We Chinese on both sides should work together to achieve reunification and heal this wound. All our compatriots in Taiwan are members of the Chinese nation and should be proud of their Chinese identity, fully consider the position and role of Taiwan in national rejuvenation and pursue both the complete reunification and rejuvenation of China as an honorable cause.

The future of Taiwan lies in national reunification and the wellbeing of the people in Taiwan hinges on the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The peaceful development of cross-Straits relations is the right path for safeguarding peace, promoting common development and benefiting people on both sides. Thus, the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations is something people on both sides should jointly promote, safeguard, and enjoy. The Chinese Dream is a dream shared by people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits; only China’s rejuvenation and prosperity can deliver a life of plenty and happiness to us Chinese on both sides. As the Chinese nation moves toward rejuvenation, our compatriots in Taiwan will certainly not miss out. We people on both sides should join hands to fulfill the Chinese Dream, shoulder the responsibility and share the glory of national rejuvenation. The Taiwan question originated in a weak and ravaged China, and it will definitely end with China’s rejuvenation!

Second, we should explore a “two systems” solution to the Taiwan question and enrich practical efforts toward peaceful reunification.

The concept of “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems” is the best approach to realizing national reunification. It embodies the Chinese wisdom that we thrive by embracing each other, gives full account to Taiwan’s reality and is conducive to the long-term stability in Taiwan after reunification.

Difference in systems is not an obstacle to reunification; it is certainly no excuse for separation. The principle of “one country, two systems” was proposed precisely to accommodate Taiwan’s actual conditions and to safeguard the interests and wellbeing of our compatriots in Taiwan. In terms of how the principle should be carried out in Taiwan, we will fully consider Taiwan’s reality, give full consideration to the views and proposals from all walks of life on both sides and fully accommodate the interests and sentiments of our compatriots in Taiwan. Provided that China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests are ensured, after peaceful reunification, Taiwan’s social system and its way of life will be fully respected, and the private property, religious beliefs, and lawful rights and interests of our compatriots in Taiwan will be fully protected.

We people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are of one family; issues between our two sides are domestic affairs, which, as such, should naturally be discussed and resolved by family members. Peaceful reunification means achieving it through consultation and discussion as equals. The long-standing political differences between the two sides are the root cause that affects the steady growth of cross-Straits relations, but we should not allow this problem to be passed down from one generation to the next. We both sides must live up to our responsibility to our nation and to future generations; we should put our heads together, show creativity, and reduce difference and seek common ground. Doing so will enable us to resolve the political antagonism at an early date, ensure lasting peace across the Taiwan Straits, and agree on a vision for national reunification, so that our future generations can live and grow up in a shared home with peace, stability, prosperity, and dignity.

On the basis of adhering to the one-China principle, there will be no obstacles in exchanges between political parties and groups in Taiwan and the mainland. Only when dialogue replaces confrontation, cooperation replaces disputes, and win-win mindset replaces zero-sum mentality, will cross-Straits relations move steadily and progress far. We are willing to engage in broad exchanges of views with all parties, groups, or individuals in Taiwan regarding political issues between the two sides and the promotion of China’s peaceful reunification, in order to forge social consensus and advance political negotiation.

Here we wish to make a solemn proposal: on the common political foundation of adhering to the “1992 Consensus” and opposing “Taiwan independence,” all political parties and all sectors of society on both sides recommend representatives who will engage in extensive and in-depth democratic consultations on cross-Straits relations and the future of the nation and work toward institutional arrangements for promoting the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations.

Third, we should adhere to the one-China principle and ensure the prospects for peaceful reunification.

Although our two sides have yet to be reunified, the sovereignty and territory of China has never been severed and the fact that the mainland and Taiwan belong to one and same China has never changed. The one-China principle is the political foundation of cross-Straits relations. When we adhere to this principle, cross-Straits relations will improve and grow and our compatriots in Taiwan will benefit. However, if we deviate from it, cross-Straits relations will become strained and volatile, and the interests of our compatriots in Taiwan will be harmed.

China’s reunification is a historical trend and the right path, while “Taiwan independence” goes against the tide of history, and it is a path to nowhere. Our compatriots in Taiwan have a glorious patriotic tradition and share a close kinship with us. We remain committed to the principle of placing our hopes on the people of Taiwan. We will continue, as ever, to respect, care about, work with, and rely on them, and we will do our utmost to help them overcome difficulties and meet their needs. Our compatriots in Taiwan, regardless of political affiliation, religious belief, social status, or origin of birth, whether civilian or military: You must see that “Taiwan independence” will only bring disaster. You should resolutely oppose “Taiwan independence” and join hands with us to pursue the bright prospects of peaceful reunification. We are willing to create vast space for peaceful reunification; but we will definitely not leave any room for separatist activities aimed at “Taiwan independence” in any form.

We Chinese should not fight each other. We will work with the greatest sincerity and exert utmost efforts to achieve peaceful reunification, because this works best for the people on both sides and for our whole nation. We do not renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. This is to guard against external interference and a tiny number of separatists and their separatist activities for “Taiwan independence”. It does in no way target our compatriots in Taiwan. We people on both sides should work together to pursue peace, protect peace, and enjoy peace.

Fourth, we should deepen integrated development of the two sides and cement the foundation for peaceful reunification.

People on both sides of the Taiwan Straits share the bonds of kinship. Just as loved ones wish each other well, we Chinese should help each other. We treat our compatriots in Taiwan as equals, and will continue paving the way for them to share first the mainland’s development opportunities and ensure that our compatriots and enterprises from Taiwan receive the same treatment as those from the mainland, thus giving them a greater sense of fulfillment. After the peaceful reunification, Taiwan will enjoy lasting peace and the people there will live in peace and contentment. Backed by a strong motherland, our compatriots in Taiwan will enjoy better life, have more opportunities for development, and they will have stronger confidence, greater sense of security and dignity in the international community.

We should take active steps to institutionalize cross-Straits economic cooperation and create a common market for the two sides, so as to increase momentum for development and vitality of cooperation and strengthen the economy of the Chinese nation. We on the two sides should promote connectivity wherever necessary, including trade and economic cooperation, infrastructure building, energy and resources development, and sharing industrial standards. We can start by supplies of water, electricity, gas, and construction of sea-crossing bridges from coastal areas in Fujian province to Kinmen and Mazu in Taiwan. We should promote cooperation in culture, education, and healthcare, and the sharing of social security and public resources, and we should support neighbouring areas or areas with similar conditions on the two sides in providing equal, universal, and accessible basic public services.

Fifth, we should forge closer bonds of heart and mind between people on both sides and strengthen our joint commitment to peaceful reunification.

The soul of a nation is molded and cast by its culture. We on the mainland and in Taiwan share the same roots, culture, and ethnic identity; it is Chinese culture that has instilled vitality in us and given us a sense of belonging. The key to kinship lies in mutual understanding. No matter the extent of interference and obstructions we may encounter, exchanges and cooperation between our people on both sides must never be diminished, suspended, or stopped.

We people on both sides should together pass on the fine traditional Chinese culture and promote its evolution and growth in new and creative ways. We should engage in exchanges and mutual learning, promote dialogue and inclusiveness, enhance empathy, deepen mutual understanding, strengthen mutual trust, and increase our shared sense of identity. We should maintain our bonds of kinship and shared values, adhere to the right approach to our history, our nation, and our country in raising awareness of younger generations, and keep alive the great spirit of our nation. Between loved ones, there is no knot of perception that cannot be untied. With perseverance, we are sure to forge closer bonds of heart and mind between people on both sides.

Supporting and pursuing reunification is a righteous cause of the Chinese nation, and this commitment should be recognized by all of us Chinese. Our great country will always stand firm behind patriots working for reunification. It is our sincere hope that all our compatriots in Taiwan will treasure peace as they do the gift of sight, pursue reunification with the same zeal with which they pursue a better life, and play an active part in advancing the just cause of China’s peaceful reunification.

The young are the hope of the country and the future of the nation. Young people on both sides should shoulder responsibility, forge solidarity and friendship, and work together for a better future. Young people from Taiwan are welcome to pursue and fulfill their dreams on the mainland. We Chinese on both sides must be united and work together to seek happiness for ourselves and create a bright future for our nation.

Comrades, my compatriots, and friends, over the years, our compatriots in Hong Kong, Macao, and overseas have shown understanding for and supported the great cause of reunification, and have made a positive contribution to this cause. I hope that they will remain committed and further contribute to the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and China’s peaceful reunification.

Comrades, my compatriots, and friends, there is only one China in the world. The one-China principle is a generally recognized norm in international relations, and it represents a general consensus of the international community. The international community has extended understanding and support for the Chinese people’s just cause of opposing “Taiwan independence” separatist activities and striving for national reunification; the Chinese government expresses its appreciation and gratitude for such understanding and support. The affairs of us Chinese must be decided by ourselves. The Taiwan question is an internal affair that involves China’s core interests and the Chinese people’s national sentiments, and no external interference in this issue will be tolerated.

China’s reunification will not harm any other country’s legitimate interests, including its economic interests in Taiwan. On the contrary, it will bring the world more opportunities for development, create more positive momentum for the prosperity and stability of the Asia Pacific and the rest of the world. Indeed, it will make greater contribution to building a community with a shared future for mankind, to the cause of global peace and development, and to the cause of human progress.

Comrades, my compatriots, and friends, we cannot choose our history, but we can steer the current course and shape the future. The new era is an era for the Chinese nation to achieve major development and make major accomplishment; it is also an era for the people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits to achieve major development and make major accomplishment. The path ahead may not be all smooth, but when we stand and work together, we can surely create a promising future for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and we can surely achieve the great cause of national reunification!

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習五條

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2019/01/02 14:38

告台灣同胞書 40 週年　中共中央總書記、國家主席、中央軍委主席習近平演說【全文】

同志們、同胞們、朋友們，今天在這裡隆重集會，紀念告台灣同胞書發表 40 周年。新年之際，代表祖國大陸人民，向廣大台灣同胞致以誠摯問候與衷心祝福。

海峽兩岸分隔已屆 70 年，台灣問題的產生與演變同近代以來中華民族命運休憩相關，1840 年鴉片戰爭之後，西方列強入侵，中國陷入內憂外患，山河破碎的悲慘境地。台灣更是被外族侵占長達半個世紀。

為戰勝外來侵略、爭取民族解放、實現國家統一，中華兒女前仆後繼進行了可歌可泣的鬥爭，台灣同胞在這場鬥爭中做出了重要貢獻，1945 年，中國人民從世界人民一道，取得了中國人民抗日戰爭暨世界反法西斯戰爭的偉大勝利，台灣隨之光復，重回祖國懷抱，且後不久，因中國內戰延續與外部勢力干涉，海峽兩岸陷入長期政治對立的特殊狀態。

1949 年以來，中國共產黨、中國政府、中國人民，始終把解決台灣問題、實現祖國完整統一作為矢志不渝的歷史任務，我們團結台灣同胞，推動台海形勢從緊張對峙走向緩和改善，進而走向和平發展道路，兩岸關係不斷取得突破性進展。

70 年來，順應兩岸同胞共突願望，推動打破兩岸隔絕狀態，實現直接雙向三通，開啟兩岸同胞大交流大交往大合作局面，兩岸交流日益廣泛，相互往來日益密切，彼此心靈日益契合。台灣同胞為祖國改革開放做出重大貢獻，也分享大陸發展機運。

70 年來，我們秉持求同存異精神，推動兩岸雙方在一個中國的基礎上達成「兩岸同屬一個中國，共同努力謀求國家統一」的九二共識，開啟兩岸協商談判，推動協商兩岸政黨黨際交流，開闢兩岸和平發展道路，實現兩岸領導人歷史性會晤，使兩岸政治互動達到新高度。

70 年來，我們把握兩岸關係發展時代變化，推出和平解決台灣問題的政策主張和「一國兩制」科學構想，確立了「和平統一、一國兩制」的基本方針，進而形成了堅持一國兩制和推進祖國統一基本方略，回答了新時代推動兩岸關係和平發展，團結台灣同胞共同致力於民族偉大復興與祖國和平統一的時代命題。

70 年來，我們高舉和平、發展、合作、共贏的旗幟，在和平共處五項和平基礎五項原則基礎上，發展同各國的友好合作，鞏固國際社會堅持一個中國原則的格局，越來越多國家和人民理解和支持中國統一事業。

70 年來，我們始終著眼於中華民族整體利益和長遠利益，堅定維護國家主權和領土完整，堅決挫敗各種製造「兩個中國、一中一台、台灣獨立」的圖謀，確立一切反台獨鬥爭的重大勝利。

兩岸關係發展歷程證明：台灣是中國一部分、兩岸同屬一個中國的歷史和法理事實，是任何人任何勢力都無法改變的！兩岸同胞都是中國人，血濃於水、守望相助的天然情感和民族認同，是任何人任何勢力都無法改變的！台海形勢走向和平穩定、兩岸關系向前發展的時代潮流，是任何人任何勢力都無法阻擋的！國家強大、民族覆興、兩岸統一的歷史大勢，更是任何人任何勢力都無法阻擋的！

同志們、同胞們、朋友們！回顧歷史，是為了啟迪今天、昭示明天。祖國必須統一，也必然統一。這是70載兩岸關係發展歷程的歷史定論，也是新時代中華民族偉大復興的必然要求。兩岸中國人、海內外中華兒女理應共擔民族大義、順應歷史大勢，共同推動兩岸關係和平發展、推進祖國和平統一進程。

第一，攜手推動民族復興，實現和平統一目標。民族復興、國家統一是大勢所趨、大義所在、民心所向。一水之隔、咫尺天涯，兩岸迄今尚未完全統一是歷史遺留給中華民族的創傷。兩岸中國人應該共同努力謀求國家統一，撫平歷史創傷。廣大台灣同胞都是中華民族一份子，要做堂堂正正的中國人，認真思考台灣在民族復興中的地位和作用，把促進國家完全統一、共謀民族偉大復興作為無上光榮的事業。

台灣前途在於國家統一，台灣同胞福祉繫於民族復興。兩岸關係和平發展是維護兩岸和平、促進兩岸共同發展、造福兩岸同胞的正確道路。兩岸關係和平發展要兩岸同胞共同推動，靠兩岸同胞共同維護，由兩岸同胞共同分享。中國夢是兩岸同胞共同的夢，民族復興、國家強盛，兩岸中國人才能過上富足美好的生活。

在中華民族走向偉大復興的進程中，台灣同胞定然不會缺席。兩岸同胞要攜手同心，共圓中國夢，共擔民族復興的責任，共享民族復興的榮耀。台灣問題因民族弱亂而產生，必將隨著民族復興而終結！

第二，探索「兩制」台灣方案，豐富和平統一實踐。「和平統一、一國兩制」是實現國家統一的最佳方式，體現了海納百川、有容乃大的中華智慧，既充分考慮台灣現實情況，又有利於統一後台灣長治久安。

制度不同，不是統一的障礙，更不是分裂的藉口。「一國兩制」的提出，本來就是為了照顧台灣現實情況，維護台灣同胞利益福祉。「一國兩制」在台灣的具體實現形式會充分考慮台灣現實情況，會充分吸收兩岸各界意見和建議，會充分照顧到台灣同胞利益和感情。在確保國家主權、安全、發展利益的前提下，和平統一後，台灣同胞的社會制度和生活方式等將得到充分尊重，台灣同胞的私人財產、宗教信仰、合法權益將得到充分保障。

兩岸同胞是一家人，兩岸的事是兩岸同胞的家裡事，當然也應該由家裡人商量著辦。和平統一，是平等協商、共議統一。兩岸長期存在的政治分歧問題是影響兩岸關係行穩致遠的總根子，總不能一代一代傳下去。兩岸雙方應該本著對民族、對後世負責的態度，凝聚智慧，發揮創意，聚同化異，爭取早日解決政治對立，實現台海持久和平，達成國家統一願景，讓我們的子孫後代在祥和、安寧、繁榮、尊嚴的共同家園中生活成長。

在一個中國原則基礎上，台灣任何政黨、團體同我們的交往都不存在障礙。以對話取代對抗、以合作取代爭鬥、以雙贏取代零和，兩岸關系才能行穩致遠。我們願意同台灣各黨派、團體和人士就兩岸政治問題和推進祖國和平統一進程的有關問題開展對話溝通，廣泛交換意見，尋求社會共識，推進政治談判。

我們鄭重倡議，在堅持「九二共識」、反對「台獨」的共同政治基礎上，兩岸各政黨、各界別推舉代表性人士，就兩岸關係和民族未來開展廣泛深入的民主協商，就推動兩岸關係和平發展達成制度性安排。

第三，堅持一個中國原則，維護和平統一前景。儘管海峽兩岸尚未完全統一，但中國主權和領土從未分割，大陸和台灣同屬一個中國的事實從未改變。一個中國原則是兩岸關係的政治基礎。堅持一個中國原則，兩岸關係就能改善和發展，台灣同胞就能受益。背離一個中國原則，就會導致兩岸關係緊張動蕩，損害台灣同胞切身利益。

統一是歷史大勢，是正道。「台獨」是歷史逆流，是絕路。廣大台灣同胞具有光榮的愛國主義傳統，是我們的骨肉天親。我們堅持寄希望於台灣人民的方針，一如既往尊重台灣同胞、關愛台灣同胞、團結台灣同胞、依靠台灣同胞，全心全意為台灣同胞辦實事、做好事、解難事。

廣大台灣同胞不分黨派、不分宗教、不分階層、不分軍民、不分地域，都要認清「台獨」只會給台灣帶來深重禍害，堅決反對「台獨」分裂，共同追求和平統一的光明前景。我們願意為和平統一創造廣闊空間，但絕不為各種形式的「台獨」分裂活動留下任何空間。

中國人不打中國人。我們願意以最大誠意、盡最大努力爭取和平統一的前景，因為以和平方式實現統一，對兩岸同胞和全民族最有利。我們不承諾放棄使用武力，保留採取一切必要措施的選項，針對的是外部勢力干涉和極少數「台獨」分裂分子及其分裂活動，絕非針對台灣同胞。兩岸同胞要共謀和平、共護和平、共享和平。

第四，深化兩岸融合發展，夯實和平統一基礎。兩岸同胞血脈相連。親望親好，中國人要幫中國人。我們對台灣同胞一視同仁，將繼續率先同台灣同胞分享大陸發展機遇，為台灣同胞台灣企業提供同等待遇，讓大家有更多獲得感。和平統一之後，台灣將永保太平，民眾將安居樂業。有強大祖國做依靠，台灣同胞的民生福祉會更好，發展空間會更大，在國際上腰桿會更硬、底氣會更足，更加安全、更有尊嚴。

我們要積極推進兩岸經濟合作制度化，打造兩岸共同市場，為發展增動力，為合作添活力，壯大中華民族經濟。兩岸要應通盡通，提升經貿合作暢通、基礎設施聯通、能源資源互通、行業標準共通，可以率先實現金門、馬祖同福建沿海地區通水、通電、通氣、通橋。要推動兩岸文化教育、醫療衛生合作，社會保障和公共資源共享，支持兩岸鄰近或條件相當地區基本公共服務均等化、普惠化、便捷化。

第五，實現同胞心靈契合，增進和平統一認同。國家之魂，文以化之，文以鑄之。兩岸同胞同根同源、同文同種，中華文化是兩岸同胞心靈的根脈和歸屬。人之相交，貴在知心。不管遭遇多少干擾阻礙，兩岸同胞交流合作不能停、不能斷、不能少。

兩岸同胞要共同傳承中華優秀傳統文化，推動其實現創造性轉化、創新性發展。兩岸同胞要交流互鑒、對話包容，推己及人、將心比心，加深相互理解，增進互信認同。要秉持同胞情、同理心，以正確的歷史觀、民族觀、國家觀化育後人，弘揚偉大民族精神。親人之間，沒有解不開的心結。久久為功，必定能達到兩岸同胞心靈契合。

支持和追求國家統一是民族大義，應該得到全民族肯定。偉大祖國永遠是所有愛國統一力量的堅強後盾！我們真誠希望所有台灣同胞，像珍視自己的眼睛一樣珍視和平，像追求人生的幸福一樣追求統一，積極參與到推進祖國和平統一的正義事業中來。

國家的希望、民族的未來在青年。兩岸青年要勇擔重任、團結友愛、攜手打拼。我們熱忱歡迎台灣青年來祖國大陸追夢、築夢、圓夢。兩岸中國人要精誠團結，攜手同心，為同胞謀福祉，為民族創未來！

同志們、同胞們、朋友們！長期以來，香港同胞、澳門同胞和海外僑胞關心支持祖國統一大業，作出了積極貢獻。希望香港同胞、澳門同胞和海外僑胞一如既往，為推動兩岸關系和平發展、實現祖國和平統一再立新功。

同志們、同胞們、朋友們！世界上只有一個中國，堅持一個中國原則是公認的國際關係準則，是國際社會普遍共識。國際社會廣泛理解和支持中國人民反對「台獨」分裂活動、爭取完成國家統一的正義事業。中國政府對此表示讚賞和感謝。中國人的事要由中國人來決定。台灣問題是中國的內政，事關中國核心利益和中國人民民族感情，不容任何外來干涉。

中國的統一，不會損害任何國家的正當利益包括其在台灣的經濟利益，只會給各國帶來更多發展機遇，只會給亞太地區和世界繁榮穩定註入更多正能量，只會為構建人類命運共同體、為世界和平發展和人類進步事業作出更大貢獻。

同志們、同胞們、朋友們！歷史不能選擇，現在可以把握，未來可以開創！新時代是中華民族大發展大作為的時代，也是兩岸同胞大發展大作為的時代。前進道路不可能一帆風順，但只要我們和衷共濟、共同奮鬥，就一定能夠共創中華民族偉大復興美好未來，就一定能夠完成祖國統一大業！

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

Sources for the text—English,  Chinese.

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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TAIPEI Act of 2019

Name in Chinese erlingyijiu nian Taiwan youbang guoji baohu ji jiaqiang changyi fa'an (Taibei fa'an) 2019 年台灣友邦國際保護及加強倡議法案（台北法案）
Document type US law
Year, date 2020, March 26
 Jump to Editor's note   [Next document]  [Previous document] 

S.1678

Public Law 116-135

116th Congress

Mar. 26, 2020—[S.1678] - Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019.

An Act

To express United States support for Taiwan's diplomatic alliances around the world.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019".

SEC. 2. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8) states that it is the policy of the United States "to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan".

(2) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 states that it is the policy of the United States "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan".

(3) Taiwan is a free, democratic, and prosperous nation of 23,000,000 people and an important contributor to peace and stability around the world.

(4) Since the election of President Tsai Ing-wen as President of Taiwan in 2016, the Government of the People's Republic of China has intensified its efforts to pressure Taiwan.

(5) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favour of diplomatic relations with China.

(6) Taiwan currently maintains full diplomatic relations with 15 nations around the world.

(7) Taiwan's unique relationship with the United States, Australia, India, Japan, and other countries are of significant benefit in strengthening Taiwan's economy and preserving its international space.

(8) According to President Tsai Ing-wen, the severance of diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favour of diplomatic relations with China is "part of a series of diplomatic and military acts of coercion" by China.

(9) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409) states that—

(A) it is United States policy "to support the close economic, political, and security relationship between Taiwan and the United States"; and

(B) the President should—

(i) "conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from the People's Republic of China, including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile, survivable, and cost-effective capabilities, into its military forces"; and

(ii) "encourage the travel of high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act".

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States and Taiwan have built a strong economic partnership, with the United States now Taiwan's second largest trading partner and with Taiwan the 11th largest trading partner of the United States and a key destination for United States agricultural exports;

(2) strong United States-Taiwan economic relations have been a positive factor in stimulating economic growth and job creation for the people of both the United States and Taiwan; and

(3) the United States Trade Representative should consult with Congress on opportunities for further strengthening bilateral trade and economic relations between the United States and Taiwan.

SEC. 4. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH REGARD TO TAIWAN'S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

It should be the policy of the United States—

(1) to advocate, as appropriate—

(A) for Taiwan's membership in all international organizations in which statehood is not a requirement and in which the United States is also a participant; and

(B) for Taiwan to be granted observer status in other appropriate international organizations;

(2) to instruct, as appropriate, representatives of the United States Government in all organizations described in paragraph (1) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to advocate for Taiwan's membership or observer status in such organizations; and

(3) for the President or the President's designees to advocate, as appropriate, for Taiwan's membership or observer status in all organizations described in paragraph (1) as part of any relevant bilateral engagements between the United States and the People's Republic of China, including leader summits and the U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue.

SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING OF TIES WITH TAIWAN.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States government should—

(1) support Taiwan in strengthening its official diplomatic relationships as well as other partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world;

(2) consider, in certain cases as appropriate and in alignment with United States interests, increasing its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that have demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan; and

(3) consider, in certain cases as appropriate, in alignment with United States foreign policy interests and in consultation with Congress, altering its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that take serious or significant actions to undermine the security or prosperity of Taiwan.

(b) Report.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State shall report to the appropriate congressional committees on the steps taken in accordance with subsection (a).

(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.

Approved March 26, 2020.

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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S. 1678:

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

Vol. 165 (2019):
Oct. 29, considered and passed Senate.

Vol. 166 (2020):
Mar. 3, 4, considered and passed House, amended.
Mar. 11, Senate concurred in House amendment.

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

Additional information concerning the TAIPEI Act of 2019 can be found on relevant page of the US Congress; please click here.

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Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020

Name in Chinese  erlingerling nian Taiwan baozhengfa 2020 年台灣保證法 
Document type US law
Year, date 2020, Dec. 27 (signed into law by POTUS)
 Jump to Editor's note   [Next document]  [Previous document] 

116th Congress Public Law 260
From the U.S. Government Publishing Office

[Page 1181]

CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2021

[...]

Subtitle B—Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020

SEC. 311. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the "Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020".

SEC. 312. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) April 10, 2019, marked the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8).

(2) Since 1949, the close relationship between the United States and Taiwan has benefitted both parties and the broader Indo-Pacific region.

(3) The security of Taiwan and its democracy are key elements of continued peace and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, which is in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States.

(4) The People's Republic of China is currently engaged in a comprehensive military modernization campaign to enhance the power-projection capabilities of the People's Liberation Army and its ability to conduct joint operations, which is shifting the military balance of power across the Taiwan Strait.

(5) Taiwan and its diplomatic partners continue to face sustained pressure and coercion from the People's Republic of China, which seeks to isolate Taiwan from the international community.

(6) It is the policy of the United States to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act in a manner consistent with the "Six Assurances" and in accordance with the United States "One China" policy.

(7) In the Taiwan Travel Act, which became law on March 16, 2018, Congress observed that the "self-imposed restrictions that the United States maintains on high-level visits" between the United States and Taiwan have resulted in insufficient high-level communication.

SEC. 313. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) Taiwan is a vital part of the United States Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy;

(2) the United States Government—

 (A) supports Taiwan's continued pursuit of asymmetric capabilities and concepts; and

 (B) urges Taiwan to increase its defense spending in order to fully resource its defense strategy; and

(3) the United States should conduct regular sales and transfers of defense articles to Taiwan in order to enhance its self-defense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, including undersea warfare and air defense capabilities, into its military forces.

SEC. 314. TAIWAN'S INCLUSION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the People's Republic of China's attempts to dictate the terms of Taiwan's participation in international organizations, has, in many cases, resulted in Taiwan's exclusion from such organizations even when statehood is not a requirement, and that such exclusion—

(1) is detrimental to global health, civilian air safety, and efforts to counter transnational crime;

(2) negatively impacts the safety and security of citizens globally; and

(3) negatively impacts the security of Taiwan and its democracy.

(b) Statement of Policy.—It is the policy of the United States to advocate for Taiwan's meaningful participation in the United Nations, the World Health Assembly, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, and other international bodies, as appropriate, and to advocate for Taiwan's membership in the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and other international organizations for which statehood is not a requirement for membership.

SEC. 315. REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE TAIWAN GUIDELINES.

(a) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall conduct a review of the Department of State's guidance that governs relations with Taiwan, including the periodic memorandum entitled "Guidelines on Relations with Taiwan" and related documents, and reissue such guidance to executive branch departments and agencies.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Department of State's guidance regarding relations with Taiwan—

(1) should be crafted with the intent to deepen and expand United States-Taiwan relations, and be based on the value, merits, and importance of the United States-Taiwan relationship;

(2) should be crafted giving due consideration to the fact that Taiwan is governed by a representative democratic government that is peacefully constituted through free and fair elections that reflect the will of the people of Taiwan, and that Taiwan is a free and open society that respects universal human rights and democratic values; and

(3) should ensure that the conduct of relations with Taiwan reflects the longstanding, comprehensive, and values-based relationship the United States shares with Taiwan, and contribute to the peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues.

(c) Reporting Requirements.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that includes a description of—

(1) the results of the review pursuant to subsection (a) of the Department of State's guidance on relations with Taiwan, including a copy of the reissued "Guidelines of Relations with Taiwan" memorandum; and

(2) the implementation of the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135) and any changes to guidance on relations with Taiwan that are the result of such implementation.

[...]

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 133:

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

Vol. 165 (2019):
Jan. 10, considered and passed House.

Vol. 166 (2020):
Jan. 15, considered and passed Senate, amended.
Dec. 21, House concurred in Senate amendment with an amendment. Senate concurred in House amendment.

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The “Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020” is part of the “Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021” which was signed into law by US President Donald Trump on Dec. 27, 2020. As the latter text comprises hundreds of pages, only the part considered relevant by the chief researcher is shown here.

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The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era

Name in Chinese Taiwan wenti yu xin shidai Zhongguo tongyi shiye 台灣問題與新時代中國統一事業
Document type PRC policy statement / CCP propaganda white paper (baipishu 白皮書)
Year, date 2022, Aug. 10
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

(Jump to First white paper—1993)    (Jump to Second white paper—2000)

The People's Republic of China
The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and The State Council Information Office
August 2022

Contents

Preamble
I. Taiwan Is Part of China - This Is an Indisputable Fact
II. Resolute Efforts of the CPC to Realize China's Complete Reunification
III. China's Complete Reunification Is a Process That Cannot Be Halted
IV. National Reunification in the New Era
V. Bright Prospects for Peaceful Reunification
Conclusion

Preamble

Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China's complete reunification is a shared aspiration of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation. It is indispensable for the realization of China's rejuvenation. It is also a historic mission of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The CPC, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people have striven for decades to achieve this goal.

The 18th National Congress of the CPC in 2012 heralded a new era in building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Under the strong leadership of the CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping at the core, the CPC and the Chinese government have adopted new and innovative measures in relation to Taiwan. They have continued to chart the course of cross-Straits relations, safeguard peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits, and promote progress towards national reunification. However, in recent years the Taiwan authorities, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), have redoubled their efforts to divide the country, and some external forces have tried to exploit Taiwan to contain China, prevent the Chinese nation from achieving complete reunification, and halt the process of national rejuvenation.

The CPC has united the Chinese people and led them in fulfilling the First Centenary Goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects as scheduled, and in embarking on a new journey towards the Second Centenary Goal of building China into a modern socialist country.

The Chinese nation has achieved a historic transformation from standing upright to becoming prosperous and growing in strength, and national rejuvenation is driven by an unstoppable force. This marks a new starting point for reunification.

The Chinese government has published two previous white papers on Taiwan. One was The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China in August 1993, and the other was The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue in February 2000. These two white papers provided a comprehensive and systematic elaboration of the basic principles and policies regarding the resolution of the Taiwan question. This new white paper is being released to reiterate the fact that Taiwan is part of China, to demonstrate the resolve of the CPC and the Chinese people and their commitment to national reunification, and to emphasize the position and policies of the CPC and the Chinese government in the new era.

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I. Taiwan Is Part of China - This Is an Indisputable Fact

Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times. This statement has a sound basis in history and jurisprudence. New archeological discoveries and research findings regularly attest to the profound historical and cultural ties between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. A large number of historical records and annals document the development of Taiwan by the Chinese people in earlier periods.

The earliest references to this effect are to be found, among others, in Seaboard Geographic Gazetteer compiled in the year 230 by Shen Ying of the State of Wu during the Three Kingdoms Period. The royal court of the Sui Dynasty had on three occasions sent troops to Taiwan, called Liuqiu at that time. Starting from the Song and Yuan dynasties, the imperial central governments of China all set up administrative bodies to exercise jurisdiction over Penghu and Taiwan.

In 1624, Dutch colonialists invaded and occupied the southern part of Taiwan. In 1662, General Zheng Chenggong, hailed as a national hero, led an expedition and expelled them from the island. Subsequently, the Qing court gradually set up more administrative bodies in Taiwan. In 1684, a Taiwan prefecture administration was set up under the jurisdiction of Fujian Province. In 1885, Taiwan's status was upgraded and it became the 20th province of China.

In July 1894, Japan launched a war of aggression against China. In April 1895, the defeated Qing government was forced to cede Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to Japan. During the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1931-1945), China's Communists called for the recovery of Taiwan. Talking with American journalist Nym Wales on May 15, 1937, Mao Zedong said that China's goal was to achieve a final victory in the war - a victory that would recover the occupied Chinese territories in Northeast China and to the south of the Shanhai Pass, and secure the liberation of Taiwan.

On December 9, 1941, the Chinese government issued a declaration of war against Japan, and proclaimed that all treaties, conventions, agreements, and contracts regarding relations between China and Japan had been abrogated, and that China would recover Taiwan and the Penghu Islands.

The Cairo Declaration issued by China, the United States and the United Kingdom on December 1, 1943 stated that it was the purpose of the three allies that all the territories Japan had stolen from China, such as Northeast China, Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, should be restored to China.

The Potsdam Proclamation was signed by China, the United States and the United Kingdom on July 26, 1945, and subsequently recognized by the Soviet Union. It reiterated: "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." In September of the same year, Japan signed the instrument of surrender, in which it promised that it would faithfully fulfill the obligations laid down in the Potsdam Proclamation. On October 25 the Chinese government announced that it was resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan, and the ceremony to accept Japan's surrender in Taiwan Province of the China war theater of the Allied powers was held in Taibei (Taipei). From that point forward, China had recovered Taiwan de jure and de facto through a host of documents with international legal effect.

On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was founded, becoming the successor to the Republic of China (1912-1949), and the Central People's Government became the only legitimate government of the whole of China. The new government replaced the previous KMT regime in a situation where China, as a subject under international law, did not change and China's sovereignty and inherent territory did not change. As a natural result, the government of the PRC should enjoy and exercise China's full sovereignty, which includes its sovereignty over Taiwan.

As a result of the civil war in China in the late 1940s and the interference of external forces, the two sides of the Taiwan Straits have fallen into a state of protracted political confrontation. But the sovereignty and territory of China have never been divided and will never be divided, and Taiwan's status as part of China's territory has never changed and will never be allowed to change.

At its 26th session in October 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758, which undertook "to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it". This resolution settled once and for all the political, legal and procedural issues of China's representation in the UN, and it covered the whole country, including Taiwan. It also spelled out that China has one single seat in the UN, so there is no such thing as "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan".

The specialized agencies of the UN later adopted further resolutions restoring to the PRC its lawful seat and expelling the representatives of the Taiwan authorities. One of these is Resolution 25.1 adopted at the 25th World Health Assembly in May 1972. It was clearly stated in the official legal opinions of the Office of Legal Affairs of the UN Secretariat that "the United Nations considers 'Taiwan' as a province of China with no separate status", and the "'authorities' in 'Taipei' are not considered to... enjoy any form of government status". At the UN the island is referred to as "Taiwan, Province of China" [1].

Resolution 2758 is a political document encapsulating the one-China principle whose legal authority leaves no room for doubt and has been acknowledged worldwide. Taiwan does not have any ground, reason, or right to join the UN, or any other international organization whose membership is confined to sovereign states.

In recent years some elements in a small number of countries, the US foremost among them, have colluded with forces in Taiwan, to falsely claim that the resolution did not conclusively resolve the issue of Taiwan's representation. Puffing up the illegal and invalid Treaty of San Francisco [2] and disregarding the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and other international legal documents, they profess that the status of Taiwan has yet to be determined, and declare their support for "Taiwan's meaningful participation in the UN system". What they are actually attempting to do is to alter Taiwan's status as part of China and create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" as part of a political ploy - using Taiwan to contain China. These actions in violation of Resolution 2758 and international law are a serious breach of political commitments made by these countries. They damage China's sovereignty and dignity, and treat the basic principles of international law with contempt. The Chinese government has condemned and expressed its resolute opposition to them.

The one-China principle represents the universal consensus of the international community; it is consistent with the basic norms of international relations. To date, 181 countries including the United States have established diplomatic relations with the PRC on the basis of the one-China principle. The China-US Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, published in December 1978, states: "The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." It also states: "The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan."

The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) in December 1982, stipulates: "Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China. It is the inviolable duty of all Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland."

The Anti-Secession Law, adopted at the Third Session of the 10th NPC in March 2005, stipulates: "There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division. Safeguarding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included. Taiwan is part of China. The state shall never allow the 'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means."

The National Security Law, adopted at the 15th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 12th NPC in July 2015, stipulates: "The sovereignty and territorial integrity of China brook no violation or separation. Safeguarding national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity is the common duty of all Chinese citizens, including Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan compatriots."

We are one China, and Taiwan is part of China. This is an indisputable fact supported by history and the law. Taiwan has never been a state; its status as part of China is unalterable. Any attempt to distort these facts and dispute or deny the one-China principle will end in failure.

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II. Resolute Efforts of the CPC to Realize China's Complete Reunification

The CPC has always been dedicated to working for the wellbeing of the Chinese people and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Soon after its founding in 1921, the CPC set itself the goal of freeing Taiwan from colonial rule, reuniting it with the rest of the country and liberating the whole nation, including compatriots in Taiwan. It has made a tremendous effort to achieve this goal.

The CPC is committed to the historic mission of resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China's complete reunification. Under its resolute leadership, people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits have worked together to de-escalate tension across the Straits. They have set out on a path of peaceful development and made many breakthroughs in improving cross-Straits relations.

After the founding of the PRC in 1949, China's Communists, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, proposed the essential guideline, underlying principle, and basic policy for peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. The CPC prepared and worked for the liberation of Taiwan, thwarted the Taiwan authorities' plans to attack the mainland, and foiled attempts to create "two Chinas" and "one China, one Taiwan". Through their efforts, the lawful seat and rights of the PRC in the United Nations were restored and the one-China principle was subscribed to by the majority of countries, laying important groundwork for peaceful reunification. The CPC central leadership established high-level contact with the Taiwan authorities through proper channels in pursuit of a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.

Following the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1978, with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States, China's Communists, led by Deng Xiaoping, defined the fundamental guideline for peaceful reunification in the vital interests of the country and the people and on the basis of the consensus for peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. The CPC introduced the creative and well-conceived concept of One Country, Two Systems, and applied it first in resolving the questions of Hong Kong and Macao. It took action to ease military confrontation across the Taiwan Straits, restore contact, and open up people-to-people exchanges and cooperation, opening a new chapter in cross-Straits relations.

After the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee in 1989, China's Communists, led by Jiang Zemin, made eight proposals for the development of cross-Straits relations and the peaceful reunification of China [3]. The CPC facilitated agreement across the Straits on the 1992 Consensus, which embodies the one-China principle. It initiated cross-Straits consultations and negotiations, resulting in the first talks between heads of the non-governmental organizations authorized by the two sides of the Straits, and expanded cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation in various fields. The CPC took firm action against separatist activities led by Lee Teng-hui, and struck hard at the separatist forces seeking "Taiwan independence". It ensured the smooth return of Hong Kong and Macao to China, and applied the policy of One Country, Two Systems, which had a constructive impact on the settlement of the Taiwan question.

After the 16th CPC National Congress in 2002, China's Communists, led by Hu Jintao, highlighted the importance of peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. The CPC pushed for the enactment of the Anti-Secession Law to curb separatist activities in Taiwan, hosted the first talks between the leaders of the CPC and the Kuomintang in six decades since 1945, and defeated attempts by Chen Shui-bian to fabricate a legal basis for "independence". The CPC effected profound changes in moving the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations forward by promoting institutionalized consultations and negotiations that produced fruitful results, establishing overall direct two-way links in mail, business and transport, and facilitating the signing and implementation of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement.

After the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012, China's Communists, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, took a holistic approach to cross-Straits relations in keeping with changing circumstances, added substance to the theory on national reunification and the principles and policies concerning Taiwan, and worked to keep cross-Straits relations on the right track. The CPC developed its overall policy for resolving the Taiwan question in the new era, and set out the overarching guideline and a program of action.

At its 19th National Congress in October 2017, the CPC affirmed the basic policy of upholding One Country, Two Systems and promoting national reunification, and emphasized its resolve never to allow any person, any organization, or any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from China.

In January 2019, Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and president of China, addressed a meeting marking the 40th anniversary of the release of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan. In his speech, Xi Jinping proposed major policies to advance the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and the peaceful reunification of China in the new era. These are: first, working together to promote China's rejuvenation and its peaceful reunification; second, seeking a Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question and making innovative efforts towards peaceful reunification; third, abiding by the one-China principle and safeguarding the prospects for peaceful reunification; fourth, further integrating development across the Straits and consolidating the foundations for peaceful reunification; fifth, forging closer bonds of heart and mind between people on both sides of the Straits and strengthening joint commitment to peaceful reunification.

The CPC and the Chinese government have thereby adopted a series of major measures for charting the course of cross-Straits relations and realizing China's peaceful reunification:

- The CPC and the Chinese government have facilitated the first meeting and direct dialogue between leaders of the two sides since 1949, raising exchanges and interactions to new heights, opening up a new chapter, and creating new space for cross-Straits relations. This is a new milestone. The departments in charge of cross-Straits affairs on both sides have established regular contact and communication mechanisms on a common political foundation, and the heads of the two departments have exchanged visits and set up hotlines.

- Upholding the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, the CPC and the Chinese government have facilitated exchanges between political parties across the Straits, and conducted dialogues, consultations, and in-depth exchanges of views on cross-Straits relations and the future of the Chinese nation with relevant political parties, organizations, and individuals in Taiwan. These efforts have resulted in consensus on multiple issues, and promoted a number of joint initiatives exploring the Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question with all sectors of Taiwan society.

- Guided by the conviction that people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are of the same family, the CPC and the Chinese government have promoted peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and integrated development of the two sides for the benefit of both the mainland and Taiwan. We have also refined the institutional arrangements, policies and measures to promote cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation, designed to advance the wellbeing of the people of Taiwan. These include the delivery of water from the coastal province of Fujian to Kinmen Island, electronic travel passes for Taiwan residents to enter or leave the mainland, residence permits for Taiwan residents, progressively ensuring that Taiwan compatriots have equal access to public services so as to facilitate their studying, starting businesses, working and living on the mainland, and an ongoing effort to pave the way for Taiwan to benefit first from the mainland's development opportunities.

- While countering interference and obstruction from separatist forces, the CPC and the Chinese government have called on the people of Taiwan to promote effective and in-depth cooperation and people-to-people exchanges in various fields across the Straits. Having overcome the impact of COVID-19, we have held a number of exchange events such as the Straits Forum, and maintained the momentum of cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation.

- Resolute in defending state sovereignty and territorial integrity and opposing separatist activities and external interference, the CPC and the Chinese government have safeguarded peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. We have taken lawful action against and effectively deterred separatist forces. We have handled Taiwan's external exchanges in a sound manner, and consolidated the international community's commitment to the one-China principle.

Under the guidance of the CPC, great progress has been made in cross-Straits relations over the past seven decades, especially since the estrangement between the two sides was ended. Increased exchanges, broader cooperation and closer interactions have brought tangible benefits to people across the Straits, especially of Taiwan. This fully demonstrates that cross-Straits amity and cooperation are mutually beneficial.

The volume of cross-Straits trade was only US$46 million in 1978. It rose to US$328.34 billion in 2021, up by a factor of more than 7,000. The mainland has been Taiwan's largest export market for the last 21 years, generating a large annual surplus for the island. The mainland is also the largest destination for Taiwan's off-island investment. By the end of 2021 Taiwan businesses had invested in almost 124,000 projects on the mainland, to a total value of US$71.34 billion [4].

In 1987 less than 50,000 visits were made between the two sides; by 2019 this number had soared to about 9 million. In the past three years, affected by COVID-19, online communication has become the main form of people-to-people interactions across the Straits, and the numbers of people participating in and covered by online communication are reaching new highs.

The CPC has always been the spine of the Chinese nation, exercising strong leadership in realizing national rejuvenation and reunification. Its consistent efforts over the decades to resolve the Taiwan question and achieve complete national reunification are based on the following:

First, the one-China principle must be upheld, and no individual or force should be allowed to separate Taiwan from China.

Second, it is imperative to strive for the wellbeing of all Chinese people, including those in Taiwan, and to realize the aspirations of all Chinese people for a better life.

Third, we must follow the principles of freeing the mind, seeking truth from facts, maintaining the right political orientation, and breaking new ground, and defend the fundamental interests of the nation and the core interests of the state in formulating principles and policies on work related to Taiwan.

Fourth, it is necessary to have the courage and skill to fight against any force that attempts to undermine China's sovereignty and territorial integrity or stands in the way of its reunification.

Fifth, extensive unity and solidarity must be upheld to mobilize all factors to fight against any force that would divide the country, and pool strengths to advance national reunification.

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III. China's Complete Reunification Is a Process That Cannot Be Halted

Against a backdrop of profound and complex changes in the domestic and international situation, our cause of complete national reunification is facing new challenges. The CPC and the Chinese government have the strength and the confidence to deal with complexities and overcome risks and threats, and the ability to take great strides forward on the path to national reunification.

1. Complete Reunification Is Critical to National Rejuvenation

Throughout China's 5,000-year history, national reunification and opposition to division have remained a common ideal and a shared tradition of the whole nation. In the modern era from the mid-19th century, due to the aggression of Western powers and the decadence of feudal rule, China was gradually reduced to a semi-feudal, semi-colonial society, and went through a period of suffering worse than anything it had previously known. The country endured intense humiliation, the people were subjected to great pain, and the Chinese civilization was plunged into darkness. Japan's 50-year occupation of Taiwan epitomized this humiliation and inflicted agony on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. Our two sides face each other just across a strip of water, yet we are still far apart. The fact that we have not yet been reunified is a scar left by history on the Chinese nation. We Chinese on both sides should work together to achieve reunification and heal this wound.

National rejuvenation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation since the modern era began. Only by realizing complete national reunification can the Chinese people on both sides of the Straits cast aside the shadow of civil war and create and enjoy lasting peace. National reunification is the only way to avoid the risk of Taiwan being invaded and occupied again by foreign countries, to foil the attempts of external forces to contain China, and to safeguard the sovereignty, security, and development interests of our country. It is the most effective remedy to secessionist attempts to divide our country, and the best means to consolidate Taiwan's status as part of China and advance national rejuvenation. It will enable us to pool the strengths of the people on both sides, build our common home, safeguard our interests and wellbeing, and create a brighter future for the Chinese people and the Chinese nation. As Dr Sun Yat-sen, the great pioneer of China's revolution, once said, "Unification is the hope of all Chinese nationals. If China can be unified, all Chinese will enjoy a happy life; if it cannot, all will suffer."

In exploring the path to rejuvenation and prosperity, China has endured vicissitudes and hardships. "Unification brings strength while division leads to chaos." This is a law of history. The realization of complete national reunification is driven by the history and culture of the Chinese nation and determined by the momentum towards and circumstances surrounding our national rejuvenation. Never before have we been so close to, confident in, and capable of achieving the goal of national rejuvenation. The same is true when it comes to our goal of complete national reunification. The Taiwan question arose as a result of weakness and chaos in our nation, and it will be resolved as national rejuvenation becomes a reality. When all the Chinese people stick together and work together, we will surely succeed in realizing national reunification on our way to national rejuvenation.

2. National Development and Progress Set the Direction of Cross-Straits Relations

China's development and progress are a key factor determining the course of cross-Straits relations and the realization of complete national reunification. In particular, the great achievements over four decades of reform, opening up and modernization have had a profound impact on the historical process of resolving the Taiwan question and realizing complete national reunification. No matter which political party or group is in power in Taiwan, it cannot alter the course of progress in cross-Straits relations or the trend towards national reunification.

International Monetary Fund statistics show that in 1980 the GDP of the mainland was about US$303 billion, just over 7 times that of Taiwan, which was about US$42.3 billion; in 2021, the GDP of the mainland was about US$17.46 trillion, more than 22 times that of Taiwan, which was about US$790 billion. [5]

China's development and progress, and in particular the steady increases in its economic power, technological strength, and national defense capabilities, are an effective curb against separatist activities and interference from external forces. They also provide broad space and great opportunities for cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation. As more and more compatriots from Taiwan, especially young people, pursue their studies, start businesses, seek jobs, or go to live on the mainland, cross-Straits exchanges, interaction and integration are intensified in all sectors, the economic ties and personal bonds between the people on both sides run deeper, and our common cultural and national identities grow stronger, leading cross-Straits relations towards reunification.

The CPC has united the Chinese people and led them in embarking on the new journey of building China into a modern socialist country in all respects. Following the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the mainland has improved its governance and maintained long-term economic growth; it enjoys a solid material foundation, a wealth of human resources, a huge market, strong resilience in development, and social stability. It therefore has many strengths and favourable conditions for further development, and these have become the driving force for reunification.

Grounding its effort in the new development stage, the mainland is committed to applying the new development philosophy, creating a new development dynamic, and promoting high-quality development. As a result, the overall strength and international influence of the mainland will continue to increase, and its influence over and appeal to Taiwan society will keep growing. We will have a more solid foundation for resolving the Taiwan question and greater ability to do so. This will give a significant boost to national reunification.

3. Any Attempt by Separatist Forces to Prevent Reunification Is Bound to Fail

Taiwan has been an integral part of China's territory since ancient times. Moves to separate Taiwan from China represent the serious crime of secession, and undermine the common interests of compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. They will lead nowhere.

The DPP authorities have adopted a separatist stance, and colluded with external forces in successive provocative actions designed to divide the country. They refuse to recognize the one-China principle, and distort and deny the 1992 Consensus. They assert that Taiwan and the mainland should not be subordinate to each other, and proclaim a new "two states" theory. On the island, they constantly press for "de-sinicization" and promote "incremental independence". They incite radical separatists in and outside the DPP to lobby for amendments to their "constitution" and "laws". They deceive the people of Taiwan, incite hostility against the mainland, and obstruct and undermine cross-Straits exchanges, cooperation and integrated development. They have steadily built up their military forces with the intention of pursuing "independence" and preventing reunification by force. They join with external forces in trying to sow the seeds of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". The actions of the DPP authorities have resulted in tension in cross-Straits relations, endangering peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, and undermining the prospects and restricting the space for peaceful reunification. These are obstacles that must be removed in advancing the process of peaceful reunification.

Taiwan belongs to all the Chinese people, including the 23 million Taiwan compatriots. The Chinese people are firm in their resolve and have a deep commitment to safeguarding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation, and this resolve and commitment will frustrate any attempt to divide the country. When Taiwan was invaded by a foreign power more than 100 years ago, China was a poor and weak country. More than 70 years ago, China defeated the invaders and recovered Taiwan. Today, China has grown into the world's second largest economy. With significant growth in its political, economic, cultural, technological, and military strength, there is no likelihood that China will allow Taiwan to be separated again. Attempts to reject reunification and split the country are doomed, because they will founder against the history and culture of the Chinese nation as well as the resolve and commitment of more than 1.4 billion Chinese people.

4. External Forces Obstructing China's Complete Reunification Will Surely Be Defeated

External interference is a prominent obstacle to China's reunification. Still lost in delusions of hegemony and trapped in a Cold War mindset, some forces in the US insist on perceiving and portraying China as a major strategic adversary and a serious long-term threat. They do their utmost to undermine and pressurize China, exploiting Taiwan as a convenient tool. The US authorities have stated that they remain committed to the one-China policy and that they do not support "Taiwan independence". But their actions contradict their words. They are clouding the one-China principle in uncertainty and compromising its integrity. They are contriving "official" exchanges with Taiwan, increasing arms sales, and colluding in military provocation. To help Taiwan expand its "international space", they are inducing other countries to interfere in Taiwan affairs, and concocting Taiwan-related bills that infringe upon the sovereignty of China. They are creating confusion around what is black and white, right and wrong. On the one hand, they incite separatist forces to create tension and turmoil in cross-Straits relations. On the other hand, they accuse the mainland of coercion, pressurizing Taiwan, and unilaterally changing the status quo, in order to embolden these forces and create obstacles to China's peaceful reunification.

The important principles of respecting state sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations are the cornerstones of modern international law and basic norms of international relations. It is the sacred right of every sovereign state to safeguard national unity and territorial integrity. It goes without saying that the Chinese government is entitled to take all measures necessary to settle the Taiwan question and achieve national reunification, free of external interference.

Behind the smokescreens of "freedom, democracy, and human rights" and "upholding the rules-based international order", some anti-China forces in the US deliberately distort the nature of the Taiwan question - which is purely an internal matter for China - and try to deny the legitimacy and justification of the Chinese government in safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This clearly reveals their intention of using Taiwan to contain China and obstruct China's reunification, which should be thoroughly exposed and condemned.

These external forces are using Taiwan as a pawn to undermine China's development and progress, and obstruct the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. They are doing so at the cost of the interests, wellbeing and future of the people of Taiwan rather than for their benefit. They have encouraged and instigated provocative actions by the separatist forces; these have intensified cross-Straits tension and confrontation, and undermined peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. This runs counter to the underlying global trends of peace, development and win-win cooperation, and goes against the wishes of the international community and the aspiration of all peoples.

Shortly after the PRC was founded, even though the country itself had to be rebuilt on the ruins of decades of war, China and its people won a resounding victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea (1950-1953). We defeated a powerful and well-armed enemy through gallantry and tenacity. In doing so, we safeguarded the security of the newly founded People's Republic, reestablished the status of China as a major country in the world, and demonstrated our heroic spirit, our lack of fear, and our will to stand up against the abuse of the powerful.

China is firmly committed to peaceful development. At the same time, it will not flinch under any external interference, nor will it tolerate any infringement upon its sovereignty, security and development interests. Relying on external forces will achieve nothing for Taiwan's separatists, and using Taiwan to contain China is doomed to fail.

Tranquility, development and a decent life are the expectations of our Taiwan compatriots, and the common aspiration of those on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. Under the strong leadership of the CPC, the Chinese people and the Chinese nation have stood upright, won prosperity, and grown in strength. A moderately prosperous society in all respects has been built on the mainland, where a large population once lived in dire poverty. We now have better conditions, more confidence, and greater capabilities. We can complete the historic mission of national reunification, so that both sides of the Straits can enjoy a better life. The wheel of history rolls on towards national reunification, and it will not be stopped by any individual or any force.

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IV. National Reunification in the New Era

Taking into consideration the overall goal of national rejuvenation in the context of global change on a scale unseen in a century, the CPC and the Chinese government have continued to follow the CPC's fundamental guidelines on the Taiwan question and implement its principles and policies towards Taiwan, and have made concrete efforts to promote peaceful cross-Straits relations, integrate the development of the two sides, and work towards national reunification.

1. Upholding the Basic Principles of Peaceful Reunification and One Country, Two Systems

National reunification by peaceful means is the first choice of the CPC and the Chinese government in resolving the Taiwan question, as it best serves the interests of the Chinese nation as a whole, including our compatriots in Taiwan, and it works best for the long-term stability and development of China. We have worked hard to overcome hardships and obstacles to peaceful reunification over the past decades, showing that we cherish and safeguard the greater good of the nation, the wellbeing of our compatriots in Taiwan, and peace on both sides.

The One Country, Two Systems principle is an important institutional instrument created by the CPC and the Chinese government to enable peaceful reunification. It represents a great achievement of Chinese socialism. Peaceful reunification and One Country, Two Systems are our basic principles for resolving the Taiwan question and the best approach to realizing national reunification. Embodying the Chinese wisdom - we thrive by embracing each other - they take full account of Taiwan's realities and are conducive to long-term stability in Taiwan after reunification.

We maintain that after peaceful reunification, Taiwan may continue its current social system and enjoy a high degree of autonomy in accordance with the law. The two social systems will develop side by side for a long time to come. One Country is the precondition and foundation of Two Systems; Two Systems is subordinate to and derives from One Country; and the two are integrated under the one-China principle.

We will continue working with our compatriots in Taiwan to explore a Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question and increase our efforts towards peaceful reunification. In designing the specifics for implementing One Country, Two Systems, we will give full consideration to the realities in Taiwan and the views and proposals from all walks of life on both sides, and fully accommodate the interests and sentiments of our compatriots in Taiwan.

Ever since the One Country, Two Systems principle was proposed, certain political forces have been misrepresenting and distorting its objectives. The DPP and the authorities under its leadership have done everything possible to target the principle with baseless criticisms, and this has led to misunderstandings about its aims in some quarters of Taiwan. It is a fact that since Hong Kong and Macao returned to the motherland and were reincorporated into national governance, they have embarked on a broad path of shared development together with the mainland, and each complements the others' strengths. The practice of One Country, Two Systems has been a resounding success.

For a time, Hong Kong faced a period of damaging social unrest caused by anti-China agitators both inside and outside the region. Based on a clear understanding of the situation there, the CPC and the Chinese government upheld the One Country, Two Systems principle, made some appropriate improvements, and took a series of measures that addressed both the symptoms and root causes of the unrest. Order was restored and prosperity returned to Hong Kong. This has laid a solid foundation for the law-based governance of Hong Kong and Macao and the long-term continuation of One Country, Two Systems.

To realize peaceful reunification, we must acknowledge that the mainland and Taiwan have their own distinct social systems and ideologies. The One Country, Two Systems principle is the most inclusive solution to this problem. It is an approach that is grounded in democratic principles, demonstrates good will, seeks peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, and delivers mutual benefit. The differences in social system are neither an obstacle to reunification nor a justification for secessionism. We firmly believe that our compatriots in Taiwan will develop a better understanding of the principle, and that the Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question will play its full role while compatriots on both sides work together towards peaceful reunification.

Peaceful reunification can only be achieved through consultation and discussion as equals. The long-standing political differences between the two sides are the fundamental obstacles to the steady improvement of cross-Straits relations, but we should not allow this problem to be passed down from one generation to the next. We can phase in flexible forms of consultation and discussion. We are ready to engage with all parties, groups, or individuals in Taiwan in a broad exchange of views aimed at resolving the political differences between the two sides based on the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus. Representatives will be recommended by all political parties and all sectors of society on both sides, and they will engage in democratic consultations on peaceful development of cross-Straits relations, integrated development of the two sides, and the peaceful reunification of our country.

2. Promoting Peaceful Cross-Straits Relations and Integrated Development

Peaceful cross-Straits relations and integrated development pave the way for reunification and serve to benefit our people on both sides. Thus, both sides should work together towards this goal. We will extend integrated development, increase exchanges and cooperation, strengthen bonds, and expand common interests in the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. In this way, we will all identify more closely with the Chinese culture and Chinese nation, and heighten the sense of our shared future. This lays solid foundations for peaceful reunification.

We will explore an innovative approach to integrated development and take the lead in setting up a pilot zone for integrated cross-Straits development in Fujian Province, advancing integration through better connectivity and more preferential policies, and based on mutual trust and understanding. Both sides should continue to promote connectivity in any area where it is beneficial, including trade and economic cooperation, infrastructure, energy and resources, and industrial standards. We should promote cooperation in culture, education, and health care, and the sharing of social security and public resources. We should support neighbouring areas or areas with similar conditions on the two sides in providing equal, universal, and accessible public services. We should take active steps to institutionalize cross-Straits economic cooperation and create a common market for the two sides to strengthen the Chinese economy.

We will improve the systems and policies to guarantee the wellbeing of Taiwan compatriots and ensure that they are treated as equals on the mainland, and we will protect their legitimate rights and interests here in accordance with the law. We will support our fellow Chinese and enterprises from Taiwan in participating in the Belt and Road Initiative, major regional development strategies, and the strategy for coordinated regional development. We will help them integrate into the new development dynamic, participate in high-quality development, share in more development opportunities, and benefit from national socio-economic development.

We will expand cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation in various fields and overcome any obstacles and obstruction. We will encourage our people on both sides to pass on the best of traditional Chinese culture and ensure that it grows in new and creative ways. We will strengthen communication among the general public and the younger generations on both sides, and encourage more fellow Chinese in Taiwan - young people in particular - to pursue studies, start businesses, seek jobs, or live on the mainland. This will help people on both sides to expand mutual understanding, strengthen mutual trust, consolidate a shared sense of identity, and forge closer bonds of heart and mind.

3. Defeating Separatism and External Interference

Separatism will plunge Taiwan into the abyss and bring nothing but disaster to the island. To protect the interests of the Chinese nation as a whole, including our compatriots in Taiwan, we must resolutely oppose it and work for peaceful reunification. We are ready to create vast space for peaceful reunification; but we will leave no room for separatist activities in any form.

We Chinese will decide our own affairs. The Taiwan question is an internal affair that involves China's core interests and the Chinese people's national sentiments, and no external interference will be tolerated. Any attempt to use the Taiwan question as a pretext to interfere in China's internal affairs or obstruct China's reunification will meet with the resolute opposition of the Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan. No one should underestimate our resolve, will and ability to defend China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

We will work with the greatest sincerity and exert our utmost efforts to achieve peaceful reunification. But we will not renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. This is to guard against external interference and all separatist activities. In no way does it target our fellow Chinese in Taiwan. Use of force would be the last resort taken under compelling circumstances. We will only be forced to take drastic measures to respond to the provocation of separatist elements or external forces should they ever cross our red lines.

We will always be ready to respond with the use of force or other necessary means to interference by external forces or radical action by separatist elements. Our ultimate goal is to ensure the prospects of China's peaceful reunification and advance this process.

Some forces in the US are making every effort to incite groups inside Taiwan to stir up trouble and use Taiwan as a pawn against China. This has jeopardized peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits, obstructed the Chinese government's efforts towards peaceful reunification, and undermined the healthy and steady development of China-US relations. Left unchecked, it will continue to escalate tension across the Straits, further disrupt China-US relations, and severely damage the interests of the US itself. The US should abide by the one-China principle, deal with Taiwan-related issues in a prudent and proper manner, stand by its previous commitments, and stop supporting Taiwan separatists.

4. Working with Our Fellow Chinese in Taiwan Towards National Reunification and Rejuvenation

National reunification is an essential step towards national rejuvenation. The future of Taiwan lies in China's reunification, and the wellbeing of the people in Taiwan hinges on the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, an endeavor that bears on the future and destiny of the people on both sides. A united and prosperous China will be a blessing for all Chinese, while a weak and divided China will be a disaster. Only China's rejuvenation and prosperity can bring lives of plenty and happiness to both sides. But it requires the joint efforts of both sides, as does the complete reunification of the country.

Separatist propaganda and the unresolved political dispute between the two sides have created misconceptions over cross-Straits relations, problems with national identity, and misgivings over national reunification among some fellow Chinese in Taiwan. Blood is thicker than water, and people on both sides of the Straits share the bond of kinship. We have great patience and tolerance and we will create conditions for closer exchanges and communication between the two sides, and to increase our compatriots' knowledge of the mainland and reduce these misconceptions and misgivings, in order to help them resist the manipulation of separatists.

We will join hands with our fellow Chinese in Taiwan to strive for national reunification and rejuvenation. We hope they will stand on the right side of history, be proud of their Chinese identity, and fully consider the position and role of Taiwan in China's rejuvenation. We hope they will pursue the greater good of the nation, resolutely oppose separatism and any form of external interference, and make a positive contribution to the just cause of China's peaceful reunification.

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V. Bright Prospects for Peaceful Reunification

Once peaceful reunification is achieved under One Country, Two Systems, it will lay new foundations for China to make further progress and achieve national rejuvenation. At the same time, it will create huge opportunities for social and economic development in Taiwan and bring tangible benefits to the people of Taiwan.

1. Taiwan Will Have a Vast Space for Development

Taiwan boasts a high level of economic growth, industries with distinctive local features, and robust foreign trade. Its economy is highly complementary with that of the mainland. After reunification, the systems and mechanisms for cross-Straits economic cooperation will be further improved. Backed up by the vast mainland market, Taiwan's economy will enjoy broader prospects, become more competitive, develop steadier and smoother industrial and supply chains, and display greater vitality in innovation-driven growth. Many problems that have long afflicted Taiwan's economy and its people can be resolved through integrated cross-Straits development with all possible connectivity between the two sides. Taiwan's fiscal revenues can be better employed to improve living standards, bringing real benefits to the people and resolving their difficulties.

Taiwan's cultural creativity will also enjoy a great boost. Both sides of the Taiwan Straits share the culture and ethos of the Chinese nation. Nourished by the Chinese civilization, Taiwan's regional culture will flourish and prosper.

2. The Rights and Interests of the People in Taiwan Will Be Fully Protected

Provided that China's sovereignty, security and development interests are guaranteed, after reunification Taiwan will enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region. Taiwan's social system and its way of life will be fully respected, and the private property, religious beliefs, and lawful rights and interests of the people in Taiwan will be fully protected. All Taiwan compatriots who support reunification of the country and rejuvenation of the nation will be the masters of the region, contributing to and benefitting from China's development. With a powerful motherland in support, the people of Taiwan will enjoy greater security and dignity and stand upright and rock-solid in the international community.

3. Both Sides of the Taiwan Straits Will Share the Triumph of National Rejuvenation

The people of Taiwan are brave, diligent and patriotic, and have made unremitting efforts to improve themselves. They revere their ancestry and love their homeland. Working together and applying their talents, people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits will create a promising future. After reunification, we Chinese will bridge gaps and differences caused by long-term separation, share a stronger sense of national identity, and stand together as one. After reunification, we can leverage complementary strengths in pursuit of mutual benefit and common development. After reunification, we can join hands to make the Chinese nation stronger and more prosperous, and stand taller among all the nations of the world.

The people separated by the Taiwan Straits share the same blood and a common destiny. After reunification, China will have greater international influence and appeal, and a stronger ability to shape international public opinion, and the Chinese people will enjoy greater self-esteem, self-confidence and national pride. In Taiwan and on the mainland the people will share the dignity and triumph of a united China and be proud of being Chinese. We will work together to refine and implement the Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question, to improve the institutional arrangements for implementing the One Country, Two Systems policy, and to ensure lasting peace and stability in Taiwan.

4. Peaceful Reunification of China Is Conducive to Peace and Development in the Asia-Pacific and the Wider World

Peaceful cross-Straits reunification is of benefit not only to the Chinese nation, but to all peoples and the international community as a whole. The reunification of China will not harm the legitimate interests of any other country, including any economic interests they might have in Taiwan. On the contrary, it will bring more development opportunities to all countries; it will create more positive momentum for prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific and the rest of the world; it will contribute more to building a global community of shared future, promoting world peace and development, and propelling human progress.

After reunification, foreign countries can continue to develop economic and cultural relations with Taiwan. With the approval of the central government of China, they may set up consulates or other official and quasi-official institutions in Taiwan, international organizations and agencies may establish offices, relevant international conventions can be applied, and relevant international conferences can be held there.

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Conclusion

Over its 5,000-year history, China has created a splendid culture that has shone throughout the world from past times to present, and has made an enormous contribution to human society. After a century of suffering and hardship, the nation has overcome humiliation, emerged from backwardness, and embraced boundless development opportunities. Now, it is striding towards the goal of national rejuvenation.

Embarking on a new journey in a new era, the CPC and the Chinese government will continue to rally compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, and lead the efforts to answer the call of the times, shoulder historic responsibilities, grasp our fate and our future in our own hands, and work hard to achieve national reunification and rejuvenation.

The journey ahead cannot be all smooth sailing. However, as long as we Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits devote our ingenuity and energy to the same goal, let there be no doubt - we will tolerate no foreign interference in Taiwan, we will thwart any attempt to divide our country, and we will combine as a mighty force for national reunification and rejuvenation. The historic goal of reuniting our motherland must be realized and will be realized.

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Notes

[1] United Nations Juridical Yearbook 2010, p. 516.

[2] Between September 4 and 8, 1951, the United States gathered a number of countries in San Francisco for what they described as the San Francisco Peace Conference. Neither the PRC nor the Soviet Union received an invitation. The treaty signed at this meeting, commonly known as the Treaty of San Francisco, included an article under which Japan renounced all rights, title and claim to Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. This treaty contravened the provisions of the Declaration by United Nations signed by 26 countries - including the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China - in 1942, the fundamental principles of the UN Charter, and the basic norms of international law. The PRC was excluded from its preparation, drafting and signing, and its rulings on the territory and sovereign rights of China - including the sovereignty over Taiwan - are therefore illegal and invalid. The Chinese government has always refused to recognize the Treaty of San Francisco, and has never from the outset deviated from this stance. Other countries, including the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam, have also refused to recognize the document's authority.

[3] In his speech titled "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland" on January 30, 1995, Jiang Zemin, then general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and president of China, made eight proposals for the development of cross-Straits relations and peaceful national reunification. He emphasized, "Adhering to the one-China principle is the basis and prerequisite for peaceful reunification", and "in not promising to renounce the use of force, we are in no way targeting our Taiwan compatriots, but rather foreign forces conspiring to interfere in China's peaceful reunification and bring about Taiwan independence". (See Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. I, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 2009, pp. 407-412.)

[4] This figure does not include reinvestment by Taiwan investors through a third place.

[5] From the statistics of the April 2022 edition of the World Economic Outlook databases of the International Monetary Fund.

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《台灣問題與新時代中國統一事業》【中共白皮書】

———[英文版]———  ———[上一章]———

（2022 年 8 月）
中華人民共和國
國務院台灣事務辦公室
國務院新聞辦公室

目錄

前言
一、台灣是中國的一部分不容置疑也不容改變
二、中國共產黨堅定不移推進祖國完全統一
三、祖國完全統一進程不可阻擋
（一）實現祖國完全統一是中華民族偉大復興的必然要求
（二）國家發展進步引領兩岸關系發展方向
（三）“台獨”分裂勢力抗拒統一不會得逞
（四）外部勢力阻礙中國完全統一必遭失敗
四、在新時代新征程上推進祖國統一
（一）堅持“和平統一、一國兩制”基本方針
（二）努力推動兩岸關系和平發展、融合發展
（三）堅決粉碎“台獨”分裂和外來干涉圖謀
（四）團結台灣同胞共謀民族復興和國家統一
五、實現祖國和平統一的光明前景
（一）台灣發展空間將更為廣闊
（二）台灣同胞切身利益將得到充分保障
（三）兩岸同胞共享民族復興的偉大榮光
（四）有利于亞太地區及全世界和平與發展
結束語

前言

解決台灣問題、實現祖國完全統一，是全體中華兒女的共同願望，是實現中華民族偉大復興的必然要求，是中國共產黨矢志不渝的歷史任務。中國共產黨、中國政府和中國人民為此進行了長期不懈的努力。

中共十八大以來，中國特色社會主義進入新時代。在以習近平同志為核心的中共中央堅強領導下，中國共產黨和中國政府積極推進對台工作理論和實踐創新，牢牢把握兩岸關系主導權和主動權，有力維護台海和平穩定，扎實推進祖國統一進程。但一個時期以來，台灣民進黨當局加緊進行“台獨”分裂活動，一些外部勢力極力搞“以台制華”，企圖阻擋中國實現完全統一和中華民族邁向偉大復興。

中國共產黨團結帶領全國各族人民長期奮斗，如期全面建成小康社會、實現第一個百年奮斗目標，開啟全面建設社會主義現代化國家、向第二個百年奮斗目標進軍新征程。中華民族迎來了從站起來、富起來到強起來的偉大飛躍，實現中華民族偉大復興進入了不可逆轉的歷史進程。這是中國統一大業新的歷史方位。

中國政府于 1993 年 8 月、 2000 年 2 月分別發表了《台灣問題與中國的統一》、《一個中國的原則與台灣問題》白皮書，全面系統闡述了解決台灣問題的基本方針和有關政策。為進一步重申台灣是中國的一部分的事實和現狀，展現中國共產黨和中國人民追求祖國統一的堅定意志和堅強決心，闡述中國共產黨和中國政府在新時代推進實現祖國統一的立場和政策，特發布本白皮書。

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一、台灣是中國的一部分不容置疑也不容改變

台灣自古屬于中國的歷史經緯清晰、法理事實清楚。不斷有新的考古發現和研究證明海峽兩岸深厚的歷史和文化聯系。大量的史書和文獻記載了中國人民早期開發台灣的情景。公元 230 年，三國時期吳人沈瑩所著《臨海水土志》留下了關于台灣最早的記述。隋朝政府曾三次派兵到時稱“流求”的台灣。宋元以後，中國歷代中央政府開始在澎湖、台灣設治，實施行政管轄。1624 年，荷蘭殖民者侵佔台灣南部。1662 年，民族英雄鄭成功驅逐荷蘭殖民者收復台灣。清朝政府逐步在台灣擴增行政機構，1684 年設立台灣府，隸屬福建省管轄；1885 年改設台灣為行省，是當時中國第 20 個行省。

1894 年 7 月，日本發動侵略中國的甲午戰爭，次年 4 月迫使戰敗的清朝政府割讓台灣及澎湖列島。抗日戰爭時期，中國共產黨人明確提出收復台灣的主張。1937 年 5 月 15 日，毛澤東同志會見美國記者尼姆 • 韋爾斯時表示︰“中國的抗戰是要求得最後的勝利，這個勝利的範圍，不限于山海關，不限于東北，還要包括台灣的解放。”

1941 年 12 月 9 日，中國政府發布對日宣戰布告，宣告“所有一切條約、協定、合同，有涉及中日間之關系者，一律廢止”，並宣布將收回台灣、澎湖列島。1943 年 12 月 1 日，中美英三國政府發表《開羅宣言》宣布，三國之宗旨在使日本所竊取于中國之領土，例如東北、台灣、澎湖列島等，歸還中國。1945 年 7 月 26 日，中美英三國共同簽署、後來蘇聯參加的《波茨坦公告》，重申“開羅宣言之條件必將實施”。同年 9 月，日本簽署《日本投降條款》，承諾“忠誠履行波茨坦公告各項規定之義務”。10 月 25 日，中國政府宣告“恢復對台灣行使主權”，並在台北舉行“中國戰區台灣省受降儀式”。由此，通過一系列具有國際法律效力的文件，中國從法律和事實上收復了台灣。

1949 年 10 月 1 日，中華人民共和國中央人民政府宣告成立，取代中華民國政府成為代表全中國的唯一合法政府。這是在中國這一國際法主體沒有發生變化情況下的政權更替，中國的主權和固有領土疆域沒有改變，中華人民共和國政府理所當然地完全享有和行使中國的主權，其中包括對台灣的主權。由于中國內戰延續和外部勢力干涉，海峽兩岸陷入長期政治對立的特殊狀態，但中國的主權和領土從未分割也決不允許分割，台灣是中國領土的一部分的地位從未改變也決不允許改變。

1971 年 10 月，第 26 屆聯合國大會通過第 2758 號決議，決定︰“恢復中華人民共和國的一切權利，承認她的政府的代表為中國在聯合國組織的唯一合法代表並立即把蔣介石的代表從它在聯合國組織及其所屬一切機構中所非法佔據的席位上驅逐出去。”這一決議不僅從政治上、法律上和程序上徹底解決了包括台灣在內全中國在聯合國的代表權問題，而且明確了中國在聯合國的席位只有一個，不存在“兩個中國”、“一中一台”的問題。隨後，聯合國相關專門機構以正式決議等方式，恢復中華人民共和國享有的合法席位，驅逐台灣當局的“代表”，如 1972 年 5 月第 25 屆世界衛生大會通過第 25.1 號決議。聯合國秘書處法律事務辦公室官方法律意見明確指出，“台灣作為中國的一個省沒有獨立地位”，“台灣當局不享有任何形式的政府地位”。實踐中，聯合國對台灣使用的稱謂是“台灣，中國的省（Taiwan，Province of China）” ①。

聯大第 2758 號決議是體現一個中國原則的政治文件，國際實踐充分證實其法律效力，不容曲解。台灣沒有任何根據、理由或權利參加聯合國及其他只有主權國家才能參加的國際組織。近年來，以美國為首的個別國家一些勢力與“台獨”分裂勢力沆瀣一氣，妄稱該決議沒有處理“台灣的代表權問題”，炒作非法無效的“舊金山和約” ②，無視《開羅宣言》、《波茨坦公告》在內的一系列國際法律文件，再度鼓吹“台灣地位未定”，宣稱支持台灣“有意義地參與聯合國體系”，其實質是企圖改變台灣是中國的一部分的地位，制造“兩個中國”、“一中一台”，實現其“以台制華”的政治目的。這些行徑歪曲聯大第 2758 號決議，違反國際法，嚴重背棄有關國家對中國作出的政治承諾，侵犯中國的主權和尊嚴，踐踏國際關系基本準則。對此，中國政府已經表明了反對和譴責的嚴正立場。

一個中國原則是國際社會的普遍共識，是遵守國際關系基本準則的應有之義。目前，全世界有包括美國在內的 181 個國家，在一個中國原則的基礎上與中國建立了外交關系。1978 年 12 月發表的《中美建交公報》聲明︰“美利堅合眾國政府承認中國的立場，即只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分”；“美利堅合眾國承認中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府。在此範圍內，美國人民將同台灣人民保持文化、商務和其他非官方關系”。

1982 年 12 月，中華人民共和國第五屆全國人民代表大會第五次會議通過《中華人民共和國憲法》，規定︰“台灣是中華人民共和國的神聖領土的一部分。完成統一祖國的大業是包括台灣同胞在內的全中國人民的神聖職責。” 2005 年 3 月，第十屆全國人民代表大會第三次會議通過《反分裂國家法》，規定︰“世界上只有一個中國，大陸和台灣同屬一個中國，中國的主權和領土完整不容分割。維護國家主權和領土完整是包括台灣同胞在內的全中國人民的共同義務。”“台灣是中國的一部分。國家絕不允許‘台獨’分裂勢力以任何名義、任何方式把台灣從中國分裂出去。” 2015 年 7 月，第十二屆全國人民代表大會常務委員會第十五次會議通過《中華人民共和國國家安全法》，規定︰“中國的主權和領土完整不容侵犯和分割。維護國家主權、統一和領土完整是包括港澳同胞和台灣同胞在內的全中國人民的共同義務。”

世界上只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分的歷史事實和法理事實不容置疑，台灣從來不是一個國家而是中國的一部分的地位不容改變。任何歪曲事實、否定和挑戰一個中國原則的行徑都將以失敗告終。

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二、中國共產黨堅定不移推進祖國完全統一

中國共產黨始終致力于為中國人民謀幸福、為中華民族謀復興。在成立初期，中國共產黨就把爭取台灣擺脫殖民統治回歸祖國大家庭、實現包括台灣同胞在內的民族解放作為奮斗目標，付出了巨大努力。

中國共產黨始終把解決台灣問題、實現祖國完全統一作為矢志不渝的歷史任務，團結帶領兩岸同胞，推動台海形勢從緊張對峙走向緩和改善、進而走上和平發展道路，兩岸關系不斷取得突破性進展。

新中國成立以後，以毛澤東同志為主要代表的中國共產黨人，提出和平解決台灣問題的重要思想、基本原則和政策主張；進行了解放台灣的準備和斗爭，粉碎了台灣當局“反攻大陸”的圖謀，挫敗了各種制造“兩個中國”、“一中一台”的圖謀；促成聯合國恢復了中華人民共和國的合法席位和一切權利，爭取了世界上絕大多數國家接受一個中國原則，為實現和平統一創造了重要條件。中共中央還通過適當渠道與台灣當局高層人士接觸，為尋求和平解決台灣問題而積極努力。

中共十一屆三中全會以後，以鄧小平同志為主要代表的中國共產黨人，從國家和民族的根本利益出發，在實現中美建交的時代條件下，在爭取和平解決台灣問題思想的基礎上，確立了爭取祖國和平統一的大政方針，創造性地提出了“一個國家，兩種制度”的科學構想，並首先運用于解決香港問題、澳門問題；主動緩和兩岸軍事對峙狀態，推動打破兩岸長期隔絕狀態，開啟兩岸民間交流合作的大門，使兩岸關系進入新的歷史階段。

中共十三屆四中全會以後，以江澤民同志為主要代表的中國共產黨人，提出發展兩岸關系、推進祖國和平統一進程的八項主張 ③；推動兩岸雙方達成體現一個中國原則的“九二共識”，開啟兩岸協商談判，實現兩岸授權團體負責人首次會談，持續擴大兩岸各領域交流合作；堅決開展反對李登輝分裂祖國活動的斗爭，沉重打擊“台獨”分裂勢力；實現香港、澳門順利回歸祖國，實行“一國兩制”，對解決台灣問題產生積極影響。

中共十六大以後，以胡錦濤同志為主要代表的中國共產黨人，提出兩岸關系和平發展重要思想；針對島內“台獨”分裂活動猖獗制定實施《反分裂國家法》，舉行中國共產黨和中國國民黨兩黨主要領導人 60 年來首次會談，堅決挫敗陳水扁“法理台獨”圖謀；開闢兩岸關系和平發展新局面，推動兩岸制度化協商談判取得豐碩成果，實現兩岸全面直接雙向“三通”，簽署實施《海峽兩岸經濟合作框架協議》，兩岸關系面貌發生深刻變化。

中共十八大以來，以習近平同志為主要代表的中國共產黨人，全面把握兩岸關系時代變化，豐富和發展國家統一理論和對台方針政策，推動兩岸關系朝著正確方向發展，形成新時代中國共產黨解決台灣問題的總體方略，提供了新時代做好對台工作的根本遵循和行動綱領。2017 年 10 月，中共十九大確立了堅持“一國兩制”和推進祖國統一的基本方略，強調︰“絕不允許任何人、任何組織、任何政黨、在任何時候、以任何形式、把任何一塊中國領土從中國分裂出去！” 2019 年 1 月，習近平總書記在《告台灣同胞書》發表 40 周年紀念會上發表重要講話，鄭重提出了新時代推動兩岸關系和平發展、推進祖國和平統一進程的重大政策主張︰攜手推動民族復興，實現和平統一目標；探索“兩制”台灣方案，豐富和平統一實踐；堅持一個中國原則，維護和平統一前景；深化兩岸融合發展，夯實和平統一基礎；實現同胞心靈契合，增進和平統一認同。中國共產黨和中國政府采取一系列引領兩岸關系發展、促進祖國和平統一的重大舉措︰

——推動實現 1949 年以來兩岸領導人首次會晤、直接對話溝通，將兩岸交流互動提升到新高度，為兩岸關系發展翻開了新篇章、開闢了新空間，成為兩岸關系發展道路上一座新的里程碑。雙方兩岸事務主管部門在共同政治基礎上建立常態化聯系溝通機制，兩部門負責人實現互訪、開通熱線。

——堅持一個中國原則和“九二共識”，推進兩岸政黨黨際交流，與台灣有關政黨、團體和人士就兩岸關系與民族未來開展對話協商，深入交換意見，達成多項共識並發表共同倡議，與台灣社會各界共同努力探索“兩制”台灣方案。

——踐行“兩岸一家親”理念，以兩岸同胞福祉為依歸，推動兩岸關系和平發展、融合發展，完善促進兩岸交流合作、保障台灣同胞福祉的制度安排和政策措施，實行卡式台胞證，實現福建向金門供水，制發台灣居民居住證，逐步為台灣同胞在大陸學習、創業、就業、生活提供同等待遇，持續率先同台灣同胞分享大陸發展機遇。

——團結廣大台灣同胞，排除“台獨”分裂勢力干擾阻撓，推動兩岸各領域交流合作和人員往來走深走實。克服新冠肺炎疫情影響，堅持舉辦海峽論壇等一系列兩岸交流活動，保持了兩岸同胞交流合作的發展態勢。

——堅定捍衛國家主權和領土完整，堅決反對“台獨”分裂和外部勢力干涉，有力維護台海和平穩定和中華民族根本利益。依法打擊“台獨”頑固分子，有力震懾“台獨”分裂勢力。妥善處理台灣對外交往問題，鞏固發展國際社會堅持一個中國原則的格局。

在中國共產黨的引領推動下，70 多年來特別是兩岸隔絕狀態打破以來，兩岸關系獲得長足發展。兩岸交流合作日益廣泛，互動往來日益密切，給兩岸同胞特別是台灣同胞帶來實實在在的好處，充分說明兩岸和則兩利、合則雙贏。1978 年兩岸貿易額僅有 4600 萬美元，2021 年增長至 3283.4 億美元，增長了 7000 多倍；大陸連續 21 年成為台灣最大出口市場，每年為台灣帶來大量順差；大陸是台商島外投資的第一大目的地，截至 2021 年底，台商投資大陸項目共計 123781 個、實際投資額 713.4 億美元 ④。1987 年兩岸人員往來不足5萬人次，2019 年約 900 萬人次。近3年來受疫情影響，線上交流成為兩岸同胞溝通互動的主要形式，參與及可及人數屢創新高。

中國共產黨始終是中國人民和中華民族的主心骨，是民族復興、國家統一的堅強領導核心。中國共產黨為解決台灣問題、實現祖國完全統一不懈奮斗的歷程充分表明︰必須堅持一個中國原則，絕不允許任何人任何勢力把台灣從祖國分裂出去；必須堅持為包括台灣同胞在內的全體中國人民謀幸福，始終致力于實現兩岸同胞對美好生活的向往；必須堅持解放思想、實事求是、守正創新，把握民族根本利益和國家核心利益，制定實施對台方針政策；必須堅持敢于斗爭、善于斗爭，同一切損害中國主權和領土完整、企圖阻擋祖國統一的勢力進行堅決斗爭；必須堅持大團結大聯合，廣泛調動一切有利于反“獨”促統的積極因素，共同推進祖國統一進程。

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三、祖國完全統一進程不可阻擋

當前，在國內國際兩個大局都發生深刻復雜變化的時代背景下，推進祖國完全統一面臨著新的形勢。中國共產黨和中國政府有駕馭復雜局面、戰勝風險挑戰的綜合實力和必勝信心，完全有能力推動祖國統一大業闊步前進。

（一）實現祖國完全統一是中華民族偉大復興的必然要求

在中華民族五千多年的發展進程中，追求統一、反對分裂始終是全民族的主流價值觀，這一價值觀早已深深融入整個中華民族的精神血脈。近代以後，由于西方列強入侵和封建統治腐敗，中國逐步成為半殖民地半封建社會，國家蒙辱、人民蒙難、文明蒙塵，中華民族遭受了前所未有的劫難。台灣被日本霸佔半個世紀的歷史，是中華民族近代屈辱的縮影，給兩岸同胞留下了剜心之痛。一水之隔、咫尺天涯，兩岸迄今尚未完全統一是歷史遺留給中華民族的創傷。兩岸同胞應該共同努力，謀求國家統一，撫平歷史創傷。

實現中華民族偉大復興，是近代以來中國人民和中華民族最偉大的夢想。實現祖國完全統一，才能使兩岸同胞徹底擺脫內戰的陰霾，共創共享台海永久和平；才能避免台灣再次被外國侵佔的危險，打掉外部勢力遏制中國的圖謀，維護國家主權、安全、發展利益；才能清除“台獨”分裂的隱患，穩固台灣作為中國的一部分的地位，推進中華民族偉大復興；才能更好地凝聚兩岸同胞力量建設共同家園，增進兩岸同胞利益福祉，創造中國人民和中華民族更加幸福美好的未來。正如中國偉大的革命先行者孫中山先生所言︰“‘統一’是中國全體國民的希望。能夠統一，全國人民便享福；不能統一，便要受害。”

中華民族在探尋民族復興強盛之道的過程中飽經苦難滄桑。“統則強、分必亂”，這是一條歷史規律。實現祖國完全統一，是中華民族的歷史和文化所決定的，也是中華民族偉大復興的時和勢所決定的。我們比歷史上任何時期都更接近、更有信心和能力實現中華民族偉大復興的目標，也更接近、更有信心和能力實現祖國完全統一的目標。台灣問題因民族弱亂而產生，必將隨著民族復興而解決。全體中華兒女團結奮斗，就一定能在同心實現中華民族偉大復興進程中完成祖國統一大業。

（二）國家發展進步引領兩岸關系發展方向

決定兩岸關系走向、實現祖國完全統一的關鍵因素是國家的發展進步。國家發展進步特別是 40 多年來改革開放和現代化建設所取得的偉大成就，深刻影響著解決台灣問題、實現祖國完全統一的歷史進程。無論何黨何派在台灣掌權，都無法改變兩岸關系向前發展的總體趨勢和祖國統一的歷史大勢。

根據國際貨幣基金組織的統計 ⑤，1980 年，大陸生產總值約 3030 億美元，台灣生產總值約 423 億美元，大陸是台灣的 7.2 倍；2021 年，大陸生產總值約 174580 億美元，台灣生產總值約 7895 億美元，大陸是台灣的 22.1 倍。國家發展進步特別是經濟實力、科技實力、國防實力持續增強，不僅有效遏制了“台獨”分裂活動和外部勢力干涉，更為兩岸交流合作提供了廣闊空間、帶來了巨大機遇。越來越多的台灣同胞特別是台灣青年來大陸學習、創業、就業、生活，促進了兩岸社會各界交往交流交融，加深了兩岸同胞利益和情感聯系，增進了兩岸同胞文化、民族和國家認同，有力牽引著兩岸關系沿著統一的正確方向不斷前行。

中國共產黨團結帶領中國人民已經踏上了全面建設社會主義現代化國家的新征程。大陸堅持中國特色社會主義道路，治理效能提升，經濟長期向好，物質基礎雄厚，人力資源豐厚，市場空間廣闊，發展韌性強大，社會大局穩定，繼續發展具有多方面優勢和條件，並持續轉化為推進統一的動力。立足新發展階段，貫徹新發展理念，構建新發展格局，推動高質量發展，將使大陸綜合實力和國際影響力持續提升，大陸對台灣社會的影響力、吸引力不斷擴大，我們解決台灣問題的基礎更雄厚、能力更強大，必將有力推動祖國統一進程。

（三）“台獨”分裂勢力抗拒統一不會得逞

台灣自古是中國的神聖領土。所謂“台灣獨立”，是企圖把台灣從中國分割出去，是分裂國家的嚴重罪行，損害兩岸同胞共同利益和中華民族根本利益，是走不通的絕路。

民進黨當局堅持“台獨”分裂立場，勾連外部勢力不斷進行謀“獨”挑釁。他們拒不接受一個中國原則，歪曲否定“九二共識”，妄稱“中華民國與中華人民共和國互不隸屬”，公然拋出“新兩國論”；在島內推行“去中國化”、“漸進台獨”，縱容“急獨”勢力鼓噪推動“修憲修法”，欺騙台灣民眾，煽動仇視大陸，阻撓破壞兩岸交流合作和融合發展，加緊“以武謀獨”、“以武拒統”；勾結外部勢力，在國際上竭力制造“兩個中國”、“一中一台”。民進黨當局的謀“獨”行徑導致兩岸關系緊張，危害台海和平穩定，破壞和平統一前景、擠壓和平統一空間，是爭取和平統一進程中必須清除的障礙。

台灣是包括 2300 萬台灣同胞在內的全體中國人民的台灣，中國人民捍衛國家主權和領土完整、維護中華民族根本利益的決心不可動搖、意志堅如磐石，這是挫敗一切“台獨”分裂圖謀的根本力量。100 多年前中國積貧積弱，台灣被外國侵佔。70 多年前中國打敗侵略者，收復了台灣。現在的中國，躍升為世界第二大經濟體，政治、經濟、文化、科技、軍事等實力大幅增強，更不可能再讓台灣從中國分裂出去。搞“台獨”分裂抗拒統一，根本過不了中華民族的歷史和文化這一關，也根本過不了 14 億多中國人民的決心和意志這一關，是絕對不可能得逞的。

（四）外部勢力阻礙中國完全統一必遭失敗

外部勢力干涉是推進中國統一進程的突出障礙。美國一些勢力出于霸權心態和冷戰思維，將中國視為最主要戰略對手和最嚴峻的長期挑戰，竭力進行圍堵打壓，變本加厲推行“以台制華”。美國聲稱“奉行一個中國政策，不支持‘台獨’”，但美國一些勢力在實際行動上卻背道而馳。他們虛化、掏空一個中國原則，加強與台灣地區官方往來，不斷策動對台軍售，加深美台軍事勾連，助台拓展所謂“國際空間”，拉攏其他國家插手台灣問題，不時炮制損害中國主權的涉台議案。他們顛倒黑白、混淆是非，一方面慫恿“台獨”分裂勢力制造兩岸關系緊張動蕩，另一方面卻無端指責大陸“施壓”、“脅迫”、“單方面改變現狀”，為“台獨”分裂勢力撐腰打氣，給中國實現和平統一制造障礙。

《聯合國憲章》規定的尊重國家主權和領土完整、不干涉別國內政等重要原則，是現代國際法和國際關系的基石。維護國家統一和領土完整，是每個主權國家的神聖權利，中國政府理所當然可以采取一切必要手段解決台灣問題、實現國家統一，不容外部勢力干涉。美國的一些反華勢力以所謂“自由、民主、人權”和“維護以規則為基礎的國際秩序”為幌子，刻意歪曲台灣問題純屬中國內政的性質，企圖否定中國政府維護國家主權和領土完整的正當性與合理性。這充分暴露了他們搞“以台制華”、阻撓中國統一的政治圖謀，必須予以徹底揭露和嚴正譴責。

外部勢力打“台灣牌”，是把台灣當作遏制中國發展進步、阻撓中華民族偉大復興的棋子，犧牲的是台灣同胞的利益福祉和光明前途，絕不是為了台灣同胞好。他們縱容鼓動“台獨”分裂勢力滋事挑釁，加劇兩岸對抗和台海形勢緊張，破壞亞太地區和平穩定，既違逆求和平、促發展、謀共贏的時代潮流，也違背國際社會期待和世界人民意願。新中國成立之初，在百廢待興、百業待舉的情況下，中國共產黨和中國政府緊緊依靠人民，以“鋼少氣多”力克“鋼多氣少”，贏得抗美援朝戰爭偉大勝利，捍衛了新中國安全，彰顯了新中國大國地位，展現了我們不畏強暴、反抗強權的錚錚鐵骨。中國堅定不移走和平發展道路，同時決不會在任何外來干涉的壓力面前退縮，決不會容忍國家主權、安全、發展利益受到任何損害。“挾洋謀獨”沒有出路，“以台制華”注定失敗。

要安寧、要發展、要過好日子，是台灣同胞的普遍心聲，創造美好生活是兩岸同胞的共同追求。在中國共產黨的堅強領導下，中國人民和中華民族迎來從站起來、富起來到強起來的偉大飛躍，一窮二白、人口眾多的祖國大陸全面建成小康社會，我們更有條件、更有信心、更有能力完成祖國統一大業，讓兩岸同胞都過上更好的日子。祖國統一的歷史車輪滾滾向前，任何人任何勢力都無法阻擋。

TOP   HOME    [Directory Texts & Documents (1990—)]    [第三中共白皮書]

四、在新時代新征程上推進祖國統一

在民族復興的新征程上，中國共產黨和中國政府統籌中華民族偉大復興戰略全局和世界百年未有之大變局，深入貫徹新時代中國共產黨解決台灣問題的總體方略和對台大政方針，扎實推動兩岸關系和平發展、融合發展，堅定推進祖國統一進程。

（一）堅持“和平統一、一國兩制”基本方針

以和平方式實現祖國統一，最符合包括台灣同胞在內的中華民族整體利益，最有利于中國的長期穩定發展，是中國共產黨和中國政府解決台灣問題的第一選擇。盡管幾十年來遇到困難和阻力，但我們仍然堅持不懈地爭取和平統一，這體現了我們對民族大義、同胞福祉與兩岸和平的珍視和維護。

“一國兩制”是中國共產黨和中國政府為實現和平統一作出的重要制度安排，是中國特色社會主義的一個偉大創舉。“和平統一、一國兩制”是我們解決台灣問題的基本方針，也是實現國家統一的最佳方式，體現了海納百川、有容乃大的中華智慧，既充分考慮台灣現實情況，又有利于統一後台灣長治久安。我們主張，和平統一後，台灣可以實行不同于祖國大陸的社會制度，依法實行高度自治，兩種社會制度長期共存、共同發展。“一國”是實行“兩制”的前提和基礎，“兩制”從屬和派生于“一國”並統一于“一國”之內。我們將繼續團結台灣同胞，積極探索“兩制”台灣方案，豐富和平統一實踐。“一國兩制”在台灣的具體實現形式會充分考慮台灣現實情況，會充分吸收兩岸各界意見和建議，會充分照顧到台灣同胞利益和感情。

“一國兩制”提出以來，台灣一些政治勢力曲解誤導，民進黨及其當局不遺余力地造謠抹黑，造成部分台灣同胞的偏頗認知。事實是，香港、澳門回歸祖國後，重新納入國家治理體系，走上了同祖國內地優勢互補、共同發展的寬廣道路，“一國兩制”實踐取得舉世公認的成功。同時，一個時期內，受各種內外復雜因素影響，“反中亂港”活動猖獗，香港局勢一度出現嚴峻局面。中國共產黨和中國政府審時度勢，采取一系列標本兼治的舉措，堅持和完善“一國兩制”制度體系，推動香港局勢實現由亂到治的重大轉折，進入由治及興的新階段，為推進依法治港治澳、促進“一國兩制”實踐行穩致遠打下了堅實基礎。

實現兩岸和平統一，必須面對大陸和台灣社會制度與意識形態不同這一基本問題。“一國兩制”正是為解決這個問題而提出的最具包容性的方案。這是一個和平的方案、民主的方案、善意的方案、共贏的方案。兩岸制度不同，不是統一的障礙，更不是分裂的借口。我們相信，隨著時間的推移，“一國兩制”將被廣大台灣同胞重新認識；在兩岸同胞共同致力實現和平統一的過程中，“兩制”台灣方案的空間和內涵將得到充分展現。

和平統一，是平等協商、共議統一。兩岸長期存在的政治分歧問題是影響兩岸關系行穩致遠的總根子，總不能一代一代傳下去。兩岸協商談判可以有步驟、分階段進行，方式可靈活多樣。我們願意在一個中國原則和“九二共識”的基礎上，同台灣各黨派、團體和人士就解決兩岸政治分歧問題開展對話溝通，廣泛交換意見。我們也願意繼續推動由兩岸各政黨、各界別推舉的代表性人士開展民主協商，共商推動兩岸關系和平發展、融合發展和祖國和平統一的大計。

（二）努力推動兩岸關系和平發展、融合發展

兩岸關系和平發展、融合發展是通向和平統一的重要途徑，是造福兩岸同胞的康莊大道，需要凝聚兩岸同胞力量共同推進。我們要在兩岸關系和平發展進程中深化兩岸融合發展，密切兩岸交流合作，拉緊兩岸情感紐帶和利益聯結，增強兩岸同胞對中華文化和中華民族的認同，鑄牢兩岸命運共同體意識，厚植祖國和平統一的基礎。

突出以通促融、以惠促融、以情促融，勇于探索海峽兩岸融合發展新路，率先在福建建設海峽兩岸融合發展示範區。持續推進兩岸應通盡通，不斷提升兩岸經貿合作暢通、基礎設施聯通、能源資源互通、行業標準共通。推動兩岸文化教育、醫療衛生合作，社會保障和公共資源共享，支持兩岸鄰近或條件相當地區基本公共服務均等化、普惠化、便捷化。積極推進兩岸經濟合作制度化，打造兩岸共同市場，壯大中華民族經濟。

完善保障台灣同胞福祉和在大陸享受同等待遇的制度和政策，依法維護台灣同胞正當權益。支持台胞台企參與“一帶一路”建設、國家區域重大戰略和區域協調發展戰略，融入新發展格局，參與高質量發展，讓台灣同胞分享更多發展機遇，參與國家經濟社會發展進程。

排除干擾、克服障礙，不斷擴大兩岸各領域交流合作。推動兩岸同胞共同傳承和創新發展中華優秀傳統文化，加強兩岸基層民眾和青少年交流，吸引更多台胞特別是台灣青年來大陸學習、創業、就業、生活，使兩岸同胞加深相互理解，增進互信認同，逐步實現心靈契合。

（三）堅決粉碎“台獨”分裂和外來干涉圖謀

搞“台獨”分裂只會將台灣推入災難深淵，給台灣同胞帶來深重禍害。維護包括台灣同胞在內的中華民族整體利益，必須堅決反對“台獨”分裂、促進祖國和平統一。我們願意為和平統一創造廣闊空間，但絕不為各種形式的“台獨”分裂活動留下任何空間。中國人的事要由中國人來決定。台灣問題是中國的內政，事關中國核心利益和中國人民民族感情，不容任何外來干涉。任何利用台灣問題干涉中國內政、阻撓中國統一進程的圖謀和行徑，都將遭到包括台灣同胞在內的全體中國人民的堅決反對。任何人都不要低估中國人民捍衛國家主權和領土完整的堅強決心、堅定意志、強大能力。

我們願繼續以最大誠意、盡最大努力爭取和平統一。我們不承諾放棄使用武力，保留采取一切必要措施的選項，針對的是外部勢力干涉和極少數“台獨”分裂分子及其分裂活動，絕非針對台灣同胞，非和平方式將是不得已情況下做出的最後選擇。如果“台獨”分裂勢力或外部干涉勢力挑釁逼迫，甚至突破紅線，我們將不得不采取斷然措施。始終堅持做好以非和平方式及其他必要措施應對外部勢力干涉和“台獨”重大事變的充分準備，目的是從根本上維護祖國和平統一的前景、推進祖國和平統一的進程。

當前，美國一些勢力圖謀“以台制華”，處心積慮打“台灣牌”，刺激“台獨”分裂勢力冒險挑釁，不僅嚴重危害台海和平穩定，妨礙中國政府爭取和平統一的努力，也嚴重影響中美關系健康穩定發展。如果任其發展下去，必將導致台海形勢緊張持續升級，給中美關系造成顛覆性的巨大風險，並嚴重損害美國自身利益。美國應該恪守一個中國原則，慎重妥善處理涉台問題，停止說一套做一套，以實際行動履行不支持“台獨”的承諾。

（四）團結台灣同胞共謀民族復興和國家統一

國家統一是中華民族走向偉大復興的歷史必然。台灣前途在于國家統一，台灣同胞福祉系于民族復興。實現中華民族偉大復興，與兩岸同胞前途命運息息相關。民族強盛，是兩岸同胞之福；民族弱亂，是兩岸同胞之禍。民族復興、國家強盛，兩岸同胞才能過上富足美好的生活。實現中華民族偉大復興需要兩岸同胞共同奮斗，實現祖國完全統一同樣需要兩岸同胞攜手努力。

由于受到“台獨”思想毒害，也由于兩岸政治分歧問題尚未得到解決，一些台灣同胞對兩岸關系性質和國家認同問題認識出現偏差，對祖國統一心存疑懼。台灣同胞是我們的骨肉天親，兩岸同胞是血濃于水的一家人。我們願意保持足夠的耐心和包容心，創造條件加強兩岸交流交往，不斷加深廣大台灣同胞對祖國大陸的了解，逐步減少他們的誤解和疑慮，進而走出受“台獨”煽惑的歷史誤區。

我們將團結廣大台灣同胞共創祖國統一、民族復興的光榮偉業。希望廣大台灣同胞堅定站在歷史正確的一邊，做堂堂正正的中國人，認真思考台灣在民族復興中的地位和作用，深明大義、奉義而行，堅決反對“台獨”分裂和外部勢力干涉，積極參與到推進祖國和平統一的正義事業中來。

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五、實現祖國和平統一的光明前景

按照“一國兩制”實現兩岸和平統一，將給中國發展進步和中華民族偉大復興奠定新的基礎，將給台灣經濟社會發展創造巨大機遇，將給廣大台灣同胞帶來實實在在的好處。

（一）台灣發展空間將更為廣闊

台灣經濟發展水平較高，產業特色明顯，對外貿易發達，兩岸經濟互補性強。統一後，兩岸經濟合作機制、制度更加完善，台灣經濟將以大陸市場為廣闊腹地，發展空間更大，競爭力更強，產業鏈供應鏈更加穩定通暢，創新活力更加生機勃勃。長期困擾台灣經濟發展和民生改善的眾多難題，可以在兩岸融合發展、應通盡通中得到解決。台灣財政收入盡可用于改善民生，多為老百姓做實事、辦好事、解難事。

台灣的文化創造力將得到充分發揚，兩岸同胞共同傳承中華文化、弘揚民族精神，台灣地域文化在中華文化根脈的滋養中更加枝繁葉茂、煥發光彩。

（二）台灣同胞切身利益將得到充分保障

在確保國家主權、安全、發展利益的前提下，台灣可以作為特別行政區實行高度自治。台灣同胞的社會制度和生活方式等將得到充分尊重，台灣同胞的私人財產、宗教信仰、合法權益將得到充分保障。所有擁護祖國統一、民族復興的台灣同胞將在台灣真正當家作主，參與祖國建設，盡享發展紅利。有強大祖國做依靠，台灣同胞在國際上腰桿會更硬、底氣會更足，更加安全、更有尊嚴。

（三）兩岸同胞共享民族復興的偉大榮光

台灣同胞崇敬祖先、愛土愛鄉、勤勞勇敢、自強不息，具有光榮的愛國主義傳統。兩岸同胞發揮聰明才智，攜手共創美好未來潛力巨大。統一後，兩岸同胞可以彌合因長期沒有統一而造成的隔閡，增進一家人的同胞親情，更加緊密地團結起來；可以發揮各自優勢，實現互利互補，攜手共謀發展；可以共同促進中華民族的繁榮昌盛，讓中華民族以更加昂揚的姿態屹立于世界民族之林。

兩岸同胞血脈相連、命運與共。統一後，中國的國際影響力、感召力、塑造力將進一步增強，中華民族的自尊心、自信心、自豪感將進一步提升。台灣同胞將同大陸同胞一道，共享一個偉大國家的尊嚴和榮耀，以做堂堂正正的中國人而驕傲和自豪。兩岸同胞共同探索實施“兩制”台灣方案，共同發展完善“一國兩制”制度體系，確保台灣長治久安。

（四）有利于亞太地區及全世界和平與發展

實現兩岸和平統一，不僅是中華民族和中國人民之福，也是國際社會和世界人民之福。中國的統一，不會損害任何國家的正當利益包括其在台灣的經濟利益，只會給各國帶來更多發展機遇，只會給亞太地區和世界繁榮穩定注入更多正能量，只會為構建人類命運共同體、為世界和平發展和人類進步事業作出更大貢獻。

統一後，有關國家可以繼續同台灣發展經濟、文化關系。經中國中央政府批準，外國可以在台灣設立領事機構或其他官方、半官方機構，國際組織和機構可以在台灣設立辦事機構，有關國際公約可以在台灣適用，有關國際會議可以在台灣舉辦。

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結束語

具有五千多年文明史的中華民族創造了震古爍今的燦爛文化，對人類社會發展進步作出了重大貢獻。在經歷了近代以來從屈辱走向奮起、從落伍走向崛起的百年滄桑之後，中華民族迎來了大發展大作為的時代，邁出了走向偉大復興的鏗鏘步伐。

在新時代新征程上，中國共產黨和中國政府將繼續團結帶領兩岸同胞順應歷史大勢，勇擔時代責任，把前途命運牢牢掌握在自己手中，為實現祖國完全統一和中華民族偉大復興而努力奮斗。

前進道路不可能一馬平川，但只要包括兩岸同胞在內的所有中華兒女同心同德、團結奮斗，就一定能夠粉碎任何形式的“台獨”分裂和外來干涉圖謀，就一定能夠匯聚起促進祖國統一和民族復興的磅礡偉力。祖國完全統一的歷史任務一定要實現，也一定能夠實現！

① 詳見《聯合國司法年鑒 2010》（United Nations Juridical Yearbook 2010）第 516 頁。

② 1951 年 9 月 4 日至 8 日，美國糾集一些國家，在排斥中華人民共和國、蘇聯的情況下，在美國舊金山召開所謂“對日和會”，簽署包含“日本放棄對台灣、澎湖列島之所有權利和請求權”等內容的“舊金山和約”。該“和約”違反 1942 年中美英蘇等 26 國簽署的《聯合國家宣言》規定，違反《聯合國憲章》和國際法基本原則，對台灣主權歸屬等任何涉及中國作為非締約國的領土和主權權利的處置也都是非法、無效的。中國政府從一開始就鄭重聲明，“舊金山和約”由于沒有中華人民共和國參加準備、擬制和簽訂，中國政府認為是非法無效的，絕不承認。蘇聯、波蘭、捷克斯洛伐克、朝鮮、蒙古、越南等國家也拒絕承認“和約”效力。

③ 1995 年 1 月 30 日，時任中共中央總書記、國家主席江澤民發表題為《為促進祖國統一大業的完成而繼續奮斗》的講話，提出發展兩岸關系、推進祖國和平統一進程的八項主張，強調“堅持一個中國的原則，是實現和平統一的基礎和前提”、“我們不承諾放棄使用武力，決不是針對台灣同胞，而是針對外國勢力干涉中國統一和搞‘台灣獨立’的圖謀的”等。詳見《江澤民文選》第一卷，人民出版社 2006 年 8 月第 1 版，第 418 至 423 頁。

④ 這里不含經第三地的轉投資。

⑤ 根據 2022 年 4 月國際貨幣基金組織“世界經濟展望數據庫”的統計。

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🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

This white paper was issued on Aug. 10, 2022 and was the third of altogether three white papers the PRC issued on Taiwan so far. The first white paper on the topic had been issued on Aug. 31, 1993, the second on Feb. 21, 2000.

See also the URLs leading to the sources of this white paper in English and Chinese.

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

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◆ Focus Hong Kong—relevant treaties and laws

● Introduction

Treaty / law / documentYear~ in Chinese
★ The Sino-British Declaration on Hong Kong1984 中華人民共和國政府和大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府關於香港問題的聯合聲明
★ HKSAR Basic Law, Article 231990 / 2024 中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法 第二十三條
★ NPC Standing Committee Decision, Instrument A2122014 文件 A212：全國人大常委會關於香港特別行政區行政長官普選問題和 2016 年立法會產生辦法的決定
★ Hong Kong National Security Law2020 港區國安法
★ Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the HKSAR National Security Law2020 港區國安法第四十三條實施細則
★ Safeguarding National Security Ordinance2024 維護國家安全條例

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Introduction

When the ROC was formally founded in 1912, Hong Kong was not part of it—the Qing had been forced to give up three swaths of territory to the UK under military pressure: Hong Kong (Xianggang 香港) in 1842, Kowloon (Jiulong 九龍) in 1860, and the New Territories (Xinjie 新界) in 1898. The three parts were administrated by the UK as one crown colony. In the 1980s the PRC and the UK began negotiations about the return of the British colony to Chinese rule, and in 1984 the "Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong" (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu han Da buliedian ji Bei aierlan lianhe wangguo zhengfu guanyu Xianggang wentide lianhe shengming 中華人民共和國政府和大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府關於香港問題的聯合聲明), short "Sino-British Declaration on Hong Kong", was signed. Both sides agreed that Hong Kong would be allowed to keep its own judiciary and a legal system separate from the PRC for 50 years, but the Declaration did not specify how Hong Kong would be governed after 2047, and it contained no sanctions that could be imposed for violations of clauses in the Declaration.

With the handover on July 1, 1997 Hong Kong became part of the PRC as Special Administrative Region (tebie xingzhengqu 特别行政區, abbrev. SAR) under the principle of “one country, two systems” (yiguo liangzhi 一國兩制, abbrev. 1C2S). Its legal foundation is the Basic Law (jibenfa 基本法) which was endorsed by the PRC’s National People's Congress (quanguo renmin daibiao dahui 全國人民代表大會, abbrev. quanguo renda 全國人大 in Chinese and NPC in English) on April 4, 1990 and took effect with the handover.

Since the democratization process in the ROC began in 1987, pro-democracy advocates in Hong Kong have been inspired by the rights and freedoms ROC citizens enjoy in Taiwan and engaged in frequent exchanges with politicians in Taiwan. Not only did the Hong Kong activists want to preserve their freedom of opinion and assembly as they were allowed to exercise at the time of the handover, they also persistently pushed for universal suffrage—in other words, more freedoms.

Meanwhile, the top priority for the PRC leadership has been to maintain maximum political control in Hong Kong under the 1C2S formula. The pro-democracy movements, protests and unrest which have been recurring in Hong Kong since the early 2000s have been regarded by Beijing as a serious challenge and threat to stability and their political control over Hong Kong. To counter those threats, the PRC sought to tighten their grip on Hong Kong—in other words, less freedoms.

Hotspot for discontent

First attempts to introduce national security legislation in connection with Basic Law Article 23 triggered widespread protests and were eventually abandoned in 2003. At that time the question of introducing universal suffrage by 2012 was under discussion, later such a measure was considered for the year 2017. The Standing Committee of the PRC National People’s Congress (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui 中華人民共和國全國人民代表大會常務委員會, abbrev. quanguo renda changweihui 全國人大常委會 in Chinese and NPCSC in English) in 2014 proposed direct voting for Hong Kong's Chief Executive (xingzheng zhangguan 行政長官) in 2017 as long as the candidates were nominated by a committee. Critics regarded the offer as too favourable to Beijing, and disaffected students started the ensuing Umbrella Movement (yusan geming 雨傘革命) aka Occupy Movement (zhanling xingdong 佔領行動).

In this context two threadbare CCP euphemisms are noteworthy: electoral reform with reduction of seats filled by popular vote was coined "improving HKSAR's electoral system" (wanshan Xianggang tequ xuanju zhidu 「完善香港特區選舉制度」), and disqualifying pro-democracy candidates from running in elections came under the label "patriots administering Hong Kong" (aiguozhe zhi Gang 「愛國者治港」).

The main bone of contention for activists in the Umbrella Movement was the imposed patriotic rule—on Aug. 31, 2014 the NPCSC had decided that "the Chief Executive shall be a person who loves the country and loves Hong Kong" (行政長官必須由愛國愛港人士擔任) and stipulated "the method for selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage must provide corresponding institutional safeguards for this purpose" (行政長官普選辦法必須為此提供相應的制度保障). Following massive protests HKSAR Chief Executive Carrie Lam 林鄭月娥 stated that the development of democracy in Hong Kong was not a top priority and that the Hong Kong government should focus on livelihood issues first. This strongly indicated that universal suffrage would never be implemented in HKSAR.

The next confrontation between the HKSAR leadership and pro-democracy activists came in 2019. It originated in a murder case that took place in Taiwan—on Feb. 17, 2018, Hong Kong citizen Chan Tong-kai 陳同佳 killed his girlfriend Poon Hiu-wing 潘曉穎 in a room of the Purple Garden Hotel (ziyuan lüdian 紫園旅店) in Taipei, stuffed her body in a suitcase and disposed of both separately in a park near an MRT station in New Taipei City, returning to Hong Kong before the Taiwanese authorities named him a suspect in the crime. Since an extradition agreement did not exist between Hong Kong and Taiwan, Chan could not be prosecuted. (A detailed account of the events can be found on Wikipedia.)

As a reaction to the situation, the HKSAR government introduced the "Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation [Amendment] Bill 2019" (erlingyijou nian taofan ji xingshi shiyi xianghu falü xiezhu fali (xiuding) tiaoli cao’an 2019 年逃犯及刑事事宜相互法律協助法例（修訂）條例草案), short "Extradition Bill" (taofan tiaoli 逃犯條例), in February 2019. Critics feared that the bill could be used to target activists and journalists. It was argued that it risked exposing Hongkongers to unfair trials and violent treatment, and the pro-democracy camp rejected plans to allow extradition to mainland China as well. A sit-in at the government headquarters on March 15, 2019 marked the beginning of the protests, and a demonstration on June 9 that year was attended by hundreds of thousands. The protests were at times fierce and violent, with police firing live bullets and protesters attacking officers and throwing petrol bombs. Chief Executive Carrie Lam eventually withdrew the bill on Sept. 4, 2019. Nevertheless, elections for the Hong Kong District Councils on Nov. 24, 2019 resulted in an unprecedented landslide victory for the pro-democracy camp.

Destruction of liberties

After years of recurring unrest and anti-government protests, another attempt to criminalize dissent was finally pushed through Hong Kong’s legislature, with profound impact on Hong Kong’s politics and society. The "Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region" (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo Xianggang tebie xingzhengqu weihu guojia anquanfa 中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法)—short "Hong Kong National Security Law" (Gang qu guo'anfa 港區國安法)—was promulgated on June 30, 2020 and went into force immediately, establishing the crimes of secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces. Under the law, an Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the HKSAR (zhongyang renmin zhengfu zhu Xianggang tebie xingzhengqu weihu guojia anquan gongshu 中央人民政府駐香港特别行政區維護國家安全公署, abbrev. CPGNSO), i. e. an investigative office under the PRC government authority immune from HKSAR jurisdiction, was set up on July 8, 2020.

The HKSAR National Security Law changed the political atmosphere in Hong Kong fundamentally, and voices of dissent have effectively been silenced. Anti-government demonstrations, annual candlelight vigils commemorating the 1989 June 6 Tiananmen Massacre (liusi Tianmen shijian 六四天門事件 aka liusi shijian 六四事件 or Tiananmen shijian 天安門事件) and other forms of protest can be prosecuted under the pretext of national security and punished with prison time, and the law also sparked a wave of mass emigration from the city. Needless to say, the political developments in HKSAR since early 2020 have done nothing to increase the appeal of 1C2S in Taiwan.

Follow-up legislation included the "Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region" (Gang qu guo'anfa di sishisan tiao shishi xize 港區國安法第四十三條實施細則), short "Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the HKSAR National Security Law", which were gazetted on July 6, 2020 and became effective the following day. The most recent piece of legislation in this context was the "Safeguarding National Security Ordinance" (weihu guojia anquan tiaoli 維護國家安全條例, abbrev. SNSO) promulgated on March 23, 2024.

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The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong

Name in Chinese Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu han da buliezhen ji bei Aierlan lianhe wangguo zhengfu guanyu Xianggang wentide lianhe shengming 中華人民共和國政府和大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府關於香港問題的聯合聲明
Document type Bilateral treaty between the UK and the PRC
Year, date 1984, Dec. 19
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 Annex I    Annex II    Annex III    Memoranda


JOINT DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China have reviewed with satisfaction the friendly relations existing between the two Governments and peoples in recent years and agreed that a proper negotiated settlement of the question of Hong Kong, which is left over from the past, is conducive to the maintenance of the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and to the further strengthening and development of the relations between the two countries on a new basis. To this end, they have, after talks between the delegations of the two Governments, agreed to declare as follows:

1. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that to recover the Hong Kong area (including Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories, hereinafter referred to as Hong Kong) is the common aspiration of the entire Chinese people, and that it has decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997.

2. The Government of the United Kingdom declares that it will restore Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China with effect from 1 July 1997.

3. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that the basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong are as follows:

(1) Upholding national unity and territorial integrity and taking account of the history of Hong Kong and its realities, the People's Republic of China has decided to establish, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region upon resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong.

(2) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be directly under the authority of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People's Government.

(3) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The laws currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged.

(4) The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive will be appointed by the Central People's Government on the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally. Principal officials will be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for appointment by the Central People's Government. Chinese and foreign nationals previously working in the public and police services in the government departments of Hong Kong may remain in employment. British and other foreign nationals may also be employed to serve as advisers or hold certain public posts in government departments of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(5) The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will be protected by law.

(6) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the status of a free port and a separate customs territory.

(7) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the status of an international financial centre, and its markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures will continue. There will be free flow of capital. The Hong Kong dollar will continue to circulate and remain freely convertible.

(8) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will have independent finances. The Central People's Government will not levy taxes on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(9) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may establish mutually beneficial economic relations with the United Kingdom and other countries, whose economic interests in Hong Kong will be given due regard.

(10) Using the name of "Hong Kong, China", the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own maintain and develop economic and cultural relations and conclude relevant agreements with states, regions and relevant international organisations.

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own issue travel documents for entry into and exit from Hong Kong.

(11) The maintenance of public order in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be the responsibility of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(12) The above-stated basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong and the elaboration of them in Annex I to this Joint Declaration will be stipulated, in a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, and they will remain unchanged for 50 years.

4. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China declare that, during the transitional period between the date of the entry into force of this Joint Declaration and 30 June 1997, the Government of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong with the object of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity and social stability; and that the Government of the People's Republic of China will give its co-operation in this connection.

5. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China declare that, in order to ensure a smooth transfer of government in 1997, and with a view to the effective implementation of this Joint Declaration, a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group will be set up when this Joint Declaration enters into force; and that it will be established and will function in accordance with the provisions of Annex II to this Joint Declaration.

6. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China declare that land leases in Hong Kong and other related matters will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Annex III to this Joint Declaration.

7. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to implement the preceding declarations and the Annexes to this Joint Declaration.

8. This Joint Declaration is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which shall take place in Beijing before 30 June 1985. This Joint Declaration and its Annexes shall be equally binding.

Done in duplicate at Beijing on December 19, 1984 in the English and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Margaret Thatcher

For the Government of the People's Republic of China
Zhao Ziyang

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ANNEX I

  I. Constitution
II. Legal system
III. Judicial system
IV. Public service
V. Finance
VI. Economic system
VII. Monetary system		  VIII. Shipping
IX. Civil aviation
X. Education
XI. Foreign affairs
XII. Defence
XIII. Basic rights and freedoms
XIV. Right to abode, travel immigration

Elaboration by the government of the People's Republic of China of its basic policies regarding Hong Kong

The Government of the People's Republic of China elaborates the basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong as set out in paragraph 3 of the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong as follows:

I. CONSTITUTION

Establishment of the Hong Kong S.A.R.

The Basic Law

The Constitution of the People's Republic of China stipulates in Article 31 "that the state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by laws enacted by the National People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions." In accordance with this Article, the People's Republic of China shall, upon the resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997, establish the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China shall enact and promulgate a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Basic Law) in accordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, stipulating that after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region the socialist system and socialist policies shall not be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and that Hong Kong's previous capitalist system and life-style shall remain unchanged for 50 years.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be directly under the authority of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Except for foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People's Government, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The Central People's Government shall authorise the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to conduct on its own those external affairs specified in Section XI of this Annex.

Chief Executive. Principal Officials. The Legislature

The government and legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government. Principal officials (equivalent to Secretaries) shall be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and appointed by the Central People's Government. The legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by elections. The executive authorities shall abide by the law and shall be accountable to the legislature.

Language

In addition to Chinese, English may also be used in organs of government and in the courts in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Regional flag and emblem

Apart from displaying the national flag and national emblem of the People's Republic of China, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may use a regional flag and emblem of its own.

II. LEGAL SYSTEM

Laws previously in force

After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong (i.e. the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law) shall be maintained, save for any that contravene the Basic Law and subject to any amendment by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature.

Legislative power

The legislative power of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The legislature may on its own authority enact laws in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and legal procedures, and report them to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record. Laws enacted by the legislature which are in accordance with the Basic Law and legal procedures shall be regarded as valid.

Laws of the SAR

The laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the Basic Law, and the laws previously in force in Hong Kong and laws enacted by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature as above.

III. JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Previous judicial system

After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the judicial system previously practised in Hong Kong shall be maintained except for those changes consequent upon the vesting in the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the power of final adjudication.

Judicial power; Precedents

Judicial power in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The courts shall exercise judicial power independently and free from any interference. Members of the judiciary shall be immune from legal action in respect of their judicial functions. The courts shall decide cases in accordance with the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and may refer to precedents in other common law jurisdictions.

Appointment and removal of judges

Judges of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region courts shall be appointed by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region acting in accordance with the recommendation of an independent commission composed of local judges, persons from the legal profession and other eminent persons. Judges shall be chosen by reference to their judicial qualities and may be recruited from other common law jurisdictions. A judge may only be removed for inability to discharge the functions of his office, or for misbehaviour, by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region acting in accordance with the recommendation of a tribunal appointed by the chief judge of the court of final appeal, consisting of not fewer than three local judges. Additionally, the appointment or removal of principal judges (i.e. those of the highest rank) shall be made by the chief executive with the endorsement of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature and reported to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record. The system of appointment and removal of judicial officers other than judges shall be maintained.

Power of final judgment

The power of final judgment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the court of final appeal in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which may as required invite judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the court of final appeal.

Prosecutions

A prosecuting authority of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall control criminal prosecutions free from any interference.

Legal practitioners

On the basis of the system previously operating in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall on its own make provision for local lawyers and lawyers from outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to work and practise in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Reciprocal juridical assistance

The Central People's Government shall assist or authorise the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to make appropriate arrangements for reciprocal juridical assistance with foreign states.

IV. PUBLIC SERVICE

Public servants and members of judiciary previously serving in H.K.

After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, public servants previously serving in Hong Kong in all government departments, including the police department, and members of the judiciary may all remain in employment and continue their service with pay, allowances, benefits and conditions of service no less favourable than before. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall pay to such persons who retire or complete their contracts, as well as to those who have retired before 1 July 1997, or to their dependants, all pensions, gratuities, allowances and benefits due to them on terms no less favourable than before, and irrespective of their nationality or place of residence.

Foreign nationals in public service

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may employ British and other foreign nationals previously serving in the public service in Hong Kong, and may recruit British and other foreign nationals holding permanent identity cards of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to serve as public servants at all levels, except as heads of major government departments (corresponding to branches or departments at Secretary level) including the police department, and as deputy heads of some of those departments. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may also employ British and other foreign nationals as advisers to government departments and, when there is a need, may recruit qualified candidates from outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to professional and technical posts in government departments. The above shall be employed only in their individual capacities and, like other public servants, shall be responsible to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government.

Appointment and promotion of public servants

The appointment and promotion of public servants shall be on the basis of qualifications, experience and ability. Hong Kong's previous system of recruitment, employment, assessment, discipline, training and management for the public service (including special bodies for appointment, pay and conditions of service) shall, save for any provisions providing privileged treatment for foreign nationals, be maintained.

V. FINANCE

Budget

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall deal on its own with financial matters, including disposing of its financial resources and drawing up its budgets and its final accounts. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall report its budgets and final accounts to the Central People's Government for the record.

Taxation and public expenditure

The Central People's Government shall not levy taxes on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall use its financial revenues exclusively for its own purposes and they shall not be handed over to the Central People's Government. The systems by which taxation and public expenditure must be approved by the legislature, and by which there is accountability to the legislature for all public expenditure, and the system for auditing public accounts shall be maintained.

VI. ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Economic and trade system.

Ownership of property

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the capitalist economic and trade systems previously practised in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall decide its economic and trade policies on its own. Rights concerning the ownership of property, including those relating to acquisition, use, disposal, inheritance and compensation for lawful deprivation (corresponding to the real value of the property concerned, freely convertible and paid without undue delay) shall continue to be protected by law.

Free port and free trade policy

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall retain the status of a free port and continue a free trade policy, including the free movement of goods and capital. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own maintain and develop economic and trade relations with all states and regions.

Customs territory.

GATT.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a separate customs territory. It may participate in relevant international organisations and international trade agreements (including preferential trade arrangements), such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and arrangements regarding international trade in textiles. Export quotas, tariff preferences and other similar arrangements obtained by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be enjoyed exclusively by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have authority to issue its own certificates of origin for products manufactured locally, in accordance with prevailing rules of origin.

Trade missions

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, as necessary, establish official and semi-official economic and trade missions in foreign countries, reporting the establishment of such missions to the Central People's Government for the record.

VII. MONETARY SYSTEM

Previous monetary and financial systems

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall retain the status of an international financial centre. The monetary and financial systems previously practised in Hong Kong, including the systems of regulation and supervision of deposit taking institutions and financial markets, shall be maintained.

Monetary and financial policies

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may decide its monetary and financial policies on its own. It shall safeguard the free operation of financial business and the free flow of capital within, into and out of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. No exchange control policy shall be applied in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures shall continue.

Hong Kong dollar

The Hong Kong dollar, as the local legal tender, shall continue to circulate and remain freely convertible. The authority to issue Hong Kong currency shall be vested in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may authorise designated banks to issue or continue to issue Hong Kong currency under statutory authority, after satisfying itself that any issue of currency will be soundly based and that the arrangements for such issue are consistent with the object of maintaining the stability of the currency. Hong Kong currency bearing references inappropriate to the status of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China shall be progressively replaced and withdrawn from circulation.

Exchange Fund

The Exchange Fund shall be managed and controlled by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, primarily for regulating the exchange value of the Hong Kong dollar.

VIII. SHIPPING

Previous systems of shipping management and regulation

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain Hong Kong's previous systems of shipping management and shipping regulation, including the system for regulating conditions of seamen. The specific functions and responsibilities of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government in the field of shipping shall be defined by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government on its own. Private shipping businesses and shipping-related businesses and private container terminals in Hong Kong may continue to operate freely.

Shipping registers and issue of certificates

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be authorised by the Central People's Government to continue to maintain a shipping register and issue related certificates under its own legislation in the name of 'Hong Kong, China'.

Access to HKSAR ports

With the exception of foreign warships, access for which requires the permission of the Central People's Government, ships shall enjoy access to the ports of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

IX. CIVIL AVIATION

Previous system of civil aviation management

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the status of Hong Kong as a centre of international and regional aviation. Airlines incorporated and having their principal place of business in Hong Kong and civil aviation related businesses may continue to operate. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall continue the previous system of civil aviation management in Hong Kong, and keep its own aircraft register in accordance with provisions laid down by the Central People's Government concerning nationality marks and registration marks of aircraft. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be responsible on its own for matters of routine business and technical management of civil aviation, including the management of airports, the provision of air traffic services within the flight information region of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the discharge of other responsibilities allocated under the regional air navigation procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organisation.

Air services

The Central People's Government shall, in consultation with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, make arrangements providing for air services between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other parts of the People's Republic of China for airlines incorporated and having their principal place of business in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other airlines of the People's Republic of China. All Air Service Agreements providing for air services between other parts of the People's Republic of China and other states and regions with stops at the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and air services between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other states and regions with stops at other parts of the People's Republic of China shall be concluded by the Central People's Government. For this purpose, the Central People's Government shall take account of the special conditions and economic interests of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and consult the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. Representatives of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may participate as members of delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of China in air service consultations with foreign governments concerning arrangements for such services.

Air Service Agreements

Acting under specific authorisations from the Central People's Government, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may:

  • renew or amend Air Service Agreements and arrangements previously in force; in principle, all such Agreements and arrangements may be renewed or amended with the rights contained in such previous Agreements and arrangements being as far as possible maintained;
  • negotiate and conclude new Air Service Agreements providing routes for airlines incorporated and having their principal place of business in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and rights for overflights and technical stops; and
  • negotiate and conclude provisional arrangements where no Air Service Agreement with a foreign state or other region is in force.

All scheduled air services to, from or through the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region which do not operate to, from or through the mainland of China shall be regulated by Air Service Agreements or provisional arrangements referred to in this paragraph.

The Central People's Government shall give the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government the authority to:

  • negotiate and conclude with other authorities all arrangements concerning the implementation of the above Air Service Agreements and provisional arrangements;
  • issue licences to airlines incorporated and having their principal place of business in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
  • designate such airlines under the above Air Service Agreements and provisional arrangements; and
  • issue permits to foreign airlines for services other than those to, from or through the mainland of China.

X. EDUCATION

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the educational system previously practised in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall on its own decide policies in the fields of culture, education, science and technology, including policies regarding the educational system and its administration, the language of instruction, the allocation of funds, the examination system, the system of academic awards and the recognition of educational and technological qualifications. Institutions of all kinds, including those run by religious and community organisations, may retain their autonomy. They may continue to recruit staff and use teaching materials from outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Students shall enjoy freedom of choice of education and freedom to pursue their education outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

XI. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

General

Subject to the principle that foreign affairs are the responsibility of the Central People's Government, representatives of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may participate, as members of delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of China, in negotiations at the diplomatic level directly affecting the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region conducted by the Central People's Government. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own, using the name 'Hong Kong, China', maintain and develop relations and conclude and implement agreements with states, regions and relevant international organisations in the appropriate fields, including the economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping, communications, touristic, cultural and sporting fields. Representatives of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may participate, as members of delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of China, in international organisations or conferences in appropriate fields limited to states and affecting the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, or may attend in such other capacity as may be permitted by the Central People's Government and the organisation or conference concerned, and may express their views in the name of 'Hong Kong, China'. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, using the name 'Hong Kong, China', participate in international organisations and conferences not limited to states.

International agreements

The application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of international agreements to which the People's Republic of China is or becomes a party shall be decided by the Central People's Government, in accordance with the circumstances and needs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and after seeking the views of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. International agreements to which the People's Republic of China is not a party but which are implemented in Hong Kong may remain implemented in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Central People's Government shall, as necessary, authorise or assist the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to make appropriate arrangements for the application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of other relevant international agreements. The Central People's Government shall take the necessary steps to ensure that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall continue to retain its status in an appropriate capacity in those international organisations of which the People's Republic of China is a member and in which Hong Kong participates in one capacity or another. The Central People's Government shall, where necessary, facilitate the continued participation of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in an appropriate capacity in those international organisations in which Hong Kong is a participant in one capacity or another, but of which the People's Republic of China is not a member.

Consular and other missions

Foreign consular and other official or semi-official missions may be established in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region with the approval of the Central People's Government. Consular and other official missions established in Hong Kong by states which have established formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China may be maintained. According to the circumstances of each case, consular and other official missions of states having no formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China may either be maintained or changed to semi-official missions. States not recognised by the People's Republic of China can only establish non-governmental institutions.

The United Kingdom may establish a Consulate-General in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

XII. DEFENCE

The maintenance of public order in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the responsibility of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. Military forces sent by the Central People's Government to be stationed in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for the purpose of defence shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Expenditure for these military forces shall be borne by the Central People's Government.

XIII. BASIC RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

General

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall protect the rights and freedoms of inhabitants and other persons in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region according to law. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall maintain the rights and freedoms as provided for by the laws previously in force in Hong Kong, including freedom of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, to form and join trade unions, of correspondence, of travel, of movement, of strike, of demonstration, of choice of occupation, of academic research, of belief, inviolability of the home, the freedom to marry and the right to raise a family freely.

Legal advice and judicial remedies

Every person shall have the right to confidential legal advice, access to the courts, representation in the courts by lawyers of his choice, and to obtain judicial remedies. Every person shall have the right to challenge the actions of the executive in the courts.

Religion

Religious organisations and believers may maintain their relations with religious organisations and believers elsewhere, and schools, hospitals and welfare institutions run by religious organisations may be continued. The relationship between religious organisations in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and those in other parts of the People's Republic of China shall be based on the principles of non-subordination, non-interference and mutual respect.

International Covenants

The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force.

XIV. RIGHT OF ABODE, TRAVEL, IMMIGRATION

Right of abode

The following categories of persons shall have the right of abode in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and, in accordance with the law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, be qualified to obtain permanent identity cards issued by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, which state their right of abode:

  • all Chinese nationals who where born or who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for a continuous period of 7 years or more, and persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of such Chinese nationals;
  • all other persons who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for a continuous period of 7 years or more and who have taken Hong Kong as their place of permanent residence before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and persons under 21 years of age who were born of such persons in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
  • any other persons who had the right of abode only in Hong Kong before the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Passports etc

The Central People's Government shall authorise the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to issue, in accordance with the law, passports of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China to all Chinese nationals who hold permanent identity cards of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and travel documents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China to all other persons lawfully residing in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The above passports and documents shall be valid for all states and regions and shall record the holder's right to return to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Use of travel documents

For the purpose of travelling to and from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may use travel documents issued by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, or by other competent authorities of the People's Republic of China, or of other states. Holders of permanent identity cards of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may have this fact stated in their travel documents as evidence that the holders have the right of abode in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of persons from other parts of China shall continue to be regulated in accordance with the present practice.

Immigration controls

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may apply immigration controls on entry, stay in and departure from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by persons from foreign states and regions.

Freedom to leave SAR

Unless restrained by law, holders of valid travel documents shall be free to leave the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region without special authorisation.

Visa abolition agreements

The Central People's Government shall assist or authorise the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to conclude visa abolition agreements with states or regions.

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ANNEX II

Sino-British Joint Liaison Group

1. In furtherance of their common aim and in order to ensure a smooth transfer of government in 1997, the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed to continue their discussions in a friendly spirit and to develop the cooperative relationship which already exists between the two Governments over Hong Kong with a view to the effective implementation of the Joint Declaration.

2. In order to meet the requirements for liaison, consultation and the exchange of information, the two Governments have agreed to set up a Joint Liaison Group.

3. The functions of the Joint Liaison Group shall be:

a) to conduct consultations on the implementation of the Joint Declaration;

b) to discuss matters relating to the smooth transfer of government in 1997;

c) to exchange information and conduct consultations on such subjects as may be agreed by the two sides.

Matters on which there is disagreement in the Joint Liaison Group shall be referred to the two Governments for solution through consultations.

4. Matters for consideration during the first half of the period between the establishment of the Joint Liaison Group and 1 July 1997 shall include:

a) action to be taken by the two Governments to enable the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to maintain its economic relations as a separate customs territory, and in particular to ensure the maintenance of Hong Kong's participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Multifibre Arrangement and other international arrangements; and

b) action to be taken by the two Governments to ensure the continued application of international rights and obligations affecting Hong Kong.

5. The two Governments have agreed that in the second half of the period between the establishment of the Joint Liaison Group and 1 July 1997 there will be need for closer cooperation, which will therefore be intensified during that period. Matters for consideration during this second period shall include:

a) procedures to be adopted for the smooth transition in 1997;

b) action to assist the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to maintain and develop economic and cultural relations and conclude agreements on these matters with states, regions and relevant international organisations.

6. The Joint Liaison Group shall be an organ for liaison and not an organ of power. It shall play no part in the administration of Hong Kong or the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Nor shall it have any supervisory role over that administration. The members and supporting staff of the Joint Liaison Group shall only conduct activities within the scope of the functions of the Joint Liaison Group.

7. Each side shall designate a senior representative who shall be of Ambassadorial rank, and four other members of the group. Each side may send up to 20 supporting staff.

8. The Joint Liaison Group shall be established on the entry into force of the Joint Declaration. From 1 July 1988 the Joint Liaison Group shall have its principal base in Hong Kong. The Joint Liaison Group shall continue its work until 1 January 2000.

9. The Joint Liaison Group shall meet in Beijing, London and Hong Kong. It shall meet at least once in each of the three locations in each year. The venue for each meeting shall be agreed between the two sides.

10. Members of the Joint Liaison Group shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities as appropriate when in the three locations. Proceedings of the Joint Liaison Group shall remain confidential unless otherwise agreed between the two sides.

11. The Joint Liaison Group may by agreement between the two sides decide to set up specialist sub-groups to deal with particular subjects requiring expert assistance.

12. Meetings of the Joint Liaison Group and sub-groups may be attended by experts other than the members of the Joint Liaison Group. Each side shall determine the composition of its delegation to particular meetings of the Joint Liaison Group or sub-group in accordance with the subjects to be discussed and the venue chosen.

13. The working procedures of the Joint Liaison Group shall be discussed and decided upon by the two sides within the guidelines laid down in this Annex.

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ANNEX III

Land Leases

The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with effect from the entry into force of the Joint Declaration, land leases in Hong Kong and other related matters shall be dealt with in accordance with the following provisions:

1. All leases of land granted or decided upon before the entry into force of the Joint Declaration and those granted thereafter in accordance with paragraph 2 or 3 of this Annex, and which extend beyond 30 June 1997, and all rights in relation to such leases shall continue to be recognised and protected under the law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

2. All leases of land granted by the British Hong Kong Government not containing a right of renewal that expire before 30 June 1997, except short term tenancies and leases for special purposes, may be extended if the lessee so wishes for a period expiring not later than 30 June 2047 without payment of an additional premium. An annual rent shall be charged from the date of extension equivalent to 3 per cent of the rateable value of the property at that date, adjusted in step with any changes in the rateable value thereafter. In the case of old schedule lots, village lots, small houses and similar rural holdings, where the property was on 30 June 1984 held by, or, in the case of small houses granted after that date, the property is granted to, a person descended through the male line from a person who was in 1898 a resident of an established village in Hong Kong, the rent shall remain unchanged so long as the property is held by that person or by one of his lawful successors in the male line. Where leases of land not having a right of renewal expire after 30 June 1997, they shall be dealt with in accordance with the relevant land laws and policies of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

3. From the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997, new leases of land may be granted by the British Hong Kong Government for terms expiring not later than 30 June 2047. Such leases shall be granted at a premium and nominal rental until 30 June 1997, after which date they shall not require payment of an additional premium but an annual rent equivalent to 3 per cent of the rateable value of the property at that date, adjusted in step with changes in the rateable value thereafter, shall be charged.

4. The total amount of new land to be granted under paragraph 3 of this Annex shall be limited to 50 hectares a year (excluding land to be granted to the Hong Kong Housing Authority for public rental housing) from the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997.

5. Modifications of the conditions specified in leases granted by the British Hong Kong Government may continue to be granted before 1 July 1997 at a premium equivalent to the difference between the value of the land under the previous conditions and its value under the modified conditions.

6. From the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997, premium income obtained by the British Hong Kong Government from land transactions shall, after deduction of the average cost of land production, be shared equally between the British Hong Kong Government and the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. All the income obtained by the British Hong Kong Government, including the amount of the above-mentioned deduction, shall be put into the Capital Works Reserve Fund for the financing of land development and public works in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government's share of the premium income shall be deposited in banks incorporated in Hong Kong and shall not be drawn on except for the financing of land development and public works in Hong Kong in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 7(d) of this Annex.

7. A Land Commission shall be established in Hong Kong immediately upon the entry into force of the Joint Declaration. The Land Commission shall be composed of an equal number of officials designated respectively by the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China together with necessary supporting staff. The officials of the two sides shall be responsible to their respective governments. The Land Commission shall be dissolved on 30 June 1997.

The terms of reference of the Land Commission shall be:

a) to conduct consultations on the implementation of this Annex;

b) to monitor observance of the limit specified in paragraph 4 of this Annex, the amount of land granted to the Hong Kong Housing Authority for public rental housing, and the division and use of premium income referred to in paragraph 6 of this Annex;

c) to consider and decide on proposals from the British Hong Kong Government for increasing the limit referred to in paragraph 4 of this Annex;

d) to examine proposals for drawing on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government's share of premium income referred to in paragraph 6 of this Annex and to make recommendations to the Chinese side for decision.

Matters on which there is disagreement in the Land Commission shall be referred to the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China for decision.

8. Specific details regarding the establishment of the Land Commission shall be finalised separately by the two sides through consultations.

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Memoranda (Exchanged Between the Two Sides)

United Kingdom Memorandum

In connection with the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the question of Hong Kong to be signed this day, the Government of the United Kingdom declares that, subject to the completion of the necessary amendments to the relevant United Kingdom legislation:

a) All persons who on 30 June 1997 are, by virtue of a connection with Hong Kong, British Dependent Territories Citizens (BDTCs) under the law in force in the United Kingdom will cease to be BDTCs with effect from 1 July 1997, but will be eligible to retain an appropriate status which, without conferring the right of abode in the United Kingdom, will entitle them to continue to use passports issued by the Government of the United Kingdom. This status will be acquired by such persons only if they hold or are included in such a British passport issued before 1 July 1997, except that eligible persons born on or after 1 January 1997 but before 1 July 1997 may obtain or be included in such a passport up to 31 December 1997.
b)No person will acquire BDTC status on or after 1 July 1997 by virtue of a connection with Hong Kong. No person born on or after 1 July 1997 will acquire the status referred to as being appropriate in sub-paragraph (a).
c)United Kingdom consular officials in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and elsewhere may renew and replace passports of persons mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) and may also issue them to persons, born before 1 July 1997 of such persons, who had previously been included in the passport of their parent.
d)Those who have obtained or been included in passports issued by the Government of the United Kingdom under sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) will be entitled to receive, upon request, British consular services and protection when in third countries.

Beijing, 19 December 1984.

Chinese Memorandum

The Government of the People's Republic of China has received the memorandum from the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated 19 December 1984.

Under the Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, all Hong Kong Chinese compatriots, whether they are holders of the 'British Dependent Territories Citizens' Passport' or not, are Chinese nationals.

Taking account of the historical background of Hong Kong and its realities, the competent authorities of the Government of the People's Republic of China will, with effect from 1 July 1997, permit Chinese nationals in Hong Kong who were previously called 'British Dependent Territories Citizens' to use travel documents issued by the Government of the United Kingdom for the purpose of travelling to other states and regions.

The above Chinese nationals will not be entitled to British consular protection in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other parts of the People's Republic of China on account of their holding the above-mentioned British travel documents.

Beijing, 19 December 1984.

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中華人民共和國政府和大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府關於香港問題的聯合聲明

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

 附件一    附件二    附件三    雙方交換的備忘錄   


中華人民共和國政府和大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府滿意地回顧了近年來兩國政府和兩國人民之間的友好關係，一致認為通過協商妥善地解決歷史上遺留下來的香港問題，有助於維持香港的繁榮與穩定，並有助於兩國關係在新的基礎上進一步鞏固和發展，為此，經過兩國政府代表團的會談，同意聲明如下：

一、中華人民共和國政府聲明：收回香港地區（包括香港島、九龍和"新界"，以下稱香港）是全中國人民的共同願望，中華人民共和國政府決定於一九九七年七月一日對香港恢復行使主權。

二、聯合王國政府聲明：聯合王國政府於一九九七年七月一日將香港交還給中華人民共和國。

三、中華人民共和國政府聲明，中華人民共和國對香港的基本方針政策如下：

（一） 爲了維護國家的統一和領土完整，並考慮到香港的歷史和現實情況，中華人民共和國決定在對香港恢復行使主權時，根據中華人民共和國憲法第三十一條的規定，設立香港特別行政區。

（二） 香港特別行政區直轄於中華人民共和國中央人民政府。除外交和國防事務屬中央人民政府管理外，香港特別行政區享有高度的自治權。

（三） 香港特別行政區享有行政管理權、立法權、獨立的司法權和終審權。現行的法律基本不變。

（四） 香港特別行政區政府由當地人組成。行政長官在當地通過選舉或協商産生，由中央人民政府任命。主要官員由香港特別行政區行政長官提名，報中央人民政府任命。原在香港各政府部門任職的中外藉公務、警務人員可以留用。香港特別行政區各政府部門可以聘請英籍人士或其他外籍人士擔任顧問或某些公職。

（五） 香港的現行社會、經濟制度不變；生活方式不變。香港特別行政區依法保障人身、言論、出版、集會、結社、旅行、遷徙、通信、罷工、選擇職業和學術研究以及宗教信仰等各項權利和自由。私人財産、企業所有權、合法繼承權以及外來投資均受法律保護。

（六） 香港特別行政區將保持自由港和獨立關稅地區的地位。

（七） 香港特別行政區將保持國際金融中心的地位，繼續開放外匯、黃金、證券、期貨等市場，資金進出自由。港幣繼續流通，自由兌換。

（八） 香港特別行政區將保持財政獨立。中央人民政府不向香港特別行政區徵稅。

（九） 香港特別行政區可同聯合王國和其他國家建立互利的經濟關係。聯合王國和其他國家在香港的經濟利益將得到照顧。

（十） 香港特別行政區可以 "中國香港" 的名義單獨地同各國、各地區及有關國際組織保持和發展經濟、文化關係，並簽訂有關協定。香港特別行政區政府可自行簽發出入香港的旅行證件。

（十一） 香港特別行政區的社會治安由香港特別行政區政府負責維持。

（十二） 關於中華人民共和國對香港的上述基本方針政策和本聯合聲明附件一對上述基本方針政策的具體說明，中華人民共和國全國人民代表大會將以中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法規定之，並在五十年內不變。

四、中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府聲明：自本聯合聲明生效之日起至一九九七年六月三十日止的過渡時期內，聯合王國政府負責香港的行政管理，以維護和保持香港的經濟繁榮和社會穩定；對此，中華人民共和國政府將給予合作。

五、中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府聲明：為求本聯合聲明得以有效執行，並保證一九九七年政權的順利交接，在本聯合聲明生效時成立中英聯合聯絡小組；聯合聯絡小組將根據本聯合聲明附件二的規定建立和履行職責。

六、中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府聲明：關於香港土地契約和其他有關事項，將根據本聯合聲明附件三的規定處理。

七、中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府同意，上述各項聲明和本聯合聲明的附件均將付諸實施。

八、本聯合聲明須經批准，並自互換批准書之日起生效。批准書應於一九八五年六月三十日前在北京互換。本聯合聲明及其附件具有同等約束力。

一九八四年十二月十九日在北京簽訂，共兩份，每份都用中文和英文寫成，兩種文本具有同等效力。

中華人民共和國政府代表 趙紫陽（簽字）

大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府代表 瑪格麗特 • 柴契爾（簽字）

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附件一

  一（Constitution）
二（Legal system）
三（Judicial system）
四（Public service）
五（Finance）
六（Economic system）
七（Monetary system）		  八（Shipping）
九（Civil aviation）
十（Education）
十一（Foreign affairs）
十二（Defence）
十三（Basic rights and freedoms）
十四（Right to abode, travel immigration）

中華人民共和國政府對香港的基本方針政策的具體說明

中華人民共和國政府就中華人民共和國政府和大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府關於香港問題的聯合聲明第三款所載中華人民共和國對香港的基本方針政策，具體說明如下：

一

中華人民共和國憲法第三十一條規定："國家在必要時得設立特別行政區。在特別行政區內實行的制度按照具體情況由全國人民代表大會以法律規定。"據此，中華人民共和國將在一九九七年七月一日對香港恢復行使主權時，設立中華人民共和國香港特別行政區。中華人民共和國全國人民代表大會將根據中華人民共和國憲法制定並頒布中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法（以下簡稱《基本法》），規定香港特別行政區成立後不實行社會主義的制度和政策，保持香港原有的資本主義制度和生活方式，五十年不變。

香港特別行政區直轄於中華人民共和國中央人民政府，並享有高度的自治權。除外交和國防事務屬中央人民政府管理外，香港特別行政區享有行政管理權、立法權、獨立的司法權和終審權。中央人民政府授權香港特別行政區自行處理本附件第十一節所規定的各項涉外事務。

香港特別行政區政府和立法機關由當地人組成。香港特別行政區行政長官在當地通過選舉或協商產生，由中央人民政府任命。香港特別行政區政府的主要官員（相當於"司"級官員）由香港特別行政區行政長官提名，報請中央人民政府任命。香港特別行政區立法機關由選舉產生。行政機關必須遵守法律，對立法機關負責。

香港特別行政區的政府機關和法院，除使用中文外，還可使用英文。

香港特別行政區除懸掛中華人民共和國國旗和國徽外，還可以使用區旗和區徽。

二

香港特別行政區成立後，香港原有法律（即普通法及衡平法、條例、附屬立法、習慣法）除與《基本法》相抵觸或香港特別行政區的立法機關作出修改者外，予以保留。

香港特別行政區的立法權屬於香港特別行政區立法機關。立法機關可根據《基本法》的規定並依照法定程序制定法律，報中華人民共和國全國人民代表大會常務委員會備案。立法機關制定的法律凡符合《基本法》和法定程序者，均屬有效。

在香港特別行政區實行的法律為《基本法》，以及上述香港原有法律和香港特別行政區立法機關制定的法律。

三

香港特別行政區成立後，除因香港特別行政區法院享有終審權而產生的變化外，原在香港實行的司法體制予以保留。

香港特別行政區的審判權屬於香港特別行政區法院。法院獨立進行審判，不受任何干涉。司法人員履行審判職責的行為不受法律追究。法院依照香港特別行政區的法律審判案件，其他普通法適用地區的司法判例可作參考。

香港特別行政區法院的法官，根據當地法官和法律界及其他方面知名人士組成的獨立委員會的推薦，由行政長官予以任命。法官應根據本人的司法才能選用，並可從其他普通法適用地區聘用。法官只有在無力履行職責或行為不檢的情況下，才能由行政長官根據終審法院首席法官任命的不少於三名當地法官組成的審議庭的建議，予以免職。主要法官（即最高一級法官）的任命和免職，還須由行政長官徵得香港特別行政區立法機關的同意並報全國人民代表大會常務委員會備案。法官以外的其他司法人員的任免制度繼續保持。

香港特別行政區的終審權屬於香港特別行政區終審法院。終審法院可根據需要邀請其他普通法適用地區的法官參加審判。

香港特別行政區的檢察機關主管刑事檢察工作，不受任何干涉。

香港特別行政區政府可參照原在香港實行的辦法，作出有關當地和外來的律師在香港特別行政區工作和執業的規定。

中央人民政府將協助或授權香港特別行政區政府同外國就司法互助關係作出適當安排。

四

香港特別行政區成立後，原在香港各政府部門（包括警察部門）任職的公務人員和司法人員均可留用，繼續工作；其薪金、津貼、福利待遇和服務條件不低於原來的標準。對退休或約滿離職的人員，包括一九九七年七月一日以前退休的人員，不論其所屬國籍或居住地點，香港特別行政區政府將按不低於原來的標準向他們或其家屬支付應得的退休金、酬金、津貼及福利費。

香港特別行政區政府可任用原香港公務人員中的或持有香港特別行政區永久性居民身份證的英籍和其他外籍人士擔任政府部門的各級公務人員，各主要政府部門，（相當於"司"級部門，包括警察部門）的正職和某些主要政府部門的副職除外。香港特別行政區政府還可聘請英籍和其他外籍人士擔任政府部門的顧問；必要時並可從香港特別行政區以外聘請合格人員擔任政府部門的專業和技術職務。上述人士只能以個人身份受聘，並和其他公務人員一樣對香港特別行政區政府負責。

公務人員應根據本人的資格、經驗和才能予以任命和提升。香港原有關於公務人員的招聘、僱用、考核、紀律、培訓和管理的制度（包括負責公務人員的任用、薪金、服務條件的專門機構），除有關給予外籍人員特權待遇的規定外，予以保留。

五

香港特別行政區自行管理財政事務，包括支配財政資源，編製財政預算和決算。香港特別行政區的預決算須報中央人民政府備案。

中央人民政府不向香港特別行政區徵稅。香港特別行政區的財政收入全部用於自身需要，不上繳中央人民政府。徵稅和公共開支經立法機關批准、公共開支向立法機關負責和公共帳目的審計等制度，予以保留。

六

香港特別行政區保持原在香港實行的資本主義經濟制度和貿易制度。香港特別行政區政府自行制定經濟和貿易政策。財產所有權，包括財產的取得、使用、處置和繼承的權利，以及依法徵用財產得到補償（補償相當於該財產的實際價值、可自由兌換、不無故遲延支付）的權利，繼續受法律保護。香港特別行政區將保持自由港地位，並繼續實行自由貿易政策，包括貨物和資本的自由流動。香港特別行政區可單獨同各國、各地區保持和發展經濟和貿易關係。

香港特別行政區為單獨的關稅地區。香港特別行政區可參加關稅和貿易總協定、關於國際紡織品貿易安排等有關的國際組織和國際貿易協定，包括優惠貿易安排。香港特別行政區取得的出口配額、關稅優惠和達成的其他類似安排，全由香港特別行政區享有。香港特別行政區有權根據當時的產地規則，對在當地製造的產品簽發產地來源證。

香港特別行政區可根據需要在外國設立官方或半官方的經濟和貿易機構，並報中央人民政府備案。

七

香港特別行政區將保持國際金融中心的地位。原在香港實行的貨幣金融制度，包括對接受存款機構和金融市場的管理和監督制度，予以保留。

香港特別行政區政府可自行制定貨幣金融政策，並保障金融企業的經營自由以及資金在香港特別行政區流動和進出香港特別行政區的自由。香港特別行政區不實行外匯管制政策。外匯、黃金、證券、期貨市場繼續開放。

港元作為當地的法定貨幣，繼續流通，自由兌換。港幣發行權屬香港特別行政區政府，在確知港幣的發行基礎是健全的以及有關發行的安排符合保持港幣穩定的目的的情況下，香港特別行政區政府可授權指定銀行根據法定權限發行或繼續發行香港貨幣。凡所帶標誌與中華人民共和國香港特別行政區地位不符的香港貨幣，將逐步更換和退出流通。

外匯基金由香港特別行政區政府管理和支配，主要用於調節港元匯價。

八

香港特別行政區保持原在香港實行的航運經營和管理體制，包括有關海員的管理體制。香港特別行政區政府可自行規定在航運方面的具體職能和責任。香港的私營航運及與航運有關的企業和私營集裝箱碼頭，可繼續自由經營。

香港特別行政區經中央人民政府授權繼續進行船舶登記，並可根據法律以"中國香港"名義頒發有關證件。

除外國軍用船隻進入香港特別行政區須經中央人民政府特別許可外，其他船舶可根據香港特別行政區法律進出其港口。

九

香港特別行政區將保持香港作為國際和區域航空中心的地位。在香港註冊並以香港為主要營業地的航空公司和與民用航空有關的行業可繼續經營。香港特別行政區繼續沿用原在香港實行的民用航空管理制度，並按中央人民政府關於飛機國籍標誌和登記標誌的規定，設置自己的飛機登記冊。香港特別行政區自行負責民用航空的日常業務和技術管理，包括機場管理，在香港特別行政區飛行情報區內提供空中交通服務，以及履行國際民用航空組織的區域性航行規劃程序所規定的其他職責。

中央人民政府經同香港特別行政區政府磋商作出安排，為在香港特別行政區註冊並以香港特別行政區為主要營業地的航空公司和中華人民共和國的其他航空公司，提供香港特別行政區和中華人民共和國其他地區之間的往返航班。凡涉及中華人民共和國其他地區與其他國家和地區的往返並經停香港特別行政區的航班，和涉及香港特別行政區與其他國家和地區的往返並經停中華人民共和國其他地區航班的民用航空運輸協定，由中央人民政府簽訂。為此，中央人民政府將考慮香港特別行政區的特殊情況和經濟利益，並同香港特別行政區政府磋商。中央人民政府在同外國政府商談有關此類航班的安排時，香港特別行政區政府的代表可作為中華人民共和國政府代表團成員參加。

經中央人民政府具體授權，香港特別行政區政府可以：對原有的民用航空運輸協定和協議續簽或修改，這些協定和協議原則上都可以續簽或修改，原協定和協議規定的權利盡可能保留；談判簽訂新的民用航空運輸協定，為在香港特別行政區註冊並以香港特別行政區為主要營業地的航空公司提供航線，以及過境和技術停降權利；在同外國和其它地區沒有民用航空運輸協定的情況下，談判簽訂臨時協議。凡不涉及往返、經停中國內地而只往返、經停香港特別行政區的定期航班，均由本段所述的民用航空運輸協定或臨時協議加以規定。

中央人民政府授權香港特別行政區政府：同其他當局商談並簽訂有關執行上述民用航空運輸協定和臨時協議的各項安排；對在香港特別行政區註冊並以香港特別行政區為主要營業地的航空公司簽發執照；按照上述民用航空運輸協定和臨時協議指定航空公司；對外國航空公司除往返、經停中國內地的航班以外的其他航班簽發許可證。

十

香港特別行政區保持原在香港實行的教育制度。香港特別行政區政府自行制定有關文化、教育和科學技術方面的政策，包括教育體制及管理、教學語言、經費分配、考試制度、學位制度、承認學歷及技術資格等政策。各類院校，包括宗教及社會團體所辦院校，均可保留其自主性，並可繼續從香港特別行政區以外招聘教職員，選用教材。學生享有選擇院校和在香港特別行政區以外求學的自由。

十一

在外交事務屬中央人民政府管理的原則下，香港特別行政區政府的代表，可作為中華人民共和國政府代表團的成員，參加由中央人民政府進行的與香港特別行政區直接有關的外交談判。香港特別行政區可以"中國香港"的名義，在經濟、貿易、金融、航運、通訊、旅遊、文化、體育等領域單獨地同世界各國、各地區及有關國際組織保持和發展關係，並簽訂和履行有關協定。對以國家為單位參加的、與香港特別行政區有關的、適當領域的國際組織和國際會議，香港特別行政區政府的代表可作為中華人民共和國政府代表團的成員或以中央人民政府和上述有關國際組織或國際會議允許的身份參加，並以"中國香港"的名義發表意見。對不以國家為單位參加的國際組織和國際會議，香港特別行政區可以"中國香港"的名義參加。

中華人民共和國締結的國際協定，中央人民政府可根據香港特別行政區的情況和需要，在徵詢香港特別行政區政府的意見後，決定是否適用於香港特別行政區。中華人民共和國尚未參加但已適用於香港的國際協定仍可繼續適用。中央人民政府根據需要授權或協助香港特別行政區政府作出適當安排，使其他有關的國際協定適用於香港特別行政區。對中華人民共和國已經參加而香港目前也以某種形式參加的國際組織，中央人民政府將採取必要措施使香港特別行政區以適當形式繼續保持在這些組織中的地位。對中華人民共和國尚未參加而香港目前以某種形式參加的國際組織，中央人民政府將根據需要使香港特別行政區以適當形式繼續參加這些組織。

外國在香港特別行政區設立領事機構或其他官方、半官方機構，須經中央人民政府批准。同中華人民共和國建立正式外交關係的國家在香港設立的領事機構和其他官方機構，可予保留；尚未同中華人民共和國建立正式外交關係國家的領事機構和其他官方機構，可根據情況予以保留或改為半官方機構；尚未為中華人民共和國承認的國家，只能設立民間機構。

聯合王國可在香港特別行政區設立總領事館。

十二

香港特別行政區的社會治安由香港特別行政區政府負責維持。中央人民政府派駐香港特別行政區負責防務的部隊不干預香港特別行政區的內部事務，駐軍軍費由中央人民政府負擔。

十三

香港特別行政區政府依法保障香港特別行政區居民和其他人的權利和自由。香港特別行政區政府保持香港原有法律中所規定的權利和自由，包括人身、言論、出版、集會、結社、組織和參加工會、通信、旅行、遷徙、罷工、遊行、選擇職業、學術研究和信仰自由、住宅不受侵犯、婚姻自由以及自願生育的權利。

任何人均有權得到秘密法律諮詢、向法院提起訴訟、選擇律師在法庭上為其代理以及獲得司法補救。任何人均有權對行政部門的行為向法院申訴。

宗教組織和教徒可同其他地方的宗教組織和教徒保持關係，宗教組織所辦學校、醫院、福利機構等均可繼續存在。香港特別行政區的宗教組織與中華人民共和國其他地區宗教組織的關係應以互不隸屬、互不干涉和互相尊重的原則為基礎。

《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》和《經濟、社會與文化權利的國際公約》適用於香港的規定將繼續有效。

十四

在香港特別行政區有居留權並有資格按香港特別行政區的法律獲得香港特別行政區政府簽發的載明此項權利的永久性居民身份證者為：在香港特別行政區成立以前或以後在當地出生或通常居住連續七年以上的中國公民及其在香港以外所生的中國籍子女；在香港特別行政區成立以前或以後在當地通常居住連續七年以上並以香港為永久居住地的其他人及其在香港特別行政區成立以前或以後在當地出生的未滿二十一歲的子女；以及在香港特別行政區成立前只在香港有居留權的其他人。

中央人民政府授權香港特別行政區政府依照法律，給持有香港特別行政區永久性居民身份證的中國公民簽發中華人民共和國香港特別行政區護照，並給在香港特別行政區的其他的合法居留者簽發中華人民共和國香港特別行政區其他旅行證件。上述護照和證件，前往各國和各地區有效，並載明持有人有返回香港特別行政區的權利。

香港特別行政區居民出入當地，可使用香港特別行政區政府或中華人民共和國其他主管部門，或其他國家主管部門簽發的旅行證件。凡持有香港特別行政區永久性居民身份證者，其旅行證件可載明此項事實，以證明其在香港特別行政區有居留權。

對中國其他地區的人進入香港特別行政區將按現在實行的辦法管理。

對其他國家和地區的人入境、逗留和離境，香港特別行政區政府可實行出入境管制。

有效旅行證件持有人，除非受到法律制止，可自由離開香港特別行政區，無需特別批准。

中央人民政府將協助或授權香港特別行政區政府同各國或各地區締結互免簽證協定。

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附件二

關於中英聯合聯絡小組

一、為促進雙方共同目標，並為保證一九九七年政權的順利交接，中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府同意，繼續以友好的精神進行討論並促進兩國政府在香港問題上已有的合作關係，以求《聯合聲明》得以有效執行。

二、為了進行聯絡、磋商及交換情況的需要，兩國政府同意成立聯合聯絡小組。

三、聯合聯絡小組的職責為：

（一）就《聯合聲明》的實施進行磋商；

（二）討論與一九九七年政權順利交接有關的事宜；

（三）就雙方商定的事項交換情況並進行磋商。

聯合聯絡小組未能取得一致意見的問題，提交兩國政府通過協商解決。

四、在聯合聯絡小組成立到一九九七年七月一日的前半段時期中審議的事項 包括：

（一）兩國政府為使香港特別行政區作為獨立關稅地區保持其經濟關係，特別是為確保香港特別行政區繼續參加關稅及貿易總協定、多種纖維協定及其他國際性安排所需採取的行動；

（二）兩國政府為確保同香港有關的國際權利與義務繼續適用所需採取的行動。

五、兩國政府同意，在聯合聯絡小組成立到一九九七年七月一日的後半段時期中，有必要進行更密切的合作，因此屆時將加強合作，在此第二階段時期中審議的事項包括：

（一）為一九九七年順利過渡所要採取的措施；

（二）為協助香港特別行政區同各國、各地區及有關國際組織保持和發展經濟、文化關係並就此類事項簽訂協議所需採取的行動。

六、聯合聯絡小組是聯絡機構而不是權力機構，不參與香港或香港特別行政區的行政管理，也不對之起監督作用。聯合聯絡小組的成員和工作人員只在聯合聯絡小組職責範圍內進行活動。

七、雙方各指派一名大使級的首席代表和另外四名小組成員。每方可派不超過二十名的工作人員。

八、聯合聯絡小組在《聯合聲明》生效時成立。聯合聯絡小組自一九八八年七月一日起以香港為主要駐地。聯合聯絡小組將繼續工作到二○○○年一月一日為止。

九、聯合聯絡小組在北京、倫敦和香港開會。每年至少在上述三地各開會一次。每次開會地點由雙方商定。

十、聯合聯絡小組成員在上述三地享有相應的外交特權與豁免。除非雙方另有協議，聯合聯絡小組討論情況須加以保密。

十一、經雙方協議，聯合聯絡小組可決定設立專家小組以處理需要專家協助的具體事項。

十二、聯合聯絡小組成員以外的專家可參加聯合聯絡小組和專家小組的會議。每方按照討論的問題和選定的地點，決定其參加聯合聯絡小組或專家小組每次會議的人員組成。

十三、聯合聯絡小組的工作程序由雙方按照本附件規定討論決定。

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附件三

關於土地契約

中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府同意自《聯合聲明》生效之日起，按下列規定處理關於香港土地契約和其他有關事項：

一、《聯合聲明》生效前批出或決定的超越一九九七年六月三十日年期的所有土地契約和與土地契約有關的一切權利，以及該聲明生效後根據本附件第二款或第三款批出的超越一九九七年六月三十日年期的所有土地契約和與土地契約 有關的一切權利，按照香港特別行政區的法律繼續予以承認和保護。

二、除了短期租約和特殊用途的契約外，已由香港英國政府批出的一九九七年六月三十日以前滿期而沒有續期權利的土地契約，如承租人願意，均可續期到不超過二○四七年六月三十日，不補地價。從續期之日起，每年交納相當於當日該土地應課差餉租值百分之三的租金，此後，隨應課差餉租值的改變而調整租金。至於舊批約地段、鄉村屋地、丁屋地和類似的農村土地，如該土地在一九八四年六月三十日的承租人，或在該日以後批出的丁屋地的承租人，其父系為一八九八年在香港的原有鄉村居民，只要該土地的承租人仍為該人或其合法父系繼承人，租金將維持不變。一九九七年六月三十日以後滿期而沒有續期權利的土地契約，將按照香港特別行政區有關的土地法律及政策處理。

三、從《聯合聲明》生效之日起至一九九七年六月三十日止，香港英國政府可以批出租期不超過二○四七年六月三十日的新的土地契約。該項土地的承租人須交納地價並交納名義租金至一九九七年六月三十日，該日以後不補地價，但需每年交納相當於當日該土地應課差餉租值百分之三的租金，此後，隨應課差餉租值的改變而調整租金。

四、從《聯合聲明》生效之日起至一九九七年六月三十日止，根據本附件第三款所批出的新的土地，每年限於五十公頃，不包括批給香港房屋委員會建造出租的公共房屋所用的土地。

五、在一九九七年七月一日之前，可繼續批准修改香港英國政府所批出的土地契約規定的土地使用條件，補交的地價為原有條件的土地價值和修改條件後的土地價值之間的差額。

六、從《聯合聲明》生效之日起至一九九七年六月三十日止，香港英國政府從土地交易所得的地價收入，在扣除開發土地平均成本的款項後，均等平分，分別歸香港英國政府和日後的香港特別行政區政府所有。屬於香港英國政府所得的全部收入，包括上述扣除的款項，均撥入"基本工程儲備基金"，用於香港土地開發和公共工程。屬於香港特別行政區政府的地價收入部分，將存入在香港註冊的銀行，除按照本附件第七款（四）的規定用於香港土地開發和公共工程外，不得動用。

七、《聯合聲明》生效之日起，立即在香港成立土地委員會。土地委員會由中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府指派同等人數的官員組成，輔以必要的工作人員。雙方官員向各自的政府負責。土地委員會將於一九九七年六月三十日解散。

土地委員會的職權範圍為：

（一）就本附件的實施進行磋商；

（二）監察本附件第四款規定的限額，批給香港房屋委員會建造出租的公共房屋所用的土地數量，以及本附件第六款關於地價收入的分配和使用的執行；

（三）根據香港英國政府提出的建議，考慮並決定提高本附件第四款所述的限額數量；

（四）審核關於擬動用本附件第六款所述的屬於香港特別行政區政府的地價收入部分的建議，並提出意見，供中方決定。

土地委員會未能取得一致意見的問題，提交中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府決定。

八、有關建立土地委員會的細則，由雙方另行商定。

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雙方交換的備忘錄

備忘錄（英方）

聯繫到今天簽訂的大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府和中華人民共和國政府關於香港問題的聯合聲明，聯合王國政府聲明，在完成對聯合王國有關立法的必要修改的情況下，

一、 凡根據聯合王國實行的法律，在 1997 年 6 月 30 日由於同香港的關係為英國屬土公民者，從 1997 年 7 月 1 日起，不再是英國屬土公民，但將有資格保留某種適當地位，使其可繼續使用聯合王國政府簽發的護照，而不賦予在 聯合王國的居留權。取得這種地位的人，必須為持有在 1997 年 7 月 1 日以前簽發的該種英國護照或包括在該種護照上的人，但 1997 年 1 月 1 日或該日 以後、1997 年 7 月 1 日以前出生的有資格的人，可在 1997 年 12 月 31 日截止的期間內取得該種護照或包括在該種護照上。
二、在 1997 年 7 月 1 日或該日以後，任何人不得由於同香港的關係而取得英國屬土公民的地位。凡在 1997 年 7 月 1 日或該日以後出生者，不得取得第一節中所述的適當地位。
三、在香港特別行政區和其他地方的聯合王國的領事官員可為第一節中提及的人所持的護照延長期限和予以更換，亦可給他們在 1997 年 7 月 1 日前出生並且原來包括在他們護照上的子女簽發護照。
四、根據第一節和第三節已領取聯合王國政府簽發的護照的人或包括在該護照上的人，經請求有權在第三國獲得英國的領事服務和保護。

英國駐華大使館（印）
1984 年 12 月 19 日

備忘錄（中方）

中華人民共和國政府收到了大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府 1984 年 12 月 19 日的備忘錄。

根據中華人民共和國國籍法，所有香港中國同胞，不論其是否持有“英國屬土公民護照”，都是中國公民。

考慮到香港的歷史背景和現實情況，中華人民共和國政府主管部門自 1997 年 7 月 1 日起，允許原被稱為“英國屬土公民”的香港中國公民使用由聯合王國政府簽發的旅行證件去其他國家和地區旅行。

上述中國公民在香港特別行政區和中華人民共和國其他地區不得因其持有上述英國旅行證件而享受英國的領事保護的權利。

中華人民共和國外交部（印）
1984 年 12 月 19 日

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Hong Kong Basic Law Article 23

Name in Chinese Zhonghua renmin gongheguo Xianggang tebie xingzhengqu jibenfa di ershisan tiao 中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法 第二十三條
Document type PRC law for Hong Kong
Year, date 1990, April 4
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Basic Law

Chapter II - Relationship between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

Article 23

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.

中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法 第二十三條

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基本法

第二章 - 中央和香港特別行政區的關係

第二十三條

香港特別行政區應自行立法禁止任何叛國、分裂國家、煽動叛亂、顛覆中央人民政府及竊取國家機密的行為，禁止外國的政治性組織或團體在香港特別行政區進行政治活動，禁止香港特別行政區的政治性組織或團體與外國的政治性組織或團體建立聯繫。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

While the wording of Article 23 itself has remained unchanged since the 1997 handover, controversial Basic Law Article 23 legislation was enacted on March 23, 2024, notably the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance. In this context, the HKSAR Security Bureau (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo Xianggang tebie xingzhengqu zhengfu baoanju 中華人民共和國香港特別行政區政府保安局) has published pamphlets for justification.

The full text of the HKSAR Basic Law is available here on two separate PDF files in English and Chinese (May 2021 edition).

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NPC Standing Committee Decision, Instrument A212

Name in Chinese quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu Xianggang tebie xingzhengqu xingzheng zhangguan puxuan wenti han erlingyiliu nian lifahui chansheng banfade jueding 全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於香港特別行政區行政長官普選問題和 2016 年立法會產生辦法的決定
Document type Decision of the Standing Committee of the PRC National People's Congress
Year, date 2014, Aug. 31
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[Instrument A212]

Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016 (Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People’s Congress at its Tenth Session on 31 August, 2014)

Editorial Notes:
 1. This instrument was not given a chapter number under the Legislation Publication Ordinance (Cap. 614). An unofficial reference number, however, is assigned to this instrument in Hong Kong e-Legislation (http://www.elegislation.gov.hk) for identification purposes. This also enables users to carry out a search by reference to the unofficial reference number.
 2. This English translation is for reference only and has no legislative effect.

The Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People’s Congress considered at its Tenth Session the Report by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on whether there is a need to amend the methods for selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2017 and for forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2016 submitted by Leung Chun-ying, the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, on 15 July 2014. In the course of deliberation, the relevant views and suggestions of the Hong Kong community were given full consideration.

The Session points out that according to the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage adopted by the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress at its Thirty-first Session on 29 December 2007, the election of the fifth Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the year 2017 may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage; at an appropriate time prior to the selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by universal suffrage, the Chief Executive shall make a report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress as regards the issue of amending the method for selecting the Chief Executive in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Hong Kong Basic Law and the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, and a determination thereon shall be made by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. From 4 December 2013 to 3 May 2014, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region conducted an extensive and in-depth public consultation on the methods for selecting the Chief Executive in 2017 and for forming the Legislative Council in 2016. In the course of consultation, the Hong Kong community generally expressed the hope to see the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage in 2017, and broad consensus was reached on important principles such as: the method for selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage shall comply with the Hong Kong Basic Law and the relevant Decisions of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and the Chief Executive shall be a person who loves the country and loves Hong Kong. With respect to the methods for selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage in 2017 and for forming the Legislative Council in 2016, the Hong Kong community put forward various views and suggestions. It was on this basis that the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region made a report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on issues relating to amending the methods for selecting the Chief Executive in 2017 and for forming the Legislative Council in 2016. The Session is of the view that the report complies with the requirements of the Hong Kong Basic Law, the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Hong Kong Basic Law and the relevant Decisions of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, and reflects comprehensively and objectively the views collected during the public consultation; and is thus a positive, responsible and pragmatic report.

The Session is of the view that implementing universal suffrage for the selection of the Chief Executive represents a historic progress in Hong Kong’s democratic development and a significant change in the political structure of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Since the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and the sovereignty, security and development interests of the country are at stake, there is a need to proceed in a prudent and steady manner. The selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by universal suffrage has its origin in Paragraph 2 of Article 45 of the Hong Kong Basic Law: “The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.” The formulation of the method for selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage must strictly comply with the relevant provisions of the Hong Kong Basic Law, accord with the principle of “one country, two systems”, and befit the legal status of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. It must meet the interests of different sectors of the society, achieve balanced participation, be conducive to the development of the capitalist economy, and make gradual and orderly progress in developing a democratic system that suits the actual situation in Hong Kong. Given the divergent views within the Hong Kong community on how to implement the Hong Kong Basic Law provisions on universal suffrage for selecting the Chief Executive, and in light of the constitutional responsibility of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for the proper implementation of the Hong Kong Basic Law and for deciding on the method for the selection of the Chief Executive, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress finds it necessary to make provisions on certain core issues concerning the method for selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage, so as to facilitate the building of consensus within the Hong Kong community and the attainment of universal suffrage for the selection of the Chief Executive smoothly and in accordance with law.

The Session is of the view that since the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be accountable to both the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Central People’s Government in accordance with the provisions of the Hong Kong Basic Law, the principle that the Chief Executive has to be a person who loves the country and loves Hong Kong must be upheld. This is a basic requirement of the policy of “one country, two systems”. It is determined by the legal status as well as important functions and duties of the Chief Executive, and is called for by the actual need to maintain long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and uphold the sovereignty, security and development interests of the country. The method for selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage must provide corresponding institutional safeguards for this purpose.

The Session is of the view that the amendments made to the method for forming the fifth term Legislative Council in 2012 represented major strides towards the direction of enhancing democracy. The existing formation method and voting procedures for the Legislative Council as prescribed in Annex II to the Hong Kong Basic Law will not be amended, and will continue to apply in respect of the sixth term Legislative Council in 2016. This is consistent with the principle of gradual and orderly progress in developing a democratic system that suits Hong Kong’s actual situation and conforms to the majority view in the Hong Kong community. It also helps the various sectors of the Hong Kong community to focus their efforts on addressing the issues concerning universal suffrage for selecting the Chief Executive first, thus creating the conditions for attaining the aim of electing all the members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage after the implementation of universal suffrage for the selection of the Chief Executive.

Accordingly, pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China and the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress makes the following decision:

I. Starting from 2017, the selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage.

II. When the selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is implemented by the method of universal suffrage:

(1) A broadly representative nominating committee shall be formed. The provisions for the number of members, composition and formation method of the nominating committee shall be made in accordance with the number of members, composition and formation method of the Election Committee for the Fourth Chief Executive.

(2) The nominating committee shall nominate two to three candidates for the office of Chief Executive in accordance with democratic procedures. Each candidate must have the endorsement of more than half of all the members of the nominating committee.

(3) All eligible electors of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region have the right to vote in the election of the Chief Executive and elect one of the candidates for the office of Chief Executive in accordance with law.

(4) The Chief Executive-elect, after being selected through universal suffrage, will have to be appointed by the Central People’s Government.

III. The specific method of universal suffrage for selecting the Chief Executive shall be prescribed in accordance with legal procedures through amending Annex I to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China: The Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The bill on the amendments and the proposed amendments to such bill shall be introduced by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the Hong Kong Basic Law and the provisions of this Decision. Such amendments shall obtain the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Legislative Council and the consent of the Chief Executive before being submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for approval.

IV. If the specific method of universal suffrage for selecting the Chief Executive is not adopted in accordance with legal procedures, the method used for selecting the Chief Executive for the preceding term shall continue to apply.

V. The existing formation method and voting procedures for the Legislative Council as prescribed in Annex II to the Hong Kong Basic Law will not be amended. The formation method and procedures for voting on bills and motions of the fifth term Legislative Council will continue to apply to the sixth term Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2016. After the election of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage, the election of all the members of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage. At an appropriate time prior to the election of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage, the Chief Executive elected by universal suffrage shall submit a report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Hong Kong Basic Law and the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China as regards the issue of amending the method for forming the Legislative Council. A determination thereon shall be made by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.

The Session stresses that it is the consistent position of the central authorities to implement resolutely and firmly the principles of “one country, two systems”, “Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong” and a high degree of autonomy, strictly adhere to the Hong Kong Basic Law and steadily take forward the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage in 2017. It is hoped that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government and all sectors of the Hong Kong community will act in accordance with the provisions of the Hong Kong Basic Law and this Decision and jointly work towards the attainment of the aim of selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage.

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全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於香港特別行政區行政長官普選問題和 2016 年立法會產生辦法的決定

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【文件 A212】

（2014 年 8 月 31 日第十二屆全國人民代表大會常務委員會第十次會議通過）

編輯附註：
本文件並無根據《法例發布條例》(第 614 章)編配章號。然而本文件在「電子版香港法例」(http://www.elegislation.gov.hk) 中獲編配以一個非正式的參考編號以作識別，並讓用戶可藉該非正式的參考編號進行搜尋。

第十二屆全國人民代表大會常務委員會第十次會議審議了香港特別行政區行政長官梁振英 2014 年 7 月 15 日提交的《關於香港特別行政區 2017 年行政長官及 2016 年立法會產生辦法是否需要修改的報告》，並在審議中充分考慮了香港社會的有關意見和建議。

會議指出，2007 年 12 月 29 日第十屆全國人民代表大會常務委員會第三十一次會議通過的《全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於香港特別行政區 2012 年行政長官和立法會產生辦法及有關普選問題的決定》規定，2017 年香港特別行政區第五任行政長官的選舉可以實行由普選產生的辦法；在行政長官實行普選前的適當時候，行政長官須按照香港基本法的有關規定和《全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於〈中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法〉附件一第七條和附件二第三條的解釋》，就行政長官產生辦法的修改問題向全國人民代表大會常務委員會提出報告，由全國人民代表大會常務委員會確定。2013 年 12 月 4 日至 2014 年 5 月 3 日，香港特別行政區政府就 2017 年行政長官產生辦法和 2016 年立法會產生辦法進行了廣泛、深入的公眾諮詢。諮詢過程中，香港社會普遍希望 2017 年實現行政長官由普選產生，並就行政長官普選辦法必須符合香港基本法和全國人大常委會有關決定、行政長官必須由愛國愛港人士擔任等重要原則形成了廣泛共識。對於 2017 年行政長官普選辦法和 2016 年立法會產生辦法，香港社會提出了各種意見和建議。在此基礎上，香港特別行政區行政長官就 2017 年行政長官和 2016 年立法會產生辦法修改問題向全國人大常委會提出報告。會議認為，行政長官的報告符合香港基本法、全國人大常委會關於香港基本法附件一第七條和附件二第三條的解釋以及全國人大常委會有關決定的要求，全面、客觀地反映了公眾諮詢的情況，是一個積極、負責、務實的報告。

會議認為，實行行政長官普選，是香港民主發展的歷史性進步，也是香港特別行政區政治體制的重大變革，關係到香港長期繁榮穩定，關係到國家主權、安全和發展利益，必須審慎、穩步推進。香港特別行政區行政長官普選源於香港基本法第四十五條第二款的規定，即“行政長官的產生辦法根據香港特別行政區的實際情況和循序漸進的原則而規定，最終達至由一個有廣泛代表性的提名委員會按民主程序提名後普選產生的目標。”制定行政長官普選辦法，必須嚴格遵循香港基本法有關規定，符合“一國兩制”的原則，符合香港特別行政區的法律地位，兼顧社會各階層的利益，體現均衡參與，有利於資本主義經濟發展，循序漸進地發展適合香港實際情況的民主制度。鑒於香港社會對如何落實香港基本法有關行政長官普選的規定存在較大爭議，全國人大常委會對正確實施香港基本法和決定行政長官產生辦法負有憲制責任，有必要就行政長官普選辦法的一些核心問題作出規定，以促進香港社會凝聚共識，依法順利實現行政長官普選。

會議認為，按照香港基本法的規定，香港特別行政區行政長官既要對香港特別行政區負責，也要對中央人民政府負責，必須堅持行政長官由愛國愛港人士擔任的原則。這是“一國兩制”方針政策的基本要求，是行政長官的法律地位和重要職責所決定的，是保持香港長期繁榮穩定，維護國家主權、安全和發展利益的客觀需要。行政長官普選辦法必須為此提供相應的制度保障。

會議認為，2012 年香港特別行政區第五屆立法會產生辦法經過修改後，已經向擴大民主的方向邁出了重大步伐。香港基本法附件二規定的現行立法會產生辦法和表決程序不作修改，2016 年第六屆立法會產生辦法和表決程序繼續適用現行規定，符合循序漸進地發展適合香港實際情況的民主制度的原則，符合香港社會的多數意見，也有利於香港社會各界集中精力優先處理行政長官普選問題，從而為行政長官實行普選後實現立法會全部議員由普選產生的目標創造條件。

鑒此，全國人民代表大會常務委員會根據《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法》、《全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於〈中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法〉附件一第七條和附件二第三條的解釋》和《全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於香港特別行政區 2012 年行政長官和立法會產生辦法及有關普選問題的決定》的有關規定，決定如下：

一、從 2017 年開始，香港特別行政區行政長官選舉可以實行由普選產生的辦法。

二、香港特別行政區行政長官選舉實行由普選產生的辦法時：

（一）須組成一個有廣泛代表性的提名委員會。提名委員會的人數、構成和委員產生辦法按照第四任行政長官選舉委員會的人數、構成和委員產生辦法而規定。

（二）提名委員會按民主程序提名產生二至三名行政長官候選人。每名候選人均須獲得提名委員會全體委員半數以上的支持。

（三）香港特別行政區合資格選民均有行政長官選舉權，依法從行政長官候選人中選出一名行政長官人選。

（四）行政長官人選經普選產生後，由中央人民政府任命。

三、行政長官普選的具體辦法依照法定程序通過修改《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法》附件一《香港特別行政區行政長官的產生辦法》予以規定。修改法案及其修正案應由香港特別行政區政府根據香港基本法和本決定的規定，向香港特別行政區立法會提出，經立法會全體議員三分之二多數通過，行政長官同意，報全國人民代表大會常務委員會批准。

四、如行政長官普選的具體辦法未能經法定程序獲得通過，行政長官的選舉繼續適用上一任行政長官的產生辦法。

五、香港基本法附件二關於立法會產生辦法和表決程序的現行規定不作修改，2016 年香港特別行政區第六屆立法會產生辦法和表決程序，繼續適用第五屆立法會產生辦法和法案、議案表決程序。在行政長官由普選產生以後，香港特別行政區立法會的選舉可以實行全部議員由普選產生的辦法。在立法會實行普選前的適當時候，由普選產生的行政長官按照香港基本法的有關規定和《全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於〈中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法〉附件一第七條和附件二第三條的解釋》，就立法會產生辦法的修改問題向全國人民代表大會常務委員會提出報告，由全國人民代表大會常務委員會確定。

會議強調，堅定不移地貫徹落實“一國兩制”、“港人治港”、高度自治方針政策，嚴格按照香港基本法辦事，穩步推進 2017 年行政長官由普選產生，是中央的一貫立場。希望香港特別行政區政府和香港社會各界依照香港基本法和本決定的規定，共同努力，達至行政長官由普選產生的目標。

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🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The full text of the NPCSC's decision can also be found on the website "Hong Kong e-Legislation", please click here.

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Hong Kong National Security Law

Name in Chinese Zhonghua renmin gongheguo Xianggang tebie xingzhengqu weihu guojia anquanfa (Gang qu guo'anfa) 中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法（《港區國安法》）
Document type PRC law
Year, date 2020, June 30 (promulgated)
Jump to Chinese version  Jump to Editor's note  [Next document]  [Previous document] 

(Jump to UK-PRC Declaration on Hong Kong—1984)

THE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON SAFEGUARDING NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

Chapter I: General Principles

Article 1 This Law is enacted, in accordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, and the Decision of the National People's Congress on Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement Mechanisms for Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, for the purpose of:
  • ensuring the resolute, full and faithful implementation of the policy of One Country, Two Systems under which the people of Hong Kong administer Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy;
  • safeguarding national security;
  • preventing, suppressing and imposing punishment for the offences of secession, subversion, organisation and perpetration of terrorist activities, and collusion with a foreign country or with external elements to endanger national security in relation to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
  • maintaining prosperity and stability of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; and
  • protecting the lawful rights and interests of the residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Article 2 The provisions in Articles 1 and 12 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on the legal status of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region are the fundamental provisions in the Basic Law. No institution, organisation or individual in the Region shall contravene these provisions in exercising their rights and freedoms.
Article 3 The Central People's Government has an overarching responsibility for national security affairs relating to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
It is the duty of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under the Constitution to safeguard national security and the Region shall perform the duty accordingly.
The executive authorities, legislature and judiciary of the Region shall effectively prevent, suppress and impose punishment for any act or activity endangering national security in accordance with this Law and other relevant laws.
Article 4 Human rights shall be respected and protected in safeguarding national security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The rights and freedoms, including the freedoms of speech, of the press, of publication, of association, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration, which the residents of the Region enjoy under the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applied to Hong Kong, shall be protected in accordance with the law.
Article 5 The principle of the rule of law shall be adhered to in preventing, suppressing, and imposing punishment for offences endangering national security. A person who commits an act which constitutes an offence under the law shall be convicted and punished in accordance with the law. No one shall be convicted and punished for an act which does not constitute an offence under the law.
A person is presumed innocent until convicted by a judicial body. The right to defend himself or herself and other rights in judicial proceedings that a criminal suspect, defendant, and other parties in judicial proceedings are entitled to under the law shall be protected. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he or she has already been finally convicted or acquitted in judicial proceedings.
Article 6 It is the common responsibility of all the people of China, including the people of Hong Kong, to safeguard the sovereignty, unification and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of China.
Any institution, organisation or individual in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall abide by this Law and the laws of the Region in relation to the safeguarding of national security, and shall not engage in any act or activity which endangers national security.
A resident of the Region who stands for election or assumes public office shall confirm in writing or take an oath to uphold the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China and swear allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China in accordance with the law.

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Chapter II: The Duties and the Government Bodies of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for Safeguarding National Security

Part 1: Duties

Article 7 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall complete, as early as possible, legislation for safeguarding national security as stipulated in the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and shall refine relevant laws.
Article 8 In order to safeguard national security effectively, the law enforcement and judicial authorities of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall fully enforce this Law and the laws in force in the Region concerning the prevention of, suppression of, and imposition of punishment for acts and activities endangering national security.
Article 9 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall strengthen its work on safeguarding national security and prevention of terrorist activities. The government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall take necessary measures to strengthen public communication, guidance, supervision and regulation over matters concerning national security, including those relating to schools, universities, social organisations, the media, and the internet.
Article 10 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall promote national security education in schools and universities and through social organisations, the media, the internet and other means to raise the awareness of Hong Kong residents of national security and of the obligation to abide by the law.
Article 11 The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be accountable to the Central People's Government for affairs relating to safeguarding national security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and shall submit an annual report on the performance of duties of the Region in safeguarding national security.
The Chief Executive shall, at the request of the Central People's Government, submit in a timely manner a report on specific matters relating to safeguarding national security.

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Part 2: Government Bodies

Article 12 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall establish the Committee for Safeguarding National Security. The Committee shall be responsible for affairs relating to and assume primary responsibility for safeguarding national security in the Region. It shall be under the supervision of and accountable to the Central People's Government.
Article 13 The Chief Executive shall be the chairperson of the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The other members of the Committee shall be the Chief Secretary for Administration, the Financial Secretary, the Secretary for Justice, the Secretary for Security, the Commissioner of Police, the head of the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force established under Article 16 of this Law, the Director of Immigration, the Commissioner of Customs and Excise, and the Director of the Chief Executive's Office.
A secretariat headed by a Secretary-General shall be established under the Committee. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the Central People's Government upon nomination by the Chief Executive.
Article 14 The duties and functions of the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be:
(1) analysing and assessing developments in relation to safeguarding national security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, making work plans, and formulating policies for safeguarding national security in the Region;
(2) advancing the development of the legal system and enforcement mechanisms of the Region for safeguarding national security; and
(3) coordinating major work and significant operations for safeguarding national security in the Region.
No institution, organisation or individual in the Region shall interfere with the work of the Committee. Information relating to the work of the Committee shall not be subject to disclosure. Decisions made by the Committee shall not be amenable to judicial review.
Article 15 The Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have a National Security Adviser, who shall be designated by the Central People's Government and provide advice on matters relating to the duties and functions of the Committee. The National Security Adviser shall sit in on meetings of the Committee.
Article 16 The Police Force of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall establish a department for safeguarding national security with law enforcement capacity.
The head of the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force shall be appointed by the Chief Executive. The Chief Executive shall seek in writing the opinion of the Office established under Article 48 of this Law before making the appointment. When assuming office, the head of the Department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force shall swear to uphold the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, swear allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, and swear to abide by the law and to observe the obligation of secrecy.
The department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force may recruit qualified professionals and technical personnel from outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to provide assistance in the performance of duties for safeguarding national security.
Article 17 The duties and functions of the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force shall be:
(1) collecting and analysing intelligence and information concerning national security;
(2) planning, coordinating and enforcing measures and operations for safeguarding national security;
(3) investigating offences endangering national security;
(4) conducting counter-interference investigation and national security review;
(5) carrying out tasks of safeguarding national security assigned by the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; and
(6) performing other duties and functions necessary for the enforcement of this Law.
Article 18 The Department of Justice of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall establish a specialised prosecution division responsible for the prosecution of offences endangering national security and other related legal work. The prosecutors of this division shall be appointed by the Secretary for Justice after obtaining the consent of the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
The head of the specialised prosecution division of the Department of Justice shall be appointed by the Chief Executive, who shall seek in writing the opinion of the Office established under Article 48 of this Law before making the appointment. When assuming office, the head of the specialised prosecution division shall swear to uphold the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, swear allegiance to the Hong Kong Special administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, and swear to abide by the law and to observe the obligation of secrecy.
Article 19 The Financial Secretary of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, upon approval of the Chief Executive, appropriate from the general revenue a special fund to meet the expenditure for safeguarding national security and approve the establishment of relevant posts, which are not subject to any restrictions in the relevant provisions of the laws in force in the Region. The Financial Secretary shall submit an annual report on the control and management of the fund for this purpose to the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

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Chapter III: Offences and Penalties

Part 1: Secession

Article 20 A person who organises, plans, commits or participates in any of the following acts, whether or not by force or threat of force, with a view to committing secession or undermining national unification shall be guilty of an offence:
(1) separating the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or any other part of the People's Republic of China from the People's Republic of China;
(2) altering by unlawful means the legal status of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or of any other part of the People's Republic of China; or
(3) surrendering the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or any other part of the People's Republic of China to a foreign country.
A person who is a principal offender or a person who commits an offence of a grave nature shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years; a person who actively participates in the offence shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years; and other participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, short-term detention or restriction.
Article 21 A person who incites, assists in, abets or provides pecuniary or other financial assistance or property for the commission by other persons of the offence under Article 20 of this Law shall be guilty of an offence. If the circumstances of the offence committed by a person are of a serious nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than ten years; if the circumstances of the offence committed by a person are of a minor nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, short-term detention or restriction.

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Part 2: Subversion

Article 22 A person who organises, plans, commits or participates in any of the following acts by force or threat of force or other unlawful means with a view to subverting the State power shall be guilty of an offence:
(1) overthrowing or undermining the basic system of the People's Republic of China established by the Constitution of the People's Republic of China;
(2) overthrowing the body of central power of the People's Republic of China or the body of power of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
(3) seriously interfering in, disrupting, or undermining the performance of duties and functions in accordance with the law by the body of central power of the People's Republic of China or the body of power of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; or
(4) attacking or damaging the premises and facilities used by the body of power of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to perform its duties and functions, rendering it incapable of performing its normal duties and functions.
A person who is a principal offender or a person who commits an offence of a grave nature shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years; a person who actively participates in the offence shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years; and other participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, short-term detention or restriction.
Article 23 A person who incites, assists in, abets or provides pecuniary or other financial assistance or property for the commission by other persons of the offence under Article 22 of this Law shall be guilty of an offence. If the circumstances of the offence committed by a person are of a serious nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than ten years; if the circumstances of the offence committed by a person are of a minor nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, short-term detention or restriction.

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Part 3: Terrorist Activities

Article 24 A person who organises, plans, commits, participates in or threatens to commit any of the following terrorist activities causing or intended to cause grave harm to the society with a view to coercing the Central People's Government, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or an international organisation or intimidating the public in order to pursue political agenda shall be guilty of an offence:
(1) serious violence against a person or persons;
(2) explosion, arson, or dissemination of poisonous or radioactive substances, pathogens of infectious diseases or other substances;
(3) sabotage of means of transport, transport facilities, electric power or gas facilities, or other combustible or explosible facilities;
(4) serious interruption or sabotage of electronic control systems for providing and managing public services such as water, electric power, gas, transport, telecommunications and the internet; or
(5) other dangerous activities which seriously jeopardise public health, safety or security.
A person who commits the offence causing serious bodily injury, death or significant loss of public or private property shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years; in other circumstances, a person who commits the offence shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years.
Article 25 A person who organises or takes charge of a terrorist organisation shall be guilty of an offence and shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years, and shall be subject to confiscation of property; a person who actively participates in a terrorist organisation shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years and shall be imposed with a criminal fine; and other participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, short-term detention or restriction, and shall be liable to a criminal fine.
For the purpose of this Law, a terrorist organisation means an organisation which commits or intends to commit the offence under Article 24 of this Law or participates or assists in the commission of the offence.
Article 26 A person who provides support, assistance or facility such as training, weapons, information, funds, supplies, labour, transport, technologies or venues to a terrorist organisation or a terrorist, or for the commission of a terrorist activity; or manufactures or illegally possesses substances such as explosive, poisonous or radioactive substances and pathogens of infectious diseases or uses other means to prepare for the commission of a terrorist activity, shall be guilty of an offence. If the circumstances of the offence committed by a person are of a serious nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than ten years, and shall be imposed with a criminal fine or subject to confiscation of property; in other circumstances, a person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, short-term detention or restriction, and shall be imposed with a criminal fine.
If the act referred to in the preceding paragraph also constitutes other offences, the person who commits the act shall be convicted and sentenced for the offence that carries a more severe penalty.
Article 27 A person who advocates terrorism or incites the commission of a terrorist activity shall be guilty of an offence. If the circumstances of the offence committed by a person are of a serious nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than ten years, and shall be imposed with a criminal fine or subject to confiscation of property; in other circumstances, a person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, short-term detention or restriction, and shall be imposed with a criminal fine.
Article 28 The provisions of this Part shall not affect the prosecution of terrorist offences committed in other forms or the imposition of other measures such as freezing of property in accordance with the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

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Part 4: Collusion with a Foreign Country or with External Elements to Endanger National Security

Article 29 A person who steals, spies, obtains with payment, or unlawfully provides State secrets or intelligence concerning national security for a foreign country or an institution, organisation or individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People's Republic of China shall be guilty of an offence; a person who requests a foreign country or an institution, organisation or individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People's Republic of China, or conspires with a foreign country or an institution, organisation or individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People's Republic of China, or directly or indirectly receives instructions, control, funding or other kinds of support from a foreign country or an institution, organisation or individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People's Republic of China, to commit any of the following acts shall be guilty of an offence:
(1) waging a war against the People's Republic of China, or using or threatening to use force to seriously undermine the sovereignty, unification and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of China;
(2) seriously disrupting the formulation and implementation of laws or policies by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or by the Central People's Government, which is likely to cause serious consequences;
(3) rigging or undermining an election in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which is likely to cause serious consequences;
(4) imposing sanctions or blockade, or engaging in other hostile activities against the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or the People's Republic of China; or
(5) provoking by unlawful means hatred among Hong Kong residents towards the Central People's Government or the Government of the Region, which is likely to cause serious consequences.
A person who commits the offence shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years; a person who commits an offence of a grave nature shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years.
The institution, organisation and individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People's Republic of China referred to in the first paragraph of this Article shall be convicted and punished for the same offence.
Article 30 A person who conspires with or directly or indirectly receives instructions, control, funding or other kinds of support from a foreign country or an institution, organisation, or individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People's Republic of China to commit the offences under Article 20 or 22 of this Law shall be liable to a more severe penalty in accordance with the provisions therein respectively.

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Part 5: Other Provisions on Penalty

Article 31 An incorporated or unincorporated body such as a company or an organisation which commits an offence under this Law shall be imposed with a criminal fine.
The operation of an incorporated or unincorporated body such as a company or an organisation shall be suspended or its licence or business permit shall be revoked if the body has been punished for committing an offence under this Law.
Article 32 Proceeds obtained from the commission of an offence under this Law including financial aid, gains and rewards, and funds and tools used or intended to be used in the commission of the offence shall be seized and confiscated.
Article 33 A lighter penalty may be imposed, or the penalty may be reduced or, in the case of a minor offence, exempted, if an offender, criminal suspect, or defendant:
(1) in the process of committing an offence, voluntarily discontinues the commission of the offence or voluntarily and effectively forestalls its consequences;
(2) voluntarily surrenders himself or herself and gives a truthful account of the offence; or
(3) reports on the offence committed by other person, which is verified to be true, or provides material information which assists in solving other criminal case.
Sub-paragraph (2) of the preceding paragraph shall apply to a criminal suspect or defendant who is subjected to mandatory measures and provides a truthful account of other offences committed by him or her under this Law which are unknown to the law enforcement or judicial authorities.
Article 34 A person who is not a permanent resident of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may be subject to deportation as the sole or an additional punishment if he or she commits an offence under this Law.
A person who is not a permanent resident of the Region may be subject to deportation if he or she contravenes the provisions of this Law but is not prosecuted for any reason.
Article 35 A person who is convicted of an offence endangering national security by a court shall be disqualified from standing as a candidate in the elections of the Legislative Council and district councils of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, holding any public office in the Region, or serving as a member of the Election Committee for electing the Chief Executive. If a person so convicted is a member of the Legislative Council, a government official, a public servant, a member of the Executive Council, a judge or a judicial officer, or a member of the district councils, who has taken an oath or made a declaration to uphold the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China and swear allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, he or she shall be removed from his or her office upon conviction, and shall be disqualified from standing for the aforementioned elections or from holding any of the aforementioned posts.
The disqualification and removal from offices referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be announced by the authorities responsible for organising and managing the relevant elections or for the appointment and removal of holders of public office.

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Part 6: Scope of Application

Article 36 This Law shall apply to offences under this Law which are committed in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by any person. An offence shall be deemed to have been committed in the Region if an act constituting the offence or the consequence of the offence occurs in the Region.
This Law shall also apply to offences under this Law committed on board a vessel or aircraft registered in the Region.
Article 37 This Law shall apply to a person who is a permanent resident of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or an incorporated or unincorporated body such as a company or an organisation which is set up in the Region if the person or the body commits an offence under this Law outside the Region.
Article 38 This Law shall apply to offences under this Law committed against the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region from outside the Region by a person who is not a permanent resident of the Region.
Article 39 This Law shall apply to acts committed after its entry into force for the purpose of conviction and imposition of punishment.

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Chapter IV: Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Procedure

Article 40 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have jurisdiction over cases concerning offences under this Law, except under the circumstances specified in Article 55 of this Law.
Article 41 This Law and the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall apply to procedural matters, including those related to criminal investigation, prosecution, trial, and execution of penalty, in respect of cases concerning offence endangering national security over which the Region exercises jurisdiction.
No prosecution shall be instituted in respect of an offence endangering national security without the written consent of the Secretary for Justice. This provision shall not prejudice the arrest and detention of a person who is suspected of having committed the offence or the application for bail by the person in accordance with the law.
Cases concerning offence endangering national security within the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be tried on indictment.
The trial shall be conducted in an open court. When circumstances arise such as the trial involving State secrets or public order, all or part of the trial shall be closed to the media and the public but the judgment shall be delivered in an open court.
Article 42 When applying the laws in force in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region concerning matters such as the detention and time limit for trial, the law enforcement and judicial authorities of the Region shall ensure that cases concerning offence endangering national security are handled in a fair and timely manner so as to effectively prevent, suppress and impose punishment for such offence.
No bail shall be granted to a criminal suspect or defendant unless the judge has sufficient grounds for believing that the criminal suspect or defendant will not continue to commit acts endangering national security.
Article 43 When handling cases concerning offence endangering national security, the department for safeguarding national security of the Police Force of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may take measures that law enforcement authorities, including the Hong Kong Police Force, are allowed to apply under the laws in force in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in investigating serious crimes, and may also take the following measures:
(1) search of premises, vehicles, vessels, aircraft and other relevant places and electronic devices that may contain evidence of an offence;
(2) ordering any person suspected of having committed an offence endangering national security to surrender travel documents, or prohibiting the person concerned from leaving the Region;
(3) freezing of, applying for restraint order, charging order and confiscation order in respect of, and forfeiture of property used or intended to be used for the commission of the offence, proceeds of crime, or other property relating to the commission of the offence;
(4) requiring a person who published information or the relevant service provider to delete the information or provide assistance;
(5) requiring a political organisation of a foreign country or outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People's Republic of China, or an agent of authorities or a political organisation of a foreign country or outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People's Republic of China, to provide information;
(6) upon approval of the Chief Executive, carrying out interception of communications and conducting covert surveillance on a person who is suspected, on reasonable grounds, of having involved in the commission of an offence endangering national security; and
(7) requiring a person, who is suspected, on reasonable grounds, of having in possession information or material relevant to investigation, to answer questions and furnish such information or produce such material.
The Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be responsible for supervising the implementation of the measures stipulated in the first paragraph of this Article by law enforcement authorities including the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force.
The Chief Executive shall be authorised, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, to make relevant implementation rules for the purpose of applying the measures under the first paragraph of this Article.
Article 44 The Chief Executive shall designate a number of judges from the magistrates, the judges of the District Court, the judges of the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal of the High Court, and the judges of the Court of Final Appeal, and may also designate a number of judges from deputy judges or recorders, to handle cases concerning offence endangering national security. Before making such designation, the Chief Executive may consult the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal. The term of office of the aforementioned designated judges shall be one year.
A person shall not be designated as a judge to adjudicate a case concerning offence endangering national security if he or she has made any statement or behaved in any manner endangering national security. A designated judge shall be removed from the designation list if he or she makes any statement or behaves in any manner endangering national security during the term of office.
The proceedings in relation to the prosecution for offences endangering national security in the magistrates' courts, the District Court, the High Court and the Court of Final Appeal shall be handled by the designated judges in the respective courts.
Article 45 Unless otherwise provided by this Law, magistrates' courts, the District Court, the High Court and the Court of Final Appeal shall handle proceedings in relation to the prosecution for offences endangering national security in accordance with the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Article 46 In criminal proceedings in the Court of First Instance of the High Court concerning offences endangering national security, the Secretary for Justice may issue a certificate directing that the case shall be tried without a jury on the grounds of, among others, the protection of State secrets, involvement of foreign factors in the case, and the protection of personal safety of jurors and their family members. Where the Secretary for Justice has issued the certificate, the case shall be tried in the Court of First Instance without a jury by a panel of three judges.
Where the Secretary for Justice has issued the certificate, the reference to "a jury" or "a verdict of the jury" in any provision of the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region applicable to the related proceedings shall be construed as referring to the judges or the functions of the judge as a judge of fact.
Article 47 The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall obtain a certificate from the Chief Executive to certify whether an act involves national security or whether the relevant evidence involves State secrets when such questions arise in the adjudication of a case. The certificate shall be binding on the courts.

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Chapter V: Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

Article 48 The Central People's Government shall establish in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region an office for safeguarding national security. The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall perform its mandate for safeguarding national security and exercise relevant powers in accordance with the law.
The staff of the Office shall be jointly dispatched by relevant national security authorities under the Central People's Government.
Article 49 The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall perform the following mandate:
(1) analysing and assessing developments in relation to safeguarding national security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and providing opinions and making proposals on major strategies and important policies for safeguarding national security;
(2) overseeing, guiding, coordinating with, and providing support to the Region in the performance of its duties for safeguarding national security;
(3) collecting and analysing intelligence and information concerning national security; and
(4) handling cases concerning offence endangering national security in accordance with the law.
Article 50 The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall perform its mandate in strict compliance with the law and be subject to supervision in accordance with the law. It shall not infringe upon the lawful rights and interests of any individual or organisation.
The staff of the Office shall abide by the laws of the Hong Kong Special administrative Region as well as national laws.
The staff of the Office shall be subject to the supervision of the national supervisory authorities in accordance with the law.
Article 51 The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be funded by the Central People's Government.
Article 52 The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall strengthen working relations and cooperation with the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the Hong Kong Garrison of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.
Article 53 The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall establish a mechanism of coordination with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to oversee and provide guidance on the work of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for safeguarding national security.
The working departments of the Office shall establish mechanisms for collaboration with the relevant authorities of the Region responsible for Safeguarding national security to enhance information sharing and operations coordination.
Article 54 The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Hong Kong Special administrative Region shall, together with the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, take necessary measures to strengthen the management of and services for organs of foreign countries and international organisations in the Region, as well as non-governmental organisations and news agencies of foreign countries and from outside the mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao of the People's Republic of China in the Region.
Article 55 The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, upon approval by the Central People's Government of a request made by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or by the Office itself, exercise jurisdiction over a case concerning offence endangering national security under this Law, if:
(1) the case is complex due to the involvement of a foreign country or external elements, thus making it difficult for the Region to exercise jurisdiction over the case;
(2) a serious situation occurs where the Government of the Region is unable to effectively enforce this Law; or
(3) a major and imminent threat to national security has occurred.
Article 56 In exercising jurisdiction over a case concerning offence endangering national security pursuant to Article 55 of this Law, the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall initiate investigation into the case, the Supreme People's Procuratorate shall designate a prosecuting body to prosecute it, and the Supreme People's Court shall designate a court to adjudicate it.
Article 57 The Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China and other related national laws shall apply to procedural matters, including those related to criminal investigation, examination and prosecution, trial, and execution of penalty, in respect of cases over which jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to Article 55 of this Law.
When exercising jurisdiction over cases pursuant to Article 55 of this Law, the law enforcement and judicial authorities referred to in Article 56 of this Law shall exercise powers in accordance with the law. The legal documents issued by these authorities on their decisions to take mandatory and investigation measures and on their judicial decisions shall have legal force in the Hong Kong Special administrative Region. The institutions, organisations and individuals concerned must comply with measures taken by the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the law.
Article 58 In a case over which jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to Article 55 of this Law, a criminal suspect shall have the right to retain a lawyer to represent him or her from the day he or she first receives inquiry made by the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special administrative Region or from the day a mandatory measure is taken against him or her. A defence lawyer may provide legal assistance to a criminal suspect or defendant in accordance with the law.
A criminal suspect or defendant who is arrested in accordance with the law shall be entitled to a fair trial before a judicial body without undue delay.
Article 59 In a case over which jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to Article 55 of this Law, any person who has information pertaining to an offence endangering national security under this Law is obliged to testify truthfully.
Article 60 The acts performed in the course of duty by the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and its staff in accordance with this Law shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
In the course of performing duty, a holder of an identification document or a document of certification issued by the Office and the articles including vehicles used by the holder shall not be subject to inspection, search or detention by law enforcement officers of the Region.
The Office and its staff shall enjoy other rights and immunities provided by laws of the Region.
Article 61 The relevant departments of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall provide necessary facilitation and support to the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in performing its mandate in accordance with this Law, and shall stop any act obstructing the performance of such mandate and hold those who commit such act liable in accordance with the law.

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Chapter VI: Supplementary Provisions

Article 62 This Law shall prevail where provisions of the local laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region are inconsistent with this Law.
Article 63 The law enforcement and judicial authorities and their staff who handle cases concerning offence endangering national security under this Law, or the law enforcement and judicial authorities of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and their staff who handle other cases concerning offence endangering national security, shall keep confidential State secrets, trade secrets or personal information which they come to know in the process of handling such cases.
A lawyer who serves as defence counsel or legal representative shall keep confidential State secrets, trade secrets or personal information which he or she comes to know in the practice of law.
The relevant institutions, organisations and individuals who assist with the handling of a case shall keep confidential any information pertaining to the case.
Article 64 In the application of this Law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the terms "fixed-term imprisonment", "life imprisonment", "confiscation of property" and "criminal fine" in this Law respectively mean "imprisonment", "imprisonment for life", "confiscation of proceeds of crime" and "fine"; "short-term detention" shall be construed, with reference to the relevant laws of the Region, as "imprisonment", "detention in a detention centre" or "detention in a training centre"; "restriction" shall be construed, with reference to the relevant laws of the Region, as "community service" or "detention in a reformatory school"; and "revoke licence or business permit" means "revoke registration or exemption from registration, or revoke licence" as provided for in the relevant laws of the Region.
Article 65 The power of interpretation of this Law shall be vested in the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.
Article 66 This Law shall come into force on the date of its promulgation.

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中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法（《港區國安法》）

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

【第一章　總則】

第一條 為堅定不移並全面準確貫徹「一國兩制」、「港人治港」、高度自治的方針，維護國家安全，防範、制止和懲治與香港特別行政區有關的分裂國家、顛覆國家政權、組織實施恐怖活動和勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全等犯罪，保持香港特別行政區的繁榮和穩定，保障香港特別行政區居民的合法權益，根據中華人民共和國憲法、中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法和全國人民代表大會關於建立健全香港特別行政區維護國家安全的法律制度和執行機制的決定，制定本法。
第二條 關於香港特別行政區法律地位的香港特別行政區基本法第一條和第十二條規定是香港特別行政區基本法的根本性條款。香港特別行政區任何機構、組織和個人行使權利和自由，不得違背香港特別行政區基本法第一條和第十二條的規定。
第三條 中央人民政府對香港特別行政區有關的國家安全事務負有根本責任。
香港特別行政區負有維護國家安全的憲制責任，應當履行維護國家安全的職責。
香港特別行政區行政機關、立法機關、司法機關應當依據本法和其他有關法律規定有效防範、制止和懲治危害國家安全的行為和活動。
第四條 香港特別行政區維護國家安全應當尊重和保障人權，依法保護香港特別行政區居民根據香港特別行政區基本法和《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》、《經濟、社會與文化權利的國際公約》適用於香港的有關規定享有的包括言論、新聞、出版的自由，結社、集會、遊行、示威的自由在內的權利和自由。
第五條 防範、制止和懲治危害國家安全犯罪，應當堅持法治原則。法律規定為犯罪行為的，依照法律定罪處刑；法律沒有規定為犯罪行為的，不得定罪處刑。
任何人未經司法機關判罪之前均假定無罪。保障犯罪嫌疑人、被告人和其他訴訟參與人依法享有的辯護權和其他訴訟權利。任何人已經司法程序被最終確定有罪或者宣告無罪的，不得就同一行為再予審判或者懲罰。
第六條 維護國家主權、統一和領土完整是包括香港同胞在內的全中國人民的共同義務。
在香港特別行政區的任何機構、組織和個人都應當遵守本法和香港特別行政區有關維護國家安全的其他法律，不得從事危害國家安全的行為和活動。
香港特別行政區居民在參選或者就任公職時應當依法簽署文件確認或者宣誓擁護中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法，效忠中華人民共和國香港特別行政區。

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【第二章　香港特別行政區維護國家安全的職責和機構】

● 第一節　職責

第七條 香港特別行政區應當盡早完成香港特別行政區基本法規定的維護國家安全立法，完善相關法律。
第八條 香港特別行政區執法、司法機關應當切實執行本法和香港特別行政區現行法律有關防範、制止和懲治危害國家安全行為和活動的規定，有效維護國家安全。
第九條 香港特別行政區應當加強維護國家安全和防範恐怖活動的工作。對學校、社會團體、媒體、網絡等涉及國家安全的事宜，香港特別行政區政府應當採取必要措施，加強宣傳、指導、監督和管理。
第十條 香港特別行政區應當通過學校、社會團體、媒體、網絡等開展國家安全教育，提高香港特別行政區居民的國家安全意識和守法意識。
第十一條 香港特別行政區行政長官應當就香港特別行政區維護國家安全事務向中央人民政府負責，並就香港特別行政區履行維護國家安全職責的情況提交年度報告。
如中央人民政府提出要求，行政長官應當就維護國家安全特定事項及時提交報告。

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● 第二節　機構

第十二條 香港特別行政區設立維護國家安全委員會，負責香港特別行政區維護國家安全事務，承擔維護國家安全的主要責任，並接受中央人民政府的監督和問責。
第十三條 香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會由行政長官擔任主席，成員包括政務司長、財政司長、律政司長、保安局長、警務處長、本法第十六條規定的警務處維護國家安全部門的負責人、入境事務處長、海關關長和行政長官辦公室主任。
香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會下設秘書處，由秘書長領導。秘書長由行政長官提名，報中央人民政府任命。
第十四條 香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會的職責為：
（一）分析研判香港特別行政區維護國家安全形勢，規劃有關工作，制定香港特別行政區維護國家安全政策；
（二）推進香港特別行政區維護國家安全的法律制度和執行機制建設；
（三）協調香港特別行政區維護國家安全的重點工作和重大行動。
香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會的工作不受香港特別行政區任何其他機構、組織和個人的干涉，工作信息不予公開。香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會作出的決定不受司法覆核。
第十五條 香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會設立國家安全事務顧問，由中央人民政府指派，就香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會履行職責相關事務提供意見。國家安全事務顧問列席香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會會議。
第十六條 香港特別行政區政府警務處設立維護國家安全的部門，配備執法力量。
警務處維護國家安全部門負責人由行政長官任命，行政長官任命前須書面徵求本法第四十八條規定的機構的意見。警務處維護國家安全部門負責人在就職時應當宣誓擁護中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法，效忠中華人民共和國香港特別行政區，遵守法律，保守秘密。
警務處維護國家安全部門可以從香港特別行政區以外聘請合格的專門人員和技術人員，協助執行維護國家安全相關任務。
第十七條 警務處維護國家安全部門的職責為：
（一）收集分析涉及國家安全的情報信息；
（二）部署、協調、推進維護國家安全的措施和行動；
（三）調查危害國家安全犯罪案件；
（四）進行反干預調查和開展國家安全審查；
（五）承辦香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會交辦的維護國家安全工作；
（六）執行本法所需的其他職責。
第十八條 香港特別行政區律政司設立專門的國家安全犯罪案件檢控部門，負責危害國家安全犯罪案件的檢控工作和其他相關法律事務。該部門檢控官由律政司長徵得香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會同意後任命。
律政司國家安全犯罪案件檢控部門負責人由行政長官任命，行政長官任命前須書面徵求本法第四十八條規定的機構的意見。律政司國家安全犯罪案件檢控部門負責人在就職時應當宣誓擁護中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法，效忠中華人民共和國香港特別行政區，遵守法律，保守秘密。
第十九條 經行政長官批准，香港特別行政區政府財政司長應當從政府一般收入中撥出專門款項支付關於維護國家安全的開支並核准所涉及的人員編制，不受香港特別行政區現行有關法律規定的限制。財政司長須每年就該款項的控制和管理向立法會提交報告。

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【第三章 罪行和處罰】

● 第一節　分裂國家罪

第二十條 任何人組織、策劃、實施或者參與實施以下旨在分裂國家、破壞國家統一行為之一的，不論是否使用武力或者以武力相威脅，即屬犯罪：
（一）將香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國其他任何部分從中華人民共和國分離出去；
（二）非法改變香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國其他任何部分的法律地位；
（三）將香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國其他任何部分轉歸外國統治。
犯前款罪，對首要分子或者罪行重大的，處無期徒刑或者十年以上有期徒刑；對積極參加的，處三年以上十年以下有期徒刑；對其他參加的，處三年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制。
第二十一條 任何人煽動、協助、教唆、以金錢或者其他財物資助他人實施本法第二十條規定的犯罪的，即屬犯罪。情節嚴重的，處五年以上十年以下有期徒刑；情節較輕的，處五年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制。

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● 第二節　顛覆國家政權罪

第二十二條 任何人組織、策劃、實施或者參與實施以下以武力、威脅使用武力或者其他非法手段旨在顛覆國家政權行為之一的，即屬犯罪：
（一）推翻、破壞中華人民共和國憲法所確立的中華人民共和國根本制度；
（二）推翻中華人民共和國中央政權機關或者香港特別行政區政權機關；
（三）嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞中華人民共和國中央政權機關或者香港特別行政區政權機關依法履行職能；
（四）攻擊、破壞香港特別行政區政權機關履職場所及其設施，致使其無法正常履行職能。
犯前款罪，對首要分子或者罪行重大的，處無期徒刑或者十年以上有期徒刑；對積極參加的，處三年以上十年以下有期徒刑；對其他參加的，處三年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制。
第二十三條 任何人煽動、協助、教唆、以金錢或者其他財物資助他人實施本法第二十二條規定的犯罪的，即屬犯罪。情節嚴重的，處五年以上十年以下有期徒刑；情節較輕的，處五年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制。

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● 第三節　恐怖活動罪

第二十四條 為脅迫中央人民政府、香港特別行政區政府或者國際組織或者威嚇公眾以圖實現政治主張，組織、策劃、實施、參與實施或者威脅實施以下造成或者意圖造成嚴重社會危害的恐怖活動之一的，即屬犯罪：
（一）針對人的嚴重暴力；
（二）爆炸、縱火或者投放毒害性、放射性、傳染病病原體等物質；
（三）破壞交通工具、交通設施、電力設備、燃氣設備或者其他易燃易爆設備；
（四）嚴重干擾、破壞水、電、燃氣、交通、通訊、網絡等公共服務和管理的電子控制系統；
（五）以其他危險方法嚴重危害公眾健康或者安全。
犯前款罪，致人重傷、死亡或者使公私財產遭受重大損失的，處無期徒刑或者十年以上有期徒刑；其他情形，處三年以上十年以下有期徒刑。
第二十五條 組織、領導恐怖活動組織的，即屬犯罪，處無期徒刑或者十年以上有期徒刑，並處沒收財產；積極參加的，處三年以上十年以下有期徒刑，並處罰金；其他參加的，處三年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制，可以並處罰金。
本法所指的恐怖活動組織，是指實施或者意圖實施本法第二十四條規定的恐怖活動罪行或者參與或者協助實施本法第二十四條規定的恐怖活動罪行的組織。
第二十六條 為恐怖活動組織、恐怖活動人員、恐怖活動實施提供培訓、武器、信息、資金、物資、勞務、運輸、技術或者場所等支持、協助、便利，或者製造、非法管有爆炸性、毒害性、放射性、傳染病病原體等物質以及以其他形式準備實施恐怖活動的，即屬犯罪。情節嚴重的，處五年以上十年以下有期徒刑，並處罰金或者沒收財產；其他情形，處五年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制，並處罰金。
有前款行為，同時構成其他犯罪的，依照處罰較重的規定定罪處罰。
第二十七條 宣揚恐怖主義、煽動實施恐怖活動的，即屬犯罪。情節嚴重的，處五年以上十年以下有期徒刑，並處罰金或者沒收財產；其他情形，處五年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制，並處罰金。
第二十八條 本節規定不影響依據香港特別行政區法律對其他形式的恐怖活動犯罪追究刑事責任並採取凍結財產等措施。

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● 第四節　勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪

第二十九條 為外國或者境外機構、組織、人員竊取、刺探、收買、非法提供涉及國家安全的國家秘密或者情報的；請求外國或者境外機構、組織、人員實施，與外國或者境外機構、組織、人員串謀實施，或者直接或者間接接受外國或者境外機構、組織、人員的指使、控制、資助或者其他形式的支援實施以下行為之一的，均屬犯罪：
（一）對中華人民共和國發動戰爭，或者以武力或者武力相威脅，對中華人民共和國主權、統一和領土完整造成嚴重危害；
（二）對香港特別行政區政府或者中央人民政府制定和執行法律、政策進行嚴重阻撓並可能造成嚴重後果；
（三）對香港特別行政區選舉進行操控、破壞並可能造成嚴重後果；
（四）對香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動；
（五）通過各種非法方式引發香港特別行政區居民對中央人民政府或者香港特別行政區政府的憎恨並可能造成嚴重後果。
犯前款罪，處三年以上十年以下有期徒刑；罪行重大的，處無期徒刑或者十年以上有期徒刑。
本條第一款規定涉及的境外機構、組織、人員，按共同犯罪定罪處刑。
第三十條 為實施本法第二十條、第二十二條規定的犯罪，與外國或者境外機構、組織、人員串謀，或者直接或者間接接受外國或者境外機構、組織、人員的指使、控制、資助或者其他形式的支援的，依照本法第二十條、第二十二條的規定從重處罰。

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● 第五節　其他處罰規定

第三十一條 公司、團體等法人或者非法人組織實施本法規定的犯罪的，對該組織判處罰金。
公司、團體等法人或者非法人組織因犯本法規定的罪行受到刑事處罰的，應責令其暫停運作或者吊銷其執照或者營業許可證。
第三十二條 因實施本法規定的犯罪而獲得的資助、收益、報酬等違法所得以及用於或者意圖用於犯罪的資金和工具，應當予以追繳、沒收。
第三十三條 有以下情形的，對有關犯罪行為人、犯罪嫌疑人、被告人可以從輕、減輕處罰；犯罪較輕的，可以免除處罰：
（一）在犯罪過程中，自動放棄犯罪或者自動有效地防止犯罪結果發生的；
（二）自動投案，如實供述自己的罪行的；
（三）揭發他人犯罪行為，查證屬實，或者提供重要線索得以偵破其他案件的。
被採取強制措施的犯罪嫌疑人、被告人如實供述執法、司法機關未掌握的本人犯有本法規定的其他罪行的，按前款第二項規定處理。
第三十四條 不具有香港特別行政區永久性居民身分的人實施本法規定的犯罪的，可以獨立適用或者附加適用驅逐出境。
不具有香港特別行政區永久性居民身分的人違反本法規定，因任何原因不對其追究刑事責任的，也可以驅逐出境。
第三十五條 任何人經法院判決犯危害國家安全罪行的，即喪失作為候選人參加香港特別行政區舉行的立法會、區議會選舉或者出任香港特別行政區任何公職或者行政長官選舉委員會委員的資格；曾經宣誓或者聲明擁護中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法、效忠中華人民共和國香港特別行政區的立法會議員、政府官員及公務人員、行政會議成員、法官及其他司法人員、區議員，即時喪失該等職務，並喪失參選或者出任上述職務的資格。
前款規定資格或者職務的喪失，由負責組織、管理有關選舉或者公職任免的機構宣布。

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● 第六節　效力範圍

第三十六條 任何人在香港特別行政區內實施本法規定的犯罪的，適用本法。犯罪的行為或者結果有一項發生在香港特別行政區內的，就認為是在香港特別行政區內犯罪。
在香港特別行政區註冊的船舶或者航空器內實施本法規定的犯罪的，也適用本法。
第三十七條 香港特別行政區永久性居民或者在香港特別行政區成立的公司、團體等法人或者非法人組織在香港特別行政區以外實施本法規定的犯罪的，適用本法。
第三十八條 不具有香港特別行政區永久性居民身分的人在香港特別行政區以外針對香港特別行政區實施本法規定的犯罪的，適用本法。
第三十九條 本法施行以後的行為，適用本法定罪處刑。

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【第四章　案件管轄、法律適用和程序】

第四十條 香港特別行政區對本法規定的犯罪案件行使管轄權，但本法第五十五條規定的情形除外。
第四十一條 香港特別行政區管轄危害國家安全犯罪案件的立案偵查、檢控、審判和刑罰的執行等訴訟程序事宜，適用本法和香港特別行政區本地法律。
未經律政司長書面同意，任何人不得就危害國家安全犯罪案件提出檢控。但該規定不影響就有關犯罪依法逮捕犯罪嫌疑人並將其羈押，也不影響該等犯罪嫌疑人申請保釋。
香港特別行政區管轄的危害國家安全犯罪案件的審判循公訴程序進行。
審判應當公開進行。因為涉及國家秘密、公共秩序等情形不宜公開審理的，禁止新聞界和公眾旁聽全部或者一部分審理程序，但判決結果應當一律公開宣布。
第四十二條 香港特別行政區執法、司法機關在適用香港特別行政區現行法律有關羈押、審理期限等方面的規定時，應當確保危害國家安全犯罪案件公正、及時辦理，有效防範、制止和懲治危害國家安全犯罪。
對犯罪嫌疑人、被告人，除非法官有充足理由相信其不會繼續實施危害國家安全行為的，不得准予保釋。
第四十三條 香港特別行政區政府警務處維護國家安全部門辦理危害國家安全犯罪案件時，可以採取香港特別行政區現行法律准予警方等執法部門在調查嚴重犯罪案件時採取的各種措施，並可以採取以下措施：
（一）搜查可能存有犯罪證據的處所、車輛、船隻、航空器以及其他有關地方和電子設備；
（二）要求涉嫌實施危害國家安全犯罪行為的人員交出旅行證件或者限制其離境；
（三）對用於或者意圖用於犯罪的財產、因犯罪所得的收益等與犯罪相關的財產，予以凍結，申請限制令、押記令、沒收令以及充公；
（四）要求信息發布人或者有關服務商移除信息或者提供協助；
（五）要求外國及境外政治性組織，外國及境外當局或者政治性組織的代理人提供資料；
（六）經行政長官批准，對有合理理由懷疑涉及實施危害國家安全犯罪的人員進行截取通訊和秘密監察；
（七）對有合理理由懷疑擁有與偵查有關的資料或者管有有關物料的人員，要求其回答問題和提交資料或者物料。
香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會對警務處維護國家安全部門等執法機構採取本條第一款規定措施負有監督責任。
授權香港特別行政區行政長官會同香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會為採取本條第一款規定措施制定相關實施細則。
第四十四條 香港特別行政區行政長官應當從裁判官、區域法院法官、高等法院原訟法庭法官、上訴法庭法官以及終審法院法官中指定若干名法官，也可從暫委或者特委法官中指定若干名法官，負責處理危害國家安全犯罪案件。行政長官在指定法官前可徵詢香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會和終審法院首席法官的意見。上述指定法官任期一年。
凡有危害國家安全言行的，不得被指定為審理危害國家安全犯罪案件的法官。在獲任指定法官期間，如有危害國家安全言行的，終止其指定法官資格。
在裁判法院、區域法院、高等法院和終審法院就危害國家安全犯罪案件提起的刑事檢控程序應當分別由各該法院的指定法官處理。
第四十五條 除本法另有規定外，裁判法院、區域法院、高等法院和終審法院應當按照香港特別行政區的其他法律處理就危害國家安全犯罪案件提起的刑事檢控程序。
第四十六條 對高等法院原訟法庭進行的就危害國家安全犯罪案件提起的刑事檢控程序，律政司長可基於保護國家秘密、案件具有涉外因素或者保障陪審員及其家人的人身安全等理由，發出證書指示相關訴訟毋須在有陪審團的情況下進行審理。凡律政司長發出上述證書，高等法院原訟法庭應當在沒有陪審團的情況下進行審理，並由三名法官組成審判庭。
凡律政司長發出前款規定的證書，適用於相關訴訟的香港特別行政區任何法律條文關於「陪審團」或者「陪審團的裁決」，均應當理解為指法官或者法官作為事實裁斷者的職能。
第四十七條 香港特別行政區法院在審理案件中遇有涉及有關行為是否涉及國家安全或者有關證據材料是否涉及國家秘密的認定問題，應取得行政長官就該等問題發出的證明書，上述證明書對法院有約束力。

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【第五章　中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全機構】

第四十八條 中央人民政府在香港特別行政區設立維護國家安全公署。中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署依法履行維護國家安全職責，行使相關權力。
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署人員由中央人民政府維護國家安全的有關機關聯合派出。
第四十九條 駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署的職責為：
（一）分析研判香港特別行政區維護國家安全形勢，就維護國家安全重大戰略和重要政策提出意見和建議；
（二）監督、指導、協調、支持香港特別行政區履行維護國家安全的職責；
（三）收集分析國家安全情報信息；
（四）依法辦理危害國家安全犯罪案件。
第五十條 駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署應當嚴格依法履行職責，依法接受監督，不得侵害任何個人和組織的合法權益。
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署人員除須遵守全國性法律外，還應當遵守香港特別行政區法律。
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署人員依法接受國家監察機關的監督。
第五十一條 駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署的經費由中央財政保障。
第五十二條 駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署應當加強與中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區聯絡辦公室、外交部駐香港特別行政區特派員公署、中國人民解放軍駐香港部隊的工作聯繫和工作協同。
第五十三條 駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署應當與香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會建立協調機制，監督、指導香港特別行政區維護國家安全工作。
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署的工作部門應當與香港特別行政區維護國家安全的有關機關建立協作機制，加強信息共享和行動配合。
第五十四條 駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署、外交部駐香港特別行政區特派員公署會同香港特別行政區政府採取必要措施，加強對外國和國際組織駐香港特別行政區機構、在香港特別行政區的外國和境外非政府組織和新聞機構的管理和服務。
第五十五條 有以下情形之一的，經香港特別行政區政府或者駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署提出，並報中央人民政府批准，由駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署對本法規定的危害國家安全犯罪案件行使管轄權：
（一）案件涉及外國或者境外勢力介入的複雜情況，香港特別行政區管轄確有困難的；
（二）出現香港特別行政區政府無法有效執行本法的嚴重情況的；
（三）出現國家安全面臨重大現實威脅的情況的。
第五十六條 根據本法第五十五條規定管轄有關危害國家安全犯罪案件時，由駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署負責立案偵查，最高人民檢察院指定有關檢察機關行使檢察權，最高人民法院指定有關法院行使審判權。
第五十七條 根據本法第五十五條規定管轄案件的立案偵查、審查起訴、審判和刑罰的執行等訴訟程序事宜，適用《中華人民共和國刑事訴訟法》等相關法律的規定。
根據本法第五十五條規定管轄案件時，本法第五十六條規定的執法、司法機關依法行使相關權力，其為決定採取強制措施、偵查措施和司法裁判而簽發的法律文書在香港特別行政區具有法律效力。對於駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署依法採取的措施，有關機構、組織和個人必須遵從。
第五十八條 根據本法第五十五條規定管轄案件時，犯罪嫌疑人自被駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署第一次訊問或者採取強制措施之日起，有權委託律師作為辯護人。辯護律師可以依法為犯罪嫌疑人、被告人提供法律幫助。
犯罪嫌疑人、被告人被合法拘捕後，享有盡早接受司法機關公正審判的權利。
第五十九條 根據本法第五十五條規定管轄案件時，任何人如果知道本法規定的危害國家安全犯罪案件情況，都有如實作證的義務。
第六十條 駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署及其人員依據本法執行職務的行為，不受香港特別行政區管轄。
持有駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署制發的證件或者證明文件的人員和車輛等在執行職務時不受香港特別行政區執法人員檢查、搜查和扣押。
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署及其人員享有香港特別行政區法律規定的其他權利和豁免。
第六十一條 駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署依據本法規定履行職責時，香港特別行政區政府有關部門須提供必要的便利和配合，對妨礙有關執行職務的行為依法予以制止並追究責任。

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【第六章　附則】

第六十二條 香港特別行政區本地法律規定與本法不一致的，適用本法規定。
第六十三條 辦理本法規定的危害國家安全犯罪案件的有關執法、司法機關及其人員或者辦理其他危害國家安全犯罪案件的香港特別行政區執法、司法機關及其人員，應當對辦案過程中知悉的國家秘密、商業秘密和個人隱私予以保密。
擔任辯護人或者訴訟代理人的律師應當保守在執業活動中知悉的國家秘密、商業秘密和個人隱私。
配合辦案的有關機構、組織和個人應當對案件有關情況予以保密。
第六十四條 香港特別行政區適用本法時，本法規定的「有期徒刑」「無期徒刑」「沒收財產」和「罰金」分別指「監禁」「終身監禁」「充公犯罪所得」和「罰款」，「拘役」參照適用香港特別行政區相關法律規定的「監禁」「入勞役中心」「入教導所」，「管制」參照適用香港特別行政區相關法律規定的「社會服務令」「入感化院」，「吊銷執照或者營業許可證」指香港特別行政區相關法律規定的「取消註冊或者註冊豁免，或者取消牌照」。
第六十五條 本法的解釋權屬於全國人民代表大會常務委員會。
第六十六條 本法自公布之日起施行。

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

Following the promulgation of the law on June 30, 2020, the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (zhongyang renmin zhengfu zhu Xianggang tebie xingzhengqu weihu guojia anquan gongshu 中央人民政府駐香港特别行政區維護國家安全公署, abbrev. CPGNSO) was established on July 8, 2020 to ensure and supervise the implementation of the law. The office is not subject to Hong Kong jurisdiction, and Zheng Yanxiong 鄭雁雄 (b. 1963, Guangdong) was appointed as its inaugural director (shuzhang 署長).

The source for the English text of the HKSAR National Security Law as shown above is the PRC's Xinhuanet.

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Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the HKSAR National Security Law

Name in Chinese Gang qu guo'anfa di sishisan tiao shishi xize 港區國安法第四十三條實施細則
Document type Binding guidelines for law enforcement issued by the PRC
Year, dates 2020, July 6 (gazetted); 2020, July 7 (effective)
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IMPLEMENTATION RULES FOR ARTICLE 43 OF THE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON SAFEGUARDING NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

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Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Implementation Rules) were gazetted today (July 6) and will take effect on July 7.

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) passed on June 30 the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (the National Security Law) and listed the legislation in Annex III to the Basic Law in accordance with the procedures under Article 18 of the Basic Law. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government promulgated the National Security Law in the gazette for implementation at 11pm the same day. Article 43 of the National Security Law stipulates various measures that the department for safeguarding national security of the Police Force of HKSAR may take when handling cases concerning offence endangering national security, and authorises the Chief Executive of the HKSAR, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the HKSAR (National Security Committee) to make relevant implementation rules for the purpose of applying the measures stipulated under Article 43.

At the first meeting of the National Security Committee today, the Chief Executive, in conjunction with the National Security Committee, exercised the power under Article 43 of the National Security Law to make relevant implementation rules for law enforcement agencies such as the department for Safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force to implement the measures stipulated under Article 43. The Implementation Rules provide for rules that relevant officers should observe when carrying out the specific measures concerned to prevent, suppress and impose punishment for offences endangering national security, and relevant offences and penalties for the effective implementation of the measures, so as to improve the enforcement mechanisms for the HKSAR to safeguard national security.

The Government spokesman pointed out that the aforementioned Implementation Rules, formulated for the exercise of various measures by relevant officers, clearly set out in detail the procedural requirements, circumstances that must be met and conditions for approval, etc. when implementing those measures. The purpose is to ensure that when relevant officers exercise powers and apply measures under Article 43 of the National Security Law to enforce the Law, the objectives of preventing, suppressing and imposing punishment for any acts and activities endangering national security can be achieved, while the requirement under the General Principles of the National Security Law to respect and protect human rights, as well as the protection of various rights and freedom in accordance with the law can be complied with.

The Implementation Rules have the force of law, and details are as follows:

1. Search of Places for Evidence

The relevant rules are formulated with reference to various existing ordinances regarding the permission to conduct urgent search under exceptional circumstances, including the Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance (Cap. 238) and the Import and Export Ordinance (Cap. 60). For investigation of an offence endangering national security, a police officer may apply to a magistrate for a warrant to enter and search a place for evidence. Under exceptional circumstances (for instance, in urgent situations), a police officer not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police may authorise his officers to enter the relevant place to search for evidence without a warrant.

2. Restriction on Persons under Investigation from Leaving Hong Kong

With reference to provisions under the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Cap. 201) which restrict a person under investigation from leaving Hong Kong, the rules authorise police officers to apply to a magistrate for a warrant to require a person who is suspected to have committed offences endangering national security to surrender his travel document, and to restrict that person from leaving Hong Kong, lest some of the persons involved in the case abscond overseas. A person who has surrendered a travel document may make application in writing to the Commissioner of Police or to a magistrate for its return and for permission to leave Hong Kong.

3. Freezing, Restraint, Confiscation and Forfeiture of Property Related to Offences Endangering National Security

The arrangements concerned are formulated with reference to the existing powers and provisions under the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 455) and the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Ordinance (Cap. 575). If the Secretary for Security has reasonable grounds to suspect that any property is property related to an offence endangering national security, he may, by notice in writing, direct that a person must not deal with the property. The Court of First Instance may, on the application by the Secretary for Justice, order the confiscation of the property related to the offence. Anyone who knows or suspects that any property is property related to an offence endangering national security is obliged to make a disclosure to the Police Force as soon as is reasonably practicable, and must not disclose to another person any information which is likely to prejudice any investigation which might be conducted following that first-mentioned disclosure. In addition, the Secretary for Justice may make an application to the Court of First Instance for a restraint order or charging order to prohibit any person from dealing with any realisable property, or impose on any realisable property that is specified in the order a charge for securing the payment of money to the Government. Furthermore, the Secretary for Justice may also make an application to the court for confiscating the proceeds arising from an offence endangering national security and ordering the amount due be paid within a fixed period.

4. Removal of Messages Endangering National Security and Request for Assistance

If the Commissioner of Police has reasonable grounds to suspect that an electronic message published on an electronic platform is likely to constitute an offence endangering national security or is likely to cause the occurrence of an offence endangering national security, he may, with the approval of the Secretary for Security, authorise a designated police officer to request the relevant message publisher(s), platform service provider(s), hosting service provider(s) and/or network service provider(s) to remove the message; restrict or cease access by any person to the message; or restrict or cease access by any person to the platform or its relevant part(s). It is a reasonable defence if the technology necessary for complying with the requirement was not reasonably available to the publisher or relevant service provider; or there was a risk of incurring substantial loss to, or otherwise substantially prejudicing the right of, a third party.

If the publisher fails to cooperate immediately, and the relevant information on the Internet will continue to seriously affect members of the public, police officers may apply to the magistrate for a warrant to seize the relevant electronic device and take any action for removing that information as soon as practicable. Relevant officers may also apply to the magistrate for a warrant under specific circumstances to authorise police officers to request the relevant service provider to provide the identification record or decryption assistance as the case requires.

5. Requiring Foreign and Taiwan Political Organisations and Agents to Provide Information on Activities Concerning Hong Kong

If the Commissioner of Police reasonably believes that it is necessary for the prevention and investigation of an offence endangering national security, the Commissioner of Police may, with the approval of the Secretary for Security, by written notice served on a foreign political organisation or Taiwan political organisation, or a foreign agent or a Taiwan agent, require the organisation or agent to provide the Commissioner of Police with the prescribed information (including the activities, the personal particulars, as well as the assets, income, sources of income, and expenditure of the organisation in Hong Kong) in a prescribed manner within the specified period. The relevant rules are formulated with reference to the prevailing provisions of the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151) under which Societies Officers may request the provision of information from societies.

6. Application on Authorisation for Interception of Communications and Covert Surveillance

To effectively prevent and detect offences endangering national security and protect the confidentiality of information related to national security, all applications for interception of communications and covert surveillance operations must be approved by the Chief Executive. Applications for the less intrusive covert surveillance may be made to a directorate officer of the Police Force designated by the Chief Executive. The authorising authority has to ensure that the covert operation concerned satisfies the proportionality and necessity tests before granting the authorisation. According to Article 43 of the National Security Law, the National Security Committee shall be responsible for supervising the implementation of the stipulated measures by the Police Force. On the other hand, the Implementation Rules provide that the Chief Executive may appoint an independent person to assist the National Security Committee in performing the aforementioned supervising responsibility. Furthermore, the Secretary for Security issues Operating Principles and Guidelines for the purpose of providing operating principles and guidance to officers of the HKPF regarding the making of relevant applications and the exercise of powers. Officers of the HKPF are required to comply with the provisions in the Operating Principles and Guidelines when performing any function under the relevant rules.　The Operating Principles and Guidelines will be gazetted at the same time with the Implementation Rules.

7. Requirement to Furnish Information and Produce Materials

For the purpose of assisting an investigation into an offence endangering national security or the proceeds obtained with the commission of the relevant offence, the Secretary for Justice or police officers may apply to the court for an order to require the person concerned to answer questions within a specified time period, or to furnish or produce the relevant information or material.　The provisions are formulated with reference to the relevant powers and provisions under the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 455) and the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Ordinance (Cap. 575) currently.

To ensure the effective implementation of the above relevant measures, there is also a need to provide in the Implementation Rules relevant penalties for contravention of the requirements.　For instance, if a person who published a message fails to comply with the requirement of the police to remove the message endangering national security without reasonable excuse, the person is liable on conviction to a fine of $100,000 and to imprisonment for one year. If a service provider fails to comply with the requirement to remove messages endangering national security, or to restrict or cease access to messages or platforms, or the request to provide assistance, the service provider is liable on conviction to a fine of $100,000 and to imprisonment for six months. Furthermore, a foreign political organisation or Taiwan political organisation, or a foreign agent or a Taiwan agent, who fails to provide information as requested by the Police is liable on conviction to a fine of $100,000 and to imprisonment for six months unless it can prove that it has exercised due diligence and there have been reasons beyond its control. If any information provided is false, incorrect, or incomplete, the person who provided the information is liable on conviction to a fine of $100,000 and to imprisonment for two years, unless the person has grounds to believe that the relevant information was true, correct and complete. As for other items, the relevant offences and defence (if specified) are largely the same as the existing provisions in the laws that the Implementation Rules have made reference to. The provision of defence provisions under appropriate circumstances provide appropriate defence for people who fail to comply with the requirements.　The above Implementation Rules are in compliance with the requirements concerned under the National Security Law and the Basic Law, including the requirements concerning the respect and protection of human rights.

Government representatives will attend a joint panel meeting of the Panel on Security, the Panel on Administration of Justice and Legal Services and the Panel on Constitutional Affairs of the Legislative Council on July 7 to brief Members on the content of National Security Law and the Implementation Rules.

Monday, July 6, 2020

Issued at HKT 21:51

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港區國安法第四十三條實施細則

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《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法第四十三條實施細則》（《實施細則》）今日（七月六日）刊憲公布，於七月七日生效。

全國人民代表大會常務委員會（全國人大常委會）六月三十日正式通過《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法》（《國安法》），並按《基本法》第十八條的程序列入《基本法》附件三。香港特別行政區（香港特區）政府於同日晚上十一時刊憲公布實施。《國安法》第四十三條規定特區政府警務處維護國家安全部門辦理危害國家安全犯罪案件時可以採取的各種措施，並授權香港特區行政長官會同香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會（國安委）為採取第四十三條所規定的措施制定相關實施細則。

行政長官於今日首次召開的國安委會議上，會同國安委行使《國安法》第四十三條所授予的權力，為警務處維護國家安全部門等執法機構，制定使用第四十三條所規定的措施的相關實施細則。《實施細則》包括為相關人員採取該特定措施以防範、制止及懲治危害國家安全罪行時的細則，及為確保有效執行措施所需的相關罪行和罰則，以完善特區維護國家安全的執行機制。

政府發言人指出，上述為相關人員行使各項規定措施所訂定的《實施細則》，清晰並詳細地列明執行各項措施的程序要求、所需符合的情況和審批的條件等，其目的是確保相關人員在執行《國安法》時，所行使《國安法》第四十三條的權力和採取的措施，既能達到防範、制止和懲治危害國家安全行為和活動的目的，也能同時符合《國安法》總則下對尊重和保障人權以及依法保護各項權利和自由的要求。

《實施細則》具有法律效力，詳情如下：

1.　為搜證而搜查有關地方

有關細則參照多條現行法例中有關特殊情況下容許緊急搜查的條文，包括《火器及彈藥條例》（第 238 章）及《進出口條例》（第 60 章）等。為偵查危害國家安全罪行，警務人員可向裁判官申請手令進入和搜查有關地方進行搜證。在特殊情況（如緊急情況）下，助理處長級或以上警務人員可授權其人員在無手令的情況下，進入有關地方搜證。

2.　限制受調查的人離開香港

參照現行《防止賄賂條例》（第 201 章）限制受調查人離境的條文，細則授權警務人員可向裁判官申請手令，要求懷疑犯了該等危害國家安全罪行而受調查的人交出旅行證件，並限制其離開香港，以免部分涉案人士潛逃海外。交出旅行證件的人，可以書面向警務處處長或裁判官申請發還該旅行證件及批准離開香港。

3.　凍結、限制、沒收及充公與危害國家安全罪行相關財產

有關安排參考現行《有組織及嚴重罪行條例》（第 455 章）及《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》（第 575 章）相關權力和規定。保安局局長如有合理理由懷疑某財產是危害國家安全罪行相關財產，可藉書面通知作出指示，任何人不得處理該財產。而原訟法庭可在律政司司長的申請下，命令將罪行相關財產充公。任何人如知悉或懷疑任何財產是危害國家安全罪行相關財產，亦有責任在切實可行的情況下盡快向警方披露，以及不得向另一人披露任何相當可能損害或會因應上述的披露而進行的任何調查的資料。律政司司長亦可向原訟法庭申請限制令或押記令，禁止任何人處理任何可變現財產，或指明可變現財產作為押記以擔保向政府繳付款項的命令，並可向法庭申請沒收危害國家安全罪行的犯罪得益，命令在訂定期間内妥為繳付追討款額。

4.　移除危害國家安全的信息及要求協助

如警務處處長有合理理由懷疑在電子平台上發布的電子信息相當可能構成危害國家安全罪行或相當可能會導致危害國家安全罪行的發生，可在保安局局長批准下，授權指定的警務處人員要求有關發布人士、平台服務商、主機服務商及／或網路服務商移除危害國家安全的信息；限制或停止任何人接達該信息；或限制或停止任何人接達該平台或相關部分。但若所需的科技並非發布者或有關服務商合理可得，或有關服務商遵從有關要求有對第三方招致相當程度損失或損害第三方的權利的風險存在，則可為合理辯解。

若有關的信息發布人未即時合作，而有關資訊會繼續在網上嚴重影響公眾，警務人員可向裁判官申請手令檢取有關電子器材，並作出行動盡快移除該信息。有關人員亦可在指定情況向裁判官申請發出手令，授權警務人員，要求有關服務商按情況所需提供有關身分紀錄或解密協助。

5.　向外國及台灣政治性組織及其代理人要求就涉港活動提供資料

警務處處長如合理地相信是防止及偵查危害國家安全罪行所需要的，可在保安局局長批准下，藉向某外國政治性組織或台灣政治性組織，或某外國代理人或台灣代理人，送達書面通知，規定該組識或代理人在指定期限內，按指定方式向警務處處長提交指明資料（包括在香港的活動及個人資料、資產、收入、收入來源及開支）。此細則參考了現有《社團條例》（第 151 章），社團事務主任可要求社團提供資料的條文。

6.　進行截取通訊及秘密監察的授權申請

為有效防止和偵測危害國家安全罪行及保護涉及國家安全的資料的機密性，所有截取通訊及秘密監察行動的申請，須經行政長官批准；而進行侵擾程度較低的秘密監察行動，可向行政長官指定的首長級警務處人員申請。授權當局須確定秘密行動能符合「相稱性」和「必要性」的驗證標準，方可作出授權。根據《國安法》第四十三條，國安委對警務處採取規定的措施負有監督責任，而根據實行細則，行政長官可委任一名獨立人士，協助國安委履行上述的監督責任。此外，保安局局長亦發出《運作原則及指引》，為警務人員如何作出有關申請及行使權力提供運作原則及指引，規定警務處人員在執行有關職能時須予遵守。有關《運作原則及指引》會與《實施細則》同時刊憲。

7.　提供資料和提交物料

為協助偵查危害國家安全罪行，或干犯有關罪行而獲得的得益，律政司司長或警務人員可向法庭申請批准，要求有關人士在指定時限内回答問題，或提供或交出相關資料或物料。有關條文，參考現行《有組織及嚴重罪行條例》（第 455 章）及《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》（第 575 章）相關權力和規定。

為確保上述有關措施能有效實施，《實施細則》亦按需要訂定違反規定的相關罰則。舉例而言，若無合理辯解，如信息發布人未有遵從警方移除危害國家安全的信息要求，一經定罪，可被判罰款 $100,000 及監禁一年；如有服務商未有遵從移除或限制或停止任何人接達危害國家安全的信息或平台，或提供協助的要求，一經定罪，則可被判罰款 $100,000 及監禁六個月。此外，若外國及台灣政治性組織或外國及台灣代理人未有按要求向警方提供資料，除非可證明已經盡力或有非可能控制的原因，否則一經定罪，可被判罰款 $100,000 及監禁六個月；而若涉及提供虛假、不正確或不完整的資料，則可被判罰款 $100,000 及監禁兩年，但有理由相信有關資料是真實、正確及完整則屬合理辯解。至於其他的各項，有關的罪行及免責辯護（如有訂明）與所參考的現有法律條文大致相同。在合適的情況下提供辯解條文，可以為無法遵從要求的人提供合適的辯解理由。上述的實施細則符合《國安法》及《基本法》的規定，包括關於尊重和保障人權的規定。

政府代表明日（七月七日）會出席立法會保安事務委員會、司法及法律事務委員會及政制事務委員會聯合會議，向議員講解《國安法》及《實施細則》的內容。

2020 年 7 月 6 日（星期一）

香港時間20時16分

🛑 EDITOR'S NOTE ===============

The English text of the Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was published in a press release by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

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Safeguarding National Security Ordinance

Name in Chinese weihu guojia anquan tiaoli 維護國家安全條例 
Document type PRC law for Hong Kong
Year, date 2024, March 23
 Jump to Chinese version   [Previous document]   [Next chapter] 

(Jump to HKSAR Basic Law Article 23)

Preamble

WHEREAS it is a must—

(a) to resolutely, fully and faithfully implement the policy of “one country, two systems” under which the people of Hong Kong administer Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy;

(b) to establish and improve the legal system and enforcement mechanisms for the HKSAR to safeguard national security; and

(c) to prevent, suppress and punish acts and activities endangering national security in accordance with the law, to protect the lawful rights and interests of the residents of the HKSAR and other people in the HKSAR, to ensure the property and investment in the HKSAR are protected by the law, to maintain prosperity and stability of the HKSAR:

AND WHEREAS there are requirements under the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and the following law, decision and interpretation for the HKSAR to perform the constitutional duty to safeguard national security and to improve the law for safeguarding national security in the HKSAR—

(a) the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, including the provisions of Article 23 of that Law;

(b) the Decision of the National People’s Congress on Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement Mechanisms for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to Safeguard National Security (a translation of “《全國人民代表大會關於建立健全香港特別行政區維護國家安全的法律制度和執行機制的決定》”) adopted at the Third Session of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress on 28 May 2020;

(c) the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (a translation of “《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法》”); and

(d) the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 14 and Article 47 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (a translation of “《全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於〈中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法〉第十四條和第四十七條的解釋》”) adopted at the 38th Session of the Standing Committee of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress on 30 December 2022:

AND WHEREAS—

(a) the executive, legislative and judicial authorities of the HKSAR must effectively prevent, suppress and punish acts and activities endangering national security in accordance with the law; and

(b) the residents of the HKSAR must safeguard the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the state; any institution, organization and individual in the HKSAR must abide by the law of the HKSAR applicable for safeguarding national security, must not engage in acts and activities endangering national security, and must provide assistance in accordance with the law in response to a request made by the authorities when conducting the work on safeguarding national security in accordance with the law:

NOW, THEREFORE, it is enacted by the Legislative Council as follows—

Editorial Note: This instrument was not given a chapter number under the Legislation Publication Ordinance (Cap. 614). An unofficial reference number, however, is assigned to this instrument in Hong Kong e-Legislation (https://www.elegislation.gov.hk) for identification purposes. This also enables users to carry out a search by reference to the unofficial reference number.

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Part 1—Preliminary

1. Short title
This Ordinance may be cited as the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance.
2. Principles of this Ordinance
This Ordinance is based on the following principles—
(a) the highest principle of the policy of “one country, two systems” is to safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests;
(b) human rights are to be respected and protected, the rights and freedoms, including the freedoms of speech, of the press and of publication, the freedoms of association, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration, enjoyed under the Basic Law, the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applied to the HKSAR, are to be protected in accordance with the law; and
(c) for acts and activities endangering national security, there must be adherence to active prevention in accordance with the principle of the rule of law, and suppression and punishment in accordance with the law, and accordingly—
(i) a person whose act constitutes an offence under the law is to be convicted and punished in accordance with the law; no one is to be convicted and punished for an act that does not constitute an offence under the law;
(ii) a person is to be presumed innocent before the person is convicted by a judicial authority;
(iii) the right to defend, and other rights in a legal action, enjoyed in accordance with the law by a criminal suspect, defendant and other participants in the action are to be protected; and
(iv) a person who has already been finally convicted or acquitted of an offence in judicial proceedings is not to be tried or punished again for the same act.
3. Interpretation
(1) In this Ordinance—
Central Authorities (中央) means the body of central power under the constitutional order established by the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, including (but not limited to) the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China and its Standing Committee, the President of the People’s Republic of China, the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China;
Chinese armed force (中國武裝力量) means an armed force of China, that is the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force or the militia;
Court (法院) means any of the following courts or tribunals of the Judiciary of the HKSAR—
(a) the Court of Final Appeal;
(b) the Court of Appeal;
(c) the Court of First Instance;
(d) the Competition Tribunal;
(e) the District Court;
(f) a Magistrates’ Court;
(g) the Lands Tribunal;
(h) the Labour Tribunal;
(i) the Small Claims Tribunal;
(j) the Obscene Articles Tribunal;
(k) the Coroner’s Court;
designated judge (指定法官), in relation to a Court, means a judicial officer designated among the judicial officers of the Court under Article 44 of the HK National Security Law;
external force (境外勢力)—see section 6;
external place (境外) means a region or place outside the HKSAR (other than the Mainland and Macao);
function (職能) includes a power and a duty;
HK National Security Law (《香港國安法》) means the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (a translation of “《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法》”), as applied in the HKSAR under the Promulgation of National Law 2020 (L.N. 136 of 2020)*;
international organization (國際組織) means—
(a) an organization the members of which include 2 or more countries, regions, places, or entities entrusted with functions by any country, region or place; or
(b) an organization established by or under a treaty, convention or agreement made by 2 or more countries, regions or places, and includes an institution (however described) under the organization;
judicial officer (司法人員) means—
(a) a judicial officer holding a judicial office specified in Schedule 1 to the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission Ordinance (Cap. 92); or
(b) a judicial officer appointed by the Chief Justice.
(2) In this Ordinance, a reference to a case concerning national security includes—
(a) a case in connection with an offence endangering national security;
(b) a case in connection with any measures taken for, or in connection with, safeguarding national security, whether under the HK National Security Law, this Ordinance or any other law; and
(c) any proceedings in connection with the case mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b).
Editorial Note: * See Instrument A302.
4. Meaning of national security
In this Ordinance or any other Ordinance, a reference to national security is a reference to the status in which the state’s political regime, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major interests of the state are relatively free from danger and internal or external threats, and the capability to maintain a sustained status of security.
Note—See Article 2 of the National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China (a translation of “《中華人民共和國國家安全法》”)—“National security means the status in which the state’s political regime, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major interests of the state are relatively free from danger and internal or external threats, and the capability to maintain a sustained status of security.” (a translation of “國家安全是指國家政權、主權、統一和領土完整、人民福祉、經濟社會可持續發展和國家其他重大利益相對處於沒有危險和不受內外威脅的狀態，以及保障持續安全狀態的能力。”).
5. Meaning of colluding with external force
For the purposes of an offence under this Ordinance, a person colludes with an external force to do an act if one or more of the following circumstances exist—
(a) the person participates in an activity planned or otherwise led by an external force, and the act is an act that the person’s participation in the activity involves;
(b) the person does the act on behalf of an external force;
(c) the person does the act in cooperation with an external force;
(d) the person does the act under the control, supervision or direction of, or on request by, an external force;
(e) the person does the act with the financial contributions, or the support by other means, of an external force.
6. Meaning of external force
(1) In this Ordinance—external force (境外勢力) means—
(a) a government of a foreign country;
(b) the authority of an external place;
(c) a political party in an external place;
(d) any other organization in an external place that pursues political ends;
(e) an international organization;
(f) a related entity of a government, authority, political party or organization mentioned in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e); or
(g) a related individual of a government, authority, political party, organization or entity mentioned in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f).
(2) In paragraph (f) of the definition of external force in subsection (1), a reference to a related entity of a government or authority is a reference to—
(a) a company that falls within either or both of the following descriptions—
(i) the directors of the company are accustomed, or under an obligation (whether formal or informal), to act in accordance with the directions, instructions or wishes of the government or authority;
(ii) the government or authority is in a position to exercise, by virtue of other factors, substantial control over the company; or
(b) a body that is not a company and that falls within either or both of the following descriptions—
(i) the members of the executive committee (however called) of the body are accustomed, or under an obligation (whether formal or informal), to act in accordance with the directions, instructions or wishes of the government or authority;
(ii) the government or authority is in a position to exercise, by virtue of other factors, substantial control over the body.
(3) In paragraph (f) of the definition of external force in subsection (1), a reference to a related entity of a political party in an external place, any other organization in an external place that pursues political ends or an international organization (the organization) is a reference to—
(a) a company that falls within either or both of the following descriptions—
(i) the directors of the company are accustomed, or under an obligation (whether formal or informal), to act in accordance with the directions, instructions or wishes of the organization;
(ii) the organization is in a position to exercise, by virtue of other factors, substantial control over the company;
(b) a body that is not a company and that falls within either or both of the following descriptions—
(i) the members of the executive committee (however called) of the body are accustomed, or under an obligation (whether formal or informal), to act in accordance with the directions, instructions or wishes of the organization;
(ii) the organization is in a position to exercise, by virtue of other factors, substantial control over the body; or
(c) a body that falls within the following description: the law, constitution, rules or other governing documents by which the body is constituted (or according to which the body operates) contain either or both of the following requirements—
(i) a director, senior officer or employee of the body is required to be a member of the organization;
(ii) any part of the body is required to constitute a part (however called) of the organization.
(4) In paragraph (g) of the definition of external force in subsection (1), a reference to a related individual of a government, authority, political party, organization or entity is a reference to an individual that falls within either or both of the following descriptions—
(a) the individual is accustomed, or under an obligation (whether formal or informal), to act in accordance with the directions, instructions or wishes of the government, authority, political party, organization or entity;
(b) the government, authority, political party, organization or entity is in a position to exercise, by virtue of other factors, substantial control over the individual.
7. Meaning of offence endangering national security
To avoid doubt, in this Ordinance or any other Ordinance, a reference to an offence endangering national security includes—
(a) the four types of offences under the HK National Security Law (which are the offence of secession, the offence of subversion, the offence of terrorist activities and the offence of collusion with a foreign country or with external elements to endanger national security (a translation of “分裂國家罪、顛覆國家政權罪、恐怖活動罪及勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪”));
(b) the offences under the Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (a translation of “《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法第四十三條實施細則》”)*;
(c) the offences under this Ordinance; and
(d) other offences endangering national security under the law of the HKSAR.
Editorial Note: * See Instrument A303.
8. Interpretation of other Ordinances etc.
(1) If this Ordinance and another Ordinance would be inconsistent but for this subsection, that other Ordinance is to be read in a way that have the best regard to the object and purposes of this Ordinance.
(2) A reference to the security of the HKSAR (including a phrase that means the same as “security of the HKSAR”) in another Ordinance is to be read as including national security.
(3) If the law of the HKSAR confers any function on a person—
(a) the function is to be read as including a duty to safeguard national security; and
(b) accordingly, any person, in making any decision in the performance of the function, must regard national security as the most important factor, and give appropriate consideration to it accordingly,
and a reference in any Ordinance in connection with such a function is to be read accordingly.
9. Persons to whom offence provisions apply
Unless otherwise provided in a provision, an offence under this Ordinance applies to every person in the HKSAR. If an offence has extra-territorial effect, the extra-territorial effect is provided in the relevant Part.

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Part 2—Treason etc.

10. Treason
(1) A Chinese citizen who—
(a) joins an external armed force that is at war with China, or is a part of the armed force;
(b) with intent to prejudice the situation of China in a war, assists an enemy at war with China in a war;
(c) levies war against China;
(d) instigates a foreign country or an external armed force to invade China with force; or
(e) with intent to endanger the sovereignty, unity or territorial integrity of China, uses force or threatens to use force,
commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to life imprisonment.
(2) In this section—enemy at war with China (與中國交戰的敵方) includes a government of a foreign country or external armed force that is at war with China;
external armed force (外來武裝力量) means an armed force that does not belong to China.
11. Publicly manifest intention to commit offence of treason
A Chinese citizen who intends to commit an offence under section 10(1) and publicly manifests such intention commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 14 years.
12. Requirement on disclosure of commission by others of offence of treason
(1) If a Chinese citizen (the person) knows that another person has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offence under section 10(1) (commission of offence), the person must disclose the commission of offence and the material facts in connection with the commission of offence within the person’s knowledge to a police officer as soon as reasonably practicable after the person knows of the commission of offence, unless the commission of offence has been in the public domain.
(2) A Chinese citizen who contravenes subsection (1) commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 14 years.
(3) This section does not affect any claims, rights or entitlements on the ground of legal professional privilege.
(4) This section provides for the offence of misprision of treason under common law as a statutory provision with appropriate improvements.
13. Unlawful drilling
(1) If—
(a) a person, without the permission of the Secretary for Security or the Commissioner of Police, provides specified drilling to any other person; or
(b) a person is present, for the purpose of providing specified drilling to any other person, at a meeting held for the purpose of providing specified drilling, and the meeting is held without the permission of the Secretary for Security or the Commissioner of Police, the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.
(2) A person who—
(a) receives specified drilling at a meeting mentioned in subsection (1)(b); or
(b) is present at a meeting mentioned in subsection (1)(b) for the purpose of receiving specified drilling, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 3 years.
(3) A person who, without the permission of the Secretary for Security or the Commissioner of Police—
(a) receives or participates in specified drilling the conduct of which is planned or otherwise led by an external force; or
(b) receives or participates in specified drilling conducted under the control, direction, financial contributions or support of an external force, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 5 years.
(4) A person who, without the permission of the Secretary for Security or the Commissioner of Police—
(a) provides specified drilling in a meeting the holding of which is planned or otherwise led by an external force;
(b) provides specified drilling on behalf of an external force;
(c) provides specified drilling in cooperation with an external force;
(d) provides specified drilling under the control, supervision or direction of, or on request by, an external force; or
(e) provides specified drilling under the financial contributions, or support by other means, of an external force, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.
(5) Subsections (3) and (4) do not apply if—
(a) the specified act is necessary for the person to discharge the person’s duty as a public servant;
(b) the specified drilling is conducted under the law of the HKSAR;
(c) the person is not a Chinese citizen and has the nationality of a foreign country, and the person does the specified act because the person serves in an armed force of a government of the foreign country or serves as a law enforcement officer of a government of the foreign country;
(d) the person has the nationality or residency of a foreign country, and the person does the specified act because the person serves in an armed force of a government of the foreign country for complying with the legal requirement of the foreign country;
(e) China participates in the specified drilling, and the person does the specified act as a serviceman or law enforcement officer; or
(f) the specified drilling is provided by the military, national defence or police department of a government of a foreign country, and the drilling is a part of a course or extra-curricular activity held or arranged by an educational establishment for the students receiving full-time education at the educational establishment.
(6) If—
(a) a person does an act before the commencement* of this section, and the act continues on or after that commencement; or
(b) a person does an act on or after that commencement under an arrangement or agreement made before that commencement, and the person would have committed an offence under subsection (3) or (4) for the act but for this subsection, then the person must not be convicted of the offence for the act.
(7) Where an act is done or continues to be done after the expiry of 6 months after the commencement of this section, subsection (6) does not apply in relation to the act.
(8) In this section—
educational establishment (教育機構)—
(a) means a university, college, school or other similar educational establishment; but
(b) does not include an educational establishment specialized in providing military training or drilling course;
specified act (指明作為), in relation to an offence under subsection (3) or (4), means an act that constitutes the offence;
specified drilling (指明操練)—
(a) means training or drilling in—
(i) the use of an offensive weapon as defined by section 2(1) of the Public Order Ordinance (Cap. 245);
(ii) the practice of military exercises; or
(iii) the practice of evolutions; but
(b) does not include an activity that is training or drilling mentioned in paragraph (a)(i) but conducted solely for leisure purpose.
Editorial Note: * Commencement date: 23 March 2024.
14. Extra-territorial effect of this Part
(1) If—
(a) a HKSAR resident who is a Chinese citizen does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under section 10(1) had it been done in the HKSAR,
the resident commits the offence.
(2) If—
(a) any—
(i) Hong Kong permanent resident;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under section 13(3) or (4) had it been done in the HKSAR,
the resident or body commits the offence.
(3) In this section—HKSAR resident (特區居民) means—
(a) a Hong Kong permanent resident; or
(b) a person who is qualified to be issued with an identity card under the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177) but has no right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115).

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Part 3—Insurrection, Incitement to Mutiny and Disaffection, and Acts with Seditious Intention, etc.

Division 1: Insurrection

15. Insurrection
If—
(a) a person joins an armed force, or is a part of an armed force, that is in an armed conflict with a Chinese armed force;
(b) a person, with intent to prejudice the situation of a Chinese armed force in an armed conflict, assists an armed force (that armed force) that is in an armed conflict with a Chinese armed force, or assists the government, authority or organization to which that armed force belongs;
(c) a person initiates armed conflict against a Chinese armed force; or
(d) a person—
(i) with intent to endanger the sovereignty, unity or territorial integrity of China or the public safety of the HKSAR as a whole; or
(ii) being reckless as to whether the sovereignty, unity or territorial integrity of China, or the public safety of the HKSAR as a whole, would be endangered, does a violent act in the HKSAR, the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to life imprisonment.
16. Extra-territorial effect of this Division
(1) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident who is a Chinese citizen;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR, does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under section 15 had it been done in the HKSAR, the resident or body commits the offence.
(2) In this section—HKSAR resident (特區居民) means—
(a) a Hong Kong permanent resident; or
(b) a person who is qualified to be issued with an identity card under the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177) but has no right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115).

Division 2: Incitement of Members of Chinese Armed Force to Mutiny, Assisting Those Members to Abandon Duties, etc.

17. Incitement of members of Chinese armed force to mutiny
(1) A person who knowingly incites a member of a Chinese armed force—
(a) to abandon the duties and abandon the allegiance to China; or
(b) to organize, initiate or participates in a mutiny, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to life imprisonment.
(2) In this section—Mutiny (叛變) means an act done by 2 or more persons who are, or at least 2 of whom are, members of a Chinese armed force—
(a) to overthrow the lawful authority in a Chinese armed force or in an army or force of a government or organization of a foreign country that is acting in cooperation with a Chinese armed force; or
(b) to resist such lawful authority in such a manner as to substantially prejudice the operational efficiency of a Chinese armed force or of, or of a part of, an army or force of a government or organization of a foreign country that is acting in cooperation with a Chinese armed force.
18. Assisting members of Chinese armed force to abandon duties or absent without leave
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years if the person, knowing that a member of a Chinese armed force is about to abandon the duties or absent himself or herself without leave, assists the member in so doing.
(2) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years if the person, knowing that a member of a Chinese armed force is about to abandon the duties or absent himself or herself without leave, colludes with an external force to assist the member in so doing.
(3) A person who, knowing that a member of a Chinese armed force has abandoned the duties or has absented himself or herself without leave—
(a) conceals the member;
(b) assists the member in concealing himself or herself; or
(c) assists the member in escaping from lawful custody, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.
(4) A person who, knowing that a member of a Chinese armed force has abandoned the duties or has absented himself or herself without leave, colludes with an external force to—
(a) conceal the member;
(b) assist the member in concealing himself or herself; or
(c) assist the member in escaping from lawful custody, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.

Division 3: Incitement to Disaffection etc.

19. Inciting disaffection of public officers
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years if the person knowingly incites a public officer to abandon upholding the Basic Law and abandon the allegiance to the HKSAR.
(2) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years if the person colludes with an external force to knowingly incite a public officer to abandon upholding the Basic Law and abandon the allegiance to the HKSAR.
(3) In this section—public officer (公職人員) means—
(a) a person holding an office of emolument under the Government, whether such office be permanent or temporary;
(b) any of the following persons (if the person is not a person mentioned in paragraph (a))—
(i) a principal official of the Government appointed in accordance with the Basic Law;
(ii) the Monetary Authority appointed under section 5A of the Exchange Fund Ordinance (Cap. 66) or a person appointed under section 5A(3) of that Ordinance;
(iii) the Chairman of the Public Service Commission;
(iv) a staff member of the Independent Commission Against Corruption;
(v) The Ombudsman or a person appointed under section 6 of The Ombudsman Ordinance (Cap. 397);
(vi) the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data or a person employed or engaged by the Commissioner under the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486);
(vii) the Chairperson or a member of the Equal Opportunities Commission, or a person employed or engaged by the Commission under the Sex Discrimination Ordinance (Cap. 480);
(viii) a judicial officer or a staff member of the Judiciary;
(c) a member of the Executive Council;
(d) a member of the Legislative Council;
(e) a member of a District Council;
(f) a member of the Election Committee as defined by section 2(1) of the Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap. 569); or
(g) a person of a class specified under section 20.
20. Specification of public officers
For the purposes of section 19, the Chief Executive in Council may, by order published in the Gazette, specify a class of persons as public officers if the Chief Executive in Council reasonably considers that it is necessary for safeguarding national security to specify the class of persons as public officers.
21. Inciting disaffection of personnel of offices of Central Authorities in Hong Kong
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years if the person knowingly incites any of the personnel of any of the following offices of the Central Authorities in Hong Kong (personnel of a CA office in HK) to abandon the duties and abandon the allegiance to China—
(a) the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
(b) the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
(c) the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
(2) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years if the person colludes with an external force to knowingly incite any of the personnel of a CA office in HK to abandon the duties and abandon the allegiance to China.
22. Possession of documents or articles of incitement nature with intent to commit specified offence
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 3 years if the person, with intent to commit a specified offence, possesses a document or other article of such a nature that the distribution of a document or article of that nature to a relevant officer would constitute the specified offence.
(2) In this section—relevant officer (相關人員) means—
(a) in relation to an offence under section 17—a member of a Chinese armed force;
(b) in relation to an offence under section 19—a public officer within the meaning of that section;
(c) in relation to an offence under section 21—any of the personnel of a CA office in HK within the meaning of that section; specified offence (指明罪行) means an offence under section 17, 19 or 21.

Division 4: Acts with Seditious Intention etc.

23. Seditious intention
(1) For the purposes of this Division—
(a) a person does an act with a seditious intention if the person does the act with one or more of the intentions specified in subsection (2); and
(b) an act, word or publication is an act, word or publication that has a seditious intention if the act, word or publication has one or more of the intentions specified in subsection (2).
(2) The intentions are as follows—
(a) an intention to bring a Chinese citizen, Hong Kong permanent resident or a person in the HKSAR into hatred, contempt or disaffection against the following system or institution—
(i) the fundamental system of the state established by the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China;
(ii) a state institution under the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China; or
(iii) the following offices of the Central Authorities in Hong Kong—
(A) the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
(B) the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
(C) the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; or
(D) the Hong Kong Garrison of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army;
(b) an intention to bring a Chinese citizen, Hong Kong permanent resident or a person in the HKSAR into hatred, contempt or disaffection against the constitutional order, executive, legislative or judicial authority of the HKSAR;
(c) an intention to incite any person to attempt to procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of—
(i) any matter established in accordance with the law by the Central Authorities in relation to the HKSAR; or
(ii) any matter established in accordance with the law in the HKSAR;
(d) an intention to cause hatred or enmity amongst different classes of residents of the HKSAR or amongst residents of different regions of China;
(e) an intention to incite any other person to do a violent act in the HKSAR;
(f) an intention to incite any other person to do an act that does not comply with the law of the HKSAR or that does not obey an order issued under the law of the HKSAR.
(3) However—
(a) if a person does an act only with any of the intentions specified in subsection (4), the act is not done with a seditious intention; and
(b) if an act, word or publication only has any of the intentions specified in subsection (4), the act, word or publication is not an act, word or publication that has a seditious intention.
(4) The intentions are as follows—
(a) an intention to give an opinion on the system or constitutional order mentioned in subsection (2)(a) or (b), with a view to improving the system or constitutional order;
(b) an intention to point out an issue on a matter in respect of an institution or authority mentioned in subsection (2)(a) or (b), with a view to giving an opinion on the improvement of the matter;
(c) an intention to persuade any person to attempt to procure the alteration, by lawful means, of—
(i) any matter established in accordance with the law by the Central Authorities in relation to the HKSAR; or
(ii) any matter established in accordance with the law in the HKSAR;
(d) an intention to point out that hatred or enmity amongst different classes of residents of the HKSAR or amongst residents of different regions of China is produced, or that there is a tendency for such hatred or enmity to be produced, with a view to removing the hatred or enmity.
24. Offences in connection with seditious intention
(1) A person who—
(a) with a seditious intention—
(i) does an act that has a seditious intention; or
(ii) utters a word that has a seditious intention;
(b) knowing that a publication has a seditious intention, prints, publishes, sells, offers for sale, distributes, displays or reproduces the publication; or
(c) imports a publication that has a seditious intention,
commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.
(2) A person who colludes with an external force to do the following—
(a) with a seditious intention—
(i) do an act that has a seditious intention; or
(ii) utter a word that has a seditious intention;
(b) knowing that a publication has a seditious intention, print, publish, sell, offer for sale, distribute, display or reproduce the publication; or
(c) import a publication that has a seditious intention,
commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.
(3) A person who, without reasonable excuse, possesses a publication that has a seditious intention commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 3 years.
(4) In this section—publish (發布) includes—
(a) to communicate in any form, including speaking, writing, displaying notices, broadcasting, screening and playing of tapes or other recorded material; and
(b) to disseminate or make available.
25. Proof of intention to incite public disorder or to incite violence not necessary
(1) In proceedings for an offence under section 24(1)(a) or (2)(a)—
(a) it is not necessary to prove that the person does the act or utters the word with the intention to incite any other person to do an act causing public disorder; and
(b) unless the intention under section 23(2)(e) constitutes an element of the offence, it is not necessary to prove that the person does the act or utters the word with the intention to incite any other person to do a violent act.
(2) In proceedings for an offence under section 24(1), (2) or (3)—
(a) it is not necessary to prove that the act, word or publication (as appropriate) has the intention to incite any other person to do an act causing public disorder; and
(b) unless the intention under section 23(2)(e) constitutes an element of the offence, it is not necessary to prove that the act, word or publication (as appropriate) has the intention to incite any other person to do a violent act.
26. Defence for offence under section 24(1)(c) or (2)(c)
(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 24(1)(c) or (2)(c) to establish that, at the time of the alleged offence, the person did not know that the publication is a publication that has a seditious intention.
(2) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (1) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

Division 5: Miscellaneous Provisions

27. Power to remove or obliterate publications that have seditious intention
(1) A law enforcement officer—
(a) may, subject to subsection (3), enter any premises or place; and
(b) may stop and board any conveyance, and may remove or obliterate any publication that has a seditious intention from there.
(2) A law enforcement officer may take all or any of the following actions—
(a) to enter (by reasonable force if necessary) any premises or place that the officer is authorized under this section to enter;
(b) to remove by reasonable force any person or article obstructing the officer from exercising the power of removal or obliteration which the officer is authorized under this section to exercise;
(c) to detain any conveyance until all publications that have a seditious intention have been removed or obliterated from the conveyance;
(d) to remove any person (by reasonable force if necessary) from any conveyance while any publication that has a seditious intention is removed or obliterated.
(3) If the publication that has a seditious intention is not visible from a public place, the powers conferred by subsection (1)(a) may only be exercised—
(a) with the prior permission of the occupier of the premises or place; or
(b) under and in accordance with a warrant issued by a magistrate for such purpose.
(4) In this section—conveyance (運輸工具) includes a vehicle, vessel, aircraft and hovercraft;
law enforcement officer (執法人員) means—
(a) a police officer; or
(b) an officer of a law enforcement agency who is authorized by the Secretary for Security to perform the functions under this section.
28. Extra-territorial effect of Divisions 2, 3 and 4
(1) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident who is a Chinese citizen;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under section 17(1) had it been done in the HKSAR,
the resident or body commits the offence.
(2) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under a provision specified in subsection (3) had it been done in the HKSAR, the resident or body commits the offence.
(3) The provision specified for the purposes of subsection (2) is—
(a) section 18(1), (2), (3) or (4);
(b) section 19(1) or (2);
(c) section 21(1) or (2); or
(d) section 24(1) or (2).
(4) In this section—HKSAR resident (特區居民) means—
(a) a Hong Kong permanent resident; or
(b) a person who is qualified to be issued with an identity card under the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177) but has no right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115).

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Part 4—Offences in connection with State Secrets and Espionage

Division 1: Offences in connection with State Secrets

29. Interpretation
In this Division—
disclose (披露), in relation to a document or other article, includes parting with possession of the document or article, and disclosing the information contained in the document or article;
government contractor (政府承辦商) means a person who is not a public officer but who provides, or is employed in the provision of, goods or services—
(a) for the purposes of the Government; or
(b) under an agreement or arrangement that is certified by the Chief Executive as being an agreement or arrangement to which the authority of a region or place, the government of a foreign country (including an institution under the government) or an international organization is a party, or that is subordinate to, or made for the purposes of implementing, any such agreement or arrangement;
information (資料), except in section 33 or 34, includes—
(a) information stored by electronic means; and
(b) message or intelligence that is not stored on any medium;
public officer (公職人員) means—
(a) a person holding an office of emolument under the Government, whether such office be permanent or temporary;
(b) any of the following persons (if the person is not a person mentioned in paragraph (a))—
(i) a principal official of the Government appointed in accordance with the Basic Law;
(ii) the Monetary Authority appointed under section 5A of the Exchange Fund Ordinance (Cap. 66) or a person appointed under section 5A(3) of that Ordinance;
(iii) the Chairman of the Public Service Commission;
(iv) a staff member of the Independent Commission Against Corruption;
(v) The Ombudsman or a person appointed under section 6 of The Ombudsman Ordinance (Cap. 397);
(vi) the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data or a person employed or engaged by the Commissioner under the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486);
(vii) the Chairperson or a member of the Equal Opportunities Commission, or a person employed or engaged by the Commission under the Sex Discrimination Ordinance (Cap. 480);
(viii) a judicial officer or a staff member of the Judiciary;
(c) a member of the Executive Council;
(d) a member of the Legislative Council;
(e) a member of a District Council;
(f) a member of the Election Committee as defined by section 2(1) of the Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap. 569); or
(g) a person of a class specified under section 31; region (地區) means a region, not being a country, outside the HKSAR;
specified disclosure (指明披露)—see section 30;
state secret (國家秘密) means one of the following secrets the disclosure, without lawful authority, of which would likely endanger national security—
(a) a secret concerning major policy decision on affairs of China or the HKSAR;
(b) a secret concerning the construction of national defence of China or concerning a Chinese armed force;
(c) a secret concerning diplomatic or foreign affair activities of China, a secret concerning external affairs of the HKSAR, or a secret that China or the HKSAR is under an external obligation to preserve secrecy;
(d) a secret concerning the economic or social development of China or the HKSAR;
(e) a secret concerning the technological development or scientific technology of China or the HKSAR;
(f) a secret concerning activities for safeguarding national security or the security of the HKSAR or for the investigation of offences;
(g) a secret concerning the relationship between the Central Authorities and the HKSAR (including information on affairs relating to the HKSAR for which the Central Authorities are responsible under the Basic Law).
30. Meaning of specified disclosure
(1) In this Division—specified disclosure (指明披露), in relation to any information, document or other article, means the disclosure of the information, document or article in the following circumstances—
(a) the purpose of making the disclosure is to reveal—
(i) circumstances in which the Government’s performance of its functions in accordance with the law is seriously affected; or
(ii) a serious threat to public order, public safety or public health;
(b) the disclosure is of an extent that does not exceed what is necessary for revealing the matter mentioned in paragraph (a)(i) or (ii); and
(c) having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the public interest served by making the disclosure manifestly outweighs the public interest served by not making the disclosure.
(2) In determining whether a person discloses any information, document or other article in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (c) of the definition of specified disclosure in subsection (1), regard must be had to—
(a) the seriousness of the matter mentioned in paragraph (a)(i) or (ii) of that definition;
(b) whether there is any reasonably practicable step in place of the disclosure, and if so, whether the person has taken those steps before making the disclosure;
(c) whether the person has reasonable grounds to believe that the disclosure is in the public interest;
(d) the public interest served by the disclosure;
(e) the extent of the damage or risk of damage brought about by the disclosure; and
(f) whether the disclosure is made under an emergency.
31. Specification of public officers
For the purposes of this Division, the Chief Executive in Council may, by order published in the Gazette, specify a class of persons as public officers if the Chief Executive in Council reasonably considers that it is necessary for safeguarding national security to specify the class of persons as public officers.
32. Unlawful acquisition of state secrets
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 5 years if the person—
(a) knowing that any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret; or
(b) having reasonable grounds to believe any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret, and with intent to endanger national security,
and without lawful authority, acquires the information, document or article.
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1)(a) to prove that the purpose of acquiring the information, document or article is to make a specified disclosure of the information, document or article.
(3) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years if the person, knowing that any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret, and—
(a) with intent to endanger national security; or
(b) being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered,
and without lawful authority, acquires the information, document or article.
(4) In this section, a reference to a person acquiring any information, document or other article—
(a) includes the person asking for, collecting, recording or copying the information, document or article; but
(b) does not include—
(i) the information, document or article coming into the person’s physical possession without the person’s knowledge; or
(ii) the information, document or article coming into the person’s possession or knowledge without the person taking any step.
33. Unlawful possession of state secrets
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 3 years if the person—
(a) knowing that any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret; or
(b) having reasonable grounds to believe any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret, and with intent to endanger national security,
and without lawful authority, possesses the information, document or article.
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1)(a) to prove that the purpose of possessing the information, document or article is to make a specified disclosure of the information, document or article.
(3) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 5 years if the person, knowing that any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret, and—
(a) with intent to endanger national security; or
(b) being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered,
and without lawful authority, possesses the information, document or article.
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) or (3) to establish that—
(a) the person has taken all reasonable steps to do the following as soon as possible after the time at which the alleged offence commences (commencement time)—
(i) surrender the information, document or article mentioned in that subsection to a police officer; or
(ii) dispose of the information, document or article mentioned in that subsection in accordance with the direction of a police officer; and
(b) since the commencement time and until the happening of the event mentioned in paragraph (a)(i) or (ii), the person has taken all reasonable steps to ensure that the information, document or article is not disclosed.
(5) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (4) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(6) In this section—information (資料)—
(a) includes information stored by electronic means; but
(b) does not include message or intelligence that is not stored on any medium.
34. Unlawful possession of state secrets when leaving HKSAR
(1) A person who is (or was) a public officer commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years if the person—
(a) acquires or possesses (or acquired or possessed) any information, document or other article by virtue of the person’s capacity as a public officer;
(b) knows that the information, document or article is or contains a state secret; and
(c) with intent to endanger national security or being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered, and without lawful authority, possesses the information, document or article when leaving the HKSAR.
(2) For a person leaving the HKSAR on a departure conveyance, a reference in subsection (1) to the person possessing any information, document or other article includes any of the following circumstances—
(a) the information, document or article being part of the personal belongings of the person carried on the conveyance;
(b) the information, document or article being in the checked baggage of the person (whether or not carried, or to be carried, on the same conveyance).
(3) In this section—departure conveyance (離境運輸工具) means a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, hovercraft or other means of transport engaged on a journey leaving the HKSAR;
information (資料)—
(a) includes information stored by electronic means; but
(b) does not include message or intelligence that is not stored on any medium.
35. Unlawful disclosure of state secrets
(1) If a specified person, without lawful authority, discloses any information, document or other article that is or contains a specified state secret and that is (or was) acquired or possessed by the person by virtue of the person’s specified capacity, the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.
(2) It is a defence for a specified person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to establish that, at the time of the alleged offence, the person did not know and had no reasonable grounds to believe that the information, document or article was or contained a specified state secret.
(3) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (2) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(4) A specified person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years if the person—
(a) acquires or possesses (or acquired or possessed) any information, document or other article by virtue of the person’s specified capacity;
(b) knows that the information, document or article is or contains a state secret (other than a specified state secret); and
(c) without lawful authority, discloses the information, document or article.
(5) A specified person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years if the person—
(a) acquires or possesses (or acquired or possessed) any information, document or other article by virtue of the person’s specified capacity;
(b) knows that the information, document or article is or contains a state secret (other than a specified state secret); and
(c) with intent to endanger national security, or being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered, and without lawful authority, discloses the information, document or article.
(6) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 5 years if the person—
(a) knowing that any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret; or
(b) having reasonable grounds to believe any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret, and with intent to endanger national security,
and without lawful authority, discloses the information, document or article.
(7) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (6)(a) to prove that the disclosure of the information, document or article is a specified disclosure.
(8) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years if the person, knowing that any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret, and—
(a) with intent to endanger national security; or
(b) being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered,
and without lawful authority, discloses the information, document or article.
(9) In this section, a reference to disclosing any information, document or other article does not include—
(a) surrendering the information, document or article to a police officer; or
(b) disposing of the information, document or article in accordance with the direction of a police officer.
(10) In this section—
specified capacity (指明身分)—
(a) in relation to a person who is (or was) a public officer—means the capacity of the person as a public officer; or
(b) in relation to a person who is (or was) a government contractor—means the capacity of the person as a government contractor;
specified person (指明人士) means a person who is (or was) a public officer or government contractor;
specified state secret (指明國家秘密) means a state secret that is a secret mentioned in paragraph (b), (c) or (g) of the definition of state secret in section 29.
36. Unlawful disclosure of information etc. acquired by espionage
(1) A person commits an offence if the person, without lawful authority, discloses any information, document or other article that the person knows (or has reasonable grounds to believe) to have come into the person’s possession as a result of a contravention of section 43(1).
(2) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.
37. Unlawful disclosure of information etc. that appears to be confidential matter
(1) If—
(a) a specified person, with intent to endanger national security, and without lawful authority—
(i) discloses any information, document or other article; and
(ii) in making the disclosure, represents or holds out that the information, document or article is (or was) acquired or possessed by the person by virtue of the person’s specified capacity; and
(b) the information, document or article would be (or likely to be) a confidential matter if it were true,
the person commits an offence regardless of whether the information, document or article is true or not, and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 5 years.
(2) If—
(a) a specified person colludes with an external force, with intent to endanger national security, and without lawful authority—
(i) discloses any information, document or other article; and
(ii) in making the disclosure, represents or holds out that the information, document or article is (or was) acquired or possessed by the person by virtue of the person’s specified capacity; and
(b) the information, document or article would be (or likely to be) a confidential matter if it were true,
the person commits an offence regardless of whether the information, document or article is true or not, and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.
(3) It is a defence for a specified person charged with an offence under subsection (1) or (2) to establish that, at the time of the alleged offence, the person did not know and had no reasonable grounds to believe that the information, document or article fell within subsection (1)(b) or (2)(b) (as the case may be).
(4) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (3) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(5) In this section—
confidential matter (機密事項) means a matter the disclosure, without lawful authority, of which would prejudice the interest of the Central Authorities or the Government;
specified capacity (指明身分)—
(a) in relation to a person who is (or was) a public officer—means the capacity of the person as a public officer; or
(b) in relation to a person who is (or was) a government contractor—means the capacity of the person as a government contractor;
specified person (指明人士) means a person who is (or was) a public officer or government contractor.
38. Authorized disclosures
(1) For the purposes of this Division, a disclosure by a public officer is made with lawful authority if, and only if, it is made in accordance with the officer’s official duty.
(2) For the purposes of this Division, a disclosure by a government contractor is made with lawful authority if, and only if, it is made—
(a) in accordance with an official authorization; or
(b) for the purposes of the functions by virtue of which the contractor is a government contractor and without contravening an official restriction.
(3) For the purposes of this Division, a disclosure by a person who is neither a public officer nor a government contractor is made with lawful authority if, and only if, it is made in accordance with an official authorization.
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 35, 36 or 37 to establish that, at the time of the alleged offence, the person believed that the person had lawful authority to make the disclosure and had no reasonable grounds to believe otherwise.
(5) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (4) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(6) In this section—
official authorization (正式授權) means an authorization duly given by a public officer or government contractor;
official restriction (正式限制) means a restriction duly imposed by a public officer or government contractor.
39. Safeguarding of information
(1) Subsection (2) applies if—
(a) a specified person possesses or controls any information, document or other article (relevant information, document or article) by virtue of the person’s capacity as a specified person; and
(b) the specified person would commit an offence under section 35 or 36 if the person discloses, without lawful authority, the relevant information, document or article.
(2) The specified person commits an offence if—
(a) being a public officer—the specified person retains the relevant information, document or article contrary to the person’s official duty; or
(b) being a government contractor—the specified person fails to comply with an official direction for the return or disposal of the relevant information, document or article,
or if the specified person fails to take such care to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of the relevant information, document or article as a person in the specified person’s position may reasonably be expected to take.
(3) It is a defence for a public officer charged with an offence under subsection (2)(a) to establish that, at the time of the alleged offence, the officer believed that the officer was acting in accordance with the officer’s official duty and had no reasonable grounds to believe otherwise.
(4) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (3) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(5) Where a person possesses or controls any information, document or other article that it would be an offence under section 35 or 36 for the person to disclose without lawful authority, the person commits an offence if—
(a) the person fails to comply with an official direction for the return or disposal of the information, document or article; or
(b) the person—
(i) obtained the information, document or article from a specified person on terms requiring the information, document or article to be held in confidence; or
(ii) obtained the information, document or article from a specified person in circumstances in which the specified person could reasonably expect that the information, document or article would be held in confidence,
and the person fails to take such care to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of the information, document or article as a person in the person’s position may reasonably be expected to take.
(6) A person who commits an offence under subsection (2) or (5) is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine at level 4 and to imprisonment for 3 months.
(7) A person commits an offence if the person discloses any official information, document or other article that can be used for the purpose of obtaining access to any information, document or other article protected against disclosure by section 35 or 36 and the circumstances in which it is disclosed are such that it would be reasonable to expect that the official information, document or article might be used for that purpose without authority.
(8) For the purposes of subsection (7), any information, document or article disclosed by the person is official information, document or article if—
(a) the person possesses (or possessed) the information, document or article by virtue of the person’s capacity as a specified person; or
(b) the person knows (or has reasonable grounds to believe) that a specified person possesses (or possessed) the information, document or article by virtue of the specified person’s capacity as a specified person.
(9) A person who commits an offence under subsection (7) is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of $500,000 and to imprisonment for 2 years.
(10) In this section—
official direction (正式指示) means a direction duly given by a specified person;
specified person (指明人士) means a public officer or government contractor.
40. Extra-territorial effect of this Division
(1) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under section 32(1) or (3), 33(1) or (3), 35(6) or (8) or 36(1) had it been done in the HKSAR, the resident or body commits the offence.
(2) If a person does any act outside the HKSAR, and the act would have constituted an offence under section 35(1), (4) or (5) or 37(1) or (2) had it been done in the HKSAR, the person commits the offence.
(3) In this section—HKSAR resident (特區居民) means—
(a) a Hong Kong permanent resident; or
(b) a person who is qualified to be issued with an identity card under the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177) but has no right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115).

Division 2: Offences in connection with Espionage

41. Interpretation
(1) In this Division—
conveyance (運輸工具) includes a vehicle, vessel, aircraft and hovercraft;
document (文件) includes part of a document;
munitions (軍火) includes the whole or any part of any vessel, aircraft, tank or similar engine, arms and ammunition, torpedo or mine, intended or adapted for use in war or armed conflict, and any other article, material or device, whether actual or proposed, intended for such use;
place (地方) means any place, and includes—
(a) any conveyance; and
(b) any tent or structure (whether or not movable or offshore);
prohibited place (禁地) means any of the following that is situated in the HKSAR—
(a) a work of defence, arsenal or military or national defence establishment;
(b) a place declared as a military restricted zone under Article 12 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Garrisoning of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (a translation of “《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區駐軍法》”);
(c) a station, factory, dockyard, mine, minefield, camp, vessel or aircraft belonging to or occupied by or on behalf of the Central Authorities or the Government (relevant Authority) and used for military or national defence purpose;
(d) a place that—
(i) belongs to or is occupied by or on behalf of a relevant Authority; and
(ii) may only be entered by a person performing a function in relation to that place, and is designed for placing one or more of the following items or relevant facilities—
(A) radiocommunications installation;
(B) telecommunications system;
(C) telecommunications installation;
(D) telecommunications network;
(E) telecommunications line;
(F) server;
(e) a place belonging to or occupied by or on behalf of a relevant Authority and used for the purpose of building, repairing, making or storing any munitions, vessel, aircraft, arms or materials or instruments for use in time of war or armed conflict, or any information, document or other article relating to such munitions, vessel, aircraft, arms or materials or instruments, or for the purpose of getting any metals, oil or minerals of use in time of war or armed conflict;
(f) a place not belonging to the relevant Authorities where any munitions, or any information, document or other article relating to such munitions, are being made, repaired, obtained or stored under a contract with, or with a person on behalf of, a relevant Authority, or otherwise on behalf of a relevant Authority; or
(g) a place declared under section 42 as a prohibited place;
radiocommunications installation (無線電通訊裝置) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap. 106);
telecommunications installation (電訊裝置) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap. 106);
telecommunications line (電訊線路) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap. 106);
telecommunications network (電訊網絡) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap. 106);
telecommunications system (電訊系統) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap. 106);
unmanned tool (無人工具) means a conveyance or other power driven machine that is operated with no person on board.
(2) In this Division—
(a) an expression referring to communicating includes any communicating, whether in whole or in part, and whether the information, document or other article itself or the substance, effect or description of the information, document or other article only be communicated;
(b) an expression referring to the communication of any information, document or other article includes the transfer or transmission of the information, document or other article, and also includes providing means of obtaining or accessing the information, document or other article; and
(c) an expression referring to obtaining any information, document or other article includes copying or causing to be copied the whole or any part of the information, document or other article.
42. Declaration of prohibited places and authorization of guards
(1) For the purposes of this Division, the Chief Executive may, by order published in the Gazette, declare a place situated in the HKSAR as a prohibited place if, having regard to the matters specified in subsection (2), the Chief Executive reasonably considers that it is necessary for safeguarding national security to declare the place as a prohibited place.
(2) The matters are—
(a) the use of the place;
(b) the owner or occupier of the place;
(c) the nature of any information kept, stored or processed in the place; and
(d) the nature of any technology, equipment or material situated at the place.
(3) An order made under subsection (1) may be made in respect of a particular place and may also be made in respect of a description of place.
(4) The Chief Executive may authorize any person or any class of persons as a person or persons to discharge duty as a guard or sentry in respect of any prohibited place.
43. Espionage
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 20 years if the person, with intent to endanger national security, does an act specified in subsection (2).
(2) The act is—
(a) approaching, inspecting, passing over or under, entering or accessing a prohibited place, or being in the neighbourhood of a prohibited place (including doing such act by electronic or remote means);
(b) causing an unmanned tool to approach, inspect, pass over or under, enter or access a prohibited place, or to be in the neighbourhood of a prohibited place (including doing such act by electronic or remote means); or
(c) obtaining (including by interception of communication), collecting, recording, producing or possessing, or communicating to any other person, any information, document or other article that is calculated to be, or is intended to be, directly or indirectly useful to an external force.
(3) If a person colludes with an external force to publish to the public a statement of fact that is false or misleading, and—
(a) the person—
(i) with intent to endanger national security or being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered, so publishes the statement; and
(ii) knows that the statement is false or misleading; or
(b) the person—
(i) with intent to endanger national security, so publishes the statement; and
(ii) has reasonable grounds to believe that the statement is false or misleading,
the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3)—
(a) a statement is a statement of fact if a reasonable person would consider it to be a representation of fact after reading or hearing it or after it comes to the person’s knowledge by other means; and
(b) a statement of fact is false if it is wholly false or false in a material respect, whether on its own or in the context in which it appears.
(5) In this section—
communication (通訊) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance (Cap. 589);
interception (截取) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance (Cap. 589).
44. Entering prohibited places without lawful authority etc.
A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 2 years if the person—
(a) without reasonable excuse or lawful authority—
(i) inspects, passes over or under, enters or accesses a prohibited place (including doing such act by electronic or remote means); or
(ii) causes an unmanned tool to inspect, pass over or under, enter or access a prohibited place (including doing such act by electronic or remote means); and
(b) knows (or has reasonable grounds to believe) that the person has no lawful authority to do the act mentioned in paragraph (a)(i) or (ii) at the time when doing the act.
45. Powers exercisable in relation to prohibited places
(1) A specified officer may order—
(a) any person not to do or cease to do an act specified in section 43(2)(a) or (b);
(b) a person who has entered or accessed (including having entered or accessed by electronic or remote means) a prohibited place to leave the prohibited place immediately;
(c) a person who is in the neighbourhood of a prohibited place to leave the neighbourhood immediately; or
(d) a person who drives or operates a conveyance that is in a prohibited place or in the neighbourhood of a prohibited place (relevant place), or who operates an unmanned tool that is in a relevant place, to remove the conveyance or the unmanned tool from the relevant place.
(2) A specified officer may arrange—
(a) a conveyance or unmanned tool in a relevant place to be removed from the relevant place; or
(b) a conveyance or unmanned tool to be moved from a place within a relevant place to another place within a relevant place.
(3) A specified officer must not exercise a power conferred by subsection (1) or (2) unless the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that it is necessary for safeguarding national security to exercise the power.
(4) A person who contravenes an order made under subsection (1) commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 2 years.
(5) In this section—specified officer (指明人員)—
(a) in relation to a prohibited place—means any of the following persons—
(i) a police officer;
(ii) a person authorized under section 42(4) in respect of the prohibited place; or
(b) in relation to a prohibited place belonging to or occupied by or on behalf of the Central Authorities—means a person assigned by the institution in charge of the prohibited place to discharge duty as a guard or sentry in respect of the prohibited place.
46. Obstruction etc. in the vicinity of prohibited places
(1) If a specified officer is discharging duty in respect of a prohibited place, and another person, in the vicinity of the prohibited place—
(a) wilfully obstructs the specified officer from discharging the duty;
(b) knowingly misleads the specified officer in circumstances concerning the discharge of the duty by the specified officer; or
(c) otherwise wilfully interferes with or impedes the specified officer in the discharge of the duty,
that other person commits an offence.
(2) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 2 years.
(3) In this section—
specified officer (指明人員)—
(a) in relation to a prohibited place—means any of the following persons—
(i) a police officer;
(ii) a person authorized under section 42(4) in respect of the prohibited place; or
(b) in relation to a prohibited place belonging to or occupied by or on behalf of the Central Authorities—means a person assigned by the institution in charge of the prohibited place to discharge duty as a guard or sentry in respect of the prohibited place.
47. Participating in or supporting external intelligence organizations, or accepting advantages offered by them, etc.
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 14 years if the person—
(a) with intent to endanger national security; or
(b) being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered,
knowingly does a prohibited act in relation to an external intelligence organization.
(2) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years if—
(a) the person, being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered, does an act (relevant act);
(b) the relevant act constitutes a prohibited act done in relation to an external intelligence organization; and
(c) the person is reckless as to whether the relevant act would constitute the prohibited act.
(3) The Chief Executive may issue a certifying document to certify whether an organization is an external intelligence organization, and the document is binding on a Court.
(4) In this section—
advantage (利益) means—
(a) any gift, loan, fee, reward or commission consisting of money, of any valuable security or of other property or interest in property of any description;
(b) any office, employment or contract;
(c) any payment, release, discharge or liquidation of any loan, obligation or other liability, whether in whole or in part;
(d) any other service, or favour (other than entertainment), including protection from any penalty or disability incurred or apprehended or from any action or proceedings of a disciplinary, civil or criminal nature, whether or not already instituted;
(e) the exercise, or forbearance from the exercise, of any right, power or duty; and
(f) any offer, undertaking or promise, whether conditional or unconditional, of any advantage within the meaning of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e);
economic resources (經濟資源) means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds but can be used to obtain funds, goods or services;
entertainment (款待) means the provision of food or drink, for consumption on the occasion when it is provided, and of any other entertainment relating to, or provided at the same time as, such provisions;
external intelligence organization (境外情報組織) means an organization established by an external force and engaging in the following work or activity (however described)—
(a) intelligence work; or
(b) subversion or sabotage of other countries or places;
financial support (財政支援) means any funds or other financial assets or economic resources;
funds (資金) includes—
(a) gold coin, gold bullion, cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders and other payment instruments;
(b) deposits with financial institutions or other entities, balances on accounts, debts and debt obligations;
(c) securities and debt instruments (including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, debentures, debenture stock and derivatives contracts);
(d) interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by property;
(e) credit, rights of set-off, guarantees, performance bonds or other financial commitments;
(f) letters of credit, bills of lading and bills of sale;
(g) documents evidencing an interest in funds or financial resources; and
(h) any other instrument of export financing;
prohibited act (受禁作為), in relation to an external intelligence organization, means—
(a) becoming a member of the organization;
(b) accepting a task or training from the organization (or a person acting on behalf of the organization);
(c) offering substantial support (including providing financial support or information and recruiting members for the organization) to the organization (or a person acting on behalf of the organization); or
(d) accepting substantial advantage offered by the organization (or a person acting on behalf of the organization).
48. Extra-territorial effect of this Division
(1) If a person does any act outside the HKSAR, and the act would have constituted an offence under section 43(1) (in respect of an act specified in section 43(2)(a) or (b)) or an offence under section 44 had it been done in the HKSAR, the person commits the offence.
(2) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident who is a Chinese citizen;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under section 43(1) (in respect of an act specified in section 43(2)(c)) or an offence under section 47(1) or (2) had it been done in the HKSAR, the resident or body commits the offence.
(3) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under section 43(3) had it been done in the HKSAR,
the resident or body commits the offence.
(4) In this section—HKSAR resident (特區居民) means—
(a) a Hong Kong permanent resident; or
(b) a person who is qualified to be issued with an identity card under the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177) but has no right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115).

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Part 5—Sabotage Endangering National Security etc.

49. Sabotage endangering national security
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 20 years if the person—
(a) with intent to endanger national security; or
(b) being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered,
damages or weakens a public infrastructure.
(2) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to life imprisonment if the person—
(a) with intent to endanger national security; or
(b) being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered,
colludes with an external force to damage or weaken a public infrastructure.
(3) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2), an act is weakening a public infrastructure if the act causes any of the following effects (whenever caused) on the infrastructure (including any thing or software that constitutes the infrastructure)—
(a) making the infrastructure vulnerable to abuse or damage;
(b) making the infrastructure vulnerable to be accessed or altered by persons who are not entitled to access or alter the infrastructure;
(c) causing the infrastructure not to be able to function as it should in whole or in part;
(d) causing the infrastructure not to operate in a way as set by its owner or the owner’s representative (even if the act would not reduce the reliability of the operation of the infrastructure, of the thing or software constituting the infrastructure or of the information stored in the infrastructure).
(4) In this section—
public infrastructure (公共基礎設施) means—
(a) the following item that belongs to the Central Authorities or the Government or is occupied by or on behalf of the Central Authorities or the Government (whether it is situated in the HKSAR or not)—
(i) infrastructure;
(ii) facility or equipment;
(iii) network or computer or electronic system;
(iv) office premises; or
(v) military or national defence facility or equipment;
(b) public means of transport, public transport infrastructure or public transport facility that is situated in the HKSAR (including an airport and relevant facility); or
(c) the following item that is situated in the HKSAR—
(i) the following item providing or maintaining public services (such as finance, logistics, water, electricity, energy, fuel, drainage, communication, the Internet)—
(A) infrastructure; or
(B) facility; or
(ii) computer or electronic system providing or managing the services mentioned in subparagraph (i).
50. Doing acts endangering national security in relation to computers or electronic systems
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 20 years if—
(a) the person, with intent to endanger national security and without lawful authority, does an act in relation to a computer or electronic system;
(b) the person knows that the person has no lawful authority to do the act at the time of doing the act; and
(c) the act endangers (or is likely to endanger) national security.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), a person who does an act in relation to a computer or electronic system (the person) does the act without lawful authority if—
(a) the person is not a person who is responsible for the computer or electronic system and is entitled to decide whether the act could be done (responsible person); and
(b) the person does the act without the consent of a responsible person.
(3) In this section—
computer or electronic system (電腦或電子系統) includes any thing or software that constitutes the computer or electronic system.
51. Extra-territorial effect of this Part
If a person does any act outside the HKSAR, and the act would have constituted an offence under section 49(1) or (2) or 50(1) had it been done in the HKSAR, the person commits the offence.

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Part 6—External Interference Endangering National Security and Organizations Engaging in Activities Endangering National Security

Division 1: External Interference Endangering National Security

52. External interference endangering national security
A person who—
(a) with intent to bring about an interference effect, collaborates with an external force to do an act; and
(b) uses improper means when so doing the act,
commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 14 years.
53. Meaning of bringing about interference effect
(1) In this Division, a reference to bringing about an interference effect is a reference to bringing about one or more of the following effects—
(a) influencing the Central People’s Government or the executive authorities of the HKSAR in—
(i) the formulation or execution of any policy or measures; or
(ii) the making or execution of any other decision,
including influencing an official of the Central People’s Government or of the executive authorities of the HKSAR, or any other officer who is authorized to perform the above function of the official, in performing that function;
(b) influencing the Legislative Council in performing functions (including influencing a member of the Legislative Council in performing functions as such a member), or interfering with any process in connection with the Legislative Council;
(c) influencing a Court in performing functions (including influencing a judicial officer in performing functions as such an officer), or interfering with the administration of justice in the HKSAR;
(d) interfering with any election or any process in connection with an election, including—
(i) influencing any other person in exercising the right to vote, or the right to stand for election, of the person enjoyed in relation to any election under the Basic Law;
(ii) interfering with the process of constituting the Election Committee under section 8 of the Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap. 569); and
(iii) interfering with the process under which any other person becomes a member of a District Council under the District Councils Ordinance (Cap. 547);
(e) prejudicing any one or more of the following relationships—
(i) the relationship between China and any foreign country;
(ii) the relationship between the Central Authorities and the HKSAR;
(iii) the relationship between the Central Authorities and any other region of China;
(iv) the relationship between the HKSAR and any other region of China;
(v) the relationship between the HKSAR and any foreign country.
(2) In this section—election (選舉) means an election set out in section 4(1) of the Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Conduct) Ordinance (Cap. 554).
54. Meaning of collaborating with external force
For the purposes of this Division, a person collaborates with an external force to do an act if one or more of the following circumstances exist—
(a) the person participates in an activity planned or otherwise led by an external force, and the act is an act that the person’s participation in the activity involves;
(b) the person does the act on behalf of an external force;
(c) the person does the act in cooperation with an external force;
(d) the person does the act under the control, supervision or direction of, or on request by, an external force;
(e) the person does the act with the financial contributions, or the support by other means, of an external force.
55. Meaning of using improper means
(1) For the purposes of section 52, the person mentioned in that section (subject person) uses improper means when doing the act mentioned in that section if the person falls within at least one of the descriptions in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c)—
(a) the subject person knowingly makes to a person a material misrepresentation when doing the act or any part of it;
(b) the act or any part of it is done by any one or more of the following ways—
(i) using or threatening to use violence against a person;
(ii) destroying or damaging, or threatening to destroy or damage, a person’s property;
(iii) causing financial loss to a person by other means, or threatening to cause financial loss to a person by other means;
(iv) damaging or threatening to damage a person’s reputation;
(v) causing psychological harm to, or placing undue psychological pressure on, a person;
(c) the act or any part of it constitutes an offence.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), a material misrepresentation—
(a) may be made orally or by written representation, and may be made by other conduct; and
(b) may be express or implied.
(3) In this section, a reference to making to a person a material misrepresentation is a reference to making to the person a false or misleading representation that has the effect of preventing the person from discerning—
(a) the fact that the subject person, with intent to bring about an interference effect, does the act; or
(b) the fact that the subject person collaborates with an external force to do the act.
56. Presumption of doing acts on behalf of external force
(1) In proceedings brought against a person (defendant) for an offence under section 52, if the prosecution proves that the defendant, with intent to bring about an interference effect, did an act, the defendant is to be presumed, for the purposes of section 54(b), to have done the act on behalf of an external force as long as the prosecution further proves that—
(a) the defendant communicated with the external force in relation to the intent or a matter in connection with the intent before so doing the act; and
(b) the defendant knew or ought to have known that the act or any part of it—
(i) would result in the external force achieving its aims; or
(ii) would otherwise benefit the external force.
(2) However, the presumption under subsection (1) is rebutted by the defendant if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue that the defendant did not do the act on behalf of the external force; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
57. Extra-territorial effect of this Division
(1) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident who is a Chinese citizen;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under section 52 had it been done in the HKSAR,
the resident or body commits the offence.
(2) In this section—HKSAR resident (特區居民) means—
(a) a Hong Kong permanent resident; or
(b) a person who is qualified to be issued with an identity card under the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177) but has no right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115).

Division 2: Organizations Engaging in Activities Endangering National Security

Subdivision 1: Preliminary

58. Interpretation
In this Division—
authorized officer (獲授權人員) means a public servant appointed under section 67;
connection (聯繫), in relation to an organization that is a political body, means the following circumstances—
(a) the organization solicits or accepts financial contributions, financial sponsorships or financial support of any kind or loans, or substantive support by other means, directly or indirectly, from a political organization of an external place;
(b) the organization is affiliated directly or indirectly with a political organization of an external place;
(c) any policy of the organization is determined directly or indirectly by a political organization of an external place; or
(d) a political organization of an external place directs, controls, supervises, dictates or participates, directly or indirectly, in the decision making process of the organization;
office-bearer (幹事)—
(a) in relation to an organization, means the president, vice-president, secretary or treasurer of the organization, or a member of the committee or governing body of the organization, or a person who holds in the organization an office or position analogous to any of those mentioned above; or
(b) in relation to a prohibited organization, means a person holding any office or position in the prohibited organization other than that of an ordinary member;
organization (組織) means—
(a) a society as defined by section 2(1) of the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151);
(b) a person listed in the Schedule to that Ordinance; or
(c) any other body, whatever its nature and regardless of whether the body is formed or established pursuant to, or is operated in accordance with, any object or aim;
political body (政治性團體) means—
(a) a political party or an organization that purports to be a political party; or
(b) an organization whose principal function or main object is to promote or prepare a candidate for an election set out in section 4(1) of the Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Conduct) Ordinance (Cap. 554);
political organization of an external place (境外政治性組織) includes—
(a) a government of a foreign country or a political subdivision of the government;
(b) the authority of an external place or a political subdivision of the authority;
(c) an agent of the government or authority or an agent of the political subdivision of the government or authority; and
(d) a political party in an external place or an agent of the political party;
prohibited organization (受禁組織) means an organization in relation to which an order made under section 60(1) or (2) is in force.
59. This Division does not affect operation of Societies Ordinance
This Division does not affect the operation of the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151).

Subdivision 2: Prohibition of Operation of Organizations Engaging in Activities Endangering National Security in HKSAR

60. Prohibition of operation of organizations
(1) If the Secretary for Security reasonably believes that it is necessary for safeguarding national security to prohibit the operation or continued operation of an organization specified in subsection (3) in the HKSAR, the Secretary for Security may, by order published in the Gazette, prohibit the operation or continued operation of the organization in the HKSAR.
(2) If an organization specified in subsection (3)(a) (local organization) is a political body and has a connection with a political organization of an external place, the Secretary for Security may, by order published in the Gazette, prohibit the operation or continued operation of the local organization in the HKSAR.
(3) The organization specified for subsections (1) and (2) is—
(a) an organization that is organized and established in the HKSAR or has its headquarters or chief place of business in the HKSAR, but does not include—
(i) a company registered under the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622) (CO);
(ii) a company registered under the former Companies Ordinance (as defined by section 2(1) of the CO); or
(iii) a non-Hong Kong company as defined by section 2(1) of the CO (non-Hong Kong company); or
(b) an organization that is organized and established outside the HKSAR and has its headquarters or chief place of business outside the HKSAR (but excluding a non-Hong Kong company), to which one or more of the following circumstances apply—
(i) the organization conducts any activity in the HKSAR;
(ii) any person in the HKSAR acts as an office-bearer or member of the organization or professes or claims to be an office-bearer or member of the organization;
(iii) any person in the HKSAR manages or assists in the management of the organization;
(iv) any person in the HKSAR conducts any activity in the HKSAR on behalf of, or in cooperation with, or under the control, supervision or direction of, the organization;
(v) the organization incites, induces or invites any person in the HKSAR to become a member of, or manage or assist in the management of, the organization;
(vi) any person in the HKSAR pays money or gives aid of other kinds to or for the purposes of the organization;
(vii) the organization solicits or accepts financial contributions, loans, or financial sponsorships of any kind, or aid of other kinds, directly or indirectly from any person in the HKSAR;
(viii) the organization provides financial contributions, loans, or financial sponsorships of any kind, or aid of other kinds, directly or indirectly to any person in the HKSAR.
(4) The Secretary for Security must not make an order under subsection (1) or (2) without first affording the organization an opportunity to be heard or to make written representations as the organization considers appropriate as to why such an order should not be made.
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply if the Secretary for Security reasonably believes that affording the organization an opportunity to be heard or to make written representations would not be practicable in the circumstances of that case.
(6) An order made under subsection (1) or (2) must as soon as practicable be—
(a) served on the organization;
(b) published in a Chinese language newspaper and an English language newspaper in general circulation in the HKSAR designated by the Secretary for Security;
(c) published in the Gazette; and
(d) published on an internet website designated by the Secretary for Security.
(7) An order made under subsection (1) or (2)—
(a) takes effect on publication in the Gazette; or
(b) if specified to take effect on a subsequent date—takes effect on the specified date.
61. Matters following prohibition of operation of local organizations
(1) If the operation or continued operation in the HKSAR of any organization specified in section 60(3)(a) is prohibited under section 60 (local prohibited organization), the organization is dissolved on the taking effect of the order prohibiting the operation or continued operation of the organization under section 60(7).
(2) After the dissolution of a local prohibited organization, the liability (if any) of every office-bearer and member of the organization continues and may be enforced as if the organization had not been dissolved.
(3) If, immediately before the taking effect of an order prohibiting the operation or continued operation of a local prohibited organization under section 60(7), the organization is registered (however described, and carried out in whatever manner) under a specified Ordinance, subsections (4) and (5) apply to the organization.
(4) If the organization is dissolved under subsection (1), the registration mentioned in subsection (3) is cancelled, and the specified authority must—
(a) if a register (however described) is required to be kept in relation to the registration under the specified Ordinance—update the register in view of the cancellation of the registration; and
(b) publish a notice of the cancellation of the registration in the Gazette.
(5) Where the organization is dissolved under subsection (1)—
(a) if there is any provision in the specified Ordinance that applies after the dissolution of the organization under the specified Ordinance—the provision applies as if the organization were dissolved under the specified Ordinance; and
(b) if there is any provision that applies to the winding up of the organization, or any other provision that has the same effect, in the specified Ordinance—the provision applies to the organization.
(6) Subsection (7) applies to a local prohibited organization if—
(a) the organization is not an organization mentioned in subsection (3); or
(b) the organization is an organization mentioned in subsection (3), but there is neither a provision that applies to the winding up of the organization nor any other provision that has the same effect in the specified Ordinance.
(7) Where a local prohibited organization is dissolved under subsection (1), sections 360E, 360F, 360G, 360H, 360I, 360J, 360K, 360L and 360M of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32) apply, with necessary modifications, to the organization as if the organization were a company that had been struck off the Companies Register, and had been dissolved, under section 360C of that Ordinance.
(8) In this section—specified authority (指明當局), in relation to a registration mentioned in subsection (3), means—
(a) if a person is required to keep a register (however described) in relation to the registration under the specified Ordinance—the person; or
(b) in any other case—the Secretary for Security;
specified Ordinance (指明條例) means an Ordinance other than the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622) and the former Companies Ordinance as defined by section 2(1) of the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622).

Subdivision 3: Offences in connection with Prohibited Organizations

62. Prohibition of participation in activities of prohibited organizations
(1) A person who, after the operation or continued operation of an organization in the HKSAR is prohibited under section 60—
(a) is or acts as an office-bearer of the organization, or professes or claims to be an officer-bearer of the organization; or
(b) manages or assists in the management of the organization,
commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of $1,000,000 and imprisonment for 14 years.
(2) A person who, after the operation or continued operation of an organization in the HKSAR is prohibited under section 60—
(a) is or acts as a member of the organization, or professes or claims to be a member of the organization;
(b) conducts any activity on behalf of, or in cooperation with, or under the control, supervision or direction of, the organization;
(c) participates in a meeting of the organization; or
(d) pays money or gives aid of other kinds to or for the purposes of the organization, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of $250,000 and imprisonment for 10 years.
(3) The following act does not constitute an offence under subsection (1) or (2)—
(a) doing an act with the prior written permission of the Secretary for Security;
(b) participating in any proceedings, whether in one’s own capacity or as a representative of an organization that is a party to the proceedings;
(c) seeking, providing or accepting any legal services, or making or receiving any payment for the services; or
(d) doing any act that is incidental to the act referred to in paragraph (b) or (c).
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) or (2) to establish that, at the time of the alleged offence, the person did not know and had no reasonable grounds to believe that the operation or continued operation of the organization in the HKSAR was prohibited under section 60.
(5) Without affecting subsection (4)—
(a) it is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1), for being or acting as an office-bearer of a prohibited organization, to establish that the person has taken all reasonable steps and exercised due diligence to terminate the status as such an office-bearer; or
(b) it is a defence for a person who is charged with an offence under subsection (2), for being or acting as a member of a prohibited organization, to establish that the person has taken all reasonable steps and exercised due diligence to terminate the membership.
(6) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (4) or (5) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
63. Allowing meetings of prohibited organizations to be held on premises
A person who knowingly allows a meeting of a prohibited organization, or of members of a prohibited organization, to be held in or on any place or premises belonging to or occupied by the person, or over which the person has control, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of $250,000 and to imprisonment for 7 years.
64. Inciting etc. others to become members of prohibited organizations
A person who incites, induces or invites any other person to become a member of or assist in the management of a prohibited organization, or uses any violence, threat or intimidation towards any other person in order to induce that other person to become a member of or to assist in the management of a prohibited organization, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of $250,000 and to imprisonment for 7 years.
65. Procuring subscription or aid for prohibited organizations
A person who procures or attempts to procure from any other person any subscription or aid for the purposes of a prohibited organization commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of $250,000 and to imprisonment for 7 years.
66. Shadow organizations of prohibited organizations
(1) In section 62(1)(a) and (b) and (2)(a), (b), (c) and (d), a reference to the organization includes a shadow organization of the organization.
(2) In sections 63, 64 and 65, a reference to a prohibited organization includes a shadow organization of a prohibited organization.
(3) For the purposes of this section, if an organization (Organization A) holds itself out to be another organization (Organization B), Organization A is a shadow organization of Organization B.

Subdivision 4: Miscellaneous Provisions

67. Authorized officers
The Secretary for Security may appoint a public servant in writing to be an authorized officer for the purposes of this Division.
68. Information to be provided by organizations
(1) An authorized officer may, by written notice, require any organization to provide in writing information that is reasonably necessary for the Secretary for Security to perform a function of the Secretary for Security under section 60.
(2) The notice under subsection (1) must be served on—
(a) the organization; or
(b) any office-bearer of the organization or any person who manages or assists in the management of the organization in the HKSAR.
(3) The information required to be provided under subsection (1) may include the income, the source of income and the expenditure of the organization.
(4) The notice under subsection (1) must specify the time within which (being not less than 7 days) the information must be provided.
(5) The authorized officer may, on application made to the officer and on good reason being shown, grant an extension of time at the officer’s discretion.
69. Persons responsible for providing information
(1) The obligations imposed on any organization under section 68 are binding on every office-bearer of the organization, and on every person managing or assisting in the management of the organization in the HKSAR, who has been served with the notice under that section.
(2) If an organization fails to comply with the whole or part of a notice served under section 68, each of the persons mentioned in subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction to a fine at level 4 unless the person establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the person has exercised due diligence and has failed to comply with the notice for reasons beyond the person’s control.
(3) If any information provided to the Secretary for Security in compliance with a notice served under section 68 is false, incorrect, or incomplete in a material particular, the person who has provided the information is liable on summary conviction to a fine at level 4 unless the person establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the person had good reason to believe that the information was true, correct and complete.
70. Power to inspect non-domestic premises
For the purpose of enabling the Secretary for Security to perform a function of the Secretary for Security under section 60, if a police officer of the rank of Superintendent or above reasonably believes that any non-domestic premises are kept or used by an organization or any of its members as a place for conducting any meeting or activity or a place of business, the police officer (or a police officer authorized by that officer) may, at the time during which the meeting or activity is conducted, at the time during which the business is carried on, or at any other reasonable time, enter and inspect the non-domestic premises.
71. Power to search places in specific circumstances
(1) If a magistrate is satisfied by information on oath by an authorized officer that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that any specified evidence is in a place, the magistrate may issue a warrant.
(2) The warrant may authorize an authorized officer and any other person specified in the warrant to take all or any of the following actions—
(a) to enter and search the place;
(b) to seize, remove or impound anything that appears to that officer or that other person to be specified evidence;
(c) to remove by force a person or thing obstructing that officer or that other person from exercising a power conferred on that officer or that other person by this section;
(d) to detain a person found in the place until the place has been searched.
(3) If—
(a) a police officer of the rank of Superintendent or above has reasonable grounds to suspect that any specified evidence is in a place; and
(b) the delay necessary to obtain a warrant is likely to result in the loss or destruction of evidence or for any other reason it would not be reasonably practicable to obtain such a warrant,
the police officer (or a police officer authorized by that officer) may exercise any of the powers referred to in subsection (2) in respect of the place without a warrant issued under subsection (1).
(4) In this section—
place (地方) means any place, and includes—
(a) any vehicle, vessel, aircraft, hovercraft or other conveyance;
(b) any tent or structure (whether or not movable or offshore); and
(c) any electronic equipment;
specified evidence (指明證據) means anything that is or contains, or that is likely to be or contain, evidence necessary for the Secretary for Security to perform a function of the Secretary for Security under section 60.
72. Forfeiture
Any books, accounts, writings, banners, insignia or other movable property belonging to any prohibited organization must, on order of a magistrate, be forfeited and given to the Secretary for Security for disposal in the manner that the Secretary for Security considers appropriate.
73. Service of notices etc.
A notice or order that must be served on a person or organization under this Division is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, deemed to be so served if—
(a) for an individual, the notice or order is—
(i) delivered to the individual;
(ii) left at the individual’s last known address for service, or at the individual’s last known place of residence or business;
(iii) sent by post to the individual at the individual’s last known address for service, or at the individual’s last known postal address, whether or not the address is in the HKSAR;
(iv) sent by electronic mail transmission, fax transmission or other similar method to the individual at the individual’s last known address for service, or at the individual’s last known postal address, or at the individual’s last known place of residence or business, whether or not the address or place is in the HKSAR; or
(v) published through the Internet or a similar electronic network for the purpose of bringing the matter that the notice or order concerns to the attention of the individual;
(b) for an organization, the notice or order is—
(i) given to or served on an office-bearer of the organization, or a person managing or assisting in the management of the organization;
(ii) left at the organization’s last known address for service, or at its last known address;
(iii) sent by post to the organization at its last known address for service, or at its last known postal address, whether or not the address is in the HKSAR;
(iv) sent by electronic mail transmission, fax transmission or other similar method to the organization at its last known address for service, or at its last known postal address, or at its last known address, whether or not the address is in the HKSAR; or
(v) published through the Internet or a similar electronic network for the purpose of bringing the matter that the notice or order concerns to the attention of an office-bearer of the organization, or a person managing or assisting in the management of the organization.

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Part 7—Enforcement Powers and Procedure in Legal Actions etc. in connection with Safeguarding National Security

Division 1: Enforcement Powers, and Other Matters in connection with Investigation

Subdivision 1: Applications may be Made to Court for Extension of Detention Period for Investigation of Offences Endangering National Security

74. Interpretation
(1) In this Subdivision—
arrested person (被捕人)—see section 75(2);
Cap. 232 (《第232章》) means the Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232);
first detention period (首段羈留期) means the period of 48 hours referred to in section 75(2);
hospital (醫院) means—
(a) a hospital specified in Schedule 1 or 2 to the Hospital Authority Ordinance (Cap. 113); or
(b) a clinic for medical diagnosis or treatment that is maintained or managed by the Government.
(2) In calculating a period under this Subdivision, any time during which the arrested person receives medical diagnosis or treatment in hospital, or is on the way there or back, is not included, except for any time during which the person is being questioned in hospital or on the way there or back by a police officer for the purpose of obtaining evidence in respect of an offence.
75. Application of this Subdivision to persons arrested for offences endangering national security
(1) This Subdivision applies in relation to a person who—
(a) is arrested for being reasonably suspected of having committed an offence endangering national security; and
(b) is required under section 52 of Cap. 232 to be brought before a magistrate as soon as practicable.
(2) Subject to section 78(1), the person who is detained in police custody (arrested person) must be brought before a magistrate as soon as practicable, and in any event, not later than the first sitting of a Magistrates’ Court after the expiry of the period of 48 hours after the person’s arrest.
76. Applications to Court for extension of detention period
(1) A police officer of the rank of Chief Superintendent or above or a police officer authorized by that officer may, by application supported by information on oath, apply to a magistrate for an extension, or further extension, of the period of detention of an arrested person in police custody without charge.
(2) The information in support of the application—
(a) must be laid by a police officer of the rank of Chief Inspector or above; and
(b) must state—
(i) the nature of the offence;
(ii) the general nature of the evidence on which the arrested person was arrested;
(iii) what inquiries have been made by the police in relation to the offence and what further inquiries are proposed to be made by them; and
(iv) the reasons why further detention of the arrested person is necessary.
77. Court hearings of applications for extension of detention period
(1) A magistrate must not hear the application unless—
(a) the arrested person has been given a copy of the application (the information in support of the application need not be given to the arrested person); and
(b) the arrested person has been brought before the magistrate for the hearing of the application.
(2) If the arrested person is not represented by a solicitor or counsel but wishes to be so represented—
(a) the magistrate may adjourn the hearing of the application for a reasonable period to enable the person to be represented by a solicitor or counsel, and the period must not exceed—
(i) for the first application after the arrested person’s arrest—7 days after the expiry of the first detention period; and
(ii) for any subsequent application—7 days after the expiry of the last period of extension, or 14 days after the expiry of the first detention period, whichever is the earlier; and
(b) the arrested person is to be delivered to the police for detention in their custody during the adjournment.
78. Court decisions on applications for extension of detention period
(1) If the magistrate hearing the application is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an extension (or further extension) of the period of detention of the arrested person in police custody is justified, the magistrate may authorize the period of detention of the arrested person in police custody without charge to be—
(a) for the first application after the arrested person’s arrest—extended for a period not exceeding 7 days after the expiry of the first detention period; and
(b) for any subsequent application—further extended, with each period of extension not exceeding 7 days, and with the period of extension also not causing the total period of detention of the arrested person to exceed 14 days after the expiry of the first detention period.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an extension (or further extension) of the period of detention of the arrested person in police custody is justified only if—
(a) the investigation of the offence is being diligently and expeditiously conducted by the police, and cannot reasonably be completed before the date of the application; and
(b) the detention of the arrested person without charge is necessary for securing or preserving the evidence of the offence or for obtaining the evidence by questioning the person.
(3) An authorization given under subsection (1)—
(a) must be in writing; and
(b) must state—
(i) the time at which the authorization is given; and
(ii) the period for which the arrested person is delivered to the police for detention in their custody is authorized.
(4) If the magistrate authorizes, under subsection (1), an extension (or further extension) of the period of detention of the arrested person in police custody (extended period), then, unless the person is charged, the person must be discharged, in circumstances in which section 52(3) of Cap. 232 applies, on or before the expiry of the extended period.
(5) If the magistrate refuses the application under subsection (1), then, unless the arrested person is charged, the arrested person must be discharged, in circumstances in which section 52(3) of Cap. 232 applies—
(a) for the first application after the arrested person’s arrest—
(i) on or before the expiry of the first detention period; or
(ii) if the first detention period has expired when the application is refused—at the conclusion of the hearing of the application; and
(b) for any subsequent application—
(i) on or before the expiry of the last extended period; or
(ii) if the last extended period has expired when the application is refused—at the conclusion of the hearing of the application.
(6) Despite subsections (4) and (5), if, before the expiry of the period under subsection (4) or (5) (as applicable), the police officer who laid the information no longer has reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances specified in subsection (2) exist, then, unless the arrested person is charged, the person must be discharged, in circumstances in which section 52(3) of Cap. 232 applies, immediately.

Subdivision 2: Applications may be Made to Court for Imposition of Appropriate Restrictions in relation to Consultation with Legal Representatives in View of Circumstances Endangering National Security

79. Consultation with relevant particular legal representatives may be restricted in view of circumstances endangering national security
(1) This section applies if a person is arrested for being reasonably suspected of having committed an offence endangering national security and is detained in police custody, and during the detention in police custody, the person requests to consult, or is consulting, a particular legal representative or particular legal representatives.
(2) A police officer of the rank of Chief Superintendent or above or a police officer authorized by that officer may, by ex parte application supported by information on oath, apply to a magistrate for the issue by the magistrate of a warrant in relation to the person under this section.
(3) If the magistrate hearing the application is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances specified in subsection (4) exist, the magistrate may issue a warrant authorizing a police officer to impose the following restriction on the person—
(a) the person must not, during the person’s detention in police custody—
(i) consult the particular legal representative or legal representatives; or
(ii) if the particular legal representative or legal representatives is or are in the practice of the law in a certain Hong Kong firm or certain Hong Kong firms—consult any legal representative in the practice of the law in the firm or firms; but
(b) the person may consult any other legal representative of the person’s choosing.
(4) The circumstances are—
(a) the person’s consultation with any legal representative referred to in subsection (3)(a) (relevant legal representative) during the person’s detention in police custody will endanger national security or cause bodily harm to any person;
(b) the person has benefited from the offence, and the person’s consultation with the relevant legal representative during the person’s detention in police custody will hinder the recovery of the benefit unless the authorization is given; or
(c) the person’s consultation with the relevant legal representative during the person’s detention in police custody will pervert or obstruct the course of justice unless the authorization is given.
(5) If the information under subsection (2) is laid during the person’s consultation with a particular legal representative or particular legal representatives, then, before a magistrate makes any decision on the information—
(a) if the application that is supported by the information requests for the imposition of restrictions in relation to the person’s consultation with the particular legal representative or legal representatives—the person must suspend consultation with the particular legal representative or legal representatives, but may consult any other legal representative of the person’s choosing; or
(b) if the particular legal representative or legal representatives is or are in the practice of the law in a certain Hong Kong firm or certain Hong Kong firms, and the application requests for the imposition of restrictions in relation to the person’s consultation with any legal representative who is in the practice of the law in the firm or firms (relevant firm or firms)—the person must suspend consultation with the particular legal representative or legal representatives, and must not consult any other legal representative of the relevant firm or firms, but may consult any other legal representative of the person’s choosing.
(6) If, after the issue of the warrant and during the person’s detention in police custody, the police officer who laid the information no longer has reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances specified in subsection (4) exist, a police officer must immediately cease to impose on the person the restriction mentioned in subsection (3).
(7) In this section—
Hong Kong firm (香港律師行) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Legal Practitioners Ordinance (Cap. 159);
legal representative (法律代表) means a solicitor or counsel.
80. Consultation with legal representatives may be restricted in view of circumstances endangering national security
(1) This section applies if a person is investigated for being reasonably suspected of having committed an offence endangering national security, regardless of whether the person has been arrested.
(2) A police officer of the rank of Chief Superintendent or above or a police officer authorized by that officer may, by ex parte application supported by information on oath, apply to a magistrate for the issue by the magistrate of a warrant in relation to the person under this section.
(3) If the magistrate hearing the application is satisfied that—
(a) if the person has not been arrested—
(i) there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the person has committed the offence;
(ii) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is about to be arrested; and
(iii) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances specified in subsection (4) exist; or
(b) if the person has been arrested—there are reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances specified in subsection (4) exist, the magistrate may issue a warrant authorizing a police officer to restrict the person’s consultation with a legal representative during the period of detention of the person in police custody within the period of 48 hours after the person’s arrest (specified period).
(4) The circumstances are—
(a) the person’s consultation with a legal representative during the specified period will endanger national security or cause bodily harm to any person;
(b) the person has benefited from the offence, and the person’s consultation with a legal representative during the specified period will hinder the recovery of the benefit unless the authorization is given; or
(c) the person’s consultation with a legal representative during the specified period will pervert or obstruct the course of justice unless the authorization is given.
(5) If the warrant is issued before the person is arrested, the magistrate may direct that the warrant is only in force before the date that is specified.
(6) After the issue of the warrant, if, before the expiry of the specified period, the police officer who laid the information no longer has reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances specified in subsection (4) exist, a police officer must immediately cease to restrict the person’s consultation with a legal representative.
(7) In this section—legal representative (法律代表) means a solicitor or counsel.

Subdivision 3: Applications may be Made to Court for Imposition of Appropriate Restrictions in relation to Persons on Bail for Prevention or Investigation of Offences Endangering National Security

81. Interpretation
In this Subdivision—
movement restriction order (行動限制令)—see section 83(1);
person on bail (獲保釋人)—see section 82;
recognizance (擔保) means a recognizance entered into in accordance with section 52(3) of the Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232);
specified (指明) means specified in a movement restriction order.
82. Application of this Subdivision to persons arrested for offences endangering national security and on bail
If—
(a) a person is arrested for being reasonably suspected of having committed an offence endangering national security; and
(b) the person is about to be, or has been, discharged (whether or not a recognizance is required) by the police,
this Subdivision applies in relation to the person (person on bail).
83. Applications to Court for movement restriction orders in relation to period of bail
(1) A police officer of the rank of Chief Superintendent or above or a police officer authorized by that officer may, by ex parte application supported by information on oath, apply to a magistrate for the making by the magistrate of an order (movement restriction order) directing that a person on bail must comply with the specified requirements and the specified conditions imposed in relation to those requirements.
(2) The magistrate may specify one or more of the following requirements—
(a) the following requirements on the place of residence of the person on bail—
(i) the person on bail must reside in the specified place during the specified period;
(ii) the person on bail must report to the police by the specified deadline information as to the identity of any person who also resides in the specified place;
(iii) the person on bail must remain in the specified place during the specified time;
(b) the person on bail must not enter the specified area or place during the specified period, or may only enter the area or place if the specified conditions are met;
(c) the person on bail must not, by any means or through any person, associate or communicate with the specified person during the specified period, or may only associate or communicate with the specified person if the specified conditions are met;
(d) the person on bail must report to the police at the specified police station at the specified time.
(3) The information in support of the application—
(a) must be laid by a police officer of the rank of Chief Inspector or above; and
(b) must state—
(i) the nature of the offence;
(ii) the general nature of the evidence on which the person on bail was arrested;
(iii) what inquiries have been made by the police in relation to the offence and what further inquiries are proposed to be made by them; and
(iv) the reasons why imposing any of the requirements mentioned in subsection (2) on the person on bail is necessary.
84. Court may make movement restriction orders
(1) If the magistrate hearing the application is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances specified in subsection (2) exist, the magistrate may make a movement restriction order in relation to a person on bail.
(2) The circumstances are—
(a) the person on bail will not report to the police in accordance with the conditions specified by the police unless the person on bail is subject to the requirements requested to be imposed on the person on bail in the application (relevant requirements);
(b) there will be perversion or obstruction of the course of justice unless the person on bail is subject to the relevant requirements; or
(c) national security will be endangered unless the person on bail is subject to the relevant requirements.
(3) A movement restriction order—
(a) must be in writing; and
(b) must state the requirements imposed on the person on bail and the conditions imposed in relation to the requirements.
(4) A movement restriction order is valid for 3 months, and the validity period must not begin before the date on which the movement restriction order is served under subsection (5).
(5) A movement restriction order must be served personally on the person on bail.
(6) A magistrate may, on application by a police officer mentioned in section 83(1) (relevant officer), extend (or further extend) the validity period of a movement restriction order made in relation to a person on bail, with each period of extension being 1 month, if the magistrate is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that—
(a) a circumstance specified in subsection (2) remains in existence; and
(b) the investigation of the offence is being diligently and expeditiously conducted by the police, and cannot reasonably be completed before the date of the application.
(7) A magistrate may, on the application by a relevant officer or a person on bail, vary or discharge a movement restriction order made in relation to the person on bail.
(8) A magistrate must not grant an application made under subsection (7) unless the magistrate is satisfied that, in all the circumstances of the case, it is reasonable and necessary, and would not be contrary to the interests of national security, to do so.
85. Review of movement restriction orders
(1) If a magistrate refuses an application made by a person on bail under section 84(7), the person on bail may make an application to a judge of the Court of First Instance for the first-mentioned application to be granted (review application).
(2) The judge of the Court of First Instance must not grant the review application unless the judge is satisfied that, in all the circumstances of the case, it is reasonable and necessary, and would not be contrary to the interests of national security, to do so.
(3) Subject to subsection (2), the judge of the Court of First Instance may, by order, confirm, vary or revoke the magistrate’s decision and may make any other order in relation to relevant matters as the judge of the Court of First Instance considers just.
86. Contravention of movement restriction orders
If a person on bail, without reasonable excuse, contravenes—
(a) any requirement in a movement restriction order made in relation to the person; or
(b) any condition imposed in relation to the requirement,
the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 1 year.

Subdivision 4: Miscellaneous Provisions and Offences in connection with Investigation

87. Applications under this Division to be heard in closed court in general
(1) An application under this Division must be heard in a closed court.
(2) Despite subsection (1), the judge of the Court of First Instance or the magistrate (as applicable) hearing the application may, either on his or her own motion or on application by any party to the hearing, order the application to be heard in open court.
(3) However, the judge of the Court of First Instance or the magistrate concerned may only make an order under subsection (2) on being satisfied that doing so is necessary in the interests of justice and would not be contrary to the interests of national security.
88. No prejudicing of investigation of offences endangering national security
If a person knows or suspects that an investigation of an offence endangering national security is being conducted—
(a) the person—
(i) with intent to prejudice the investigation; or
(ii) being reckless as to whether the investigation will be prejudiced,
without reasonable excuse or lawful authority, makes any disclosure; or
(b) the person—
(i) knowing or suspecting that any material is likely to be relevant to the investigation; and
(ii) with intent to conceal the facts disclosed by the material from persons conducting the investigation,
without reasonable excuse, falsifies, conceals, destroys or otherwise disposes of the material, or causes or permits the material to be falsified, concealed, destroyed or otherwise disposed of,
the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.

Division 2: Absconders in respect of Offences Endangering National Security

Subdivision 1: Specification of Relevant Absconders

89. Power of Secretary for Security to specify an absconder for application of certain measures against the absconder
(1) If the Secretary for Security reasonably believes that it is necessary for safeguarding national security to specify a person to which this subsection applies for the purposes of subsection (4), the Secretary for Security may, by notice published in the Gazette, specify the person for the purposes of that subsection.
(2) Subsection (1) applies to a person if—
(a) a Court has issued, in relation to an offence endangering national security, a warrant to arrest the person;
(b) reasonable steps have been taken to inform the person of the issue of the warrant, or the Secretary for Security reasonably believes that the person knew of the issue of the warrant;
(c) the person has not been brought before a judge or magistrate (as the case may be); and
(d) the Secretary for Security reasonably believes that the person is not in the HKSAR.
(3) The Secretary for Security must revoke a specification made in relation to a person under subsection (1) if—
(a) the warrant mentioned in subsection (2)(a) in respect of the person has been revoked; or
(b) the person has been brought before a judge or magistrate (as the case may be).
(4) If the Secretary for Security specifies a person under subsection (1), the Secretary for Security may, during the period within which the specification is in force, by notice published in the Gazette, further specify that any one or more provisions in Subdivision 2 of this Division that the Secretary for Security reasonably considers to be suitable in all the circumstances of the case apply in relation to the person.
(5) The Secretary for Security may, by notice published in the Gazette, vary or revoke a specification made under subsection (4).

Subdivision 2: Measures that may Apply against Relevant Absconders

90. Prohibition against making available funds etc. or dealing with funds etc.
(1) If it is specified under section 89(4) (including by virtue of section 89(5)) that this section applies in relation to a person, the person is a relevant absconder for the purposes of this section during the period within which the specification is in force.
(2) Except under the authority of a licence granted under section 97, a person must not—
(a) make available, directly or indirectly, any funds or other financial assets or economic resources to, or for the benefit of, a relevant absconder; or
(b) deal with, directly or indirectly, any funds or other financial assets or economic resources belonging to, or owned or controlled by, a relevant absconder.
(3) A person who contravenes subsection (2) commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to establish that the person did not know and had no reason to believe—
(a) for a contravention of subsection (2)(a)—that the funds or other financial assets or economic resources concerned were, or were to be, made available to, or for the benefit of, a relevant absconder; or
(b) for a contravention of subsection (2)(b)—that the person was dealing with the funds or other financial assets or economic resources belonging to, or owned or controlled by, a relevant absconder.
(5) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (4) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(6) A person is not to be regarded as having contravened subsection (2) by reason only of having credited any of the following to an account belonging to, or directly or indirectly owned or controlled by, a relevant absconder—
(a) interest or other earnings due on that account;
(b) payment due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose before the date on which the relevant absconder became a relevant absconder.
(7) In this section—
deal with (處理) means—
(a) in respect of funds—
(i) use, alter, move, allow access to or transfer;
(ii) deal with in any other way that would result in any change in volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character or destination; or
(iii) make any other change that would enable use, including portfolio management; and
(b) in respect of other financial assets or economic resources—use to obtain funds, goods or services in any way, including by selling, hiring out or mortgaging the assets or resources;
economic resources (經濟資源) means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds but can be used to obtain funds, goods or services;
funds (資金) includes—
(a) gold coin, gold bullion, cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders and other payment instruments;
(b) deposits with financial institutions or other entities, balances on accounts, debts and debt obligations;
(c) securities and debt instruments (including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, debentures, debenture stock and derivatives contracts);
(d) interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by property;
(e) credit, rights of set-off, guarantees, performance bonds or other financial commitments;
(f) letters of credit, bills of lading and bills of sale;
(g) documents evidencing an interest in funds or financial resources; and
(h) any other instrument of export financing.
91. Prohibition against certain activities in connection with immovable property
(1) If it is specified under section 89(4) (including by virtue of section 89(5)) that this section applies in relation to a person, the person is a relevant absconder for the purposes of this section during the period within which the specification is in force.
(2) Except under the authority of a licence granted under section 97, a person must not—
(a) lease, or otherwise make available, immovable property, directly or indirectly, to a relevant absconder; or
(b) lease immovable property, directly or indirectly, from a relevant absconder.
(3) A person who contravenes subsection (2) commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to establish that the person did not know and had no reason to believe—
(a) for a contravention of subsection (2)(a)—that the immovable property concerned was leased, or otherwise made available, to a relevant absconder; or
(b) for a contravention of subsection (2)(b)—that the immovable property concerned was leased from a relevant absconder.
(5) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (4) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(6) If a person does an act mentioned in subsection (2) under a contract, agreement or obligation that arose before the date on which the relevant absconder became a relevant absconder, the person is not to be regarded as having contravened that subsection by reason only of that act.
92. Prohibition in connection with joint ventures or partnerships with relevant absconders
(1) If it is specified under section 89(4) (including by virtue of section 89(5)) that this section applies in relation to a person, the person is a relevant absconder for the purposes of this section during the period within which the specification is in force.
(2) Except under the authority of a licence granted under section 97, a person must not—
(a) establish a joint venture, partnership or any like relationship with a relevant absconder; or
(b) invest in such a joint venture, partnership or any like relationship.
(3) A person who contravenes subsection (2) commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to establish that the person did not know and had no reason to believe that the joint venture, partnership or like relationship concerned was one with a relevant absconder.
(5) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (4) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(6) If a person does an act mentioned in subsection (2) under a contract, agreement or obligation that arose before the date on which the relevant absconder became a relevant absconder, the person is not to be regarded as having contravened that subsection by reason only of that act.
93. Suspension of qualification to practise
(1) If it is specified under section 89(4) (including by virtue of section 89(5)) that this section applies in relation to a person, the person is a relevant absconder for the purposes of this section during the period within which the specification is in force.
(2) If, at any time during the period within which the specification is in force (material time), a relevant absconder holds a qualification to practise in a profession under any Ordinance, the qualification to practise is, for all purposes, to be regarded as suspended at the material time (regardless of whether the Ordinance itself provides for the suspension (however described) of the qualification to practise).
(3) If, under any Ordinance, a person is required to keep a register (however described) in relation to the qualification to practise, the person must from time to time update the register in view of the operation of subsection (2).
(4) Also, if, under any Ordinance, had the qualification to practise been suspended (however described) under the Ordinance, a provision would apply accordingly, then, where the qualification to practise is regarded as suspended under subsection (2), the provision also applies, with necessary modifications, accordingly as if the qualification to practise is suspended (however described) under the Ordinance.
(5) In subsection (4), a reference to any provision does not include a provision that concerns an appeal or review against the suspension of the qualification to practise.
(6) This section does not affect any power that a person may exercise under any Ordinance in relation to a relevant absconder.
94. Permission or registration for carrying on business or for employment not in effect temporarily
(1) If it is specified under section 89(4) (including by virtue of section 89(5)) that this section applies in relation to a person, the person is a relevant absconder for the purposes of this section during the period within which the specification is in force.
(2) If, at any time during the period within which the specification is in force (material time), there is in effect, in relation to a relevant absconder (but not in effect in relation to the relevant absconder together with any other person)—
(a) a permission (however described, and given in whatever manner) under any Ordinance; or
(b) a registration (however described, and carried out in whatever manner) under any Ordinance,
that is necessary for the relevant absconder to carry on any business or to be employed for any work, the permission or registration is, for all purposes, to be regarded as being not in effect temporarily at the material time (regardless of whether the Ordinance itself provides for the permission or registration being not in effect temporarily (however described)).
(3) If, under any Ordinance, a person is required to keep a register (however described) in relation to the permission or registration, the person must from time to time update the register in view of the operation of subsection (2).
(4) Also, if, under any Ordinance, had the permission or registration been not in effect temporarily (however described) under the Ordinance, a provision would apply accordingly, then, where the permission or registration is regarded as being not in effect temporarily under subsection (2), the provision also applies, with necessary modifications, accordingly as if the permission or registration is not in effect temporarily (however described) under the Ordinance.
(5) In subsection (4), a reference to any provision does not include a provision that concerns an appeal or review against the permission or registration being not in effect temporarily.
(6) This section does not affect any power that a person may exercise under any Ordinance in relation to a relevant absconder, or in relation to the business carried on by the relevant absconder or the work for which the relevant absconder is employed.
95. Temporary removal from office of director
(1) If it is specified under section 89(4) (including by virtue of section 89(5)) that this section applies in relation to a person, the person is a relevant absconder for the purposes of this section during the period within which the specification is in force.
(2) If, at any time during the period within which the specification is in force (material time), a relevant absconder holds the office of director of any company, the relevant absconder is, for all purposes, to be regarded as being removed temporarily from that office of director at the material time, and accordingly, the relevant absconder must not directly or indirectly take part or be concerned in the management of the company temporarily.
(3) If, under any Ordinance, a person is required to keep a register (however described) in relation to that office of director, the person must from time to time update the register in view of the operation of subsection (2).
(4) This section does not affect—
(a) any power that a person may exercise under the law of the HKSAR in relation to a relevant absconder; or
(b) any power that a person may exercise under the constitution, rules or other governing documents by which the company is constituted (or according to which the company operates) in relation to a relevant absconder.
(5) In this section—
company (公司) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622);
director (董事) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622).
96. Cancellation of HKSAR passports etc.
(1) If it is specified under section 89(4) (including by virtue of section 89(5)) that this section applies in relation to a person, the person is a relevant absconder for the purposes of this section during the period within which the specification is in force.
(2) If—
(a) a relevant absconder holds a HKSAR passport; and
(b) the passport is valid immediately before the specification is made,
the passport is, for all purposes, to be regarded as being cancelled at the time when the specification is made, and accordingly, the Director of Immigration may take possession of the passport.
(3) If an application for a HKSAR passport is made by a relevant absconder, the application is, for the purposes of section 3(1) of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Passports Ordinance (Cap. 539) and all other purposes, to be regarded as being invalid.
(4) In this section—HKSAR passport (特區護照) means a passport issued by the Director of Immigration under section 3 of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Passports Ordinance (Cap. 539).

Subdivision 3: Licences

97. Grant of licences
(1) The Secretary for Security may, on application, grant a licence for doing an act prohibited by section 90, 91 or 92.
(2) The Secretary for Security must not grant a licence under subsection (1) unless the Secretary for Security is satisfied that, in all the circumstances of the case, it is reasonable and necessary, and would not be contrary to the interests of national security, to do so.
98. Provision of false or misleading information or documents for purpose of obtaining licences
(1) A person who, for the purpose of obtaining a licence, makes any statement or provides or produces any information or document that the person knows to be false or misleading in a material particular commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 3 years.
(2) A person who, for the purpose of obtaining a licence, recklessly makes any statement or provides or produces any information or document that is false or misleading in a material particular commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 3 years.

Division 3: Procedure in Legal Actions: General Provisions

99. Application of procedure under HK National Security Law to offences under this Ordinance
To avoid doubt, any case in connection with an offence under this Ordinance is a case mentioned in Article 41 of the HK National Security Law, and the procedure under Chapter IV of the HK National Security Law applies to such a case.
100. Cases concerning national security to be adjudicated by designated judges
(1) If a case adjudicated by a Court is a case concerning national security by virtue of section 3(2)(b), the case must be adjudicated by a designated judge.
(2) Subsection (1) does not limit the application of any other enactment to any case to the extent that the other enactment is not inconsistent with that subsection.

Division 4: Criminal Procedure for Cases in connection with Offences Endangering National Security

101. Application
This Division applies to a case in connection with an offence endangering national security, regardless of whether the case is also in connection with any other offence.
102. Interpretation
In this Division—
Cap. 227 (《第227章》) means the Magistrates Ordinance (Cap. 227);
return day (提訊日) has the meaning given by section 71A of Cap. 227.
103. Remand during committal proceedings
In applying section 79(1) of Cap. 227, the requirement in that section for remand not to exceed 8 clear days (and the exception to the requirement) must be disregarded.
104. Appointment of return day
(1) Subsection (2) applies in place of section 80A(3) of Cap. 227.
(2) The return day must not, unless the prosecutor and the accused consent or the magistrate, on reasonable cause being shown, determines otherwise, be less than 10 days nor more than 28 days from the day on which the return day is appointed.
105. Translations of documents
(1) Subsection (2) applies in place of section 80B(2)(c) and (3) of Cap. 227.
(2) Unless the magistrate, on application by the accused, orders, for the purposes of section 80B(1) of Cap. 227, that a statement of a witness, or a documentary exhibit, of which a copy is served under that section must be accompanied by the following translation—
(a) if the statement or documentary exhibit is written in a language other than English—an English translation;
(b) if the statement or documentary exhibit is written in a language other than Chinese—a Chinese translation,
the statement or documentary exhibit need not be accompanied by the translation.
(3) In deciding whether to make an order under subsection (2), the magistrate must consider the need for the case to be handled in a fair and timely manner.
106. Preliminary inquiries dispensed with
(1) Subsection (2) applies in place of sections 80C, 81, 81A, 82, 83, 84 and 85 of Cap. 227.
(2) When the accused appears or is brought before a magistrate on the return day—
(a) the prosecutor must, if the requirements of section 80B(1) of Cap. 227 are satisfied, hand into court the originals of the documents referred to in that section; and
(b) the magistrate must, after an application is made by or on behalf of the Secretary for Justice, take the action under section 80C(4) of Cap. 227, and if the accused then pleads not guilty to the charge, the magistrate must order that the accused stand committed for trial in the Court of First Instance, and inform the accused of this fact or cause the accused to be informed of this fact.
(3) Accordingly—
(a) in applying section 80A of Cap. 227—
(i) subsections (4)(c) and (d) of that section must be disregarded; and
(ii) subsection (4)(e) of that section is to be read as requiring that the magistrate must, on first appointing the return day, inform the accused of the matters mentioned in subsection (4) of this section;
(b) in applying section 81B of Cap. 227—
(i) a reference to section 80C(4)(a) or 82(1) of Cap. 227 in subsection (1) of that section 81B is to be read as a reference to subsection (2)(b) of this section;
(ii) subsection (1) of that section 81B is to be read as requiring that the magistrate must inform the accused of the matters mentioned in subsection (4) of this section in the circumstances described in that subsection (1); and
(iii) the reference to “where the accused pleads guilty in proceedings under section 80C,” in subsection (2)(a) of that section 81B must be disregarded;
(c) in applying section 85A of Cap. 227, a reference to section 80C(4) or 85(2) of Cap. 227 in subsection (1) of that section 85A is to be read as a reference to subsection (2)(b) of this section;
(d) in applying section 86 of Cap. 227—
(i) the reference to section 80C(4) of Cap. 227 in subsection (1)(b) of that section 86 is to be read as a reference to subsection (2)(b) of this section; and
(ii) the reference to section 80C(1) of Cap. 227 in subsection (1)(b) of that section 86 is to be read as a reference to subsection (2)(a) of this section;
(e) in applying section 33 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200), the reference to section 80C(1) of Cap. 227 in paragraph (a) of that section 33 is to be read as a reference to subsection (2)(a) of this section;
(f) in applying section 14 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221) (Cap. 221), the reference to section 80C(4) of Cap. 227 in subsection (1)(a) of that section 14 is to be read as a reference to subsection (2)(b) of this section;
(g) in applying section 16 of Cap. 221—
(i) the reference to section 80C(4) of Cap. 227 in subsection (1) of that section 16 is to be read as a reference to subsection (2)(b) of this section; and
(ii) the reference to section 80C(1) of Cap. 227 in subsection (1) of that section 16 is to be read as a reference to subsection (2)(a) of this section; and
(h) if an application is made under section 77A of the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336) for the proceedings to be transferred to the Court of First Instance, the following must be disregarded in applying that section—
(i) the requirement in subsection (4) of that section that the judge may only make an order allowing the application subject to subsection (5) of that section;
(ii) subsections (5) and (6) of that section; and
(iii) the condition in subsection (7) of that section that the accused elects under subsection (5) of that section to have a preliminary inquiry.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3)(a)(ii) and (b)(ii), the matters are that if the accused pleads not guilty to the charge, the court will have the accused committed for trial in the Court of First Instance, and if the accused pleads guilty to the charge, the court will have the accused committed to the Court of First Instance for sentence on that charge.
107. Accused not to apply for discharge without hearing after committal
(1) If a certificate is issued in relation to a case under Article 46 of the HK National Security Law, section 16 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221) has no effect in relation to the case.
(2) Accordingly, in applying section 85A of Cap. 227, subsection (1)(e) of that section must be disregarded.
(3) This section does not limit the application of any other provision of this Division to the case to the extent that the other provision of this Division is not inconsistent with this section.
108. Lifting of restrictions on reports of committal proceedings
(1) This section applies in place of section 87A(2) of Cap. 227.
(2) Despite section 87A(1) of Cap. 227, a magistrate may, on application by the prosecution or the accused, order that the section does not apply to relevant reports of the committal proceedings.
(3) However, the magistrate may only make an order under subsection (2) on being satisfied that doing so is necessary in the interests of justice and would not be contrary to the interests of national security.
(4) An order made under subsection (2) must be entered in the Magistrate’s Case Register.
(5) If there are more than one accused in the case, the reference to the accused in subsection (2) is a reference to one of the accused.
(6) For the purposes of sections 86(1)(f) and 87A(4) and (7) of Cap. 227, an order made under subsection (2) is to be regarded as an order made under section 87A(2) of Cap. 227.

Division 5: Penalties for Inchoate Offences

109. Penalty for conspiracy, incitement or attempt to commit offence under HK National Security Law
To avoid doubt, despite any other Ordinance—
(a) if a person is convicted of conspiracy to commit any offence under the HK National Security Law (NSL offence), any provision concerning the penalty for the NSL offence under the HK National Security Law also applies to the penalty for the conspiracy;
(b) if a person is convicted of incitement to commit any NSL offence, any provision concerning the penalty for the NSL offence under the HK National Security Law also applies to the penalty for the incitement unless the HK National Security Law itself provides for the penalty for incitement to commit the NSL offence; and
(c) if a person is convicted of attempt to commit any NSL offence, any provision concerning the penalty for the NSL offence under the HK National Security Law also applies to the penalty for the attempt.

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Part 8—Mechanisms for Safeguarding National Security and Relevant Protections

110. Chief Executive in Council may make subsidiary legislation for safeguarding national security
(1) The Chief Executive in Council may make subsidiary legislation for the needs of safeguarding national security and the better carrying into effect of the following laws and interpretation—
(a) the HK National Security Law, including provisions in its Chapter V concerning the mandate of the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
(b) the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 14 and Article 47 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (a translation of “《全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於〈中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法〉第十四條和第四十七條的解釋》”)* adopted at the 38th Session of the Standing Committee of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress on 30 December 2022;
(c) this Ordinance.
(2) Any subsidiary legislation made under this section may provide that a contravention of the subsidiary legislation is an indictable offence and may prescribe penalties for it of a fine not exceeding $500,000 and imprisonment not exceeding 7 years.
Editorial Note: * See Instrument A304.
111. Administrative instructions in connection with safeguarding national security
(1) The Chief Executive may issue an administrative instruction to any department or agency of the Government or any public servant to give directions in relation to any of the following matters—
(a) the implementation of any instruction given by the Central People’s Government in relation to safeguarding national security;
(b) the work on safeguarding national security;
(c) the provision of rights, exemptions, facilitation and support that are necessary for the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in performing its mandate under Chapter V of the HK National Security Law in accordance with the law;
(d) any other matter that the Chief Executive considers conducive to safeguarding national security.
(2) Any department or agency of the Government or any public servant must comply with an administrative instruction mentioned in subsection (1).
112. Judgements and decisions of National Security Committee
(1) A meeting of the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (National Security Committee) is to be convened by the chairperson. The National Security Adviser is to sit in on meetings of the National Security Committee. The National Security Adviser is to provide advice on matters relating to the duties and functions of the National Security Committee.
(2) The secretariat of the National Security Committee is to convey, and assist in the follow-up of and the giving of effect to, the judgements and decisions made by the National Security Committee in its performance of duties and functions under the provisions of the HK National Security Law.
(3) If the law of the HKSAR confers any function on a person, any person, in making any decision in the performance of the function, must respect, and implement in accordance with the law, the judgements and decisions of the National Security Committee.
113. Provision of advice, or giving of directions, in relation to national security education etc.
The Chief Secretary for Administration may provide advice, or give any direction, to any person whom the Chief Secretary for Administration considers appropriate, for promoting national security education, raising the awareness of residents of the HKSAR of national security and of the obligation to abide by the law, or strengthening public communication, guidance, supervision and regulation of the work on safeguarding national security and prevention of terrorist activities.
114. Public servants to assist in work on safeguarding national security
(1) A public servant must provide all such assistance that is necessary for the work on safeguarding national security.
(2) Accordingly, a public servant must provide any department or agency that is responsible for the work on safeguarding national security, and its personnel, in the HKSAR, with all reasonable facilitation, support, backing and protection in a timely manner, including providing the necessary manpower and other necessary resources in a timely manner.
(3) A public servant must exercise all powers and discretions that the public servant has (including any power and discretion concerning the giving of any exemption) to discharge the obligation under this section.
115. Chief Executive to issue certificate in relation to question of whether national security or state secrets involved
(1) Apart from in the circumstances mentioned in Article 47 of the HK National Security Law, the Chief Executive may also, in circumstances that the Chief Executive considers appropriate, issue a certificate to certify whether an act or matter involves national security or whether any material involves state secrets.
(2) A certificate under subsection (1)—
(a) may be issued whether or not any proceedings have been commenced; and
(b) may be issued by the Chief Executive on the Chief Executive’s own motion.
(3) If a Court receives in any proceedings a certificate issued by the Chief Executive certifying a question under this section, the court is to be regarded as having obtained a certificate issued by the Chief Executive certifying the question under Article 47 of the HK National Security Law.
116. Adjudication of cases concerning national security etc.
(1) The Courts are to adjudicate cases concerning national security independently in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Basic Law and the HK National Security Law, free from any interference. A person must respect and safeguard the Courts’ adjudication of cases concerning national security in accordance with the law.
(2) The Department of Justice is to control criminal prosecutions of cases in connection with offences endangering national security in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Basic Law and the HK National Security Law, free from any interference.
(3) The Government must take necessary measures to ensure the personal safety, and the safety of the property and place of residence, of any specified person and any aider, are subject to necessary protection.
(4) In this section—
aider (協助者) means an informer of, or a witness in, a case concerning national security;
specified person (指明人士 ) means—
(a) any of the personnel of any department or agency that handles cases concerning national security, or is responsible for the work on safeguarding national security, in the HKSAR; or
(b) a judicial officer, staff member of the Judiciary, counsel or solicitor, who handles a case concerning national security.
117. Signing or certification of legal documents in respect of specified cases etc.
(1) This section applies to a document in respect of a specified case (relevant document) if an Ordinance or a direction of a Court—
(a) requires the document to be signed or certified by any of the following persons—
(i) a party to the case;
(ii) a specified person representing a party to the case;
(b) requires the document to state the name of any of the following persons—
(i) a party to the case;
(ii) a specified person representing a party to the case;
(c) permits the document to be signed or certified by any of the following persons—
(i) a party to the case;
(ii) a specified person representing a party to the case; or
(d) permits the document to state the name of any of the following persons—
(i) a party to the case;
(ii) a specified person representing a party to the case.
(2) However, this section does not apply to—
(a) an affidavit or any other document made on oath;
(b) a statutory declaration;
(c) a document made by a person as a witness for stating the truth; or
(d) a statement of truth made under an Ordinance or a direction of a Court for verifying a document.
(3) Where the relevant document—
(a) is one that falls within subsection (1)(a)(i) or (c)(i)—the document may be signed or certified by a specified person representing the party, and need not be signed or certified by the party; and
(b) is one that falls within subsection (1)(b)(i) or (d)(i)—the document may state the name of a specified person representing the party, and need not state the name of the party.
(4) Where the relevant document—
(a) is one that falls within subsection (1)(a)—the requirement under subsection (1)(a) is met if the document contains a signature specified in subsection (5);
(b) is one that falls within subsection (1)(b)—the requirement under subsection (1)(b) is met if the document contains a name specified in subsection (6);
(c) is one that falls within subsection (1)(c)—the document may contain a signature specified in subsection (5); and
(d) is one that falls within subsection (1)(d)—the document may contain a name specified in subsection (6).
(5) The signature specified for the purposes of subsection (4)(a) and (c) is—
(a) if the relevant document must or may (including may by virtue of subsection (3)(a)) be signed by a specified person and the specified person is a public servant—a signature made in the name of the department or agency represented by the specified person;
(b) if the relevant document must or may (including may by virtue of subsection (3)(a)) be signed by a specified person and the specified person is a counsel—a signature made in the name of the department or agency (or solicitors’ firm) represented by the person who gives instructions to the specified person; or
(c) if the relevant document must or may (including may by virtue of subsection (3)(a)) be signed by a specified person and the specified person is a solicitor—a signature made in the name of the solicitors’ firm represented by the specified person.
(6) The name specified for the purposes of subsection (4)(b) and (d) is—
(a) if the relevant document must or may (including may by virtue of subsection (3)(b)) state the name of a specified person and the specified person is a public servant—the name of the department or agency represented by the specified person;
(b) if the relevant document must or may (including may by virtue of subsection (3)(b)) state the name of a specified person and the specified person is a counsel—the name of the department or agency (or solicitors’ firm) represented by the person who gives instructions to the specified person; or
(c) if the relevant document must or may (including may by virtue of subsection (3)(b)) state the name of a specified person and the specified person is a solicitor—the name of the solicitors’ firm represented by the specified person.
(7) For the purposes of subsection (1), if—
(a) a case is a case concerning national security; or
(b) proceedings are brought against a person for an offence endangering national security, and the person is a party to a case,
the case is a specified case.
(8) For the purposes of subsection (7)(b), proceedings for an offence endangering national security are brought against a person if—
(a) a magistrate issues a warrant or summons against the person under section 72 of the Magistrates Ordinance (Cap. 227) in respect of the offence;
(b) the person is arrested for the offence (whether or not the person is released on bail);
(c) the person is charged with the offence after being taken into custody without a warrant; or
(d) an indictment charging the person with the offence is preferred by the direction or with the consent of a judge under section 24A(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221).
(9) In this section—specified person (指明人士) means a public servant, counsel or solicitor;
state (述明), in relation to a name, means mark, print, set out or otherwise provide the name.
118. Unlawful disclosure of personal data of persons handling cases or work concerning national security
(1) If a person commits an offence under section 64(3A) of the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486), and—
(a) the data subject referred to in that section is—
(i) a specified person;
(ii) a family member of a specified person;
(iii) an aider; or
(iv) a family member of an aider; and
(b) the person commits the offence—
(i) with intent to prevent or deter the specified person’s performance of his or her functions as a specified person or the aider’s provision of assistance in relation to a case concerning national security; or
(ii) in consequence of a thing done (or attempted to be done) by the specified person in the lawful performance of his or her functions as a specified person or by the aider in providing assistance in relation to a case concerning national security,
the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.
(2) If a person commits an offence under section 64(3C) of the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486), and—
(a) the data subject referred to in that section is—
(i) a specified person;
(ii) a family member of a specified person;
(iii) an aider; or
(iv) a family member of an aider; and
(b) the person commits the offence—
(i) with intent to prevent or deter the specified person’s performance of his or her functions as a specified person or the aider’s provision of assistance in relation to a case concerning national security; or
(ii) in consequence of a thing done (or attempted to be done) by the specified person in the lawful performance of his or her functions as a specified person or by the aider in providing assistance in relation to a case concerning national security,
the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.
(3) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under subsection (1) or (2) had it been done in the HKSAR,
the resident or body commits the offence.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), a reference to commit an offence under the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486) in subsection (1) or (2) is to be read as including to do an act that—
(a) is done outside the HKSAR; and
(b) would have constituted the offence had it been done in the HKSAR.
(5) In this section—
aider (協助者) means an informer of, or a witness in, a case concerning national security;
family member (家人), in relation to a person, means another person who is related to the person by blood, marriage, adoption or affinity;
HKSAR resident (特區居民) means—
(a) a Hong Kong permanent resident; or
(b) a person who is qualified to be issued with an identity card under the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177) but has no right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115);
specified person (指明人士) means—
(a) any of the personnel of any department or agency that handles cases concerning national security, or is responsible for the work on safeguarding national security, in the HKSAR; or
(b) a judicial officer, staff member of the Judiciary, counsel or solicitor, who handles a case concerning national security.
119. Unlawful harassment of persons handling cases or work concerning national security
(1) If—
(a) a person (Party A), with intent to cause alarm or distress or specified harm to a specified person (or a family member of the specified person) or an aider (or a family member of the aider) (Party B)—
(i) uses any intimidating, abusive or offensive words to Party B by any means, or otherwise makes to Party B any intimidating, abusive or offensive communication; or
(ii) does any intimidating, abusive or offensive act towards Party B by any means;
(b) a reasonable person, having regard to all the circumstances, would have anticipated that so using the words to Party B, making the communication to Party B or doing the act towards Party B would cause alarm or distress or specified harm to Party B;
(c) the words, communication or act, in fact, causes alarm or distress or specified harm to Party B; and
(d) Party A falls within the description in any of subparagraphs (i) and (ii)—
(i) Party A uses the words, makes the communication, or does the act with intent to prevent or deter the specified person’s performance of his or her functions as a specified person or the aider’s provision of assistance in relation to a case concerning national security;
(ii) Party A uses the words, makes the communication, or does the act in consequence of—
(A) a thing done (or attempted to be done) by the specified person in the lawful performance of his or her functions as a specified person; or
(B) a thing done (or attempted to be done) by the aider in providing assistance in relation to a case concerning national security,
Party A commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.
(2) If a person is charged with an offence under subsection (1) and the charge alleges that the person falls within the description in subsection (1)(d)(ii), it is a defence for the person to establish that it was reasonable in the circumstances to use the words, make the communication, or do the act.
(3) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (2) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(4) In this section—
aider (協助者) means an informer of, or a witness in, a case concerning national security;
family member (家人), in relation to a person, means another person who is related to the person by blood, marriage, adoption or affinity;
specified harm (指明傷害), in relation to a person, means—
(a) psychological harm to the person;
(b) harm causing the person to be concerned for the person’s safety or well-being; or
(c) harm causing the person to be concerned for damage to the property of the person;
specified person (指明人士) means—
(a) any of the personnel of any department or agency that handles cases concerning national security, or is responsible for the work on safeguarding national security, in the HKSAR; or
(b) a judicial officer, staff member of the Judiciary, counsel or solicitor, who handles a case concerning national security.
120. Specified Court may on application take anonymity measures
(1) If a specified Court is satisfied that it is necessary for safeguarding national security to take certain measures in relation to any existing or contemplated proceedings (regardless of whether the proceedings concern a case concerning national security, and regardless of whether the proceedings take place in that Court or any other Court) to protect the identity of any specified person from disclosure, the specified Court may, on ex parte application by the Secretary for Justice, order the measures be taken.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), an order made under that subsection may prohibit a person from disclosing—
(a) information that shows the identity of a specified person; or
(b) information from which the identity of a specified person may be inferred.
(3) A hearing of an application under subsection (1) must take place in a closed court.
(4) If an order is made under subsection (1), a person affected by the order may apply to the specified Court to vary or revoke the order.
(5) The specified Court must not vary or revoke the order unless the specified Court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, is satisfied that injustice would be caused if the order is not varied or revoked.
(6) To avoid doubt, unless the specified Court orders otherwise, the Secretary for Justice need not, for the purposes of an application under subsection (4), provide to the applicant documents submitted to the specified Court at the time when the Secretary for Justice made the application under subsection (1).
(7) To avoid doubt—
(a) this section does not limit any other power that any Court may exercise; and
(b) section 117 does not prevent a specified Court from ordering under subsection (1) any measures to be taken in relation to a document mentioned in section 117(2).
(8) In this section—
specified Court (指明法院) means any of the following courts of the Judiciary of the HKSAR—
(a) the Court of Final Appeal;
(b) the Court of Appeal;
(c) the Court of First Instance;
(d) the District Court;
(e) a Magistrates’ Court;
specified person (指明人士), in relation to any existing or contemplated proceedings, means the following person whom the proceedings involve or are likely to involve—
(a) a public servant;
(b) a judicial officer or a staff member of the Judiciary;
(c) a counsel or solicitor; or
(d) an informer or witness.
121. Offence of contravening order prohibiting disclosure of identity
(1) If a person, knowing that an order prohibiting disclosure of identity has been made, discloses information the disclosure of which is prohibited by the order, the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 5 years.
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to establish that the person had a reasonable excuse or lawful authority to make the disclosure.
(3) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (2) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(4) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under a subsection (1) had it been done in the HKSAR,
the resident or body commits the offence.
(5) In this section—order prohibiting disclosure of identity (身分披露禁令) means an order made under section 120(1) prohibiting any person from making the disclosure mentioned in section 120(2).

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Part 9—Related Amendments

Division 1: Enactments Amended

122. Enactments amended
The enactments specified in Divisions 2 to 29 are amended as set out in those Divisions.

Division 2: Amendment to Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1)

123. Section 3 amended (interpretation of words and expressions)
Section 3—
Add in alphabetical order “national security (國家安全)—see section 4 of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024);”.

Division 3: Amendment to Evidence Ordinance (Cap. 8)

124. Section 77 amended (privilege of witnesses)
Section 77(3)—
Repeal “the security of the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, or any other territory for which the United Kingdom is responsible under international law”
Substitute “national security or the security of the HKSAR”.

Division 4: Amendments to Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32)

125. Section 181 amended (power to stay or restrain proceedings against company)
(1) Section 181—
Renumber the section as section 181(1).
(2) After section 181(1)—
Add “(2) However, if the action or proceeding relates to a case concerning national security (within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024)), the reference to “and before a winding-up order has been made” in subsection (1) is to be disregarded in applying that subsection.”.
126. Section 186 amended (actions stayed on winding-up order)
(1) Section 186—
Renumber the section as section 186(1).
(2) After section 186(1)—
Add “(2) If any action or proceeding relates to a case concerning national security (within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024)), subsection (1) does not prevent the action or proceeding from being proceeded with or commenced against the company.”.
127. Section 360C amended (power of the Chief Executive in Council to order company engaging in undesirable activities to be struck off)
(1) Section 360C(1)—
Repeal everything before “may order”
Substitute “(1) If the Chief Executive in Council is satisfied that a company formed and registered under the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622) or any former Companies Ordinance would—
if it were a society to which the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151) applied—
(i) be liable to have its registration or exemption from registration cancelled under section 5D of that Ordinance; or
(ii) be liable to have its operation or continued operation prohibited by the Secretary for Security under section 8 of that Ordinance; or
(b) if it were an organization to which section 60(1) or (2) of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024) applied—be liable to have its operation or continued operation in Hong Kong prohibited by the Secretary for Security under that section,
the Chief Executive in Council”.
(2) After section 360C(2)—
Add “(2A) A company dissolved under subsection (2)—
(a) in the case of subsection (1)(a)(ii)—is, for all purposes, to be regarded as an unlawful society; or
(b) in the case of subsection (1)(b)—is, for all purposes, to be regarded as a prohibited organization.
(2B) If a person is, because of the operation of this section, required to act as a member of an unlawful society or prohibited organization to deal with matters arising from the winding up or dissolution of the society or organization, the person does not commit any offence under the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151) or the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024) only because the person so acts.”.
(3) After section 360C(3)—
Add “(4) In this section—
prohibited organization (受禁組織) means a prohibited organization within the meaning of Division 2 of Part 6 of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024);
unlawful society (非法社團) means an unlawful society within the meaning of the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151).”.
128. Section 360G amended (certain sections to apply)
Section 360G, after “211,”—
Add “216,”.
129. Section 360M substituted
Section 360M—
Repeal the section
Substitute “360M.
Protection of Official Receiver etc.
(1) A person to whom this section applies is not personally liable for an act done or omitted to be done by the person in good faith in respect of the winding up of any company under this Part in—
(a) performing or purportedly performing a function under this Part; or
(b) exercising or purportedly exercising a power under this Part.
(2) The persons to whom this section applies are—
(a) the Official Receiver; and
(b) a public servant.”.
130. Section 360N amended (non-Hong Kong companies)
(1) Section 360N—
Renumber the section as section 360N(1).
(2) Section 360N(1)—
Repeal everything before “Provided”
Substitute “(1) If the Chief Executive in Council is satisfied that a non-Hong Kong company would—
(a) if it were a society to which the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151) applied—
(i) be liable to have its registration or exemption from registration cancelled under section 5D of that Ordinance; or
(ii) be liable to have its operation or continued operation prohibited by the Secretary for Security under section 8 of that Ordinance; or
(b) if it were an organization to which section 60(1) or (2) of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024) applied—be liable to have its operation or continued operation in Hong Kong prohibited by the Secretary for Security under that section,
the Chief Executive in Council may order the company to cease to carry on business within Hong Kong, and the company must immediately cease to carry on business within Hong Kong:”.
(3) After section 360N(1)—
Add “(2) A company which has been ordered to cease to carry on business within Hong Kong under subsection (1)—
(a) in the case of subsection (1)(a)(ii)—is, for all purposes, to be regarded as an unlawful society; or
(b) in the case of subsection (1)(b)—is, for all purposes, to be regarded as a prohibited organization.
(3) If a person is, because of the operation of this section, required to act as a member of an unlawful society or prohibited organization to deal with matters arising from the winding up or dissolution of the society or organization, the person does not commit any offence under the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151) or the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024) only because the person so acts.
(4) In this section—
prohibited organization (受禁組織) means a prohibited organization within the meaning of Division 2 of Part 6 of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024);
unlawful society (非法社團) means an unlawful society within the meaning of the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151).”.

Division 5: Amendment to Pensions Ordinance (Cap. 89)

131. Section 15 amended (pension, gratuity or allowance may be cancelled, suspended or reduced on conviction, etc.)
Section 15(1)(a)(iii)—
Repeal “treason under section 2 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200)”
Substitute “any offence endangering national security”.

Division 6: Amendment to Post Office Ordinance (Cap. 98)

132. Section 32 amended (prohibited articles)
Section 32(1)—
Repeal paragraph (h)
Substitute “(h) anything the publication of which would constitute an offence endangering national security;”.

Division 7: Amendment to Pension Benefits Ordinance (Cap. 99)

133. Section 29 amended (pension benefits may be cancelled, suspended or reduced on conviction, etc.)
Section 29(1)(c)—
Repeal “treason under section 2 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200)”
Substitute “any offence endangering national security”.

Division 8: Amendments to Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151)

134. Section 2 amended (interpretation)
(1) Section 2(1), definition of election—
Repeal everything after “means”
Substitute “an election set out in section 4(1) of the Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Conduct) Ordinance (Cap. 554);”.
(2) Section 2(1)—
(a) definition of foreign political organization;
(b) definition of political organization of Taiwan;
(c) definition of connection—
Repeal the definitions.
(3) Section 2(1)—
Add in alphabetical order “connection (聯繫), in relation to a society or a branch, that is a political body, means the following circumstances—
(a) the society or the branch solicits or accepts financial contributions, financial sponsorships or financial support of any kind or loans, or substantive support by other means, directly or indirectly, from a political organization of an external place;
(b) the society or the branch is affiliated directly or indirectly with a political organization of an external place;
(c) any policy of the society or the branch is determined directly or indirectly by a political organization of an external place; or
(d) a political organization of an external place directs, controls, supervises, dictates or participates, directly or indirectly, in the decision making process of the society or the branch;
external place (境外) means a region or place outside Hong Kong (other than the Mainland and Macao);
political organization of an external place (境外政治性組織) includes—
(a) a government of a foreign country or a political subdivision of the government;
(b) the authority of an external place or a political subdivision of the authority;
(c) an agent of the government or authority or an agent of the political subdivision of the government or authority; and
(d) a political party in an external place or an agent of the political party;”.
(4) Section 2(4)—
Repeal everything after “Hong Kong.”.
135. Section 5A amended (registration and exemption from registration)
Section 5A(3)(b)—
Repeal “foreign political organization or a political organization of Taiwan”
Substitute “political organization of an external place”.
135. Section 5A amended (registration and exemption from registration)
Section 5A(3)(b)—
Repeal “foreign political organization or a political organization of Taiwan”
Substitute “political organization of an external place”.
136. Section 5D amended (cancellation of registration or exemption from registration)
Section 5D(1)(b)—
Repeal “foreign political organization or a political organization of Taiwan”
Substitute “political organization of an external place”.
137. Section 8 amended (prohibition of operation of societies)
Section 8(1)—
Repeal everything after “prohibiting the operation or continued operation of”
Substitute “a society or a branch if the Societies Officer reasonably believes that the prohibition of the operation or continued operation of the society or the branch is necessary in the interests of public safety, public order or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”.
138. Section 32 amended (power of entry in special cases)
Section 32—
Repeal “national security or to”.

Division 9: Amendment to Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200)

139. Parts I and II repealed   
Parts I and II—
Repeal the Parts.

Division 10: Amendments to Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221)

140. Section 9 amended (rules and orders as to practice and procedure)
Section 9(3)—
Repeal “(including trials for treason or misprision of treason)”.
141. Section 9G amended (an accused person may be refused bail in particular circumstances)
Section 9G—
Repeal subsection (10)
Substitute “(10) An accused person charged with murder may be admitted to bail only on the order of a judge.”.
142. Section 14A amended (trial of offences)
(1) Section 14A(1)—
Repeal paragraph (a).
(2) Section 14A—
Repeal subsection (2)
Substitute “(2) Where any provision in any Ordinance creates, or results in the creation of, an offence and subject to subsection (4), the words “upon indictment” or “on indictment” appear, the offence is triable only on indictment.”.
143. Section 51 amended (trial of offences)
Section 51(2)—
Repeal “other than treason”.
144. Section 79I amended (court may take evidence by live television link from person outside Hong Kong)
(1) After section 79I(2)(a)—
Add “(ab) the criminal proceedings concerned are specified proceedings;”.
(2) After section 79I(2)— Add “(3) Even if any permission has been given, in specified proceedings, under this section that is not yet amended, then, as long as a verdict has not yet been delivered in the proceedings, the permission is to be regarded as having never been given. (4) In this section—
amended (經修訂) means amended by the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024);
specified proceedings (指明法律程序) means proceedings of a case concerning national security (within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024)).”.
145. Section 91 amended (penalties for concealing offences)
Section 91(4)—
Repeal “other than treason”.
146. Section 100 amended (abolition of presumption of coercion of married woman by husband)
Section 100—
Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security the maximum penalty for which is life imprisonment”.
147. Section 123 amended (criminal proceedings may be held in camera and non-disclosure of identity of witnesses in certain cases)
(1) Section 123(1)—
Repeal “in the interests of justice or public order or security”
Substitute “for a purpose mentioned in subsection (1AA)”.
(2) After section 123(1)—
Add “(1AA) The purpose is—
(a) safeguarding national security, including preventing the disclosure of state secret (as defined by section 29 of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024));
(b) safeguarding public order;
(c) safeguarding justice; or
(d) any other proper purpose.”.
(3) Section 123(1A)(b)—
Repeal “prejudice the interests of justice or public order or security”
Substitute “be contrary to a purpose mentioned in subsection (1AA)”.
(4) Section 123(1B)(a)—
Repeal “and the decision of the Court of Appeal shall be final”.
(5) After section 123(1B)(a)—
Add “(ab) Also, if the case is a case to which Division 4 of Part 7 of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024) applies, then if the Court of Appeal grants leave, the prosecution may also appeal to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the court to refuse to make an order under subsection (1).
(ac) The decision of the Court of Appeal on the appeal is final.”.
(6) Section 123(1B)(d)(ii), after “order”—
Add “or decision”.
(7) Section 123(1B)(e), after “subsection (1)”—
Add “, or decisions of a court to refuse to make orders under subsection (1),”.
(8) Section 123(1B)(f)—
Repeal “in the interests of justice or public order or security”
Substitute “for a purpose mentioned in subsection (1AA)”.
148. Schedule 3 amended (excepted offences)
Schedule 3—
Add “11. An offence endangering national security.”.

Division 11: Amendments to Legal Aid in Criminal Cases Rules (Cap. 221 sub. leg. D)

149. Rule 13 amended (legal aid in certain cases)
(1) Rule 13(1)(a)—
Repeal “upon a charge of murder, treason or piracy with violence”
Substitute “for a specified offence”.
(2) Rule 13(1)(b)—
Repeal “charge of murder, treason or piracy with violence”
Substitute “specified offence”.
(3) Rule 13(1)(c)—
Repeal “charge of murder, treason or piracy with violence”
Substitute “specified offence”.
(4) After rule 13(3)—
Add “(4) In this rule—specified offence (指明罪行) means—
(a) an offence endangering national security the maximum penalty for which is life imprisonment;
(b) murder; or
(c) an offence under section 19 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200).”.

Division 12: Amendments to Magistrates Ordinance (Cap. 227)

150. Second Schedule amended
(1) Second Schedule, Part I, item 2—
Repeal “or an offence against Part VIII of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200)”
Substitute “an offence against Part VIII of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200), or an offence endangering national security”.
(2) Second Schedule, Part I—
Repeal items 4 and 5.
(3) Second Schedule, Part I, item 7—
Repeal “, seditious”.
(4) Second Schedule, Part III, item 2—
Repeal “section 17, 28 or 29 of the Offences against the Person Ordinance (Cap. 212) or section 16, 17 or 18 of the Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance (Cap. 238)”
Substitute “an offence against section 17, 28 or 29 of the Offences against the Person Ordinance (Cap. 212), an offence against section 16, 17 or 18 of the Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance (Cap. 238), or an offence endangering national security”.
(5) Second Schedule, Part III—
Repeal items 4 and 5.
(6) Second Schedule, Part III, item 7—
Repeal “, seditious”.

Division 13: Amendment to Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232)

151. Section 3 amended (interpretation)
Section 3—
Repeal the definition of serious arrestable offence
Substitute “serious arrestable offence (嚴重的可逮捕罪行) means—
(a) an offence endangering national security;
(b) an offence specified in Schedule 2; or
(c) any other offence for which a person may under or by virtue of any law be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not less than 7 years.”.

Division 14: Amendment to Prison Rules (Cap. 234 sub. leg. A)

152. Rule 69 amended (remission of sentence)
After rule 69(1)—
Add “(1A) However, if a prisoner serves a sentence in respect of the prisoner’s conviction of an offence endangering national security, the prisoner must not be granted remission under subrule (1) unless the Commissioner is satisfied that the prisoner’s being granted remission will not be contrary to the interests of national security.
(1B) To avoid doubt, subsection (1A) applies whether the sentence of the prisoner mentioned in that subsection was imposed before, on or after the commencement of that subsection.
(1C) If a prisoner is not granted remission because of a decision made by the Commissioner under subsection (1A), the Commissioner must, after making the decision, review the decision annually.”.

Division 15: Amendment to Public Order Ordinance (Cap. 245)

153. Section 2 amended (interpretation)
Section 2(2)—
Repeal everything after “Hong Kong.”.   

Division 16: Amendment to Education Ordinance (Cap. 279)

154. Section 31 amended (grounds for cancellation of registration of manager)
After section 31(1)(a)—
Add “(ab) if the Secretary for Security has made an order under section 60(1) or (2) of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024) in relation to an organization (as defined by section 58 of that Ordinance), and the person was an office-bearer (as defined by section 58 of that Ordinance) of the organization immediately before the order was made;
(ac) if the Chief Executive in Council has made an order under section 360C or 360N of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32) in relation to a company or non-Hong Kong company (as defined by section 2(1) of that Ordinance), and the person was a director (as defined by section 2(1) of that Ordinance) of the company immediately before the order was made;”.

Division 17: Amendment to Trade Unions Ordinance (Cap. 332)

155. Section 48 amended (conspiracy in relation to trade disputes)
Section 48(4)—
Repeal “sedition or any offence against the State or the Sovereign”   
Substitute “any offence endangering national security”.

Division 18: Amendments to Customs and Excise Service Ordinance (Cap. 342)

156. Section 17 amended (when members to be deemed on duty)
Section 17, after “Schedule 2”—
Add “or in preventing, suppressing or investigating an offence endangering national security”.
157. Section 17A amended (general powers of arrest and search)
(1) Section 17A(1)—
Repeal “an offence against this Ordinance or an Ordinance specified in Schedule 2”
Substitute “a specified offence”.
(2) After section 17A(4)—
Add “(5) In this section—specified offence (指明罪行) means—
(a) an offence endangering national security; or
(b) an offence against this Ordinance or an Ordinance specified in Schedule 2.”.
158. Section 17B amended (power to enter and search for suspects)
Section 17B(5), definition of arrestable offence—
Repeal “an offence”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security, or any other offence”.
159. Section 17BA amended (search and examination without warrant)
(1) Section 17BA(1)—
Repeal “, for the purposes of enforcing this Ordinance or an Ordinance specified in Schedule 2”.
(2) After section 17BA(1)—
Add “(1A) The power under subsection (1) may only be exercised for either or both of the following purposes—
(a) preventing, suppressing or investigating an offence endangering national security;
(b) enforcing this Ordinance or an Ordinance specified in Schedule 2.”.
160. Section 17BB amended (inspection of travel documents)
(1) Section 17BB—
Renumber the section as section 17BB(1).
(2) Section 17BB(1)—
Repeal “in exercising any powers under this Ordinance or any Ordinance specified in Schedule 2,”.
(3) After section 17BB(1)—
Add “(2) The power under subsection (1) may only be exercised in either or both of the following circumstances—
(a) during the prevention, suppression or investigation of an offence endangering national security;
(b) during the exercise of any powers under this Ordinance or any Ordinance specified in Schedule 2.”.

Division 19: Amendment to Pension Benefits (Judicial Officers) Ordinance (Cap. 401)

161. Section 31 amended (pension benefits may be cancelled, suspended or reduced on conviction, etc.)
Section 31(1)(c)—
Repeal “treason under section 2 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200)”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.

Division 20: Amendment to Hong Kong Arts Development Council Ordinance (Cap. 472)

162. Section 3 amended (establishment of the Council)
Section 3(6)(m)—
Repeal “treason”
Substitute “any offence endangering national security”.   

Division 21: Amendment to Post-Release Supervision of Prisoners Ordinance (Cap. 475)

163. Section 6 amended (Board may order early release of prisoner under supervision)
After section 6(3)—
Add “(3A) However, if a prisoner serves a sentence in respect of the prisoner’s conviction of an offence endangering national security, the Commissioner must not refer to the Board for its consideration under subsection (3) the case of the prisoner unless the Commissioner is satisfied that an early release of the prisoner will not be contrary to the interests of national security.
(3B) To avoid doubt, subsection (3A) applies whether the sentence of the prisoner mentioned in that subsection was imposed before, on or after the commencement of that subsection.
(3C) If the Commissioner decides under subsection (3A) not to refer to the Board for its consideration the case of the prisoner, the Commissioner must, after making the decision, review the decision annually.”.

Division 22: Amendment to Post-Release Supervision of Prisoners Regulation (Cap. 475 sub. leg. A)

164. Schedule 1 amended (specified offences)
Schedule 1, before the Note—
Add “Others
8. An offence endangering national security”.   

Division 23: Amendments to Official Secrets Ordinance (Cap. 521)

165. Part II repealed (espionage)
Part II—Repeal the Part.
166. Section 12 amended (interpretation)
(1) Section 12(1), definition of prescribed—
Repeal “Governor”
Substitute “Chief Executive”.
(2) Section 12(1), definition of public servant, paragraph (a)—
Repeal “Crown in right of the Government of Hong Kong”
Substitute “Government”.
(3) Section 12(1), definition of public servant—
Repeal paragraphs (b) and (c).
(4) Section 12(1)—
(a) definition of armed forces;
(b) definition of British national;
(c) definition of defence;
(d) definition of disclose and disclosure;
(e) definition of international relations—
Repeal the definitions.
(5) Section 12(1)—
Add in alphabetical order
“disclose (披露), in relation to a document or other article, includes parting with possession of the document or article, and disclosing the information contained in the document or article;
HKSAR resident (特區居民) means—
(a) a Hong Kong permanent resident; or
(b) a person who is qualified to be issued with an identity card under the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177) but has no right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115);
international organization (國際組織) means—
(a) an organization the members of which include 2 or more countries, regions, places, or entities entrusted with functions by any country, region or place; or
(b) an organization established by or under a treaty, convention or agreement made by 2 or more countries, regions or places, and includes an institution (however described) under the organization;”.
(6) Section 12(2)—
Repeal everything after “goods or services”
Substitute “for the purposes of the Government.”.
(7) Section 12—
Repeal subsections (4), (5) and (6).
167. Section 13 amended (security and intelligence information—members of services and persons notified)
(1) Section 13(4)—
Repeal “Governor, and such a notice may be served if, in the Governor’s opinion, the work undertaken by the person in question is or includes work connected with the security or intelligence services and its nature is such that the interests of the national security of the United Kingdom or the security of Hong Kong”
Substitute “Chief Executive, and such a notice may be served if, in the Chief Executive’s opinion, the work undertaken by the person in question is or includes work connected with the security or intelligence services and its nature is such that the interests of the security of Hong Kong”.
(2) Section 13(6)—
Repeal “Governor on the person concerned and the Governor”
Substitute “Chief Executive on the person concerned and the Chief Executive”.
168. Sections 15 and 16 repealed
Sections 15 and 16—Repeal the sections.
169. Section 18 amended (information resulting from unauthorized disclosures or information entrusted in confidence)
(1) Section 18(1)(a) and (2)—
Repeal “to 17”
Substitute “, 14 and 17”.
(2) Section 18(3)—Repeal “to 16”
Substitute “and 14”.
(3) Section 18(4)—Repeal “, 15 or 16”.
(4) Section 18(5)—Repeal “British national or Hong Kong permanent resident”
Substitute “person mentioned in subsection (5A)”.
(5) After section 18(5)—
Add “(5A) The person is—
(a) a HKSAR resident;
(b) a body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in Hong Kong; or
(c) a body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in Hong Kong.”.
(6) Section 18—
Repeal subsection (6)
Substitute “(6) For the purposes of this section, information or a document or article is protected against disclosure by any of sections 13, 14 and 17 if—
(a) it relates to security or intelligence; or
(b) it is information or a document or article to which section 17 applies,
and information or a document or article is protected against disclosure by any of sections 13 and 14 if it falls within paragraph (a).”.
(7) Section 18(7)—Repeal “to 17”
Substitute “, 14 and 17”.
170. Section 19 repealed (information resulting from spying)
Section 19—Repeal the section.
171. Section 20 amended (information entrusted in confidence to territories, States or international organizations)
(1) Section 20(2)—Repeal “, defence or international relations”.
(2) Section 20(2)(a)—
Repeal “Government of the United Kingdom or Hong Kong”
Substitute “Central People’s Government or the Government”.
(3) Section 20(4)—
Repeal “, 15 or 16”.
(4) Section 20(6)—Repeal “to 18”
Substitute “, 14, 17 and 18”.
172. Section 21 amended (authorized disclosures)
Section 21(4)—Repeal “to 20”
Substitute “, 14, 17, 18 and 20”.
173. Section 22 amended (safeguarding of information)
(1) Section 22(1)—Repeal “to 21”
Substitute “, 14, 17, 18, 20 and 21”.
(2) Section 22(4)—Repeal “or 19”.
(3) Section 22(6)—Repeal “to 21”
Substitute “, 14, 17, 18, 20 and 21”.
174. Section 23 amended (acts done abroad)
(1) Section 23—Renumber the section as section 23(1).
(2) Section 23(1)—Repeal “British national, a Hong Kong permanent resident or a public servant”
Substitute “person mentioned in subsection (2)”.
(3) After section 23(1)—Add “(2) The person is—
(a) a HKSAR resident;
(b) a body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in Hong Kong;
(c) a body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in Hong Kong; or
(d) a public servant.”.
175. Section 24 amended (provisions as to trial of offences)
Section 24(2)—Repeal “the United Kingdom or”.

Division 24: Amendments to Long-term Prison Sentences Review Ordinance (Cap. 524)

176. Section 11 amended (duty of Commissioner to refer cases of prisoners to Board for review)
After section 11(1)—
Add
“(1A) However, if a prisoner serves a sentence in respect of the prisoner’s conviction of an offence endangering national security, the Commissioner must not refer to the Board for review the sentence of the prisoner under this section unless the Commissioner is satisfied that an early release of the prisoner will not be contrary to the interests of national security.
(1B) To avoid doubt, subsection (1A) applies whether the sentence of the prisoner mentioned in that subsection was imposed before, on or after the commencement of that subsection.
(1C) If the Commissioner decides under subsection (1A) not to refer to the Board for review the sentence of the prisoner, the Commissioner must, after making the decision, review the decision every 2 years.”.
177. Section 28 amended (review of sentence after recall)
(1) Section 28—Renumber the section as section 28(1).
(2) After section 28(1)—
Add
“(2) However, if a prisoner serves a sentence in respect of the prisoner’s conviction of an offence endangering national security, the Commissioner must not refer the sentence to the Board for review under subsection (1) unless the Commissioner is satisfied that an early release of the prisoner will not be contrary to the interests of national security.
(3) To avoid doubt, subsection (2) applies whether the sentence was imposed before, on or after the commencement of that subsection.
(4) If the Commissioner decides under subsection (2) not to refer the sentence to the Board for review, the Commissioner must, after making the decision, review the decision every 2 years.”.

Division 25: Amendments to Legislative Council Ordinance (Cap. 542)

178. Section 39 amended (when person is disqualified from being nominated as a candidate and from being elected as a Member)
Section 39(1)(c)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.
179. Section 40 amended (what requirements are to be complied with by persons nominated as candidates)
Section 40(1)(b)(iii)(C)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.

Division 26: Amendments to District Councils Ordinance (Cap. 547)

180. Section 14 amended (disqualification from being appointed as members)
Section 14(1)(c)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.
181. Section 19 amended (disqualification from being registered as ex officio members)
Section 19(1)(c)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.
182. Section 21 amended (when person is disqualified from being nominated as a candidate and from being elected as a member)
Section 21(1)(c)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.
183. Section 26A amended (disqualification from holding office as members)
Section 26A(1)(c)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.

Division 27: Amendments to Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap. 569)

184. Section 14 amended (disqualification from being nominated)
Section 14(1)(g)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.
185. Section 16 amended (manner of nomination)
Section 16(5)(c), after “(c),”—Add “(ca),”.
186. Section 26 amended (disqualification from voting)
Section 26(1)(c), after “(b),”—
Add “(ca),”.
187. Schedule amended (Election Committee)
(1) The Schedule, after section 5M(1)(a)—
Add “(ab) has been convicted of an offence endangering national security;”.
(2) The Schedule, after section 9(1)(a)—
Add “(ab) has been convicted of an offence endangering national security;”.
(3) The Schedule, after section 18(1)(c)—
Add “(ca) has been convicted of an offence endangering national security;”.

Division 28: Amendments to Rural Representative Election Ordinance (Cap. 576)

188. Section 9 amended (when a Rural Representative is disqualified from holding office)
Section 9(1)(c)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.
189. Section 23 amended (when a person is disqualified from being nominated as a candidate and from being elected as a Rural Representative)
Section 23(1)(c)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.

Division 29: Amendment to Legislation Publication Ordinance (Cap. 614)

190. Section 4 amended (contents of database)
After section 4(1)(a)(vi)—Add “(vii) the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024);”.

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維護國家安全條例

———[英文版]———  ———[上一章]———

本條例旨在完善中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全的法律；以及就相關事宜訂定條文。
[2024 年 3 月 23 日]

弁言

鑑於必須 ——

(a) 堅定不移並全面準確貫徹“一國兩制”、“港人治港”、高度自治的方針；

(b) 建立健全特區維護國家安全的法律制度和執行機制；及

(c) 依法防範、制止和懲治危害國家安全的行為和活動，保障特區居民和在特區的其他人的合法權益，確保特區內的財產和投資受法律保護，保持特區的繁榮和穩定：

又鑑於《中華人民共和國憲法》及以下法律、決定及解釋下有關特區履行維護國家安全的憲制責任以及完善特區維護國家安全的法律的要求 ——

(a) 《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法》，包括當中第二十三條的規定；

(b) 於2020年5月28日第十三屆全國人民代表大會第三次會議上通過的《全國人民代表大會關於建立健全香港特別行政區維護國家安全的法律制度和執行機制的決定》；

(c) 《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法》；及

(d) 於2022年12月30日第十三屆全國人民代表大會常務委員會第三十八次會議上通過的《全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於〈中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法〉第十四條和第四十七條的解釋》：

又鑑於 ——

(a) 特區行政、立法、司法機關應當依法有效防範、制止和懲治危害國家安全的行為和活動；及

(b) 特區居民須維護國家主權、統一和領土完整；在特區的任何機構、組織和個人，都應當遵守特區維護國家安全所適用的法律，不得從事危害國家安全的行為和活動，並應當在上述機關依法開展維護國家安全工作時，應其要求依法提供協助：

現由立法會制定本條例如下 ——

編輯附註：
本文件並無根據《法例發布條例》(第614章)編配章號。然而本文件在「電子版香港法例」（https://www.elegislation.gov.hk）中獲編配一個非正式的參考編號以作識別，並讓用戶可藉該非正式的參考編號進行搜尋。

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第 1 部 導言

1. 簡稱
本條例可引稱為《維護國家安全條例》。
2. 條例的原則
本條例建基於以下原則 ——
(a) “一國兩制”方針的最高原則，是維護國家主權、安全、發展利益；
(b) 尊重和保障人權，依法保護根據《基本法》、《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》、《經濟、社會與文化權利的國際公約》適用於特區的有關規定享有的包括言論、新聞、出版的自由，結社、集會、遊行、示威的自由在內的權利和自由；及
(c) 對於危害國家安全的行為和活動，應當按法治原則堅持積極防範，依法制止和懲治，據此 ——
(i) 法律規定為犯罪行為的，依照法律定罪處罰；法律沒有規定為犯罪行為的，不得定罪處罰；
(ii) 任何人未經司法機關判罪之前，均假定無罪；
(iii) 犯罪嫌疑人、被告人和其他訴訟參與人依法享有的辯護權和其他訴訟權利，予以保障；及
(iv) 任何人已經司法程序被最終確定有罪或者宣告無罪的，不得就同一行為再予審判或者懲罰。
3. 釋義
(1) 在本條例中 ——
中央 （Central Authorities）指《中華人民共和國憲法》確立的憲制秩序下的中央政權機關，包括（但不限於）中華人民共和國全國人民代表大會及其常務委員會、中華人民共和國主席、中華人民共和國中央人民政府及中華人民共和國中央軍事委員會；
中國武裝力量（Chinese armed force）指中國的武裝力量，即中國人民解放軍、中國人民武裝警察部隊或民兵；
司法人員（judicial officer）指 ——
(a) 擔任於《司法人員推薦委員會條例》（第92章）附表1指明的司法職位的司法人員；或
(b) 由終審法院首席法官委任的司法人員；
法院（Court）指屬特區司法機構的任何以下法院、法庭或審裁處 ——
(a) 終審法院；
(b) 上訴法庭；
(c) 原訟法庭；
(d) 競爭事務審裁處；
(e) 區域法院；
(f) 裁判法院；
(g) 土地審裁處；
(h) 勞資審裁處；
(i) 小額錢債審裁處；
(j) 淫褻物品審裁處；
(k) 死因裁判法庭；
指定法官（designated judge）就任何法院而言，指根據《香港國安法》第四十四條從該法院的司法人員中指定的司法人員；
《香港國安法》（HK National Security Law）指根據《2020年全國性法律公布》（2020年第136號法律公告）在特區實施的《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法》*；
國際組織（international organization）指 ——
(a) 某組織，其成員包括2個或多於2個國家、地區、地方或受任何國家、地區或地方委以職能的實體；或
(b) 藉（或基於）2個或多於2個國家、地區或地方之間訂立的條約、公約、協議或協定而設立的組織，
並包括上述組織轄下的機構（不論如何描述）；
境外（external place）指特區以外的地區或地方（內地及澳門除外）；
境外勢力（external force）——見第6條；
職能（function）包括權力及責任。
(2) 在本條例中，提述涉及國家安全的案件，包括 ——
(a) 與危害國家安全的罪行相關的案件；
(b) 與以下措施相關的案件：不論是根據《香港國安法》、本條例或其他法律，為維護國家安全(或在與維護國家安全相關的情況下)而採取的措施；及
(c) 與(a)或(b)段所述案件相關的任何法律程序。
編輯附註：* 見文件A302。
4. 國家安全的涵義
在本條例或任何其他條例中，提述國家安全，即提述國家政權、主權、統一和領土完整、人民福祉、經濟社會可持續發展和國家其他重大利益相對處於沒有危險和不受內外威脅的狀態，以及保障持續安全狀態的能力。
附註 ——請參閱《中華人民共和國國家安全法》第二條 ——“國家安全是指國家政權、主權、統一和領土完整、人民福祉、經濟社會可持續發展和國家其他重大利益相對處於沒有危險和不受內外威脅的狀態，以及保障持續安全狀態的能力。”。
5. 勾結境外勢力的涵義
就本條例所訂罪行而言，如有一項或多於一項以下情況，某人即屬勾結境外勢力作出某項作為 ——
(a) 該人參與某項由境外勢力策劃或以其他方式主導的活動，而該項作為，是該人參與該項活動所牽涉的作為；
(b) 該人代境外勢力作出該項作為；
(c) 該人在與境外勢力合作下，作出該項作為；
(d) 該人在境外勢力控制、監督、指使或要求下，作出該項作為；
(e) 該人在境外勢力資助或以其他方式支援下，作出該項作為。
6. 境外勢力的涵義
(1) 在本條例中 ——
境外勢力（external force）指 ——
(a) 外國政府；
(b) 境外當局；
(c) 在境外的政黨；
(d) 在境外的其他追求政治目的之組織；
(e) 國際組織；
(f) 任何 (a)、(b)、(c)、(d) 或 (e) 段所述政府、當局、政黨或組織的關聯實體；或
(g) 任何 (a)、(b)、(c)、(d)、(e) 或 (f) 段所述政府、當局、政黨、組織或實體的關聯個人。
(2) 在第 (1) 款中境外勢力的定義的 (f) 段中，提述某政府或當局的關聯實體，即提述 ——
(a) 符合一項或兩項以下描述的公司 ——
(i) 其董事慣常或有義務（不論是正式或非正式的義務）按照該政府或當局的指示、指令或意願行事；
(ii) 該政府或當局能夠憑藉其他因素在相當程度上控制它；或
(b) 符合一項或兩項以下描述的並非公司的團體 ——
(i) 其執行委員會（不論稱謂如何）的成員慣常或有義務（不論是正式或非正式的義務）按照該政府或當局的指示、指令或意願行事；
(ii) 該政府或當局能夠憑藉其他因素在相當程度上控制它。
(3) 在第 (1) 款中境外勢力的定義的 (f) 段中，提述某在境外的政黨、在境外的其他追求政治目的之組織或國際組織(該組織)的關聯實體，即提述 ——
(a) 符合一項或兩項以下描述的公司 ——
(i) 其董事慣常或有義務（不論是正式或非正式的義務）按照該組織的指示、指令或意願行事；
(ii) 該組織能夠憑藉其他因素在相當程度上控制它；
(b) 符合一項或兩項以下描述的並非公司的團體 ——
(i) 其執行委員會（不論稱謂如何）的成員慣常或有義務（不論是正式或非正式的義務）按照該組織的指示、指令或意願行事；
(ii) 該組織能夠憑藉其他因素在相當程度上控制它；或
(c) 符合以下描述的團體：其組成或運作所據的法律、章程、規則或其他規管文件，有一項或兩項以下規定 ——
(i) 該團體的董事、高級人員或僱員，須由該組織的成員擔任；
(ii) 該團體的任何部分，須構成該組織的部分（不論稱謂如何）。
(4) 在第 (1) 款中境外勢力的定義的 (g) 段中，提述某政府、當局、政黨、組織或實體的關聯個人，即提述符合一項或兩項以下描述的個人 ——
(a) 該人慣常或有義務（不論是正式或非正式的義務）按照該政府、當局、政黨、組織或實體的指示、指令或意願行事；
(b) 該政府、當局、政黨、組織或實體能夠憑藉其他因素在相當程度上控制該人。
7. 危害國家安全的罪行的涵義
為免生疑問，在本條例或任何其他條例中，提述危害國家安全的罪行，包括 ——
(a) 《香港國安法》下的四類罪行（即分裂國家罪、顛覆國家政權罪、恐怖活動罪及勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪）；
(b) 《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法第四十三條實施細則》*下的罪行；
(c) 本條例所訂的罪行；及
(d) 特區的法律下其他危害國家安全的罪行。
編輯附註：* 見文件A303。
8. 其他條例的釋義等
(1) 凡本條例與另一條例，如無本款的話是會有不一致之處的，則須以最能顧及本條例的目的和作用的方式，理解該另一條例。
(2) 凡另一條例提述特區的安全（包括與“特區的安全”意義相同的詞句），須理解為包括國家安全。
(3) 凡特區的法律授予某人任何職能 ——
(a) 該職能須理解為包括維護國家安全的責任；及
(b) 據此，任何人在作出執行該職能上的任何決定時，須將國家安全視為最重要的因素，並據此給予適當的考慮，而在任何條例中與該等職能相關的提述，須據此理解。
9. 罪行條文的適用對象 除非條文另有規定，本條例所訂的罪行適用於在特區的所有人。如某罪行具有域外法律效力，該域外法律效力在相關的部內訂定。

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第 2 部 叛國等

10. 叛國
(1) 任何中國公民 ——
(a) 加入與中國交戰的外來武裝力量，或作為其中一分子；
(b) 意圖損害中國在戰爭中的形勢，而協助在戰爭中與中國交戰的敵方；
(c) 向中國發動戰爭；
(d) 鼓動外國或外來武裝力量以武力入侵中國；或
(e) 意圖危害中國的主權、統一或領土完整，而使用武力或威脅使用武力，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處終身監禁。
(2) 在本條中 ——外來武裝力量（external armed force）指不屬於中國的武裝力量；
與中國交戰的敵方（enemy at war with China）包括與中國交戰的外國政府或外來武裝力量。
11. 公開表明意圖犯叛國罪 任何中國公民意圖犯第10(1) 條所訂罪行，並公開表明該項意圖，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁14年。
12. 披露他人犯叛國罪的規定
(1) 如任何中國公民（該人）知悉另一人已犯、正犯或即將犯第10(1) 條所訂罪行（犯罪事宜），則除非犯罪事宜是公眾已可知的，否則該人須在知悉犯罪事宜後，在合理地切實可行範圍內，盡快向警務人員披露犯罪事宜，以及該人所知悉並與犯罪事宜相關的關鍵事實。
(2) 任何中國公民違反第 (1) 款，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁14年。
(3) 基於法律專業保密權的理由的申索、權利或享有權，不受本條影響。
(4) 本條將普通法下的隱匿叛國罪經適當改善而訂為成文法條文。
13. 非法操練
(1) 如 ——
(a) 任何人未經保安局局長或警務處處長准許，而向其他人提供指明操練；或
(b) 任何人為向其他人提供指明操練，出席旨在提供指明操練的聚會，而該聚會是未經保安局局長或警務處處長准許舉行的，該人即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁7年。
(2) 任何人 ——
(a) 在第 (1)(b) 款所述的聚會中，接受指明操練；或
(b) 出席第 (1)(b) 款所述的聚會，旨在接受指明操練，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁3年。
(3) 任何人未經保安局局長或警務處處長准許 ——
(a) 接受或參與由境外勢力策劃或以其他方式主導進行的指明操練；或
(b) 接受或參與在境外勢力控制、指使、資助或支援下進行的指明操練，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁5年。
(4) 任何人未經保安局局長或警務處處長准許 ——
(a) 在由境外勢力策劃或以其他方式主導舉行的聚會中，提供指明操練；
(b) 代境外勢力提供指明操練；
(c) 在與境外勢力合作下，提供指明操練；
(d) 在境外勢力控制、監督、指使或要求下，提供指明操練；或
(e) 在境外勢力資助或以其他方式支援下，提供指明操練，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁10年。
(5) 第 (3) 及 (4) 款不適用於以下情況 ——
(a) 指明作為是有關的人以其公務人員身分履行職責所需的；
(b) 有關指明操練是根據特區法律進行的；
(c) 有關的人並非中國公民，並具有某外國的國籍，而該人因在該外國的政府的武裝部隊中服務，或因擔任該外國的政府的執法人員，作出指明作為；
(d) 有關的人具有某外國的國籍或居民身分，而該人為遵守該外國的法律規定而在該外國的政府的武裝部隊中服務，因而作出指明作為；
(e) 中國有參與有關指明操練，而有關的人以軍人或執法人員身分作出指明作為；或
(f) 有關指明操練由外國政府的軍事、國防或警察部門提供，而該等操練是教育機構為在該教育機構接受全日制教育的學生舉辦或安排的課程或課餘活動的一部分。
(6) 如 ——
(a) 某人在本條生效日期*之前作出某項作為，而該項作為在該日期當日或之後仍然持續；或
(b) 某人根據在該日期之前訂立的某項安排或協議，在該日期當日或之後作出某項作為，
而該人若非因有本款便會就該項作為而犯了第 (3) 或 (4) 款所訂罪行，則該人不得就該項作為而被裁定犯上述罪行。
(7) 凡任何作為是在本條生效日期後6個月屆滿後作出或繼續作出的，第 (6) 款並不就該項作為而適用。
(8) 在本條中 ——指明作為（specified act）就第 (3) 或 (4) 款所訂罪行而言，指構成該罪行的作為；
指明操練（specified drilling） ——
(a) 指以下事宜的訓練或操練 ——
(i) 使用攻擊性武器（《公安條例》（第245章）第2(1) 條所界定者）；
(ii) 進行軍事練習；或
(iii) 進行變陣演習；但
(b) 如某項活動屬 (a)(i) 段所指的訓練或操練但純粹為康樂目的而進行的——不包括該項活動；
教育機構（educational establishment） ——
(a) 指任何大學、學院、學校或其他相類似的教育機構；但
(b) 不包括專門提供軍事訓練或操練課程的教育機構。
編輯附註：* 生效日期：2024年3月23日。
14. 本部的域外法律效力
(1) 如 ——
(a) 任何屬中國公民的特區居民，在特區以外地方作出任何作為；而
(b) 該項作為假若是在特區作出即構成第10(1) 條所訂罪行，則該居民即屬犯該罪行。
(2) 如 ——
(a) 任何 ——
(i) 香港永久性居民；
(ii) 在特區成立、組成或註冊的法人團體；或
(iii) 不論是法團抑或不是法團的在特區有業務地點的團體，在特區以外地方作出任何作為；而
(b) 該項作為假若是在特區作出即構成第13(3) 或 (4) 條所訂罪行，則該居民或該團體即屬犯該罪行。
(3) 在本條中 ——特區居民（HKSAR resident）指 ——
(a) 香港永久性居民；或
(b) 符合獲發《人事登記條例》（第177章）所指的身分證的資格，但沒有《入境條例》（第115章）所指的香港居留權的人。

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第 3 部 叛亂、煽惑叛變及離叛，以及具煽動意圖的作為等

第1分部：叛亂

15. 叛亂
如 ——
(a) 任何人加入與中國武裝力量進行武裝衝突的武裝力量，或作為其中一分子；
(b) 任何人意圖損害中國武裝力量在武裝衝突中的形勢，而協助與中國武裝力量進行武裝衝突的武裝力量，或協助該武裝力量所屬的政府、當局或組織；
(c) 任何人向中國武裝力量發動武裝衝突；或
(d) 任何人 ——
(i) 意圖危害中國的主權、統一或領土完整或特區整體的公共安全；或
(ii) 罔顧是否會危害中國的主權、統一或領土完整或特區整體的公共安全，而在特區作出暴力作為，
該人即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處終身監禁。
16. 本分部的域外法律效力
(1) 如 ——
(a) 任何 ——
(i) 屬中國公民的特區居民；
(ii) 在特區成立、組成或註冊的法人團體；或
(iii) 不論是法團抑或不是法團的在特區有業務地點的團體，在特區以外地方作出任何作為；而
(b) 該項作為假若是在特區作出即構成第15條所訂罪行，則該居民或該團體即屬犯該罪行。
(2) 在本條中 ——特區居民（HKSAR resident）指 ——
(a) 香港永久性居民；或
(b) 符合獲發《人事登記條例》（第177章）所指的身分證的資格，但沒有《入境條例》（第115章）所指的香港居留權的人。

第 2 分部：煽惑中國武裝力量成員叛變、協助該等成員放棄職責等

17. 煽惑中國武裝力量成員叛變
(1) 任何人明知而煽惑中國武裝力量成員 ——
(a) 放棄職責及放棄向中國效忠；或
(b) 組織、發動或參與叛變，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處終身監禁。
(2) 在本條中 ——叛變（mutiny）的涵義如下：凡2名或多於2名人士作出以下作為，而該等人士屬中國武裝力量成員，或當中最少2名人士屬中國武裝力量成員，則該項作為即屬叛變 ——
(a) 推翻中國武裝力量的合法權力，或推翻正與中國武裝力量合作行動的外國政府或組織的軍隊或部隊的合法權力；或
(b) 反抗上述合法權力，而反抗方式嚴重影響中國武裝力量的運作效率，或嚴重影響正與中國武裝力量合作行動的外國政府或組織的軍隊或部隊或其任何部分的運作效率。
18. 協助中國武裝力量成員放棄職責或擅離職守
(1) 任何人知悉中國武裝力量成員即將放棄職責或擅離職守，仍協助該成員作出該行動，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁7年。
(2) 任何人知悉中國武裝力量成員即將放棄職責或擅離職守，仍勾結境外勢力，協助該成員作出該行動，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁10年。
(3) 任何人知悉中國武裝力量成員已放棄職責或擅離職守，仍 ——
(a) 藏匿該成員；
(b) 協助該成員藏匿；或
(c) 協助該成員逃離合法羈押，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁7年。
(4) 任何人知悉中國武裝力量成員已放棄職責或擅離職守，仍勾結境外勢力 ——
(a) 藏匿該成員；
(b) 協助該成員藏匿；或
(c) 協助該成員逃離合法羈押，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁10年。

第 3 分部：煽惑離叛等

19. 煽惑公職人員離叛
(1) 任何人明知而煽惑公職人員放棄擁護《基本法》及放棄向特區效忠，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁7年。
(2) 任何人勾結境外勢力，明知而煽惑公職人員放棄擁護《基本法》及放棄向特區效忠，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁10年。
(3) 在本條中 ——公職人員（public officer）指 ——
(a) 擔任特區政府轄下的受薪職位的人，不論該職位屬永久或臨時性質；
(b) 任何以下人士（如該人不屬於 (a) 段所指的人） ——
(i) 按照《基本法》委任的特區政府主要官員；
(ii) 根據《外匯基金條例》（第66章）第5A條委任的金融管理專員或根據該條例第5A(3) 條委任的人；
(iii) 公務員敍用委員會主席；
(iv) 廉政公署的職員；
(v) 申訴專員或根據《申訴專員條例》（第397章）第6條委任的人；
(vi) 個人資料私隱專員或其根據《個人資料(私隱)條例》（第486章）僱用或聘用的人；
(vii) 平等機會委員會的主席或成員，或由該委員會根據《性別歧視條例》（第480章）僱用或聘用的人；
(viii) 司法人員或司法機構的職員；
(c) 行政會議成員；
(d) 立法會議員；
(e) 區議會議員；
(f) 《行政長官選舉條例》（第569章）第2(1) 條所界定的選舉委員；或
(g) 屬根據第20條指明的類別的人士。
20. 公職人員的指明
為施行第19條，行政長官會同行政會議如合理地認為，將屬某類別的人士指明為公職人員，是維護國家安全所需者，則可藉在憲報刊登的命令，將屬該類別的人士指明為公職人員。
21. 煽惑中央駐港機構人員離叛
(1) 任何人明知而煽惑任何以下中央駐港機構的人員（中央駐港機構人員）放棄職責及放棄向中國效忠，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁7年 ——
(a) 中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區聯絡辦公室；
(b) 中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署；
(c) 中華人民共和國外交部駐香港特別行政區特派員公署。
(2) 任何人勾結境外勢力，明知而煽惑中央駐港機構人員放棄職責及放棄向中國效忠，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁10年。
22. 意圖犯指明罪行而管有煽惑性質的文件或物品
(1) 任何人出於犯指明罪行的意圖，管有某種性質的文件或其他物品，而將該種性質的文件或物品分發予相關人員是會構成該指明罪行的，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁3年。
(2) 在本條中 ——指明罪行（specified offence）指第17、19或21條所訂罪行；相關人員（relevant officer）指 ——
(a) 就第17條所訂罪行而言——中國武裝力量成員；
(b) 就第19條所訂罪行而言——該條所指的公職人員；
(c) 就第21條所訂罪行而言——該條所指的中央駐港機構人員。

第 4 分部：具煽動意圖的作為等

23. 煽動意圖
(1) 就本分部而言 ——
(a) 任何人如出於一項或多於一項第 (2) 款所指明的意圖而作出某項作為，即屬出於煽動意圖而作出該項作為；及
(b) 任何作為、文字或刊物如具一項或多於一項第 (2) 款所指明的意圖，即屬具煽動意圖的作為、文字或刊物。
(2) 有關意圖如下 ——
(a) 意圖引起中國公民、香港永久性居民或在特區的人，對以下制度或機構的憎恨或藐視，或對其離叛 ——
(i) 《中華人民共和國憲法》確定的國家根本制度；
(ii) 《中華人民共和國憲法》規定的國家機構；或
(iii) 以下中央駐港機構 ——
(A) 中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區聯絡辦公室；
(B) 中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署；
(C) 中華人民共和國外交部駐香港特別行政區特派員公署；或
(D) 中國人民解放軍駐香港部隊；
(b) 意圖引起中國公民、香港永久性居民或在特區的人，對特區的憲制秩序、行政、立法或司法機關的憎恨或藐視，或對其離叛；
(c) 意圖煽惑任何人企圖不循合法途徑改變 ——
(i) 中央就特區依法制定的事項；或
(ii) 在特區依法制定的事項；
(d) 意圖引起特區不同階層居民間或中國不同地區居民間的憎恨或敵意；
(e) 意圖煽惑他人在特區作出暴力作為；
(f) 意圖煽惑他人作出不遵守特區法律或不服從根據特區法律發出的命令的作為。
(3) 然而 ——
(a) 任何人如僅出於任何第 (4) 款所指明的意圖而作出某項作為，則不屬出於煽動意圖而作出該項作為；及
(b) 任何作為、文字或刊物如僅具任何第 (4) 款所指明的意圖，則不屬具煽動意圖的作為、文字或刊物。
(4) 有關意圖如下 ——
(a) 意圖就第 (2)(a) 或 (b) 款所指的制度或憲制秩序提出意見，而目的是完善該制度或憲制秩序；
(b) 意圖就關乎第 (2)(a) 或 (b) 款所指的機構或機關的事宜指出問題，而目的是就該事宜提出改善意見；
(c) 意圖勸說任何人嘗試循合法途徑改變 ——
(i) 中央就特區依法制定的事項；或
(ii) 在特區依法制定的事項；
(d) 意圖指出在特區不同階層居民間或中國不同地區居民間產生或有傾向產生憎恨或敵意，而目的是消除該項憎恨或敵意。
24. 煽動意圖的相關罪行q
(1) 任何人 ——
(a) 出於煽動意圖 ——
(i) 作出具煽動意圖的作為；或
(ii) 發表具煽動意圖的文字；
(b) 明知刊物具煽動意圖而刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製該刊物；或
(c) 輸入具煽動意圖的刊物，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁7年。
(2) 任何人勾結境外勢力 ——
(a) 出於煽動意圖 ——
(i) 作出具煽動意圖的作為；或
(ii) 發表具煽動意圖的文字；
(b) 明知刊物具煽動意圖而刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製該刊物；或
(c) 輸入具煽動意圖的刊物，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁10年。
(3) 任何人無合理辯解而管有具煽動意圖的刊物，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁3年。
(4) 在本條中 ——發布（publish）包括 ——
(a) 作出任何形式的通訊，包括講話、書寫、展示通告、廣播、於屏幕放映及播放紀錄帶或其他經記錄的材料；及
(b) 傳布或提供。
25. 無需證明煽惑擾亂公共秩序或煽惑暴力的意圖
(1) 在就第24(1)(a) 或 (2)(a) 條所訂罪行而進行的法律程序中 ——
(a) 無需證明有關的人出於煽惑他人作出擾亂公共秩序的作為的意圖，而作出有關作為或發表有關文字；及
(b) 除非第23(2)(e) 條所指的意圖構成該罪行的其中一項元素，否則無需證明有關的人出於煽惑他人作出暴力作為的意圖，而作出有關作為或發表有關文字。
(2) 在就第24(1)、(2) 或 (3) 條所訂罪行而進行的法律程序中 ——
(a) 無需證明有關作為、文字或刊物（視何者屬適當而定）具煽惑他人作出擾亂公共秩序的作為的意圖；及
(b) 除非第23(2)(e) 條所指的意圖構成該罪行的其中一項元素，否則無需證明有關作為、文字或刊物(視何者屬適當而定)具煽惑他人作出暴力作為的意圖。
26. 第24(1)(c) 或 (2)(c) 條所訂罪行的免責辯護
(1) 被控犯第24(1)(c) 或 (2)(c) 條所訂罪行的人，如確立在指稱的罪行發生時，自己並不知道有關刊物是具煽動意圖的刊物，即為免責辯護。
(2) 在以下情況下，某人須視作已確立需要就第(1)款所訂的免責辯護而確立的事宜 ——
(a) 有足夠證據，就該事宜帶出爭論點；及
(b) 控方沒有提出足以排除合理疑點的相反證明。

第 5 分部：雜項條文

27. 移走或清除具煽動意圖的刊物的權力
(1) 執法人員 ——
(a) 可在第 (3) 款的規限下，進入任何處所或地方；及
(b) 可截停及登上任何運輸工具，並可從該處移走或清除任何具煽動意圖的刊物。
(2) 執法人員可作出所有或任何以下行動 ——
(a) 進入（並在有必要時可使用合理武力進入）其根據本條獲授權進入的處所或地方；
(b) 以合理武力驅逐或移走妨礙其根據本條獲授權行使移走或清除權力的人或物品；
(c) 扣留任何運輸工具，直至從該處將具煽動意圖的刊物全部移走或清除為止；
(d) 在移走或清除具煽動意圖的刊物時，將任何人驅離（並在有必要時可使用合理武力將任何人驅離）任何運輸工具。
(3) 如具煽動意圖的刊物並非從公眾地方可見，則只有在符合以下情況下，方可行使第 (1)(a) 款所賦予的權力 ——
(a) 事先取得有關處所或地方佔用人的准許；或
(b) 根據及按照裁判官為此目的而發出的手令。
(4) 在本條中 ——執法人員（law enforcement officer）指 ——
(a) 警務人員；或
(b) 獲保安局局長授權執行本條職能的執法機關人員；運輸工具（conveyance）包括車輛、船隻、航空器及氣墊船。
28. 第2、3及4分部的域外法律效力
(1) 如 ——
(a) 任何 ——
(i) 屬中國公民的特區居民；
(ii) 在特區成立、組成或註冊的法人團體；或
(iii) 不論是法團抑或不是法團的在特區有業務地點的團體，在特區以外地方作出任何作為；而
(b) 該項作為假若是在特區作出即構成第17(1) 條所訂罪行，則該居民或該團體即屬犯該罪行。
(2) 如 ——
(a) 任何 ——
(i) 特區居民；
(ii) 在特區成立、組成或註冊的法人團體；或
(iii) 不論是法團抑或不是法團的在特區有業務地點的團體，在特區以外地方作出任何作為；而
(b) 該項作為假若是在特區作出即構成第 (3) 款指明的條文所訂罪行，則該居民或該團體即屬犯該罪行。
(3) 為施行第 (2) 款而指明的條文是 ——
(a) 第18(1)、(2)、(3) 或 (4) 條；
(b) 第19(1) 或 (2) 條；
(c) 第21(1) 或 (2) 條；或
(d) 第24(1) 或 (2) 條。
(4) 在本條中 ——特區居民（HKSAR resident）指 ——
(a) 香港永久性居民；或
(b) 符合獲發《人事登記條例》（第177章）所指的身分證的資格，但沒有《入境條例》（第115章）所指的香港居留權的人。

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第 4 部 與國家秘密及間諜活動相關的罪行

第 1 分部：與國家秘密相關的罪行

29. 釋義
在本分部中 ——公職人員（public officer）指 ——
(a) 擔任特區政府轄下的受薪職位的人，不論該職位屬永久或臨時性質；
(b) 任何以下人士（如該人不屬於 (a) 段所指的人） ——
(i) 按照《基本法》委任的特區政府主要官員；
(ii) 根據《外匯基金條例》（第66章）第5A條委任的金融管理專員或根據該條例第5A(3) 條委任的人；
(iii) 公務員敍用委員會主席；
(iv) 廉政公署的職員；
(v) 申訴專員或根據《申訴專員條例》（第397章）第6條委任的人；
(vi) 個人資料私隱專員或其根據《個人資料(私隱)條例》（第486章）僱用或聘用的人；
(vii) 平等機會委員會的主席或成員，或由該委員會根據《性別歧視條例》（第480章）僱用或聘用的人；
(viii) 司法人員或司法機構的職員；
(c) 行政會議成員；
(d) 立法會議員；
(e) 區議會議員；
(f) 《行政長官選舉條例》（第569章）第2(1) 條所界定的選舉委員；或
(g) 屬根據第31條指明的類別的人士；
地區（region）指特區以外的不屬國家的地區；
披露（disclose）就文件或其他物品而言，包括放棄對該文件或物品的管有，及披露該文件或物品所載有的資料；
指明披露（specified disclosure）——見第30條；
政府承辦商（government contractor）指任何不是公職人員，但屬 ——
(a) 為特區政府的目的，提供貨品或服務（或受僱為該等目的提供貨品或服務）的人；或
(b) 根據以下協議或安排提供貨品或服務（或受僱根據以下協議或安排提供貨品或服務）的人：由行政長官核證為屬任何地區或地方的當局、任何外國政府（包括該政府轄下的機構）或任何國際組織屬其中一方的協議或安排的協議或安排，或附屬於任何該等協議或安排的或為執行任何該等協議或安排而訂立的協議或安排；
國家秘密（state secret）的涵義如下：若屬以下其中一項的秘密，在沒有合法權限下披露，便相當可能會危害國家安全，該秘密即屬國家秘密 ——
(a) 關乎中國或特區事務的重大決策的秘密；
(b) 關乎中國國防建設或中國武裝力量的秘密；
(c) 關乎中國外交或外事活動的秘密、關乎特區對外事務的秘密，或中國或特區對外承擔保密義務的秘密；
(d) 關乎中國或特區經濟或社會發展的秘密；
(e) 關乎中國或特區科技發展或科學技術的秘密；
(f) 關乎維護國家安全或特區安全或偵查罪行的活動的秘密；
(g) 關乎中央與特區之間的關係的秘密（包括與特區有關並且根據《基本法》是由中央管理的事務的資料）；
資料（information）除在第33或34條外，包括 ——
(a) 以電子形式儲存的資料；及
(b) 並非儲存於任何媒體的訊息或消息。
30. 指明披露的涵義
(1) 在本分部中 ——指明披露（specified disclosure）就某資料、文件或其他物品而言，指在以下情況下披露該資料、文件或物品 ——
(a) 作出該項披露的目的是揭露 ——
(i) 嚴重影響特區政府依法執行職能的情況；或
(ii) 一項對公共秩序、公共安全或公眾健康的嚴重威脅；
(b) 該項披露並不超逾揭露 (a)(i) 或 (ii) 段所述事宜所需的範圍；及
(c) 在顧及有關個案的整體情況下，作出該項披露所照顧的公眾利益，明顯重於不作出該項披露所照顧的公眾利益。
(2) 在斷定某人披露某資料、文件或其他物品，是否屬第 (1) 款中指明披露的定義的 (c) 段所述的情況時，須考慮 ——
(a) 該定義的 (a)(i) 或 (ii) 段所述事宜的嚴重性；
(b) 是否有替代該項披露並屬合理地切實可行的步驟，以及（如有的話）該人在作出該項披露前，是否採取了該等步驟；
(c) 該人是否有合理理由相信該項披露符合公眾利益；
(d) 該項披露所照顧的公眾利益；
(e) 該項披露所帶來的損害或損害風險的程度；及
(f) 作出該項披露是否基於緊急情況。
31. 公職人員的指明
為施行本分部，行政長官會同行政會議如合理地認為，將屬某類別的人士指明為公職人員，是維護國家安全所需者，則可藉在憲報刊登的命令，將屬該類別的人士指明為公職人員。
32. 非法獲取國家秘密
(1) 任何人如 ——
(a) 明知某資料、文件或其他物品屬或載有國家秘密；或
(b) 有合理理由相信某資料、文件或其他物品屬或載有國家秘密，並意圖危害國家安全，
而在沒有合法權限下，獲取該資料、文件或物品，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁5年。
(2) 被控犯第 (1)(a) 款所訂罪行的人，如證明獲取有關資料、文件或物品的目的，是為作出該資料、文件或物品的指明披露，即為免責辯護。
(3) 任何人如明知某資料、文件或其他物品屬或載有國家秘密，並 ——
(a) 意圖危害國家安全；或
(b) 罔顧是否會危害國家安全，
而在沒有合法權限下，獲取該資料、文件或物品，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁7年。
(4) 在本條中，提述某人獲取某資料、文件或其他物品 ——
(a) 包括該人索取、收集、記錄或複製該資料、文件或物品；但
(b) 不包括 ——
(i) 該資料、文件或物品在該人不知情的情況下，落入該人的實質管有；或
(ii) 在該人沒有採取任何步驟的情況下，該資料、文件或物品落入該人的管有或被該人知悉。
33. 非法管有國家秘密
(1) 任何人如 ——
(a) 明知某資料、文件或其他物品屬或載有國家秘密；或
(b) 有合理理由相信某資料、文件或其他物品屬或載有國家秘密，並意圖危害國家安全，
而在沒有合法權限下，管有該資料、文件或物品，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁3年。
(2) 被控犯第 (1)(a) 款所訂罪行的人，如證明管有有關資料、文件或物品的目的，是為作出該資料、文件或物品的指明披露，即為免責辯護。
(3) 任何人如明知某資料、文件或其他物品屬或載有國家秘密，並 ——
(a) 意圖危害國家安全；或
(b) 罔顧是否會危害國家安全，
而在沒有合法權限下，管有該資料、文件或物品，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁5年。
(4) 被控犯第 (1) 或 (3) 款所訂罪行的人，如確立以下事情，即為免責辯護 ——
(a) 在指稱的罪行開始發生的時間（開始時間）之後，該人已採取一切合理步驟，盡快將該款所述的資料、文件或物品 ——
(i) 交予警務人員；或
(ii) 按照警務人員的指示處置；及
(b) 自開始時間起，至 (a)(i) 或 (ii) 段所述的事情發生為止，該人已採取一切合理步驟，以確使該資料、文件或物品不被披露。
(5) 在以下情況下，某人須視作已確立需要就第 (4) 款所訂的免責辯護而確立的事宜 ——
(a) 有足夠證據，就該事宜帶出爭論點；及
(b) 控方沒有提出足以排除合理疑點的相反證明。
(6) 在本條中 ——資料（information） ——
(a) 包括以電子形式儲存的資料；但
(b) 不包括並非儲存於任何媒體的訊息或消息。
34. 非法在離開特區時管有國家秘密
(1) 任何屬（或曾經屬）公職人員的人如 ——
(a) 憑藉其公職人員身分而獲取或管有（或曾經獲取或管有）某資料、文件或其他物品；
(b) 明知該資料、文件或物品屬或載有國家秘密；及
(c) 意圖危害國家安全，或罔顧是否會危害國家安全，而在沒有合法權限下，在離開特區時管有該資料、文件或物品，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁7年。
(2) 就乘搭離境運輸工具離開特區的人而言，在第 (1) 款中提述該人管有某資料、文件或其他物品，包括任何以下情況 ——
(a) 該資料、文件或物品屬該人的個人物品的一部分，並由該運輸工具運載；
(b) 該資料、文件或物品在該人的托運行李內（不論是否由或將會由同一運輸工具運載）。
(3) 在本條中 ——資料（information） ——
(a) 包括以電子形式儲存的資料；但
(b) 不包括並非儲存於任何媒體的訊息或消息；離境運輸工具（departure conveyance）指在離開特區的行程中使用的車輛、船隻、航空器、氣墊船或其他運輸工具。
35 非法披露國家秘密
(1) 任何指明人士如在沒有合法權限下，披露憑藉其指明身分而獲取或管有（或曾經獲取或管有）的、屬或載有指明國家秘密的資料、文件或其他物品，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁10年。
(2) 被控犯第 (1) 款所訂罪行的指明人士，如確立在指稱的罪行發生時，自己既不知道亦無合理理由相信有關資料、文件或物品屬或載有指明國家秘密，即為免責辯護。
(3) 在以下情況下，某人須視作已確立需要就第 (2) 款所訂的免責辯護而確立的事宜 ——
(a) 有足夠證據，就該事宜帶出爭論點；及
(b) 控方沒有提出足以排除合理疑點的相反證明。
(4) 任何指明人士如 ——
(a) 憑藉其指明身分而獲取或管有（或曾經獲取或管有）某資料、文件或其他物品；
(b) 明知該資料、文件或物品屬或載有國家秘密（指明國家秘密除外）；及
(c) 在沒有合法權限下，披露該資料、文件或物品，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁7年。
(5) 任何指明人士如 ——
(a) 憑藉其指明身分而獲取或管有（或曾經獲取或管有）某資料、文件或其他物品；
(b) 明知該資料、文件或物品屬或載有國家秘密（指明國家秘密除外）；及
(c) 意圖危害國家安全，或罔顧是否會危害國家安全，而在沒有合法權限下，披露該資料、文件或物品，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁10年。
(6) 任何人如 ——
(a) 明知某資料、文件或其他物品屬或載有國家秘密；或
(b) 有合理理由相信某資料、文件或其他物品屬或載有國家秘密，並意圖危害國家安全，而在沒有合法權限下，披露該資料、文件或物品，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁5年。
(7) 被控犯第 (6)(a) 款所訂罪行的人，如證明披露有關資料、文件或物品屬一項指明披露，即為免責辯護。
(8) 任何人如明知某資料、文件或其他物品屬或載有國家秘密，並 ——
(a) 意圖危害國家安全；或
(b) 罔顧是否會危害國家安全，而在沒有合法權限下，披露該資料、文件或物品，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁7年。
(9) 在本條中，提述披露某資料、文件或其他物品，不包括將該資料、文件或物品 ——
(a) 交予警務人員；或
(b) 按照警務人員的指示處置。
(10) 在本條中 ——指明人士（specified person）指屬（或曾經屬）公職人員或政府承辦商的人；指明身分
（specified capacity） ——
(a) 就屬(或曾經屬)公職人員的人而言——指該人作為公職人員的身分；或
(b) 就屬（或曾經屬）政府承辦商的人而言——指該人作為政府承辦商的身分；指明國家秘密（specified state secret）指屬第29條中國家秘密的定義的 (b)、(c) 或 (g) 段所述的秘密的國家秘密。
36. 非法披露因間諜活動所得的資料等
(1) 任何人如在沒有合法權限下，披露該人明知（或有合理理由相信）是因違反第43(1) 條以致落入該人的管有的資料、文件或其他物品，即屬犯罪。
(2) 任何人犯第 (1) 款所訂罪行，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁10年。
37. 非法披露看來屬機密事項的資料等
(1) 如 ——
(a) 任何指明人士意圖危害國家安全，而在沒有合法權限下 ——
(i) 披露任何資料、文件或其他物品；及
(ii) 在作出該項披露時，表述或顯示該資料、文件或物品為該人士憑藉其指明身分而獲取或管有（或曾經獲取或管有）者；及
(b) 該資料、文件或物品假若屬實的話，便會屬（或相當可能屬）機密事項，則不論該資料、文件或物品是否屬實，該人士即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁5年。
(2) 如 ——
(a) 任何指明人士勾結境外勢力，意圖危害國家安全，而在沒有合法權限下 ——
(i) 披露任何資料、文件或其他物品；及
(ii) 在作出該項披露時，表述或顯示該資料、文件或物品為該人士憑藉其指明身分而獲取或管有（或曾經獲取或管有）者；及
(b) 該資料、文件或物品假若屬實的話，便會屬（或相當可能屬）機密事項，則不論該資料、文件或物品是否屬實，該人士即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁7年。
(3) 被控犯第 (1) 或 (2) 款所訂罪行的指明人士，如確立在指稱的罪行發生時，自己既不知道亦無合理理由相信有關資料、文件或物品屬第 (1)(b) 或 (2)(b) 款（視屬何情況而定）所指者，即為免責辯護。
(4) 在以下情況下，某人須視作已確立需要就第(3)款所訂的免責辯護而確立的事宜 ——
(a) 有足夠證據，就該事宜帶出爭論點；及
(b) 控方沒有提出足以排除合理疑點的相反證明。
(5) 在本條中 ——指明人士（specified person）指屬（或曾經屬）公職人員或政府承辦商的人；指明身分（specified capacity） ——
(a) 就屬（或曾經屬）公職人員的人而言——指該人作為公職人員的身分；或
(b) 就屬（或曾經屬）政府承辦商的人而言——指該人作為政府承辦商的身分；機密事項（confidential matter）指符合以下說明的事項：若在沒有合法權限下披露該事項，便會損害中央或特區政府的利益。
38. 經授權的披露
(1) 就本分部而言，如公職人員按照其公務上的職責作出披露，該項披露即屬在合法權限下作出，亦僅在該等情況下該項披露方屬在合法權限下作出。
(2) 就本分部而言，如政府承辦商 ——
(a) 按照正式授權作出披露；或
(b) 憑藉某職能而屬政府承辦商，而該承辦商在沒有違反正式限制的情況下，為該職能的目的作出披露，該項披露即屬在合法權限下作出，亦僅在該等情況下該項披露方屬在合法權限下作出。
(3) 就本分部而言，如既非公職人員亦非政府承辦商的人所作出的披露是按照正式授權作出的，該項披露即屬在合法權限下作出，亦僅在該等情況下該項披露方屬在合法權限下作出。
(4) 被控犯第35、36或37條所訂罪行的人，如確立在指稱的罪行發生時，相信自己有合法權限作出有關的披露，亦沒有合理理由相信情況並非如此，即為免責辯護。
(5) 在以下情況下，某人須視作已確立需要就第 (4) 款所訂的免責辯護而確立的事宜 ——
(a) 有足夠證據，就該事宜帶出爭論點；及
(b) 控方沒有提出足以排除合理疑點的相反證明。
(6) 在本條中 ——正式限制（official restriction）指由公職人員或政府承辦商妥為施加的限制；正式授權（official authorization）指由公職人員或政府承辦商妥為給予的授權。
39. 資料的保障
(1) 在以下情況下，第 (2) 款適用 ——
(a) 任何指明人士憑藉其作為指明人士的身分，管有或控制任何資料、文件或其他物品(有關資料、文件或物品)；及
(b) 若該指明人士在沒有合法權限下披露有關資料、文件或物品，便會犯第35或36條所訂罪行。
(2) 如指明人士 ——
(a) 如屬公職人員——在違反其公務上的職責的情況下保留有關資料、文件或物品；或
(b) 如屬政府承辦商——沒有遵從關於有關資料、文件或物品的交回或處置的正式指示，或沒有採取可合理地期望一名處於該指明人士的位置的人會採取的謹慎措施，以防止有關資料、文件或物品在未經授權下披露，該指明人士即屬犯罪。
(3) 被控犯第 (2)(a) 款所訂罪行的公職人員，如確立在指稱的罪行發生時，相信自己是按照其公務上的職責行事，亦沒有合理理由相信情況並非如此，即為免責辯護。
(4) 在以下情況下，某人須視作已確立需要就第 (3) 款所訂的免責辯護而確立的事宜 ——
(a) 有足夠證據，就該事宜帶出爭論點；及
(b) 控方沒有提出足以排除合理疑點的相反證明。
(5) 凡任何人管有或控制任何資料、文件或其他物品，而若該人在沒有合法權限下披露該資料、文件或物品，便會犯第35或36條所訂罪行，如有以下情況，該人即屬犯罪 ——
(a) 該人沒有遵從關於該資料、文件或物品的交回或處置的正式指示；或
(b) 該人 ——
(i) 按某些條款從指明人士取得該資料、文件或物品，而該等條款規定該資料、文件或物品須在機密情況下持有；或
(ii) 在某情況下從指明人士取得該資料、文件或物品，而該情況令該指明人士能夠合理地期望該資料、文件或物品會在機密情況下持有，
而該人沒有採取可合理地期望一名處於其位置的人會採取的謹慎措施，以防止該資料、文件或物品在未經授權下披露。
(6) 任何人犯第 (2) 或 (5) 款所訂罪行，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處第4級罰款及監禁3個月。
(7) 凡有任何官方資料、文件或其他物品能被人用於取覽被第35或36條禁止披露的任何資料、文件或其他物品，則任何人披露該官方資料、文件或物品，而從作出該項披露的情況來看，預期該官方資料、文件或物品可能被人在沒有權限下用於該目的是合理的，該人即屬犯罪。
(8) 就第 (7) 款而言，如有以下情況，有關的人所披露的資料、文件或物品即屬官方資料、文件或物品 ——
(a) 該人憑藉其作為指明人士的身分（或曾經憑藉該身分）而管有該資料、文件或物品；或
(b) 該人明知（或有合理理由相信）某指明人士憑藉其作為指明人士的身分（或曾經憑藉該身分）而管有該資料、文件或物品。
(9) 任何人犯第 (7) 款所訂罪行，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處罰款 $500,000及監禁2年。
(10) 在本條中 ——正式指示（official direction）指由指明人士妥為給予的指示；指明人士（specified person）指公職人員或政府承辦商。
40. 本分部的域外法律效力
(1) 如 ——
(a) 任何 ——
(i) 特區居民；
(ii) 在特區成立、組成或註冊的法人團體；或
(iii) 不論是法團抑或不是法團的在特區有業務地點的團體，在特區以外地方作出任何作為；而
(b) 該項作為假若是在特區作出即構成第32(1) 或 (3)、33(1) 或 (3)、35(6) 或 (8) 或36(1) 條所訂罪行，則該居民或該團體即屬犯該罪行。
(2) 如任何人在特區以外地方作出任何作為，而該項作為假若是在特區作出即構成第35(1)、(4) 或 (50) 或37(1) 或 (2) 條所訂罪行，則該人即屬犯該罪行。
(3) 在本條中 ——特區居民（HKSAR resident）指 ——
(a) 香港永久性居民；或
(b) 符合獲發《人事登記條例》（第177章）所指的身分證的資格，但沒有《入境條例》（第115章）所指的香港居留權的人。

第 2 分部：與間諜活動相關的罪行

41. 釋義
(1) 在本分部中 ——
文件（document）包括文件的一部分；
地方（place）指任何地方，並包括 ——
(a) 任何運輸工具；及
(b) 任何帳幕或構築物(不論是否可移動的或是否離岸的)；
軍火（munitions）包括擬在戰爭或武裝衝突中使用（或經改裝以在戰爭或武裝衝突中使用）的任何船隻、航空器、坦克或類似機器的整體或其任何部分、槍械及彈藥、魚雷、水雷、地雷或空雷，以及任何擬作該用途的其他物品、物料或裝置，不論是實有的或擬有的；
無人工具（unmanned tool）指沒有人在其上的情況下操作的運輸工具或其他以動力驅動的機器；
無線電通訊裝置（radiocommunications installation）具有《電訊條例》（第106章）第2(1) 條所給予的涵義；
禁地（prohibited place）指位於特區的 ——
(a) 防衞工事、軍火庫或軍事或國防設施；
(b) 根據《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區駐軍法》第十二條宣布為軍事禁區的地方；
(c) 屬於中央或特區政府（有關當局）、由有關當局佔用或代表有關當局佔用，並作軍事或國防用途的站所、工廠、船塢、坑道、雷場、營舍、船隻或航空器；
(d) 某一地方，它 ——
(i) 是屬於有關當局、由有關當局佔用或代表有關當局佔用的地方；及
(ii) 僅可由任何就該地方執行職能的人士進入，以及設計用作放置以下一項或多於一項，或相關設施 ——
(A) 無線電通訊裝置；
(B) 電訊系統；
(C) 電訊裝置；
(D) 電訊網絡；
(E) 電訊線路；
(F) 伺服器；
(e) 屬於有關當局、由有關當局佔用或代表有關當局佔用，並用於建造、修理、製作或儲存任何供戰時或武裝衝突時使用的軍火、船隻、航空器、槍械或物料或工具，或用於建造、修理、製作或儲存與之有關的資料、文件或其他物品的地方，或屬於有關當局、由有關當局佔用或代表有關當局佔用，並為取得任何在戰時或武裝衝突時有用的金屬、石油或礦物的目的而使用的地方；
(f) 不屬於有關當局的地方，而在該地方內，有任何軍火或與之有關的任何資料、文件或其他物品正根據與有關當局或與代表有關當局的人訂立的合約而製作、修理、取得或儲存或在其他情況下代表有關當局而製作、修理、取得或儲存；或
(g) 根據第42條宣布為禁地的地方；
運輸工具（conveyance）包括車輛、船隻、航空器及氣墊船；
電訊系統（telecommunications system）具有《電訊條例》（第106章）第2(1) 條所給予的涵義；
電訊裝置（telecommunications installation）具有《電訊條例》（第106章）第2(1) 條所給予的涵義；
電訊網絡（telecommunications network）具有《電訊條例》（第106章）第2(1) 條所給予的涵義；
電訊線路（telecommunications line）具有《電訊條例》（第106章）第2(1) 條所給予的涵義。
(2) 在本分部中 ——
(a) 提述傳達的詞句，包括任何傳達，不論是全部傳達或部分傳達，亦不論所傳達的是資料、文件或其他物品本身或只是傳達其內容或效果或對其所作的描述；
(b) 提述傳達資料、文件或其他物品的詞句，包括轉移或轉傳資料、文件或其他物品，亦包括提供取得或接達資料、文件或其他物品的途徑；及
(c) 提述取得資料、文件或其他物品的詞句，包括複製或安排複製資料、文件或其他物品的整體或其任何部分。
42. 禁地的宣布和守衞的授權
(1) 為施行本分部，行政長官如在顧及第 (2) 款指明的事宜下，合理地認為宣布某位於特區的地方為禁地，是維護國家安全所需者，則可藉在憲報刊登的命令宣布該地方為禁地。
(2) 有關事宜是 ——
(a) 有關地方的用途；
(b) 該地方的擁有人或佔用人；
(c) 在該地方內保存、儲存或處理的任何資料的性質；及
(d) 位於該地方內的任何科技、設備或物料的性質。
(3) 根據第 (1) 款作出的命令，可就某特定地方作出，亦可就某種類的地方作出。
(4) 行政長官可授權任何人或任何類別的人，作為就任何禁地履行守衞或警衞職責的人。
43. 間諜活動
(1) 如任何人意圖危害國家安全，而作出第 (2) 款指明的作為，該人即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁20年。
(2) 有關作為是 ——
(a) 接近、查察、從上方或下方越過、進入或接達禁地，或出現於毗鄰禁地之處（包括透過電子或遙距方式作出上述作為）；
(b) 致使無人工具接近、查察、從上方或下方越過、進入或接達禁地，或出現於毗鄰禁地之處（包括透過電子或遙距方式作出上述作為）；或
(c) 取得（包括以截取通訊方式取得）、收集、記錄、製作或管有旨在對或擬對境外勢力有直接或間接用處的任何資料、文件或其他物品，或將之傳達予任何其他人。
(3) 如任何人勾結境外勢力，向公眾發布虛假或具誤導性的事實陳述，而 ——
(a) 該人 ——
(i) 意圖危害國家安全，或罔顧是否會危害國家安全，而如此發布該項陳述；及
(ii) 知道該項陳述屬虛假或具誤導性；或
(b) 該人 ——
(i) 意圖危害國家安全，而如此發布該項陳述；及
(ii) 有合理理由相信該項陳述屬虛假或具誤導性，該人即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁10年。
(4) 就第 (3) 款而言 ——
(a) 如合理的人閱讀、聆聽或以其他方式得悉某項陳述後，會認為該項陳述是事實的表述，該項陳述即屬事實陳述；及
(b) 如某項事實陳述全部或在要項上屬虛假（不論該項陳述本身如此，或該項陳述在其語境中是如此），該項陳述即屬虛假。
(5) 在本條中 ——通訊（communication）具有《截取通訊及監察條例》（第589章）第2(1) 條所給予的涵義；截取（interception）具有《截取通訊及監察條例》（第589章）第2(1) 條所給予的涵義。
44. 在沒有合法權限下進入禁地等 如任何人 ——
(a) 在沒有合理辯解或合法權限下 ——
(i) 查察、從上方或下方越過、進入或接達禁地（包括透過電子或遙距方式作出上述作為）；或
(ii) 致使無人工具查察、從上方或下方越過、進入或接達禁地（包括透過電子或遙距方式作出上述作為）；及
(b) 明知（或有合理理由相信）自己在作出 (a)(i) 或 (ii) 段所述的作為時，並沒有合法權限作出該項作為，該人即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁2年。
45. 可就禁地行使的權力
(1) 指明人員可命令 ——
(a) 任何人不得作出或停止作出第43(2)(a) 或 (b) 條指明的作為；
(b) 已進入或接達（包括透過電子或遙距方式進入或接達）禁地的人立即離開禁地；
(c) 出現於毗鄰禁地之處的人立即離開該處；或
(d) 駕駛或操作在禁地或毗鄰禁地之處（有關地方）內的運輸工具的人，或操作在有關地方內的無人工具的人，將該運輸工具或無人工具移離有關地方。
(2) 指明人員可安排 ——
(a) 將在有關地方內的運輸工具或無人工具，移離有關地方；或
(b) 將運輸工具或無人工具從有關地方內的某處，移至有關地方內的另一處。
(3) 指明人員除非有合理理由相信行使第 (1) 或 (2) 款所賦予的權力是維護國家安全所需者，否則不得行使該權力。
(4) 任何人違反根據第 (1) 款作出的命令，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁2年。
(5) 在本條中 ——指明人員（specified officer） ——
(a) 就任何禁地而言——指任何以下的人 ——
(i) 警務人員；
(ii) 根據第42(4) 條就該禁地獲授權的人；或
(b) 就屬於中央、由中央佔用或代表中央佔用的禁地而言——指掌管該禁地的機構所指派的就該禁地履行守衞或警衞職責的人。
46 在禁地附近作出妨礙等
(1) 如任何指明人員正在就某禁地履行職責，而有另一人在該禁地附近 ——
(a) 蓄意妨礙該指明人員履行該職責；
(b) 在關乎該指明人員履行該職責的情況下，明知而誤導該指明人員；或
(c) 蓄意以其他方式干預或阻礙該指明人員履行該職責，該另一人即屬犯罪。
(2) 任何人犯第 (1) 款所訂罪行，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁2年。
(3) 在本條中 ——指明人員（specified officer） ——
(a) 就任何禁地而言——指任何以下的人 ——
(i) 警務人員；
(ii) 根據第42(4) 條就該禁地獲授權的人；或
(b) 就屬於中央、由中央佔用或代表中央佔用的禁地而言——指掌管該禁地的機構所指派的就該禁地履行守衞或警衞職責的人。
47. 參加或支援境外情報組織，或接受其提供的利益等
(1) 如任何人 ——
(a) 意圖危害國家安全；或
(b) 罔顧是否會危害國家安全，而明知地就境外情報組織作出受禁作為，該人即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁14年。
(2) 如 ——
(a) 任何人罔顧是否會危害國家安全，而作出某項作為（有關作為）；
(b) 有關作為構成就境外情報組織作出的受禁作為；及
(c) 該人罔顧有關作為是否會構成上述受禁作為，該人即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁10年。
(3) 行政長官可就某組織是否境外情報組織的認定問題發出證明文件，該文件對法院有約束力。
(4) 在本條中 ——
利益（advantage）指 ——
(a) 任何饋贈、貸款、費用、報酬或佣金，其形式為金錢、任何有價證券或任何種類的其他財產或財產權益；
(b) 任何職位、受僱工作或合約；
(c) 將任何貸款、義務或其他法律責任全部或部分予以支付、免卻、解除或了結；
(d) 任何其他服務或優待（款待除外），包括維護使免受已招致或料將招致的懲罰或資格喪失，或維護使免遭採取紀律、民事或刑事上的行動或程序，不論該行動或程序是否已經提出；
(e) 行使或不行使任何權利、權力或職責；及
(f) 有條件或無條件提供、承諾給予或答應給予 (a)、(b)、(c)、(d) 或 (e) 段所指的任何利益；
受禁作為（prohibited act）就某境外情報組織而言，指 ——
(a) 成為該組織的成員；
(b) 接受該組織（或代該組織行事的人）的任務或培訓；
(c) 向該組織（或代該組織行事的人）提供實質支援（包括提供財政支援或資料，以及為該組織招募成員）；或
(d) 接受由該組織（或代該組織行事的人）提供的實質利益；
財政支援（financial support）指任何資金或其他財務資產或經濟資源；
款待（entertainment）指供應在當場享用的食物或飲品，以及任何與此項供應有關或同時提供的其他款待；
經濟資源（economic resources）指並非資金的各種資產，不論是有形的或無形的、是動產或不動產，並可用以取得資金、貨物或服務；
資金（funds）包括 ——
(a) 金幣、金錠、現金、支票、金錢的申索、銀票、匯票及其他作付款用的票據；
(b) 存於財務機構或其他實體的存款、帳户結餘、債項及債務責任；
(c) 證券及債務票據（包括股額及股份、代表證券的證明書、債券、票據、認購權證、債權證、債權股證及衍生工具合約）；
(d) 財產所孳生的利息、股息或其他收入、自財產累算的價值或財產所產生的價值；
(e) 信貸、抵銷權、保證或擔保、履約保證或其他財務承擔；
(f) 信用狀、提單及賣據；
(g) 資金或財務資源的權益的證明文件；及
(h) 任何其他出口融資的票據；
境外情報組織（external intelligence organization）指由境外勢力設立並從事以下工作或活動（不論如何稱述）的組織 ——
(a) 情報工作；或
(b) 對其他國家或地方進行的顛覆或破壞活動。
48. 本分部的域外法律效力
(1) 如任何人在特區以外地方作出任何作為，而該項作為假若是在特區作出即構成第43(1) 條所訂罪行（關乎第43(2)(a) 或 (b) 條指明的作為者）或第44條所訂罪行，則該人即屬犯該罪行。
(2) 如 ——
(a) 任何 ——
(i) 屬中國公民的特區居民；
(ii) 在特區成立、組成或註冊的法人團體；或
(iii) 不論是法團抑或不是法團的在特區有業務地點的團體，在特區以外地方作出任何作為；而
(b) 該項作為假若是在特區作出即構成第43(1) 條所訂罪行（關乎第43(2)(c) 條指明的作為者）或第47(1) 或 (2) 條所訂罪行，則該居民或該團體即屬犯該罪行。
(3) 如 ——
(a) 任何 ——
(i) 特區居民；
(ii) 在特區成立、組成或註冊的法人團體；或
(iii) 不論是法團抑或不是法團的在特區有業務地點的團體，在特區以外地方作出任何作為；而
(b) 該項作為假若是在特區作出即構成第43(3) 條所訂罪行，則該居民或該團體即屬犯該罪行。
(4) 在本條中 ——特區居民（HKSAR resident）指 ——
(a) 香港永久性居民；或
(b) 符合獲發《人事登記條例》（第177章）所指的身分證的資格，但沒有《入境條例》（第115章）所指的香港居留權的人。

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第 5 部 危害國家安全的破壞活動等

49. 危害國家安全的破壞活動
(1) 如任何人 ——
(a) 意圖危害國家安全；或
(b) 罔顧是否會危害國家安全，而損壞或削弱公共基礎設施，該人即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁20年。
(2) 如任何人勾結境外勢力 ——
(a) 意圖危害國家安全；或
(b) 罔顧是否會危害國家安全，而損壞或削弱公共基礎設施，該人即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處終身監禁。
(3) 就第(1)及(2)款而言，凡任何作為對公共基礎設施（包括組成該設施的東西或軟件）造成任何以下效果（不論在何時造成） ——
(a) 使該設施變得容易遭濫用或損壞；
(b) 使無權接達或改動該設施的人，變得容易接達或改動該設施；
(c) 導致該設施無法發揮其完整或部分應有功能；
(d) 導致該設施並非如其擁有人（或該擁有人的代表）對其所設定的運作方式運作（即使該項作為不會令該設施的操作、組成該設施的東西或軟件或在該設施內儲存的資料的可靠性減損亦然），該項作為即屬削弱該設施。
(4) 在本條中 ——公共基礎設施（public infrastructure）指 ——
(a) 屬於中央或特區政府的，或由或代表中央或特區政府佔用的以下各項（不論其是否位於特區） ——
(i) 基礎設施；
(ii) 設施或設備；
(iii) 網絡或電腦或電子系統；
(iv) 辦公處所；或
(v) 軍事或國防的設施或設備；
(b) 位於特區的公共交通工具、公共交通基礎設施或公共交通設施（包括機場及相關設施）；或
(c) 位於特區的 ——
(i) 提供或維持公共服務（例如金融、物流、水、電力、能源、燃料、排污、通訊、互聯網）的 ——
(A) 基礎設施；或
(B) 設施；或
(ii) 提供或管理第 (i) 節所述服務的電腦或電子系統。
50. 就電腦或電子系統作出危害國家安全的作為
(1) 如 ——
(a) 某人意圖危害國家安全，而在沒有合法權限下，就某電腦或電子系統作出某項作為；
(b) 該人知道自己在作出該項作為時，並沒有合法權限作出該項作為；及
(c) 該項作為危害（或相當可能危害）國家安全，該人即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁20年。
(2) 就第 (1)(a) 款而言，在以下情況下，就某電腦或電子系統作出某項作為的人（該人），即屬在沒有合法權限下作出該項作為 ——
(a) 該人並非下述的人：對該電腦或電子系統負有責任，並有權決定是否可作出該項作為的人（負責人）；及
(b) 該人在沒有獲負責人同意的情況下作出該項作為。
(3) 在本條中 ——電腦或電子系統（computer or electronic system）包括組成電腦或電子系統的東西或軟件。
51. 本部的域外法律效力
如任何人在特區以外地方作出任何作為，而該項作為假若是在特區作出即構成第49(1) 或 (2) 或50(1) 條所訂罪行，則該人即屬犯該罪行。

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第 6 部 危害國家安全的境外干預及從事危害國家安全活動的組織

第 1 分部：危害國家安全的境外干預

52. 危害國家安全的境外干預
任何人如 ——
(a) 意圖帶來干預效果，而配合境外勢力作出某項作為；及
(b) 在如此作出該項作為時，使用不當手段，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁14年。
53. 帶來干預效果的涵義
(1) 在本分部中，提述帶來干預效果，即提述帶來一種或多於一種以下效果 ——
(a) 影響中央人民政府或特區行政機關 ——
(i) 制訂或執行任何政策或措施；或
(ii) 作出或執行任何其他決定，包括影響中央人民政府或特區行政機關的官員，或其他獲授權執行其上述職能的人員，執行該職能；
(b) 影響立法會執行職能（包括影響任何立法會議員以該身分執行職能），或干預與立法會相關的程序；
(c) 影響法院執行職能（包括影響任何司法人員以該身分執行職能），或干預特區的司法；
(d) 干預任何選舉或與選舉相關的程序，包括 ——
(i) 影響他人行使其在《基本法》下就任何選舉而享有的選舉權或被選舉權；
(ii) 干預根據《行政長官選舉條例》（第569章）第8條組成選舉委員會的程序；及
(iii) 干預他人根據《區議會條例》（第547章）成為區議會議員的程序；
(e) 損害任何一項或多於一項以下關係 ——
(i) 中國與任何外國的關係；
(ii) 中央與特區的關係；
(iii) 中央與中國任何其他地區的關係；
(iv) 特區與中國任何其他地區的關係；
(v) 特區與任何外國的關係。
(2) 在本條中 ——選舉（election）指《選舉(舞弊及非法行為)條例》（第554章）第4(1) 條所列的選舉。
54. 配合境外勢力的涵義
就本分部而言，如有一項或多於一項以下情況，某人即屬配合境外勢力作出某項作為 ——
(a) 該人參與某項由境外勢力策劃或以其他方式主導的活動，而該項作為，是該人參與該項活動所牽涉的作為；
(b) 該人代境外勢力作出該項作為；
(c) 該人在與境外勢力合作下，作出該項作為；
(d) 該人在境外勢力控制、監督、指使或要求下，作出該項作為；
(e) 該人在境外勢力資助或以其他方式支援下，作出該項作為。
55. 使用不當手段的涵義
(1) 就第52條而言，該條所述的人（當事者）如符合 (a)、(b) 及 (c) 段當中至少一項的描述，即屬在作出該條所述的作為時，使用不當手段 ——
(a) 當事者在作出該項作為或其任何部分時，明知而對任何人作出關鍵失實陳述；
(b) 該項作為或其任何部分，是以任何一種或多於一種以下方式作出的 ——
(i) 對任何人施予暴力，或威脅對任何人施予暴力；
(ii) 摧毀或損毀任何人的財產，或威脅摧毀或損毀任何人的財產；
(iii) 以其他方式使任何人蒙受財政上的損失，或威脅以其他方式使任何人蒙受財政上的損失；
(iv) 使任何人的名譽受損，或威脅使任何人的名譽受損；
(v) 使任何人受到心理傷害，或對任何人施予過分的心理壓力；
(c) 該項作為或其任何部分構成罪行。
(2) 就第 (1)(a) 款而言，關鍵失實陳述 ——
(a) 可藉口頭或書面陳述作出，亦可藉其他行徑作出；及
(b) 可屬明言或暗示。
(3) 在本條中，提述對任何人作出關鍵失實陳述，即提述對該人作出虛假或具誤導性的陳述，而該項陳述具有防止該人洞悉任何以下事實的效果 ——
(a) 當事者意圖帶來干預效果而作出有關作為此一事實；或
(b) 當事者配合境外勢力而作出有關作為此一事實。
56. 代境外勢力作出作為的推定
(1) 凡有就第52條所訂罪行而對某人（被告人）提起任何法律程序，則在該法律程序中，如控方證明被告人意圖帶來干預效果而作出某項作為，則只要控方進一步證明 ——
(a) 被告人在如此作出該項作為前，曾就該項意圖，或曾就與該項意圖相關的事宜，與某境外勢力溝通；及
(b) 被告人知道或理應知道，該項作為或其任何部分 ——
(i) 是會使該境外勢力達到其目的的；或
(ii) 是會在其他情況下使該境外勢力得益的，被告人即須被推定為就第54(b) 條而言屬代該境外勢力作出該項作為。
(2) 然而，被告人在以下情況下，即屬推翻第 (1) 款所訂的推定 ——
(a) 有足夠證據，帶出被告人並非代有關境外勢力作出有關作為的爭論點；及
(b) 控方沒有提出足以排除合理疑點的相反證明。
57. 本分部的域外法律效力
(1) 如 ——
(a) 任何 ——
(i) 屬中國公民的特區居民；
(ii) 在特區成立、組成或註冊的法人團體；或
(iii) 不論是法團抑或不是法團的在特區有業務地點的團體，在特區以外地方作出任何作為；而
(b) 該項作為假若是在特區作出即構成第52條所訂罪行，則該居民或該團體即屬犯該罪行。
(2) 在本條中 ——特區居民（HKSAR resident）指 ——
(a) 香港永久性居民；或
(b) 符合獲發《人事登記條例》（第177章）所指的身分證的資格，但沒有《入境條例》（第115章）所指的香港居留權的人。

第 2 分部：從事危害國家安全活動的組織

第 1 次分部：導言

58. 釋義
在本分部中 ——
受禁組織（prohibited organization）的涵義如下：凡根據第60(1) 或 (2) 條就某組織作出命令，而該項命令屬有效，該組織即屬受禁組織；
政治性團體（political body）指 ——
(a) 政黨或宣稱是政黨的組織；或
(b) 其主要功能或宗旨是為參加選舉(《選舉（舞弊及非法行為）條例》（第554章）第4(1) 條所列者)的候選人宣傳或作準備的組織；
組織（organization）指 ——
(a) 《社團條例》（第151章）第2(1) 條所界定的社團；
(b) 該條例的附表所列明的人；或
(c) 任何其他團體，而不論該團體屬何性質，亦不論該團體是否根據任何宗旨或目標而組成或成立，或是否按照任何宗旨或目標而運作；
幹事（office-bearer） ——
(a) 就組織而言，指組織的會長、副會長、秘書或司庫，或組織的委員會成員或管治組織成員，或在組織擔任類似任何上述職位或職務的人；或
(b) 就受禁組織而言，指在受禁組織擔任普通成員以外任何職位或職務的人；
境外政治性組織（political organization of an external place）包括 ——
(a) 外國政府或其政治分部；
(b) 境外當局或其政治分部；
(c) 該政府或當局的代理人，或該政府或當局的政治分部的代理人；及
(d) 在境外的政黨或其代理人；
獲授權人員（authorized officer）指根據第67條委任的公務人員；
聯繫（connection）就屬政治性團體的組織而言，指以下情況 ——
(a) 該組織直接或間接尋求或接受境外政治性組織的資助、任何形式的財政上的贊助或支援或貸款，或其他方式的實質支援；
(b) 該組織直接或間接附屬於境外政治性組織；
(c) 該組織的任何政策是直接或間接由境外政治性組織釐定；或
(d) 在該組織的決策過程中，境外政治性組織直接或間接作出指示、控制、監督、主使或參與。
59. 本分部不影響《社團條例》的施行
本分部不影響《社團條例》（第151章）的施行。

第 2 次分部：禁止從事危害國家安全活動的組織在特區運作

60. 禁止組織運作
(1) 如保安局局長合理地相信，禁止第 (3) 款指明的組織在特區運作或繼續運作，是維護國家安全所需者，則保安局局長可藉在憲報刊登的命令，禁止該組織在特區運作或繼續運作。
(2) 如第 (3)(a) 款指明的組織（本地組織）是政治性團體，並與境外政治性組織有聯繫，則保安局局長可藉在憲報刊登的命令，禁止該本地組織在特區運作或繼續運作。
(3) 為施行第 (1) 及 (2) 款而指明的組織是 ——
(a) 在特區組織和成立或總部或主要的業務地點設於特區的任何組織，但不包括 ——
(i) 根據《公司條例》（第622章）（《公司條例》）註冊的公司；
(ii) 根據《公司條例》第2(1) 條所界定的《舊有公司條例》註冊的公司；或
(iii) 《公司條例》第2(1) 條所界定的非香港公司（非香港公司）；或
(b) 在特區以外地方組織和成立而總部或主要的業務地點設於特區以外地方的任何組織（但不包括非香港公司），而有一項或多於一項以下情況適用於該組織 ——
(i) 該組織在特區進行任何活動；
(ii) 任何在特區的人以該組織的幹事或成員身分行事，或自稱或聲稱是該組織的幹事或成員；
(iii) 任何在特區的人管理或協助管理該組織；
(iv) 任何在特區的人在特區代該組織或與該組織合作進行任何活動，或在該組織控制、監督或指使下在特區進行任何活動；
(v) 該組織煽惑、誘使或邀請任何在特區的人成為該組織的成員或管理或協助管理該組織；
(vi) 任何在特區的人向該組織付款或給予其他形式的援助，或為該組織的目的而付款或給予其他形式的援助；
(vii) 該組織直接或間接尋求或接受任何在特區的人的資助、貸款，或任何形式的財政上的贊助或其他形式的援助；
(viii) 該組織直接或間接向任何在特區的人提供資助、貸款，或任何形式的財政上的贊助或其他形式的援助。
(4) 保安局局長如事先沒有給予該組織機會，就為何不應根據第 (1) 或 (2) 款作出命令而作出該組織認為適當的陳詞或書面申述，則不得作出該項命令。
(5) 如保安局局長合理地相信給予該組織機會作出陳詞或書面申述，在該個案的情況下並不切實可行，第(4)款則不適用。
(6) 根據第 (1) 或 (2) 款作出的命令，須在切實可行範圍內盡快 ——
(a) 送達該組織；
(b) 在保安局局長指定的、於特區廣泛流通的一份中文報章及一份英文報章刊登；
(c) 在憲報刊登；及
(d) 在保安局局長指定的互聯網網站發布。
(7) 凡根據第 (1) 或 (2) 款作出命令，該項命令 ——
(a) 一經在憲報刊登，即行生效；或
(b) 如指明於較後日期生效——在該指明日期生效。
61. 本地組織被禁止運作後的善後事宜
(1) 任何第60(3)(a) 條指明的組織如根據第60條被禁止在特區運作或繼續運作（本地受禁組織），當禁止該組織運作或繼續運作的命令根據第60(7) 條生效時，該組織即屬已解散。
(2) 本地受禁組織的每名幹事及成員的法律責任（如有的話）在該組織解散後仍然持續並可強制執行，猶如該組織未曾解散。
(3) 在緊接禁止本地受禁組織運作或繼續運作的命令根據第60(7) 條生效前，如該組織有根據某指明條例獲註冊(不論如何描述，亦不論以何種方式進行)，則第 (4) 及 (5) 款適用於該組織。
(4) 如該組織根據第 (1) 款屬已解散，第 (3) 款所述的註冊即屬已取消，而指明當局須 ——
(a) 如根據該指明條例須就該項註冊備存登記冊（不論如何描述）——因應該項註冊取消而更新該登記冊；及
(b) 在憲報刊登關於該項註冊取消的公告。
(5) 凡該組織根據第 (1) 款屬已解散 ——
(a) 如該指明條例有條文在該組織根據該指明條例解散後適用——該條文即猶如該組織是根據該指明條例解散的而適用；及
(b) 如該指明條例有適用於該組織的清盤的條文或具相同效力的其他條文——該條文即適用於該組織。
(6) 第 (7) 款適用於以下本地受禁組織 ——
(a) 該組織並非第 (3) 款所述的組織；或
(b) 該組織屬第 (3) 款所述的組織，但有關指明條例既無適用於該組織的清盤的條文，亦無具相同效力的其他條文。
(7) 凡本地受禁組織根據第 (1) 款屬已解散，《公司（清盤及雜項條文）條例》（第32章）第360E、360F、360G、360H、360I、360J、360K、360L及360M條在經必要的變通後，即適用於該組織，猶如該組織屬根據該條例第360C條自公司登記冊中被剔除並解散的公司。
(8) 在本條中 ——指明條例（specified Ordinance）指《公司條例》（第622章）及該條例第2(1) 條所界定的《舊有公司條例》以外的條例；指明當局（specified authority）就第 (3) 款所述的註冊而言，指 ——
(a) 如某人根據有關指明條例須就該項註冊備存登記冊（不論如何描述）——該人；或
(b) 如屬其他情況——保安局局長。

第 3 次分部：與受禁組織相關的罪行

62. 禁止參與受禁組織的活動
(1) 任何人在某組織根據第60條被禁止在特區運作或繼續運作後 ——
(a) 身為該組織的幹事或以該組織的幹事身分行事，或自稱或聲稱是該組織的幹事；或
(b) 管理或協助管理該組織，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處罰款 $1,000,000及監禁14年。
(2) 任何人在某組織根據第60條被禁止在特區運作或繼續運作後 ——
(a) 身為該組織的成員或以該組織的成員身分行事，或自稱或聲稱是該組織的成員；
(b) 代該組織或與該組織合作進行任何活動，或在該組織控制、監督或指使下進行任何活動；
(c) 參與該組織的集會；或
(d) 向該組織付款或給予其他形式的援助，或為該組織的目的而付款或給予其他形式的援助，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處罰款$250,000及監禁10年。
(3) 以下作為不構成第 (1) 或 (2) 款所訂罪行 ——
(a) 在事先獲得保安局局長書面批准的情況下作出作為；
(b) 參與某法律程序，不論是以本人身分參與或作為屬該法律程序的一方的組織的代表而參與；
(c) 尋求、提供或接受任何法律服務，或就該等服務支付或收取任何款項；或
(d) 作出 (b) 或 (c) 段提述的作為所附帶的任何作為。
(4) 被控犯第 (1) 或 (2) 款所訂罪行的人，如確立在指稱的罪行發生時，自己既不知道亦無合理理由相信有關組織已根據第60條被禁止在特區運作或繼續運作，即為免責辯護。
(5) 在不影響第 (4) 款的原則下 ——
(a) 就身為受禁組織的幹事或以受禁組織的幹事身分行事而被控犯第 (1) 款所訂罪行的人，如確立自己已採取一切合理步驟，並已盡應盡的努力，以終止該幹事身分；或
(b) 就身為受禁組織的成員或以受禁組織的成員身分行事而被控犯第 (2) 款所訂罪行的人，如確立自己已採取一切合理步驟，並已盡應盡的努力，以終止該成員身分，
即為免責辯護。
(6) 在以下情況下，某人須視作已確立需要就第 (4) 或 (5) 款所訂的免責辯護而確立的事宜 ——
(a) 有足夠證據，就該事宜帶出爭論點；及
(b) 控方沒有提出足以排除合理疑點的相反證明。
63. 容許受禁組織在處所內集會
任何人明知而容許受禁組織或受禁組織成員的集會在屬於該人或由該人佔用或控制的任何地方或處所舉行，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處罰款 $250,000及監禁7年。
64. 煽惑他人成為受禁組織成員等
任何人煽惑、誘使或邀請他人成為受禁組織成員或協助管理受禁組織，或對他人使用暴力、作出威脅或恐嚇以誘使該人成為受禁組織成員或協助管理受禁組織，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處罰款 $250,000及監禁7年。
65. 為受禁組織牟取會費或援助
任何人為受禁組織的目的而向他人牟取或企圖為受禁組織的目的而向他人牟取會費或援助，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處罰款 $250,000及監禁7年。
66. 受禁組織的影子組織
(1) 在第62(1)(a) 及 (b) 及 (2)(a)、(b)、(c) 及 (d) 條中，提述該組織，包括該組織的影子組織。
(2) 在第63、64及65條中，提述受禁組織，包括受禁組織的影子組織。
(3) 就本條而言，如某組織（組織甲）顯示自己是另一組織（組織乙），組織甲即屬組織乙的影子組織。

第 4 次分部：雜項條文

67. 獲授權人員
為施行本分部，保安局局長可藉書面委任某公務人員為獲授權人員。
68. 組織須提供資料
(1) 獲授權人員可藉書面通知，規定任何組織以書面提供保安局局長為根據第60條執行其職能而合理需要的資料。
(2) 第 (1) 款所指的通知，須送達 ——
(a) 該組織；或
(b) 該組織的任何幹事或任何在特區管理或協助管理該組織的人。
(3) 根據第 (1) 款規定提供的資料，可包括該組織的收入、收入來源及開支。
(4) 第 (1) 款所指的通知，須指明提供資料的時限，而該時限不得少於7日。
(5) 獲授權人員可就向其提出的申請，在有好的理由提出後，酌情批准將有關時限延長。
69. 負責提供資料的人
(1) 第68條施加於任何組織的責任，對每名根據該條獲送達通知的該組織幹事及在特區管理或協助管理該組織的人，均有約束力。
(2) 如任何組織沒有遵從根據第68條送達的通知的全部或部分規定，則每名第 (1) 款所述的人，一經循簡易程序定罪，可處第4級罰款，但如該人確立而使法庭信納，該人已盡應盡的努力，以及該人沒有遵從該通知的規定是由於非該人所能控制的原因所致的，則屬例外。
(3) 為遵從根據第68條送達的通知的規定而向保安局局長提供的任何資料，如在要項上是虛假、不正確或不完整的，則提供該等資料的人，一經循簡易程序定罪，可處第4級罰款，但如該人確立而使法庭信納，該人當時有好的理由相信該等資料是真實、正確及完整的，則屬例外。
70. 視察非住宅處所的權力
為使保安局局長能根據第60條執行其職能，警司級或以上的警務人員如合理地相信，某組織或其成員將某非住宅處所設置為或用作為進行集會或活動的地點或經營業務的地點，則該警務人員(或獲其授權的警務人員)可在上述集會或活動進行的時間、上述業務經營的時間，或任何其他合理時間，進入和視察該非住宅處所。
71. 在特定情況下搜查地方的權力
(1) 如裁判官因經獲授權人員宣誓而作的告發，信納有合理理由懷疑，在某地方有任何指明證據，則裁判官可發出手令。
(2) 上述手令可授權獲授權人員及該手令所指明的其他人，作出所有或任何以下行動 ——
(a) 進入和搜查該地方；
(b) 在覺得任何物件屬指明證據時，檢取、移走或扣押該物件；
(c) 如任何人或物件妨礙該人員或該其他人行使本條賦予該人員或該其他人的權力——強行移走該人或物件；
(d) 扣留在該地方發現的人，直至完成搜查該地方為止。
(3) 如 ——
(a) 警司級或以上的警務人員有合理理由懷疑，在某地方有任何指明證據；及
(b) 取得手令，必然引致阻延，此項阻延相當可能導致證據喪失或毀滅，或有任何其他理由，使取得上述手令並非合理地切實可行，則該警務人員（或獲其授權的警務人員）可在沒有根據第 (1) 款發出的手令的情況下，就該地方行使第 (2) 款提述的任何權力。
(4) 在本條中 ——地方（place）指任何地方，並包括 ——
(a) 任何車輛、船隻、航空器、氣墊船或其他運輸工具；
(b) 任何帳幕或構築物（不論是否可移動的或是否離岸的）；及
(c) 任何電子設備；指明證據（specified evidence）指屬或包含（或相當可能屬或包含）保安局局長在根據第60條執行其職能方面所需要的證據的任何物件。
72. 沒收
屬於受禁組織的任何簿冊、帳目、字據、旗幟、徽章或其他動產，一經裁判官發出命令，均須予以沒收和交由保安局局長按其認為適當的方式處置。
73. 通知等的送達
如無相反證據，則根據本分部須向某人或某組織送達的通知或命令，在以下情況下，須當作已經送達 ——
(a) 就個人而言，該通知或命令 ——
(i) 已交付該人；
(ii) 已留在該人最後為人所知的供送達文件的地址，或其最後為人所知的居住地方或業務地址；
(iii) 已藉郵遞寄往該人最後為人所知的供送達文件的地址，或其最後為人所知的通信地址，以寄交該人，而不論該地址是否在特區；
(iv) 已藉電郵、圖文傳真或其他類似的方法送往該人最後為人所知的供送達文件的地址，或其最後為人所知的通信地址，或其最後為人所知的居住地方或業務地址，以送交該人，而不論該地址或地方是否在特區；或
(v) 已透過互聯網或相類似的電子網絡發布，以令該人知悉該通知或命令所關乎的事宜；
(b) 就組織而言，該通知或命令 ——
(i) 已給予或送達該組織的幹事或管理或協助管理該組織的人士；
(ii) 已留在該組織最後為人所知的供送達文件的地址，或其最後為人所知的地址；
(iii) 已藉郵遞寄往該組織最後為人所知的供送達文件的地址，或其最後為人所知的通信地址，以寄交該組織，而不論該地址是否在特區；
(iv) 已藉電郵、圖文傳真或其他類似的方法送往該組織最後為人所知的供送達文件的地址，或其最後為人所知的通信地址，或其最後為人所知的地址，以送交該組織，而不論該地址是否在特區；或
(v) 已透過互聯網或相類似的電子網絡發布，以令該組織的幹事或管理或協助管理該組織的人士知悉該通知或命令所關乎的事宜。

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第 7 部 與維護國家安全相關的執法權力及訴訟程序等

第 1 分部：執法權力及其他與調查相關的事宜

第 1 次分部：為調查危害國家安全罪行可向法院申請延長羈留期

74. 釋義
(1) 在本次分部中 ——首段羈留期（first detention period）指第75(2) 條提述的48小時期間；被捕人（arrested person）——見第75(2) 條；《第232章》（Cap. 232）指《警隊條例》（第232章）；醫院（hospital）指 ——
(a) 《醫院管理局條例》（第113章）附表1或2中指明的醫院；或
(b) 由特區政府經辦或管理用作醫療診斷或治療的診所。
(2) 在根據本次分部計算某期間時，被捕人在醫院接受醫療診斷或治療的時間、該人前往醫院的時間或該人自醫院返回的時間，均不計算在內，但如該人在醫院時接受警務人員訊問，或在前往醫院或自醫院返回的途中，有任何時間接受警務人員訊問，而訊問的目的是為了取得關乎某罪行的證據，則在根據本次分部計算某期間時，該等訊問時間均須計算在內。
75. 本次分部適用於因危害國家安全的罪行而被拘捕的人
(1) 如 ——
(a) 某人因被合理地懷疑干犯危害國家安全的罪行而被拘捕；及
(b) 該人須根據《第232章》第52條，在切實可行範圍內，盡快帶到裁判官席前，則本次分部就該人而適用。
(2) 除第78(1) 條另有規定外，被警方羈留的上述的人（被捕人）須在切實可行範圍內，盡快帶到裁判官席前，而無論如何，不得遲於在該人被拘捕後的48小時期間屆滿後首次有裁判法院開庭之時。
76. 向法院申請延長羈留期
(1) 總警司級或以上的警務人員或獲其授權的警務人員，可向裁判官提出以經宣誓而作的告發支持的申請，要求將被捕人在沒有被落案起訴的情況下被警方羈留的期間，延長或進一步延長。
(2) 支持上述申請的告發 ——
(a) 須由總督察級或以上的警務人員作出；及
(b) 須述明 ——
(i) 該罪行的性質；
(ii) 拘捕被捕人所憑藉的證據的概括性質；
(iii) 警方已就該罪行作出何種查究，以及警方建議作出何種進一步查究；及
(iv) 基於何種原因，而有必要繼續羈留被捕人。
77. 法院就申請延長羈留期的聆訊
(1) 除非以下條件獲符合，否則裁判官不得就有關申請進行聆訊 ——
(a) 被捕人已獲給予該項申請的申請書的複本（支持該項申請的告發則無需給予被捕人）；及
(b) 被捕人已為了就該項申請進行聆訊，而被帶到裁判官席前。
(2) 如被捕人並無律師或大律師代表，但意欲有律師或大律師代表，則 ——
(a) 裁判官可將申請聆訊押後一段合理期間，使該人能夠獲得律師或大律師代表，而該期間不得超逾 ——
(i) 如屬被捕人被拘捕後的首次申請——自首段羈留期屆滿後起計的7日；及
(ii) 如屬其後的申請——自上一段延長期屆滿後起計的7日，或自首段羈留期屆滿後起計的14日，兩者以較早者為準；及
(b) 在聆訊押後期間，被捕人交由警方羈留。
78. 法院就申請延長羈留期的決定
(1) 如就申請進行聆訊的裁判官信納，有合理理由相信延長（或進一步延長）被捕人被警方羈留的期間屬有理可據，則該裁判官可作出授權，將被捕人在沒有被落案起訴的情況下被警方羈留的期間 ——
(a) 如屬被捕人被拘捕後的首次申請——延長，延長期為一段自首段羈留期屆滿後起計的不超逾7日的期間；及
(b) 如屬其後的申請——進一步延長，每段延長期不得超逾7日，而延長期亦不得致使被捕人的總羈留期間，超逾自首段羈留期屆滿後起計的14日。
(2) 就第 (1) 款而言，只有在以下情況下，延長（或進一步延長）被捕人被警方羈留的期間方屬有理可據 ——
(a) 警方正努力並迅速地進行該罪行的調查，而調查按理不能在有關申請日期前完成；及
(b) 被捕人在沒有被落案起訴的情況下被羈留，對保障或保存該罪行的證據，或對訊問該人以取得該等證據，屬於必要。
(3) 根據第 (1) 款作出的授權 ——
(a) 須採用書面形式；及
(b) 須述明 ——
(i) 該項授權的作出時間；及
(ii) 授權將被捕人交由警方羈留的期間。
(4) 如裁判官根據第 (1) 款，授權延長（或進一步延長）被捕人被警方羈留的期間（經延長期間），則除非該人被落案起訴，否則須在該經延長期間屆滿之時或之前，在《第232章》第52(3) 條適用的情況下，釋放該人。
(5) 如裁判官根據第 (1) 款拒絕申請，則除非被捕人被落案起訴，否則須在以下時間，在《第232章》第52(3) 條適用的情況下，釋放該人 ——
(a) 如屬被捕人被拘捕後的首次申請 ——
(i) 在首段羈留期屆滿之時或之前；或
(ii) 如該項申請遭拒絕時首段羈留期已屆滿——該項申請的聆訊完結時；及
(b) 如屬其後的申請 ——
(i) 在對上一次經延長期間屆滿之時或之前；或
(ii) 如該項申請遭拒絕時對上一次經延長期間已屆滿——該項申請的聆訊完結時。
(6) 儘管有第 (4) 及 (5) 款的規定，在第 (4) 或 (5) 款（視何者適用而定）所指的期間屆滿之前，如作出有關告發的警務人員不再有合理理由相信有第 (2) 款指明的情況，則除非被捕人被落案起訴，否則須在《第232章》第52(3) 條適用的情況下，立即釋放該人。

第 2 次分部：因應危害國家安全情況可向法院申請就諮詢法律代表施加適當限制

79. 因應危害國家安全情況可限制諮詢相關個別法律代表
(1) 如某人因被合理地懷疑干犯危害國家安全的罪行而被拘捕及被警方羈留，而該人在被警方羈留期間，要求諮詢某名或某些個別法律代表或正諮詢某名或某些個別法律代表，則本條適用。
(2) 總警司級或以上的警務人員或獲其授權的警務人員，可向裁判官提出以經宣誓而作的告發支持的單方面申請，要求裁判官就該人根據本條發出手令。
(3) 就申請進行聆訊的裁判官如信納，有合理理由相信有第 (4) 款指明的情況，即可發出手令，授權警務人員向該人施加以下限制 ——
(a) 該人不得在被警方羈留期間 ——
(i) 諮詢該名或該等個別法律代表；或
(ii) 如該名或該等個別法律代表在某間或某些香港律師行從事法律執業——諮詢在該間或該等律師行從事法律執業的任何法律代表；但
(b) 該人可諮詢該人所選擇的其他法律代表。
(4) 有關情況是 ——
(a) 該人在被警方羈留期間諮詢任何第 (3)(a) 款提述的法律代表(相關法律代表)，將危害國家安全或導致任何人身體受傷；
(b) 該人已從該罪行中取得利益，而除非上述授權作出，否則該人在被警方羈留期間諮詢相關法律代表，將妨礙追討上述利益；或
(c) 除非上述授權作出，否則該人在被警方羈留期間諮詢相關法律代表，將破壞或妨礙司法公正。
(5) 如第 (2) 款所指的告發是在該人諮詢某名或某些個別法律代表的期間作出的，則在裁判官就該告發作出任何決定之前 ——
(a) 如以該告發支持的申請要求就該人諮詢該名或該等個別法律代表施加限制——該人須暫停諮詢該名或該等個別法律代表，但可諮詢該人所選擇的其他法律代表；或
(b) 如該名或該等個別法律代表在某間或某些香港律師行從事法律執業，而該項申請要求就該人諮詢在該間或該等律師行（相關律師行）從事法律執業的任何法律代表施加限制——該人須暫停諮詢該名或該等個別法律代表，且不得諮詢相關律師行的任何其他法律代表，但可諮詢該人所選擇的其他法律代表。
(6) 在上述手令發出後並在該人被警方羈留的期間，如作出有關告發的警務人員不再有合理理由相信有第(4)款指明的情況，則警務人員須立即停止向該人施加第 (3) 款所指的限制。
(7) 在本條中 ——法律代表（legal representative）指律師或大律師；香港律師行（Hong Kong firm）具有《法律執業者條例》（第159章）第2(1) 條所給予的涵義。
80. 因應危害國家安全情況可限制諮詢法律代表
(1) 如某人因被合理地懷疑干犯危害國家安全的罪行而受調查，則本條適用，不論該人是否已被拘捕。
(2) 總警司級或以上的警務人員或獲其授權的警務人員，可向裁判官提出以經宣誓而作的告發支持的單方面申請，要求裁判官就該人根據本條發出手令。
(3) 就申請進行聆訊的裁判官如信納 ——
(a) 如該人尚未被拘捕 ——
(i) 有合理理由懷疑該人已干犯該罪行；
(ii) 有合理理由相信該人即將被拘捕；及
(iii) 有合理理由相信有第 (4) 款指明的情況；或
(b) 如該人已被拘捕——有合理理由相信有第 (4) 款指明的情況，即可發出手令，授權警務人員在該人被拘捕後的48小時期間內被警方羈留的期間（指明期間），限制該人諮詢法律代表。
(4) 有關情況是 ——
(a) 該人在指明期間諮詢法律代表，將危害國家安全或導致任何人身體受傷；
(b) 該人已從該罪行中取得利益，而除非上述授權作出，否則該人在指明期間諮詢法律代表，將妨礙追討上述利益；或
(c) 除非上述授權作出，否則該人在指明期間諮詢法律代表，將破壞或妨礙司法公正。
(5) 如上述手令是在該人被拘捕之前發出的，有關裁判官可指示該手令只在所指明的日期之前有效。
(6) 在上述手令發出後，如在指明期間屆滿前，作出有關告發的警務人員不再有合理理由相信有第 (4) 款指明的情況，則警務人員須立即停止限制該人諮詢法律代表。
(7) 在本條中 ——法律代表（legal representative）指律師或大律師。

第 3 次分部：為防範或調查危害國家安全罪行可向法院申請就獲保釋人施加適當限制

81. 釋義
在本次分部中 ——行動限制令（movement restriction order）——見第83(1) 條；指明（specified）指在行動限制令中指明；擔保（recognizance）指按照《警隊條例》（第232章）第52(3) 條作出的擔保；獲保釋人（person on bail）——見第82條。
82. 本次分部適用於因危害國家安全的罪行而被拘捕並獲准保釋的人如 ——
(a) 某人因被合理地懷疑干犯危害國家安全的罪行而被拘捕；及
(b) 該人即將或已經獲警方釋放（不論是否在須作出擔保的情況下釋放），則本次分部就該人（獲保釋人）而適用。
83. 向法院申請就保釋期間的行動限制令
(1) 總警司級或以上的警務人員或獲其授權的警務人員，可向裁判官提出以經宣誓而作的告發支持的單方面申請，要求裁判官發出命令（行動限制令），指示獲保釋人須遵從指明規定，以及就該等規定所施加的指明條件。
(2) 裁判官可指明的規定，是一項或多於一項的以下規定 ——
(a) 關於獲保釋人居住地方的以下規定 ——
(i) 獲保釋人須在指明期間內，於指明地方居住；
(ii) 獲保釋人須在指明限期前，向警方申報同住於指明地方的人的身分資料；
(iii) 獲保釋人須在指明時間留在指明地方；
(b) 獲保釋人不得在指明期間內，進入指明地區或地方，或僅可在符合指明條件的情況下進入該地區或地方；
(c) 獲保釋人不得在指明期間內，以任何方式（或透過任何人）與指明人士聯繫，或僅可在符合指明條件的情況下與指明人士聯繫；
(d) 獲保釋人須在指明時間，於指明警署向警方報到。
(3) 支持上述申請的告發 ——
(a) 須由總督察級或以上的警務人員作出；及
(b) 須述明 ——
(i) 該罪行的性質；
(ii) 拘捕獲保釋人所憑藉的證據的概括性質；
(iii) 警方已就該罪行作出何種查究，以及警方建議作出何種進一步查究；及
(iv) 基於何種原因，而有必要向獲保釋人施加第 (2) 款所指的任何規定。
84. 法院可發出行動限制令
(1) 如就申請進行聆訊的裁判官信納，有合理理由相信有第 (2) 款指明的情況，則該裁判官可就獲保釋人發出行動限制令。
(2) 有關情況是 ——
(a) 除非獲保釋人受制於該項申請中要求向獲保釋人施加的規定（有關規定），否則獲保釋人將不會按照警方指明的條件，向警方報到；
(b) 除非獲保釋人受制於有關規定，否則將破壞或妨礙司法公正；或
(c) 除非獲保釋人受制於有關規定，否則將危害國家安全。
(3) 行動限制令 ——
(a) 須採用書面形式；及
(b) 須述明向獲保釋人施加的規定，以及就上述規定所施加的條件。
(4) 行動限制令的有效期為3個月，而該期間不得早於根據第 (5) 款送達行動限制令的日期開始。
(5) 行動限制令須面交送達獲保釋人。
(6) 裁判官如信納有合理理由相信有以下情況，則可應第83(1) 條所述的警務人員（有關人員）的申請，延長（或進一步延長）就獲保釋人發出的行動限制令的有效期，每段延長期為1個月 ——
(a) 第 (2) 款指明的某項情況仍然存在；及
(b) 警方正努力並迅速地進行該罪行的調查，而調查按理不能在該項申請日期前完成。
(7) 裁判官可應有關人員或獲保釋人的申請，更改或解除就獲保釋人發出的行動限制令。
(8) 裁判官除非信納在有關個案的整體情況下，批准根據第 (7) 款提出的申請屬合理和必需，而且不會不利於國家安全，否則不得批准該項申請。
85. 行動限制令的覆核
(1) 如裁判官拒絕批准獲保釋人根據第84(7) 條提出的申請，獲保釋人可向原訟法庭法官提出要求批准該項申請的申請（覆核申請）。
(2) 原訟法庭法官除非信納在有關個案的整體情況下，批准覆核申請屬合理和必需，而且不會不利於國家安全，否則不得批准覆核申請。
(3) 在第 (2) 款的規限下，原訟法庭法官可藉命令確認、更改或撤銷裁判官的決定，並可就有關事宜作出原訟法庭法官認為公正的其他命令。
86. 違反行動限制令
獲保釋人無合理辯解而違反 ——
(a) 就其發出的行動限制令的任何規定；或
(b) 就上述規定所施加的任何條件，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁1年。

第 4 次分部：雜項條文及與調查相關的罪行

87. 本分部申請一般於非公開法庭進行聆訊
(1) 本分部所指的申請須於非公開法庭進行聆訊。
(2) 儘管有第 (1) 款的規定，就申請進行聆訊的原訟法庭法官或裁判官（視何者適用而定）可主動或應聆訊任何一方的申請，命令申請須於公開法庭進行聆訊。
(3) 然而，有關的原訟法庭法官或裁判官僅在信納根據第 (2) 款作出命令，是就司法公正而言屬必需，而且不會不利於國家安全的情況下，方可如此作出該項命令。
88. 不得妨害調查危害國家安全的罪行
如任何人知悉或懷疑有對危害國家安全的罪行的調查正在進行 ——
(a) 該人 ——
(i) 意圖妨害該項調查；或
(ii) 罔顧是否會妨害該項調查，
而在沒有合理辯解或合法權限下，作出任何披露；或
(b) 該人 ——
(i) 在知悉或懷疑任何材料相當可能是與該項調查有關的情況下；及
(ii) 意圖對進行該項調查的人隱瞞該材料所披露的事實，而在沒有合理辯解下，捏改、隱藏、銷毀或以其他方式處置該材料，或致使安排或准許捏改、隱藏、銷毀或以其他方式處置該材料，該人即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁7年。

第 2 分部：危害國家安全罪行的潛逃者

第 1 次分部：指明有關潛逃者

89. 保安局局長有權為針對某潛逃者施行某些措施而指明該潛逃者
(1) 如保安局局長合理地相信，為施行第 (4) 款指明某名本款適用的人，是維護國家安全所需者，則保安局局長可藉在憲報刊登的公告，為施行該款指明該人。
(2) 如 ——
(a) 法院已就危害國家安全的罪行，發出手令將某人拘捕；
(b) 已採取合理步驟將發出該手令一事通知該人，或保安局局長合理地相信該人已知悉該手令已發出；
(c) 該人仍未被帶到法官或裁判官（視屬何情況而定）席前；及
(d) 保安局局長合理地相信該人並非身處特區，則第 (1) 款適用於該人。
(3) 在以下情況下，保安局局長須撤銷根據第 (1) 款就某人作出的指明 ——
(a) 第 (2)(a) 款所述的、關乎該人的手令已被撤銷；或
(b) 該人已被帶到法官或裁判官（視屬何情況而定）席前。
(4) 保安局局長如根據第 (1) 款指明某人，則可在該項指明屬有效的期間，藉在憲報刊登的公告，進一步指明，本分部第2次分部當中保安局局長合理地認為在有關個案的整體情況下屬合適的任何一條或多於一條條文，就該人而適用。
(5) 保安局局長可藉在憲報刊登的公告，更改或撤銷根據第 (4) 款作出的指明。

第 2 次分部：可針對有關潛逃者施行的措施

90. 禁止提供資金等或處理資金等
(1) 如有根據第89(4) 條（包括憑藉第89(5) 條）指明本條就某人而適用，則在該項指明屬有效的期間，該人即就本條而言屬有關潛逃者。
(2) 除獲根據第97條批予的特許授權外，任何人不得 ——
(a) 直接或間接向有關潛逃者提供任何資金或其他財務資產或經濟資源，亦不得為有關潛逃者的利益而直接或間接提供任何資金或其他財務資產或經濟資源；或
(b) 直接或間接處理屬於有關潛逃者的任何資金或其他財務資產或經濟資源，亦不得直接或間接處理由有關潛逃者擁有或控制的任何資金或其他財務資產或經濟資源。
(3) 任何人違反第 (2) 款，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁7年。
(4) 被控犯第 (3) 款所訂罪行的人，如確立自己既不知道亦無理由相信 ——
(a) 如屬違反第 (2)(a) 款——有關的資金或其他財務資產或經濟資源，是向（或將會向）有關潛逃者提供的，或是為（或將會為）有關潛逃者的利益而提供的；或
(b) 如屬違反第 (2)(b) 款——自己在處理屬於有關潛逃者的資金或其他財務資產或經濟資源，或由有關潛逃者擁有或控制的資金或其他財務資產或經濟資源，即為免責辯護。
(5) 在以下情況下，某人須視作已確立需要就第 (4) 款所訂的免責辯護而確立的事宜 ——
(a) 有足夠證據，就該事宜帶出爭論點；及
(b) 控方沒有提出足以排除合理疑點的相反證明。
(6) 任何人不得僅因將任何以下一項，記入屬於有關潛逃者的帳户，或由有關潛逃者直接或間接擁有或控制的帳户，而被視為違反第 (2) 款 ——
(a) 該帳户應得的利息或其他收入；
(b) 該有關潛逃者根據在其成為有關潛逃者當日之前產生的合約、協定或義務，而應得的付款。
(7) 在本條中 ——
處理（deal with） ——
(a) 就資金而言，指 ——
(i) 使用、改動、移動、容許動用或移轉；
(ii) 以將會導致任何以下方面有所改變的任何其他方式，予以處理：規模、數額、地點、擁有權、管有權、性質或目的地；或
(iii) 作出任何令到資金可予使用的任何其他改變，包括資金組合管理；及
(b) 就其他財務資產或經濟資源而言，指使用該等資產或資源，以任何方式，取得資金、貨物或服務，包括將該等資產或資源出售、出租或作抵押；
經濟資源（economic resources）指並非資金的各種資產，不論是有形的或無形的、是動產或不動產，並可用以取得資金、貨物或服務；
資金（funds）包括 ——
(a) 金幣、金錠、現金、支票、金錢的申索、銀票、匯票及其他作付款用的票據；
(b) 存於財務機構或其他實體的存款、帳户結餘、債項及債務責任；
(c) 證券及債務票據（包括股額及股份、代表證券的證明書、債券、票據、認購權證、債權證、債權股證及衍生工具合約）；
(d) 財產所孳生的利息、股息或其他收入、自財產累算的價值或財產所產生的價值；
(e) 信貸、抵銷權、保證或擔保、履約保證或其他財務承擔；
(f) 信用狀、提單及賣據；
(g) 資金或財務資源的權益的證明文件；及
(h) 任何其他出口融資的票據。
91. 禁止與不動產相關的某些活動
(1) 如有根據第89(4) 條（包括憑藉第89(5) 條）指明本條就某人而適用，則在該項指明屬有效的期間，該人即就本條而言屬有關潛逃者。
(2) 除獲根據第97條批予的特許授權外，任何人不得 ——
(a) 直接或間接將不動產租賃予或以其他方式提供予有關潛逃者；或
(b) 直接或間接向有關潛逃者租入不動產。
(3) 任何人違反第 (2) 款，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁7年。
(4) 被控犯第 (3) 款所訂罪行的人，如確立自己既不知道亦無理由相信 ——
(a) 如屬違反第 (2)(a) 款——有關的不動產，是租賃予或以其他方式提供予有關潛逃者的；或
(b) 如屬違反第 (2)(b) 款——有關的不動產，是向有關潛逃者租入的，即為免責辯護。
(5) 在以下情況下，某人須視作已確立需要就第 (4) 款所訂的免責辯護而確立的事宜 ——
(a) 有足夠證據，就該事宜帶出爭論點；及
(b) 控方沒有提出足以排除合理疑點的相反證明。
(6) 如任何人是根據在有關潛逃者成為有關潛逃者當日之前產生的合約、協定或義務，而作出第 (2) 款所述的作為的，則該人不得僅因該項作為，而被視為違反該款。
92. 與涉及有關潛逃者的合資企業或合夥相關的禁止
(1) 如有根據第89(4) 條（包括憑藉第89(5) 條）指明本條就某人而適用，則在該項指明屬有效的期間，該人即就本條而言屬有關潛逃者。
(2) 除獲根據第97條批予的特許授權外，任何人不得 ——
(a) 與有關潛逃者成立合資企業、合夥或類似的關係；或
(b) 投資於該等合資企業、合夥或類似的關係。
(3) 任何人違反第 (2) 款，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁7年。
(4) 被控犯第 (3) 款所訂罪行的人，如確立自己既不知道亦無理由相信有關的合資企業、合夥或類似的關係，是涉及有關潛逃者的合資企業、合夥或類似的關係，即為免責辯護。
(5) 在以下情況下，某人須視作已確立需要就第 (4) 款所訂的免責辯護而確立的事宜 ——
(a) 有足夠證據，就該事宜帶出爭論點；及
(b) 控方沒有提出足以排除合理疑點的相反證明。
(6) 如任何人是根據在有關潛逃者成為有關潛逃者當日之前產生的合約、協定或義務，而作出第 (2) 款所述的作為的，則該人不得僅因該項作為，而被視為違反該款。
93. 執業資格暫時吊銷
(1) 如有根據第89(4) 條(包括憑藉第89(5) 條)指明本條就某人而適用，則在該項指明屬有效的期間，該人即就本條而言屬有關潛逃者。
(2) 如有關潛逃者在該項指明屬有效的期間內，有任何時間（關鍵時間）根據任何條例持有某專業的執業資格，則該執業資格即就所有目的而言視為在關鍵時間暫時吊銷（而不論該條例本身有否就該執業資格的暫時吊銷（不論如何描述）訂定條文）。
(3) 如根據任何條例，某人須就該執業資格備存任何名冊（不論如何描述），則該人須不時因應第 (2) 款的施行而更新該名冊。
(4) 此外，如根據任何條例，假使該執業資格根據該條例暫時吊銷（不論如何描述）的話某條文便會因而適用，則凡該執業資格根據第 (2) 款視為暫時吊銷，該條文即在經必要的變通後亦因而適用，猶如該執業資格是根據該條例而暫時吊銷（不論如何描述）。
(5) 在第 (4) 款中，提述任何條文，不包括關乎對有關執業資格的暫時吊銷作出上訴或覆核的條文。
(6) 任何人根據任何條例可就有關潛逃者行使的任何權力，不受本條影響。
94. 在經營業務或受僱工作上的准許或註冊暫時無效
(1) 如有根據第89(4) 條（包括憑藉第89(5) 條）指明本條就某人而適用，則在該項指明屬有效的期間，該人即就本條而言屬有關潛逃者。
(2) 如在該項指明屬有效的期間內，有任何時間（關鍵時間）有某項就有關潛逃者經營任何業務或受僱任何工作而言屬必需的 ——
(a) 任何條例下的准許（不論如何描述，亦不論以何種方式給予）；或
(b) 任何條例下的註冊（不論如何描述，亦不論以何種方式進行），
就有關潛逃者而具有效力（但並非就有關潛逃者兼任何其他人而具有效力），則該項准許或註冊即就所有目的而言視為在關鍵時間暫時無效（而不論該條例本身有否就該項准許或註冊的暫時無效（不論如何描述）訂定條文）。
(3) 如根據任何條例，某人須就該項准許或註冊備存任何名冊（不論如何描述），則該人須不時因應第 (2) 款的施行而更新該名冊。
(4) 此外，如根據任何條例，假使該項准許或註冊根據該條例暫時無效（不論如何描述）的話某條文便會因而適用，則凡該項准許或註冊根據第 (2) 款視為暫時無效，該條文即在經必要的變通後亦因而適用，猶如該項准許或註冊是根據該條例而暫時無效（不論如何描述）。
(5) 在第 (4) 款中，提述任何條文，不包括關乎對有關准許或註冊的暫時無效作出上訴或覆核的條文。
(6) 任何人根據任何條例可就有關潛逃者行使的任何權力，或就有關潛逃者經營的業務或受僱的工作行使的任何權力，不受本條影響。
95. 暫時罷免董事職位
(1) 如有根據第89(4) 條（包括憑藉第89(5) 條）指明本條就某人而適用，則在該項指明屬有效的期間，該人即就本條而言屬有關潛逃者。
(2) 有關潛逃者如在該項指明屬有效的期間內，有任何時間（關鍵時間）擔任任何公司的董事職位，即就所有目的而言視為在關鍵時間遭暫時罷免該董事職位，並據此而暫時不得直接或間接參與或關涉該公司的管理。
(3) 如根據任何條例，某人須就該董事職位備存任何名冊（不論如何描述），則該人須不時因應第 (2) 款的施行而更新該名冊。
(4) 任何人 ——
(a) 根據特區的法律而可就有關潛逃者行使的任何權力；或
(b) 根據有關公司的組成或運作所據的章程、規則或其他規管文件而可就有關潛逃者行使的任何權力，不受本條影響。
(5) 在本條中 ——公司（company）具有《公司條例》（第622章）第2(1) 條所給予的涵義；董事（director）具有《公司條例》（第622章）第2(1) 條所給予的涵義。
96. 撤銷特區護照等
(1) 如有根據第89(4) 條（包括憑藉第89(5) 條）指明本條就某人而適用，則在該項指明屬有效的期間，該人即就本條而言屬有關潛逃者。
(2) 如 ——
(a) 有關潛逃者持有特區護照；及
(b) 在緊接該項指明作出前，該護照屬有效，則該護照即就所有目的而言視為在該項指明作出時被撤銷，據此，入境事務處處長可接管該護照。
(3) 如任何要求發出特區護照的申請，是由有關潛逃者所作出的，則該項申請即就《香港特別行政區護照條例》（第539章）第3(1) 條及所有其他目的而言視為無效。
(4) 在本條中 ——特區護照（HKSAR passport）指入境事務處處長根據《香港特別行政區護照條例》（第539章）第3條發出的護照。

第 3 次分部：特許

97. 特許的批予
(1) 保安局局長可應申請批予特許，准許作出第90、91或92條所禁止的作為。
(2) 保安局局長除非信納在有關個案的整體情況下，根據第 (1) 款批予特許屬合理和必需，而且不會不利於國家安全，否則不得批予該特許。
98. 為取得特許，提供虛假或具誤導性的資料或文件
(1) 任何人為了取得特許，而作出任何該人知道在要項上屬虛假或具誤導性的陳述，或提供或交出任何該人知道在要項上屬虛假或具誤導性的資料或文件，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁3年。
(2) 任何人為了取得特許，而罔顧實情地作出任何在要項上屬虛假或具誤導性的陳述，或提供或交出任何在要項上屬虛假或具誤導性的資料或文件，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁3年。

第 3 分部：訴訟程序：一般條文

99. 《香港國安法》所訂程序適用於本條例所訂罪行
為免生疑問，任何與本條例所訂罪行相關的案件，均屬《香港國安法》第四十一條所述的案件，《香港國安法》第四章所訂程序，適用於該等案件。
100. 任何涉及國家安全的案件均須由指定法官審理
(1) 任何法院所審理的案件，如憑藉第3(2)(b) 條而屬涉及國家安全的案件，即須由指定法官審理。
(2) 在其他成文法則與第 (1) 款並無抵觸的範圍內，該款並不局限其他成文法則對任何案件的適用。

第 4 分部：與危害國家安全的罪行相關的案件的刑事訴訟程序

101. 適用範圍
如任何案件屬與危害國家安全的罪行相關的案件，則本分部適用於該案件（而不論該案件是否亦與任何其他罪行相關）。
102. 釋義
在本分部中 ——《第227章》（Cap. 227）指《裁判官條例》（第227章）；提訊日（return day）具有《第227章》第71A條所給予的涵義。
103. 交付審判程序中的還押期間
在應用《第227章》第79(1) 條時，該條中還押期間須不超過8整天此一規定（以及該項規定的例外情況），須不予理會。
104. 提訊日的指定
(1) 第 (2) 款取代《第227章》第80A(3) 條而適用。
(2) 除非檢控官及被控人均同意，或在有合理因由提出的情況下裁判官另有裁定，否則提訊日不得在提訊日被指定之日起計的10天內或28天後。
105. 文件的譯本
(1) 第 (2) 款取代《第227章》第80B(2)(c) 及 (3) 條而適用。
(2) 除非裁判官應被控人的申請，為《第227章》第80B(1) 條的目的，命令任何根據該條送達的證人陳述書或呈堂文件，須附有以下譯本 ——
(a) 如該陳述書或呈堂文件並非用英文寫成——英文譯本；
(b) 如該陳述書或呈堂文件並非用中文寫成——中文譯本，否則該陳述書或呈堂文件無需附有該譯本。
(3) 裁判官在決定是否根據第 (2) 款作出任何命令時，須考慮公正地和及時地辦理有關案件的需要。
106. 省免初級偵訊
(1) 第 (2) 款取代《第227章》第80C、81、81A、82、83、84及85條而適用。
(2) 被控人在提訊日出庭或被帶到裁判官席前時 ——
(a) 如《第227章》第80B(1) 條的規定已獲遵行，則檢控官須將該條所指的文件正本提交法庭；及
(b) 裁判官在律政司司長或其代表提出申請後，須採取《第227章》第80C(4) 條所指的行動，而如被控人當時否認控罪，則裁判官須命令將被控人交付原訟法庭審訊，並須將此事通知被控人或安排令被控人獲悉此事。
(3) 據此 ——
(a) 在應用《第227章》第80A條時 ——
(i) 該條的第 (4)(c) 及 (d) 款，須不予理會；及
(ii) 該條的第 (4)(e) 款，須理解為規定裁判官須在首次指定提訊日時，通知被控人本條的第 (4) 款所述的事宜；
(b) 在應用《第227章》第81B條時 ——
(i) 該條的第 (1) 款中對《第227章》第80C(4)(a) 或82(1) 條的提述，須理解為對本條的第 (2)(b) 款的提述；
(ii) 該條的第 (1) 款，須理解為規定裁判官須在該款所描述的情況下，通知被控人本條的第 (4) 款所述的事宜；及
(iii) 該條的第 (2)(a) 款中對“如被控人在根據第80C條進行的法律程序中承認控罪，”的提述，須不予理會；
(c) 在應用《第227章》第85A條時，該條的第 (1) 款中對《第227章》第80C(4) 或85(2) 條的提述，須理解為對本條的第 (2)(b) 款的提述；
(d) 在應用《第227章》第86條時 ——
(i) 該條的第 (1)(b) 款中對《第227章》第80C(4) 條的提述，須理解為對本條的第 (2)(b) 款的提述；及
(ii) 該條的第 (1)(b) 款中對《第227章》第80C(1) 條的提述，須理解為對本條的第 (2)(a) 款的提述；
(e) 在應用《刑事罪行條例》（第200章）第33條時，該條的 (a) 段中對《第227章》第80C(1) 條的提述，須理解為對本條的第 (2)(a) 款的提述；
(f) 在應用《刑事訴訟程序條例》（第221章） （《第221章》）第14條時，該條的第 (1)(a) 款中對《第227章》第80C(4) 條的提述，須理解為對本條的第 (2)(b) 款的提述；
(g) 在應用《第221章》第16條時 ——
(i) 該條的第 (1) 款中對《第227章》第80C(4) 條的提述，須理解為對本條的第 (2)(b) 款的提述；及
(ii) 該條的第 (1) 款中對《第227章》第80C(1) 條的提述，須理解為對本條的第 (2)(a) 款的提述；及
(h) 如有根據《區域法院條例》（第336章）第77A條要求將法律程序移交原訟法庭的申請作出，則在應用該條時 ——
(i) 該條的第 (4) 款中法官須在符合該條的第 (5) 款的情況下方可作出准許申請的命令此一規定；
(ii) 該條的第 (5) 及 (6) 款；及
(iii) 該條的第 (7) 款中被控人根據該條的第 (5) 款選擇作初級偵訊此一條件，須不予理會。
(4) 就第(3)(a)(ii) 及 (b)(ii) 款而言，有關事宜，是如被控人否認控罪，法庭會將被控人交付原訟法庭審訊，而如被控人承認控罪，法庭則會就該項控罪將被控人交付原訟法庭判處。
107. 被控人被交付審訊後不得申請未經聆訊釋放
(1) 如有證書根據《香港國安法》第四十六條就任何案件發出，則就該案件而言，《刑事訴訟程序條例》（第221章）第16條並無任何效力。
(2) 據此，在應用《第227章》第85A條時，該條的第 (1)(e) 款，須不予理會。
(3) 在本分部其他條文與本條並無抵觸的範圍內，本條並不局限本分部其他條文對上述案件的適用。
108. 解除對報導交付審判程序限制
(1) 本條取代《第227章》第87A(2) 條而適用。
(2) 儘管有《第227章》第87A(1) 條的規定，裁判官可應控方或被控人的申請，命令該條並不適用於有關交付審判程序的相關報導。
(3) 然而，裁判官僅在信納根據第 (2) 款作出命令，是就司法公正而言屬必需，而且不會不利於國家安全的情況下，方可如此作出該項命令。
(4) 根據第 (2) 款作出的命令，須載入裁判官的案件登記冊內。
(5) 如有關案件中有多於一名被控人，則第 (2) 款中提述被控人，即提述其中一名被控人。
(6) 就《第227章》第86(1)(f) 及87A(4) 及 (7) 條而言，根據第 (2) 款作出的命令，須視為根據《第227章》第87A(2) 條作出的命令。

第 5 分部：初步罪行的罰則

109. 串謀犯、煽惑他人犯或企圖犯《香港國安法》所訂罪行的罰則
為免生疑問，儘管有其他條例的規定 ——
(a) 如任何人被裁定串謀犯任何《香港國安法》所訂罪行（國安法罪行），則《香港國安法》下關於該項國安法罪行的罰則的條文，亦適用於該項串謀犯罪的罰則；
(b) 如任何人被裁定煽惑他人犯任何國安法罪行，則《香港國安法》下關於該項國安法罪行的罰則的條文，亦適用於該項煽惑他人犯罪的罰則（但如《香港國安法》本身有就煽動他人犯該項國安法罪行訂明罰則，則屬例外）；及
(c) 如任何人被裁定企圖犯任何國安法罪行，則《香港國安法》下關於該項國安法罪行的罰則的條文，亦適用於該項企圖犯罪的罰則。

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第 8 部 維護國家安全機制及相關保障

110. 行政長官會同行政會議可訂立維護國家安全附屬法例
(1) 行政長官會同行政會議可為維護國家安全所需，並為更有效地實施以下法律及解釋，訂立附屬法例 ——
(a) 《香港國安法》，包括當中第五章關乎中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署的職責的條文；
(b) 於2022年12月30日第十三屆全國人民代表大會常務委員會第三十八次會議上通過的《全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於〈中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法〉第十四條和第四十七條的解釋》*；
(c) 本條例。
(2) 根據本條訂立的附屬法例，可規定違反該附屬法例屬可公訴罪行，並可為該罪行，訂明罰款不超過 $500,000及監禁不超過7年的刑罰。
編輯附註：* 見文件A304。
111. 與維護國家安全相關的行政指令
(1) 行政長官可向特區政府的任何部門或機關或任何公務人員發布行政指令，就任何以下事宜作出指示 ——
(a) 落實中央人民政府就維護國家安全發出的指令；
(b) 維護國家安全的工作；
(c) 為中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署依法履行在《香港國安法》第五章下的職責提供必需的權利、豁免、便利和配合；
(d) 行政長官認為有利於維護國家安全的其他事宜。
(2) 特區政府的任何部門或機關或任何公務人員須遵守第 (1) 款所述的行政指令。
112. 國安委的判斷和決定
(1) 香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會（國安委）由主席召開會議，國家安全事務顧問列席國安委會議。國家安全事務顧問就國安委履行職責相關事務提供意見。
(2) 國安委根據《香港國安法》的規定履行職責時所作的判斷和決定，由國安委秘書處傳達並協助跟進落實。
(3) 凡特區的法律授予某人任何職能，任何人在作出執行該職能上的任何決定時，須尊重並依法執行國安委的判斷和決定。
113. 就國家安全教育等事宜提供意見或發出指示
政務司司長可為開展國家安全教育、提高特區居民的國家安全意識和守法意識，或為加強就維護國家安全和防範恐怖活動的工作的宣傳、指導、監督和管理，向其認為適當的人，提供意見或發出指示。
114. 公務人員須協助維護國家安全工作
(1) 任何公務人員須為維護國家安全的工作，提供一切所需的協助。
(2) 據此，任何公務人員須向在特區的負責維護國家安全工作的任何部門、機關及其人員，及時提供一切合理的便利、配合、支持和保障，包括及時提供所需的人力及其他資源。
(3) 任何公務人員須運用其享有的一切權力及酌情權（包括關乎給予任何豁免的權力及酌情權），以履行本條下的責任。
115. 行政長官就國家安全或國家秘密認定問題發出證明書
(1) 除《香港國安法》第四十七條所述的情況外，行政長官亦可在其認為適當的情況下，就某行為或事宜是否涉及國家安全或某材料是否涉及國家秘密的認定問題，發出證明書。
(2) 第(1)款所指的證明書 ——
(a) 可在不論是否已有法律程序展開的情況下發出；及
(b) 可由行政長官主動發出。
(3) 法院如在任何法律程序中，收到行政長官根據本條就某認定問題發出的證明書，即視為已根據《香港國安法》第四十七條，取得行政長官就該認定問題發出的證明書。
116. 涉及國家安全的案件的審理等
(1) 法院依照《基本法》及《香港國安法》的有關規定，獨立審理涉及國家安全的案件，不受任何干涉。任何人須尊重和維護法院依法審理涉及國家安全的案件。
(2) 律政司依照《基本法》及《香港國安法》的有關規定，主管與危害國家安全的罪行相關的案件的刑事檢控工作，不受任何干涉。
(3) 特區政府須採取必要措施，確保指明人士及協助者的人身、財產和住所安全受到必要的保障。
(4) 在本條中 ——協助者（aider）指涉及國家安全的案件的舉報人或證人；指明人士（specified person）指 ——
(a) 在特區處理涉及國家安全的案件或負責維護國家安全工作的任何部門或機關的人員；或
(b) 處理涉及國家安全的案件的司法人員、司法機構的職員、大律師或律師。
117. 簽署或核證關乎指明案件之法律文件等
(1) 凡任何文件關乎指明案件，而某條例或法院指示 ——
(a) 規定該文件由任何以下人士簽署或核證 ——
(i) 該案件某方；
(ii) 代表該案件某方的指明人士；
(b) 規定該文件述明任何以下人士的姓名或名稱 ——
(i) 該案件某方；
(ii) 代表該案件某方的指明人士；
(c) 准許該文件由任何以下人士簽署或核證 ——
(i) 該案件某方；
(ii) 代表該案件某方的指明人士；或
(d) 准許該文件述明任何以下人士的姓名或名稱 ——
(i) 該案件某方；
(ii) 代表該案件某方的指明人士，則本條適用於該文件（有關文件）。
(2) 然而，本條不適用於以下文件 ——
(a) 誓章或其他經宣誓作出的文件；
(b) 法定聲明；
(c) 屬某人以證人身分作出的用以陳述事實的文件；或
(d) 根據某條例或法院指示作出的用以核實某文件的屬實申述。
(3) 有關文件 ——
(a) 凡屬第 (1)(a)(i) 或 (c)(i) 款 ——可由代表有關方的指明人士簽署或核證，而無需由該方簽署或核證；及
(b) 凡屬第 (1)(b)(i) 或 (d)(i) 款 ——可述明代表有關方的指明人士的姓名，而無需述明該方的姓名或名稱。
(4) 有關文件 ——
(a) 凡屬第 (1)(a) 款——如載有第 (5) 款指明的簽署，則第 (1)(a) 款所指的規定即屬符合；
(b) 凡屬第 (1)(b) 款——如載有第 (6) 款指明的名稱，則第 (1)(b) 款所指的規定即屬符合；
(c) 凡屬第 (1)(c) 款——可載有第 (5) 款指明的簽署；及
(d) 凡屬第 (1)(d) 款——可載有第 (6) 款指明的名稱。
(5) 為施行第 (4)(a) 及 (c) 款而指明的簽署是 ——
(a) 如有關文件須或可（包括憑藉第 (3)(a) 款而可）由某指明人士簽署而該人士屬公務人員——以該人士所代表的部門或機關的名義作出的簽署；
(b) 如有關文件須或可（包括憑藉第 (3)(a) 款而可）由某指明人士簽署而該人士屬大律師——以向該人士發出指示的人所代表的部門或機關（或律師行）的名義作出的簽署；或
(c) 如有關文件須或可（包括憑藉第 (3)(a) 款而可）由某指明人士簽署而該人士屬律師——以該人士所代表的律師行的名義作出的簽署。
(6) 為施行第 (4)(b) 及 (d) 款而指明的名稱是 ——
(a) 如有關文件須或可（包括憑藉第 (3)(b) 款而可）述明某指明人士的姓名而該人士屬公務人員——該人士所代表的部門或機關的名稱；
(b) 如有關文件須或可（包括憑藉第 (3)(b) 款而可）述明某指明人士的姓名而該人士屬大律師——向該人士發出指示的人所代表的部門或機關（或律師行）的名稱；或
(c) 如有關文件須或可（包括憑藉第 (3)(b) 款而可）述明某指明人士的姓名而該人士屬律師——該人士所代表的律師行的名稱。
(7) 就第 (1) 款而言，凡 ——
(a) 某案件屬涉及國家安全的案件；或
(b) 有法律程序就危害國家安全的罪行而對某人提起，而該人屬某案件的一方，該案件即屬指明案件。
(8) 就第 (7)(b) 款而言，如 ——
(a) 裁判官就某危害國家安全的罪行根據《裁判官條例》（第227章）第72條針對某人發出手令或傳票；
(b) 某人因某危害國家安全的罪行而被拘捕（不論該人是否獲保釋）；
(c) 某人在無手令的情況下受拘押後被控以某危害國家安全的罪行；或
(d) 控告某人某危害國家安全的罪行的公訴書，根據《刑事訴訟程序條例》（第221章）第24A(1)(b) 條，按法官的指示或經其同意而提出，即屬有法律程序就該罪行而對該人提起。
(9) 在本條中 ——指明人士（specified person）指公務人員、大律師或律師；述明（state）就姓名或名稱而言，指註明、印有、列出或以其他方式提供該姓名或名稱。
118. 非法披露處理涉及國家安全的案件或工作的人的個人資料
(1) 任何人犯《個人資料(私隱)條例》（第486章）第64(3A) 條所訂罪行，而 ——
(a) 該條提述的資料當事人是 ——
(i) 某指明人士；
(ii) 某指明人士的家人；
(iii) 某協助者；或
(iv) 某協助者的家人；及
(b) 該人犯該罪行 ——
(i) 其意圖是妨礙或阻嚇該指明人士執行其指明人士的職能，或妨礙或阻嚇該協助者就涉及國家安全的案件提供協助；或
(ii) 是由於該指明人士在合法執行其指明人士的職能的過程中作出（或試圖作出）的事情，或由於該協助者就涉及國家安全的案件提供協助的過程中作出（或試圖作出）的事情，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁7年。
(2) 任何人犯《個人資料(私隱)條例》（第486章）第64(3C) 條所訂罪行，而 ——
(a) 該條提述的資料當事人是 ——
(i) 某指明人士；
(ii) 某指明人士的家人；
(iii) 某協助者；或
(iv) 某協助者的家人；及
(b) 該人犯該罪行 ——
(i) 其意圖是妨礙或阻嚇該指明人士執行其指明人士的職能，或妨礙或阻嚇該協助者就涉及國家安全的案件提供協助；或
(ii) 是由於該指明人士在合法執行其指明人士的職能的過程中作出（或試圖作出）的事情，或由於該協助者就涉及國家安全的案件提供協助的過程中作出（或試圖作出）的事情，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁10年。
(3) 如 ——
(a) 任何 ——
(i) 特區居民；
(ii) 在特區成立、組成或註冊的法人團體；或
(iii) 不論是法團抑或不是法團的在特區有業務地點的團體，在特區以外地方作出任何作為；而
(b) 該項作為假若是在特區作出即構成第 (1) 或 (2) 款所訂罪行，則該居民或該團體即屬犯該罪行。
(4) 就第 (3) 款而言，在第 (1) 或 (2) 款中對犯《個人資料(私隱)條例》（第486章）所訂的某罪行的提述，須理解為包括作出符合以下說明的作為 ——
(a) 該項作為在特區以外地方作出；及
(b) 該項作為假若是在特區作出即構成該罪行。
(5) 在本條中 ——
協助者（aider）指涉及國家安全的案件的舉報人或證人；
指明人士（specified person）指 ——
(a) 在特區處理涉及國家安全的案件或負責維護國家安全工作的任何部門或機關的人員；或
(b) 處理涉及國家安全的案件的司法人員、司法機構的職員、大律師或律師；
家人（family member）就某人而言，指藉血緣、婚姻、領養或姻親關係而與該人有親屬關係的人；
特區居民（HKSAR resident）指 ——
(a) 香港永久性居民；或
(b) 符合獲發《人事登記條例》（第177章）所指的身分證的資格，但沒有《入境條例》（第115章）所指的香港居留權的人。
119. 對處理涉及國家安全的案件或工作的人作出非法騷擾作為
(1) 如 ——
(a) 任何人（甲方）意圖令某指明人士（或其任何家人）或某協助者（或其任何家人）（乙方）感到驚恐或困擾或蒙受指明傷害而 ——
(i) 以任何方式對乙方使用具威嚇性、辱罵性或冒犯性的言詞，或以任何其他方式向乙方傳達具威嚇性、辱罵性或冒犯性的訊息；或
(ii) 以任何方式對乙方作出具威嚇性、辱罵性或冒犯性的作為；
(b) 一名合乎常理的人在顧及所有情況後，應會預期如此對乙方使用上述言詞、傳達上述訊息或作出上述作為，會令乙方感到驚恐或困擾或蒙受指明傷害；
(c) 上述言詞、訊息或作為，事實上令乙方感到驚恐或困擾或蒙受指明傷害；及
(d) 甲方符合第 (i) 及 (ii) 節當中任何一節的描述 ——
(i) 其使用上述言詞、傳達上述訊息或作出上述作為的意圖，是妨礙或阻嚇該指明人士執行其指明人士的職能，或妨礙或阻嚇該協助者就涉及國家安全的案件提供協助；
(ii) 其使用上述言詞、傳達上述訊息或作出上述作為，是由於 ——
(A) 該指明人士在合法執行其指明人士的職能的過程中作出（或試圖作出）的事情；或
(B) 該協助者就涉及國家安全的案件提供協助的過程中作出（或試圖作出）的事情，甲方即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁10年。
(2) 凡任何人被控犯第 (1) 款所訂罪行，而控罪指稱該人符合第 (1)(d)(ii) 款的描述，則該人如確立在有關情況下，使用有關言詞、傳達有關訊息或作出有關作為是合理的，即為免責辯護。
(3) 在以下情況下，某人須視作已確立需要就第 (2) 款所訂的免責辯護而確立的事宜 ——
(a) 有足夠證據，就該事宜帶出爭論點；及
(b) 控方沒有提出足以排除合理疑點的相反證明。
(4) 在本條中 ——
協助者（aider）指涉及國家安全的案件的舉報人或證人；
指明人士（specified person）指 ——
(a) 在特區處理涉及國家安全的案件或負責維護國家安全工作的任何部門或機關的人員；或
(b) 處理涉及國家安全的案件的司法人員、司法機構的職員、大律師或律師；
指明傷害（specified harm）就某人而言，指 ——
(a) 對該人的心理傷害；
(b) 導致該人擔心其安全或福祉的傷害；或
(c) 導致該人擔心其財產受損的傷害；
家人（family member）就某人而言，指藉血緣、婚姻、領養或姻親關係而與該人有親屬關係的人。
120. 指明法院可應申請採取身分保密措施
(1) 如任何指明法院信納，就任何正進行或擬進行的法律程序（不論該法律程序是否關乎涉及國家安全的案件，亦不論該法律程序是在該法院抑或任何其他法院進行），採取某項措施，保障任何指明人士的身分免被披露，是維護國家安全所需者，則該指明法院可應律政司司長提出的單方面申請，命令該項措施予以施行。
(2) 在不局限第 (1) 款的前提下，根據該款作出的命令，可禁止任何人披露 ——
(a) 顯示指明人士身分的資料；或
(b) 可從中推斷出指明人士身分的資料。
(3) 任何就第 (1) 款所指的申請而進行的聆訊，須於非公開法庭進行。
(4) 如有任何命令根據第 (1) 款作出，則受該項命令影響的人，可向有關指明法院申請更改或撤銷該項命令。
(5) 除非該指明法院在顧及相關案件的所有情況後信納，不更改或撤銷該項命令的話，會造成不公正情況，否則不得更改或撤銷該項命令。
(6) 為免生疑問，除非指明法院另有命令，否則律政司司長無需為第 (4) 款所指的申請的目的，向有關申請人提供律政司司長根據第 (1) 款提出有關申請時呈交指明法院的文件。
(7) 為免生疑問 ——
(a) 本條並不局限任何法院可行使的任何其他權力；及
(b) 第117條並不阻止指明法院根據第 (1) 款命令任何措施就第117(2) 條所述的文件予以施行。
(8) 在本條中 ——
指明人士（specified person）就任何正進行或擬進行的法律程序而言，指該法律程序牽涉或相當可能會牽涉的 ——
(a) 公務人員；
(b) 司法人員或司法機構的職員；
(c) 大律師或律師；或
(d) 舉報人或證人；
指明法院（specified Court）指屬特區司法機構的任何以下法院或法庭 ——
(a) 終審法院；
(b) 上訴法庭；
(c) 原訟法庭；
(d) 區域法院；
(e) 裁判法院。
121. 違反身分披露禁令的罪行
(1) 任何人明知某項身分披露禁令已作出，而披露該項禁令所禁止披露的資料，即屬犯罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁5年。
(2) 被控犯第 (1) 款所訂罪行的人，如確立自己有合理辯解或合法權限作出有關的披露，即為免責辯護。
(3) 在以下情況下，某人須視作已確立需要就第 (2) 款所訂的免責辯護而確立的事宜 ——
(a) 有足夠證據，就該事宜帶出爭論點；及
(b) 控方沒有提出足以排除合理疑點的相反證明。
(4) 如 ——
(a) 任何 ——
(i) 特區居民；
(ii) 在特區成立、組成或註冊的法人團體；或
(iii) 不論是法團抑或不是法團的在特區有業務地點的團體，在特區以外地方作出任何作為；而
(b) 該項作為假若是在特區作出即構成第 (1) 款所訂罪行，則該居民或該團體即屬犯該罪行。
(5) 在本條中 ——身分披露禁令（order prohibiting disclosure of identity）指根據第120(1) 條作出的、禁止任何人作出第120(2) 條所述披露的命令。

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第 9 部 相關修訂

第 1 分部：修訂成文法則

122. 修訂成文法則
第2至29分部指明的成文法則現予修訂，修訂方式列於上述各分部。

第 2 分部：修訂《釋義及通則條例》（第 1 章）

123. 修訂第3條（詞語和詞句的釋義）
第3條 ——按筆劃數目順序加入“國家安全（national security）——見《維護國家安全條例》（2024年第6號）第4條；”。

第 3 分部：修訂《證據條例》（第 8 章）

124. 修訂第77條（證人特權）
第77(3) 條 ——廢除“聯合王國、香港、或任何其他地區（根據國際法是由聯合王國須就該地區負責的）的安全”代以“國家安全或特區的安全”。

第 4 分部：修訂《公司（清盤及雜項條文）條例》（第 32 章）

125. 修訂第181條（擱置或禁制進行針對公司的法律程序的權力）
(1) 第181條 ——將該條重編為第181(1) 條。
(2) 在第181(1) 條之後 ——加入“(2) 然而，如上述訴訟或法律程序，是關乎涉及國家安全的案件（《維護國家安全條例》（2024年第6號）第3(2) 條所指者）的，則在應用第 (1) 款時，該款中對“及在清盤令作出前”的提述，須不予理會。”。
126. 修訂第186條（清盤令作出後訴訟須予擱置）
(1) 第186條 ——將該條重編為第186(1) 條。
(2) 在第186(1) 條之後 ——加入“(2) 如任何訴訟或法律程序，是關乎涉及國家安全的案件（《維護國家安全條例》（2024年第6號）第3(2) 條所指者）的，則第 (1) 款並不阻止針對公司進行或展開該項訴訟或法律程序。”。
127. 修訂第360C條（行政長官會同行政會議有權命令將從事不良活動的公司剔除）
(1) 第360C(1) 條 ——
廢除
在“可命令”之前的所有字句
代以
“(1) 行政長官會同行政會議如信納根據《公司條例》（第622章）或任何《舊有公司條例》組成及註冊的公司 ——
(a) 假若是《社團條例》（第151章）所適用的社團 ——
(i) 其註冊或註冊豁免本可根據該條例第5D條取消；或
(ii) 保安局局長本可根據該條例第8條禁止其運作或繼續運作；或
(b) 假若是《維護國家安全條例》（2024年第6號）第60(1) 或 (2) 條所適用的組織，保安局局長本可根據該條禁止其在香港運作或繼續運作，則行政長官會同行政會議”。
(2) 在第360C(2) 條之後 ——
加入
“(2A) 根據第 (2) 款解散的公司 ——
(a) 如屬第 (1)(a)(ii) 款的情況——即就所有目的而言視為非法社團；或
(b) 如屬第 (1)(b) 款的情況——即就所有目的而言視為受禁組織。
(2B) 如任何人是因為本條的施行，而須以非法社團或受禁組織的成員的身分行事，以處理該社團或組織清盤或解散所引致的事宜，則該人不會僅因如此行事而犯任何《社團條例》（第151章）或《維護國家安全條例》（2024年第6號）所訂罪行。”。
(3) 在第360C(3) 條之後 ——
加入
“(4) 在本條中 ——
受禁組織（prohibited organization）指《維護國家安全條例》（2024年第6號）第6部第2分部所指的受禁組織；
非法社團（unlawful society）指《社團條例》（第151章）所指的非法社團。”。
128. 修訂第360G條（某些條文適用）
第360G條，在“211、”之後 ——加入“216、”。
129. 取代第360M條
第360M條 ——廢除該條 代以
“360M. 對破產管理署署長等的保障
(1) 凡本條適用的人 ——
(a) 在執行或看來是執行本部之下的職能時；或
(b) 在行使或看來是行使本部之下的權力時，就根據本部進行的任何公司清盤真誠地作出或沒有作出某項作為，該人無需為該項作為或不作為，承擔個人法律責任。
(2) 本條適用的人為 ——
(a) 破產管理署署長；及
(b) 公務人員。”。
130. 修訂第360N條（非香港公司）
(1) 第360N條 ——將該條重編為第360N(1) 條。
(2) 第360N(1) 條 ——廢除 在“但任何人”之前的所有字句 代以 “(1) 行政長官會同行政會議如信納非香港公司 ——
(a) 假若是《社團條例》（第151章）所適用的社團 ——
(i) 其註冊或註冊豁免本可根據該條例第5D條取消；或
(ii) 保安局局長本可根據該條例第8條禁止其運作或繼續運作；或
(b) 假若是《維護國家安全條例》（2024年第6號）第60(1) 或 (2) 條所適用的組織，保安局局長本可根據該條禁止其在香港運作或繼續運作，則行政長官會同行政會議可命令有關公司停止在香港內經營業務，而該公司須隨即停止在香港內經營業務：”。
(3) 在第360N(1) 條之後 ——
加入
“(2) 根據第 (1) 款被命令停止在香港內經營業務的公司 ——
(a) 如屬第 (1)(a)(ii) 款的情況——即就所有目的而言視為非法社團；或
(b) 如屬第 (1)(b) 款的情況——即就所有目的而言視為受禁組織。
(3) 如任何人是因為本條的施行，而須以非法社團或受禁組織的成員的身分行事，以處理該社團或組織清盤或解散所引致的事宜，則該人不會僅因如此行事而犯任何《社團條例》（第151章）或《維護國家安全條例》（2024年第6號）所訂罪行。
(4) 在本條中 ——
受禁組織（prohibited organization）指《維護國家安全條例》（2024年第6號）第6部第2分部所指的受禁組織；
非法社團（unlawful society）指《社團條例》（第151章）所指的非法社團。”。

第 5 分部：修訂《退休金條例》（第 89 章）

131. 修訂第15條（經定罪等後退休金、酬金或津貼可予取消、暫停支付或扣減）
第15(1)(a)(iii) 條 ——廢除“《刑事罪行條例》（第200章）第2條所訂的叛逆罪” 代以 “任何危害國家安全的罪行”。

第 6 分部：修訂《郵政署條例》（第 98 章）

132. 修訂第32條（禁寄物品）
第32(1) 條 ——廢除 (h) 段 代以 “(h) 如發布某東西會構成危害國家安全的罪行——該東西；”。

第 7 分部：修訂《退休金利益條例》（第 99 章）

133. 修訂第29條（經定罪等後退休金利益可予取消、暫停支付或扣減）
第29(1)(c) 條 ——廢除“《刑事罪行條例》（第200章）第2條所訂的叛逆” 代以 “任何危害國家安全的罪行”。

第 8 分部：修訂《社團條例》（第 151 章）

134. 修訂第2條（釋義）
(1) 第2(1) 條，選舉的定義 ——
廢除
在“指”之後的所有字句
代以
“《選舉（舞弊及非法行為）條例》（第554章）第4(1) 條所列的選舉；”。
(2) 第2(1) 條 ——
(a) 外國政治性組織的定義；
(b) 台灣政治性組織的定義；
(c) 聯繫的定義 ——廢除該等定義。
(3) 第2(1) 條 ——
按筆劃數目順序加入
“境外（external place）指香港以外的地區或地方（內地及澳門除外）；
境外政治性組織（political organization of an external place）包括 ——
(a) 外國政府或其政治分部；
(b) 境外當局或其政治分部；
(c) 該政府或當局的代理人，或該政府或當局的政治分部的代理人；及
(d) 在境外的政黨或其代理人；
聯繫（connection）就屬政治性團體的社團或分支機構而言，指以下情況 ——
(a) 該社團或該分支機構直接或間接尋求或接受境外政治性組織的資助、任何形式的財政上的贊助或支援或貸款，或其他方式的實質支援；
(b) 該社團或該分支機構直接或間接附屬於境外政治性組織；
(c) 該社團或該分支機構的任何政策是直接或間接由境外政治性組織釐定；或
(d) 在該社團或該分支機構的決策過程中，境外政治性組織直接或間接作出指示、控制、監督、主使或參與。”。
(4) 第2(4) 條 ——
廢除
在“相同。”之後的所有字句。
135. 修訂第5A條（註冊及豁免註冊）
第5A(3)(b) 條 ——廢除 “外國政治性組織或台灣” 代以 “境外”。
136. 修訂第5D條（取消註冊或註冊豁免）
第5D(1)(b) 條 ——廢除“外國政治性組織或台灣” 代以 “境外”。
137. 修訂第8條（禁止社團的運作）
第8(1) 條 ——
廢除
在“事務主任可”之前的所有字句
代以
“(1) 如社團事務主任合理地相信禁止任何社團或分支機構的運作或繼續運作，是維護公共安全、公共秩序或保護他人的權利和自由所需者，社團”。
138. 修訂第32條（在特殊情況下進入的權力）
第32條 ——廢除“國家安全或”。

第 9 分部：修訂《刑事罪行條例》（第 200 章）

139. 廢除第I及II部
第I及II部 ——廢除該等部。

第 10 分部：修訂《刑事訴訟程序條例》（第 221 章）

140. 修訂第9條（關於常規與程序的規則及命令）
第9(3) 條 ——廢除“（包括叛逆罪或隱匿叛逆罪的審訊）”。
141. 修訂第9G條（在特別情況下可拒絕被控人保釋）
第9G條 ——廢除第 (10) 款 代以 “(10) 被控人如被控告謀殺罪，只有在法官的命令下才可獲准保釋。”。
142. 修訂第14A條（罪行的審訊）
(1) 第14A(1) 條 ——廢除 (a) 段。
(2) 第14A條 ——廢除第 (2) 款 代以 “(2) 凡條例中任何條文訂出罪行或達致訂出罪行，且載有“循公訴程序”等字，則在不抵觸第 (4) 款的條文下，該罪行只可循公訴程序審訊。”。
143. 修訂第51條（罪行的審訊）
第51(2) 條 ——廢除“任何並非叛逆罪的” 代以 “就任何”。
144. 修訂第79I條（法庭可藉電視直播聯繫錄取在香港以外的人的證據）
(1) 在第79I(2)(a) 條之後 ——
加入
“(ab) 有關的刑事法律程序屬指明法律程序；”。
(2) 在第79I(2) 條之後 ——
加入
“(3) 即使已有任何准許，在指明法律程序中根據未經修訂的本條給予，只要在該法律程序中尚未有裁決宣告，該項准許即視為從未給予。
(4) 在本條中 ——
指明法律程序（specified proceedings）指涉及國家安全的案件（《維護國家安全條例》（2024年第6號）第3(2) 條所指者）的法律程序；
經修訂（amended）指經《維護國家安全條例》（2024年第6號）修訂。”。
145. 修訂第91條（隱瞞罪行的罰則）
第91(4) 條 ——廢除“（叛逆罪除外）”。
146. 修訂第100條（已婚婦女遭丈夫脅迫的推定的廢除）
第100條 ——廢除“叛逆罪” 代以 “最高刑罰為終身監禁的危害國家安全的罪行”。
147. 修訂第123條（在某些案件中刑事法律程序可藉非公開形式進行和不披露證人的身分）
(1) 第123(1) 條 ——廢除“司法公正、公安或安全” 代以 “第 (1AA) 款所述的目的”。
(2) 在第123(1) 條之後 ——加入“(1AA) 有關目的是 ——
(a) 維護國家安全，包括防止國家秘密（《維護國家安全條例》（2024年第6號）第29條所界定者）的披露；
(b) 維護公共秩序；
(c) 維護司法公正；或
(d) 其他正當目的。”。
(3) 第123(1A)(b) 條 ——廢除“損害司法公正、公安或安全” 代以 “有違第 (1AA) 款所述的目的”。
(4) 第123(1B)(a) 條 ——廢除“，而上訴法庭的決定是最終決定”。
(5) 在第123(1B)(a) 條之後 ——
加入
“(ab) 此外，如有關案件，屬適用《維護國家安全條例》（2024年第6號）第7部第4分部者，則如上訴法庭給予許可，控方亦可針對法庭拒絕根據第 (1) 款作出命令的決定，向上訴法庭提出上訴。
(ac) 上訴法庭對上述上訴所作的決定是最終決定。”。
(6) 第123(1B)(d)(ii) 條，在“命令”之後 ——加入“或決定”。
(7) 第123(1B)(e) 條，在“命令”之後 ——加入“或對法庭拒絕根據第 (1) 款作出命令的決定”。
(8) 第123(1B)(f) 條 ——廢除“司法公正、公安或安全” 代以 “第 (1AA) 款所述的目的”。
148. 修訂附表3（例外罪行）
附表3 ——加入 “11.危害國家安全的罪行。”。

第 11 分部：修訂《刑事案件法律援助規則》（第 221 章，附屬法例 D）

149. 修訂第13條（某些案件的法律援助）
(1) 第13(1)(a) 條 ——廢除“謀殺、叛逆或使用暴力的海盜行為的控罪” 代以 “指明罪行”。
(2) 第13(1)(b) 條 ——廢除“就謀殺、叛逆或使用暴力的海盜行為的控罪被定罪” 代以 “被裁定犯某指明罪行，”。
(3) 第13(1)(c) 條 ——廢除“謀殺、叛逆或使用暴力的海盜行為的控罪” 代以 “指明罪行”。
(4) 在第13(3) 條之後 ——加入“(4) 在本條中 ——指明罪行（specified offence）指 ——
(a) 最高刑罰為終身監禁的危害國家安全的罪行；
(b) 謀殺罪；或
(c) 《刑事罪行條例》（第200章）第19條所訂罪行。”。

第 12 分部：修訂《裁判官條例》（第 227 章）

150. 修訂附表2
(1) 附表2，第I部，第2項 ——廢除“，或違反《刑事罪行條例》（第200章）第VIII部” 代以 “的罪行、《刑事罪行條例》（第200章）第VIII部的罪行，或危害國家安全”。
(2)附表2，第I部 ——廢除第4及5項。
(3) 附表2，第I部，第7項 ——廢除“、煽動性”。
(4) 附表2，第III部，第2項 ——廢除 “或違反《火器及彈藥條例》（第238章）第16、17或18條的罪行” 代以 “違反《火器及彈藥條例》（第238章）第16、17或18條的罪行，或危害國家安全的罪行”。
(5) 附表2，第III部 ——廢除第4及5項。
(6) 附表2，第III部，第7項 ——廢除“、煽動性”。

第 13 分部：修訂《警隊條例》（第 232 章）

151. 修訂第3條（釋義）
第3條 ——
廢除
嚴重的可逮捕罪行的定義
代以
“嚴重的可逮捕罪行（serious arrestable offence）指 ——
(a) 危害國家安全的罪行；
(b) 附表2所指明的罪行；或
(c) 令犯者可根據或憑藉任何法律被判處的最長監禁刑期是不少於7年的其他罪行；”。

第 14 分部：修訂《監獄規則》（第 234 章，附屬法例 A）

152. 修訂第69條（減刑）
在第69(1) 條之後 ——
加入
“(1A) 然而，如某囚犯是因被裁定犯危害國家安全的罪行而服刑，則除非署長信納該囚犯獲得減刑，不會不利於國家安全，否則該囚犯不得根據第 (1) 款獲得減刑。
(1B) 為免生疑問，不論第 (1A) 款所述的囚犯的刑罰是在該款的生效日期之前、當日或之後判處的，該款亦適用。
(1C) 如囚犯因署長根據第 (1A) 款作出的決定不獲得減刑，署長須在作出該項決定後，每年覆核該項決定。”。

第 15 分部：修訂《公安條例》（第 245 章）

153. 修訂第2條（釋義）
第2(2) 條 ——廢除在“相同。”之後的所有字句。

第 16 分部：修訂《教育條例》（第 279 章）

154. 修訂第31條（取消校董註冊的理由）
在第31(1)(a) 條之後 ——
加入
“(ab) 如保安局局長已根據《維護國家安全條例》（2024年第6號）第60(1) 或 (2) 條，就該條例第58條所界定的組織作出命令，而該人在緊接該項命令作出前，屬該組織的幹事（該條例第58條所界定者）；
(ac) 如行政長官會同行政會議已根據《公司（清盤及雜項條文）條例》（第32章）第360C或360N條，就該條例第2(1) 條所界定的公司或非香港公司作出命令，而該人在緊接該項命令作出前，屬該公司的董事（該條例第2(1) 條所界定者）；”。

第 17 分部：修訂《職工會條例》（第 332 章）

155. 修訂第48條（與勞資糾紛有關的串謀罪）
第48(4) 條 ——廢除“、煽動或對國家或君主犯罪” 代以 “或任何危害國家安全的罪行”。

第 18 分部：修訂《香港海關條例》（第 342 章）

156. 修訂第17條（海關人員當作值勤的情況）
第17條，在“行事，”之後 ——加入“或會需要他為防範、制止或調查危害國家安全的罪行而行事，”。
157. 修訂第17A條（逮捕和搜查的一般權力）
(1) 第17A(1) 條 ——
廢除
“觸犯本條例或附表2內指明條例”
代以
“干犯指明罪行”。
(2) 在第17A(4) 條之後 ——
加入
“(5) 在本條中 ——
指明罪行（specified offence）指 ——
(a) 危害國家安全的罪行；或
(b) 違反本條例或附表2內指明條例的罪行。”。
158. 修訂第17B條（進入處所和搜尋疑犯的權力）
第17B(5) 條，可逮捕的罪行的定義 ——廢除“由法律規限固定刑罰的罪行，” 代以 “危害國家安全的罪行，或其他由法律規限固定刑罰的罪行”。
159. 修訂第17BA條（在無手令下的搜查和檢查）
(1) 第17BA(1) 條 ——廢除“為執行本條例或附表2內指明的條例，”。
(2) 在第17BA(1) 條之後 ——加入“(1A) 第 (1) 款所指的權力，僅可為一項或兩項以下目的而行使 ——
(a) 防範、制止或調查危害國家安全的罪行；
(b) 執行本條例或附表2內指明的條例。”。
160. 修訂第17BB條（旅行證件的查閱）
(1) 第17BB條 ——將該條重編為第17BB(1)條。
(2) 第17BB(1) 條 ——廢除“在根據本條例或附表2內指明的任何條例行使任何權力時，”。
(3) 在第17BB(1) 條之後 ——加入“(2) 第 (1) 款所指的權力，僅可在一項或兩項以下情況下行使 ——
(a) 在防範、制止或調查危害國家安全的罪行時；
(b) 在根據本條例或附表2內指明的任何條例行使任何權力時。”。

第 19 分部：修訂《退休金利益(司法人員)條例》（第 401 章）

161. 修訂第31條（經定罪等後退休金利益可予取消、暫停支付或扣減）
第31(1)(c) 條 ——廢除“《刑事罪行條例》（第200章）第2條所訂的叛逆” 代以 “任何危害國家安全的罪行”。

第 20 分部：修訂《香港藝術發展局條例》（第 472 章）

162. 修訂第3條（發展局的設立）
第3(6)(m) 條 ——廢除“叛逆罪” 代以 “任何危害國家安全的罪行”。

第 21 分部：修訂《監管釋囚條例》（第 475 章）

163. 修訂第6條（委員會可命令將囚犯提早釋放並加以監管）
在第6(3) 條之後 ——
加入
“(3A) 然而，如某囚犯是因被裁定犯危害國家安全的罪行而服刑，則署長除非信納提早釋放該囚犯，不會不利於國家安全，否則不得根據第 (3) 款將該囚犯的個案轉介予委員會考慮。
(3B) 為免生疑問，不論第 (3A) 款所述的囚犯的刑罰是在該款的生效日期之前、當日或之後判處的，該款亦適用。
(3C) 如署長根據第 (3A) 款決定不將有關囚犯的個案轉介予委員會考慮，署長須在作出該項決定後，每年覆核該項決定。”。

第 22 分部：修訂《監管釋囚規例》（第 475 章，附屬法例 A）

164. 修訂附表1（指明罪行）
附表1，在註之前 ——加入 “其他8. 危害國家安全的罪行”。

第 23 分部：修訂《官方機密條例》（第 521 章）

165. 廢除第II部（間諜活動）
第II部 ——廢除該部。
166. 修訂第12條（釋義）
(1) 第12(1) 條，訂明的定義 ——廢除“總督” 代以 “行政長官”。
(2) 第12(1) 條，公務人員的定義，(a) 段 ——廢除“英皇香港” 代以 “特區”。
(3) 第12(1) 條，公務人員的定義 ——廢除 (b) 及 (c) 段。
(4) 第12(1) 條 ——
(a) 武裝部隊的定義；
(b) 英國國民的定義；
(c) 防務的定義；
(d) 披露的定義；
(e) 國際關係的定義 ——廢除該等定義。
(5) 第12(1) 條 ——
按筆劃數目順序加入
“披露（disclose）就文件或其他物品而言，包括放棄對該文件或物品的管有，及披露該文件或物品所載有的資料；
特區居民（HKSAR resident）指 ——
(a) 香港永久性居民；或
(b) 符合獲發《人事登記條例》（第177章）所指的身分證的資格，但沒有《入境條例》（第115章）所指的香港居留權的人；
國際組織（international organization）指 ——
(a) 某組織，其成員包括2個或多於2個國家、地區、地方或受任何國家、地區或地方委以職能的實體；或
(b) 藉（或基於）2個或多於2個國家、地區或地方之間訂立的條約、公約、協議或協定而設立的組織，並包括上述組織轄下的機構（不論如何描述）。”。
(6) 第12(2) 條 ——廢除在“但”之後的所有字句 代以 “屬為特區政府的目的，提供貨品或服務（或受僱為該等目的提供貨品或服務）的人。”。
(7) 第12條 ——廢除第 (4)、(5) 及 (6) 款。
167. 修訂第13條（保安及情報資料——部門成員及獲知會人士）
(1) 第13(4) 條 ——
廢除
“總督送達該人的書面通知而作出，而總督如認為有關人士所承擔的工作屬或包括與保安或情報部門有關連，且其性質是為保障聯合王國的國家安全或香港的安全的需要，該人宜受該款規限，則總督”
代以
“行政長官送達該人的書面通知而作出，而行政長官如認為有關人士所承擔的工作屬或包括與保安或情報部門有關連，且其性質是為保障香港的安全的需要，該人宜受該款規限，則行政長官”。
(2) 第13(6) 條 ——
廢除
“總督送達有關人士的另一書面通知而撤銷，而總督”
代以
“行政長官送達有關人士的另一書面通知而撤銷，而行政長官”。
168. 廢除第15及16條
第15及16條 ——廢除該等條文。
169. 修訂第18條（因未經授權的披露所得的資料或在機密情況下託付的資料）
(1) 第18(1)(a) 及 (2) 條 ——廢除“至” 代以 “、14及”。
(2) 第18(3) 條 ——廢除“至16” 代以 “及14”。
(3) 第18(4) 條 ——廢除“、15或16”。
(4) 第18(5) 條 ——廢除“英國國民或香港永久性居民” 代以 “第(5A)款所指的人士”。
(5) 在第18(5) 條之後 ——加入 “(5A) 有關人士是 ——
(a) 特區居民；
(b) 在香港成立、組成或註冊的法人團體；或
(c) 不論是法團抑或不是法團的在香港有業務地點的團體。”。
(6) 第18條 ——廢除第 (6) 款 代以 “(6) 就本條而言，如任何資料、文件或物品 ——
(a) 關乎保安或情報；或
(b) 是第17條適用的資料、文件或物品，該資料、文件或物品即屬為第13、14及17條中的任何一條禁止披露者，而如它符合(a)段的描述，它即屬為第13及14條中的任何一條禁止披露者。”。
(7) 第18(7) 條 ——廢除“至” 代以 “、14及”。
170. 廢除第19條（因諜報活動所得的資料）
第19條 ——廢除該條。
171. 修訂第20條（在機密情況下託付予地區、國家或國際組織的資料）
(1) 第20(2) 條 ——廢除“或防務或國際關係”。
(2) 第20(2)(a) 條 ——廢除“聯合王國政府或香港政府在機密情況下傳達予某地區、國家或國際組織，或被人代表聯合王國政府或香港” 代以 “中央人民政府或特區政府在機密情況下傳達予某地區、國家或國際組織，或被人代表中央人民政府或特區”。
(3) 第20(4) 條 ——廢除“、15或16”。
(4) 第20(6) 條 ——廢除“至” 代以 “、14、17及”。
172. 修訂第21條（經授權的披露）
第21(4) 條 ——廢除“至” 代以 “、14、17、18及”。
173. 修訂第22條（資料的保障）
(1) 第22(1) 條 ——廢除“至” 代以 “、14、17、18、20及”。
(2) 第22(4) 條 ——廢除“或19”。
(3) 第22(6) 條 ——廢除“至” 代以 “、14、17、18、20及”。
174. 修訂第23條（在海外作出的作為）
(1) 第23條 ——將該條重編為第23(1) 條。
(2) 第23(1)條 ——廢除“英國國民、香港永久性居民或公務人員” 代以 “第 (2) 款所指的人士”。
(3) 在第23(1) 條之後 ——加入“(2) 有關人士是 ——
(a) 特區居民；
(b) 在香港成立、組成或註冊的法人團體；
(c) 不論是法團抑或不是法團的在香港有業務地點的團體；或
(d) 公務人員。”。
175. 修訂第24條（關於罪行審訊的條文）
第24(2) 條 ——廢除“聯合王國或”。

第 24 分部：修訂《長期監禁刑罰覆核條例》（第 524 章）

176. 修訂第11條（署長將囚犯的個案轉介委員會覆核的責任）
在第11(1) 條之後 ——
加入
“(1A) 然而，如某囚犯是因被裁定犯危害國家安全的罪行而服刑，則署長除非信納提早釋放該囚犯，不會不利於國家安全，否則不得根據本條將該囚犯的刑罰轉介予委員會覆核。
(1B) 為免生疑問，不論第 (1A) 款所述的囚犯的刑罰是在該款的生效日期之前、當日或之後判處的，該款亦適用。
(1C) 如署長根據第 (1A) 款決定不將有關囚犯的刑罰轉介予委員會覆核，署長須在作出該項決定後，每兩年覆核該項決定。”。
177. 修訂第28條（召回囚犯後對刑罰作出的覆核）
(1) 第28條 ——將該條重編為第28(1)條。
(2) 在第28(1) 條之後 ——加入“(2) 然而，如囚犯是因被裁定犯危害國家安全的罪行而服刑，則署長除非信納提早釋放該囚犯，不會不利於國家安全，否則不得根據第 (1) 款將該項刑罰轉介予委員會覆核。
(3) 為免生疑問，不論該項刑罰是在第 (2) 款的生效日期之前、當日或之後判處的，該款亦適用。
(4) 如署長根據第 (2) 款決定不將該項刑罰轉介予委員會覆核，署長須在作出該項決定後，每兩年覆核該項決定。”。

第 25 分部：修訂《立法會條例》（第 542 章）

178. 修訂第39條（喪失獲提名為候選人或當選為議員的資格的情況）
第39(1)(c) 條 ——廢除“叛逆罪” 代以 “任何危害國家安全的罪行”。
179. 修訂第40條（獲提名的候選人須遵從的規定）
第40(1)(b)(iii)(C) 條 ——廢除“叛逆罪” 代以 “任何危害國家安全的罪行”。

第 26 分部：修訂《區議會條例》（第 547 章）

180. 修訂第14條（喪失獲委任為議員的資格的情況）
第14(1)(c) 條 ——廢除“叛逆罪” 代以 “任何危害國家安全的罪行”。
181. 修訂第19條（喪失登記為當然議員的資格的情況）
第19(1)(c) 條 ——廢除“叛逆罪” 代以 “任何危害國家安全的罪行”。
182. 修訂第21條（喪失獲提名為候選人及當選為議員的資格的情況）
第21(1)(c) 條 ——廢除“叛逆罪” 代以 “任何危害國家安全的罪行”。
183. 修訂第26A條（喪失擔任議員的資格的情況）
第26A(1)(c) 條 ——廢除“叛逆罪” 代以 “任何危害國家安全的罪行”。

第 27 分部：修訂《行政長官選舉條例》（第 569 章）

184. 修訂第14條(喪失獲提名為候選人的資格)
第14(1)(g) 條 ——廢除“叛逆罪” 代以 “任何危害國家安全的罪行”。
185. 修訂第16條（提名方式）
第16(5)(c) 條，在“(c)、”之後 ——加入“(ca)、”。
186. 修訂第26條（喪失投票資格）
第26(1)(c) 條，在“(b)、”之後 ——加入“(ca)、”。
187. 修訂附表（選舉委員會）
(1) 附表，在第5M(1)(a) 條之後 ——加入 “(ab) 已被裁定犯任何危害國家安全的罪行；”。
(2) 附表，在第9(1)(a) 條之後 ——加入 “(ab) 已被裁定犯任何危害國家安全的罪行；”。
(3) 附表，在第18(1)(c) 條之後 ——加入 “(ca) 已被裁定犯任何危害國家安全的罪行；”。

第 28 分部：修訂《鄉郊代表選舉條例》（第 576 章）

188. 修訂第9條（喪失擔任鄉郊代表職位的資格的情況）
第9(1)(c) 條 ——廢除 “叛逆罪” 代以 “任何危害國家安全的罪行”。
189. 修訂第23條（喪失獲提名為候選人及當選為鄉郊代表的資格的情況）
第23(1)(c) 條 ——廢除 “叛逆罪” 代以 “任何危害國家安全的罪行”。

第 29 分部：修訂《法例發布條例》（第 614 章）

190. 修訂第4條（資料庫的內容）
在第4(1)(a)(vi) 條之後 ——加入 “(vii)《維護國家安全條例》（2024年第6號）；”。

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◆ Inaugural addresses by ROC presidents since 1996

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Overview

The inaugural speech of a new ROC president is usually regarded as a major political statement about the concepts and plans the incoming head of state wishes to implement during his/her term of office, and it always attracts close attention from domestic and international observers. The full texts of all inaugural addresses delivered by directly elected ROC presidents since 1996 (Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai Ing-wen, Lai Ching-te) on the day they were sworn in are presented below, complete and unabridged, the official English translation followed by the Chinese original.

1996
Lee Teng-hui		Ninth term ROC president (Zhonghua minguo dijiuren zongtong 中華民國第九任總統): Lee Teng-hui 李登輝 (party affiliation during presidential term: KMT), inaugurated on May 20, 1996 (Monday).
 Title of inaugural address—English translation: 'Manage the Great Taiwan, Nurture a New Chinese Culture'; Chinese original: jingying da Taiwan, jianli xin zhongyuan《經營大台灣，建立新中原》
2000
Chen Shui-bian		Tenth term ROC president (Zhonghua minguo dishiren zongtong 中華民國第十任總統): Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁 (party affiliation during presidential term: DPP), inaugurated on May 20, 2000 (Saturday).
 Title of inaugural address—English translation: 'Taiwan Stands Up: Toward the Dawn of a Rising Era'; Chinese original: Taiwan zhanqilai—yingjie xiangshang tishengde xin shidai《台灣站起來——迎接向上提升的新時代》
2004
Chen Shui-bian		Eleventh term ROC president (Zhonghua minguo dishiyiren zongtong 中華民國第十一任總統): Chen Shui-bian (party affiliation during presidential term: DPP), inaugurated on May 20, 2004 (Thursday).
 Title of inaugural address—English translation: 'Paving the Way for a Sustainable Taiwan'; Chinese original: wei yongxu Taiwan dianji《為永續台灣奠基》
2008
Ma Ying-jeou		Twelfth term ROC president (Zhonghua minguo dishierren zongtong 中華民國第十二任總統): Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九 (party affiliation during presidential term: KMT), inaugurated on May 20, 2008 (Tuesday).
 Title of inaugural address—English translation: 'Taiwan's Renaissance'; Chinese original: renmin fenqi, Taiwan xinsheng《人民奮起，台灣新生》
2012
Ma Ying-jeou		Thirteenth term ROC president (Zhonghua minguo dishisanren zongtong 中華民國第十三任總統): Ma Ying-jeou (party affiliation during presidential term: KMT), inaugurated on May 20, 2012 (Sunday).
 Title of inaugural address—English translation: 'Upholding Ideals, Working Together for Reform and Creating Greater Well-being for Taiwan'; Chinese original: jianzhi lixiang, xishou gaige, dazao xingfu Taiwan《堅持理想、攜手改革、打造幸福臺灣》
2016
Tsai Ing-wen		Fourteenth term ROC president (Zhonghua minguo dishisiren zongtong 中華民國第十四任總統): Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文 (party affiliation during presidential term: DPP), inaugurated on May 20, 2016 (Friday).
 Title of inaugural address—English translation: 'N/A'; Chinese original: dailing Taiwan yiqi wancheng xinshidai《帶領台灣一起完成新時代》
2020
Tsai Ing-wen		Fifteenth term ROC president (Zhonghua minguo dishiwuren zongtong 中華民國第十五任總統): Tsai Ing-wen (party affiliation during presidential term: DPP), inaugurated on May 20, 2020 (Wednesday).
Title of inaugural address—English translation: 'N/A'; Chinese original: N/A
2024
Lai Ching-te		Sixteenth term ROC president (Zhonghua minguo dishiliuren zongtong 中華民國第十六任總統): Lai Ching-te 賴清德 (party affiliation during presidential term: DPP), inaugurated on May 20, 2024 (Monday).
 Title of inaugural address—English translation: 'Building a democratic, peaceful, and prosperous new Taiwan'; Chinese original: dazao minzhu heping fanrong de xin Taiwan《打造民主和平繁榮的新台灣》


Lee Teng-hui
  

Chen Shui-bian
  

Ma Ying-jeou
  

Tsai Ing-wen
  

Lai Ching-te

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Speech statistics

Number of words in Chinese original/English translation

Speech Chinese original English translation Mention of 'ROC' Mention of 'Taiwan'
Lee 1996 4,355 words 2,853 words 10 times 13 times
Chen 2000 5,319 words 3,451 words 9 times 41 times
Chen 2004  5,664 words 4,369 words 9 times 48 times
Ma 2008 3,685 words 2,176 words 9 times 49 times
Ma 2012 5,933 words 4,445 words 12 times 42 times
Tsai 2016 5,982 words 3,656 words 5 times 41 times
Tsai 2020 5,897 words 3,771 words 5 times 50 times
Lai 2024 5,277 words 3,891 words 12 times 88 times

The number of times the terms 'ROC' (Zhonghua minguo 中華民國) and 'Taiwan' (台灣 / 臺灣) were mentioned refers to the Chinese original only, not to the English translation.

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————————————————————

1996—Lee Teng-hui

Jump to Chinese version  Chen 2000 Chen 2004 Ma 2008 Ma 2012 Tsai 2016 Tsai 2020 Lai 2024

Your Majesty, Your Excellencies, Distinguished Guests, My Fellow Countrymen, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Today we are assembled here to jubilantly and solemnly celebrate the inauguration of the President and the Vice President before all our compatriots. This gathering marks not only the commencement of the ninth-term Presidency and Vice Presidency, but also a fresh beginning for the future of the country and the people.

Today, the 21.3 million people in this country formally march into the new era of "popular sovereignty."

Today, the Chinese people enter a new frontier full of hope.

Today, we in Taiwan firmly tell the world, with great pride and self- confidence:

—We now stand on the apex of democratic reform and will remain there resolutely.

—We have proved eloquently that the Chinese are capable of practicing democracy.

—We have effectively expanded the influence of the international democratic camp and made significant contributions to the cause of freedom and democracy.

Therefore, this gathering of today does not celebrate the victory of any candidate, or any political party for that matter. It honors a triumph of democracy for the 21.3 million people. It salutes the confirmation of freedom and dignity—the most fundamental human values—in the Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu area.

My fellow countrymen: The doors have opened to full democracy, with all its vigor in full swing. Today, most deserving of a salute are the people of the Republic of China:

—A salute to them for being so resolute and decisive when it comes to the future of the country.

—A salute to them for being so firm and determined when it comes to the defense of democracy.

—A salute to them for being so calm and invincible when it comes to facing up to threats.

From now on, the people as a whole, rather than any individual or any political party, will be invested with the ruling power of the nation. This is free will in full play, the fullest realization of "popular sovereignty," the real "compliance with the will of Heaven and response to human wishes," the getting rid of the old and ringing in the new. All the glory belongs to the people.

My fellow countrymen: At this very fresh start of history, we pledge ourselves to launch the new era with a new determination and new deeds. This is our common homeland, and this is the fundamental support we draw upon in our struggle for survival. Fifty years of a common destiny forged in fortune and misfortune have united us all into a closely bound and interdependent community. The first-ever popular presidential election has reconfirmed our collective consciousness that we in Taiwan have to work together as one man.

How to make this land of ours more beautiful and how to make its inhabitants feel safer and live a happier and more harmonious life is the common responsibility of the 21.3 million people!

"Whatever the people desire is always in my heart." I am fully aware of the needs of the people and I pledge myself to do my best to deserve their trust. But no individual or political party can single-handedly decide a policy of far-reaching importance to the country. The government will soon invite opinion leaders and other representatives from various quarters to exchange views on major topics of future national development. The consensus that emerges from such meetings will launch the country into a new era.

The election is over, but the promises made during the campaign will be kept and fulfilled as soon as possible. Building a modern country entails the services of all available talents. I am convinced that only when upright, insightful, capable and experienced people, regardless of their political affiliation or social group, participate in the leadership of the government will political stability and national growth be ensured.

The times are changing, so is the social climate. Keeping in the old grooves while refraining from any innovation is doomed to failure. Political maneuvering has no place in political interaction, nor can self- interest have any role in deciding upon a political position. No quarrels can be started under the pretense of representing the will of the voters. A boycott certainly is not the equivalent of checks and balances. The ideal of democracy we are pursuing means not just effective checks and balances; it demands hand-in-hand cooperation for the welfare of the people among the political parties.

Four years will soon pass. We have no time for wavering or waiting. For the purpose of laying a solid and secure foundation for the country and bequeathing a happy and comfortable life to the future generations, let us get off to a very good start today—May 20, 1996.

Firstly, we have to broaden and deepen the democratic exercise. Horizontally, we will share our democratic experience with all Chinese and international friends. Vertically, we will proceed to phase 2 constitutional reform, promote clean elections, ensure clean and efficient government, enhance law and order, restructure the political landscape, and strengthen the multiparty political system, so as to guarantee stability and development for democracy.

Economic growth and political democracy are equally important. Without continued success in economic development, we risk losing everything. We have to make sure that the plan for turning Taiwan into a hub for business operations in the Asia-Pacific region will proceed on schedule so that this country may from a position of strength play a role to be reckoned with in the international community and in the process of national unification. In the meanwhile we have to plan ahead for national development well into the next century, nurture a liberalized and internationalized economic regime in as short as possible a period of time, foster a low-tax, obstacle-free business climate, renovate the land system, improve the small and medium businesses, and greatly enhance national competitiveness. Only when thus prepared will we be able to compete in a new Asia-Pacific age of mutual benefit and co-prosperity, thus becoming an indispensable partner for prosperity and development internationally.

At the same time we do not intend to neglect development in non- economic sectors. Our top priorities will be the judicial system, education, culture, and social restructuring, which will have to move ahead in tandem.

Judicial reform should be based above all on the rule of law. All judicial judgments have to be fair and make sure that all are equal before the law. The rule of law being the foundation of democracy, the cause of democracy will be compromised to a serious extent if court rulings are not trusted by the people. The reform will also guarantee full respect for any fundamental human rights including those of prisoners and parties to a law suit. Rectitude and efficiency in the court and prosecutorial system will have to be drastically improved.

Reform in education aims to put into practice a concept of education that imparts happiness, contentment, pluralism and mutual respect. Such education is designed to develop potentialities, respect individualism, promote humanism, and encourage creativeness. All unreasonable restrictions will be removed to allow the emergence of the life education system. Ample room will be reserved for individual originality and personal traits to ensure the continued pursuit of self-growth and self- realization. The new generation will be assisted to know their homeland, love their country and foster a broad international view. Fortified in this manner they can better meet international challenges and map out a bright future for their country in an increasingly competitive global village.

My fellow countrymen: After 5,000 years the Chinese are still going strong solely because they derive sustenance from an excellent culture. Under the strong impact of Western civilization since the mid-19th century, Chinese culture has gone through tribulations and shocks giving rise to a sharp decline in national confidence. Bearing this in mind, I have never stopped thinking about cultural regeneration. I am hoping that the people of Taiwan will nurture a new life culture as well as a broad and long-sighted view of life. The new Chinese culture, with moorings in the immense Chinese heritage, will draw upon Western cultural essence to facilitate adapting to the new climate of the next century.

This is the essence of the concept of "manage the great Taiwan, nurture a new Chinese culture." All the major cultures originated in a very restricted area. The 5,000-year Chinese culture also rose from a small region called Chung Yuan. Uniquely situated at the confluence of mainland and maritime cultures, Taiwan has been able in recent decades to preserve traditional culture on the one hand and to come into wide contact with Western democracy and science and modern business culture on the other. Equipped with a much higher level of education and development than in other parts of China, Taiwan is set to gradually exercise its leadership role in cultural development and take upon itself the responsibility for nurturing a new Chinese culture.

Managing the great Taiwan can nurture not just a new culture, but also a new society. With political democracy, Taiwan's society has become robustly pluralistic. The vigor thus released will provide nourishment for new social life and bring about further progress.

We will regenerate family ethics and build up a strong sense of community beginning at the grass roots. This will enable us to have a harmonious and communicative society where all members can have the joy of family life. People will also be encouraged to live a simple life and treasure all available resources. The land should be used based upon optimum planning, and nature conservation should be promoted to make it possible for future generations to savor the beauty of the landscape. In the same spirit, we will take better care of the disadvantaged groups in the interests of social harmony and human dignity. We also want to have in place a social security system, fair to all and sure to endure, that provides for freedom from want. But this system can only be installed gradually, depending upon the availability of funding support.

At the very time when we are engaged in the task of developing the Republic of China on Taiwan, the overseas Chinese are never out of mind. We do our very best continuing to assist them in developing their careers. The welfare of the Chinese in Hong Kong and Macao has always been of great concern to us. We are ready to lend them a helping hand to help maintain democracy, freedom and prosperity in this area.

Today the existence and development of the Republic of China on Taiwan has won international recognition and respect. In the new international order of today, such basic tenets as democracy, human rights, peace and renunciation of force are universally adhered to; they are in full accord with the ideals upon which our country was founded. We will continue to promote pragmatic diplomacy in compliance with the principles of goodwill and reciprocity. By so doing we will secure for our 21.3 million people enough room for existence and development as well as the respect and treatment they deserve in the international arena.

My fellow countrymen: China has suffered a lot in the 20th century. In the initial stages, it was buffeted with a series of invasions, and over the last 50 years an ideological gap has been responsible for the Chinese- fighting-Chinese tragedy, resulting in confrontation and enmity among the Chinese. I have been of the view that on the threshold of the 21st century the two sides of the Taiwan Straits should work for ending this historical tragedy and ushering in a new epoch when Chinese should help each other.

It is this consideration that over the past years has been guiding our initiative in promoting a win-win strategy for expanding cross-straits relations leading to eventual national unification, but we are doing this on the premise that the Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu area is well protected and the welfare of its people safeguarded. Unfortunately, the cross-straits relationship has experienced bumps from time to time because the Chinese Communists have refused to admit the very fact that the Republic of China does exist in the area. Beginning last year, the Chinese Communists, because of their opposition to democracy, launched against myself a smear campaign using false charges to damage my credibility, but I simply ignore their irrational behavior and remain patient. An eye for an eye is no solution to an historical question of 50 years.

In an attempt to influence the outcome of the first popular presidential election in March, the Chinese Communists conducted a series of military exercises against Taiwan, but unrivaled restraint prevailed in this country. We know that it is imperative that peace and stability be maintained in the Asia-Pacific region. More important, we would not like to see the sudden disappearance of the economic growth in mainland China that has been made possible with great difficulty by its openness policy over the years. Patience on the part of the 21.3 million people is not tantamount to cowardice. Because we believe quiet tolerance is the only way to dispel enmity bred by confrontation. We will never negotiate under threat of attack, but we do not fear to negotiate. Our position is that dialogue will lead to the resolution of any issues between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits.

The Republic of China has always been a sovereign state. Disputes across the Straits center around system and lifestyle; they have nothing to do with ethnic or cultural identity. Here in this country it is totally unnecessary or impossible to adopt the so-called course of "Taiwan independence." For over 40 years, the two sides of the Straits have been two separate jurisdictions due to various historical factors, but it is also true that both sides pursue eventual national unification. Only when both sides face up to the facts and engage in dialogue with profound sincerity and patience will they be able to find the solution to the unification question and work for the common welfare of the Chinese people.

Today, I will seriously call upon the two sides of the Straits to deal straightforwardly with the momentous question of how to terminate the state of hostility between them, which will then make a crucial contribution to the historic task of unification. In the future, at the call of my country and with the support of its people, I would like to embark upon a journey of peace to mainland China taking with me the consensus and will of the 21.3 million people. I am also ready to meet with the top leadership of the Chinese Communists for a direct exchange of views in order to open up a new era of communication and cooperation between the two sides and ensure peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

My fellow countrymen: We in Taiwan have realized the Chinese dream. The Chinese of the 20th century have been striving for the realization of a happy, wealthy China and of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "popular sovereignty" ideal. For 50 years, we have created in the Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu area an eye-catching "economic miracle" and achieved a world- acclaimed democratic reform. The Chinese who were regarded as dictatorial, feudalistic, penurious, and backward by Western countries one century ago have by now created in the Taiwan area a new land of democracy, wealth and progress, proudly enjoying enthusiastic recognition from the world. This stands for not just a proud achievement of our 21.3 million people; it marks a crucial departure for the Chinese people to rise again to a new height of glory. We believe that whatever is achieved by the Chinese in Taiwan can also be achieved by the Chinese in mainland China. We are willing to provide our developmental experience as an aid in mapping out the direction of development in mainland China. The fruits of our hard work can be used to assist in enhancing the welfare of millions of our compatriots on the mainland. The Chinese on the two sides can thus join forces for the benefit of the prosperity and development of the Chinese nation as a whole.

My fellow countrymen: I wish to take this opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude for the trust you have reposed in me. Today, I have accepted with humility and solemnity the office of the ninth-term President of the Republic of China at the swearing-in ceremony this morning. I fully understand the meaning of this office as well as the duties of this office. I pledge myself to the complete performance of my duties to the best of my power. I would never fail you! Meanwhile, I sincerely call upon all my fellow citizens to give me wholehearted, unselfish and patient support so that we may stride forward hand in hand into the 21st century. I am convinced that during the next century the Chinese people will be able to achieve the historic enterprise of peaceful unification and do their very part for the peace and development of the world.

May I wish the Republic of China continued prosperity and all the distinguished guests health and happiness.

Thank you!

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【中華民國第九任總統李登輝就職演說 全文】

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———

各位遠道而來的友邦元首、各位特使、外交團的各位使節、各位貴賓、各位親愛的父老兄弟姐妹：

今天，我們相聚一堂，在廣大同胞的面前，以莊嚴歡欣的心情，舉行慶祝就職大會。這個盛會，不僅是中華民國第九任總統、副總統任期的開始，更是國家前途與民族命運嶄新的開端。

今天，兩千一百三十萬同胞，正式邁進「主權在民」的新時代。

今天，中華民族進入一個充滿希望的新境界。

今天，在台灣的我們，以無比的驕傲與自信，堅定地告訴全世界：

我們已經成功地站上民主興革的高峰，且將屹立不搖！

我們已經清楚地證明中國人有能力施行民主制度，運用民主政治！

我們已經有效地擴大了國際民主陣營的力量，對全人類的自由民主，做出了積極的貢獻！

所以，今天的這個慶典，不是為了慶祝任何一個候選人的勝利，不是為了慶祝任何一個政黨的勝利，而是為了慶祝我們兩千一百三十萬同胞追求民主的共同勝利！是為了人類最基本的價值｜自由與尊嚴，在台澎金馬獲得肯定而歡呼！

親愛的全國同胞們：民主的大門已經全然開啟，民主的活力正沛然奔放。今天最應該接受喝采的是每一位中華民國的國民。

喝采大家思考國家的未來，如此果斷，毫不猶豫。

喝采大家捍衛民主的決心，如此堅定，毫不動搖。

喝采大家面臨強權的威脅，如此鎮靜，毫不屈服。

從此，統治國家的權力屬於人民全體，不是個人、不是政黨。這是「自由意志」的充分發揮，是「主權在民」的完全落實，是真正的「順乎天，應乎人」，真正的革故鼎新。一切的榮耀，歸於所有的人民。

各位親愛的父老兄弟姊妹：在這個歷史的新起點，我們要以新的決心、新的作為，開展新的時代。這裡是我們共同的家園，是我們生存奮鬥的根本憑藉。五十年來的禍福相共，已經讓我們成為密不可分的生命共同體；而第一次由人民直選總統，更讓我們確立了以台灣為主體的奮鬥意識。

如何讓這塊土地更美麗，讓生活在這裡的人民更安全、更和諧、更幸福，是兩千一百三十萬同胞的共同責任！

「民之所欲，長在我心」，登輝對全國同胞的需求，有充分的領會，也一定會全力以赴，達成付託。然而，影響國家發展深遠的重大政策，不是由一個人或一個政黨就可以決定。因此，登輝將儘快責成政府，針對國家未來發展的重要課題，廣邀各界意見領袖與代表，共商大計，建立共識，開創國家新局。

競選活動雖已結束，但是競選時所作的承諾，一定要切實信守，早日實現。要建設一個現代化國家，有賴各方人才的投入。為追求政局的安定與國力的壯大，登輝認為，政府決策階層的工作，也要不分黨派，不分族群，延攬各界品德良好，能力卓越，見識宏遠，經驗豐富的人才，來擴大參與。

時代已經改變，社會環境也在變。墨守成規，不思突破，注定將被淘汰。我們不能用權謀的眼光，推度政治互動；不能以私利的考量，決定政治立場。打鬧不能代表民意，杯葛也並非就是制衡。我們所追求的民主政治理想，除了有效的監督制衡之外，也要力求不同黨派能夠為了民眾福祉，共同攜手奮進。

四年的時光，轉眼就會過去，我們沒有時間可以猶疑，也沒有時間可以等待。為了國家長治久安的基礎，為了後代幸福安樂的未來，就從今天中華民國八十五年五月二十日起，我們要有一個積極的開始。

首先，我們要提升民主運作的廣度與深度。以廣度而言，我們要與海內外所有的中國人及國際人士，分享民主經驗。以深度而言，我們必須推動第二階段的憲政改革，澄清選舉文化，強化廉能政府，改善社會治安，調整政治生態，落實政黨政治，以確保民主政治的穩定與發展。

經濟發展與政治民主，同等重要。沒有成功的經濟發展，我們會失去一切。為了厚植國家實力，讓中華民國能在國際社會，以至未來國家統一的過程中，扮演舉足輕重的角色，我們必須依據既定時程，如期發展台灣成為「亞太營運中心」，並且同步規劃推動跨世紀的國家建設，儘速營造自由化與國際化的經濟體系，建設低稅負、無障礙的企業投資環境，改革土地制度，壯大中小企業，提升國家競爭力，以迎向互利共榮的亞太新世紀，成為國際繁榮發展不可或缺的重要夥伴。

為求均衡發展，我們也將致力內政的革新，並以司法、教育、文化與社會重建為重點，同步並進。

司法改革首要強化法治精神，尤其要站在人民的立場，落實司法審判的公平，真正做到法律之前，人人平等。法治精神是民主政治的基礎，如果司法審判不能受到人民充分的信賴，民主政治勢必受到嚴重的斲傷。司法改革也絕對不能輕忽任何基本人權，包括受刑人及涉訟人在內，均應得到完整的尊重。對於審檢體系的清廉與效率，更要痛下決心，具體改善。

教育改革的重點，則在實踐快樂、滿足、多元，相互尊重的教育理念，以啟發潛能、尊重人本、發展個性、鼓勵創造為目標，解除不合理的束縛，建立終生學習的制度，讓個人創意與特性有充分發揮的空間，不斷追求自我的成長與實現。我們要導引新生的一代，認識自己的鄉土，熱愛自己的國家，培養寬廣的國際視野，以在競爭日益激烈的「地球村」中，順利迎接國際挑戰，開拓國家光明前景。

全國同胞們：中華民族能歷五千年而不墜，端賴優秀文化的維繫。然而自十九世紀中葉以來，中華文化在西方文明的強烈衝擊下，備經危疑震撼，致使部分國人的信心動搖，國勢低落。所以，登輝無時無刻不在思考文化的重建與新生。希望在台灣地區的同胞，能建立新的生活文化，培養長遠宏大的人生價值觀，並以我國浩瀚的文化傳統為基礎，汲取西方文化精髓，融合而成新的中華文化，以適應進入二十一世紀後的國內外新環境。

這也就是「經營大台灣，建立新中原」的理念所在。環顧世界文明史上的幾個重要文化，大都發源於一個小的地域，中華民族五千年優秀文化，也起源於中原一隅之地，台灣位於大陸文化與海洋文化的匯集點，近數十年來，因時局變化機緣，不但充分保存固有文化傳統，並且廣泛接觸西方民主、科學及現代工商業社會文化。再加上台灣的教育水準與發展程度，遠超越中國其他地區，勢必逐漸發揮文化主導功能，進而擔負起文化「新中原」的重任。

大台灣的經營，不僅在培育新文化，更在重建新社會。隨著政治的民主開放，台灣社會已呈現蓬勃的多元化景象。我們要運用多元化所釋放的活力，孕育新的社會生命力量，帶動社會的發展與進步。

我們要從基層開始，重振家庭倫理，建立社區意識，確立和諧感通的新社會，使民眾能真正享有家園生活之樂。我們也將從永續發展的觀點，提倡節約簡樸，珍惜現有資源，妥善規劃國土利用，加強生態環境保育，讓後代子孫永遠保有鄉土之美。我們更將本著促進社會和諧與維護人格尊嚴的原則，加強關懷照顧弱勢團體，並依據財政負擔的能力，循序建立均衡公平、可長可久的社會安全制度，讓全民享有免於匱乏的自由。

當然，我們全心全力在台灣建設中華民國的同時，也不會忘記海外的中國人。我們將盡全力，繼續協助華僑在海外的發展。而港澳地區同胞的生活福祉，更是我們關懷的重點。我們將隨時伸出相互扶持的手，共同維護此一地區的民主、自由、繁榮。

今天，中華民國在台灣的生存與發展，已受到國際社會的肯定與尊重。在新的國際秩序之中，講求民主、尊重人權、崇尚和平，拋棄武力是共同遵守的信條，這與我們的立國精神，正相一致。因此，我們將秉持善意，依循互利的原則，繼續推動務實外交，使我們兩千一百三十萬同胞，擁有必要的生存與發展空間，並進一步在國際社會中獲得應有的尊敬與待遇。

各位親愛的父老兄弟姊妹：二十世紀的中國，是一個苦難的國家。先是外患不斷，而後，五十年來，又因意識形態的不同，造成「中國人打中國人」的悲劇，積累了同胞手足間的對立與仇恨。登輝一向主張，在邁進二十一世紀的前夕，海峽雙方都應致力結束歷史的悲劇，開創「中國人幫中國人」的新局。

因此，六年來，在確保台澎金馬安全與維護全民福祉的前提下，我們無時不以積極主動的作為，務實雙贏的思考，發展兩岸關係，推進國家統一大業。但是，由於中共始終無視於中華民國在台澎金馬地區存在的事實，致使海峽兩岸關係的發展，時生波折。

去年以來，為了反對民主，中共對登輝個人發動一波又一波「欲加之罪、何患無辭」的誣衊，但是登輝忍辱負重，不予理會。因為以其人之道還治其人，解決不了累積五十年的歷史問題。

為了影響我們第一次民選總統的選情，中共進行一次又一次的軍事演習，但是我們表現了無比的自制。因為我們知道必須維持亞太地區的和平安定，更重要的是，我們不願意看到中國大陸改革開放後，好不容易建立起來的經濟成果，前功盡棄。兩千一百三十萬同胞的堅忍，不是懦弱。因為我們深信，和平寬容是化解對立仇恨的唯一手段。我們不會受威脅而談判，但是絕不畏懼談判。我們主張，只有透過對談溝通，才能真正解決海峽兩岸的問題。

中華民國本來就是一個主權國家。海峽兩岸沒有民族與文化認同問題，有的只是制度與生活方式之爭。在這裡，我們根本沒有必要，也不可能採行所謂「台獨」的路線。四十多年來，海峽兩岸因為歷史因素，而隔海分治，乃是事實；但是海峽雙方都以追求國家統一為目標，也是事實。兩岸唯有面對這些事實，以最大的誠意與耐心，進行對談溝通，化異求同，才能真正解決國家統一的問題，謀求中華民族的共同福祉。

今天，登輝要鄭重呼籲：海峽兩岸，都應該正視處理結束敵對狀態這項重大問題，以便為追求國家統一的歷史大業，作出關鍵性的貢獻。在未來，只要國家需要，人民支持，登輝願意帶著兩千一百三十萬同胞的共識與意志，訪問中國大陸，從事和平之旅。同時，為了打開海峽兩岸溝通、合作的新紀元，為了確保亞太地區的和平、安定、繁榮，登輝也願意與中共最高領導當局見面，直接交換意見。

全國同胞們：今天我們在台灣實現了中國人的夢想！二十世紀的中國人，奮力追求的是，建設富強康樂的新中國，與實踐　中山先生「主權在民」的理想。五十年來，我們在台澎金馬的艱苦奮鬥，創造了舉世矚目的「經濟奇蹟」，完成了世人推崇的民主改革。百年以前，在踏入二十世紀之初，曾被西方國家認定為專制、封建、貧窮、落後的中國人，已經在台澎金馬地區開創了民主、富足、進步的新局，傲然面對世人的讚譽。這不但是我們兩千一百三十萬同胞共同的光榮，更是中華民族振衰起敝，再創新機運的關鍵。我們相信，同樣是中華民族的一份子，在台灣做得到的，在中國大陸也可以做到。因此，我們願意以建設的經驗，導引中國大陸發展的方向，以進步的成果，協助億萬同胞改善生活福祉，進而集合兩岸中國人之力，共謀中華民族的繁榮與發展！

各位親愛的父老兄弟姊妹：登輝要再度對同胞們給予的信賴，表示衷心的感激。今天，登輝以謙卑嚴肅的心情，在宣誓儀式中，接下中華民國第九任總統的重任。我充分瞭解這項職務的意義所在，也完全明白其所包含的責任，我保證將全力以赴，克盡職守，不負國人厚望；同時，也懇求全國同胞真誠、無私、寬容地支持，讓我們能攜手並進，昂然邁向二十一世紀！登輝深信，在二十一世紀，中國人必能完成和平統一的歷史大業，為世界和平與發展，善盡更大的心力！

敬祝中華民國國運昌隆！各位貴賓健康愉快！

謝謝大家！

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2000—Chen Shui-bian

Jump to Chinese version  Lee 1996 Chen 2004 Ma 2008 Ma 2012 Tsai 2016 Tsai 2020 Lai 2024

Leaders of our friendly nations, honored guests and compatriots from Taiwan and abroad;

This is a glorious moment; it is also a moment of dignity and hope.

I thank our honored guests, who have come here from afar, as well as those friends from around the world who love democracy and care about Taiwan, for sharing this glorious moment with us.

We are here today, not just to celebrate an inauguration, but to witness the hard-won democratic values, and to witness the beginning of a new era.

On the eve of the 21st Century, the people of Taiwan have completed a historic alternation of political parties in power. This is not only the first of its kind in the history of the Republic of China, but also an epochal landmark for Chinese communities around the world. Taiwan has not only set a new model for the Asian experience of democracy, but has also added a moving example to the third wave of democracy the world over.

The election for the 10th-term President of the Republic of China has clearly shown the world that the fruits of freedom and democracy are not easily come by. Twenty-three million people with an unwavering will have allayed enmity with love, overcome intimidation with hope, and conquered fear with faith.

With our sacred votes, we have proven to the world that freedom and democracy are indisputable universal values, and that peace is humanity's highest goal.

The outcome of Taiwan's Year 2000 presidential election is not the victory of an individual or a political party. It is a victory of the people, a victory for democracy, because we have, while at the focus of global attention, transcended fear, threats and oppression and bravely risen to our feet together.

Taiwan stands up, demonstrating a firmness of purpose and faith in democracy.

Taiwan stands up, representing the self-confidence of the people and the dignity of the country.

Taiwan stands up, symbolizing the quest for hope and the realization of dreams.

Dear compatriots, let's always remember this moment; let's always remember to value and feel gratitude for it, because the fruits of democracy did not come out of the blue. It was realized by going through many perils and dangers, and by experiencing countless hardships. If not for the fearless sacrifice of our democratic forebears, if not for the unswerving faith of the tens of millions of Taiwanese people in freedom and democracy, we could not possibly be standing on our beloved land today and celebrate a glorious occasion that belongs to all the people.

Today, it is as if we are standing before a fresh new gate in history. In the process of democratization, the Taiwanese people have created a brand-new key to our shared destiny. The new century's gates of hope are soon to open. We are humble but not submissive. We are full of self-confidence but not the slightest bit of self-satisfaction.

Since that moment on March 18 when the election results came to light, I have accepted the mandate of all Taiwanese people in a most earnest and humble frame of mind, and have vowed to devote all my efforts, understanding and courage to assuming the heavy responsibility of this country's future.

I personally understand that the significance of the alternation of political parties and the peaceful transition of power lies not in that it is a change of personnel or political parties. Nor that it is a dynastic change. Rather, it is the return of state and government power to the people through a democratic procedure. The people are the true masters of the country, which no individual or political party can possess. From the head of state to the rank-and-file civil servant—the government exists for all the people and serves all the people.

The alternation of political parties does not mean an all-out negation of the past. We should be fair in evaluating the contributions made by those in power throughout the ages. Mr. Lee Teng-hui deserves our highest praise and heartfelt honor for his promotion of democratic reforms and for his excellent performance during his twelve years of leadership.

Taiwan society has rallied and participated energetically in the election. Despite the diverse views and stances, all individuals share the same intent—to come forward for the sake of their political ideas and the country's future. We believe that the end of an election is the beginning of reconciliation. After the curtain falls on emotional campaigns, rationality should prevail. Under the supreme principles of national interests and the welfare of the people, those in power and in opposition should both fulfill their duties by the people and realize the ideals of fair competition in party politics, as well as the checks and balances of democratic politics.

A democratic society with fair competition, tolerance and trust is the strongest impetus for a nation's development. Placing national interests above those of political parties, we should solidify the will of the people and seek consensus among the ruling and opposition parties, to promote the country's development and reforms.

"A government for all people" and "rule by the clean and upright" were my promises to the people during the election period. It is also an important key for Taiwan society in stepping over its fault lines and exalting to a higher level in the future.

The spirit of a "government for all people" lies in the fact that "the government exists for the people." The people are the masters and shareholders of the state. The government should rule on the basis of majority public opinion. The interests of the people are absolutely above those of any political party or individual.

I have always taken pride in being a member of the Democratic Progressive Party, but from the moment I take my oath and assume the president's post, I will put all my efforts into fulfilling my role as a "president for all people." As in the formation of the new government, we employ people according to their talents and do not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity, gender or party affiliation. We will also place the welfare of the populace as our primary goal in future.

The topmost initiatives of my promise to "rule by the clean and upright" are to eliminate "black gold"—the involvement of organized crime in politics—and to eradicate vote-buying. For a long time, the Taiwanese people have been deeply repelled by money politics and the interference of organized crime. A grassroots vote-buying culture has also robbed the people of their right to elect the wise and the able. These have tainted the development of Taiwan's democracy.

Today, I am willing to promise hereby that the new government will eliminate vote-buying and crack down on "black gold" politics, so that Taiwan can rise above such downward sinking forces. We must give the people a clean political environment.

In the area of government reforms, we need to establish a government that is clean, efficient, far-sighted, dynamic, highly flexible and responsive, in order to ensure Taiwan's competitiveness in the face of increasingly fierce global competition. The age of "large and capable" governments has now passed, replaced by "small and effective" governments, which have established partnership relations with the people. We should accelerate the streamlining of government functions and organization and actively expand the role of public participation.

This will not only allow the public to fully utilize their energy but also significantly reduce the government's burdens.

Similar partnership relations should also be set up between the central and local governments. We want to break the authoritarian attitudes from the days of centralized, money-controlled power. We want to realize the spirit of local autonomy, where the local and central governments share resources and responsibilities, where "the central government will not do what the local governments can do." Whether in the east, west, north or south, or whether on Taiwan Proper or on offshore islands, all will get balanced, pluralistic development, and the gap between urban and rural areas will decrease.

Of course, we should understand that the government is no panacea for all problems. The driving force for economic development and societal progress comes from the people. Over the past half-century, the Taiwanese people have toiled hard to create an economic miracle that has won global applause, and to lay the foundation for the survival and development of the Republic of China. Today, facing the impact of the fast-changing information technologies and trade liberalization, Taiwan's industrial development must move toward a knowledge-based economy. High-tech industries need to be constantly innovative, while traditional industries need to undergo transformation and upgrading.

The future government should not necessarily play the role of a "leader" or "manager." On the contrary, it should be the "supporter" and "service-provider," as expected by private enterprises. The responsibility of a modern government is to raise administrative efficiency, improve the domestic investment environment, and maintain financial order and stock market stability, so as to allow economic development to move toward full liberalization and internationalization with fair competition. By observing these principles, the vitality of the public will naturally bloom and create a new phase in Taiwan's economic miracle.

Apart from consolidating our democratic achievements, promoting government reforms, and raising economic competitiveness, the new government's foremost objective should be to adhere to public opinion and implement reforms, so that the people on this land can live in more dignity, more self-confidence and better quality.

Let our society be not only safe, harmonious and prosperous, but also meet the principles of fairness and justice. As we cultivate the ever-growing abilities of our citizens, we will let our next generation learn in an environment filled with happiness and hope.

The 21st Century will be a time when "the right to a quality life" and "refined lifestyles" are much emphasized. The government will have to bring up solutions for all issues relating to the people's lives, such as social order, social welfare, environmental protection, land planning, waste treatment, cleaning up rivers and community-building. It will also have to implement these solutions thoroughly.

At present, we need to immediately improve social order and environmental protection, which are important indicators of the quality of life. Building a new social order, we will let the people live and work in peace and without fear. Finding a balance between ecological preservation and economic development, we will develop Taiwan into a sustainable green silicon island.

The integrity of the judiciary is a staunch line of defense for democratic politics and social justice. An impartial, independent judicial system is a safeguard for social order and a defender of the people's rights. At present, we still have a long way to go in our judicial reforms. Our compatriots should continue to give the judiciary their calls to action and their ardent expectations. At the same time, we should also restrain our administrative authority and give the judiciary room to operate independently and without interference.

Human resources are Taiwan's most important resources. Talent is the foundation of the country's competitiveness, while education is a long-term plan for empowering the people. We will seek a consensus among the ruling and opposition parties, academia and the public to carry on with educational reforms and build a healthy, proactive, lively and innovative education system, which will allow Taiwan to cultivate first-class, outstanding talents amid the fierce international competition. We will let Taiwan move gradually toward a "learning organization" and a "knowledge-based society." We will also encourage people to take up lifetime learning to fully develop their potential and creativity.

Grassroots community organizations have now been developing around the country, working to explore and preserve the history, culture, geography and ecology of their localities. These are all part of Taiwan culture, whether they are local cultures, mass cultures or high cultures. Due to special historical and geographical factors, Taiwan possesses a wealth of diversified cultural elements. But cultural development is not something that can bring immediate success. Rather, it has to be accumulated bit by bit. We must open our hearts with tolerance and respect, so that our diverse ethnic groups and different regional cultures communicate with each other, and so that Taiwan's local cultures connect with the cultures of Chinese-speaking communities and other world cultures, and create a new milieu of "a cultural Taiwan in a modern century."

The September 21 earthquake that occurred last year brought to our land and our compatriots an unprecedented catastrophe, the pain of which is yet to heal. The new government will brook no delay in the reconstruction of disaster areas, including industrial and spiritual recovery. We will work to ensure that care is extended to every victim and rebuild every destroyed place. Here, we would also like to express our highest respect again for all individuals and non-governmental organizations that have selflessly contributed to the rescue and reconstruction work after the disaster. Amid the fierce power of Nature, we have seen Taiwan's most beautiful compassion, strongest faith and greatest trust. Our compatriots have been injured and wounded during the September 21 earthquake, but with the spirit of a "volunteer Taiwan," Taiwan's new family will stand up resolutely on its feet once again.

Dear compatriots, 400 years ago, Taiwan was called "Formosa"—the beautiful island—for its lustrous landscape. Today, Taiwan is manifesting the elegance of a democratic island, once again attracting global attention, as the people on this land create a new page in our history.

We believe that the Republic of China, with its democratic achievements and technological and economic prowess, can certainly continue to play an indispensable role in the international community. In addition to strengthening the existing relations with friendly nations, we want to actively participate in all types of international non-governmental organizations. Through humanitarian care, economic cooperation, cultural exchanges and various other methods, we will actively participate in international affairs, expand Taiwan's room for survival in the international arena, and contribute to the welfare of the international community.

Besides, we are also willing to promise a more active contribution in safeguarding international human rights. The Republic of China cannot and will not remain outside global human rights trends. We will abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convention for Civil and Political Rights, and the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action. We will bring the Republic of China back into the international human rights system.

The new government will request the Legislative Yuan to pass and ratify the International Bill of Rights as a domestic law of Taiwan, so that it will formally become the "Taiwan Bill of Rights." We hope to set up an independent national human rights commission in Taiwan, thereby realizing an action long advocated by the United Nations. We will also invite two outstanding non-governmental organizations, the International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International, to assist us in our measures to protect human rights and make the Republic of China into a new indicator for human rights in the 21st Century.

We firmly believe that in any time or any corner of the world, the meaning and values of freedom, democracy and human rights cannot be ignored or changed.

The history of the 20th Century left us with a major lesson—that war is a failure of humanity. Waged for whatever purpose or whatever imperious reasons, war is the greatest harm to freedom, democracy and human rights.

Over the past one hundred plus years, China has suffered imperialist aggression, which left indelible wounds in her history. Taiwan's destiny has been even more arduous, tormented by brute force and the rule of colonialist regimes. These similar historical experiences should bring mutual understanding between the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, setting a solid foundation for pursuing freedom, democracy and human rights together. However, due to long periods of separation, the two sides have developed vastly different political systems and lifestyles, obstructing empathy and friendship between the people on the two sides, and even creating a wall of divisiveness and confrontation.

Today, as the Cold War has ended, it is time for the two sides to cast aside the hostilities left from the old era. We do not need to wait further because now is a new opportunity for the two sides to create an era of reconciliation together.

The people across the Taiwan Strait share the same ancestral, cultural, and historical background. While upholding the principles of democracy and parity, building upon the existing foundations, and constructing conditions for cooperation through goodwill, we believe that the leaders on both sides possess enough wisdom and creativity to jointly deal with the question of a future "one China."

I fully understand that as the popularly elected 10th-term President of the Republic of China, I must abide by the Constitution, maintain the sovereignty, dignity and security of our country, and ensure the well-being of all citizens. Therefore, as long as the CCP regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in office, I will not declare independence, I will not change the national title, I will not push forth the inclusion of the so-called "state-to-state" description in the Constitution, and I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regards to the question of independence or unification. Furthermore, the abolition of the National Unification Council or the Guidelines for National Unification will not be an issue.

History has illustrated that war will only create hatred and enmity, with absolutely no benefit to the development of mutual relations. Chinese people emphasize the difference between statesmanship and hegemony, believing in the philosophy that a government which employs benevolence "will please those near and appeal to those from afar," and "when those afar will not submit, then one must practice kindness and virtue to attract them." Such Chinese wisdom will remain universal words of value.

Under the leadership of Mr. Deng Xiaoping and Mr. Jiang Zemin, the mainland has created a miracle of economic openness. In Taiwan, over a half century, not only have we created a miracle economy, we have also created the political marvel of democracy. On such a basis, as long as the governments and people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait can interact more, following the principles of "goodwill reconciliation, active cooperation, and permanent peace," while at the same time respecting the free choice of the people and excluding unnecessary obstacles, both sides of the Strait can make great contributions to the prosperity and stability of the Asia Pacific Region. Both sides will also create a glorious civilization for the world's humanity.

Dear compatriots, we hope so much to share the moving scene of this moment with all Chinese-speaking people around the world. The wide Ketagelan Boulevard before us was bristling with security guards only a few years ago. The building behind me used to be the Governor General's Mansion during the colonial era. Today, we gather here to extol the glory and joy of democracy with songs of the earth and the voice of the people. With a little reflection, our compatriots should be able to appreciate the deep and far-reaching meaning of this moment:

Authoritarianism and force can only bring surrender for one time, while democracy and freedom are values that will endure forever.

Only by adhering to the will of the people can we pioneer the paths of history and build enduring architecture.

Today, as a son of a tenant farmer and with a poor family background, I have struggled and grown on this land and, after experiencing defeat and tribulation, I have finally won the trust of the people to take up the great responsibility leading the country. My individual achievements are minor, but the message is valuable because each citizen of Formosa is a "child of Taiwan" just like me. In whatever difficult environment, Taiwan will be like a selfless, loving mother, who never stops giving us opportunities and who helps us achieve our beautiful dreams.

The spirit of the "child of Taiwan" reveals to us that even though Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu are tiny islands on the rim of the Pacific, the map of our dreams knows no limits. It extends all the way to the end of the horizon, as long as our 23 million compatriots fear no hardship and move forward hand in hand.

Dear compatriots, this magnificent moment belongs to all the people. All grace and glory belongs to Taiwan—our eternal Mother. Together, let's extend our gratitude to the earth and respect to the people.

Long live freedom and democracy!

Long live the people of Taiwan!

We pray for the prosperity of the Republic of China, and for the health and happiness of all compatriots and all honored guests!

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【中華民國第十任總統陳水扁就職演說 全文】

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

各位友邦元首、各位貴賓、各位親愛的海內外同胞：

這是一個光榮的時刻，也是一個莊嚴而充滿希望的時刻。

感謝遠道而來的各位嘉賓，以及全世界熱愛民主、關心台灣的朋友，與我們一起分享此刻的榮耀。

我們今天在這裡，不只是為了慶祝一個就職典禮，而是為了見證得來不易的民主價值，見證一個新時代的開始。

在二十一世紀來臨的前夕，台灣人民用民主的選票完成了歷史性的政黨輪替。這不僅是中華民國歷史上的第一次，更是全球華人社會劃時代的里程碑。台灣不只為亞洲的民主經驗樹立了新典範，也為全世界第三波的民主潮流增添了一個感人的例證。

中華民國第十任總統選舉的過程讓全世界清楚的看到，自由民主的果實如此得來不易。兩千三百萬人民以無比堅定的意志，用愛弭平敵意、以希望克服威脅、用信心戰勝了恐懼。

我們用神聖的選票向全世界證明，自由民主是顛撲不滅的普世價值，追求和平更是人類理性的最高目標。

公元 2000 年台灣總統大選的結果，不是個人的勝利或政黨的勝利，而是人民的勝利、民主的勝利。因為，我們在舉世注目的焦點中，一起超越了恐懼、威脅和壓迫，勇敢的站起來！

台灣站起來，展現著理性的堅持和民主的信仰。

台灣站起來，代表著人民的自信和國家的尊嚴。

台灣站起來，象徵著希望的追求和夢想的實現。

親愛的同胞，讓我們永遠記得這一刻，永遠記得珍惜和感恩，因為民主的成果並非憑空而來，而是走過艱難險阻、歷經千辛萬苦才得以實現。如果沒有民主前輩們前仆後繼的無畏犧牲、沒有千萬人民對於自由民主的堅定信仰，我們今天就不可能站在自己親愛的土地上，慶祝這一個屬於全民的光榮盛典。

今天，我們彷彿站在一座嶄新的歷史門前。台灣人民透過民主錘鍊的過程，為我們共同的命運打造了一把全新的鑰匙。新世紀的希望之門即將開啟。我們如此謙卑，但絕不退縮。我們充滿自信，但沒有絲毫自滿。

從三月十八日選舉結果揭曉的那一刻開始，阿扁以最嚴肅而謙卑的心情接受全民的付託，誓言必將竭盡個人的心力、智慧和勇氣，來承擔國家未來的重責大任。

個人深切的瞭解，政黨輪替、政權和平轉移的意義絕對不只是「換人換黨」的人事更替，更不是「改朝換代」的權力轉移，而是透過民主的程序，把國家和政府的權力交還給人民。人民才是國家真正的主人，不是任何個人或政黨所能佔有；政府是為人民而存在的，從國家元首到基層公務員都是全民的公僕。

政黨輪替並不代表對於過去的全盤否定。歷來的執政者為國家人民的付出，我們都應該給予公正的評價。李登輝先生過去十二年主政期間所推動的民主改革與卓越政績，也應該獲得國人最高的推崇與衷心的感念。

在選舉的過程中，台灣社會高度動員、積極參與，儘管有不同的主張和立場，但是每一個人為了政治理念和國家前途挺身而出的初衷是一樣的。我們相信，選舉的結束是和解的開始，激情落幕之後應該是理性的抬頭。在國家利益與人民福祉的最高原則之下，未來不論是執政者或在野者，都應該能不負人民的付託、善盡本身的職責，實現政黨政治公平競爭、民主政治監督制衡的理想。

一個公平競爭、包容信任的民主社會，是國家進步的最大動能。在國家利益高於政黨利益的基礎之上，我們應該凝聚全民的意志與朝野的共識，著手推動國家的進步改革。

「全民政府、清流共治」是阿扁在選舉期間對人民的承諾，也是台灣社會未來要跨越斷層、向上提升的重要關鍵。

「全民政府」的精神在於「政府是為人民而存在的」，人民是國家的主人和股東，政府的施政必須以多數的民意為依歸。人民的利益絕對高於政黨的利益和個人的利益。

阿扁永遠以身為民主進步黨的黨員為榮，但是從宣誓就職的這一刻開始，個人將以全部的心力做好「全民總統」的角色。正如同全民新政府的組成，我們用人唯才、不分族群、不分性別、不分黨派，未來的各項施政也都必須以全民的福祉為目標。

「清流共治」的首要目標是要掃除黑金、杜絕賄選。長期以來，台灣社會黑白不分、黑道金權介入政治的情況已經遭致台灣人民的深惡痛絕。基層選舉買票賄選的文化，不僅剝奪了人民「選賢與能、當家作主」的權利，更讓台灣的民主發展蒙上污名。

今天，阿扁願意在此承諾，新政府將以最大的決心來消除賄選、打擊黑金，讓台灣社會徹底擺脫向下沈淪的力量，讓清流共治向上提升，還給人民一個清明的政治環境。

在活力政府的改造方面，面對日益激烈的全球化競爭，為了確保台灣的競爭力，我們必須建立一個廉潔、效能、有遠見、有活力、有高度彈性和應變力的新政府。「大有為」政府的時代已經過去，取而代之的應該是與民間建立夥伴關係的「小而能」政府。我們應該加速精簡政府的職能與組織，積極擴大民間扮演的角色。如此不僅可以讓民間的活力盡情發揮，也能大幅減輕政府的負擔。

同樣的夥伴關係也應該建立在中央與地方政府之間。我們要打破過去中央集權又集錢的威權心態，落實「地方能做、中央不做」的地方自治精神，讓地方與中央政府一起共享資源、一起承擔責任。無論東西南北、不分本島離島，都能夠獲得均衡多元的發展，拉近城鄉之間的距離。

當然，我們也應該瞭解，政府不是一切問題的答案，人民才是經濟發展與社會進步的原動力。過去半個世紀以來，台灣人民靠著胼手胝足的努力創造了舉世稱羨的經濟奇蹟，也奠定了中華民國生存發展的命脈。如今，面對資訊科技日新月異以及貿易自由化的衝擊，台灣的產業發展必然要走向知識經濟的時代，高科技的產業必須不斷創新，傳統的產業也必然要轉型升級。

未來的政府並不一定要繼續扮演過去「領導者」和「管理者」的角色，反而應該像民間企業所期待的，政府是「支援者」和「服務者」。現代政府的責任在於提高行政的效能、改善國內的投資環境、維持金融秩序與股市的穩定，讓經濟的發展透過公平的競爭走向完全的自由化和國際化。循此原則，民間的活力自然能夠蓬勃興盛，再創下一個階段的經濟奇蹟。

除了鞏固民主的成果、推動政府的改造、提昇經濟的競爭力之外，新政府的首要施政目標應該是順應民意、厲行改革，讓這一塊土地上的人民生活得更有尊嚴、更有自信、更有品質。讓我們的社會不僅安全、和諧、富裕，也要符合公平正義。讓我們的下一代在充滿希望與快樂的教育環境中學習，培養國民不斷成長的競爭力。

二十一世紀將是強調「生活者權利」、「精緻化生活」的時代。舉凡與人民生活息息相關的治安改善、社會福利、環保生態、國土規劃、垃圾處理、河川整治、交通整頓、社區營造等問題，政府都必須提出一套解決方案，並透過公權力徹底加以落實。

當前我們必須立即提昇的是治安改善與環境保護這兩大生活品質的重要指標。建立社會新秩序，讓所有的老百姓都能安居樂業，生活沒有恐懼。在生態保育與經濟發展之間取得相容的平衡點，讓台灣成為永續發展的綠色矽島。

司法的尊嚴是民主政治與社會正義的堅強防線。一個公正、獨立的司法體系不僅是社會秩序的維護者，也是人民權益的捍衛者。目前司法的改革還有一段很長的路要走，國人必須繼續給予司法界嚴格的督促與殷切的期盼，在此同時，我們也應該節制行政權力，還給司法獨立運作、不受干擾的空間。

台灣最重要的資源是人力的資源，人才是國家競爭力的根本，教育是「藏富於民」的百年大計。我們將儘速凝聚朝野、學界與民間的共識，持續推動教改的希望工程，建立健康、積極、活潑、創新的教育體制，使台灣在激烈的國際競爭力之下，源源不斷地培育一流、優秀的人才。讓台灣社會逐漸走向「學習型組織」和「知識型社會」，鼓舞人民終身學習、求新求變，充分發揮個人的潛力與創造力。

目前在全國各地普遍發展的草根性社區組織，包括對地方歷史、人文、地理、生態的探索和維護，展現了人文台灣由下而上的民間活力。不管是地方文化、庶民文化或者精緻文化，都是台灣文化整體的一部份。台灣因為特殊的歷史與地理緣故，蘊含了最豐美多樣的文化元素，但是文化建設無法一蹴可幾，而是要靠一點一滴的累積。我們必須敞開心胸、包容尊重，讓多元族群與不同地域的文化相互感通，讓立足台灣的本土文化與華人文化、世界文化自然接軌，創造「文化台灣、世紀維新」的新格局。

去年發生的九二一大地震，讓我們心愛的土地和同胞歷經前所未有的浩劫，傷痛之深至今未能癒合。新政府對於災區的重建工作刻不容緩，包括產業的復甦和心靈的重建，必須做到最後一人的照顧、最後一處的重建完成為止。在此，我們也要對於災後救援與重建過程中，充滿大愛、無私奉獻的所有個人與民間團體，再次表達最高的敬意。在大自然的惡力中，我們看到了台灣最美的慈悲、最強的信念、最大的信任！九二一震災讓同胞受傷跌倒，但是在「志工台灣」的精神中，台灣新家庭一定會重新堅強的站起來！

親愛的同胞，四百年前，台灣因為璀麗的山川風貌被世人稱為「福爾摩沙——美麗之島」。今天，因為這一塊土地上的人民所締造的歷史新頁，台灣重新展現了「民主之島」的風采，再次吸引了全世界的目光。

我們相信，以今日的民主成就加上科技經貿的實力，中華民國一定可以繼續在國際社會中扮演不可或缺的角色。除了持續加強與友邦的實質外交關係之外，我們更要積極參與各種非政府的國際組織。透過人道關懷、經貿合作與文化交流等各種方式，積極參與國際事務，擴大台灣在國際的生存空間，並且回饋國際社會。

除此之外，我們也願意承諾對於國際人權的維護做出更積極的貢獻。中華民國不能也不會自外於世界人權的潮流，我們將遵守包括「世界人權宣言」、「公民與政治權利國際公約」以及維也納世界人權會議的宣言和行動綱領，將中華民國重新納入國際人權體系。

新政府將敦請立法院通過批准「國際人權法典」，使其國內法化，成為正式的「台灣人權法典」。我們希望實現聯合國長期所推動的主張，在台灣設立獨立運作的國家人權委員會，並且邀請國際法律人委員會和國際特赦組織這兩個卓越的非政府人權組織，協助我們落實各項人權保護的措施，讓中華民國成為二十一世紀人權的新指標。

我們堅信，不管在任何一個時代、在地球的任何一個角落，自由、民主、人權的意義和價值都不能被漠視或改變。

二十世紀的歷史留給人類一個最大的教訓，那就是——戰爭是人類的失敗。不論目的何在、理由多麼冠冕堂皇，戰爭都是對自由、民主、人權最大的傷害。

過去一百多年來，中國曾經遭受帝國主義的侵略，留下難以抹滅的歷史傷痕。台灣的命運更加坎坷，曾經先後受到強權的欺凌和殖民政權的統治。如此相同的歷史遭遇，理應為兩岸人民之間的相互諒解，為共同追求自由、民主、人權的決心，奠下厚實的基礎。然而，因為長期的隔離，使得雙方發展出截然不同的政治制度和生活方式，從此阻斷了兩岸人民以同理心互相對待的情誼，甚至因為隔離而造成了對立的圍牆。

如今，冷戰已經結束，該是兩岸拋棄舊時代所遺留下來的敵意與對立的時候了。我們無須再等待，因為此刻就是兩岸共創和解時代的新契機。

海峽兩岸人民源自於相同的血緣、文化和歷史背景，我們相信雙方的領導人一定有足夠的智慧與創意，秉持民主對等的原則，在既有的基礎之上，以善意營造合作的條件，共同來處理未來「一個中國」的問題。

本人深切瞭解，身為民選的中華民國第十任總統，自當恪遵憲法，維護國家的主權、尊嚴與安全，確保全體國民的福祉。因此，只要中共無意對台動武，本人保證在任期之內，不會宣佈獨立，不會更改國號，不會推動兩國論入憲，不會推動改變現狀的統獨公投，也沒有廢除國統綱領與國統會的問題。

歷史證明，戰爭只會引來更多的仇恨與敵意，絲毫無助於彼此關係的發展。中國人強調王霸之分，相信行仁政必能使「近者悅、遠者來」、「遠人不服，則修文德以來之」的道理。這些中國人的智慧，即使到了下一個世紀，仍然是放諸四海皆準的至理名言。

大陸在鄧小平先生與江澤民先生的領導下，創造了經濟開放的奇蹟；而台灣在半個世紀以來，不僅創造了經濟奇蹟，也締造了民主的政治奇蹟。在此基礎上，兩岸的政府與人民若能多多交流，秉持「善意和解、積極合作、永久和平」的原則，尊重人民自由意志的選擇，排除不必要的種種障礙，海峽兩岸必能為亞太地區的繁榮與穩定做出重大的貢獻，也必將為全體人類創造更輝煌的東方文明。

親愛的同胞，我們多麼希望海內外的華人都能親身體驗、共同分享這一刻的動人情景。眼前開闊的凱達格蘭大道，數年之前仍然戒備森嚴；在我身後的這棟建築，曾經是殖民時代的總督府。今天，我們齊聚在這裡，用土地的樂章和人民的聲音來歌頌民主的光榮喜悅。如果用心體會，海內外同胞應該都能領悟這一刻所代表的深遠意義——

威權和武力只能讓人一時屈服，民主自由才是永垂不朽的價值。

唯有服膺人民的意志，才能開拓歷史的道路、打造不朽的建築。

今天，阿扁以一個佃農之子、貧寒的出身，能夠在這一塊土地上奮鬥成長，歷經挫折與考驗，終於贏得人民的信賴，承擔起領導國家的重責大任。個人的成就如此卑微，但其中隱含的寓意卻彌足可貴。因為，每一位福爾摩沙的子民都和阿扁一樣，都是「台灣之子」。不論在多麼艱困的環境中，台灣都像至愛無私的母親，從不間斷的賜予我們機會，帶領我們實現美好的夢想。

台灣之子的精神啟示著我們：儘管台澎金馬只是太平洋邊的蕞爾小島，只要兩千三百萬同胞不畏艱難、攜手向前，我們夢想的地圖將會無限遠大，一直延伸到地平線的盡頭。

親愛的同胞，這一刻的光榮屬於全體人民，所有的恩典都要歸於台灣——我們永遠的母親。讓我們一起對土地感恩、向人民致敬。

自由民主萬歲！

台灣人民萬歲！

敬祝中華民國國運昌隆！全國同胞和各位嘉賓健康愉快！

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2004—Chen Shui-bian

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Heads of States, Diplomatic Envoys and Foreign Dignitaries, Distinguished Guests, and Fellow Citizens:

Firstly, I wish to thank our honorable guests, at home and from abroad, who have joined us today for the Inauguration Ceremony of the 11th-Term President and Vice President of the Republic of China. What we have come together to witness are the progressive steps of Taiwan's democracy, as well as a story, written jointly by the 23 million people of Taiwan—one that is extraordinary and truly remarkable.

On this joyous occasion of national celebration, I will assume the solemn duty bestowed upon me by the people. At this moment, that which fills my mind is not eloquent words of glory and exaltation, but rather, weighty thoughts of bigger responsibility, greater humility, and deeper self-reflection.

In the final year of the twentieth century, Taiwan crossed a historic doorsill, completing an unprecedented transfer of power between political parties, and ushering in a new era in our nation's democratic development. In that time of change over—between the old and the new century—our fledgling democracy found itself stumbling down a rugged path of trial and tribulation. Taiwan's maiden voyage into the new century came wrought with turbulence as the old and the new, the weak and the strong, the emergence of crisis and the rise of opportunity—all came clashing into co-existence.

In the eyes of Chinese societies and other emerging democratic states, Taiwan's democracy embodies not merely a democratic experimentation; it signifies an exemplary success. The standard of democracy achieved in Western nations is the tried result through the test of time. In comparison, Taiwan's newfound democracy, after weathering rough waters, has burgeoned into an even more precious accomplishment. Our experience also serves as testament that democracy does not come ready-made, nor is it a Utopian ideal. There is no express train to transport us to the final destination. Democratic advancement occurs only through constant and gradual endeavor, one step at a time.

In the initial stage of Taiwan's democratization—from lifting of the martial law, complete re-election of the national legislature to direct presidential election—we have vested sovereignty with the people and began fostering Taiwan's national identity. In the second stage, a greater emphasis is placed on the establishment of a civil society and on the rebuilding of unity through a sense of shared destiny.

From increased community and civic consciousness to broader participation in public affairs and national policymaking—including the holding of a referendum, the rights and duties of citizens in a civil society have been affirmed and further improved; and thereby, the development towards a more matured, rational, and responsive democracy. We must seek to establish a civil society, and through joint participation and collective efforts, to create an identity with this land and a common memory if we are to transcend the limitations of ethnicity, lineage, language and culture, and to build a new and unified sense of shared destiny.

In today's society, issues of identity and ethnicity are a serious matter that cannot be denied or deliberately overlooked. My colleagues and I, in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as the governing party, will lead the way in addressing such issues. We will take the first step and begin with candid self-reflection.

It was several hundred years ago that the generations before us traversed the "Black-water Channel" (Taiwan Strait) or crossed the great ocean to find a safe haven in Taiwan. No matter what year they arrived, regardless of their ancestral origins and their mother tongues, even in spite of their different hopes and dreams, all are our forefathers; all have settled down here and together faced a common destiny. Whether indigenous peoples or "new settlers," expatriates living abroad, foreign spouses or immigrant workers who labor under Taiwan's blazing sun—all have made a unique contribution to this land and each has become an indispensable member of our "New Taiwan" family.

Various ethnic groups, because of their disparate history and distinctive subcultures, understandably hold divergent views and values. Recognizing such inherent differences, we should embrace one another with more tolerance and understanding. The authoritarian government of the past exploited inequality among different ethnic groups, suppressing native languages and cultures. Nonetheless, we must acknowledge that except for a few individuals in power, members of all ethnic groups have been victimized. The February 28 Incident and the "White Terror," of which the victims include both the "Ben-sheng" (Taiwanese) and the "Wai-sheng" (Mainlanders), were not historical representations of subjugation by ethnic groups, rather, abuse of power by a ruling government.

The fabric of Taiwan society today is comprised mainly of diverse immigrant groups. It is not a minority-ruled colonial state; hence, no single ethnic group alone should undeservingly bear the burden of history. Presently, regardless of one's birthplace—be it Guangdong or Taitung, regardless of the origin of one's mother—be it Vietnam or Tainan, and regardless of whether an individual identifies with Taiwan or with the Republic of China, per se, a common destiny has bequeathed upon all of us the same parity and dignity. Therefore, let us relinquish our differentiation between native and foreign, and between minority and majority, for the most complimentary and accurate depiction of present-day Taiwan is of a people "ethnically diverse, but one as a nation." A shared sense of belonging has become the common denominator among all the 23 million people of Taiwan.

This year's presidential election was marked by an exceedingly spirited campaign, hitherto unseen in history. The close results have prompted opposition parties to question the process and file legal charges contesting the results of the vote. As the incumbent president, I have, with the utmost sincerity, expressed my highest respect for the independence and fairness of our judicial system. I have also vowed to accept the result of its investigation regardless of the final outcome. It is my firm belief that abiding by and acceptance of the rule of law is the only conduit through which we can resolve conflicts—for, if we were to rebuke the trust placed by the people in Taiwan's democracy and independent judiciaries, then the end result would be that "everyone loses." Today's timely spring shower will calm our spirits and clear our minds.

In a democratic system, scheduled elections are designed for the exercise of sovereignty by the people. They also provide a channel through which popular will and social values can be regularly reassessed. Fierce competition in the realm of politics forces politicians to undergo the most direct form of evaluation, which often serves as their greatest inspiration. My campaign, likewise, was subjected to rather tough scrutiny during the election, as was my administration, but we have learned and improved as a result. In any election, sharp differences among competing political factions are inevitable. This could include contrasting ideologies, disparity in policy platforms, even variation in methods used to mobilize supporters. However, a democratic election is not equal to a "winner takes all" wager; nor should it lead to purposefully fueled antagonism among voters. The checks and balances system of multi-party politics constitutes a solid framework for democratic governance. An accountable governing party and a loyal opposition, together, represent the voice of the people; both are political assets of a free nation and a free people. Be it the governing party or the opposition, their respective roles are inherently bestowed by the people with an opportunity as well as a responsibility.

In my opinion, the ultimate challenge of this past election lay not as much in garnering a mandate as in the post-election hurdle of how to scale the wall of antagonism, and, in finding ways to reconcile the deep divide caused by distrust. We must not allow the narrow margin of victory to become a source of greater conflict in society. Thus, I hereby pledge to listen, to understand, to abide by laws and reasoning, and to strive to unify the people of Taiwan—so as to dissipate the animosity engendered by the campaign and rebuild a "bridge of trust" between the governing and opposition parties.

Unite Taiwan, stabilize cross-strait relations, seek social harmony, and reinvigorate the economy. These are the earnest hopes of the people and the preeminent mission of my new administration. But none of these objectives can be accomplished through an individual effort, nor can one political party do it alone. I shall go to the people with my plea for support, just as I stand here today, calling on the opposition parties and the voices of public opinion to join me in this historic endeavor.

BELIEVE IN TAIWAN—We must continue to foster national competitiveness and cultivate an atmosphere of humanitarianism, environmental protection, and sustainable development. PERSIST WITH REFORM—We shall forge ahead in response to the people's demand for reform in our political and judicial system, in the educational system, and in our financial and fiscal infrastructures; for improvement in the quality of our media; and, for comprehensive social reform. We shall be empowered by our faith in Taiwan; and we shall persevere in striving to achieve our goals. The efforts put forth today will translate into an enduring legacy for the future generations: a just new Taiwan where social justice, economic justice, fairness in our judicial system, gender justice, and international justice are realized.

In our face-off with increasingly fierce and vigorous competition on the international front, coalescing the power of the people and working expeditiously to enhance the efficiency of government mechanisms—these are tasks vital to Taiwan's sustained development. Yet, we must bear in mind that historic and political circumstances confine us to an existing constitutional framework that now poses the most direct impediment to effective governance.

The Constitution stands as the supreme legal basis of a nation, symbolizing a paramount contract between the government and the people. Our current Constitution was promulgated under circumstances that were very different from the society we know today, and the majority of the articles in the Constitution no longer address the present—much less the future—needs of Taiwan. The promotion of constitutional re-engineering and the re-establishment of the constitutional order are tasks that correspond with the expectations of the people and are in accordance with the consensus shared by all political parties.

The constitutional re-engineering project aims to enhance good governance and increase administrative efficiency, to ensure a solid foundation for democratic rule of law, and to foster long-term stability and prosperity of the nation. There are many problems in our current Constitution that need to be tackled, amongst which the more immediate and obvious include: whether to have a three-branch or five-branch separation of power; whether to adopt a presidential or parliamentary system of government; whether the president should be elected by a relative majority or an absolute majority; reform of the national legislature and relevant articles; the role of the National Assembly and its retainment versus abolishment; whether to suspend or abolish the provincial government; lowering of voting age; modification of compulsory military service requirements; protection of basic human rights and the rights of the disadvantaged; and, principles governing the running of the national economy. Indeed, this will be a project of grand scale that is certain to have significant impact.

To avoid repeating the same mistakes by past administrations—six rounds of constitutional amendments in ten years time—the proposed constitutional reform project must not be monopolized by one person or by a single political party, nor should it be undertaken merely for the short-term. In the future, we will invite members of the ruling party and the opposition parties, as well as legal experts, academic scholars and representatives from all fields and spanning all social classes, to collaborate in forming a "Constitutional Reform Committee." Our aim will be to generate the highest level of social consensus on the scope and procedure of the constitutional reform, all of which are to be open to public scrutiny.

By the time I complete my presidency in 2008, I hope to hand to the people of Taiwan and to our country a new version of our Constitution—one that is timely, relevant and viable—this is my historic responsibility and my commitment to the people. In the same context, I am fully aware that consensus has yet to be reached on issues related to national sovereignty, territory and the subject of unification/independence; therefore, let me explicitly propose that these particular issues be excluded from the present constitutional re-engineering project. Procedurally, we shall follow the rules set out in the existing Constitution and its amendments. Accordingly, after the passage by the national legislature, members of the first and also the last Ad Hoc National Assembly will be elected and charged with the task of adopting the constitutional reform proposal as passed by the legislature, abolishing the National Assembly, and incorporating into the Constitution the people's right to referendum on constitutional revision. By so doing, we hope to lay a solid foundation for the long-term development of our constitutional democracy, and the people's right to referendum on legislative proposals for constitutional revision.

During the last four years, we have witnessed dramatic political and economic changes in the world. Taiwan, in the face of a new international order, must stand firm yet persevere in our ongoing quest to become a better and stronger nation. We must also endeavor to re-position ourselves in equilibrium between global competition and international cooperation.

Taiwan's long-term friendship with the United States, Japan and our allies in the world has been founded on the safeguarding of our common interests. More importantly, it is an alliance of core values that we share: freedom, democracy, human rights and peace.

Taiwan's democratic development, and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, remains a focal point of international attention. On behalf of our government and people, I would like to once again express our heartfelt gratitude for the friendship that has been extended to us—reminding me of the old adage "together though apart." The people of Taiwan embrace peace. Needless to say, Taiwan's national security is of greater concern to us than to anyone else in the world. Faced with an ever-increasing military threat from across the Strait, it is imperative for all the people, including political adversaries, to forge a strong will to defend ourselves, proactively strengthening our defense equipment and upgrading our self-defense capabilities. It is our sincere hope that our friends in the international arena will continue to render their valuable attention and assistance to the cause of peace in the Taiwan Strait and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region. Let us take this opportunity to give a warm round of applause to our international allies for their friendship and dedication.

Taiwan stands ready to continue in its role as active participant and contributor to international society—this is the right of Taiwan's 23 million people; likewise, it is our duty as citizens of the world community. In the global campaign against terrorism, Taiwan has never been absent. In international humanitarian assistance efforts, Taiwan has always been there. Other recent accomplishments include the founding of the Pacific Democratic Alliance and the establishment of the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. We can show a vigorous record of participation in international non-governmental organizations (NGO's), in addition to our collaboration with other members of the global village in advocacy and defense of the universal values of freedom, democracy and human rights.

At present, Taiwan is the world's fifteenth largest trading nation, with high rankings in international competitiveness. Yet, it took twelve years of strenuous effort for Taiwan to become the 144th member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). We are still fighting relentlessly to join the World Health Organization (WHO). Last year's outbreak of the SARS epidemic has taught the world a hard lesson, that we are all equals in sickness and disease. Nevertheless, despite the WHO's creed that health care—encompassing medicine, public health and disease control—is a basic human right and should heed no borders, Taiwan remains unjustly locked out. Let us come together in a continuous effort toward our goal to join the World Health Organization in two years.

Not long ago, the European Union (EU) welcomed the accession of ten new member states. Following several decades of effort, with respect to each individual country and by the free choice of citizens, the EU has successfully integrated the common interests of the people of Europe. Such a valuable experience has far-reaching implications and will impact world order in this new century. From this we see that regional integration is not merely an ongoing but also a future trend. This trend, in addition to globalization, has led to fundamental changes in the conventional thinking of national sovereignty and territorial boundaries, such that envisioning "universal harmony" will no longer be an intangible ideal.

With the new century upon us, let the leaders on both sides of the Strait, in striving to attain the greatest welfare for their peoples, heed this new trend by adopting a brand new frame of mind—together, let us take a fresh, unparalleled approach in addressing future cross-strait issues.

The peoples on both sides share a common ancestral, cultural and historical heritage. In the past century, both have endured the repression of foreign powers and the domination of authoritarian rule. Both our peoples now share an indomitable resolve to stand up and be the masters of their own destiny, a sentiment that is worthy of our full, mutual understanding.

We can understand why the government on the other side of the Strait, in light of historical complexities and ethnic sentiments, cannot relinquish the insistence on the "One China Principle." By the same token, the Beijing authorities must understand the deep conviction held by the people of Taiwan to strive for democracy, to love peace, to pursue their dreams free from threat, and, to embrace progress. But if the other side is unable to comprehend that this honest and simple wish represents the aspiration of Taiwan's 23 million people, if it continues to threaten Taiwan with military force, if it persists in isolating Taiwan diplomatically, if it keeps up irrational efforts to blockade Taiwan's rightful participation in the international arena, this will only serve to drive the hearts of the Taiwanese people further away and widen the divide in the Strait.

The Republic of China now exists in Taiwan, Penghu (The Pescadores), Kinmen and Matsu. This is a fact. Taiwan's existence as a member of international society is also a fact. Such realities cannot be negated by anyone for any reason—for therein lies the collective will of the people of Taiwan. A half century of toil and labor by the people of this land has culminated in what is now known as the "Taiwan Experience," the fruits of which validate the existence of the Republic of China and, what is more, have become the proud assets, not only of the peoples on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, but of all Chinese societies.

History has given rise to the development of two very different political systems as well as two dissimilar ways of life on either side of the Taiwan Strait. However, if we make a concerted effort to find some positive aspect of our differences and commonalities, perhaps we shall discover a wonderful opportunity, a catalyst for building a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship. Taiwan is a completely free and democratic society. Neither single individual nor political party can make the ultimate choice for the people. If both sides are willing, on the basis of goodwill, to create an environment engendered upon "peaceful development and freedom of choice," then in the future, the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China—or Taiwan and China—can seek to establish relations in any form whatsoever. We would not exclude any possibility, so long as there is the consent of the 23 million people of Taiwan.

For more than a decade, interaction between the peoples on both sides has grown closer and more intense. This development bears great significance and increases the importance of furthering cross-strait relations. In the future, we hope to continue pushing forth current liberalization measures while expanding cross-strait exchange across the spectrum—from journalism and information to education and culture, to economics and trade—and to promote the establishment of channels for resuming cross-strait dialogue and communication. By building bridges, we will aim to close gaps and establish a foundation for mutual trust.

The first two decades of this century will be a crucial time for Taiwan to pursue a comprehensive program of upgrading and transformation; it also represents an opportune moment in history for Mainland China to move forward with democratization and liberalization. Therefore, governments on both sides should seize this timely opportunity to take on the challenges of global competition, advocating for progress and development instead of dwelling on the impasse of political debate. We have taken note that Chinese Communist Party leaders repeatedly emphasize the importance of steady development for the welfare of Mainland China's 1.3 billion people, hence, the espousal of "peaceful emergence" as its tone for developing international relations. We have no doubt the Beijing authorities recognize that maintaining the peaceful status quo in the Taiwan Strait is of vital importance to sustainable development for our respective sides and for the stability of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

It is my belief that both sides must demonstrate a dedicated commitment to national development, and through consultation, establish a dynamic "peace and stability framework" for interactions; that we must work together to guarantee there will be no unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; and, additionally, we must further promote cultural, economic and trade exchanges—including the three links—for only in so doing can we ensure the welfare of our peoples while fulfilling the expectations of the international community.

As the President of the Republic of China, I have been mandated by the people of Taiwan to defend the sovereignty, security and dignity of this nation, to chart our country's sustainable development, to safeguard peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, to seek consensus and garner the collective support of all the people, and to carefully manage future relations across the Strait. Today I would like to reaffirm the promises and principles set forth in my inaugural speech in 2000. Those commitments have been honored—they have not changed over the past four years, nor will they change in the next four years. Upon this foundation, my next step will be to invite both the governing and opposition parties, in conjunction with representatives from various walks of the society, to participate in the establishment of a "Committee for Cross-Strait Peace and Development," combining the collective insight and wisdom of all parties and our citizenry, to draft the "Guidelines for Cross-Strait Peace and Development." The goal will be to pave the way for formulating a new relationship of cross-strait peace, stability and sustainable development.

Honorable guests and fellow citizens, if we look at a map of the world, Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu may seem like a tiny cluster of islands in the margins of the Pacific Rim. However, if you take a closer look, what you will discover are orchestral mountain ranges, painted with singing rivers, adorning some of the world's most bountiful ecological landscapes. Amidst the lush forestry and abundant wildlife, there is a human chain linking together 23 million warm smiles descended from an ethnic rainbow, with a history that spans across centuries and reflects a myriad of cultural heritage juxtaposed with political evolution and economic transformation—enough to fill an encyclopedia. Taiwan is a tolerant, oceanic country, a small but proud island connected to all corners of the world. Galvanizing these attributes will empower us to expand our visions and unleash our minds far beyond the horizon.

The story of Taiwan touches people's hearts. But, what inspires awe, more than its natural beauty, is the coloring that reflects the triumphant experience of overcoming hardship, trials and tribulations. This is the "Spirit of Taiwan," a gift passed through the generations, a glow which emits from the faces of the Taiwan people.

Now, the torch of history has once again been passed into my hand; each of you also holds the torch in your hands. I have set a goal for myself, that, during the next four years, I will continue to uphold the principles of sincerity and honesty, compassion and benevolence, unselfishness and impartiality in leading our country down the "middle road." I ask my fellow compatriots to stand by me in this endeavor. I will be counting on your support and encouragement.

I am just an ordinary man. I have always believed that there is no such thing as a great president, for only a great people can create a great country. Fueled by the power of the people, let us work together. Together, let us lay the foundation for our long-term national development—for sustainable democracy, sustainable reforms, sustainable humanities, and sustainable peace. Let Taiwan, the Republic of China, work toward solidarity and harmony, fairness and justice, prosperity and equality. History has endowed upon me this responsibility. It is a mission entrusted to me by the people.

On February 28 of this year, more than one million people stood on the land of Formosa, irrespective of ethnic affiliation, age, or gender. Hand in hand, they formed a mesmerizing "wall of democracy" some five hundred kilometers long, spanning the full length of the island and completing a breathtaking portrait of Taiwan. The time has come for Taiwan to stand tall, to reach out with courage and conviction. Let us mark a sustainable and firm place in the world.

My fellow citizens, let us be thankful for this land and let us pay tribute to the greatness of the people. We must unite for the sake of Taiwan. Together, we must defend our Taiwan, as we stride proudly forward into the twenty-first century. Once again let us hand-in-hand author the next chapter in this most inspirational story of twenty-first-century Taiwan.

Finally, let us wish the Republic of China great prosperity. And to all my fellow citizens, dear friends and honorable guests, may health and happiness be with you always.

Thank you.

TOP   HOME    [◆ Directory Inaugural Addresses]    [Chen 2004]


【中華民國第十一任總統陳水扁就職演說 全文】

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中華民國各位友邦元首、使節及代表團、各位貴賓 、親愛的國人同胞：

感謝來自海內外的各位貴賓，共同參與中華民國第十一任總統、副總統的就職大典。今天我們在這裡所見證的，是台灣民主前進的腳步，也是兩千三百萬人民共同寫下的一個難能可貴的故事。

在此歡欣的國家慶典中，個人承受人民所賦予的莊嚴使命。此時此刻，在我的心中與腦海浮現的並不是華麗的讚詞，而是更大的責任、更多的謙卑、更深的省思。

在二十世紀的最後一年，台灣跨越了首次政黨輪替的歷史門檻，邁向民主發展的新里程。隨著新舊世紀的交替，我們同時走過一段崎嶇艱難的民主道路。在世紀首航的驚濤駭浪之中，舊有與新生並存、脆弱與堅強共生、危機與轉機同在。

對於華人社會以及其他的新興民主國家而言，台灣的民主不僅是一個試煉、也是一個示範。西方的民主政治經過千錘百鍊才有今日的水準，身為年輕的民主國家，歷經挫折磨練的台灣經驗更顯得彌足珍貴。台灣的經驗證明：民主不是坐享其成的烏托邦，也沒有一步到位的直達車，必須一點一滴的耕耘，才有一步一腳印的前進。

在第一波的民主化過程當中，從解除戒嚴、國會全面改選到總統直接民選，我們確立了主權在民的價值觀以及台灣的主體性。第二波的民主工程，重點在於公民社會的建立以及國家共同體的再造。

從社區公民意識的形成，到國家公共政策的參與，包括公民投票的實踐，都是公民社會權利義務的確認和提升，也促使我們發展更成熟、理性、負責的民主內涵。透過公民社會的建立，經由偕同參與、集體創造的土地認同與共同記憶，才能超越族群、血緣、語言、文化的侷限，邁向一個新的國家共同體的重建。

當前的台灣社會確實存在認同與族群的嚴肅課題，我們不需要掩飾，更不能夠漠視。身為執政者，包括阿扁個人和民主進步黨，都願意率先反省、坦誠面對，並且尋求有效的化解。

回想數百年前，我們的祖先跨越黑水溝，渡海來台尋找安身立命的所在。不論先來後到，儘管來自不同的地方，使用不同的語言，甚至懷抱不同的理想，最後都在這裡落地生根，彼此命運相同、休戚與共。不管是原住民、新住民、旅居海外的僑胞、注入新血的外籍配偶，包括在相同的太陽底下辛勤流汗的外籍勞工，都對這一塊土地有不可抹滅的奉獻，也都是台灣新家庭不可或缺的一部份。

不同的族群或許因為歷史記憶與民族情感而有認同的差異，但是彼此應該相互包容、用心理解。在過去威權戒嚴的時代，曾經存在族群地位的不平等和語言文化的壓抑，但是我們必須認知的是，除了極少數的當權者之外，所有的族群都是相同的受害者。在二二八事件和白色恐怖當中，受難者同時包括本省籍和外省籍，其成因要歸咎於當權者權力的濫用，而非族群的壓迫。

台灣是一個多數移民的社會，不是少數殖民統治的國家，沒有任何一個族群應該背負莫須有的歷史包袱。在今日的台灣，不管你出生在廣東或者台東，不管我們的母親來自越南或者台南，每一個人都擁有同樣的地位和尊嚴。阿扁認為，不管是認同台灣或者認同中華民國，其實都是相同的歸屬。「族群多元、國家一體」是台灣這一塊土地上最美好完整的圖像，沒有本土和外來之分，也沒有少數和多數之別，兩千三百萬台灣人民應該是一個命運相同、榮辱與共的整數。

這一次的總統大選空前的激烈，選舉結果揭曉之後，在野黨的候選人提出了質疑和訴訟。身為現任的總統，阿扁以最大的誠意表達完全尊重司法的獨立公正，不論結果如何，個人絕對願意坦然接受。阿扁相信，遵循法治、信任司法是解決爭端唯一的路，如果因為一次的選舉而推翻了人民對民主法治與司法獨立的信任，最後只會導致全民皆輸的結果。

今天的下雨來得正是時候，讓我們的激情降溫，讓我們冷靜下來，也讓我們頭腦更加清楚。

民主政治定期選舉的設計，除了實踐主權在民的原理之外，也是人民意向與社會價值的具體檢視。激烈的競爭，可以對政治人物有最直接的檢驗和啟示。包括阿扁個人以及執政的團隊，都在這次的選舉當中接受最嚴格的考驗，並且因此而反省改進。不同的陣營之間，難免有理念的差異、政策的辯論，甚至民眾的動員，但是，民主選舉的結果，不是成王敗寇的結局，更不應該演變為民眾之間的對立。政黨政治監督制衡的設計，乃是民主健全的根基。負責的執政黨以及忠誠的反對黨，都代表國民意志的一部分，也都是國家人民的政治資產。不管扮演執政或者在野的角色，都是人民所賜與的一個機會，也是一個責任。

個人認為，此次選舉最終的考驗，已經不是跨越多數門檻的問題，而是朝野全民如何跨過對立的圍牆、如何超越信任的鴻溝。不能夠因為選票的距離拉近，而使得社會的矛盾擴大。縱使無法消弭於一時，個人仍將繼續秉持「傾聽、理解、法理、團結」的用心，弭平選舉的對立、重建朝野的信任。

團結台灣、穩定兩岸、安定社會、繁榮經濟，這些都是當前人民殷切的期待，也是政府未來施政的首要。其中任何一項，都不是一人、一黨所能獨力完成，所以我要懇請在野政黨以及社會輿論共同支持鞭策，更要祈求人民賜給阿扁力量。

相信台灣，必須持續創造國家的競爭力，打造一個人文關懷、生態環保的永續家園。堅持改革，是要讓政治、司法、教育、金融、財政、媒體及社會的改革，回應人民長久的期待。相信就有力量，堅持才能實現理想。現在付出的一切努力，是要讓我們的下一代生活在一個符合社會正義、經濟正義、司法正義、性別正義、以及國際正義的公義新台灣。

當前，台灣面對全面、激烈、快速的國際競爭，如何凝聚全民的力量，進一步提升政府的效能已經是攸關國家發展的當務之急。但是，由於特殊的國情以及歷史的因素，使得政府效能的改造，立即面臨憲政體制的難題。

憲法是國家的根本大法，也是政府與人民的契約書。我國憲法囿於當初制訂的時空背景，絕大多數的條文早已不符台灣當前及未來所需。推動憲政改造的工程，重建憲政秩序，不僅是人民的期望，也已經獲得朝野政黨的共識。

憲政改造的工程是為了政府的良好管理及效能的提升、為了確立民主法治的根基，更是為了國家的長治久安。其中，立即而明顯的問題包括：三權分立或五權憲法、總統制或內閣制、總統選制為相對多數或絕對多數、國會改革及相關的配套條文、國民大會的定位與存廢、省政府組織的存廢、投票年齡的降低、兵役制度的調整、基本人權與弱勢權益的保障、國民經濟條款……等，可以說是工程浩大、影響至深。

為了避免重蹈過去十年內六次修憲的覆轍，憲政改造的工程不應該由一人或一黨主導，更不能只著眼於一時之便。未來，我們將邀請朝野政黨、法界、學界及各領域階層的代表，共同籌組憲政改造委員會，針對憲政改造的範圍及程序尋求社會最大的共識，並且接受人民及輿論的監督。

在 2008 年阿扁卸任總統之前，能夠交給台灣人民及我們的國家一部合時、合身、合用的新憲法，這是阿扁對歷史的責任，也是對人民的承諾。基於相同的責任與承諾，阿扁也深切瞭解，涉及國家主權、領土及統獨的議題，目前在台灣社會尚未形成絕大多數的共識，所以個人明確的建議這些議題不宜在此次憲改的範圍之內。至於首次憲改的程序，我們仍將依循現行憲法及增修條文的規定，經由國會通過之後，選出第一屆也是最後一屆的任務型國代，同時完成憲政改造、廢除國大、以及公投入憲，為民主憲政長遠的發展及未來人民公投複決國會憲改提案奠定開闊的基石。

過去四年，全球政經情勢產生明顯的變化，台灣面對國際新秩序的變動，除了必須自我提升、站穩腳步之外，在全球化的競爭與國際的合作之間，也必須尋求新的立足點。

長久以來，台灣與美、日及許多國際友邦的友誼基礎，不僅在於維護共同的利益，更重要的是建立在自由、民主、人權與和平的「價值同盟」關係。

台灣的民主發展與台海的和平穩定，一直備受國際關注。對於這些天涯若比鄰的友誼，個人要代表我國政府及人民再一次表達由衷的感謝。台灣人民愛好和平，我們絕對比任何人更關心自己的國家安全，面對海峽對岸持續增加的武力威脅，朝野全民應該凝聚堅強的國防意識，積極強化有效的防備，提升自我防衛的能力，也盼望國際社會繼續關注並協助維護台海的和平與亞太地區的穩定。

在此，阿扁號召大家、朝野全民以熱烈的掌聲感謝國際友邦的友誼及真情。

台灣願意持續以積極奉獻的角色參與國際社會，這是兩千三百萬人民應有的權利，也是我們做為世界公民的義務。在全球反恐的浪潮以及國際人道援助的行列中，台灣一直沒有缺席。過去這幾年，我們籌設民主太平洋聯盟、成立民主基金會，積極參與國際非政府組織，與地球村的其他成員共同分享並維護自由、民主、人權的普世價值。

台灣目前是世界第十五大貿易國，各項國際競爭力的評比都名列前茅，我們仍然經過十二年的努力，才得以成為世界貿易組織的第 144 個會員國，其中的艱辛不可言喻。如今，我們仍在鍥而不捨的努力加入世界衛生組織。去年 SARS 疫情蔓延的殷鑑不遠，基於醫療、衛生、防疫無國界以及基本人權的普世價值，台灣理應獲得更公平的對待。

在此，阿扁呼籲大家，我們更應團結同心，繼續努力，希望在未來兩年之內完成加入世界衛生組織的心願。

不久之前，歐洲聯盟熱烈的慶祝十個新會員國的加入。歐盟經過數十年的努力，在尊重個別國家及其人民自由意志的選擇之下，成功整合了歐洲人民共同利益的寶貴經驗，對於新世紀的全球局勢產生巨大的影響和衝擊。區域整合不僅是當前、也是未來的趨勢。這種區域整合加上全球化的發展，使得人類社會原有的國家主權原理，乃至於國界的藩籬，都產生結構性的變化。世界大同已經不是遙不可及的夢想。

海峽兩岸新世紀的領導人，為了創造人民最大的福祉，應該都能前瞻這個新趨勢，並且以全新的思維和格局，共同來面對和處理兩岸未來的問題。

兩岸人民曾經擁有共同的血緣、文化和歷史背景，過去一個世紀以來也都遭逢強權的欺凌和專制的統治。如今，兩岸人民都有站起來當家作主的堅強意願，這一點應該能夠獲得彼此充分的理解。

我們可以體會海峽對岸源於歷史情結與民族情感，無法放棄對於「一個中國原則」的堅持。相對的，北京當局也應該要充分瞭解，台灣人民要民主、愛和平、求生存、求發展的堅定信念。如果對岸不能夠體會兩千三百萬人民單純良善的心願，繼續對台灣施加武力的威脅和政治的孤立，無理的將台灣阻絕於國際社會之外，只會讓台灣的民心和海峽的對岸越離越遠。

中華民國在台澎金馬存在、台灣在國際社會存在的事實，不容許任何人以任何理由加以否定，這就是台灣人民集體意志之所在。過去半個世紀以來，兩千三百萬人民胼手胝足所創造的台灣經驗，不僅印證了中華民國存在的正面價值，也應該是華人社會及兩岸人民的共同資產。

歷史的緣故讓兩岸發展出相當不同的政治制度和生活方式，但是如果以積極的態度來看待兩岸發展的「異」與「同」，應該可以善加利用，走向進一步合作互惠的關係。台灣是一個完全自由民主的社會，沒有任何個人或政黨可以代替人民做出最後的選擇。如果兩岸之間能夠本於善意，共同營造一個「和平發展、自由選擇」的環境，未來中華民國與中華人民共和國或者台灣與中國之間，將發展任何形式的關係，只要兩千三百萬台灣人民同意，我們都不排除。

過去十幾年兩岸人民的互動交流，已經發展出極為密切的關係，對於兩岸關係的進展具有重要的價值與意義。未來，我們希望在既有的基礎之上，持續放寬並且擴大兩岸新聞、資訊、教育、文化、經貿交流的相關措施，推動兩岸恢復對話與溝通的管道，如此才能拉近彼此的距離，建立互信的基礎。

二十一世紀的前二十年，不僅是台灣要全面向上提升的關鍵轉型期，也是中國大陸邁向民主化及自由化的機遇期，雙方的政府理應掌握機會全力打拼，放眼於全球競爭的趨勢，不要再虛耗於政治爭辯的僵局。我們已經注意到，中共的領導人近來一再強調穩定發展的重要，強調十三億大陸人民的福祉，並且選擇「和平崛起」做為拓展國際關係的基調。我們也相信，北京當局應該認知維持台海和平的現狀，對於兩岸各自的發展以及亞太區域穩定的重要性。

個人深信，唯有兩岸致力於建設與發展，協商建立一個動態的和平穩定互動架構，共同確保台海的現狀不被片面改變，並且進一步推動包括三通在內的文化經貿往來，才能符合兩岸人民的福祉與國際社會的期待。

身為中華民國的總統，接受台灣人民的付託，個人必須捍衛國家的主權、安全與尊嚴，兼顧國家的永續發展及台海的和平穩定，匯聚全民的意志和共識，妥善處理兩岸未來的關係。今天，個人願意在此重申，公元 2000 年 520 就職演說所揭櫫的原則和承諾，過去四年沒有改變，未來四年也不會改變。在此基礎之上，阿扁將進一步邀集朝野政黨及社會各界共同參與，成立「兩岸和平發展委員會」，凝聚朝野的智慧與全民的共識，擬定「兩岸和平發展綱領」，共同策進兩岸和平穩定、永續發展的新關係。

各位貴賓、親愛的國人同胞，攤開世界地圖來看，台澎金馬只是太平洋邊的幾個小島，但是如果仔細檢視這些島嶼上美麗的山河、多元的族群、多樣的生態，細數兩千三百萬人民過去幾個世紀所寫下的政治、經濟、文化篇章，你會發現猶如進入一部精彩豐富的百科全書。海洋國家的包容，世界島的開闊，讓這一塊土地上的子民，視野和胸懷隨著地平線無限的延伸。

台灣的故事所以動人，不是因為天生麗質，而是歷經挫折砥礪、苦難錘鍊之後，所蘊含散發的光彩。這就是「台灣精神」，從我們的祖先一直流傳到我們每一個人的身上。

如今，歷史的火炬再一次交到阿扁的手上，也握在每一位國人同胞的手中。未來四年，阿扁自我期許能夠做到講誠信、存慈悲、大公無私、中道治國，更希望國人同胞給我支持、給我鞭策。

阿扁是一個平凡的人，我一直相信，沒有偉大的總統，只有偉大的人民可以成就偉大的國家。援引人民的力量，為民主永續、改革永續、人文永續、和平永續的國家發展奠基，讓台灣中華民國邁向團結和諧、公平正義、富足均衡、生生不息，這是歷史賦予阿扁的責任，也是人民交付的使命。

今年的 228，上百萬的民眾站在福爾摩沙這一塊土地上，不分族群、年齡、性別，手牽著手，築成一座長達五百公里的民主長城，完成一幅最美的台灣圖像。台灣不但要站起來，還要勇敢的走出去，在世界地圖上永續發展、屹立不搖。

親愛的國人同胞，讓我們一起對土地感恩、向人民致敬！讓我們繼續團結台灣、守護台灣、牽手向前，再一次寫下二十一世紀動人的台灣故事。

最後，敬祝中華民國國運昌隆！各位鄉親朋友及各位嘉賓健康快樂！

謝謝大家！

TOP   HOME    [◆ Directory Inaugural Addresses]    [Chen 2004]

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2008—Ma Ying-jeou

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Heads of State of Our Diplomatic Allies, Distinguished Guests, Overseas Compatriots, My Fellow Taiwanese, and Dear Friends in front of a Television Set or Computer: Good Morning!

I. Historical Significance of the Second Turnover of Power

Earlier this year on March 22, through the presidential election of the Republic of China, the people changed the course of their future. Today we are here not to celebrate the victory of a particular party or individual, but to witness Taiwan pass a historic milestone.

Taiwan's democracy has been treading down a rocky road, but now it has finally won the chance to enter a smoother path. During that difficult time, political trust was low, political maneuvering was high, and economic security was gone. Support for Taiwan from abroad had suffered an all-time low. Fortunately, the growing pains of Taiwan's democracy did not last long compared to those of other young democracies. Through these growing pains, Taiwan's democracy matured as one can see by the clear choice the people made at this critical moment. The people have chosen clean politics, an open economy, ethnic harmony, and peaceful cross-strait relations to open their arms to the future.

Above all, the people have rediscovered Taiwan's traditional core values of benevolence, righteousness, diligence, honesty, generosity and industriousness. This remarkable experience has let Taiwan become "a beacon of democracy to Asia and the world." We, the people of Taiwan, should be proud of ourselves. The Republic of China is now a democracy respected by the international community.

Yet we are still not content. We must better Taiwan's democracy, enrich its substance, and make it more perfect. To accomplish this, we can rely on the Constitution to protect human rights, uphold law and order, make justice independent and impartial, and breathe new life into civil society. Taiwan's democracy should not be marred by illegal eavesdropping, arbitrary justice, and political interference in the media or electoral institutions. All of us share this vision for the next phase of political reform.

On the day of Taiwan's presidential election, hundreds of millions of ethnic Chinese worldwide watched the ballot count on TV and the Internet. Taiwan is the sole ethnic Chinese society to complete a second democratic turnover of power. Ethnic Chinese communities around the world have laid their hopes on this crucial political experiment. By succeeding, we can make unparalleled contributions to the democratic development of all ethnic Chinese communities. This responsibility is ours to fulfill.

II. Mission of the New Era

The new administration's most urgent task is to lead Taiwan through the daunting challenges from globalization. The world economy is changing profoundly, and newly emerging countries are arising rapidly. We must upgrade Taiwan's international competitiveness and recover lost opportunities. The uncertainty of the current global economy poses as the main challenge to the revitalization of Taiwan's economy. Yet, we firmly believe that, with right policies and steadfast determination, our goals are within our grasp.

Islands like Taiwan flourish in an open economy and wither in a closed one. This has been true throughout history. Therefore, we must open up and deregulate the economy to unleash the vitality of the private sector. This will strengthen Taiwan's comparative advantages. Taiwan's enterprises should be encouraged to establish themselves at home, network throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and position themselves globally. Taiwan's labor force must learn to adapt to rapid technological changes and industrial restructuring. Our youth must develop character, a sense of civic duty, global perspectives and lifelong learning capabilities. All forms of political interference in education must be eradicated. In this era of globalization, the government must satisfy the basic needs of the underprivileged and create opportunities for them to develop. While pursuing growth, we must seek environmental sustainability for Taiwan and the rest of the world.

The new administration must also restore political ethics to regain the people's trust in the government. We will endeavor to create an environment that is humane, rational and pluralistic—one that fosters political reconciliation and co-existence. We will promote harmony among sub-ethnic groups and between the old and new immigrants, encourage healthy competition in politics, and respect the media's monitoring of the government and freedom of the press.

The new administration will push for clean politics and set strict standards for the integrity and efficiency of officials. It also will provide a code for the interaction between the public and private sectors to prevent money politics. I hope every civil servant will keep in mind: "Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." The KMT will honor its sincere commitment to accountability in governance. The new government will be for all the people, remain non-partisan and uphold administrative neutrality. The government will not stand in the way of social progress, but rather serve as the engine that drives it.

As President of the Republic of China, my most solemn duty is to safeguard the Constitution. In a young democracy, respecting the Constitution is more important than amending it. My top priority is to affirm the authority of the Constitution and show the value of abiding by it. Serving by example, I will follow the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, especially the separation of powers. We must ensure that the government is based on the rule of law. The Executive Yuan must answer to the Legislative Yuan. The Judiciary must guarantee the rule of law and protect human rights. The Examination Yuan must make the civil service sound. The Control Yuan must redress mistakes by the government and censure malfeasance by civil servants. All told, we must take this opportunity to re-establish a robust constitutional tradition.

Taiwan has to be a respectable member of the global village. Dignity, autonomy, pragmatism and flexibility should be Taiwan's guiding principles when developing foreign relations. As a world citizen, the Republic of China will accept its responsibilities in promoting free trade, nonproliferation, anti-global warming measures, counter-terrorism, humanitarian aid, and other global commons. Taiwan must play a greater role in regional cooperation. By strengthening economic relations with its major trading partners, Taiwan can better integrate itself in East Asia and contribute more to the region's peace and prosperity.

We will strengthen bilateral relations with the United States, our foremost security ally and trading partner. Taiwan will continue to cherish its diplomatic allies and honor its commitments to them. We will expand cooperation with like-minded countries. On top of that, we will rationalize our defense budget and acquire necessary defensive weaponry to form a solid national defense force. At the same time, we are committed to cross-strait peace and regional stability. The Republic of China must restore its reputation in the international community as a peace-maker.

I sincerely hope that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can seize this historic opportunity to achieve peace and co-prosperity. Under the principle of "no unification, no independence and no use of force," as Taiwan's mainstream public opinion holds it, and under the framework of the ROC Constitution, we will maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In 1992, the two sides reached a consensus on "one China, respective interpretations." Many rounds of negotiation were then completed, spurring the development of cross-strait relations. I want to reiterate that, based on the "1992 Consensus," negotiations should resume at the earliest time possible. As proposed in the Boao Forum on April 12 of this year, let's "face reality, pioneer a new future, shelve controversies and pursue a win-win solution." This will allow us to strike a balance as each pursues its own interests. The normalization of economic and cultural relations is the first step to a win-win solution. Accordingly, we are ready to resume consultations. It is our expectation that, with the start of direct charter flights on weekends and the arrival of mainland tourists in early July this year, we will launch a new era of cross-strait relations.

We will also enter consultations with mainland China over Taiwan's international space and a possible cross-strait peace accord. Taiwan doesn't just want security and prosperity. It wants dignity. Only when Taiwan is no longer being isolated in the international arena can cross-strait relations move forward with confidence. We have taken note that Mr. Hu Jintao has recently spoken on cross-strait relations three times: first, in a conversation of March 26 with US President George W. Bush on the "1992 Consensus"; second, in his proposed "four continuations" on April 12 at the Boao Forum; and third, on April 29 when he called for "building mutual trust, shelving controversies, finding commonalities despite differences, and creating together a win-win solution" across the Taiwan Strait. His views are very much in line with our own. Here I would like to call upon the two sides to pursue reconciliation and truce in both cross-strait and international arenas. We should help and respect each other in international organizations and activities. In light of our common Chinese heritage, people on both sides should do their utmost to jointly contribute to the international community without engaging in vicious competition and the waste of resources. I firmly believe that Taiwan and mainland China are open minded enough to find a way to attain peace and co-prosperity.

In resolving cross-strait issues, what matters is not sovereignty but core values and way of life. We care about the welfare of the 1.3 billion people of mainland China, and hope that mainland China will continue to move toward freedom, democracy and prosperity for all the people. This would pave the way for the long-term peaceful development of cross-strait relations.

The damage from the recent earthquake in Sichuan was shocking. All Taiwanese have expressed deep concern and offered immediate emergency assistance. We offer our deepest condolences to the earthquake victims and pay homage to the rescue workers. May the reconstruction of the affected area be completed at the earliest time possible!

III. Taiwan's Legacy and Vision

Upon being sworn in, I had an epiphany about the significance of accepting responsibility for the 23 million people of Taiwan. Although I have never felt so honored in my life, this is the heaviest responsibility that I have ever shouldered. Taiwan is not my birthplace, but it is where I was raised and the resting place of my family. I am forever grateful to society for accepting and nurturing this post-war immigrant. I will protect Taiwan with all my heart and resolutely move forward. I'll do my very best!

For over four centuries, this island of ours has welcomed waves of immigrants, nurturing and sheltering us all. It has provided us, our children and grandchildren, and the generations to come a safe haven. With its lofty mountains and vast oceans, Taiwan has invigorated us in mind and spirit. The cultural legacies we inherited over time not only survive on this land, but flourish and evolve, creating a pluralistic and vigorous human landscape.

The Republic of China was reborn on Taiwan. During my presidency, we will celebrate the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China. This democratic republic, the very first in Asia, spent a short 38 years on the Chinese mainland, but has spent nearly 60 years in Taiwan. During these last six decades, the destinies of the Republic of China and Taiwan have been closely intertwined. Together, the two have experienced times good and bad. On the jagged path toward democracy, the ROC has made great strides. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's dream for a constitutional democracy was not realized on the Chinese mainland, but today it has taken root, blossomed and borne fruit in Taiwan.

I am confident about Taiwan's future. Over the years, I have traveled to every corner of the island and talked with people from all walks of life. What impressed me most was that the traditional core values of benevolence, righteousness, diligence, honesty, generosity and industriousness could be seen everywhere in the words and deeds of the Taiwanese people regardless of their location and age. These values have long been ingrained in their character. This is the wellspring of our progress, also lauded as the "Taiwan Spirit."

One can see that Taiwan is blessed with an excellent geographic location, precious cultural assets, a maturing democracy, innovative entrepreneurship, a pluralistic society, active civic groups, patriotic overseas compatriots, and new immigrants from all over the world. We should couple the "Taiwan Spirit" with our comparative advantages and the principle of "putting Taiwan first for the benefit of the people." This way we can transform our homeland—Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu—the envy of the world.

To revive Taiwan requires the efforts of both the government and the people. We need the expertise of the private sector, cooperation among all political parties, and participation by all the people. My dear compatriots, from this moment on, we must roll up our sleeves to build up our homeland. Together, we can lay a solid foundation of peace and prosperity for our children, grandchildren and the generations to come. Let's work hand in hand for our future!

My dear compatriots, please join me:

Long live Taiwan's democracy!

Long live the Republic of China!

Thank you!

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【中華民國第十二任總統馬英九就職演說 全文】

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

各位友邦元首、各位貴賓、各位僑胞、各位鄉親父老、各位電視機前與網路上的朋友，大家早安，大家好！

一、二次政黨輪替的歷史意義

今年三月二十二日中華民國總統選舉，台灣人民投下了改變台灣未來的一票。今天，我們在這裡不是慶祝政黨或個人的勝利，而是一起見證，台灣的民主跨越了一個歷史性的里程碑。

我們的民主走過了一段顛簸的道路，現在終於有機會邁向成熟的坦途。在過去這段波折的歲月裡，人民對政府的信賴跌到谷底，政治操作扭曲了社會的核心價值，人民失去了經濟安全感，台灣的國際支持也受到空前的折損。值得慶幸的是，跟很多年輕的民主國家相比，我們民主成長的陣痛期並不算長，台灣人民卻能展現日趨成熟的民主風範，在關鍵時刻，作出了明確的抉擇：人民選擇政治清廉、經濟開放、族群和諧、兩岸和平與迎向未來。

尤其重要的是，台灣人民一同找回了善良、正直、勤奮、誠信、包容、進取這些傳統核心價值。這一段不平凡的民主成長經驗，讓我們獲得了「台灣是亞洲和世界民主的燈塔」的讚譽，值得所有台灣人引以為傲。顯然，中華民國已經成為一個受國際社會尊敬的民主國家。

不過，我們不會以此自滿。我們要進一步追求民主品質的提升與民主內涵的充實，讓台灣大步邁向「優質的民主」：在憲政主義的原則下，人權獲得保障、法治得到貫徹、司法獨立而公正、公民社會得以蓬勃發展。台灣的民主將不會再有非法監聽、選擇性辦案、以及政治干預媒體或選務機關的現象。這是我們共同的願景，也是我們下一階段民主改革的目標。

開票當天，全球有數億的華人透過電視與網路的直播，密切關注選舉的結果。因為台灣是全球唯一在中華文化土壤中，順利完成二次政黨輪替的民主範例，是全球華人寄以厚望的政治實驗。如果這個政治實驗能夠成功，我們將為全球華人的民主發展作出史無前例的貢獻，這是我們無法推卸的歷史責任。

二、新時代的任務

未來新政府最緊迫的任務，就是帶領台灣勇敢迎接全球化帶來的巨大挑戰。當前全球經濟正處於巨變之中，新興國家迅速崛起，我們必須快速提升台灣的國際競爭力，挽回過去流失的機會。當前全球經濟環境的不穩定，將是我們振興經濟必須克服的困難。但是，我們深信，只要我們的戰略正確、決心堅定，最後一定能達成我們的預定目標。

台灣是一個海島，開放則興盛、閉鎖則衰敗，這是歷史的鐵律。所以我們要堅持開放、大幅鬆綁、釋放民間的活力、發揮台灣的優勢；我們要引導企業立足台灣、聯結亞太、佈局全球；我們要協助勞工適應快速的科技變遷與產業調整；我們要用心培育我們的下一代，讓他們具有健全人格、公民素養、國際視野與終身學習的能力，並排除各種意識形態對教育的不當干擾。我們在回應全球化挑戰的同時，一定要維護弱勢群體的基本保障與發展機會，也一定要兼顧台灣與全球生態環境的永續經營。

新政府的另一項重要任務就是導正政治風氣，恢復人民對政府的信賴。我們將共同努力創造一個尊重人性、崇尚理性、保障多元、和解共生的環境。我們將促進族群以及新舊移民間的和諧，倡導政黨良性競爭，並充分尊重媒體的監督與新聞自由。

新政府將樹立廉能政治的新典範，嚴格要求官員的清廉與效能，並重建政商互動規範，防範金權政治的污染。我希望每一位行使公權力的公僕，都牢牢記住「權力使人腐化，絕對的權力使人絕對的腐化」這句著名的警語。我們將身體力行誠信政治，實踐國民黨「完全執政、完全負責」的政見。新政府所有施政都要從全民福祉的高度出發，超越黨派利益，貫徹行政中立。我們要讓政府不再是拖累社會進步的絆腳石，而是引領台灣進步的發動機。

我堅信，中華民國總統最神聖的職責就是守護憲法。在一個年輕的民主國家，遵憲與行憲比修憲更重要。身為總統，我的首要任務就是樹立憲法的權威與彰顯守憲的價值。我一定會以身作則，嚴守憲政分際，真正落實權責相符的憲政體制。我們一定要做到：政府全面依法行政，行政院依法對立法院負責，司法機關落實法治人權，考試院健全文官體制，監察院則糾彈違法失職。現在是我們建立優良憲政傳統的最好機會，我們一定要牢牢把握。

我們要讓台灣成為國際社會中受人敬重的成員。我們將以「尊嚴、自主、務實、靈活」作為處理對外關係與爭取國際空間的指導原則。中華民國將善盡其國際公民的責任，在維護自由經濟秩序、禁止核子擴散、防制全球暖化、遏阻恐怖活動、以及加強人道援助等全球議題上，承擔我們應負的責任。我們要積極參與亞太區域合作，進一步加強與主要貿易夥伴的經貿關係，全面融入東亞經濟整合，並對東亞的和平與繁榮作出積極貢獻。

我們要強化與美國這一位安全盟友及貿易夥伴的合作關係；我們也要珍惜邦交國的情誼，信守相互的承諾；我們更要與所有理念相通的國家和衷共濟，擴大合作。我們有防衛台灣安全的決心，將編列合理的國防預算，並採購必要的防衛性武器，以打造一支堅實的國防勁旅。追求兩岸和平與維持區域穩定，是我們不變的目標。台灣要成為和平的締造者，讓國際社會刮目相看。

英九由衷的盼望，海峽兩岸能抓住當前難得的歷史機遇，從今天開始，共同開啟和平共榮的歷史新頁。我們將以最符合台灣主流民意的「不統、不獨、不武」理念，在中華民國憲法架構下，維持台灣海峽現狀。一九九二年，兩岸曾達成「一中各表」的共識，隨後並完成多次協商，促成兩岸關係順利發展。英九在此重申，我們今後將繼續在「九二共識」的基礎上，儘早恢復協商，並秉持四月十二日在博鰲論壇中提出的「正視現實，開創未來；擱置爭議，追求雙贏」，尋求共同利益的平衡點。兩岸走向雙贏的起點，是經貿往來與文化交流的全面正常化，我們已經做好協商的準備。希望七月即將開始的週末包機直航與大陸觀光客來台，能讓兩岸關係跨入一個嶄新的時代。

未來我們也將與大陸就台灣國際空間與兩岸和平協議進行協商。台灣要安全、要繁榮、更要尊嚴！唯有台灣在國際上不被孤立，兩岸關係才能穩定向前發展。我們注意到胡錦濤先生最近三次有關兩岸關係的談話，分別是三月二十六日與美國布希總統談及「九二共識」、四月十二日在博鰲論壇提出「四個繼續」、以及四月二十九日主張兩岸要「建立互信、擱置爭議、求同存異、共創雙贏」，這些觀點都與我方的理念相當一致。因此，英九願意在此誠懇呼籲：兩岸不論在台灣海峽或國際社會，都應該和解休兵，並在國際組織及活動中相互協助、彼此尊重。兩岸人民同屬中華民族，本應各盡所能，齊頭並進，共同貢獻國際社會，而非惡性競爭、虛耗資源。我深信，以世界之大、中華民族智慧之高，台灣與大陸一定可以找到和平共榮之道。

英九堅信，兩岸問題最終解決的關鍵不在主權爭議，而在生活方式與核心價值。我們真誠關心大陸十三億同胞的福祉，由衷期盼中國大陸能繼續走向自由、民主與均富的大道，為兩岸關係的長遠和平發展，創造雙贏的歷史條件。

最近四川發生大地震，災情十分慘重，台灣人民不分黨派，都表達由衷的關切，並願意提供即時的援助，希望救災工作順利，災民安置與災區重建早日完成。

三、台灣的傳承與願景

從宣誓就職的這一刻開始，英九深知個人已肩負二千三百萬人民的付託，這是我一生最光榮的職務，也是我一生最重大的責任。英九雖然不是在台灣出生，但台灣是我成長的故鄉，也是我親人埋骨的所在。我尤其感念台灣社會對我這樣一個戰後新移民的包容之義、栽培之恩與擁抱之情。我義無反顧，別無懸念，只有勇往直前，全力以赴！

四百多年來，台灣這塊土地一直慷慨的接納著先來後到的移民，滋養、庇護著我們，提供我們及後代子孫安身立命的空間，並以高峻的山峰、壯闊的大海，充實、淬礪著我們的心靈。我們繼承的種種歷史文化，不但在這片土地上得到延續，更得到擴增與創新，進而開創出豐盛多元的人文風景。

中華民國也在台灣得到了新生。在我任內，我們將慶祝中華民國開國一百週年。這一個亞洲最早誕生的民主共和國，在大陸的時間只有三十八年，在台灣的歲月卻將超過一甲子。在這近六十年間，中華民國與台灣的命運已經緊密的結合在一起，共同經歷了艱難險阻與悲歡歲月，更在追求民主的曲折道路上，有了長足的進步。國父孫中山先生的民主憲政理想，當年在大陸未能實現，但今天在台灣終於生根、開花、結果。

面對台灣的未來，英九充滿了信心。多年來我走遍台灣各個角落，在與各行各業的互動之中，最讓我感受深刻的就是：地無分南北，人無分老幼，善良、正直、勤奮、誠信、包容、進取等傳統核心價值，不但洋溢在台灣人的生活言行，也早已深植在台灣人的本性裡。這是台灣一切進步力量的泉源，也是「台灣精神」的真諦。

盱衡時局，環顧東亞，台灣擁有絕佳的地理位置、珍貴的文化資產、深厚的人文素養、日漸成熟的民主、活力創新的企業、多元和諧的社會、活躍海內外的民間組織、遍佈全球的愛鄉僑民，以及來自世界各地的新移民。只要我們秉持「台灣精神」，善用我們的優勢，並堅持「以台灣為主，對人民有利」的施政原則，我們一定可以將台澎金馬建設為舉世稱羨的樂土、我們引以為傲的美麗家園。

台灣的振興不只要靠政府的努力，更要靠人民的力量；需要借重民間的智慧、需要朝野協商合作、需要所有的社會成員積極投入。各位親愛的父老兄弟姊妹們，我們要從此刻開始，捲起袖子，立即行動，打造美麗家園，為子孫奠定百年盛世的基礎。讓我們心連心、手牽手，大家一起來奮鬥！

現在，請大家跟我一起高呼：

台灣民主萬歲！

中華民國萬歲！

謝謝大家！

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2012—Ma Ying-jeou

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Esteemed Leaders, Distinguished Guests, Compatriots from Abroad, Fellow Citizens, and Friends watching via television or the Internet: Good morning!

Historical Significance of the Fifth Direct Presidential Election: Heading Toward a Mature Democracy

On January 14, we smoothly completed the Republic of China's fifth direct presidential election. This was an important milestone as Taiwan's democracy heads toward maturity. In a free and fair election, the entire electorate of Taiwan demonstrated a highly developed democratic mindset that won praise from the international community. I would like to commend my opponents, Democratic Progressive Party Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen and People's First Party Chairman James Soong, for the democratic spirit they showed in accepting the election results. Friends, let us join together in a cheer for Taiwan's democracy!

Reflecting on the Past Four Years: Reforms Are Showing Results and the Nation Is Back on Track

Looking back at the past four years, I would like first to specially thank the public for its support. Together, we have weathered the global financial tsunami, allowing Taiwan's economic growth rate to once again compare favourably among the Four Asian Tigers.

At home, together we have emerged from the destruction brought in August 2009 by Typhoon Morakot, and have rebuilt the disaster-stricken areas. We have restored a high level of ethics in public affairs, safeguarded the spirit of the Constitution and enhanced judicial fairness and transparency. We have also streamlined the central government, and merged or upgraded the status of major cities and counties; both of these undertakings were very major reforms. Moreover, we have vigorously reduced energy use and cut carbon emissions, promoted housing justice, and greatly expanded the social safety net.

We have also created the most peaceful state of cross-strait relations in 60 years, thus winning the trust of our long-time diplomatic partners and the affirmation of the international community. As a result, ROC nationals now enjoy visa-free travel to 127 different countries and territories.

Here I would like to especially thank former Vice President Vincent Siew, former Premier Liu Chao-shiuan, former Premier Wu Den-yih, Premier Sean Chen and all support staff throughout the government, as well as the Legislative Yuan under the leadership of Speaker Wang Jin-pyng. Working hand-in-hand with the public over the last four years, they have all rendered tremendous service to the nation. I am most sincerely grateful for their hard work and contributions, and shall continue to rely on their experience and wisdom.

Golden Decade: Five Pillars to Make Taiwan Robustly Competitive

Looking ahead to the next four years, I shall strive jointly with the entire citizenry to realize the vision of a Golden Decade for our nation. Our objective is to build a nation that enjoys the benefits of peace, justice and well-being. The government has identified five pillars of national growth that it aims to achieve. First, it will enhance the drivers of economic growth. Second, it will create employment and realize social justice. Third, it will develop an environment characterized by low carbon emissions and high reliance on green energy. Fourth, it will build up culture as a source of national strength. And fifth, it will take active steps to cultivate, recruit and retain talent. Accomplishing these tasks will comprehensively bolster Taiwan's global competitiveness, so that during these four years, Taiwan can achieve a fundamental transformation and create even greater well-being.

Enhancing the drivers of economic growth is the first pillar for bolstering Taiwan's competitiveness. Further economic liberalization and improvements to our industrial structure constitute the core drivers. We saw the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement come into effect in March of this year, and mainland China is about to begin negotiating a similar agreement with Japan and South Korea later this year. We must step up the pace of liberalization; there can be no further delay. Only if Taiwan opens up to the world will the world embrace Taiwan. In an era when we are confronted by a restructuring of the global political and economic order and a shift in the economic center of gravity toward Asia, we must change from a protectionist mindset and revise outdated legislation. We must eliminate artificial trade and investment barriers and create a genuinely free and open economic environment for Taiwan that is more in line with international practices.

We are planning to establish showcase free economic zones, one of which will be in Kaohsiung. This is a crucial step in Taiwan's move to becoming a "free trade island". We must speedily complete follow-up talks under the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and expedite negotiations on economic cooperation agreements with important trading partners like Singapore and New Zealand. Over the next eight years, we must fully prepare to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership in order to seize the historic opportunity to become further integrated into the global trading system.

Our industrial sector has created many spectacular successes, but it is now faced with longstanding bottlenecks that impede further growth. In the future, we shall actively seek to improve industrial structure and build on the efficiency-driven production model of the past to actively develop a new "innovation-driven" and "value-creating" industrial model. Our strategy is to incorporate special characteristics of services into the manufacturing sector, while at the same time introducing technological and international elements into service industries, and developing the unique character of our traditional industries. Only in this way can our industrial sector become more diverse and create higher added value; and only in this way can our industrial sector genuinely transform and carve out an unassailable niche in the global economy.

The second pillar for bolstering Taiwan's competitiveness is creating employment and realizing social justice. Market liberalization due to globalization has made job market competition global in nature. We must pursue economic growth if we are to create more job opportunities. Economic growth must spur pay increases across all sectors at the same time, or else it is meaningless. Furthermore, we must firmly uphold fairness and justice, narrow the gap between rich and poor, and ensure that the fruits of economic success are enjoyed by all.

Bringing soundness to the government's fiscal structure is a top priority. We are endeavoring to realize "taxation commensurate with ability to pay" and "tax justice", establish a comprehensive social security system, and safeguard the fundamental interests of the disadvantaged. At the same time, we must reasonably allocate basic infrastructure, public services and educational resources, and establish a model for balanced regional development based on local characteristics. Doing so will reduce disparity between urban and rural areas and allow every citizen-regardless of gender, place of residence, ethnicity or social status-an equal opportunity to pursue happiness.

Taiwan's birth rate has been declining, and its population has been aging, for a long time. These trends are national security issues that must be faced. Therefore, we need to formulate a forward-looking population policy, institute a well thought-out national health insurance program and national pension system, speedily promote a long-term care system, and utilize more complete preschool care and education measures in order to provide strong support for parents and children.

The judiciary is the force for justice which safeguards the interests of the people. Over the past four years, we have completed legislation of the Speedy Trial Act, the Judges Act and the Act Governing Family Matters, and have established the Agency Against Corruption. The Supreme Court practice of not disclosing how cases are assigned to judges is now also history. The judiciary must be independent, but absolutely must not be an island unto itself, nor can it act in a manner that defies the common-sense expectations of the public for a just judiciary. Over the next four years, I shall do everything in my power to promote judicial reform that accords with the direction in which our society is moving. I want our judicial institutions, which were transplanted from the West a century ago, to genuinely take root in Taiwan so that the rule of law becomes a way of life and the safeguarding of human rights becomes an internalized commitment.

The third pillar for bolstering Taiwan's competitiveness is developing an environment characterized by low carbon emissions and high reliance on green energy. Global climate change and imbalances between resource supply and demand present Taiwan with both challenges and opportunities. In the future, all industries around the world will emphasize green production. Green industry will be a new arena of industrial competition, and consumer behavior must fall in line with the need for energy conservation and reduced carbon emissions. Therefore, we encourage the private sector to step up R&D and investment in green-energy industries, green architecture and green production, so that these become a new economic bright spot that brings employment and development, and gradually turns Taiwan into a "low-carbon, green-energy island". We must staunchly uphold the ideal of sustainable development and leave our next generation clear skies, clean air and abundant water resources. The mountains, forests, rivers, wetlands and oceans that we pass on to them must be teeming with life and vitality.

In terms of policy, we must ensure that energy prices are reasonable and create the impetus for energy conservation, carbon reduction and increased investment in green-energy industries. We must restore market-based prices for gasoline and electricity, and put into practice the "user pays" principle. Furthermore, we must respond to high public expectations for reform of and greater operational efficiency at state-run corporations in order to create a win-win scenario for consumers and producers.

Building up culture as a source of national strength is the fourth pillar for bolstering Taiwan's competitiveness. Taiwan has three cultural traits: First, civic spirit is deep-rooted; second, traditional culture is well preserved; and third, the links and transitions between tradition and modernity are sophisticated. Democracy has made our civil society what it is today. It is a civil society in which the atmosphere of openness and the spirit of freedom have become the soil that nurtures creativity. In this soil of openness and freedom, we have not only preserved traditional culture-such as Taiwanese opera and glove puppetry-but have also developed contemporary cultural brands, such as the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre and the Ju Percussion Group. On the one hand, we are pursuing high technology and internationalization; while on the other, we also champion grassroots access to cultural activities.

It takes an open society to foster ebullient creativity; bold imagination can only be tolerated in a climate of freedom. Taiwan's creativity is infused into movies, pop music and publications, forming a cultural industry that plays a decisively important role in the Chinese-speaking world. However, there must be a means of achieving integration within the industry so that, by adding value through creativity and utilizing intellectual property mechanisms, we can market our culture globally and transform the value of its content into economic output, which in turn can nurture more creative talent.

Culture is not just art, creativity or an industry; it is also a part of people's daily lives. Recently the prominent mainland Chinese writer Han Han wrote about what he had personally experienced in Taiwan: A taxi driver who returned a cell phone left in his cab, and an optician who went far out of his way to offer help. Both incidents made a deep impression on him. Similarly, not long ago, a Hualien taxi driver, Zeng Shicheng, discovered that a Japanese passenger had left a wallet behind in his cab. He drove quickly to the wharf but the passenger liner had already left shore. A tugboat pursued the departing liner, and finally, the wallet was returned to its owner via a basket lowered from the passenger ship. I think that such moving acts are reflections of kindness and honesty, core values of Chinese culture that have become part of daily life for people in Taiwan.

We must view culture as a source of national strength. The development of culture is the development of national strength; investment in culture is tantamount to investment in national strength.

The fifth pillar for bolstering Taiwan's competitiveness is cultivating, recruiting and retaining talent. Since Taiwan lacks natural resources, talent is our most important resource and the key to national development.

We must turn our universities and colleges into cradles of local talent and wellsprings of national competitiveness. Furthermore, we must adopt open-minded, forward-looking policies, and create a livable, friendly, international, non-discriminatory and salary-competitive environment with which to retain outstanding home-grown talent while recruiting outstanding talent from all over the world. In Chinese we speak of "building a nest to attract the phoenix" — in other words, "build it, and they will come".

Children are our enduring concern. Every child, rich or poor, should have the chance to develop his or her talent, and to advance-this is the very core of education. In fact, several Taiwanese have come to stand out in their respective fields, including Ang Lee and Xiao Qing-yang in the cultural and creative arena, Billy Chang and Chen Hsinghe of Cirque du Soleil, and Johan Ku and Jason Wu in the world of international fashion and design. Over the past four years, students from Taiwan have won top prizes at various international invention and design fairs. Taiwan has tremendous talent and creativity. We need to work harder at cultivating the next generation by providing quality 12-year public education so that each child can shine.

If we want our nation to develop, then we must reform; if we want reform, then we must bear the short-term pains of adjustment. We absolutely cannot leave the hot potato issues and heavy burdens to the next generation. I am keenly aware that the most important duty and mission of a re-elected president is to work with the people to forge greater well-being. In my second term in office, we must take resolute steps while engaging in timely, in-depth and extensive communication with the public to win its support. Utilizing these five pillars to "create greater well-being for Taiwan" is the goal of my second term. Taiwan needs to become more competitive if it is to survive and the well-being of its people is to be guaranteed.

The Three Legs of National Security: Cross-strait Peace, Viable Diplomacy and a Strong Defense

National security is crucial for the survival of the Republic of China. I believe that Taiwan's security rests on three legs. The first is the use of cross-strait rapprochement to realize peace in the Taiwan Strait. The second is the use of viable diplomacy to establish more breathing space for ourselves in the international community. And the third is the use of military strength to deter external threats. We must regard each as equally important and develop them in a balanced manner.

The first leg, as I mentioned, is cross-strait rapprochement to realize peace in the Taiwan Strait. Over the past four years, this government has resumed institutionalized cross-strait negotiations, signed 16 bilateral agreements and made cross-strait rapprochement a reality. In the process, we have staunchly maintained the precepts of "parity, dignity and reciprocity" and the principle of "putting Taiwan first for the benefit of the people". The executive branch has been openly and transparently accountable to the legislature, and stepped up communication with opposition parties in an effort to find consensus. This approach has created institutionalized safeguards for cross-strait rapprochement.

Over the past four years, we have improved cross-strait relations and reduced cross-strait tension. This has brought peace and prosperity and won broad public support. Nevertheless, a part of the public still has reservations about our mainland policies. Here, I would like to solemnly point out that the Constitution of the Republic of China is the supreme guiding principle for how the government deals with cross-strait relations. Within that constitutional framework, our cross-strait policy must maintain the status quo of "no unification, no independence and no use of force", and promote peaceful cross-strait development on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, whereby each side acknowledges the existence of "one China", but maintains its own interpretation of what that means.

When we speak of "one China", naturally it is the Republic of China. According to our Constitution, the sovereign territory of the Republic of China includes Taiwan and the mainland. At present, the ROC government has authority to govern only in Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. In other words, over the past two decades, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have been defined as "one Republic of China, two areas". This status has remained unchanged throughout the administrations of the past three presidents.

This is an eminently rational and pragmatic definition, and constitutes the basis for assuring the ROC's long-term development and safeguarding Taiwan's security. Both sides of the Taiwan Strait ought to squarely face up to this reality, seek common ground while respecting differences, and establish a consensus regarding "mutual non-recognition of sovereignty and mutual non-denial of authority to govern". Only in this way can the two sides move forward with confidence.

Over the past four years, we have promoted cross-strait ties in accordance with the principles of putting "pressing matters before less pressing ones, easily resolved issues before difficult ones, and economic matters before political ones". This approach has yielded unprecedented successes in the areas of economic and trade ties, transportation, public health, culture, education, judicial assistance, and financial services.

In the next four years, the two sides of the strait have to open up new areas of cooperation and continue working to consolidate peace, expand prosperity and deepen mutual trust. We also hope that civic groups on both sides of the Taiwan Strait will have more opportunities for exchanges and dialogue focusing on such areas as democracy, human rights, rule of law and civil society, to create an environment more conducive to peaceful cross-strait development.

The people of the two sides of the strait share a common Chinese ethnic heritage. We share common blood lines, history and culture. We both revere our nation's founding father, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. We cannot forget his precept that "the world is a commonwealth shared by all", or the ideals of freedom, democracy and equitable distribution of wealth on which he founded this nation.

Taiwan's experience in establishing democracy proves that it is not impossible for democratic institutions from abroad to take root in an ethnically Chinese society. I fervently look forward to the gradual opening up of greater popular participation in the political process on the mainland, along with steady improvement in human rights and the rule of law, and the autonomous development of civil society. This will further reduce the feeling of "otherness" between people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

The second leg of our national security is the use of viable diplomacy to establish more breathing space for ourselves in the international community and boost our contributions to international society. Over the past four years, rather than adopting "scorched earth diplomacy", we have chosen "viable diplomacy" and "above-board diplomacy", providing aid in accordance with the principles of "seeking proper goals, acting lawfully, and exercising effective administration". We have undertaken cooperation projects with our diplomatic partners, and they have continually spoken up for us at international organizations. We have restored mutual trust with the United States through close cooperation in many areas. This has enabled us to bolster channels of communication and build the most solid "security and economic partnership" of the past 30 years. We have also achieved important breakthroughs in relations with Japan. In addition to establishing a new representative office, we have also made progress in such areas as aviation, culture and investment. Our "special partnership" with Japan represents the friendliest state of bilateral ties in 40 years. The European Union and the European Parliament have both on many occasions issued statements and passed resolutions to support our mainland policy, and to seek stronger trade and economic ties between Taiwan and the EU.

Establishing more breathing room for ourselves in the international community has been an important breakthrough. For the past three years we have attended as an observer at the World Health Assembly after an absence of 38 years, and in 2010 we acceded to the Government Procurement Agreement under the World Trade Organization. The facts prove that progress in the cross-strait relationship does not preclude our achievement of greater international breathing room. On the contrary, the two can even be mutually complementary. Over the next four years, we shall expand our participation in international organizations, including the activities of United Nations agencies that specialize in climate change and civil aviation. We also hope that in international NGOs, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can demonstrate mutual tolerance and assist each other so that this virtuous circle model exerts an even greater positive effect.

As for contributing more to the international community, Taiwan is endowed with the world's most precious assets, by which I am referring to the abundant vitality of its civic groups, and the caring spirit of its people.

When Haiti experienced a massive earthquake in January of 2010, I called Chen Shuntian, the head of our special rescue team that had rushed to the disaster area. What I heard on the other end of the line was the sound of excited shouting, since only 15 minutes before they had rescued a victim who was still alive. This was a first for our international rescue team. When Japan was hit by the tsunami in March of last year, NT$6.6 billion in donations were raised through joint private sector and government effort. This was not only the largest amount worldwide; it also exceeded the combined amount donated by over 90 other countries. There is also a girl from Tainan City, Cai Yuhua, who went to the disaster area and quietly helped old people there. People in both Japan and Taiwan were deeply moved by her acts of kindness. And during my trip to Africa in April of this year, I encountered a physician, Dr. Huang Qilin, who has been providing medical care there for nearly 20 years. His unflagging work over the years has showed the warmth and dedication behind the white medical frock of a Taiwan doctor. These examples demonstrate an enthusiasm for life and resilience that is undaunted by difficulty. They have also won us sincere friendship.

The third leg of our national security is a strong national defense to deter external threats. An ancient proverb clearly admonishes us: "Though the world may be at peace, being unprepared to fight invites danger". We do not seek a fight, but we do not fear it, either. We have made significant progress on this front over the past four years. Our defense industry is now much more self-sufficient. We have strengthened our new-generation fighting capabilities. And our military forces are better prepared to take part in disaster prevention and rescue. At the same time, we have boosted our training programs and dramatically upgraded the physical fitness and fighting skills of our soldiers, while making great strides toward improving discipline and eliminating corruption. These are the concrete results of our efforts to build military preparedness.

In the area of weapons procurement from overseas, the United States has approved three arms sales to Taiwan since I took office, in aggregate totaling US$18.3 billion, and exceeding all previous such sales in terms of quality and amount. This provides us with an appropriate defensive force in the future that will give the government and public greater confidence and willingness to pursue continued stable and solid development of the cross-strait relationship.

Over the next four years, we shall continue to purchase weapons of a defensive nature that we cannot manufacture ourselves, and shall complete the transition to a volunteer armed force. Necessary supporting measures will also be taken. And, with a "rock solid defense and effective deterrence" military strategy and "innovative and asymmetrical" thinking, we shall establish a streamlined yet professional and sturdy national defense force. At the same time, we shall enhance relations with neighbouring countries, actively participate in international affairs, and promote establishment of institutionalized channels for strategic dialogue and cooperation to defend the sovereignty of the Republic of China, safeguard the security of Taiwan and actively make a contribution to regional peace.

Standing at a Historic Watershed: A New Century, a Good Beginning

Fellow countrymen, looking back over the past four years my heart is filled with profound gratitude. We have weathered the global financial tsunami and greeted the ROC Centennial with joy. We have wept at the wounds inflicted by severe natural catastrophes, and rejoiced at the world-beating achievements of our fellow compatriots.

We are a family and Taiwan is home to us all. We strongly believe that no matter what political differences there may be between the ruling and opposition parties, we are still one family. Despite the many difficulties over the past several years between the ruling and opposition parties, I believe we share a common commitment to democracy. On this foundation, we can surely seek consensus and work together to solve problems. Over the past four years, I have continually invited civic groups to engage in dialogue. I sincerely hope to open up dialogue with the opposition leaders as soon as possible. We will show the people that the ruling and opposition parties can not only compete but also cooperate. For the welfare of all our people, let us jointly set a good example for Taiwan's democracy.

In this, the 101st year of the Republic of China, we stand at a historic watershed. We are very familiar with the struggles that our forefathers have been through over the past century. Looking ahead to the coming century, we have a clear vision of where the nation's future challenges and opportunities lie. I feel fortunate to be the first person to take the oath of office as president at the very time the Republic of China enters upon its second century. This is indeed a great responsibility.

During this solemn and sacred ceremony, I, as well as the members of my administration, once more accept the responsibilities of this commission from the entire populace. Such a responsibility sits heavily on our shoulders. We must be ever conscious of the risks that face us, while doing everything in our power to fulfill the duties set forth in the Constitution, so that we can live up to the responsibilities entrusted to us by the citizens of this country.

Standing at the starting line of this new century for our Republic, I hope that the work we do now will provide a solid foundation for our children's further progress, and that the seedlings we plant today continue to grow and bear fruit to be enjoyed by the next generation. Let us uphold our ideals, work together for reform and create greater well-being for Taiwan.

Thank you!

TOP   HOME    [◆ Directory Inaugural Addresses]    [Ma 2012]


【中華民國第十三任總統馬英九就職演說 全文】

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各位友邦元首、各位貴賓、各位僑胞、各位鄉親父老、各位電視機前與網路上的朋友，大家早安，大家好！

一月十四日，我們順利完成中華民國第五次總統直選。這是臺灣民主邁向成熟的重要里程碑。自由與公正的選舉程序，臺灣全體選民所展現的高度民主素養，都獲得國際社會的讚揚；我也要肯定我的競爭對手—蔡主席英文和宋主席楚瑜在選舉結果揭曉時展現的民主風度。朋友們，讓我們一起，為臺灣民主喝采！

回顧過去四年，首先我要特別感謝全國民眾的支持。我們共同度過金融海嘯的侵襲，讓臺灣經濟成長回到東亞四小龍的前列；我們共同走過八八水災的衝擊，重建我們的家園；我們導正政治風氣，守護憲法精神，提升司法的公正透明；我們完成中央政府精簡與縣市合併升格兩大改革工程；我們力行節能減碳、推動「居住正義」、大幅擴大社會安全網；我們締造了六十年來最和平的臺海情勢，贏得長期盟友的信賴與國際社會的肯定，讓中華民國國民在 127 個國家與地區，免簽證入境。

在此，英九也要感謝蕭前副總統萬長、劉前院長兆玄、吳前院長敦義、陳院長冲與所有執政團隊夥伴，以及王院長金平所領導的立法院，在過去四年和人民一起打拚。英九由衷感謝大家的辛勞與貢獻，並將繼續借重他們的經驗與智慧。

第一大支柱 經濟自由產業優化

展望未來四年，英九要以「黃金十年」的國家願景，和全體國人共同奮鬥。我們的目標，是建設和平、公義與幸福的國家。政府將以「強化經濟成長動能」、「創造就業與落實社會公義」、「打造低碳綠能環境」、「厚植文化國力」、以及「積極培育延攬人才」作為國家發展的五大支柱，以全面提升臺灣的全球競爭力，讓臺灣在這四年脫胎換骨、邁向幸福。

強化經濟成長動能，是提升臺灣競爭力的第一大支柱。動能的核心，在經濟環境自由化和產業結構優質化。

我們看到，美韓自由貿易協定在今年三月生效；中國大陸與日、韓的自由貿易協定談判也將在今年內啟動，我們必須加快自由化的腳步，不能再蹉跎。臺灣向世界開放，世界才會擁抱臺灣。

面臨全球政治經濟秩序重組、經濟重心向亞洲移動的時代，我們必須改變保護主義的思維，翻修不合時宜的法制，排除貿易和投資的人為障礙，為臺灣打造一個真正自由開放、與國際社會接軌的經濟環境。

我們正規劃設立「自由經濟示範區」，高雄就是其中之一，這是臺灣邁向「自由貿易島」關鍵的一步。我們要儘快完成「兩岸經濟合作架構協議」的後續協商，加速與新加坡、紐西蘭等重要貿易夥伴洽簽經濟合作協議，並在未來八年內做好加入「跨太平洋經濟夥伴協定」的準備，以掌握融入國際經貿體系的歷史機遇。

我國的產業雖然曾經締造過輝煌的成績，但早已面臨成長瓶頸。未來我們要積極推動產業結構優質化，以過去強調效率的生產模式為基礎，積極發展「創新導向」與「價值創造」的新產業模式。

我們的策略是將服務的特質納入製造業，將科技與國際的元素引入服務業，而且建立傳統產業的特色。唯有這樣，我們的產業才能更加多元，創造更高的附加價值；也唯有這樣，我們的產業才能真正脫胎換骨，並且在國際經濟體系中建立起無可取代的地位。

提升臺灣競爭力的第二大支柱，就是創造就業與落實社會公義。全球化的開放市場讓就業變成世界性的競爭，我們要追求經濟成長，才能創造更多的就業機會；經濟成長必須促使各行各業的薪資同步調升，否則經濟成長就沒有意義。我們更要堅持公平正義，縮短貧富差距，讓經濟成長的果實，由全民共享。

第二大支柱 創造就業落實公義

健全政府財政結構是當前要務，我們正努力落實「量能課稅」與「租稅正義」，建構完整的社會安全體系，維護弱勢群體的基本權益。我們同時也要合理配置基礎建設、公共服務及教育資源，建立均衡而各有特色的區域發展模式，以縮短城鄉差距，務必要讓每一個人不分性別、地區、血緣或出身，都有追求幸福的公平機會。

長期的少子女化與高齡化是臺灣必須面對的國安課題，因此，我們需要制訂前瞻性的人口政策，建構周延的全民健保與國民年金制度，並儘速推動長期照護體系，用更完善的幼兒托育及照護措施，提供父母與子女最溫暖的支持力量。

司法是保障人民權益的正義防線。四年來，我們完成「刑事妥速審判法」、「法官法」、「家事事件法」的立法，成立廉政署，最高法院的保密分案制也已走入歷史。

司法必須獨立，但絕對不能孤立，更不能背離人民對司法正義的合理期待。未來四年，英九會竭盡所能，全力推動與社會脈動結合的司法改革，要讓我國百年前從西方移植而來的司法制度，真正在臺灣生根，使法治成為我們生活的方式、人權成為我們內化的價值。

第三大支柱 打造低碳綠能環境

提升臺灣競爭力的第三大支柱，就是打造低碳綠能環境。全球氣候變遷、資源供需失調，對臺灣是挑戰也是機會。未來全球所有的產業都將強調綠色生產，綠色產業是未來產業競爭的新領域，消費型態也必須符合節能減碳的要求。

因此我們將鼓勵民間擴大對綠能產業、綠色建築與綠色生產的研發與投資，讓綠色產業成為帶動就業與成長的新亮點，讓臺灣一步步成為「低碳綠能島」。我們一定要堅持永續發展的理念，為我們下一代留下清朗的天空，乾淨的空氣，豐沛的水資源，以及生意盎然的山林、溪流、濕地與海洋。

在政策上，我們要讓能源價格合理化，創造節能減碳與促進投資綠能產業的動力。我們要讓油電等公用事業回歸市場機制，落實「使用者付費」的原則；更要進一步回應民意對改革國營事業、提升經營效率的高度期待，創造消費者與生產者雙贏的局面。

第四大支柱 文化建設厚植國力

厚植文化國力，是提升臺灣競爭力的第四大支柱。臺灣有三個文化特質：一是公民素養植根最深厚；二是傳統文化保存最完整；三是傳統與現代的銜接轉化最細緻。民主制度造就了我們的公民社會，公民社會中開放的風氣、自由的精神，成為創作家的土壤。在開放和自由的土壤上，我們既保存了歌仔戲、布袋戲等傳統文化，又發展出雲門舞集、朱宗慶打擊樂團等當代文化品牌。我們一方面追求高科技與國際化，一方面又主張草根民眾的文化公民權。

開放的社會才會有奔放的創意，自由的環境才容許大膽的想像；臺灣的創意注入電影、流行音樂、圖書出版等等，成為文化產業，也都在華文世界有舉足輕重的地位。但是產業必須要有整合工具，把文化價值與內容，透過創意加值與智慧財產機制，轉換成行銷全球的經濟產值，而讓經濟產值又回頭來灌溉我們的創作者。

文化不只是藝文、創意與產業，文化也是人民日常生活的一部分。最近大陸知名作家韓寒發表訪臺親身經歷：計程車司機拾物不昧、眼鏡行老闆熱心助人，都讓他震撼與感動。不久前，有位花蓮運將曾世誠，把日本乘客遺失在車內的皮夾，用飛車、駁船追上已離港的郵輪，最後以吊籃送到失主手中。

英九認為，這些令人動容的善舉，都是因為中華文化中「善良」與「誠信」的核心價值，已經融入臺灣的日常生活。

我們要把文化看做國力，文化的建設，就是國力的建設；文化的投資，就是國力的投資。

第五大支柱 讓大學成人才搖籃

積極培育延攬人才，是我們提升臺灣競爭力的第五大支柱。因為，臺灣缺乏天然資源，人才是我們最重要的資源，也是國家發展的關鍵。

我們要讓大學校園成為培育本土人才的搖籃與國家競爭力的泉源。我們更要以開放前瞻的政策，「築巢引鳳」的方式，打造一個宜居、友善、國際化、無歧視以及薪資有競爭力的環境，留住本土優秀人才，並延攬全球的優秀人才。

孩子是我們永遠的關切。讓每一個孩子，不分貧富都有機會成為國家的人才，擁有上進的機會，這才是教育的核心。事實上，不只李安和蕭青陽在文創領域大放異彩、張逸軍與陳星合都登上太陽劇團的舞臺，古又文和吳季剛也在國際服裝設計界大放光芒。

四年來，我們臺灣子弟更在歐、美、亞等各種國際發明展與設計展中，屢屢拿下總冠軍。臺灣擁有極佳的人才與創造力，我們要更用心培育下一代，提供優質的十二年國民教育，讓每一個生命都能發光發熱。

國家要發展，就必須改革；要改革，就要承受調整的陣痛。我們絕對不能把燙手山芋與沈重包袱留給下一代。英九深知，一位連任總統最重要的責任與使命，就是與人民一起打造幸福的未來。

在未來的任期中，我們要踏出堅定的步伐，進行即時、深入、廣泛的溝通，以爭取民眾的支持。用五大支柱「打造幸福臺灣」，是英九第二任的目標，臺灣要提升競爭力才能生存，人民幸福才有保障。

國防鐵三角第一角 兩岸和解實現和平

國家安全是中華民國生存的關鍵，英九認為，以兩岸和解實現臺海和平、以活路外交拓展國際空間、以國防武力嚇阻外來威脅，是確保臺灣安全的鐵三角，我們必須同等重視、平衡發展。

鐵三角的第一個角，就是以兩岸和解實現臺海和平。四年來，政府堅持「對等、尊嚴、互惠」的理念，「以臺灣為主、對人民有利」的原則，恢復兩岸制度化協商，簽署 16 項協議，實現兩岸和解。行政部門公開且透明地對國會負責，並加強與在野黨溝通，努力尋求共識，兩岸和解因此建立制度化的保障。

過去四年，我們改善兩岸關係，降低臺海緊張，帶來和平與繁榮，獲得廣大民眾的支持，但仍有部分民眾對我們的大陸政策存有疑慮。英九要在此鄭重指出：中華民國憲法是政府處理兩岸關係的最高指導原則；兩岸政策必須在中華民國憲法架構下，維持臺海「不統、不獨、不武」的現狀，在「九二共識、一中各表」的基礎上，推動兩岸和平發展；而我們所說的「一中」，當然就是中華民國。

依據憲法，中華民國領土主權涵蓋臺灣與大陸，目前政府的統治權僅及於臺、澎、金、馬。換言之，二十年來兩岸的憲法定位就是「一個中華民國，兩個地區」，歷經 3 位總統，從未改變。這是最理性務實的定位，也是中華民國長遠發展、保障臺灣安全的憑藉。兩岸之間應該要正視這個現實，求同存異，建立「互不承認主權、互不否認治權」的共識，雙方才能放心向前走。

過去四年，我們依循「先急後緩、先易後難、先經後政」的原則，推動兩岸交流，不論是在經貿、交通、衛生、文化、教育、司法、金融等各方面，都創下歷史新高的紀錄。未來四年，兩岸要開拓新的合作領域，繼續鞏固和平、擴大繁榮、深化互信。也期盼兩岸民間團體在民主、人權、法治、公民社會等領域，有更多機會交流與對話，為兩岸和平發展創造更有利的環境。

兩岸人民同屬中華民族，都是炎黃子孫，擁有共同的血緣、歷史與文化，也都同樣尊崇 　　國父孫中山先生。我們不能忘記　國父「天下為公」的理念，以及自由、民主、均富的建國理想。臺灣實施民主的經驗，證明中華民族的土壤，毫不排斥外來的民主制度。英九衷心期盼中國大陸的政治參與逐步開放，人權與法治日漸完善，公民社會自主成長，以進一步縮短兩岸人民的心理距離。

國防鐵三角第二角 活路外交拓展空間

鐵三角的第二個角，就是以活路外交拓展國際空間並增加國際貢獻。過去四年，我們不採取「烽火外交」，而選擇「活路外交」與「正派外交」， 在「目的正當、過程合法、執行有效」的援外原則下，我們與邦交國進行合作計畫，邦交國也在國際組織中不斷為我國仗義執言。我們與美國重建互信，強化溝通管道，在許多領域緊密合作，已建構三十年來最堅實的「安全與經濟夥伴關係」。

我們與日本在設館、航空、文化與投資等領域都展現重要成果，建立四十年來最友好的「特別夥伴關係」。歐盟及歐洲議會分別多次發表聲明及通過決議，支持我們的大陸政策與強化臺歐經貿關係。

拓展國際空間方面，我國在三年前，正式以大會觀察員的身分，回到離開 38 年的「世界衛生大會」；九十九年又加入世界貿易組織下的「政府採購協定」。

事實證明，兩岸關係的進展與我們國際空間的擴大，不但不必相互衝突，甚至可以相輔相成。未來四年，我們要擴大參與國際組織，包括氣候變遷、民航安全等聯合國專門機構的相關活動。我們也希望在國際非政府組織中，兩岸能彼此包容、相互協助，讓這個良性循環的模式發揮更大的正面效益。

增加國際貢獻方面，臺灣立足世界最寶貴的資產，就是民間組織的充沛活力，以及民胞物與的人道關懷。

九十九年一月海地發生大地震，英九跟趕赴現場的我國特種搜救隊分隊長陳順天通電話，電話那一頭傳來興奮的呼喊聲。因為，15 分鐘前他們救出1名生還者，這是我國國際搜救史上的第一次。

去年 311 日本海嘯，民間和政府合力捐助新臺幣 66 億元，不但是世界第一，也超過其他九十多國的捐助總額；還有一位到災區為老人默默服務的臺南女孩蔡雨樺，她的善行更感動了兩國人民。

今年四月，英九到非洲遇見了在當地行醫近二十年的黃其麟醫師，他無怨無悔的付出，讓世人看見臺灣醫生沸騰在白袍下的熱血。這些例子說明，臺灣人擁有豐沛的生命熱情與不怕難的韌性，也為臺灣贏得真誠的友誼。

國防鐵三角第三角 武力嚇阻外來威脅

鐵三角的第三個角，就是以國防武力嚇阻外來威脅。「天下雖安，忘戰必危」，古有明訓。我們不求戰，但絕不畏戰。四年來，我們在國防工業自主、強化新一代兵力整建以及災害防救等方面，都有明顯成果。同時，增加訓練能量、大幅提升國軍體能及戰技，而整飭軍紀及反貪防弊，亦有相當成果，這也是我們建軍備戰的具體成效。

在對外軍購方面，英九上任以來，美國已三度同意軍售臺灣，總計 183 億美元，不論是質與量都超越以往。這讓我們未來擁有適當的防衛力量，使政府與人民更有信心與意願，繼續穩健發展兩岸關係。

未來四年，我們仍將向外採購無法自製的防衛性武器，也將完善募兵制及相關配套，在「防衛固守、有效嚇阻」的戰略下，以「創新、不對稱」思維，建立量少但質精的堅強國防武力。同時強化我國與周邊各國關係，積極參與國際事務，推動建立制度化的戰略對話合作管道，以捍衛中華民國主權與保障臺灣安全，並對區域和平做出貢獻。

各位鄉親，回想過去四年，英九內心有深深的感激。我們一起走過金融海嘯的風暴，我們一起迎接建國百年的歡欣，我們曾為天災巨變的創傷流淚，也曾為臺灣子弟在各方面的成就，歡喜難眠。我們就是一家人，臺灣就是我們共同的家園。

朝野關係 儘速對話尋求共識

我們深信，不管朝野之間有什麼歧見，我們都是一家人。即使過去幾年朝野和解存在不少困難，但英九相信，民主是我們的共同價值，在這個基礎上，我們一定可以尋求共識，合力解決問題。

四年來，英九持續邀請各種公民團體來對談。英九也誠摯的希望，儘速與在野黨領袖展開對話，我們要讓民眾看到，朝野不是只有相互競爭，也能彼此合作。為了全民福祉，讓我們一起為臺灣民主建立良好的典範。

今年是中華民國第一百零一年，我們正站在歷史的分水嶺上。過去一百年，先人的奮鬥歷程清晰在目；未來一百年，國家的挑戰與機會輪廓鮮明。英九有幸身為中華民國跨入新的一百年第一位宣誓就職的總統，感到責任無比重大。

在此莊嚴而神聖的典禮上，英九與執政團隊再度接受全民的付託，猶如千鈞重擔在肩頭，唯有以如臨深淵的心境，如履薄冰的態度，全力履行憲法所賦予的職責，才能符合國人的信賴與付託。

站在新的一百年起跑點上，英九希望，今天我們奠下的基礎，將成為孩子走向未來的磐石；今天我們種下的幼苗，將不斷長成下一代共享的果實。讓我們一起堅持理想、攜手改革、打造幸福臺灣。

謝謝大家！

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2016—Tsai Ing-wen

Jump to Chinese version  Lee 1996 Chen 2000 Chen 2004 Ma 2008 Ma 2012 Tsai 2020 Lai 2024

Esteemed heads of state and guests from our diplomatic allies, distinguished ambassadors and representatives, dear friends, our fellow citizens across the country:

Our Gratitude and Responsibilities

Just moments ago, in the Presidential Office building, Dr. Chen Chien-jen and I were officially sworn in as the 14th President and Vice President of the Republic of China. We must express our gratitude to this land for nurturing us and to the people for placing their trust in us. Most importantly, we deeply appreciate the democratic institutions of this country, which have allowed us to accomplish Taiwan's third transition of political power through a peaceful electoral process. We also overcame many uncertainties throughout a four months-long transition period that concluded peacefully today.

Once again, the people of Taiwan have shown the world through our actions that we, as a free and democratic people, are committed to the defense of our freedom and democracy as a way of life. Each and every one of us participated in this journey. My dear fellow Taiwanese, we did it.

I would like to tell you that, regarding the results of the January 16th elections, I have always had one interpretation only. The people elected a new president and new government with one single expectation: solving problems.

At this very moment, Taiwan faces a difficult situation that requires its leaders to shoulder the burdens without hesitation. This is something I will not forget. I would also like to tell you that, the multitude of challenges before us require that we face them honestly and shoulder the responsibilities together.

Therefore, this speech is an invitation. I invite every fellow citizen to carry the future of this country.

It is not the leader who makes a country great; it is the collective striving of the people that makes this country great. A president should not only unite her own supporters; she should unite the entire country. To stand united for change — that is my earnest hope for this country. Here, I sincerely call on everyone to give this country a chance.

Let us leave behind the prejudices and conflicts of the past, and together fulfill the mission that the new era has entrusted to us.

At this moment and as President, I declare to the citizens of this country that my administration will demonstrate resolve in spearheading this country's reform, and will never back down.

Building a Better Country for the Younger Generation

The path forward is not a smooth one. Taiwan needs a new government that readily takes on each and every challenge. And it is my job to lead such a government.

Our pension system will go bankrupt without reform.

Our rigid educational system is increasingly out of touch with society. Our energy and resources are limited, and our economy lacks momentum, with the old model of OEM manufacturing facing a bottleneck. This country urgently needs a new model for economic development.

Our population is rapidly aging, while the long-term care system remains inadequate.

Our birthrate remains low, while a sound childcare system seems a distant prospect.

Our environment still suffers from severe pollution.

Our country's fiscal situation is far from optimistic.

Our judicial system has lost the trust of the people.

Our families are deeply disturbed by food safety scandals.

Our wealth disparities are still widening.

Our social safety net is full of holes.

Most importantly, and I must stress: our young people still suffer from low wages. Their lives are stuck, and they feel helpless and confused about the future.

Young people's future is the government's responsibility. If unfriendly structures persist, the situation for young people will never improve, no matter how many elite talents we have. My self-expectation is that, within my term as President, I will tackle this country's problems step by step, starting with the basic structure.

This is what I want to do for the young people of Taiwan. Although I cannot give every young person a raise instantly, I can promise that the new administration will initiate actions immediately. Please give us some time, and please join us on this journey of reform.

To change young people's predicament is to change a country's predicament. When its young people have no future, a country is certain to have no future. It is the solemn duty of the new administration to help young people overcome difficulties, achieve generational justice, and deliver to the next generation a better country.

1. Transforming Economic Structures

To build a better country, going forward, the new administration must accomplish the following tasks. The first is to transform Taiwan's economic structure. This is the most formidable task that the new administration must take on. We must not think lightly of ourselves, and we must not lose confidence. Taiwan enjoys many advantages that other countries lack.

We have the vibrancy and resilience of a maritime economy, high quality human resources, the pragmatic and reliable culture of engineers, a well-developed industrial chain, nimble and agile small and medium enterprises, and of course, our relentless entrepreneurial spirit. In order to completely transform Taiwan's economy, from this moment on, we must bravely chart a different course - and that is to build a "New Model for Economic Development" for Taiwan.

The new administration will pursue a new economic model for sustainable development based on the core values of innovation, employment and equitable distribution. The first step of reform is to strengthen the vitality and autonomy of our economy, reinforce Taiwan's global and regional connections, and actively participate in multilateral and bilateral economic cooperation as well as free trade negotiations including the TPP and RCEP.

We will also promote a "New Southbound Policy" in order to elevate the scope and diversity of our external economy, and to bid farewell to our past overreliance on a single market.

Furthermore, the new administration believes that the only way for Taiwan to overcome the current economic stagnation is to stimulate new momentum for growth. Our export and domestic demand will serve as twin engines for growth, allowing business production to become closely integrated with the livelihoods of the people, while building close ties between foreign trade and the local economy.

We will prioritize our plans to promote five major innovative industries, with the goal of reshaping Taiwan's global competitiveness. By protecting labor rights, we will also actively raise productivity and allow wages to grow in lockstep with the economy.

This is a crucial moment for Taiwan's economic development. We have the resolve and the ability to communicate. Going forward, we have systematic plans to engage in interagency cooperation, in order to consolidate the strength of the entire country and bring forth this new model.

As we pursue economic development, we must not forget our responsibility to the environment. Our New Model for Economic Development will be fully integrated with national land-use planning, regional development and environmental sustainability. Industrial planning strategy and national land-use should not be fragmented or shortsighted.

We must also pursue balanced regional development, which requires planning and coordination by the central administration. And it requires our local governments to uphold the spirit of regional joint governance.

We must not endlessly expend natural resources and the health of our citizens as we have done in the past. Therefore, we will strictly monitor and control all sources of pollution. We will also bring Taiwan into an age of circular economy, turning waste into renewable resources. We will gradually adjust our energy options based on the concepts of sustainability.

The new administration will seriously address issues related to climate change, land conservation and disaster prevention. After all, we only have one earth, and we only have one Taiwan.

2. Strengthening the Social Safety Net

The second area that the new government must address is to strengthen Taiwan's social safety net. Over the past few years, several incidents of violent crime affecting the safety of children and youth have shaken our entire society.

However, a government cannot remain in a state of shock. It must demonstrate empathy. No one can endure the pain and suffering on behalf of the victims' families. However, the government, and especially the first responders, must let the victims and their family members feel that, when unfortunate incidents occur, the government is on their side.

Beyond offering empathy, the government should propose solutions. We must do everything we can to prevent the repeated occurrences of tragedy, by swiftly mending holes in areas such as public safety, education, mental health and social work. The new administration will address these issues with the utmost seriousness and readiness to act, particularly on public safety and anti-drug efforts.

The issue of pension reform is crucial for the survival and development of Taiwan. We should not hesitate, nor should we act in haste. Vice President Chen Chien-jen is spearheading the establishment of a Pension Reform Committee. Previous administrations have devoted some effort to this issue, but public participation was inadequate. The new government will launch a collective negotiation process, because pension reform must unite everyone involved.

For this reason, we will convene a national congress on pension reform that brings together representatives from different social classes and occupations to engage in negotiations on the basis of societal unity. Within a year, we will offer a workable proposal for reform. Whether you are employed in the private or the public sector, life after retirement for every citizen should receive fair protection.

Furthermore, on the issue of long-term care, we will establish a high-quality, affordable and extensive long-term care system. Like pension reform, long-term care is a process of social mobilization. The new administration's approach is for the government to lead and plan, while encouraging citizens to organize in communities; through the efforts of collective social assistance, our goal is to build an adequate and comprehensive system.

Every senior citizen can comfortably enjoy life after retirement in a community they are familiar with. Every family will see their burden of care lightened. We cannot leave senior care entirely to the free market. We will take up our responsibilities, plan and implement step by step, and get adequately prepared for the arrival of a hyper-aging society.

3. Social Fairness and Justice

The third area the new government must address is social fairness and justice. On this issue, the new government will continue to work with civil society to align its policies with the values of diversity, equality, openness, transparency, and human rights, so as to deepen and evolve Taiwan's democratic institutions.

For the new democratic system to move forward, we must first find a way to face the past together. I will establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission inside the Presidential Office, to address the historical past in the most sincere and cautious manner. The goal of transitional justice is to pursue true social reconciliation, so that all Taiwanese can take to heart the mistakes of that era.

We will begin by investigating and sorting through the facts. Within the next three years, we plan to complete Taiwan's own investigative report on transitional justice. Follow-up work on transitional justice will then be carried out in accordance with the truth unveiled by the report. We will discover the truth, heal wounds, and clarify responsibilities. From here on out, history will no longer divide Taiwan. Instead, it will propel Taiwan forward.

Also related to fairness and justice, I will uphold the same principles when addressing issues concerning Taiwan's indigenous peoples. At today's Inauguration Ceremony, before they sang the national anthem, the indigenous children first sang the traditional melodies of their tribes. This means that we dare not forget who arrived first on this island.

The new government will address issues concerning indigenous peoples with an apologetic attitude. My administration will work to rebuild an indigenous historical perspective, progressively promote indigenous autonomous governance, restore indigenous languages and cultures, and improve the livelihood of indigenous communities.

Next, the new government will actively promote judicial reform. At this juncture, this is the issue the people of Taiwan care the most about. The general sentiment is that the judicial system is not close to the people, and is not trusted by them. It is unable to fight crime effectively, and has lost its function as the last line of defense for justice.

To demonstrate the new government's resolve, we will hold a national congress on judicial issues this coming October. By allowing public participation and letting in social forces, we will advance judicial reform together. The judicial system must respond to the needs of the people. It will no longer be a judicial system for legal professionals only, but for everyone. Judicial reform is not only the business of legal professionals; it must be inclusive. These are my expectations for judicial reform.

4. Regional Peace and Stability and Cross-Strait Relations

The fourth area for the new government to address is regional peace, stability and development, as well as the proper management of cross-Strait relations. Over the past 30 years, Asia and the world have undergone dramatic changes. And governments have become increasingly concerned over global and regional economic stability and collective security.

Taiwan has always played an indispensable role in the region's development. But in recent years, regional dynamics have been changing rapidly. If Taiwan does not effectively use its strengths and leverage to proactively participate in regional affairs, it will not only become insignificant, it may even become marginalized and lose the ability to determine its own future.

But where there is crisis, there is opportunity. The present stage of Taiwan's economic development is highly connected and complementary with many countries in the region. If our efforts to build a New Model for Economic Development can be linked to other Asian and Asia-Pacific countries through cooperation, to jointly shape future development strategies, we will not just contribute to the region's innovation.

We will also contribute greatly to the region's structural adjustment and sustainable development. Together with other members of this region, we will forge an intimate sense of "economic community."

We will share resources, talents and markets with other countries to achieve economies of scale and to allow the efficient use of resources. This is the spirit on which our "New Southbound Policy" is based. We will broaden exchanges and cooperation with regional neighbours in areas such as technology, culture and commerce, and expand in particular our dynamic relationships with ASEAN and India.

We are also willing to engage in candid exchanges and pursue possibilities for cooperation and collaboration with the other side of the Strait on our common participation in regional development.

As we actively develop our economy, the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region is becoming increasingly complex. Cross-Strait relations have become an integral part of building regional peace and collective security. In this process, Taiwan will be a "staunch guardian of peace" that actively participates and is never absent. We will work to maintain peace and stability in cross-Strait relations. We will make efforts to facilitate domestic reconciliation, strengthen our democratic institutions, consolidate consensus, and present a united position to the outside world.

For us to accomplish our goals, dialogue and communication are absolutely crucial. Taiwan will also become a "proactive communicator for peace." We will establish mechanisms for intensive and routine communications with all parties involved, and exchange views at all times to prevent misjudgment, establish mutual trust, and effectively resolve disputes. We will handle related disputes in adherence to the principles of maintaining peace and sharing interests.

I was elected President in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of China, thus it is my responsibility to safeguard the sovereignty and territory of the Republic of China; regarding problems arising in the East China Sea and South China Sea, we propose setting aside disputes so as to enable joint development.

We will also work to maintain the existing mechanisms for dialogue and communication across the Taiwan Strait. In 1992, the two institutions representing each side across the Strait (SEF & ARATS), through communication and negotiations, arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings.

It was done in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences. I respect this historical fact. Since 1992, over twenty years of interactions and negotiations across the Strait have enabled and accumulated outcomes which both sides must collectively cherish and sustain; and it is based on such existing realities and political foundations that the stable and peaceful development of the cross-Strait relationship must be continuously promoted.

The new government will conduct cross-Strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other relevant legislation. The two governing parties across the Strait must set aside the baggage of history, and engage in positive dialogue, for the benefit of the people on both sides.

By existing political foundations, I refer to a number of key elements. The first element is the fact of the 1992 talks between the two institutions representing each side across the Strait (SEF & ARATS), when there was joint acknowledgement of setting aside differences to seek common ground. This is a historical fact. The second element is the existing Republic of China constitutional order. The third element pertains to the outcomes of over twenty years of negotiations and interactions across the Strait. And the fourth relates to the democratic principle and prevalent will of the people of Taiwan.

5. Diplomatic and Global Issues

The fifth area for the new government to take up is to fulfill our duty as a citizen of the world and contribute towards diplomatic and global issues. We will bring Taiwan closer to the world, and the world closer to Taiwan. With us here today are many heads of state and delegations.

I would like to thank them for their longstanding assistance to Taiwan and for giving us the opportunity to participate in the international community. Going forward, through governmental interactions, business investment and people-to-people collaborations, we will continue to share Taiwan's experience in economic development and build lasting partnerships with our allies.

Taiwan has been a model citizen in global civil society. Since our democratization, we have persisted in upholding the universal values of peace, freedom, democracy and human rights. It is with this spirit that we join the alliance of shared values and concerns for global issues. We will continue to deepen our relationships with friendly democracies including the United States, Japan and Europe to advance multifaceted cooperation on the basis of shared values.

We will proactively participate in international economic and trade cooperation and rule-making, steadfastly defend the global economic order, and integrate into important regional trade and commercial architecture. We will also not be absent on the prevention of global warming and climate change.

We will create within the Executive Yuan an office for energy and carbon-reduction. We will regularly review goals for cutting greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with the agreement negotiated at the COP21 meeting in Paris. Together with friendly nations we will safeguard a sustainable earth.

At the same time, the new government will support and participate in international cooperation on emerging global issues including humanitarian aid, medical assistance, disease prevention and research, anti-terrorism cooperation and jointly tackling transnational crime. Taiwan will be an indispensable partner for the international community.

Conclusion

From the first direct Presidential Election in 1996 to today, exactly 20 years have gone by. Thanks to two decades of hard work by successive governments and civil society, we have overcome many obstacles that emerging democracies must confront. Throughout this process, we have had many touching moments and stories. But like other countries, we have also experienced anxiety, unease, contradictions and conflict.

We have witnessed confrontation within society; confrontation between progressive and conservative forces, between pro-environment and pro-development views, and between political ideologies. These confrontations have sparked the energy for mobilization during election seasons. But also because of these dichotomies, our democracy gradually lost its ability to solve problems.

Democracy is a process. In every era, those who work in politics must recognize clearly the responsibilities they shoulder. Democracy can move forward, but it can also fall backwards. Standing here today, I want to say to everyone: for us, falling backwards is not an option.

The new government's duty is to move Taiwan's democracy forward to the next stage: before, democracy was about winning or losing the election. Now, democracy is about the welfare of the people. Before, democracy was a showdown between two opposing values. Now, democracy is a conversation between many diverse values.

To build a "united democracy" that is not hijacked by ideology; to build an "efficient democracy" that responds to the problems of society and economy; to build a "pragmatic democracy" that takes care of the people — this is the significance of the new era.

As long as we believe, the new era will arrive. As long as our leaders have unwavering faith, the new era will be born in the hands of our generation. Dear fellow Taiwanese, this speech is coming to a close, but reforms are just about to start. From this moment on, the weight of the country rests upon the new government. It is my duty for you all to see this country change.

History will remember this courageous generation. This country's prosperity, dignity, unity, confidence and justice all bear the marks of our struggle. History will remember our courage. It will remember that in the year 2016, we took this country in a new direction. Everyone on this land can be proud of having participated in changing Taiwan.

In the earlier performance, I was really touched by a verse in the lyrics of a song:

"Today is the day, my brave fellow Taiwanese."

Dear fellow citizens, dear 23 million people of Taiwan: the wait is over. Today is the day. Today, tomorrow, and on every day to come, we shall all vow to be a Taiwanese who safeguards democracy, freedom, and this country.

Thank you.

TOP   HOME    [◆ Directory Inaugural Addresses]    [Tsai 2016]


【中華民國第十四任總統蔡英文就職演說 全文】

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

各位友邦的元首與貴賓、各國駐台使節及代表、現場的好朋友，全體國人同胞，大家好。

感謝與承擔

就在剛剛，我和陳建仁已經在總統府裡面，正式宣誓就任中華民國第十四任總統與副總統。我們要感謝這塊土地對我們的栽培，感謝人民對我們的信任，以及，最重要的，感謝這個國家的民主機制，讓我們透過和平的選舉過程，實現第三次政黨輪替，並且克服種種不確定因素，順利渡過長達四個月的交接期，完成政權和平移轉。

台灣，再一次用行動告訴世界，作為一群民主人與自由人，我們有堅定的信念，去捍衛民主自由的生活方式。這段旅程，我們每一個人都參與其中。親愛的台灣人民，我們做到了。

我要告訴大家，對於一月十六日的選舉結果，我從來沒有其他的解讀方式。人民選擇了新總統、新政府，所期待的就是四個字：解決問題。此時此刻，台灣的處境很困難，迫切需要執政者義無反顧的承擔。這一點，我不會忘記。

我也要告訴大家，眼前的種種難關，需要我們誠實面對，需要我們共同承擔。所以，這個演說是一個邀請，我要邀請全體國人同胞一起來，扛起這個國家的未來。

國家不會因為領導人而偉大；全體國民的共同奮鬥，才讓這個國家偉大。總統該團結的不只是支持者，總統該團結的是整個國家。團結是為了改變，這是我對這個國家最深切的期待。在這裡，我要誠懇地呼籲，請給這個國家一個機會，讓我們拋下成見，拋下過去的對立，我們一起來完成新時代交給我們的使命。

在我們共同奮鬥的過程中，身為總統，我要向全國人民宣示，未來我和新政府，將領導這個國家的改革，展現決心，絕不退縮。

為年輕人打造一個更好的國家

未來的路並不好走，台灣需要一個正面迎向一切挑戰的新政府，我的責任就是領導這個新政府。

我們的年金制度，如果不改，就會破產。

我們僵化的教育制度，已經逐漸與社會脈動脫節。

我們的能源與資源十分有限，我們的經濟缺乏動能，舊的代工模式已經面臨瓶頸，整個國家極需要新的經濟發展模式。

我們的人口結構急速老化，長照體系卻尚未健全。

我們的人口出生率持續低落，完善的托育制度卻始終遙遙無期。

我們環境汙染問題仍然嚴重。

我們國家的財政並不樂觀。

我們的司法已經失去人民的信任。

我們的食品安全問題，困擾著所有家庭。

我們的貧富差距越來越嚴重。

我們的社會安全網還是有很多破洞。

最重要的，我要特別強調，我們的年輕人處於低薪的處境，他們的人生，動彈不得，對於未來，充滿無奈與茫然。

年輕人的未來是政府的責任。如果不友善的結構沒有改變，再多個人菁英的出現，都不足以讓整體年輕人的處境變好。我期許自己，在未來的任期之內，要一步一步，從根本的結構來解決這個國家的問題。

這就是我想為台灣的年輕人做的事。雖然我沒有辦法立刻幫所有的年輕人加薪，但是我願意承諾，新政府會立刻展開行動。請給我們一點時間，也請跟我們一起走上改革的這一條路。

改變年輕人的處境，就是改變國家的處境。一個國家的年輕人沒有未來，這個國家必定沒有未來。幫助年輕人突破困境，實現世代正義，把一個更好的國家交到下一代手上，就是新政府重大的責任。

第一、經濟結構的轉型

要打造一個更好的國家，未來，新政府要做到以下幾件事情。

首先，就是讓台灣的經濟結構轉型。這是新政府所必須承擔的最艱鉅使命。我們不要妄自菲薄，更不要失去信心。台灣有很多別的國家沒有的優勢，我們有海洋經濟的活力和靭性，高素質的人力資源、務實可靠的工程師文化、完整的產業鏈、敏捷靈活的中小企業，以及，永不屈服的創業精神。

我們要讓台灣經濟脫胎換骨，就必須從現在起就下定決心，勇敢地走出另外一條路。這一條路，就是打造台灣經濟發展的新模式。

新政府將打造一個以創新、就業、分配為核心價值，追求永續發展的新經濟模式。改革的第一步，就是強化經濟的活力與自主性，加強和全球及區域的連結，積極參與多邊及雙邊經濟合作及自由貿易談判，包括 TPP、RCEP 等，並且，推動新南向政策，提升對外經濟的格局及多元性，告別以往過於依賴單一市場的現象。

除此之外，新政府相信，唯有激發新的成長動能，我們才能突破當前經濟的停滯不前。我們會以出口和內需作為雙引擎，讓企業生產和人民生活互為表裡，讓對外貿易和在地經濟緊密連結。

我們會優先推動五大創新研發計畫，藉著這些產業來重新塑造台灣的全球競爭力。我們也要積極提升勞動生產力，保障勞工權益，讓薪資和經濟成長能同步提升。

這是台灣經濟發展的關鍵時刻。我們有決心，也有溝通能力。我們已經有系統性的規劃，未來，會以跨部會聯手的模式，把整個國家的力量集結起來，一起來催生這個新模式。

在經濟發展的同時，我們不要忘記對環境的責任。經濟發展的新模式會和國土規劃、區域發展及環境永續，相互結合。產業的佈局和國土的利用，應該拋棄零碎的規畫，和短視近利的眼光。我們必須追求區域的均衡發展，這需要中央來規畫、整合，也需要地方政府充分發揮區域聯合治理的精神。

我們也不能再像過去，無止盡地揮霍自然資源及國民健康。所以，對各種汙染的控制，我們會嚴格把關，更要讓台灣走向循環經濟的時代，把廢棄物轉換為再生資源。對於能源的選擇，我們會以永續的觀念去逐步調整。新政府會嚴肅看待氣候變遷、國土保育、災害防治的相關議題，因為，我們只有一個地球，我們也只有一個台灣。

第二、強化社會安全網

新政府必須要承擔的第二件事情，就是強化台灣的社會安全網。這些年，幾件關於兒少安全及隨機殺人的事件，都讓整個社會震驚。不過，一個政府不能永遠在震驚，它必須要有同理心。沒有人可以替受害者家屬承受傷痛，但是，一個政府，尤其是第一線處理問題的人，必須要讓受害者以及家屬覺得，不幸事件發生的時候，政府是站在他們這一邊。

除了同理心之外，政府更應該要提出解決的方法。全力防止悲劇一再發生，從治安、教育、心理健康、社會工作等各個面向，積極把破洞補起來。尤其是治安與反毒的工作，這些事情，新政府會用最嚴肅的態度和行動來面對。

在年金的改革方面，這是攸關台灣生存發展的關鍵改革，我們不應該遲疑，也不可以躁進。由陳建仁副總統擔任召集人的年金改革委員會，已經緊鑼密鼓在籌備之中。過去的政府在這個議題上，曾經有過一些努力。但是，缺乏社會的參與。新政府的做法，是發動一個集體協商，因為年金改革必須是一個透過協商來團結所有人的過程。

這就是為什麼，我們要召開年金改革國是會議，由不同階層、不同職業代表，在社會團結的基礎上，共同協商。一年之內，我們會提出可行的改革方案。無論是勞工還是公務員，每一個國民的退休生活都應該得到公平的保障。

另外，在長期照顧的議題上，我們將會把優質、平價、普及的長期照顧系統建立起來。和年金改革一樣，長照體系也是一個社會總動員的過程。新政府的做法是由政府主導和規劃，鼓勵民間發揮社區主義的精神，透過社會集體互助的力量，來建立一套妥善而完整的體系。每一個老年人都可以在自己熟悉的社區，安心享受老年生活，每一個家庭的照顧壓力將會減輕。照顧老人的工作不能完全讓它變成自由市場。我們會把責任扛起來，按部就班來規劃與執行，為超高齡社會的來臨，做好準備。

第三、社會的公平與正義

新政府要承擔的第三件事情，就是社會的公平與正義。在這個議題上，新政府會持續和公民社會一起合作，讓台灣的政策更符合多元、平等、開放、透明、人權的價值，讓台灣的民主機制更加深化與進化。

新的民主制度要能夠上路，我們必須先找出面對過去的共同方法。未來，我會在總統府成立真相與和解委員會，用最誠懇與謹慎的態度，來處理過去的歷史。追求轉型正義的目標是在追求社會的真正和解，讓所有台灣人都記取那個時代的錯誤。

我們將從真相的調查與整理出發，預計在三年之內，完成台灣自己的轉型正義調查報告書。我們將會依據調查報告所揭示的真相，來進行後續的轉型正義工作。挖掘真相、彌平傷痕、釐清責任。從此以後，過去的歷史不再是台灣分裂的原因，而是台灣一起往前走的動力。

同樣在公平正義的議題上，我會秉持相同的原則，來面對原住民族的議題。今天的就職典禮，原住民族的小朋友在唱國歌之前，先唱了他們部落傳統的古調。這象徵了，我們不敢忘記，這個島上先來後到的順序。

新政府會用道歉的態度，來面對原住民族相關議題，重建原民史觀，逐步推動自治，復育語言文化，提升生活照顧，這就是我要領導新政府推動的改變。

接下來，新政府也會積極推動司法改革。這是現階段台灣人民最關心的議題。司法無法親近人民、不被人民信任、司法無法有效打擊犯罪，以及，司法失去作為正義最後一道防線的功能，是人民普遍的感受。

為了展現新政府的決心，我們會在今年十月召開司法國是會議，透過人民實際的參與，讓社會力進來，一起推動司法改革。司法必須回應人民的需求，不再只是法律人的司法，而是全民的司法。司法改革也不只是司法人的家務事，而是全民參與的改革。這就是我對司法改革的期待。

第四、區域的和平穩定發展及兩岸關係

新政府要承擔的第四件事情，是區域的和平穩定與發展，以及妥善處理兩岸關係。過去三十年，無論是對亞洲或是全球，都是變動最劇烈的時期；而全球及區域的經濟穩定和集體安全，也是各國政府越來越關切的課題。

台灣在區域發展當中，一直是不可或缺的關鍵角色。但是近年來，區域的情勢快速變動，如果台灣不善用自己的實力和籌碼，積極參與區域事務，不但將會變得無足輕重，甚至可能被邊緣化，喪失對於未來的自主權。

我們有危機，但也有轉機。台灣現階段的經濟發展，和區域中許多國家高度關聯和互補。如果將打造經濟發展新模式的努力，透過和亞洲、乃至亞太區域的國家合作，共同形塑未來的發展策略，不但可以為區域的經濟創新、結構調整和永續發展，做出積極的貢獻，更可以和區域內的成員，建立緊密的「經濟共同體」意識。

我們要和其他國家共享資源、人才與市場，擴大經濟規模，讓資源有效利用。「新南向政策」就是基於這樣的精神。我們會在科技、文化與經貿等各層面，和區域成員廣泛交流合作，尤其是增進與東協、印度的多元關係。為此，我們也願意和對岸，就共同參與區域發展的相關議題，坦誠交換意見，尋求各種合作與協力的可能性。

在積極發展經濟的同時，亞太地區的安全情勢也變得越來越複雜，而兩岸關係，也成為建構區域和平與集體安全的重要一環。這個建構的進程，台灣會做一個「和平的堅定維護者」，積極參與，絕不缺席；我們也將致力維持兩岸關係的和平穩定；我們更會努力促成內部和解，強化民主機制，凝聚共識，形成一致對外的立場。

對話和溝通，是我們達成目標最重要的關鍵。台灣也要成為一個「和平的積極溝通者」，我們將和相關的各方，建立常態、緊密的溝通機制，隨時交換意見，防止誤判，建立互信，有效解決爭議。我們將謹守和平原則、利益共享原則，來處理相關的爭議。

我依照中華民國憲法當選總統，我有責任捍衛中華民國的主權和領土；對於東海及南海問題，我們主張應擱置爭議，共同開發。

兩岸之間的對話與溝通，我們也將努力維持現有的機制。1992 年兩岸兩會秉持相互諒解、求同存異的政治思維，進行溝通協商，達成若干的共同認知與諒解，我尊重這個歷史事實。92 年之後，20 多年來雙方交流、協商所累積形成的現狀與成果，兩岸都應該共同珍惜與維護，並在這個既有的事實與政治基礎上，持續推動兩岸關係和平穩定發展；新政府會依據中華民國憲法、兩岸人民關係條例及其他相關法律，處理兩岸事務。兩岸的兩個執政黨應該要放下歷史包袱，展開良性對話，造福兩岸人民。

我所講的既有政治基礎，包含幾個關鍵元素，第一，1992 年兩岸兩會會談的歷史事實與求同存異的共同認知，這是歷史事實；第二，中華民國現行憲政體制；第三，兩岸過去 20 多年來協商和交流互動的成果；第四，台灣民主原則及普遍民意。

第五、外交與全球性議題

新政府要承擔的第五件事情，是善盡地球公民的責任，在外交與全球性的議題上做出貢獻。讓台灣走向世界，也要讓世界走進台灣。

現場有許多來自各國的元首與使節團，我要特別謝謝他們，長久以來一直幫助台灣，讓我們有機會參與國際社會。未來，我們會持續透過官方互動、企業投資與民間合作各種方式，分享台灣發展的經驗，與友邦建立永續的夥伴關係。

台灣是全球公民社會的模範生，民主化以來，我們始終堅持和平、自由、民主及人權的普世價值。我們會秉持這個精神，加入全球議題的價值同盟。我們會繼續深化與包括美國、日本、歐洲在內的友好民主國家的關係，在共同的價值基礎上，推動全方位的合作。

我們會積極參與國際經貿合作及規則制定，堅定維護全球的經濟秩序，並且融入重要的區域經貿體系。我們也不會在防制全球暖化、氣候變遷的議題上缺席。我們將會在行政院設立專責的能源和減碳辦公室，並且根據 COP21 巴黎協議的規定，定期檢討溫室氣體的減量目標，與友好國家攜手，共同維護永續的地球。

同時，新政府會支持並參與，全球性新興議題的國際合作，包括人道救援、醫療援助、疾病的防治與研究、反恐合作，以及共同打擊跨國犯罪，讓台灣成為國際社會不可或缺的夥伴。

結語

1996 年台灣第一次總統直選，到今天剛好 20 年。過去 20 年，在幾任政府以及公民社會的努力之下，我們成功渡過了許多新興民主國家必須面對的難關。在這個過程中，我們曾經有過許多感動人心的時刻和故事，不過，正如同世界上其他國家一樣，我們也曾經有過焦慮、不安、矛盾、與對立。

我們看到了社會的對立，進步與保守的對立，環境與開發的對立，以及，政治意識之間的對立。這些對立，曾經激發出選舉時的動員能量，不過也因為這些對立，我們的民主逐漸失去了解決問題的能力。

民主是一個進程，每一個時代的政治工作者，都要清楚認識他身上所肩負的責任。民主會前進，民主也有可能倒退。今天，我站在這裡，就是要告訴大家，倒退不會是我們的選項。新政府的責任就是把台灣的民主推向下一個階段：以前的民主是選舉的輸贏，現在的民主則是關於人民的幸福；以前的民主是兩個價值觀的對決，現在的民主則是不同價值觀的對話。

打造一個沒有被意識形態綁架的「團結的民主」，打造一個可以回應社會與經濟問題的「有效率的民主」，打造一個能夠實質照料人民的「務實的民主」，這就是新時代的意義。

只要我們相信，新時代就會來臨。只要這個國家的主人，有堅定的信念，新時代一定會在我們這一代人的手上誕生。

各位親愛的台灣人民，演講要結束了，改革要開始了。從這一刻起，這個國家的擔子交在新政府身上。我會讓大家看見這個國家的改變。

歷史會記得我們這個勇敢的世代，這個國家的繁榮、尊嚴、團結、自信和公義，都有我們努力的痕跡。歷史會記得我們的勇敢，我們在 2016 年一起把國家帶向新的方向。這塊土地上的每一個人，都因為參與台灣的改變，而感到驕傲。

剛才表演節目中的一首歌曲當中，有一句讓我很感動的歌詞：

（台語）現在是彼一天，勇敢ㄟ台灣人。

各位國人同胞，兩千三百萬的台灣人民，等待已經結束，現在就是那一天。今天，明天，未來的每一天，我們都要做一個守護民主、守護自由、守護這個國家的台灣人。

謝謝大家。

TOP   HOME    [◆ Directory Inaugural Addresses]    [Tsai 2016]

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2020—Tsai Ing-wen

Jump to Chinese version  Lee 1996 Chen 2000 Chen 2004 Ma 2008 Ma 2012 Tsai 2016 Lai 2024

Vice President Lai, esteemed guests, friends watching on TV and online, my fellow citizens across the country, good morning.

A Taiwanese Community

I feel immensely grateful to stand here once again today and take on the responsibility entrusted to me by the Taiwanese people.

This inauguration ceremony is unique in the history of the Republic of China. What makes it special is not its size or the number of people in attendance. It is special because we know how difficult it has been for us to get to this point.

I want to thank the people of Taiwan for making such a difficult feat possible.

I particularly want to thank a group of people who have not received a lot of attention over the past four months in our fight against COVID-19. I want to thank every single person who waited in line outside of the pharmacy in the early days of the coronavirus outbreak. Thank you for your patience, and thank you for trusting the government. You have shown the world Taiwan's commitment to civic virtues, even in times of greatest distress.

I also want to thank everyone who was quarantined or isolated at home, putting up with inconvenience in your daily life to keep others safe and healthy. Thank you for exemplifying humanity's best qualities and helping us successfully bring the coronavirus outbreak under control.

This sense of pride in our country, this community's shared destiny, and the memories of these past months will live on in all of our hearts. This is what solidarity feels like.

Many ambassadors and representatives from other countries are here today, and I trust that many countries around the world are watching Taiwan as well.

I want to take this opportunity to tell you that the country you see is populated by kind and resilient people. No matter the difficulties we face, we can always count on our democracy, our solidarity, and our sense of responsibility towards each other to help us overcome challenges, weather difficult times, and stand steadfast in the world.

Unprecedented Challenges and Unparalleled Opportunities

From January to now, Taiwan has amazed the international community twice. The first was our democratic elections, and the second was our success in the fight against COVID-19.

In recent months, Taiwan's name has appeared in headlines around the world, thanks to our successful containment of the coronavirus outbreak.

"Taiwan" is also emblazoned on the boxes of supplies we are sending abroad. The Taiwanese people have the kindest hearts in the entire world, and we will always offer help to the international community whenever we are able.

I hope that in addition to sharing in a sense of pride and joy, my fellow citizens can take to heart the spirit of "helping ourselves to help others"; "when we help ourselves, others will help us".

This pandemic has not yet ended, and we must remain vigilant. Even when it ends, its impacts will linger on.

The coronavirus has profoundly affected our world. It has changed the global political and economic order, accelerated and expanded the reorganization of global supply chains, restructured the global economy, and changed the way we live and shop. It has even changed the way the international community views Taiwan and developments in the surrounding region.

These changes present us with both challenges and opportunities. I want to ask that my fellow citizens be prepared, because countless challenges and difficulties remain ahead of us.

Over the next four years, only those who can end the pandemic within their borders, lay out a strategy for their country's survival and development, and take advantage of opportunities in the complex world of tomorrow, will be able to set themselves apart on the international stage.

It takes more than fervor to govern a country. Leadership means calmly taking the right direction in a changing world. That is precisely what I have done over the past four years.

I said before that I will leave you with a better country. So over the next four years, I will proactively develop our industries, foster a safe society, ensure national security, and deepen our democracy. I am going to reinvent Taiwan and lead our country into the future.

National Development

1. Industrial and Economic Development

I know that the Taiwanese people are most concerned about our industrial and economic development. In 2016, we initiated a new economic development model to help connect Taiwan's economy to the world. Over the past four years, despite massive changes in the international economy, Taiwan has done more than just weather the storm. Our economic growth has once again topped the Four Asian Tigers, and the stock market index now regularly breaks 10,000 points.

Thanks to our successful control of the pandemic, so far, Taiwan is able to maintain positive economic growth. This is rare in the world. However, we need to continue to take early action on economic relief and revitalization, and do whatever it takes to maintain stable economic growth.

Over the next four years, we will face more intense changes in the global economy and the accelerated reorganization of supply chains. We will continue to implement our Forward-looking Infrastructure Development and trillion NT-dollar investment programs. We will do so in the spirit of "achieving growth through stability, and seizing opportunity amid changes", in order to secure Taiwan's economic development over the coming decades.

In terms of industrial development, we are going to take advantage of the opportunities before us in six core strategic industries founded on our 5+2 Innovative Industries Program, to transform Taiwan into a critical force in the global economy.

● Six Core Strategic Industries

First, we will continue to develop our information and digital industries. We will take advantage of Taiwan's strengths in the semiconductor and ICT industries to secure a central role in global supply chains, and make Taiwan a major base for the development of next generation technologies, including IoT and AI.

Second, we are going to develop a cybersecurity industry that can integrate with 5G, digital transformation, and our national security. We will strive to create cybersecurity systems and an industrial chain that can protect our country and earn the world's trust.

Third, we are going to create biotech and medical technology industries integrated with the rest of the world. Throughout this pandemic, Taiwanese teams have proven that they are capable of working with world-class technologies to produce reagents and develop new drugs and vaccines. We are going to give these industries our utmost support, and transform Taiwan into a key force in the global battle against infectious diseases.

Fourth, we are going to develop national defense and strategic industries by integrating military and civilian capabilities. In addition to domestically-produced naval vessel and aircraft programs that are currently underway, we will push harder to promote technological integration between the military and the private sector, to stimulate private sector production capabilities, and advance into the aviation and space industries.

Fifth, we are going to accelerate the development of green energy and renewable energy industries. Over the past four years, renewable energy has experienced explosive growth, and Taiwan has become a hotspot for international investment. Building on this foundation, I am confident that we will achieve our goal of deriving 20% of our overall energy from green sources by 2025. We are going to make Taiwan a center for green energy in Asia.

Sixth, we are going to establish strategic stockpile industries that can ensure the steady provision of critical supplies. Facing changes to the global order, we need to keep key industrial chains in Taiwan and maintain a certain degree of self-sufficiency in the production of face masks, medical and daily supplies, energy, and food.

In the current international climate, countries that end their dependence on others will have a head start on national development. I would like our friends across all industries to rest assured that our government stands with you. Over the next few years, we have several strategies to drive the growth of our industries.

● Industrial Development Strategy

First, we will use domestic demand, particularly demand from the public sector and national security needs, as the basic engine for our industrial development.

A prime example of this is the way strategic demand for face masks and other medical supplies throughout this pandemic has spurred the development of related industries. We can adopt a similar model for our national defense and renewable energy industries to help accelerate their development.

We will continue to organize "national teams", like our face mask team, according to the size and conditions of different industries. We will utilize our government's guarantee of domestic demand to establish a global strategic materials manufacturing industry under the "Taiwanese brand" and help it expand into other markets.

We know that financial support is crucial to industrial development. Looking to the future, we will adopt more flexible financial policies, continue to reform financial systems, and use more diverse means to help industries obtain the financing they need.

We will also work to create a safe environment for our industries. Our government is committed to maintaining sound public health and national security systems, a stable society, strong rule of law, and a healthy market. We need to offer these guarantees so that high-tech and strategic industries will be willing to choose Taiwan as their production and R&D base.

We will also continue to guide the global expansion of our industries. We will keep working to sign trade or investment protection agreements with the United States, Japan, and European countries.

As we continue to promote our New Southbound Policy, we will also develop other potential markets and encourage firms to establish operations there, giving our industries an edge when they engage in international cooperation. Overseas Taiwanese business communities around the world will be our best partners as we seek new international opportunities.

Finally, we have the issue of talent. In order for Taiwan to become a key global economic force, we need a diverse talent pool. My government will bring in the world's top technical, R&D, and management talents to help globalize Taiwan's workforce, widen our industries' horizons, and give them the ability to compete in the international arena.

Looking to the future, Taiwan must further connect with the international community. We will work to cultivate more outstanding bilingual and digital talents, giving our industries a global competitive edge.

Over the next four years, Taiwan's economy will enter a new stage, complete with more flexible capital and talent flows, more robust industrial capabilities, and closer ties with the world. Together, we are going to enter a new era of shared prosperity.

2. Safe Society: Health and Social Safety Nets to Catch Those Who Need Help

As we develop our industries, we will also keep in mind that the people expect the government to foster a safe society. To be a better country, the government must take on more responsibilities to reduce the burden on the people and mitigate issues in society.

Over the past few years, we have addressed Long-term Care 2.0, childcare, and residential justice issues. Over the next four years, my goal is to weave an even tighter net that can catch every single person who needs help and prevent future tragedies.

● Health and Disease Prevention Safety Net

First, we will strengthen our health and disease prevention safety net. Taiwan is an ageing society, and infectious diseases pose a serious challenge to the health of our people. That is why we need to bolster our disease prevention and treatment capabilities and link industries to make more breakthroughs in vaccine and new drug development, as well as infectious disease prevention and treatment, so that people can enjoy healthy lives and receive better care.

● Mending Gaps in the Social Safety Net

Our second step will be to mend the gaps in our social safety net. Over the past few years, a great deal of discussion has arisen around public safety incidents involving schizophrenia patients. The same goes for other mental illnesses, drug addiction, and domestic violence.

I understand your concerns. These issues are not just the responsibility of individuals or families, they are the responsibility of the government. When families are unable to provide proper care, the government has a duty to step in and help.

I am going to upgrade our social care system, enhance the capabilities of frontline social workers, and improve their work environments, so that they can work at the grassroots and identify people who have fallen through the gaps in our safety net.

We cannot hold medical agencies or individual judges solely responsible for controversies surrounding specific cases. Our judicial and executive branches should reevaluate and optimize these systems and take initiatives to make any necessary legal amendments.

3. National Security: National Defense Reforms, Active International Participation, Peaceful and Stable Cross-strait Relations

A better country requires a greater emphasis on national security. Over the past four years, we have pushed for national defense reforms, active international participation, and peaceful, stable cross-strait relations. We hope that Taiwan can play a more active role in the peace, stability, and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. Over the next four years, the direction of our policies will remain the same, and we will do even more.

● National Defense Reforms

We have three important directions for our national defense reforms. First is accelerating the development of our asymmetrical capabilities. While we work to bolster our defense capabilities, future combat capacity development will also emphasize mobility, countermeasures, and non-traditional asymmetrical capabilities. We will also work to strengthen our defenses against the threats of cyber warfare, cognitive warfare, and "unrestricted" warfare to achieve our strategic goal of multidomain deterrence.

The second is substantive reforms to our military reserve and mobilization systems. We need to enhance the quality of our reserve forces, as well as their weapons, equipment, and training, in order to achieve effective jointness with our regular forces. We also need to establish a standing, interdepartmental system connecting our reserve and mobilization systems. This system will help coordinate personnel and supplies, so that we can successfully mobilize during a transition from peacetime to war.

Third is improvements to our military's management institutions. Today's young servicemembers have all grown up in a democratic society, and one of our most important missions will be to find ways for them to better utilize their professional skills in line with military needs.

Some young servicemembers have difficulties adjusting to military needs, reflecting the gap between today's society and our military management institutions. We need to work to close that gap. We need to reduce negative societal views of the military and end the gradual erosion of our military's prestige and morale due to individual incidents caused by imperfect institutions.

Thus, we will improve appeal and counseling mechanisms within the military, establish a fair and equitable incident investigation mechanism, and regularly evaluate personnel placements. In terms of education and training, we will strengthen leadership capacities across all levels of leadership and foster a modern management system that emphasizes professionalism.

We need to strike a balance between the team-oriented military discipline needed for actual combat and society's respect for the individual.

● Active International Participation

Over the past four years, we have actively taken part in addressing major global issues, including counter-terrorism cooperation, humanitarian assistance, religious freedom, and nontraditional security.

Throughout this global pandemic, we have been praised for providing selfless assistance to the international community wherever we are able.

Taiwan has been deemed a democratic success story, a reliable partner, and a force for good in the world by the international community. All Taiwanese people should take pride in this.

Over the next four years, we will continue to fight for our participation in international organizations, strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation with our allies, and bolster ties with the United States, Japan, Europe, and other like-minded countries.

We will also participate more actively in regional cooperation mechanisms and work hand-in-hand with countries in the region to make concrete contributions to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.

● Peaceful and Stable Cross-strait Relations

In the face of complex and changing cross-strait circumstances, we have made the greatest effort to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait over the past four years, gaining approval from the international community. We will continue these efforts, and we are willing to engage in dialogue with China and make more concrete contributions to regional security.

Here, I want to reiterate the words "peace, parity, democracy, and dialogue". We will not accept the Beijing authorities' use of "one country, two systems" to downgrade Taiwan and undermine the cross-strait status quo. We stand fast by this principle.

We will continue to handle cross-strait affairs according to the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. This has been our consistent position for maintaining the peaceful and stable status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

Cross-strait relations have reached a historical turning point. Both sides have a duty to find a way to coexist over the long term and prevent the intensification of antagonism and differences. Faced with changing circumstances, I will hold firm to my principles, adopt an open attitude to resolve issues, and shoulder my responsibilities as President. I also hope that the leader on the other side of the Strait will take on the same responsibility, and work with us to jointly stabilize the long-term development of cross-strait relations.

Strengthening State Institutions and Democracy

While we work to achieve national development, it is crucial that we optimize our government institutions over the next four years. Our Legislative Yuan will establish a constitutional amendment committee, giving us a platform to engage in dialogue and reach a consensus on constitutional reforms pertaining to government systems and people's rights.

This democratic process will enable the constitutional system to progress with the times and align with the values of Taiwanese society. Our first priority should be to lower the voting age from 20 to 18, an issue on which both the majority and opposition parties are in agreement.

In terms of judicial reform, I delivered on my promise to convene a National Congress on Judicial Reform, and we completed amendments to the Judges Act, the Attorney Regulation Act, the Constitutional Court Procedure Act, and the Labor Incident Act. This is all base work for the further improvement of our judicial system.

However, our judicial reforms are still in transition, and our current progress has not yet met the public's expectations. I will continue to solicit opinions from across society and keep pressing forward. The people's dissatisfaction drives us to continue on the path of reform.

Within the next four years, we need to implement a lay judge system, so that citizens can act as lay judges in court and become catalysts for judicial reform. This will help bridge the distance between the people and our judicial system, so that it aligns better with their expectations and earns their trust.

All constitutional institutions must also continue on the path of reform. The Executive Yuan will reevaluate and reinitiate its organizational reform process, including the establishment of a specialized digital development agency and adjustments to all ministries in line with current needs. This will enable governance capabilities to be more responsive to the needs of national development.

The National Human Rights Commission under the Control Yuan will officially be established in August of this year. This will be a milestone in our journey to place human rights at the center of Taiwan's national ethos, and marks the start of a new chapter for the Control Yuan.

Our new Examination Yuan team will be instated in September, and I will ask them to propose a comprehensive reform plan and evaluate past policies, so that they can become an effective human resource department that can cultivate the talent a modern government needs.

Conclusion

My fellow citizens, over the past 70 years, the Republic of China (Taiwan) has grown more resilient and unified through countless challenges. We have resisted the pressure of aggression and annexation. We have made the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Although we were once isolated in the world, we have always persisted in the values of democracy and freedom, no matter the challenges ahead of us. We will always remain committed to our common belief: Taiwan must help ourselves to help others, and when we help ourselves, others will help us.

Many of the heroes in our fight against COVID-19 are here with us today, including members of our national face mask team, our Central Epidemic Command Center's public health team, and Premier Su Tseng-chang's team.

There are many more heroes from all walks of life not in attendance today: medical workers, postal workers, pharmacists, convenience store clerks, taxi drivers, and many more.

I may not be able to call out all of your names, but I want everyone to know that Taiwan has overcome countless challenges over the past 70 years, relying on not just one or two heroes, but thanks to countless heroes such as yourselves, working together to turn the wheels of history. You have helped make Taiwan a happy, safe, and prosperous place for generations to come.

I want to express my respect to all of you. Every single person in Taiwan is a hero. Vice President Lai and I are honored to take on the responsibility you have entrusted to us.

Taking on the responsibility of the President of the Republic of China in such difficult times brings me more pressure than joy. But I will not back down, because all of you are with me.

The path forward will not be easy, and greater challenges await us. But we are a country that has persevered through even the greatest hardships. We, the 23 million people, have always been and will always be a community with a shared destiny.

I truly hope that all of my fellow citizens will remember how it felt to come together to overcome the challenges of the past few months. The Republic of China can be united. Taiwan can be safe. Being Taiwanese can be an honor that makes you hold your head high.

My dear citizens, the path ahead of us is long, and we are about to begin a new chapter in Taiwan's story. Taiwan's story belongs to each and every one of us, and it needs each and every one of us.

I ask that the 23 million people of Taiwan act as our guides and partners. Let us pool our wisdom and courage and make this country a better place together. Thank you.

TOP   HOME    [◆ Directory Inaugural Addresses]    [Tsai 2020]


【中華民國第十五任總統蔡英文就職演說 全文】

———[英文版]———  ———[下一章]———  ———[上一章]———

賴副總統、現場的各位貴賓、電視機前跟網路上的朋友、全體國人同胞，大家好。

（一）作為共同體的台灣

今天我站在這裡，以無比感恩的心情，再次承擔台灣人民交付給我的責任。

這是中華民國史上，最特別的總統就職典禮。它特別的地方，不在於典禮的規模，也不在於參與的人數，而在於，我們都知道，這一路走來有多麼不容易。

我要感謝台灣人民，是你們讓這麼不容易的事，在台灣發生。

我要特別謝謝一些人，他們在過去這四個月的防疫期間，很少被人提及。我要謝謝每一位在防疫初期，在藥房門口排隊的台灣人民。謝謝你們的耐心，以及謝謝你們對政府的信任。是你們讓全世界看到，台灣，即使在最不安的時刻，也能保持公民的美德。

我也要謝謝那些居家檢疫、居家隔離的人。你們忍受生活的不便，為的是保護他人的健康。謝謝你們，展現人性中最善良的一面，成就台灣防疫的成功。

國家的光榮感，生死與共的共同體，這一段記憶，將會存在我們每一個人心中。團結的感覺，就是這個樣子。

我們今天現場，有許多各國使節代表，而且我相信，世界上一定有許多國家，也都在關心台灣。

我想藉著這個機會告訴你們，你們看到的國家，有一群善良而堅韌的人民。這一群人民，無論在多麼艱難的環境中，依然能靠著我們的民主、我們的團結，和我們對彼此的責任感，克服挑戰、度過難關，讓台灣在世界上屹立不搖。

（二）空前的挑戰和絕佳的機會

從一月到現在，台灣連續兩次讓國際社會驚豔。第一次是我們的民主選舉，第二次則是我們的防疫成績。

過去這一段時間，因為防疫的成功，「台灣」出現在全世界的各大新聞媒體上。

「台灣」也寫在我們一箱又一箱送往國外的物資上頭。台灣人是世界上最良善的一群人，當我們有能力的時候，一定會向國際社會伸出援手。

我也希望全體國人同胞，除了分享光榮跟喜悅之外，也能體會「自助助人、自助人助」的精神。

疫情還沒有完全結束，我們不能有絲毫鬆懈。就算疫情過去了，衝擊也不會立刻散去。

這次疫情對全球的衝擊既深又廣，它改變了全球政治經濟的秩序，不僅加速、加大了全球供應鏈的重組，重新排列了經濟板塊，也改變了人們的生活和消費型態，甚至也改變了國際社會對台灣和周邊情勢的想像。

這些改變是挑戰，但也是機會。我要請所有的國人同胞做好準備，因為接下來，還有各種考驗和難關在等著我們。

未來四年，誰能從疫情中脫困；誰能針對疫情所帶來的改變，研擬國家的生存發展策略。誰能在疫情過後，複雜詭譎的國際情勢間，掌握機會，誰就能讓國家在世界中脫穎而出。

治理國家從來不能依賴激情，而是要在變局中，保持冷靜、指出方向。過去四年，這一點，我做到了。

我說過，我會留下一個更好的國家給各位。所以，下一個四年，在產業發展、社會安定、國家安全、民主深化，這四大面向上，我也會超前部署，讓台灣脫胎換骨，我會帶領台灣迎向未來。

（三）國家建設工程

1. 產業與經濟發展

我知道，台灣人民最關心的，就是我們的產業和經濟的發展。我們在 2016 年啟動了「經濟發展新模式」，致力讓台灣經濟走向世界。四年來，在國際經濟的巨大變局下，台灣不僅挺了過來，經濟成長更回到四小龍的第一名，股市萬點也成為常態。

因為疫情控制得當，台灣至今，仍然可以維持經濟正成長，這是全球少有的。但我們在紓困以及振興經濟上，必須持續超前部署，全力維持經濟穩定成長。

未來四年，我們面對的，是全球經濟更劇烈變動，和供應鏈加速重整的局面。在整體經濟方面，我們將秉持「穩定中追求成長、變局中把握先機」的政策理念，持續落實前瞻基礎建設、兆元投資等重大計畫，來鞏固未來幾十年的經濟發展。

在產業發展方面，我們更要抓住時機，在 5+2 產業創新的既有基礎上，打造「六大核心戰略產業」，讓台灣成為未來全球經濟的關鍵力量。

● 六大核心戰略產業

第一，台灣要持續強化資訊及數位相關產業發展。我們要利用半導體和資通訊產業的優勢，全力搶占全球供應鏈的核心地位，讓台灣成為下一個世代，資訊科技的重要基地，全力促進物聯網和人工智慧的發展。

第二，台灣要發展可以結合5G時代、數位轉型、以及國家安全的資安產業。我們要全力打造可以有效保護自己，也能被世界信賴的資安系統及產業鏈。

第三，我們要打造接軌全球的生物及醫療科技產業。這次疫情中，無論是試劑製造、或是新藥和疫苗的研發，「台灣團隊」都有足夠的能力，跟全球頂尖技術接軌。我們要全力扶持相關產業，讓台灣成為全球克服疫病挑戰的關鍵力量。

第四，我們要發展軍民整合的國防及戰略產業。除了已經在進行當中的國艦國造、國機國造，我們會更強力推動軍民技術整合，激發民間製造能量，更進一步進軍航空及太空產業。

第五，我們要加速發展綠電及再生能源產業。過去四年，再生能源有飛躍性的發展，台灣成為國際再生能源投資的熱點。在這個基礎上，2025 年綠能占整體能源百分之二十的目標，我有信心可以達成，台灣將成為亞太綠能中心。

第六，我們還要建構足以確保關鍵物資供應的民生及戰備產業。面對未來的全球秩序變化，從口罩、醫療及民生用品、能源到糧食供應，我們要把重要的產業鏈留在國內，維持一定的自給率。

在當前的國際局勢中，誰能擺脫依賴，誰就掌握國家生存發展的先機。我要請所有產業界的朋友們放心，政府不會讓產業孤單。在未來幾年，我們有幾個主要的策略，來全力帶動產業發展。

● 產業發展策略

首先，我們要將國內需求，作為基礎能量，來帶動產業發展。尤其是公共部門的需求，以及維持國家安全的基本需求。

像是在這次疫情中，口罩等防疫物資的戰略需求，帶動了相關產業的發展，就是最好的例子。我們的國防產業和再生能源產業，也都能循著類似的模式，加速發展。

不只有口罩國家隊，未來，我們也會視各產業的規模及條件，組成國家隊。藉由政府對內部需求的保證，建立「台灣品牌」的全球戰略物資製造業，並且拓展到其他市場。

再來，我們知道，金融支援是產業發展最重要的環節。未來，我們會採取更靈活的金融政策，持續改革金融體制，運用更多元的金融手段，來協助產業的資金需求。

我們也會全力打造安全的產業環境。政府將致力於維持完善的公衛體系、堅固的國家安全體系、穩定的社會、良好的法治、以及健全的市場。有了這些保證，全球的高科技和戰略性產業，才會願意選擇台灣，作為生產和研發基地。

接下來，我們也要持續引導產業布局全球。和美、日、歐洽簽貿易或投資保障協定，這個目標我們會繼續努力。

我們持續推動新南向政策的同時，也會積極開拓其他有潛力的市場，鼓勵廠商前往布局，為產業的國際合作，創造更有利的條件。當我們在全球尋找機會時，各地的台商將會是我們最好的夥伴。

最後，則是人才的問題。台灣要成為全球經濟的關鍵力量，就必須匯聚各方的人才。蔡英文的政府，會全力爭取國際上最頂尖的技術、研發和管理人才，讓台灣產業的團隊能夠更加國際化，擁有全球競爭的視野和能力。

未來，台灣更要和國際進一步接軌，我們將在雙語國家及數位領域上，培養更多的本土人才和菁英，讓產業有更強的國際競爭力。

未來四年，更融通的金流、更活水的人流、更強勁的產業實力、更與世界緊密連結的台灣，將開啟嶄新的經濟格局，迎向繁榮新時代。

2. 社會安定：醫療健康網、社會安全網，接住每個需要幫助的人

產業發展的同時，我們不會忘記社會安定，也是人民對政府的重要期待。一個更好的國家，政府必須要擔起更多責任，來減輕人民的負擔，減少社會的問題。

過去幾年，我們把長照 2.0、幼托照顧、居住正義的問題，一個一個補了起來。未來四年，我的目標，就是要把這張網，做得更綿密，接住每一個需要幫助的人，盡量不要讓憾事再發生。

● 健康防疫安全網

首先，我們要更強化健康和防疫安全網。台灣已經是高齡社會，疫病的流行，對人民的健康是嚴厲的挑戰。因此我們必須強化疫病防治和醫療能量，結合產業，在疫苗和藥物的開發、以及傳染病防治的領域，有更多突破，讓人民可以更健康、受到更好的照顧。

● 社會安全網補漏網

接著，我們要把社會安全網的漏洞補起來。這幾年來，有幾起跟「思覺失調症」患者相關的治安事件，引起很多討論。不只是「思覺失調症」，其他精神疾病、毒癮、家庭暴力等問題也一樣。

我了解民眾的憂慮，這不只是個人或家庭的事，更是政府的事。當家庭無法妥善照顧這些患者時，政府就有責任介入協助。

我會強化社會照顧體系，提升第一線的社工能量，改善他們的工作環境，讓社工能夠深入最基層，把過去社會安全網沒有接住的人找出來。

另外，對於個案所引發的爭議，我們不能把責任全部推給醫療部門、或個別法官。司法和行政部門，應該要檢討制度、優化制度，該修法的地方，就應該要著手修正。

3. 國家安全：國防事務改革、積極參與國際、兩岸和平穩定

一個更好的國家，也必須重視國家安全。過去四年，我們推動國防事務改革、積極參與國際，維持兩岸關係的和平穩定，希望讓台灣在印太地區的和平、穩定與繁榮，扮演更積極的角色。未來四年，這些政策方向不會改變，我們也會做得更多。

● 國防事務改革

在國防事務改革方面，有三個重要的方向。第一是加速發展「不對稱戰力」。在強化防衛固守能力的同時，未來戰力的發展，將著重機動、反制、非傳統的不對稱戰力；並且能夠有效防衛「網路戰」、「認知戰」、以及「超限戰」的威脅，達成重層嚇阻的戰略目標。

第二是後備動員制度的實質改革。我們要提高後備部隊的人員素質和武器裝備；後備戰力提高，才能有效地跟常備軍隊協同作戰。此外，平常就要建立跨部會的常設後備動員體制，協調人力物力，平戰轉換時，動員才會順利。

第三是改善部隊管理制度。現在的年輕士官兵，都是在民主自由的社會長大，如何讓他們在軍中，發揮更好的戰力和專長，這是必須正視的課題。

年輕人從軍出現適應上的問題，反映出社會轉變和軍中管理制度的落差。我們必須把落差補起來，不要因為制度的不周全，影響了社會對軍隊的觀感，也造成軍人的榮譽和士氣，在一個又一個的個案中，被消耗掉。

因此，我們要在制度上，強化軍中申訴關懷機制、建立公允的事件調查機制、以及滾動檢討人事配置。在教育訓練上，則要提升各級幹部領導統御能力，達成管理的現代化、專業化。

我們要在維持戰力的團隊軍紀，以及社會價值對個人的尊重之間，取得均衡。

● 積極參與國際社會

在國際層面，過去四年，我們積極參與各項國際重大議題，包括反恐合作、人道援助、宗教自由、以及非傳統安全等重要全球議題。

在這次國際疫情中，我們在能力範圍內，對國際社會展開無私援助，受到了高度肯定。

台灣，已經被國際定位為民主成功故事、可信賴夥伴、世界良善力量，這是台灣人民的共同驕傲。

未來四年，我們會持續爭取參與國際組織，強化和友邦的共榮合作，和美、日、歐等共享價值的國家，深化夥伴關係。

我們也會更積極參與區域的合作機制，和區域相關國家攜手，共同為印太區域的和平、穩定與繁榮，做出實際貢獻。

● 和平穩定的兩岸關係

面對複雜多變的兩岸情勢，過去四年，我們盡力為兩岸和平穩定，做出最大的努力，也獲得國際社會的肯定；我們會持續努力，也願意跟對岸展開對話，為區域安全，做出更具體的貢獻。

我要再次重申「和平、對等、民主、對話」這八個字。我們不會接受北京當局，以「一國兩制」矮化台灣，破壞台海的現狀，這是我們堅定不移的原則。

我們也會持續遵循中華民國憲法，與兩岸人民關係條例，來處理兩岸事務。這是我們維持台海和平穩定現狀的一貫立場。

兩岸關係正處於歷史的轉折點，雙方都有責任，謀求長遠相處之道，避免對立與分歧的擴大。在變局之中，我會堅守原則，並秉持解決問題的開放態度，負起責任，也期盼對岸領導人，能承擔起相對的責任，共同穩定兩岸關係的長遠發展。

（四）國家體制強化及民主深化

未來四年，除了國家建設的工程，政府體制的優化，也非常重要。立法院即將成立修憲委員會，提供一個平台，讓攸關政府制度、以及人民權利的各項憲政體制改革議題，能夠被充分對話、形成共識。

藉由這個民主過程，憲政體制將更能夠與時俱進，契合台灣社會的價值。而朝野都有共識的18歲公民權，更應該優先來推動。

在司法改革方面，上個任期，我實現了「司改國是會議」的承諾，讓「法官法」、「律師法」、「憲法訴訟法」、以及「勞動事件法」陸續完成修法，這都是改善司法體質的基礎工程。

但是司改還在轉型期，現階段的成果，和人民的期待，還有一段距離。我會繼續傾聽各方的意見，不會停下腳步，人民的不滿，就是持續改革的動力。

在未來四年內，國民法官制度一定要上路，讓人民進入法庭擔任國民法官，成為改革的催化劑，讓司法體系與人民的距離不再遙遠，更加符合期待，贏得信賴。

另外，所有憲政機關，都要持續改革的腳步。行政院組織改造工程，將在重新盤點後再次啟動，包括成立一個專責的數位發展部會，還有與時俱進地調整各部會，讓政府的治理能力，更貼近國家發展的需要。

監察院的國家人權委員會，將在今年八月掛牌成立，它將是台灣落實「人權立國」理念的里程碑，也是監察院轉型的起點。

我也會請九月上任的考試院新團隊，提出完整的改革方案，檢討過去的思維，轉型為稱職的國家人力資源部門，培育現代政府所需的治理人才。

（五）結論

各位國人同胞，過去七十年來，中華民國台灣，在一次又一次的挑戰中，越發堅韌團結。我們抵抗過侵略併吞的壓力、走出獨裁體制的幽谷，也一度走在被世界孤立的曠野之中，但無論什麼樣的挑戰，民主自由的價值，一直是我們的堅持。「自助助人、自助人助」的共同體意識，也始終是我們的信念。

今天我們的現場，有很多防疫英雄：口罩國家隊上中下游產業成員、疫情指揮中心的公衛團隊、以及蘇貞昌院長帶領的政府團隊。

還有更多沒有在現場的各行各業防疫英雄們，醫護人員、郵務人員、藥師、便利商店店員、以及運將朋友等等。

容我無法一一叫出各位的名字，但我想要告訴大家，七十年來，台灣可以度過一次又一次的挑戰，依靠的從來不是一兩個英雄；而是像各位一樣，一起轉動歷史巨輪的無名英雄。是因為有你們，台灣世世代代的幸福、安定、繁榮，才得以延續。

我要向你們所有人致敬。所有的台灣人都是英雄。蔡英文跟賴清德，很榮幸能在此，接受各位的託付。

能在這樣艱鉅的時刻，承擔中華民國總統的重責大任，我心中的壓力多過喜悅。不過，我不會退縮，因為我有你們。

未來的路不會一片順遂，挑戰只會越來越多。不過，我們是一個在驚濤駭浪中走過來的國家。我們兩千三百萬人，是生死與共的命運共同體。過去是這樣、現在是這樣，未來也是這樣。

我由衷期許所有的國人同胞，要記得過去這幾個月，上下一心、緊緊相依、克服難關的感動。中華民國可以很團結，台灣可以很安全，當一個台灣人可以很光榮，可以抬頭挺胸、昂首闊步。

親愛的國人同胞，未來的旅程還很長，台灣的故事，也正在展開下一頁。台灣的故事，屬於每一個人，也需要每一個人。

兩千三百萬的台灣人民，請當我們的導引，請當我們的夥伴，讓我們凝聚智慧與勇氣，一起打造一個更好的國家。謝謝大家。

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2024—Lai Ching-te

Jump to Chinese version  Lee 1996 Chen 2000 Chen 2004 Ma 2008 Ma 2012 Tsai 2016 Tsai 2020

Building a democratic, peaceful, and prosperous new Taiwan

Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao, esteemed heads of state and guests from our allies, distinguished ambassadors and representatives, all visiting dignitaries, dear friends watching live on television and online, fellow citizens across the country: Good morning.

When I was young, I was determined to practice medicine and save lives.

When I went into politics, I was determined to transform Taiwan.

Now, standing here, I am determined to strengthen the nation.

With an unwavering heart, I accept the responsibility the people have entrusted to me as the 16th-term president of the Republic of China. In accordance with the Republic of China Constitution system, I will take on that solemn responsibility of leading the nation bravely forward.

On this day in 1949, martial law went into effect in Taiwan, and Taiwan plunged into a dark era of authoritarian rule.

On this day in 1996, Taiwan's first democratically elected president took the oath of office, conveying to the international community that the Republic of China Taiwan is a sovereign, independent nation in which sovereignty lies in the hands of the people.

On this day in 2024, having completed our third transition of political power, Taiwan officially commences, for the first time, the third consecutive term of the same political party in office. We also set sail into a new era that is full of challenges, yet also brimming with limitless hope.

This journey came about as a result of the valiant sacrifices and devotion of the many generations of people of this land. Although it was an arduous one, we made it through.

Now, we not only witness the beginning of a new administration, but also usher in another hard-earned victory for democracy.

Many people have interpreted my and Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao's election victory as "breaking the eight-year curse," referring to the fact that no political party has been able to remain in office for over two terms. But the reality is that in a democracy, the people have the final say. There is no such thing as a "curse" in any election. It is simply that the people put the ruling party under the toughest of tests, choosing the nation's future in the most genuine way.

I want to thank former President Tsai Ing-wen, former Vice President Chen Chien-jen, and the administrative team for their hard work over these past eight years. You have all helped build a solid base for Taiwan's development. Let's give them a big round of applause!

I also want to thank my fellow citizens once again for your support, for refusing to be swayed by external forces, for resolutely defending democracy, for pressing onward without turning back, and for turning a new page in Taiwan's history.

Every day of my term, I will strive to prove myself as someone in whom you can trust and count on, by acting justly, showing mercy, and being humble, and by treating our people as family. The new administration will work tirelessly and to the best of our ability, as all the nation's people put us to the test. We will also pursue continuous reform, shaping a new face for Taiwanese politics.

I. Coordination and cooperation between the executive and legislative branches to advance national policy

In February this year, a new Legislative Yuan was sworn in. This is the first time in 16 years that no party has an absolute majority. In the face of this new political landscape, some are feeling anticipation, while others are anxious.

I want to say to everyone, that this new structure is a result of the people's choice. Looking at it with a different frame of mind, a lack of absolute majority means that the ruling and opposition parties are now all able to share their ideas, and that we will be undertaking the nation's challenges as one.

However, Taiwan's people have high expectations for rational governance among political parties. Apart from competition, parties should also believe in cooperation. Only then can the nation continue down a stable path.

The Legislative Yuan should observe procedural justice. The majority should respect the minority, while the minority accepts majority rule. Only then can we avoid conflict and maintain a stable and harmonious society.

In a democratic society, the interests of the people come first - that is the root of democracy. Likewise, national interests come before the interests of parties - that is the sacred duty of each political party. When ruling or opposition parties put forth legislation that conforms with our Constitution; when we uphold the spirit of "people above all" and "nation above party," national policy will naturally and smoothly progress.

Premier Cho Jung-tai will lead the cabinet, and prioritize solving issues which benefit society and reflect consensus among ruling and opposition parties. He will respond to public opinion and address the issues people care about with proactive efforts and innovative thinking, and thus serve the people of Taiwan.

Today, recovery work following the April 3 earthquake is still underway. I would like to once again express my sympathy and condolences to the victims and their families. I also want to thank all our citizens who have assisted in the earthquake response and reconstruction efforts, as well as the international community for their concern and support.

The central government has already drawn up plans to funnel NT$28.55 billion into reconstruction and industry stimulus. This will help the people of Hualien return to their normal lives as quickly as possible.

I have high hopes for the future of cooperation between the central and local governments, as well as coordination between the executive and legislative branches. I also hope to work hard alongside all the people of Taiwan to further entrench our democracy, maintain peace in the Indo-Pacific, and boost global prosperity.

II. Democratic Taiwan as a global beacon

My fellow citizens: Democracy, peace, and prosperity form Taiwan's national roadmap. And they are also our links to the world. As an important link in the global chain of democracies, a glorious era of Taiwan's democracy has arrived.

Since Taiwan first held direct presidential elections, we have grown to become one of the world's most vibrant democracies. We have continued to enhance human rights, and show the world our values of democracy and freedom.

Taiwan was the first country in Asia to legalize same-sex marriage. Taiwan showed that democracy outperforms authoritarianism in fighting the pandemic.

Whether in terms of democracy or freedom, Taiwan is consistently highly ranked among Asian nations. Democratic Taiwan is already a global beacon. And this honor belongs to all the people of Taiwan.

As we move forward, my administration will continue using Taiwan's democratic vitality as a force for good, to promote national development and deepen international cooperation.

In terms of internal affairs, I will value meritocracy, and uphold honesty and diligence. I will practice democratic governance, and establish an open government. In the spirit of transparency and rule by the people, I encourage the populace to participate in public policy, and will continue to promote a voting age of 18. Together, we will fulfill our vision for our nation.

As for international affairs, we will continue working with other democratic nations to form a democratic community, and share our experiences across a range of fields. We will work together to combat disinformation, strengthen democratic resilience, address challenges, and allow Taiwan to become the MVP of the democratic world.

III. Democratic Taiwan as a pilot for global peace

Peace is priceless, and war has no winners. Next year, we will mark the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. As with other nations, Taiwan walked a difficult path for post-war revitalization, before getting to where we are today. No one wants these achievements to be destroyed by war.

Today, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and conflict between Israel and Hamas continue to shake the whole world. And China's military actions and gray-zone coercion are considered the greatest strategic challenges to global peace and stability.

Taiwan is strategically positioned in the first island chain, and what affects us here affects global geopolitical development. Even as early as 1921, Chiang Wei-shui said that Taiwan is a frontline guardian of world peace. Now, in 2024, Taiwan's role is even more significant.

There is already a strong international consensus, that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are indispensable to global security and prosperity.

To adapt to today's complicated international landscape, countries around the world have been actively cooperating to maintain regional peace and stability.

Just last month, the United States made into law the Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024. This will provide the Indo-Pacific region with additional security and assistance, thereby supporting the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait.

We thank nations around the world for their consideration and support for Taiwan. We would also like to declare to all that democracy and freedom are Taiwan's unwavering commitments. Peace is the only option. And prosperity, gained through lasting peace and stability, is our objective.

The future of cross-strait relations will have a decisive impact on the world. This means that we, who have inherited a democratic Taiwan, are pilots for peace. Our government will uphold the Four Commitments, neither yield nor provoke, and maintain the status quo.

I also want to call on China to cease their political and military intimidation against Taiwan, share with Taiwan the global responsibility of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as well as the greater region, and ensure the world is free from the fear of war.

Taiwanese are a peace-loving people who treat others with kindness. I have always believed that if the leader of a country puts the people's welfare above all, then peace in the Taiwan Strait, mutual benefits, and prosperous coexistence would be common goals.

Therefore, I hope that China will face the reality of the Republic of China's existence, respect the choices of the people of Taiwan, and in good faith, choose dialogue over confrontation, exchange over containment, and under the principles of parity and dignity, engage in cooperation with the legal government chosen by Taiwan's people. This can start from the resumption of tourism on a reciprocal basis, and enrollment of degree students in Taiwanese institutions. Let us together pursue peace and mutual prosperity.

My fellow citizens: As we pursue the ideal of peace, we must not harbor any delusions. So long as China refuses to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, all of us in Taiwan ought to understand, that even if we accept the entirety of China's position and give up our sovereignty, China's ambition to annex Taiwan will not simply disappear.

In face of the many threats and attempts of infiltration from China, we must demonstrate our resolution to defend our nation, and we must also raise our defense awareness and strengthen our legal framework for national security. This means actively promoting the Four Pillars of Peace action plan: strengthened national defense; improved economic security; stable and principled cross-strait leadership; and values-based diplomacy. By standing side-by-side with other democratic countries, we can form a peaceful global community that can demonstrate the strength of deterrence and prevent war, achieving our goal of peace through strength.

IV. Democratic Taiwan as a force for global prosperity

Taiwan needs the world, just as the world needs Taiwan. Taiwan is not just opening a door to the world - Taiwan is already on the world's center stage.

As we look toward our future, we know that semiconductors will be indispensable. And the AI wave has already swept in. Taiwan has already mastered advanced semiconductor manufacturing, and we stand at the center of the AI revolution. We are a key player in supply chains for global democracies. For these reasons, Taiwan has an influence on global economic development, as well as humanity's well-being and prosperity.

My fellow citizens: The future of the Republic of China Taiwan will be decided by its 23 million people. The future we decide is not just the future of our nation, but the future of the world.

We must walk on the right path, and our industries must make every effort, so that we may be a force for global prosperity. With every step forward that Taiwan takes, the world takes a step forward with us.

When I served as premier and vice president, I visited the various industries throughout Taiwan. I know well what our industry needs, and also what it is capable of. So, going forward, the government, working closely with the private sector, will take a threefold approach to further Taiwan's development.

The first is having a clear view for our future, and making Taiwan smart and sustainable.

As we face the dangers of climate change, we must be resolved in our transition to net-zero emissions by the year 2050. As we meet the global challenges of adopting more and more smart technologies, we in Taiwan, a "silicon island," must do all we can to expedite Taiwan's transformation into an "AI island." We must adapt AI for industry and step up the pace of AI innovation and applications. We must also adapt industry for AI and use AI's computational power to make our nation, our military, our workforce, and our economy stronger.

It is similarly crucial that we develop an economic model driven by innovation. Through our two-pronged approach of promoting digital transformation and net-zero transition, we will assist small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as they upgrade and transform, and we will seek inclusive growth, so as to create a new Taiwan that is smarter and more sustainable - a second Taiwan Miracle.

While we invest in innovation and nurture the next hidden champions, we must also make bold investments in quantum computing, robotics, the metaverse, precision medicine, and other advanced technologies, thus giving our young people the opportunity to pursue their dreams and solidifying Taiwan's leading position in the future global landscape.

The second is setting our sights on the space industry while further developing our strengths as a maritime nation.

Our sights are set on making Taiwan the Asian hub of UAV supply chains for global democracies, and developing the next generation of medium- and low-orbit communications satellites, bringing Taiwan's space and aerospace industries squarely into the international sphere.

At the same time, we will also explore and develop our strengths as a maritime nation, deepen our connections with the ocean, and invest more in marine science and technology research, thereby driving the development of our maritime industries. Altogether, this will make Taiwan a much stronger nation, and it will open up new horizons for the development of Taiwan's economy and industry. The possibilities are truly limitless.

The third is to help our enterprises expand their presence and market internationally.

Taiwan has officially applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and we will continue to engage actively in regional economic integration. We will endeavor to sign bilateral investment agreements with other democracies around the world and further deepen our trade partnerships. We will also work to resolve the carbon tax issue and thus open the path for further development.

Taiwan must hold firm its key position in the global supply chain and seize the business opportunities that come as a result of geopolitical changes. We aim to develop Five Trusted Industry Sectors, namely semiconductors, AI, military, security and surveillance, and next-generation communications; we also aim to improve the investment environment, welcome Taiwanese businesses abroad to come back and invest in Taiwan, and encourage local firms to expand their investments and set even deeper roots here in Taiwan.

Here today, I want to assure our friends from all different sectors: Just as you all are committed to be the best in your respective areas, the government is also committed to providing assistance so that you can expand your global presence and international markets from a solid base here in Taiwan.

Taiwan is eminently capable of being a thriving global economic powerhouse. Wherever the sun shines around the world, there are Taiwanese companies stimulating local development, while also enriching the livelihoods of the Taiwanese people.

V. Sympathizing with the joys and the concerns of the people

It is my firm belief that the fruits of economic development ought to be enjoyed by all the people of our nation. In the coming days of my presidency, I will launch the National Project of Hope and expand investment in society, through which I aim to shape a Taiwanese society with more love and moral courage. It will be a society in which young people have a vision of hope, people in their prime have the means to realize their dreams, the elderly can enjoy their days in happiness, and the disadvantaged can find the care they need. A society in which all people, at every stage of life, will be able to receive from the government the support they need.

Childcare, long-term care, and social housing services will continue to be expanded.
Prices of commodities and housing, as well as the wealth gap, will be addressed.
The safety and security of our food, our roads, our schools, and our social safety net will all be enhanced.
And our reform efforts in education, the judicial system, and transitional justice will continue.

I understand the concerns and expectations of the people of Taiwan. As to the issues you are concerned with and the reform society needs, the government will do its utmost to achieve solutions.

Everyone is working hard for higher pay. I will work to drive industrial upgrading and create an even better wage environment.

Everyone is hoping for more effective public safety. I will crack down on corruption and organized crime, guns, drugs, and fraud.

Everyone is wanting a stable supply of electricity. I will initiate our second energy transition, push for the development of more forms of green energy and smart grids, and help to make our electrical power generation system more resilient.

Everyone is concerned about the financing of labor insurance. I repeat here today: Labor insurance will not fail under our government.

Everyone is stressing the importance of transportation safety. I will help create a human-friendly transportation environment, putting an end to Taiwan's bad reputation as a "pedestrian hell."

Everyone is hoping that the government can help lighten the load for family caregivers and work to solve the labor shortage issue. I will do my utmost to arrive at solutions.

All of us, as we walk into the future, want a more resilient Taiwan, a Taiwan that can respond adequately to such crises as infectious disease and natural disasters, a Taiwan that can quicken the pace of urban renewal and the repair of dilapidated and dangerous old buildings.

All of us are also hoping for a healthier Taiwan. With my own expertise in medicine, I hope to bring together the strengths of other fields to beat cancer. I will establish a ministry of physical education and sports development to bring sports and athletics more into the lives of the people. I will also ensure that our National Health Insurance system remains sustainable, which will help our people live longer and healthier.

The Taiwan of tomorrow will preserve its diverse ecosystem, its diverse ethnic culture, and achieve sustainability, to create a better nation.

The Taiwan of tomorrow will have a more diverse innovation economy, a more widespread use of digital technology applications; it will be more competitive and bilingual; it will have a stronger public support service system; it will be more respectful of gender equality; it will ensure that the people are guaranteed their rights.

The Taiwan of tomorrow will allow each municipality to develop out of its own unique characteristics and promote revitalization of local industries; we will achieve the goal of a Taiwan with balanced development where all can live and work in peace and happiness.

VI. With greater solidarity, we become stronger as a nation

My dear compatriots, each and every one of you contributes a necessary part to our future development. In this era of globalization and wide-ranging competition, no one country can go it alone; and no society, if it is divided within, can successfully meet these challenges.

If we are united, we can walk with more confident strides. And when we support one another, our steps will take us further. For our nation to endure and progress, I will bring us together through the strength of democracy, for greater solidarity and a stronger nation.

I think it is apparent to us all: We have a nation insofar as we have sovereignty. Right in the first chapter of our Constitution, it says that "The sovereignty of the Republic of China shall reside in the whole body of citizens," and that "Persons possessing the nationality of the Republic of China shall be citizens of the Republic of China." These two articles tell us clearly: The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are not subordinate to each other. All of the people of Taiwan must come together to safeguard our nation; all our political parties ought to oppose annexation and protect sovereignty; and no one should entertain the idea of giving up our national sovereignty in exchange for political power.

As more countries around the world publicly express their support for Taiwan's meaningful international participation, there is increasing proof that Taiwan is a Taiwan of the world; that Taiwan is a worthy and reliable force for global peace and prosperity.

So long as we identify with Taiwan, Taiwan belongs to us all - all of the peoples of Taiwan, regardless of ethnicity, irrespective of when we arrived. Some call this land the Republic of China, some call it the Republic of China Taiwan, and some, Taiwan; but whichever of these names we ourselves or our international friends choose to call our nation, we will resonate and shine all the same. So let us overcome our differences and stride forward, with our shared aspirations, to meet the world.

VII. Taiwan greeting a new world, the world greeting a new Taiwan

As Taiwan engages more closely with the rest of the world, we welcome the world to come closer to Taiwan. Many new residents and foreign nationals have come and made Taiwan their home, writing a new chapter in Taiwan's story. To all of you, I give my sincere thanks and respect.

Here today are many friends who have come quite a long way from their countries to join us. And many overseas compatriots are also here showing their support with their presence. So, why don't we let them all know how much we appreciate their support? Please give them a round of applause!

Tonight we will be welcoming our distinguished guests at a state banquet in Tainan, the city where 1624 marked Taiwan's links to globalization. Now, as we stand here 400 years after that historical moment in Tainan, we in Taiwan must all demonstrate confidence and bravely set course for the new world, so that the world may embrace a new Taiwan.

On that note, I want to ask each fellow citizen to praise our mother Taiwan, the land that nurtures and supports us all, and to work together to protect her, honor her, let the world embrace her, and allow her the international respect she deserves as a great nation.

Thank you.

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【中華民國第十六任總統賴清德就職演說 全文】

———[英文版]———  ———[上一章]———

打造民主和平繁榮的新台灣

蕭美琴副總統、各位友邦的元首與貴賓、各國駐台使節代表、現場所有的嘉賓，電視機前、還有線上收看直播的好朋友，全體國人同胞，大家好：

我年輕的時候，立志行醫救人。

我從政的時候，立志改變台灣。

現在，站在這裡，我立志壯大國家！

我以無比堅定的心情，接受人民的託付，就職中華民國第十六任總統，我將依據中華民國憲政體制，肩負起帶領國家勇往前進的重責大任。

回想 1949 年的今天，台灣實施戒嚴，全面進入專制的黑暗年代。

1996 年的今天，台灣第一位民選總統宣誓就職，向國際社會傳達，中華民國台灣是一個主權獨立的國家、主權在民。

2024 年的今天，台灣在完成三次政黨輪替之後，第一次同一政黨連續執政，正式展開第三任期！台灣也揚帆進入一個充滿挑戰，又孕育無限希望的新時代。

這段歷程，是這塊土地上的人們，前仆後繼、犧牲奉獻的結果。雖然艱辛，但我們做到了！

此時此刻，我們不只見證新政府的開始，也是再一次迎接得來不易的民主勝利！

許多人將我和蕭美琴副總統的當選，解讀為「打破八年政黨輪替魔咒」。事實上，民主就是人民作主，每一次的選舉，虛幻的魔咒並不存在，只有人民對執政黨最嚴格的檢驗、對國家未來最真實的選擇。

我要感謝，過去八年來，蔡英文前總統、陳建仁前副總統和行政團隊的努力，為台灣的發展，打下堅實的基礎。也請大家一起給他們一個最熱烈的掌聲！

我也要再次感謝國人同胞的支持，不受外來勢力的影響，堅定守護民主，向前走；不回頭，為台灣翻開歷史的新頁！

在未來任期的每一天，我將「行公義，好憐憫，存謙卑的心」，「視民如親」，不愧於每一分信賴與託付。新政府也將兢兢業業，拿出最好的表現，來接受全民的檢驗。我們的施政更要不斷革新，開創台灣政治的新風貌。

一、行政立法協調合作，共同推動國政

今年二月上任的新國會，是台灣時隔十六年後，再次出現「三黨不過半」的立法院。面對這個政治新局，有些人抱持期待，也有些人感到憂心。

我要告訴大家，這是全民選擇的新模式，當我們以新思維看待「三黨不過半」，這代表著，朝野政黨都能分享各自的理念，也將共同承擔國家的種種挑戰。

然而，全民對於政黨的理性問政，也有很大的期待。政黨在競爭之外，也應該有合作的信念，國家才能踏出穩健的步伐。

立法院的議事運作，應該遵守程序正義，多數尊重少數，少數服從多數，才能避免衝突，維持社會的安定和諧。

在民主社會，人民的利益至上，這是民主的根本；國家的利益優先於政黨的利益，這是政黨的天職。當朝野政黨推動法案，都能夠合乎憲法，秉持「人民至上」、「國家優先」的精神時，國政自然順利推展。

行政院卓榮泰院長率領的內閣團隊，也將優先解決對社會有益、朝野有共識的議題，以積極行動、創新思維，解決民瘼，來回應民意、服務人民。

目前，0403 災後的復原工作，正在進行。我要再次向罹難者表示哀悼、慰問家屬。我也要感謝所有協助救災和重建的國人，以及再次感謝國際社會的關心和支持。

中央政府已經規劃投入 285.5 億元，來協助重建及產業振興，幫助花蓮民眾可以儘早恢復正常生活。

我對未來中央和地方的互相合作、行政和立法的協調運作，寄予厚望，也希望跟所有國人攜手努力，一起深化台灣的民主，維護印太的和平，促進世界的繁榮！

二、民主台灣，世界之光

各位國人同胞，民主、和平、繁榮是台灣的國家路線，也是台灣與世界的連結。

台灣是「世界民主鏈」的亮點，民主台灣的光榮時代已經來臨！

台灣自從總統直選以來，已經成為全球最蓬勃發展的民主國家之一。我們持續提升人權，向世界展現民主自由的價值。

台灣是亞洲第一個同性婚姻合法化的國家。

台灣示範了，民主防疫可以優於專制防疫。

台灣不論是民主指數，或是自由度的評比，在亞洲的排名都是數一數二。民主台灣已經是世界之光，這份榮耀屬於全體台灣人民！

未來，新政府將持續善用台灣的民主活力，推動國家發展，也加深國際合作。

對內，我會用人唯才，清廉勤政，並落實民主治理，建立開放政府，以「公開透明」、「人民作主」的精神，鼓勵大眾參與公共政策，繼續推動十八歲公民權，共同實踐國家的願景。

對外，我們將持續與民主國家，形成民主共同體，彼此交流各領域的發展經驗，一起對抗假訊息，強化民主韌性，因應各項挑戰，讓台灣成為民主世界的 MVP！

三、民主台灣，世界和平舵手

和平無價，戰爭沒有贏家。明年，第二次世界大戰結束，就滿八十年，台灣和各國都一樣，走過戰後艱辛的復興道路，才有今天的發展成果，沒有人願意讓戰爭摧毀這一切。

如今，俄烏戰爭和以哈戰爭，持續衝擊全世界，中國的軍事行動以及灰色脅迫，也被視為全球和平穩定最大的戰略挑戰。

台灣位居「第一島鏈」的戰略位置，牽動著世界地緣政治的發展。早在 1921 年，蔣渭水先生就指出，台灣是「世界和平第一關的守衛」，在 2024 年的今天，台灣的角色更加重要。

國際間已經有高度共識，認為台海的和平穩定，是全球安全與繁榮不可或缺的要素。

為了因應當前複雜的國際情勢，世界各國已經展開積極的合作，來維持區域的和平穩定。

就在上個月，美國也完成了「印太安全補充撥款法案」的立法，將提供印太區域額外安全援助，支持台海的和平穩定。

我們感謝世界各國對台灣的重視和支持，我們也要向世界宣告：民主自由，是台灣不可退讓的堅持，和平是唯一的選項，繁榮是長治久安的目標！

由於兩岸的未來，對世界的局勢有決定性的影響，承接民主化台灣的我們，將是和平的舵手，新政府將秉持「四個堅持」，不卑不亢，維持現狀。

我也要呼籲中國，停止對台灣文攻武嚇，一起和台灣承擔全球的責任，致力於維持台海及區域的和平穩定，確保全球免於戰爭的恐懼。

台灣人民熱愛和平，與人為善。我始終認為，如果國家領導人以人民福祉為最高考量，那麼，台海和平、互利互惠、共存共榮，應該是彼此共同的目標。

因此，我希望中國正視中華民國存在的事實，尊重台灣人民的選擇，拿出誠意，和台灣民選合法的政府，在對等、尊嚴的原則下，以對話取代對抗，交流取代圍堵，進行合作，可以先從重啟雙邊對等的觀光旅遊，以及學位生來台就學開始，一起追求和平共榮。

各位國人同胞，我們有追求和平的理想，但不能有幻想。在中國尚未放棄武力犯台之下，國人應該了解：即使全盤接受中國的主張，放棄主權，中國併吞台灣的企圖並不會消失。

面對來自中國的各種威脅滲透，我們必須展現守護國家的決心，提升全民保家衛國的意識，健全國安法制，並且積極落實「和平四大支柱行動方案」，強化國防力量，建構經濟安全，展現穩定而有原則的兩岸關係領導能力，以及推動價值外交，跟全球民主國家肩並肩，形成和平共同體，來發揮威懾力量，避免戰爭發生，靠實力達到和平的目標！

四、民主台灣，世界繁榮推手

台灣需要世界，世界也需要台灣！台灣不只是打開世界的大門，台灣已經走到世界舞台的中心！

展望未來的世界，半導體無所不在，AI 浪潮席捲而來。現在的台灣，掌握半導體先進製程技術，站在AI革命的中心，是「全球民主供應鏈」的關鍵，影響世界經濟發展，以及人類生活的幸福與繁榮。

各位國人同胞，當我們主張，中華民國台灣的未來，由兩千三百萬人民共同決定。我們決定的未來，不只是我們國家的未來，也是全世界的未來！

我們要走對的路，產業要大展身手，做世界繁榮的推手，讓台灣每前進一步，世界就向前一步！

過去，我擔任行政院長、副總統，到全國各地的產業拜訪，我了解台灣產業的潛力和需求。未來，政府會跟產業界密切合作，把握三大方向，推動台灣的發展。

第一個方向是，「前瞻未來，智慧永續」。

面對氣候危機，我們必須堅定地落實 2050 淨零轉型。面對全球智慧化的挑戰，我們站在半導體晶片矽島的基礎上，將全力推動台灣成為「人工智慧之島」，促成人工智慧產業化，加速人工智慧的創新應用，並讓產業人工智慧化，用人工智慧的算力，來提升國力、軍力、人力和經濟力。

我們也必須發展創新驅動的經濟模式，透過數位轉型，以及淨零轉型的雙軸力量，來協助中小企業升級轉型，追求包容性成長，打造智慧永續新台灣，創造台灣第二次經濟奇蹟。

除了投資新創，培育新世代隱形冠軍之外，無論是量子電腦、機器人、元宇宙，或精準醫療，各領域的前瞻科技，我們也都要大膽投資，讓年輕人可以追逐夢想，也確保台灣在未來世界的領先地位。

第二個方向是，「競逐太空，探索海洋」。

我們立定目標，要讓台灣成為無人機民主供應鏈的亞洲中心，也要發展下一個世代通訊的中低軌道衛星，進軍全球太空產業。

我們更要探索海洋，發揮海洋國家的優勢，豐富人民的海洋生活，並且投入海洋科技研究，推動海洋產業發展，提升國家競爭力。我們要讓台灣的經濟與產業，往更多面向發展，無遠弗屆。

第三個方向是，「布局全球，行銷全世界」。

台灣已經申請加入 CPTPP，我們會積極爭取加入區域經濟整合；跟世界民主國家簽訂雙邊投資保障協定，深化貿易夥伴關係；並解決碳關稅問題，進一步開拓發展空間。

我們也要站穩全球供應鏈的關鍵地位，好好把握地緣政治變化所帶來的商機，發展半導體、人工智慧、軍工、安控，以及次世代通訊等「五大信賴產業」，並且持續改善投資環境，歡迎台商回台投資，鼓勵在地的企業擴大投資，根留台灣。

我要向各行各業的朋友保證：各位有雄心壯志，追求頂尖，政府也有決心鼎力相助，讓台灣的產業能夠立足台灣、布局全球、行銷全世界！

台灣絕對有能力，成為「經濟日不落國」，無論太陽從哪裡升起，都可以照到台灣的企業，造福當地的發展，也讓台灣人民能夠有更富足的生活！

五、樂民之樂，憂民之憂

我深信，經濟發展的果實，應該為全民所共享。未來，在推動「國家希望工程」、擴大社會投資之下，我要建立一個有愛和道德勇氣的台灣社會。年輕人可以看見希望，壯年人可以實現夢想，老年人可以擁有幸福，弱勢者可以得到照顧。每一個人在人生的每一個階段，都能夠獲得政府的支持。

未來，幼托、長照、社會住宅等服務，要延續擴大；
物價、房價、貧富差距等問題，要不斷改善；
食品安全、道路安全、校園安全、社會安全網等保障，要持續強化；
還有，對於教育、司法、轉型正義等改革工作，也都要繼續做下去！

我也了解國人對生活的煩惱和期待，凡是各位關心的議題、社會需要的改革，政府都會積極以對，全力以赴。

大家希望收入更高，我會推動產業升級，創造更好的薪資環境。

大家期待治安更好，我會積極打擊黑金、槍、毒和詐騙。

大家需要供電穩定，我會推動第二次能源轉型，發展多元綠能、智慧電網，強化電力系統的韌性。

大家關心勞保財務，我要再次強調，只要政府在，勞保絕對不會倒。

大家重視交通安全，我會打造符合人本的交通環境，擺脫「行人地獄」的惡名。

大家期待政府能夠幫助家庭照顧者減輕負擔，以及協助產業改善缺工的困境，這些問題，我都會積極解決。

迎向未來，我們都期待一個更強韌的台灣，可以妥善因應傳染病、天災地變等各類型災害，以及加速都市更新，解決危老建築的問題。

我們也期待一個更健康的台灣，我期許自己發揮醫師專業，集結各界的力量，打擊癌症，以及成立「體育暨運動發展部」，推展全民運動，並且確保健保永續經營，讓國人活得長壽又健康。

未來的台灣，要保有多樣性的生態環境，多元族群的文化，以實踐環境永續、文化永續，讓國家更美好。

未來的台灣，會有更多元發展的創新經濟，會有更普及的數位科技應用，會有更好的競爭力和雙語力，會有更強大的公共支持服務體系，也會有更尊重性別平等的環境，讓每一位國民的權利受到保障。

未來的台灣，更要讓每一個縣市，依據特色發展，推動地方創生產業，落實「均衡台灣」的目標，處處可以安居，人人可以樂業！

六、團結力量大，繼續壯大國家

親愛的國人同胞，國家的未來發展，需要每一分力量。面對全球化、全面性競爭的時代，沒有一個國家可以單打獨鬥，也沒有一個分裂的社會能夠成功面對。

團結一致，我們的腳步就更穩；相互扶持，我們的足跡就更遠。為了國家的生存發展，我將透過民主的力量，團結所有國人，壯大國家。

我們都知道，有主權才有國家！根據中華民國憲法，中華民國主權屬於國民全體；有中華民國國籍者，為中華民國國民；由此可見，中華民國與中華人民共和國互不隸屬。每一個人，都要團結、愛護國家；任何一個政黨，都要反併吞、護主權，不可為了政權犧牲國家主權。

當世界上有越來越多國家，公開支持台灣的國際參與，在在證明了，台灣是世界的台灣，台灣是全球和平繁榮值得信賴的力量。

全體國人不分族群，也不論先來後到，只要認同台灣，都是這個國家的主人。無論是中華民國、中華民國台灣，或是台灣，皆是我們自己或國際友人稱呼我們國家的名稱，都一樣響亮。就讓我們不分彼此，大家一條心，大步走向世界！

七、台灣新世界，世界新台灣

當台灣走進世界，我們也歡迎世界走進台灣。許多新住民朋友、外籍友人，從世界各地來到台灣，寫下屬於台灣的新篇章。我要感謝你們，也要向你們致敬！

今天現場，也有千里來訪的國際友人，有歸國的僑胞朋友，以行動支持台灣。我們是不是用最熱烈的掌聲歡迎、感謝他們！

今晚，我們接待國內外賓客的國宴，選擇在台南舉辦。1624 年，台灣從台南出發，開啟台灣全球化的開端。站在「台南 400」的歷史時刻，台灣更要展現自信，勇敢航向新世界，讓世界迎接新台灣。

我也要邀請每一位國人，和我一起為孕育你我的母親台灣喝采，我們一起用行動守護她、榮耀她，讓世界擁抱她，讓她成為國際上令人尊敬的偉大國家！

謝謝大家！

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◆ Facts about the "1992 Consensus"

Please note that this chapter has the following sections:

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Background

Since 1949 the relations between China and Taiwan have been characterized by constantly strong tensions. Territory controlled by the Republic of China (ROC) had been shelled for two decades after 1958 by the People's Republic of China (PRC). Before the early 1990s, no direct negotiations between the two sides took place.

On Nov. 21, 1990 the ROC founded the Straits Exchange Foundation (haixia jiaoliu jijinhui 海峽交流基金會, abbrev. haijihui 海基會 in Chinese and SEF in English), on Dec. 16, 1991 the PRC followed suit with the establishment of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (haixia liang'an guanxi xiehui 海峽兩岸關係協會, abbrev. haixiehui 海協會 in Chinese and ARATS in English). Representatives of SEF and ARATS first met March 22–27, 1992 in Beijing and have been conducting talks on behalf of their respective government ever since.

A meeting which for more than two decades has been at the center of the "1992 Consensus" controversy took place in Hong Kong in 1992 (Oct. 28–30), the SEF delegation being led by Shi Hwei-yow and the ARATS delegation by Zhou Ning.

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The term "1992 Consensus"

In the first two years following the 1992 Hong Kong meeting, neither the term "1992 Consensus" (jiuer gongshi 九二共識) nor its attributed core content—"one China, with each side having its own interpretation" (yige Zhongguo, ge zi biaoshu 一個中國,各自表述, abbrev. yi Zhong gebiao 一中各表)—were used by Taiwan's media. The latter apparently was first mentioned in August 1995 by then-SEF secretary-general and KMT member Chiao Jen-ho 焦仁和 (b. 1948, Zhejiang). On March 18, 2000 the second direct ROC presidential election took place, with DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian emerging as winner and resulting in the first democratic, peaceful transfer of power in ROC history. According to sources available online, the first public mention of the term "1992 Consensus" occurred on March 28, 2000 by NP legislator Elmer Fung 馮滬祥 (1948-2021, Liaoning). In the following years the term kept popping up in Taiwanese media and has played an important role in the debate about the Cross-Strait relations since then.

According to the proponents of the "1992 Consensus", the term refers to a tacit agreement that was supposedly reached by SEF and ARATS representatives at the 1992 Hong Kong meeting. The term suggests that both sides reached an understanding in Hong Kong about "one China, with each side having its own interpretation". No documents proving that such a bilateral understanding was reached then were ever provided by the ROC or the PRC, and on Feb. 21, 2006 Su Chi 蘇起 (b. 1949, Taiwan) admitted that he had in fact invented the term in 2000. In 1992, Su had been deputy director of the KMT's Department of Mainland Affairs, between February 1999 and May 2000 he headed the ROC's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), and between 2005 and 2008 he was member of the ROC Legislative Yuan.

It should be pointed out that for many years official PRC media have been promoting the term "1992 Consensus". At the same time, the whole formula "one China, with each side having its own interpretation" was never brought up in the PRC. For the Chinese Communists, "1992 Consensus" means that the Taiwan authorities accepted the One China Principle (yige Zhongguo yuanze 一個中國原則), that 'both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the one-China principle', nothing more—no mention of each side having the right to their own interpretation of One China.

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FCJ coverage

The 1992 Hong Kong meeting between SEF and ARATS was covered by The Free China Journal (FCJ), a newspaper published by the ROC's Government information Office (GIO). The relevant articles give no indication whatsoever that a concensus on the One China issue was achieved. The following table lists the headlines of those articles which are shown with their full text below.

Date in 1992 FCJ headline Page
Oct. 28 (Wed)  [News Briefs] 1
Oct. 30 (Fri) SEF, ARATS make slow headway 2
Nov. 3 (Tue) 'One China' issue derails talks 2
Nov. 6 (Fri) Mainland intransigence halts progress between SEF, ARATS  2
Nov. 10 (Tue) Mainland wrecks document talks 2

It should be noted that an SEF-ARATS summit between SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu 辜振甫 (1917-2005, Taiwan) and ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan 汪道涵 (1915-2005, Anhui) took place in 1993 (April 27–29) in Singapore. That meeting was covered by FCJ as well, and in its articles the paper reported the breakthrough that was indeed reached during the 1993 summit.

Date in 1993 FCJ headline Page
April 27 (Tue)  Cross-Straits Koo-Wang talks begin 1
　"　 SEF, ARATS begin historic meeting 2
　"　 DPP group in Singapore to monitor Koo-Wang talks  2
April 30 (Fri) Historic meeting produces 4 agreements 1
　"　 Outcome of Koo-Wang talks 2
　"　 Cross-Straits conference talk of the town in Taiwan 2
　"　 Bridging the cross-Straits gap 6
　"　 Sorry, it's a little early yet for talks on unification 6
　"　 Shadow of politics haunts talks 7
May 4 (Tue) Koo-Wang talks dawn of new era of negotiation 1
　"　 ROC mainland policy unchanged 2
　"　 No mainland investment accord 3
May 7 (Fri) President Lee stresses Taipei, Peking equal 2

The contrast in the FCJ coverage of the 1992 Hong Kong meeting to the 1993 Singapore meeting is striking. As the ROC government had no reason to conceal a breakthrough in cross-strait negotiations, the FCJ coverage of the 1992 Hong Kong meeting serves as further evidence that no consensus was reached and the meeting was in fact a complete failure that yielded no results.

Please note that this page shows only the full text of FCJ articles covering the 1992 Hong Kong meeting but not of those covering the 1993 Singapore summit because the outcome of the latter was never controversial and has been irrelevant for the debate surrounding the "1992 Consensus".

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Full texts of relevant articles (1992 and 2006)

News Briefs

Vol. IX, No. 79

Long-halted talks between counterpart organizations on the two sides of the Taiwan Straits are apparently on the verge of picking up once again.

Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation and mainland China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits will return to the discussion table Oct. 28. The two-day meeting will take place in Hong Kong, with the SEF delegation headed by Legal Services Department Director Shi Hwei-yow (許惠祐).

Cross-Straits document verification is expected to be the main focus. Negotiators are reportedly hopeful of working out the details for a future agreement on procedures for verifying the documents that Taiwan and mainland residents need to send to the opposite side.

Source: The Free China Journal—1992, Oct. 28 (Wednesday)

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SEF, ARATS make slow headway

By Tammy C. Peng

Staff Writer

Negotiations between Taiwan and mainland China intermediary agencies finally resumed in Hong Kong this week.

Representatives of Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation met with their counterparts of the mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits Oct. 28-29.

The second bilateral conference this year, however, has apparently reached a deadlock over the "one China" issue.

As in past meetings between SEF and ARATS, a problem emerged when the mainland representatives insisted on first discussing the principle of "one China", and including those words in all agreements to be signed between the two sides.

According to ARATS' Chou Ning (周寧), all matters between the two agencies are "internal affairs of China".

SEF has rejected the proposal, saying that the discussion of purely general affairs should not involve political principles.

Shi Hwei-yow, head of the SEF delegation, said that there is no "logical connection" between the two organizations' affairs and the political interpretation of the "one China" principle.

Besides, Shi said, President Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), Premier Hau Pei-tsun (郝柏村) and the National Unification Council have all made the ROC government's stand on the "one China" principle sufficiently clear.

The NUC in August of this year formally adopted the "one China" principle as follows: "One China refers to the Republic of China that has existed since 1912, with de jure sovereignty over all of China."

However, the ROC's current jurisdiction covers only Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, said the NUC. "Taiwan is part of China, and the Chinese mainland is a part of China as well."

SEF had hoped to resume the talks that ended fruitlessly in March, when the two sides failed to reach agreement on ways of handling the verification of documents and indirect registered mail. SEF had also hoped to reach an agreement with ARATS at the Hong Kong meeting on a framework for handling similar cases in the future.

The two-day conference, however, made little progress in formulating measures to speed up the often heavy work required in arranging people-to-people exchanges across the Straits.

The two organizations did reach agreement on a few matters. Both sides agreed to act as liaisons between their respective official agencies, such as post offices and municipal authorities.

In addition, the two offices expanded the categories of documents handled from three to seven. People of both sides may soon ask for verification of inheritance, marriage, adoption, identity, birth, tax and academic degrees. SEF also accepted ARATS' proposal of collecting a fee of at least US$40 per service.

Source: The Free China Journal—1992, Oct. 30 (Friday)

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'One China' issue derails talks

SEF, ARATS fail to unravel document verification imbroglio

By Tammy C. Peng

Staff Writer

An extended meeting between representatives of Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation and its mainland counterpart was suspended last week with the two sides reaching little agreement.

The Hong Kong conference between SEF and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits failed to reach an accord on ways of verifying documents that are necessary for processing Taiwan-mainland non-official exchanges.

In spite of the setback, SEF representatives are staying on in Hong Kong until Nov. 4, hoping to begin another round of talks with ARATS.

SEF and ARATS are private organizations established in 1991 to handle matters related to people-to-people exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. The Republic of China government on Taiwan currently prohibits any official contacts with the Chinese Communist regime in the mainland.

An important element of the exchanges is the verification of documents that is often required to process entry and exit permits for residents of both sides, in particular those applying to enter Taiwan.

The Hong Kong meeting, originally scheduled for Oct. 28-29, was aborted when ARATS representatives insisted on discussing the principle of "one China". They also wanted the phrase incorporated in all agreements to be signed by the two agencies.

SEF delegates said that the meeting was not the proper venue to discuss politics.

SEF head delegate Shi Hwei-yow said he sees no "logical connection" between the two organizations' general goals and the political interpretation of "one China".

However, when ARATS representatives insisted on pushing the issue, saying that all matters between the two agencies are "internal affairs of China", Shi was forced to respond by citing the "one China" principle upheld by the ROC government.

Shi said that "one China" refers to the ROC that has existed since 1912 but was only temporarily divided in 1949. Shi explained that because of the event in 1949, "one China" now hat two "equal political entities" represented by both the ROC government in Taipei and the Chinese Communist regime in Peking.

Such definition of "one China" is also the "bottom line" that the ROC government is prepared to accept in any talks on Taiwan-mainland exchanges, said Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), spokesman of the ROC Mainland Affairs Council.

Chen Jung-chieh (陳榮傑), SEF secretary-general, said that despite the suspension of the formal meeting, the decision of the SEF representatives to remain in Hong Kong proved that the ROC was "sincere in seeking a satisfactory end to the talks".

The ARATS delegation returned to the mainland on Nov. 1, indicating that the group has no intention of continuing the negotiations with SEF.

Chou Ning, head representative of ARATS, suggested upon his departure that if any new talks are to be held, they should either be in Peking, Taipei, Amoy or Kinmen.

Source: The Free China Journal—1992, Nov. 3 (Tuesday)

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Mainland intransigence halts progress between SEF, ARATS

By Tammy C. Peng

Staff Writer

The much publicized meeting between Taiwan and mainland China liaison agencies yawned to a close Nov. 4, having achieved little toward advancing interest of the people they represent.

Negotiators from Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation and the mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits gathered in Hong Kong Oct. 28 to iron out ways to improve civilian matters. High on the agenda was a method for verifying the documents necessary in cross-Straits non-official exchanges.

The meeting ended prematurely when ARATS representatives insisted on switching from private sector concerns to the political arena to discuss how the Chinese Communists and the ROC government interpret the "one China" principle.

The mainland delegation returned home Nov. 1, as SEF representatives stayed on in Hong Kong hoping the negotiations would resume. On Nov. 4, it became clear that the latest round of SEF-ARATS talks had definitely closed when an ARATS representative informed the mainland's China News Service that the meeting was "officially over".

A meeting in March by the counterpart organizations had the same fruitless scenario, with the two sides unable to sign an accord.

The report tried to blame the latest breakdown on SEF, claiming the Taiwan group had "twisted" ARATS' intentions regarding discussing the "one China" principle.

SEF's head delegate, Shi Hwei-yow, had told his ARATS counterpart that the meeting was not the proper venue for discussing politics. He had said he saw no "logical connection" between the founding goals of the two private sector organizations and political interpretations of the term "one China".

SEF, a private agency established last year, has been commissioned by the ROC government to handle affairs related to people-to-people exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland.

Source: The Free China Journal—1992, Nov. 6 (Friday)

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Mainland wrecks document talks

'Political blackmail' charged

By Tammy C. Peng

Staff writer

The Chinese Communists' political intent and lack of sincerity were the two main stumbling blocks to the success of a recent meeting between the two Chinese intermediary agencies, the ROC's Mainland Affairs Council said in a statement Nov. 6.

The MAC, which oversees all matters related to Taiwan-mainland China exchanges, condemned the Chinese Communist authorities for resorting to extraneous matters, resulting in the collapse of the talks.

The Oct. 28-30 conference in Hong Kong over document verification between Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation and the mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits ended without any agreement after mainland representatives persisted on discussing political matters.

MAC said that issues involving document verification are general affairs that the two agencies can tackle without touching on political issues.

"The Chinese Communists attempted to achieve a breakthrough of their so-called 'one country, two systems' tactics by insisting on discussing the 'one China' principle," MAC said. "It was an obvious cover-up of a political blackmail," MAC added.

Offering a word of comfort to the SEF delegation, Premier Hau Pei-tsun said people should not have high hopes in any negotiations with the Chinese Communists.

Negotiations are often used by the Chinese Communists to achieve political ends, Hau said. Therefore, inconclusive negotiations are not failures, he added.

The meeting in Hong Kong between representatives of SEF and ARATS was the second time this year aimed at ironing out ways to improve civilian matters, particularly the verification of documents necessary in cross-Straits non-official exchanges.

The scheduled two-day meeting, which SEF had proposed to last at least four days, was extended by an extra half-day after the two sides were close to reaching an agreement. However, no specific conclusions were made, and the ARATS delegation left Hong Kong Nov. 1.

Hoping to resume the discussions with their mainland counterparts, SEF representatives stayed on in the British colony and left on Nov. 5, when it became apparent that the talks were unlikely to reopen.

According to the Chinese Communist media, ARATS has said that the meeting with SEF was "officially over". They also proposed another conference either in Taiwan or in the mainland.

The MAC statement strongly criticized the insincerity of ARATS and its want of authority from the Chinese Communists to discuss pertinent matters out of the open.

MAC said that general affairs and technicalities are problems that should be solved "immediately", adding that the time for political negotiations are "not yet ripe".

"Even though the Hong Kong meeting has ended, the problems have not disappeared", said MAC. It urged ARATS to return to the negotiation table at the same venue. "The door to negotiation should not be closed", the statement said.

SEF is a private organization authorized by the ROC government to handle affairs related to people-to-people exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland. SEF has no authority to discuss political issues, whether with private or official mainland representatives.

Mainland authorities were reported to be eager to reopen negotiations for a proposed meeting between SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu (辜振甫) and ARATS Chairman Wang Tao-han (汪道涵), but the time and venue have still to be agreed on. The much publicized proposed conference would be the highest-level contact between non-officials of the two sides.

Source: The Free China Journal—1992, Nov. 10 (Tuesday)

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Su Chi admits the '1992 Consensus' was made up

By Shih Hsiu-chuan

STAFF REPORTER

Wednesday, Feb 22, 2006, Page 3

Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Legislator Su Chi (蘇起) yesterday admitted that he made up the term "1992 consensus" in 2000, before the KMT handed over power to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

Su said he invented the term in order to break the cross-strait deadlock and alleviate tension.

"[Then president] Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) was not in the know when the term was invented. Lee found out about it later from the newspaper, but he never mentioned later that it was improper," said Su, who was chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council at the time.

Su made the remarks yesterday in response to Lee who, during a Taiwan Solidarity Union seminar on Monday, said that the so-called "1992 consensus" was a fiction.

"Little monkey boy's trying to make up history," Lee said of Su, daring him to respond on the matter.

When asked by reporters for a response yesterday, Su said he did invent the term, which was meant to encourage observers to think that "each side has its own interpretation on the meaning of 'one China.'"

The term "1992 consensus" is controversial. The KMT has insisted on the existence of a "consensus" between Taiwan and China during a meeting in Hong Kong in November 1992 that both sides should adhere to the "one China" principle.

Since the term appeared, however, the DPP government has insisted that no such consensus existed.

Stating that "no consensus" was reached on the definition of "one China" during the 1992 meeting, President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) has said that the "1992 meeting" would be a more appropriate term to describe the conference in Hong Kong.

Su said he made up the term "1992 consensus" as a replacement for the expression "each side with its own interpretation" in order to benefit cross-strait development.

"The wording 'each side with its own interpretation' of the 'one China' principle had been used from 1992 to 2000. But China didn't like the 'each side with its own interpretation' part and the DPP government didn't like the part that said 'one China,'" Su said.

"On account of these differences and the fact they could have led to more cross-strait tension after the DPP took power, I suggested the new term as a common point that was acceptable to both sides so that Taiwan and China could keep up cross-strait exchanges," he said.

Su said he initially thought the term could contribute to a resumption of cross-strait negotiations and did not think that it would be unacceptable to the DPP government.

Source: The Taipei Times—2006, Feb. 22 (Wednesday) [click here]

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Su Chi admits creating 'Consensus of 1992'

Wednesday, February 22, 2006

The China Post staff

Kuomintang lawmaker Su Chi admitted yesterday what is known as the "consensus of 1992" is his own handiwork, as former President Lee Teng-hui said it was.

Lee said Sunday he never knew there is any consensus of 1992 and charged Su with creating that non-existent unsigned agreement between Taipei and Beijing.

However, there exists what amounts to a bout de papier or aide memoire type agreement between the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association of Relations across the Taiwan Strait in 1992.

As an aide memoire, it was unsigned but dated and typed on the paper with the titles of the two quasi-government organizations charged with the conduct of "unofficial" relations between Taiwan and China.

Had it been a bout de papier, it would have been typed on "just paper" and undated.

But the agreement per se is not typed on one piece of paper. Rather the two organizations exchanged their aides memoire to complete the agreement, under which Taipei and Beijing both accept one China whose connotation can be individually and orally stated.

This agreement was characterized by Su, then chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, as the principle of "one China with different interpretations."

China did not contest his characterization, however.

"I tried what I could to come up with a solution to the imminent impasse between Taipei and Beijing right after President Chen Shui-bian's election in 2000," Su recalled.

Su knew President Chen would never accept the principle of one China with different interpretations. He also knew he had to do something to prevent the stalemate.

"That's why I decided to repack the principle of 'one China with different interpretations in the consensus of 1992," Su pointed out.

He said he did not tell President Lee of his decision and went ahead with the announcement of his creation. "President Lee did not know beforehand," he continued, "and he came to know only after reading the newspaper."

"But," Su pointed out, "President Lee did not complain."

Lee is now complaining Su was trying to "create history."

Under that aide memoire agreement, C.F. Koo, SEF chairman, met his Chinese counterpart Wang Daohan twice in 1993 and 1998 to sign agreements to solve "issues of technicalities" between Taiwan and China. Koo went to see Chinese President Jiang Zeming in Beijing after his meeting with Wang in Shanghai in 1998.

On the other hand, Su said the consensus of 1992 sounds better and is of more use to the ruling Democratic Progressive Party than the principle of one China with different interpretations.

"Well," the Kuomintang legislator said, "the consensus of 1992 makes it possible for Taipei to differently 'interpret' one China."

Beijing wants dialogue with Taipei in accordance with the consensus of 1992.

However, China now insists on the principle of one China whose connotation can be individually and orally stated. The change came about after James Soong, chairman of the People First Party, met and talked with Hu Jintao, Chinese president, in Beijing in May last year.

Source: The China Post—2006, Feb. 22 (Wednesday) [click here]

Please note that the China Post, founded on Sept. 3, 1952, was the oldest English-language daily newspaper in Taiwan. While its print edition was stopped on May 15, 2017, the online edition continued publishing content well into the year 2021 but apparently has become inactive since, rendering the URL of above article invalid.

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Conclusion

The term “1992 Consensus” is misleading and distorts the political reality in cross-Strait relations. The evidence for that can be summarized as follows.

  • Contemporary FCJ coverage as shown above gives no hint whatsoever that an agreement on the One China issue was achieved at the 1992 Hong Kong meeting between SEF and ARATS representatives and its aftermath—no consensus then.
  • Neither the ROC nor the PRC ever provided any documents which would prove that a bilateral unterstanding concerning the One China issue was reached at the 1992 Hong Kong meeting.
  • According to sources available online, the formula "one China, with each side having its own interpretation" (yi Zhong  gebiao) came up only around August 1995 and is attributed to then-SEF secretary-general and KMT member Chiao Jen-ho.
  • The term “1992 Consensus” never came up before the 2000 ROC presidential election which took place on March 18 that year, and the first public mention of the term probably occurred shortly afterwards on March 28 by NP legislator Elmer Fung.
  • As shown above, Su Chi admitted in February 2006 that it was him who had invented the term.
  • The PRC has never officially accepted the second part of the formula “yi Zhong gebiao”, rendering the term “1992 Consensus” meaningless.

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