Note: This page presents a collection of selected important texts and documents pertaining to
the Taiwan Politics Database. Alternatively, the user can also refer to a PDF file that shows the contents of this
page as well—557 pages in A5 format, file size: 8.46 MB (file includes the ROC
Constitution); click here to open.
In addition, separate relevant PDF files in A4 format are available for free download as listed below:
Selected imported texts and documents. 175 pages, file size 4.2 MB; click here
The Hong Kong files—relevant treaties and laws. 157 pages, file size: 3.69 MB; click here
Inaugural addresses by ROC Presidents since 1996. 63 pages, file size: 2.5 MB; click here
Facts about the "1992 Consensus". 14 pages, file size: 1.6 MB; click here
Please note that the texts and documents shown in this page's chapter are listed in chronological order according to the
respective publication date. Due to the sheer number of selected texts, this chapter has been subdivided into three time segments.
In the field of international politics, the status of the ROC has long been highly controversial. Most countries in the
world acknowledge the so-called "One China" principle (yige Zhongguo
yuanze 一個中國原則), i. e. its interpretation by the PRC, according to which "there is only one China in the world and
Taiwan is a part of that China". Today less than two dozen states, most of them with no international importance, maintain
formal diplomatic relations with the ROC. The existence of the ROC is not only
denied internationally but also domestically by pro-independence activists in Taiwan who claim that there was no legal
foundation for Taiwan to be put under ROC control in 1945, making the now Taipei-based ROC government a
"government-in-exile" (liuwang zhengfu 流亡政府). More details in this context can be found under the
headline "Legal aspects of Taiwan in the ROC" of the section Taiwan Province on the page "Local administration".
Most of the texts and documents shown in this page were selected for their significance to the status of China and
Taiwan/the PRC and the ROC. Others were picked for their significance in the dispute concerning the Diaoyutai Islands (Diaoyutai lieyu 釣魚台列嶼)—called "Senkaku Islands" (Jian'ge
zhudao 尖閣諸島, Japanese pronunciation "Senkaku shotō") by Japan—in
the East China Sea which are claimed by the ROC, the PRC, and Japan, or as reference to be used in the controversy
about overlapping sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, e. g. the Spratly Islands
(nansha qundao 南沙群島). A red star symbol ("★") indicates a text
authored—or co-authored—by a PRC government agency or a CCP heavyweight.
All documents are presented in original full text, with two exceptions. Because the Treaty
of Versailles and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are far too large
to be included here (in fact, UNCLOS is even larger than all other texts in this chapter combined), only parts deemed relevant
by the editor were selected—of the Treaty of Versailles which in the original has 440 articles in 15 parts, ten articles are shown,
and one article out of the 320 articles in 17 parts of UNCLOS. A scissors symbol ("✄") indicates that most of
the document's articles were left out.
As for important quotes like Bill Clinton's "Three No's", Lee Teng-hui's remarks
about the "special state-to-state relationship" between the ROC and the PRC, and
Colin Powell's statement on "one China" and Taiwan, only the paragraph with the
actual wording is displayed here. Additional notes from the editor (i. e. this website's chief
researcher) are marked as such and highlighted with a stop sign symbol ("🛑").
Please note that the topic of Taiwan’s status under international law was the focus of a doctoral thesis written by German law
expert Claudius Petzold: “Die völkerrechtliche Stellung Taiwans”, published in 2007 by Nomos Universitätsschriften – Recht, 226
pages (in German), ISBN 978-3-8329-2373-0. The text is available as eBook on the
Nomos eLibrary.
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan
and His Majesty the Emperor of China, desiring to restore the blessings of peace to their countries and subjects and to remove all cause
for future complications, have named as their Plenipotentiaries for the purpose of concluding a Treaty of Peace, that is to say:
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Count ITO Hirobumi, Junii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Paullownia,
Minister President of State; and Viscount MUTSU Munemitsu, Junii, First Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred
Treasure, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.
And His Majesty the Emperor of China, LI Hung-chang, Senior Tutor to the Heir Apparent, Senior Grand Secretary
of State, Minister Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports of China, Viceroy of the province of Chili, and Earl
of the First Rank; and LI Ching-fong, Ex-Minister of the Diplomatic Service, of the Second Official Rank:
Who, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good and proper form, have agreed to the
following Articles:—
Article 1
China recognises definitively the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea, and, in consequence, the
payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China, in derogation of such independence
and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the future.
Article 2
China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together with all fortifications,
arsenals, and public property thereon:—
(a) The southern portion of the province of Fêngtien within the following boundaries:
The line of demarcation begins at the mouth of the River Yalu and ascends that stream to the mouth of the River
An-ping, from thence the line runs to Fêng-huang, from thence to Hai-cheng, from thence to Ying-kow, forming a line
which describes the southern portion of the territory. The places above named are included in the ceded territory. When the
line reaches the River Liao at Ying-kow, it follows the course of the stream to its mouth, where it terminates. The
mid-channel of the River Liao shall be taken as the line of demarcation.
This cession also includes all islands appertaining or belonging to the province of Fêngtien situated in the
eastern portion of the Bay of Liao-tung and the northern portion of the Yellow Sea.
(b) The island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa.
(c) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east
of Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude.
Article 3
The alignment of the frontiers described in the preceding Article, and shown on the annexed map, shall be subject to
verification and demarcation on the spot by a Joint Commission of Delimitation, consisting of two or more Japanese and two
or more Chinese delegates, to be appointed immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. In case the
boundaries laid down in this Act are found to be defective at any point, either on account of topography or in consideration
of good administration, it shall also be the duty of the Delimitation Commission to rectify the same.
The Delimitation Commission will enter upon its duties as soon as possible, and will bring its labours to a conclusion
within the period of one year after appointment.
The alignments laid down in this Act shall, however, be maintained until the rectifications of the Delimitation Commission,
if any are made, shall have received the approval of the Governments of Japan and China.
Article 4
China agrees to pay to Japan as a war indemnity the sum of 200,000,000 Kuping taels; the said sum to be paid in eight
instalments. The first instalment of 50,000,000 taels to be paid within six months, and the second instalment of 50,000,000
to be paid within twelve months, after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. The remaining sum to be paid in six
equal instalments as follows: the first of such equal annual instalments to be paid within two years, the second within
three years, the third within four years, the fourth within five years, the fifth within six years, and the sixth within
seven years, after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. Interest at the rate of 5 per centum per annum shall begin
to run on all unpaid portions of the said indemnity from the date the first instalment falls due.
China shall, however, have the right to pay by anticipation at any time any or all of the said instalments. In case the
whole amount of the said indemnity is paid within three years after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act all
interest shall be waived, and the interest for two years and a half or for any less period, if any already paid, shall be
included as part of the principal amount of the indemnity.
Article 5
The inhabitants of the territories ceded to Japan who wish to take up their residence outside the ceded districts shall
be at liberty to sell their real property and retire. For this purpose a period of two years from the date of the exchange of
ratifications of the present Act shall be granted. At the expiration of that period those of the inhabitants who shall not
have left such territories shall, at the option of Japan, be deemed to be Japanese subjects.
Each of the two Governments shall, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act, send one or more
Commissioners to Formosa to effect a final transfer of that province, and within the space of two months after the exchange of
the ratifications of this Act such transfer shall be completed.
Article 6
All Treaties between Japan and China having come to an end as a consequence of war, China engages, immediately upon the
exchange of the ratifications of this Act, to appoint Plenipotentiaries to conclude with the Japanese Plenipotentiaries, a
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and a Convention to regulate Frontier Intercourse and Trade. The Treaties, Conventions, and
Regulations now subsisting between China and the European Powers shall serve as a basis for the said Treaty and Convention
between Japan and China. From the date of the exchange of ratifications of this Act until the said Treaty and Convention are
brought into actual operation, the Japanese governments, its officials, commerce, navigation, frontier intercourse and trade,
industries, ships, and subjects, shall in every respect be accorded by China most favoured nation treatment.
China makes, in addition, the following concessions, to take effect six months after the date of the present Act:—
First.—The following cities, towns, and ports, in addition to those already opened, shall be opened to the trade,
residence, industries, and manufactures of Japanese subjects, under the same conditions and with the same privileges and
facilities as exist at the present open cities, towns, and ports of China:
● Shashih, in the province of Hupeh.
● Chungking, in the province of Szechwan.
● Suchow, in the province of Kiangsu.
● Hangchow, in the province of Chekiang.
The Japanese Government shall have the right to station consuls at any or all of the above named places.
Second.—Steam navigation for vessels under the Japanese flag, for the conveyance of passengers and cargo, shall
be extended to the following places:
● On the Upper Yangtze River, from Ichang to Chungking.
● On the Woosung River and the Canal, from Shanghai to Suchow and Hangchow.
The rules and regulations that now govern the navigation of the inland waters of China by Foreign vessels shall, so far
as applicable, be enforced, in respect to the above named routes, until new rules and regulations are conjointly agreed to.
Third.—Japanese subjects purchasing goods or produce in the interior of China, or transporting imported merchandise
into the interior of China, shall have the right temporarily to rent or hire warehouses for the storage of the articles so
purchased or transported without the payment of any taxes or extractions whatever.
Fourth.—Japanese subjects shall be free to engage in all kinds of manufacturing industries in all the open cities,
towns, and ports of China, and shall be at liberty to import into China all kinds of machinery, paying only the stipulated import
duties thereon.
All articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in China shall, in respect of inland transit and internal taxes, duties, charges,
and exactions of all kinds, and also in respect of warehousing and storage facilities in the interior of China, stand upon the same
footing and enjoy the same privileges and exemptions as merchandise imported by Japanese subjects into China.
In the event additional rules and regulations are necessary in connexion with these concessions, they shall be embodied in
the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation provided for by this Article.
Article 7
Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding Article, the evacuation of China by the armies of Japan shall be completely
effected within three months after the exchange of the ratificatioins of the present Act.
Article 8
As a guarantee of the faithful performance of the stipulations of this Act, China consents to the temporary occupation by the
military forces of Japan of Weihaiwei, in the province of Shantung.
Upon payment of the first two instalments of the war indemnity herein stipulated for and the exchange of the ratifications of
the Treaty of Commerce and navigation, the said place shall be evacuated by the Japanese forces, provided the Chinese Government
consents to pledge, under suitable and sufficient arrangements, the Customs revenue of China as security for the payment of the
principal and interest of the remaining instalments of the said indemnity. In the event that no such arrangements are concluded,
such evacuation shall only take place upon the payment of the final instalment of said indemnity.
It is, however, expressly understood that no such evacuation shall take place until after the exchange of the ratifications
of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.
Article 9
Immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act, all prisoners of war then held shall be restored, and China
undertakes not to ill-treat or punish prisoners of war so restored to her by Japan. China also engages to at once release all
Japanese subjects accused of being military spies or charged with any other military offences. China further engages not to punish
in any manner, nor to allow to be punished, those Chinese subjects who have in any manner been compromised in their relations with
the Japanese army during the war.
Article 10
All offensive military operations shall cease upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act.
Article 11
The present Act shall be ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of China, and the ratifications shall
be exchanged at Chefoo on the 8th day of the 5th month of the 28th year of MEIJI, corresponding to the 14th day of the 4th month of
the 21st year of KUANG HSÜ.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same and affixed thereto the seal of their arms.
DONE in Shimonoseki, in duplicate, this 17th day of the fourth month of the 28th year of MEIJI, corresponding to the 23rd day
of the 3rd month of the 21st year of KUANG HSÜ.
Count Ito Hirobumi(Junii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Paullownia; Minister President of State; Plenipotentiary
of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan)
Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu(Junii, First Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure; Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs; Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan)
Li Hung-chang(Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China; Senior Tutor to the Heir Apparent; Senior Grand
Secretary of State; Minister Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports of China; Viceroy of the province of Chili; Earl of the
First Rank)
Li Ching-fong(Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China; Ex-Minister of the Diplomatic Service, of the
Second Official Rank)
The Treaty of Shimonoseki (Maguan tiaoyue 馬關條約; title in Japanese: Shimonoseki Jōyaku下関条約) was signed at Shimonoseki (下關) on April 17, 1895
and entered into force on May 8, 1895 by the exchange of the instruments of ratification at Chefoo (芝罘).
The Japanese have affronted China by annexing our territory of Formosa, and the supplications of us, the People of Formosa, at the portals of the Throne have been made in vain. We now learn that the Japanese slaves are about to arrive.
If we suffer this, the land of our hearths and homes will become the land of savages and barbarians, but if we do not suffer it, our condition of comparative weakness will certainly not endure long. Frequent conferences have been held with the Foreign Powers, who all aver that the People of Formosa must establish their independence before the Powers will assist them.
Now, therefore, we, the People of Formosa, are irrevocably resolved to die before we will serve the enemy. And we have in Council determined to convert the whole island of Formosa into a Republican state, and that the administration of all our State affairs shall be organized and carried on by the deliberations and decisions of Officers publicly elected by us the People.
But as in this new enterprise there is needed, as well for the resistance of Japanese aggression as for the organization of the new administration, a man to have chief control, in whom authority shall centre, and by whom the peace of our homesteads shall be assured—therefore, in view of the respect and admiration in which we have long held the Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Tang Ching Sung, we have in Council determined to raise him to the position of President of the Republic.
An official seal has been cut, and on the second day of fifth moon, at the ssu hour [9 a.m. 25 May], it will be publicly presented with all respect by the notables and people of the whole of Formosa. At early dawn on that day, all of us, notables and people, farmers and merchants, artizans and tradesmen, must assemble at the Tuan Fang Meeting House, that we may in grave and solemn manner inaugurate this undertaking.
Let there be neither delay nor mistake.
A Declaration of the whole of Formosa.
[Seal in red as follows] An announcement by the whole of Formosa
In Japanese, the Republic of Formosa (Taiwan minzhuguo 臺灣民主國) is called Taiwan minshu koku (台湾民主国), and
its Declaration of Independence (Taiwan minzhuguo duli xuanyan 臺灣民主國獨立宣言) is called Taiwan minshu koku dokuritsu sengen
(台湾民主国独立宣言).
More information about the short-lived "Republic of Formosa" can be found on the page "Introduction Taiwan / ROC", please click here.
His Majesty the Emperor of China and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, desiring to conclude a Convention for
the retrocession by Japan of all of the southern portion of the province of Fêngtien to the sovereignty of
China, have for that purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:
His Majesty the Emperor of China, LI HUNG-CHANG, Minister Plenipotentiary, Senior Tutor of the Heir Apparent,
Senior Grand Secretary of State and Earl of the First Rank, and
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Baron HAYASHI TADASU, Shoshii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Sacred
Treasure, Grand Officer of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary,
who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, which were found to be in good and proper form, have
agreed upon the following Articles:—
Article 1
Japan retrocedes to China in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern portion of the province of Fêngtien,
which was ceded to Japan under Article 2 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki on the 23rd day of the 3rd month of the 21st year
of KUANG HSÜ, corresponding to the 17th day of the 4th month of the 28th year of MEIJI, together with all fortifications,
arsenals, and public property thereon at the time the retroceded territory is completely evacuated by the Japanese forces in
accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of this Convention, that is to say, the southern portion of the province of
Fêngtien from the mouth of the River Yalu to the mouth of the River An-ping, thence to Feng-huang-ch'ên, thence
to Hai-ch'êng and thence to Ying-kow; also all cities and towns to the south of this boundary and ail islands appertaining
or belonging to the province of Fêngtien situated in the eastern portion of the Bay of Liaotung and in the northern part
of the Yellow Sea. Article 3 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki is in consequence suppressed, as are also the provisions in the same
Treaty with reference to the conclusion of a Convention to regulate frontier intercourse and trade.
Article 2
As compensation for the southern portion of the province of Fêngtien, the Chinese Government engage to pay to the
Japanese Government 30,000,000 Kuping taels on or before the 30th day of the 9th month of the 21st year of KUANG HSÜ,
corresponding to the 16th day of the 11th month of the 28th year of MEIJI.
Article 3
Within three months from the day on which China shall have paid to Japan the compensatory indemnity of 30,000,000 Kuping
taels provided for in Article 2 of this Convention, the retroceded territory shall be completely evacuated by the Japanese
forces.
Article 4
China engages not to punish in any manner, nor to allow to be punished, those Chinese subjects who have in any manner
been compromised in connection with the occupation by the Japanese forces of.the retroceded territory.
Article 5
The present Convention is signed in duplicate in the Chinese, Japanese, and English languages. All these texts have the
same meaning and intention, but in case of any differences of interpretation between the Chinese and Japanese texts, such
differences shall be decided by reference to the English text.
Article 6
The present Convention shall be ratified by His Majesty the Emperor of China and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and
the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Peking within 21 days from the present date.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same and affixed thereto the seal of their arms.
DONE in Peking this 22nd day of the 9th month of the 21st year of KUANG HSÜ, corresponding to the 8th day of the
11th month of the 28th year of MEIJI.
LI HUNG-CHANG, [L.S.]———Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China
Senior Tutor to the Heir Apparent Senior Grand Secretary of State Earl of the First Rank
Baron HAYASHI TADASU, [L.S.]———Shoshii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure
Grand Officer of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan
The Liaotung Convention (Liaodong tiaoyue 遼東條約 or Liaodong xieyi 遼東協議) was signed in Beijing
on Nov. 8, 1895 and is also known under the following names: Fengtian Peninsula Return Treaty (Fengtian bandao huanfu
tiaoyue 奉天半島還付條約), Sino-Japanese Liao-south Treaty (Zhong Ri Liaonan tiaoyue 中日遼南條約), or Treaty
of Peking (Beijing tiaoyue 北京條約); in Japanese: Treaty Concerning Fengtien Peninsula Return
(Hōten hantō kanpu ni kansuru jōyaku 奉天半島還付に関する条約).
The Plenipotentiaries
—of Germany, M. Alfons Mumm (Freiherr von Schwarzenstein);
—of Austria-Hungary, Baron Moritz Czikann von Wahlborn;
—of Belgium, Maurice Joostens;
—of Spain, M. Bernardo J. de Cólogan;
—of the United States, Mr. William W. Rockhill;
—of France, M. Paul Beau;
—of Great Britain, Sir Ernest Satow;
—of Italy, Marquis Salvago Raggi;
—of Japan, M. Jutaro Komura 小村 壽太郎;
—of the Netherlands, M. Fridolin Marinus Knobel;
—of Russia, M. Michael de Giers;
and the Plenipotentiaries of China,
His Highness Yi-K'uang 奕劻, Prince of the First Rank; Ch'ing, President of the Board of Foreign Affairs; and
His Excellency Li Hung-chang 李鴻章, Count of the First Rank; Su-Yi, Tutor of the Heir Apparent; Grand Secretary
of the Wen-Hua Throne Hall, Minister of Commerce, Superintendent of Trade for the North, Governor-General of Chihli,
have met for the purpose of declaring that China has complied with the conditions laid down in the note of the
22nd December, 1900, and which were accepted in their entirety by His Majesty the Emperor of China in a Decree dated
the 27th December, 1900.
Article 1
1) By an Imperial Edict of the 9th June last, Tsai-Feng, Prince of the First Rank, Chün, was appointed
Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of China, and directed in that capacity to convey to His Majesty the German Emperor
the expression of the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China and of the Chinese Government at the assassination of
his Excellency the late Baron von Ketteler, German Minister.
Prince Chün left Peking on the 12th July last to carry out the orders which had been given him.
2) The Chinese Government has stated that it will erect on the spot of the assassination of his Excellency the late Baron
von Ketteler, commemorative monument worthy of the rank of the deceased, and bearing an inscription in the Latin, German,
and Chinese languages which shall express the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China for the murder committed.
The Chinese Plenipotentiaries have informed his Excellency the German Plenipotentiary, in a letter dated the 22nd July last,
that an arch of the whole width of the street would be erected on the said spot, and that work on it was begun on the 25th June last.
Article 2
1) Imperial Edicts of the 13th and 21st February, 1901, inflicted the following punishments on the principal authors of
the attempts and of the crimes committed against the foreign Governments and their nationals:—
Tsa-Ii, Prince Tuan, and Tsai-Lan, Duke Fu-kuo, were sentenced to be brought before the Autumnal Court of Assize for execution,
and it was agreed that if the Emperor saw fit to grant them their lives, they should be exiled to Turkestan, and there imprisoned for life,
without the possibility of commutation of these punishments.
Tsai Hsün, Prince Chuang, Ying-Nien, President of the Court of Censors, and Chao Shu-chiao, President of the Board
of Punishments, were condemned to commit suicide.
Yü Hsien, Governor of Shansi, Chi Hsiu, President of the Board of Rites, and Hsü Cheng-yu, formerly Senior Vice-President
of the Board of Punishments, were condemned to death.
Posthumous degradation was inflicted on Kang Yi, Assistant Grand Secretary, President of the Board of Works, Hsü Tung,
Grand Secretary, and Li Ping-heng, former Governor-General of Szu-chuan.
Imperial Edict of the 13th February last rehabilitated the memories of Hsu Yung-yi, President of the Board of War; Li Shan, President
of the Board of Works; Hsu Ching Cheng, Senior Vice-President of the Board of Civil Office; Lien Yuan, Vice-Chancellor of the Grand Council;
and Yuan Chang, Vice-President of the Court of Sacrifices, who had been put to death for having protested against the outrageous breaches
of international law of last year.
Prince Chuang committed suicide on the 21st February last; Ying Nien and Chao Shu-chiao on the 24th February; Yu Hsien
was executed on the 22nd February; Chi Hsiu and Hsü Cheng-yu on the 26th February; Tung Fu-hsiang, General in Kan-su, has
been deprived of his office by Imperial Edict of the 13th February last, pending the determination of the final punishment to be inflicted
on him.
Imperial Edicts, dated the 29th April and 19th August, 1901, have inflicted various punishments on the provincial officials convicted
of the crimes and outrages of last summer.
2) An Imperial Edict, promulgated the 19th August, 1901, ordered the suspension of official examinations for five years in
all cities where foreigners were massacred or submitted to cruel treatment.
Article 3
So as to make honourable reparation for the assassination of Mr. Sugiyama, Chancellor of the Japanese Legation, His Majesty
the Emperor of China, by an Imperial Edict of the 18th June, 1901, appointed Na T'ung, Vice-President of the Board of Finances, to
be his Envoy Extraordinary, and specially directed him to convey to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan the expression of the regrets of
His Majesty the Emperor of China and of his Government at the assassination of Mr. Sugiyama.
Article 4
The Chinese Government has agreed to erect an expiatory monument in each of the foreign or international cemeteries which were
desecrated, and in which the tombs were destroyed.
It has been agreed with the Representatives of the Powers that the Legations interested shall settle the details for the erection of
these monuments, China bearing all the expenses thereof, estimated at 10,000 taels, for the cemeteries at Peking and in its neighbourhood, and
at 5,000 taels for the cemeteries in the provinces. The amounts have been paid, and the list of these cemeteries is inclosed herewith.
Article 5
China has agreed to prohibit the importation into its territory of arms and ammunition, as well as of materials exclusively
used for the manufacture of arms and ammunition.
An Imperial Edict has been issued on the 25th August, forbidding said importation for a term of two years. New Edicts may be issued
subsequently extending this by other successive terms of two years in case of necessity recognized by the Powers.
Article 6
By an Imperial Edict dated the 29th May, 1901, His Majesty the Emperor of China agreed to pay the Powers an indemnity
of 450,000,000 of Haikwan taels.
This sum represents the total amount of the indemnities for States, Companies, or Societies, private individuals and Chinese,
referred to in Article 6 of the note of the 22nd December, 1900.
1) These 450,000,000 constitute a gold debt calculated at the rate of the Haikwan tael to the gold currency of each country,
as indicated below:—
Haikwan tael =
Marks 3.055
Austro-Hungary crown 3.595
Gold dollar 0.743
Francs 3.740
£ sterling 3s.
Yen 1.407
Netherlands florin 1.796
Gold rouble (17.434 dolias fine) 1.412
This sum in gold shall shall bear interest at 4 per cent. per annum, and the capital shall be reimbursed by China in
thirty-nine years in the manner indicated in the annexed plan of amortization. Capital and interest shall be payable in gold or at the
rates of exchange corresponding to the dates at which the different payments fall due.
The amortization shall commence the 1st January, 1902, and shall finish at the end of the year 1940. The amortizations are payable
annually, the first payment being fixed on the 1st January, 1903.
Interest shall run from the 1st July, 1901, but the Chinese Government shall have the right to pay off within a term of three years,
beginning January 1902, the arrears of the first six months ending the 31st December, 1901, on condition, however, that it pays compound
interest at the rate of 4 per cent. a year on the sums the payment of which shall have been thus deferred.
Interest shall be payable semi-annually, the first payment being fixed on the 1st July, 1902.
2) The service of the debt shall take place in Shanghai in the following manner:—
Each Power shall be represented by a Delegate on a Commission of bankers authorized to receive the amount of interest and
amortization which shall be paid to it by the Chinese authorities designated for that purpose, to divide it among the interested parties,
and to give a receipt for the same.
3) The Chinese Government shall deliver to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps at Peking a bond for the lump sum, which shall
subsequently be converted into fractional bonds bearing the signature of the Delegates of the Chinese Government designated for that
purpose. This operation and all those relating to issuing of the bonds shall be performed by the above-mentioned Commission, in
accordance with the instructions which the Powers shall send their Delegates.
4) The proceeds of the revenues assigned to the payment of the bonds shall be paid monthly to the Commission.
5) The revenues assigned as security for the bonds are the following:—
a) The balance of the revenues of the Imperial Maritime Customs, after payment of the interest and
amortization of preceding loans secured on these revenues, plus the proceeds of the raising to 5 per cent. effective of the present
tariff of maritime imports, including articles until now on the free list, but exempting rice, foreign cereals, and flour, gold and
silver bullion and coin.
b) The revenues of the native Customs, administered in the open ports by the Imperial Maritime Customs.
c) The total revenues of the salt gabelle, exclusive of the fraction previously set aside for other foreign loans.
6) The raising of the present tariff on imports to 5 per cent. effective is agreed to on the conditions mentioned below. It
shall be put in force two months after the signing of the present Protocol, and no exceptions shall be made except for merchandize in
transit not more than ten days after the said signing.
a) All duties levied on imports ad valorem shall be converted as far as possible and as soon as may be
into specific duties.
This conversion shall be made in the following manner:—
The average value of merchandize at the time of their landing during the three years 1897, 1898, and 1899, that is to say, the market
price less the amount of import duties and incidental expenses, shall be taken as the basis for the valuation of merchandize.
Pending the result of the work of conversion, duties shall be levied ad valorem.
b) The beds of the Rivers Whangpoo and Peiho shall be improved with the financial participation of China.
Article 7
The Chinese Government has agreed that the quarter occupied by the Legations shall be considered as one specially reserved for
their use and placed under their exclusive control, in which Chinese shall not have the right to reside, and which may be made defensible.
The limits of this quarter have been fixed as follows on the annexed plan.
● On the east, Ketteler Street (10, 11, 12).
● On the north, the line, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
● On the west, the line 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
● On the south, the line 12—1, drawn along the exterior base of the tartar wall, and following the line of the bastions.
In the Protocol annexed to the letter of the 16th January, 1901, China recognized the right of each Power to maintain a permanent
guard in the said quarter for the defence of its Legation.
Article 8
The Chinese Government has consented to raze the forts of Taku, and those which might impede free communication between Peking
and the sea. Steps have been taken for carrying this out.
Article 9
The Chinese Government conceded the right to the Powers in the Protocol annexed to the letter of the 16th January, 1901, to occupy
certain points, to be determined by an Agreement between them for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the
sea. The points occupied by the Powers are:—
Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tien-tsin, Chun-liang-Cheng, Tong-ku, Lu-tai, Tong-shan, Lan-chou, Chang-li, Chin-wang Tao, Shan-hai Kuan.
Article 10
The Chinese Government has agreed to post and to have published during two years in all district cities the following Imperial Edicts:—
1) Edict of the ist February, 1901, prohibiting for ever under pain of death, membership in any anti-foreign society.
2) Edicts of the 13th and 21st February, 29th April and 19th August, 1901, enumerating the punishments inflicted on the guilty.
3) Edict of the 19th August, 1901, prohibiting examinations in all cities where foreigners were massacred or subjected to cruel treatment.
4) Edicts of the ist February, 1901, declaring all Governors-General, Governors, and provincial or local officials responsible for order
in their respective districts, and that in case of new anti-foreign troubles or other infractions of the Treaties which shall not be immediately
repressed and the authors of which shall not have been punished, these officials shall be immediately dismissed without possibility of being
given new functions or new honours.
The posting of these Edicts is being carried on throughout the Empire.
Article 11
The Chinese Government has agreed to negotiate the amendments deemed necessary by the foreign Governments to the Treaties
of Commerce and Navigation and the other subjects concerning commercial relations with the object of facilitating them.
At present, and as a result of the stipulation contained in Article 6 concerning the indemnity, the Chinese Government agrees to
assist in the improvement of the courses of the Rivers Peiho and Whang-poo, as stated below.—
1) The works for the improvement of the navigability of the Peiho, begun in 1898 with the co-operation of the Chinese Government,
have been resumed under the direction of an International Commission. As soon as the Administration of Tien-tsin shall have been handed back to
the Chinese Government it will be in a position to be represented on this Commission, and will pay each year a sum of 60,000 Haikwan taels
for maintaining the works.
2) A Conservancy Board, charged with the management and control of the works for straightening the Whangpoo and the improvement of
the course of that river, is hereby created.
The Board shall consist of members representing the interests of the Chinese Government and those of foreigners in the shipping trade
of Shanghai.
The expenses incurred for the works and the general management of the undertaking are estimated at the annual sum of 460,000 Haikwan
taels for the first twenty years. This sum shall be supplied in equal portions by the Chinese Government and the foreign interests concerned.
Article 12
An Imperial Edict of the 24th July, 1901, reformed the Office of Foreign Affairs, Tsung-li Yamen, on the lines indicated by the Powers,
that is to say, transformed it into a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wai Wu Pu, which takes precedence over the six other Ministries of State; the same
Edict appointed the principal Members of this Ministry.
An agreement has also been reached concerning the modification of Court ceremonial as regards the reception of foreign Representatives,
and has been the subject of several notes from the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, the substance of which is embodied in a Memorandum herewith
annexed.
Finally, it is expressly understood that as regards the declarations specified above and the annexed documents originating with the
foreign Plenipotentiaries, the French text only is authoritative.
The Chinese Government having thus complied to the satisfaction of the Powers with the conditions laid down in the above-mentioned
note of the 22nd December, 1900, the Powers have agreed to accede to the wish of China to terminate the situation created by the disorders
of the summer of 1900. In consequence thereof, the foreign Plenipotentiaries are authorized to declare in the names of their Governments that,
with the exception of the Legation guards mentioned in Article VII, the international troops will completely evacuate the city of Peking on the
17th September, 1901, and, with the exception of the localities mentioned in Article IX, will withdraw from the Province of Chihli on the 22nd
September, 1901.
The present final Protocol has been drawn up in twelve identical copies, and signed by all the Plenipotentiaries of the contracting countries.
One copy shall be given to each of the foreign Plenipotentiaries, and one copy shall be given to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries.
The Emperor of Japan on the one part, and the Emperor of all the Russias, on the other part, animated by a desire
to restore the blessings of peace, have resolved to conclude a treaty of peace, and have for this purpose named their
Plenipotentiaries, that is to say, for his Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Baron Komura Jutaro, Jusami, Grand Cordon of
the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, and his Excellency Takahira Kogoro, Imperial Order
of the Sacred Treasure, his Minister to the United States, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, his Excellency
Sergius Witte, his Secretary of State and President of the Committee of Ministers of the Empire of Russia, and his Excellency
Baron Roman Rosen, Master of the Imperial Court of Russia, his Majesty's Ambassador to the United States, who, after having
exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good and due form, and concluded the following articles:
Article 1
There shall henceforth be peace and amity between their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias,
and between their respective States and subjects.
Article 2
The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military and economical
interests engages neither to obstruct nor interfere with measures for guidance, protection and control which the Imperial Government
of Japan may find necessary to take in Korea. It is understood that Russian subjects in Korea shall be treated in exactly the same
manner as the subjects and citizens of other foreign Powers; that is to say, they shall be placed on the same footing as the subjects
and citizens of the most favoured nation. It is also agreed that, in order to avoid causes of misunderstanding, the two high contracting
parties will abstain on the Russian-Korean frontier from taking any military measure which may menace the security of Russian or
Korean territory.
Article 3
Japan and Russia mutually engage:
First. — To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease of
the Liaotung Peninsula, in conformity with the provisions of the additional article I annexed to this treaty, and,
Second. — To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria
now in occupation, or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the territory above mentioned.
The Imperial Government of Russia declares that it has not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive
concessions in the impairment of Chinese sovereignty, or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.
Article 4
Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the
development of the commerce or industry of Manchuria.
Article 5
The Imperial Russian Government transfers and assigns to the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government
of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Talien and the adjacent territorial waters, and all rights, privileges and concessions connected
with or forming part of such lease, and it also transfers and assigns to the Imperial Government of Japan all public works and
properties in the territory affected by the above-mentioned lease.
The two contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing
stipulation.
The Imperial Government of Japan, on its part, undertakes that the proprietary rights of Russian subjects in the territory
above referred to shall be perfectly respected.
Article 6
The Imperial Russian Government engages to transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, without compensation and
with the consent of the Chinese Government, the railway between Chang-chunfu and Kuanchangtsu and Port Arthur, and all the branches,
together with all the rights, privileges and properties appertaining thereto in that region, as well as all the coal mines in said
region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway. The two high contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent
of the Government of China mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.
Article 7
Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and
nowise for strategic purposes. It is understood that this restrictiction does not apply to the railway in the territory affected by
the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.
Article 8
The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia with the view to promote and facilitate intercourse and traffic will as soon as
possible conclude a separate convention for the regulation of their connecting railway services in Manchuria.
Article 9
The Imperial Russian Government cedes to the Imperial Government of Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern portion
of the Island of Saghalin and all the islands adjacent thereto and the public works and properties thereon. The fiftieth degree of
north latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded territory. The exact alignment of such territory shall be determined
in accordance with the provisions of the additional article II annexed to this treaty.
Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct in their respective possessions on the Island of Saghalin or the adjacent
islands any fortification or other similar military works. They also respectively engage not to take any military measures which
may impede the free navigation of the Strait of La Perouse and the Strait of Tartary.
Article 10
It is reserved to Russian subjects, inhabitants of the territory ceded to Japan, to sell their real property and retire to
their country, but if they prefer to remain in the ceded territory they will be maintained protected in the full exercise of their
industries and rights of property on condition of submitting to the Japanese laws and jurisdiction. Japan shall have full liberty
to withdraw the right of residence in or to deport from such territory of any inhabitants who labor under political or administrative
disability. She engages, however, that the proprietary rights of such inhabitants shall be fully respected.
Article 11
Russia engages to arrange with Japan for granting to Japanese subjects rights of fishery along the coasts of the Russian
possession in the Japan, Okhotsk and Bering Seas.
It is agreed that the foregoing engagement shall not affect rights already belonging to Russian or foreign subjects in those
regions.
Article 12
The treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and Russia having been annulled by the war the Imperial Governments of Japan
and Russia engage to adopt as a basis for their commercial relations pending the conclusion of a new treaty of commerce and navigation
the basis of the treaty which was in force previous to the present war, the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing of the most
favoured nation, in which are included import and export duties, customs formalities, transit and tonnage dues and the admission and
treatment of agents, subjects and vessels of one country in the territories of the other.
Article 13
As soon as possible after the present treaty comes in force all prisoners of war shall be reciprocally restored. The Imperial
Governments of Japan and Russia shall each appoint a special commissioner to take charge of the prisoners. All prisoners in the hands
of one Government shall be delivered to and be received by the commissioner of the other Government or by his duly authorized
representative in such convenient numbers and at such convenient ports of the delivering State as such delivering State shall
notify in advance to the commissioner of the receiving State.
The Governments of Japan and Russia shall present each other as soon as possible after the delivery of the prisoners is completed
with a statement of the direct expenditures respectively incurred by them for the care and maintenance of the prisoner from the date
of capture or surrender and up to the time of death or delivery. Russia engages to repay as soon as possible after the exchange of
statement as above provided the difference between the actual amount so expended by Japan and the actual amount similarly disbursed
by Russia.
Article 14
The present treaty shall be ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias. Such ratification
shall be with as little delay as possible, and in any case no later than fifty days from the date of the signature of the treaty, to
be announced to the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia respectively through the French Minister at Tokio and the Ambassador of
the United States at St. Petersburg, and from the date of the latter of such announcements shall in all its parts come into full
force. The formal exchange of ratifications shall take place at Washington as soon as possible.
Article 15
The present treaty shall be signed in duplicate in both the English and French languages. The texts are in absolute conformity,
but in case of a discrepancy in the interpretation the French text shall prevail.
Sub-Articles
In conformity with the provisions of articles 3 and 9 of the treaty of the peace between Japan and Russia of this date the
undersigned plenipotentiaries have concluded the following additional articles:
SUB-ARTICLE TO ARTICLE 3
The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia mutually engage to commence the withdrawal of their military forces from the
territory of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately after the treaty of peace comes into operation, and within a period of eighteen
months after that date the armies of the two countries shall be completely withdrawn from Manchuria, except from the leased territory
of the Liaotung Peninsula. The forces of the two countries occupying the front positions shall first be withdrawn.
The high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in
Manchuria. The number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per kilometre and within that maximum number the commanders of the
Japanese and Russian armies shall by common accord fix the number of such guards to be employed as small as possible while having
in view the actual requirements.
The commanders of the Japanese and Russian forces in Manchuria shall agree upon the details of the evacuation in conformity with
the above principles and shall take by common accord the measures necessary to carry out the evacuation as soon as possible, and in
any case not later than the period of eighteen months.
SUB-ARTICLE TO ARTICLE 9
As soon as possible after the present treaty comes into force a committee of delimitation composed of an equal number of members
is to be appointed by the two high contracting parties which shall on the spot mark in a permanent manner the exact boundary between
the Japanese and Russian possessions on the Island of Saghalin. The commission shall be bound so far as topographical considerations
permit to follow the fiftieth parallel of north latitude as the boundary line, and in case any deflections from that line at any
points are found to be necessary compensation will be made by correlative deflections at other points. It shall also be the duty of
the said commission to prepare a list and a description of the adjacent islands included in the cession, and finally the commission
shall prepare and sign maps showing the boundaries of the ceded territory. The work of the commission shall be subject to the approval
of the high contracting parties.
The foregoing additional articles are to be considered ratified with the ratification of the treaty of peace to which they are
annexed.
In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and affixed seals to the present treaty of peace.
Done at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, this fifth day of the ninth month of the thirty-eighth year of the Meiji, corresponding
to the twenty-third day of August, one thousand nine hundred and five (September 5, 1905).
The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous to maintain the general peace in
the Far East and to strengthen the relations of amity and good neighbourhood existing between the two countries,
agree to the following articles:
Article 1
The Chinese Government engage to give full assent to all matters that the Japanese government may
hereafter agree with the German Government respecting the disposition of all the rights, interests and concessions,
which, in virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possesses vis-à-vis China in relation to the province
of Shantung.
Article 2
The Chinese Government engage that, within the province of Shantung or along its coast, no territory
or island will be ceded or leased to any other Power, under any pretext whatever.
Article 3
The Chinese Government agree to Japan's building a railway connecting Chefoo or Lungkow with the
Kiaochou Tsinanfu Railway.
Article 4
The Chinese Government engage to open of their own accord, as soon as possible, certain important cities
and towns in the Province of Shantung for the residence and commerce of foreigners. The places to be so opened shall be
decided upon in a separate agreement.
Group II
The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, in view of the fact that the Chinese Government has always
recognized the predominant position of Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:
Article 1
The two contracting Parties mutually agree that the term of the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the term
respecting the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to a further period of 99 years respectively.
Article 2
The Japanese subjects shall be permitted in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to lease or own land
required either for erecting buildings for various commercial and industrial uses or for farming.
Article 3
The Japanese subjects shall have liberty to enter, reside, and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia,
and to carry on business of various kinds commercial, industrial, and otherwise.
Article 4
The Chinese Government grant to the Japanese subjects the right of mining in South Manchuria and Eastern
Inner Mongolia. As regards the mines to be worked, they shall be decided upon in a separate agreement.
Article 5
The Chinese Government agree that the consent of the Japanese Government shall be obtained in advance: (1)
whenever it is proposed to grant to other nationals the right of constructing a railway or to obtain from other nationals the
supply of funds for constructing a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and (2) whenever a loan is to be made
with any other Power, under security of the taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.
Article 6
The Chinese Government engage that whenever the Chinese Government need the service of political, financial, or
military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or in Eastern Inner Mongolia, Japan shall first be consulted.
Article 7
The Chinese Government agree that the control and management of the Kirin-Chungchun Railway shall be handed over
to Japan for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this treaty.
Group III
The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, having regard to the close relations existing between Japanese capitalists
and the Han-Yeh-Ping Company and desiring to promote the common interests of the two nations, agree to the following articles:
Article 1
The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Han-Yeh-Ping Company shall be
made a joint concern of the two nations, and that, without the consent of the Japanese Government, the Chinese Government shall not
dispose or permit the Company to dispose of any right or property of the Company.
Article 2
The Chinese Government engage that, as a necessary measure for protection of the invested interests of Japanese
capitalists, no mines in the neighbourhood of those owned by the Han-Yeh-Ping Company shall be permitted, without the consent of the
said Company, to be worked by anyone other than the Said Company; and further that whenever it is proposed to take any other measure
which may likely affect the interests of the said Company directly or indirectly, the consent of the said Company shall first be
obtained.
Group IV
The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, with the object of effectively preserving the territorial
integrity of China, agree to the following article:
Article 1
The Chinese Government engage not to cede or lease to any other Power any harbour or bay on or any island along
the coast of China.
Group V
Article 1
The Chinese Central Government to engage influential Japanese as political, financial, and military advisers.
Article 2
The Chinese Government to grant the Japanese hospitals, temples, and schools in the interior of China the right
to own land.
Article 3
In the face of many police disputes which have hitherto arisen between Japan and China, causing no little annoyance
the police in localities (in China), where such arrangement: are necessary, to be placed under joint Japanese and Chinese administration,
or Japanese to be employed in police office in such localities, so as to help at the same time the improvement of the Chinese Police
Service.
Article 4
China to obtain from Japan supply of a certain quantity of arms, or to establish an arsenal in China under joint
Japanese and Chinese management and to be supplied with experts and materials from Japan.
Article 5
In order to help the development of the Nanchang-Kiukiang Railway, with which Japanese capitalists are so closely
identified, and with due regard to the negotiations which have been pending between Japan and China in relation to the railway question
in South China, China to agree to give to Japan the right of constructing a railway to connect Wuchang with the Kiukiang-Nanchang
and Hangchou and between Nanchang and Chaochou.
Article 6
In view of the relations between the Province of Fukien and Formosa and of the Agreement respecting the
non-alienation of that province, Japan to be consulted first whenever foreign capital is needed in connection with the railways,
mines, and harbour works (including dockyards) in the Province of Fukien.
Article 7
China to grant to Japanese subjects the right of preaching in China.
In Japanese the Twenty-One Demands are called Taika Nijūikkajō Yōkyū
対華二十一ヵ条要求.
Negotiations between Japan and China’s Yuan Shikai administration in the aftermath of the Twenty-One Demands resulted
in an agreement which did not include the demands in Group 5, signed on May 25, 1915 under the name "Sino-Japanese Agreement"
(Zhong Ri xinyue 中日新約) aka "Treaties of the Fourth Year of the Republic" (min si tiaoyue 民四條約), comprising
the "Treaty Respecting the Province of Shandong" (guanyu Shandong zhi tiaoyue 關於山東之條約),
the "Treaty Respecting Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia" (guanyu nan Manzhou ji dongbu Neimenggu zhi tiaoyue
關於南滿洲及東部內蒙古之條約),
the "Exchange of Notes Respecting the Matter of Hanyehping" (guanyu Hanyeping shixiang zhi huanwen 關於漢冶萍事項之換文),
the "Exchange of Notes Respecting the Restoration of the Leased Territory of Jiaozhou Bay" (guanyu jiaohuan Jiaoao zhi huanwen
關於交還膠澳之換文), and
the "Exchange of Notes Respecting the Fujian Question" (guanyu Fujian shixiang zhi huanwen
關於福建事項之換文).
Part IV: German rights and interests outside Germany
[...]
Section II. China
Article 128
Germany renounces in favour of China all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed
at Peking on September 7, 1901, and from all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto. She likewise renounces in favour
of China any claim to indemnities accruing thereunder subsequent to March 14, 1917.
Article 129
From the coming into force of the present Treaty the High Contracting Parties shall apply, in so far as concerns them respectively:
1. The Arrangement of August 29, 1902, regarding the new Chinese customs tariff;
2. The Arrangement of September 27, 1905, regarding Whang-Poo (黄浦), and the provisional supplementary arrangement
of April 4, 1912. China, however, will no longer be bound to grant to Germany the advantages or privileges which she allowed Germany
under these Arrangements.
Article 130
Subject to the provisions of Section VIII of this Part, Germany cedes to China all the buildings, wharves and pontoons, barracks,
forts, arms and munitions of war, vessels of all kinds, wireless telegraphy installations and other public property belonging to
the German Government, which are situated or may be in the German Concessions at Tientsin (天津) and Hankow (漢口) or elsewhere
in Chinese territory. It is understood, however, that premises used as diplomatic or consular residences or offices are not included
in the above cession, and, furthermore, that no steps shall be taken by the Chinese Government to dispose of the German public and
private property situated within the so-called Legation Quarter (東交民巷) at Peking (北京) without the consent of the Diplomatic
Representatives of the Powers which, on the coming into force of the present Treaty, remain Parties to the Final Protocol of September
7, 1901.
Article 131
Germany undertakes to restore to China within twelve months from the coming into force of the present Treaty all the astronomical
instruments which her troops in 1900-1901 carried away from China, and to defray all expenses which may be incurred in effecting such
restoration, including the expenses of dismounting, packing, transporting, insurance and installation in Peking.
Article 132
Germany agrees to the abrogation of the leases from the Chinese Government under which the German Concessions at Hankow and Tientsin
are now held. China, restored to the full exercise of her sovereign rights in the above areas, declares her intention of opening them to
international residence and trade. She further declares that the abrogation of the leases under which these concessions are now held shall
not affect the property rights of nationals of Allied and Associated Powers who are holders of lots in these concessions.
Article 133
Germany waives all claims against the Chinese Government or against any Allied or Associated Government arising out of the internment
of German nationals in China and their repatriation. She equally renounces all claims arising out of the capture and condemnation of German
ships in China, or the liquidation, sequestration or control of German properties, rights and interests in that country since August 14,
1917. This provision, however, shall not affect the rights of the parties interested in the proceeds of any such liquidation, which shall
be governed by the provisions of Part X (Economic Clauses) of the present Treaty.
Article 134
Germany renounces in favour of the Government of His Britannic Majesty the German State property in the British Concession
at Shameen (沙面) at Canton (廣州). She renounces in favour of the French and Chinese Governments conjointly the property of
the German school situated in the French Concession at Shanghai (上海).
[...]
Section VIII. Shantung
Article 156
Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title and privileges particularly those concerning the territory of
Kiaochow (膠州), railways, mines and submarine cables which she acquired in virtue of the Treaty concluded by her with China on
March 6 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung (山東). All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu
Railway (膠濟鐵路), including its branch lines together with its subsidiary property of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling
stock, mines, plant and material for the exploitation of the mines, are and remain acquired by Japan, together with all rights and
privileges attaching thereto. The German State submarine cables from Tsingtao (青島) to Shanghai and from Tsingtao to Chefoo (芝罘),
with all the rights, privileges and properties attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and
encumbrances.
Article 157
The movable and immovable property owned by the German State in the territory of Kiaochow, as well as all the rights which Germany
might claim in consequence of the works or improvements made or of the expenses incurred by her, directly or indirectly, in connection
with this territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and encumbrances.
Article 158
Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the archives, registers,
plans, title-deeds and documents of every kind, wherever they may be, relating to the administration, whether civil, military, financial,
judicial or other, of the territory of Kiaochow. Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of all treaties, arrangements
or agreements relating to the rights, title or privileges referred to in the two preceding Articles.
The Treaty of Versailles (in French: Traité de Versailles, in Chinese: Fanersai tiaoyue 凡爾賽條約 or
Fanersai heyue 凡爾賽和約, in Japanese Verusaiyu Jōyaku ヴェルサイユ条約)
was signed on June 28, 1919 during the Paris Peace Conference which took place between Jan. 18, 1919 and Jan. 21, 1920. Members
of the Chinese delegation included Lou Tseng-tsiang 陸徵祥, Wellington Koo 顧維鈞, Thomas Wang 王正廷, Alfred Sao-ke Sze
施肇基, Wei Chen-zu 魏宸組, and Tsao Ju-lin 曹汝霖, leading members of the large Japanese delegation were Marquess Saionji
Kinmochi 西園寺 公望, Baron Makino Nobuaki 牧野 伸顕, Viscount Chinda Sutemi 珍田 捨巳, Matsui Keishirō 松井 慶四郎,
and Ijuin Hikokichi 伊集院 彦吉. Signatories were the German Reich, the Allied Powers (France, the British Empire, Italy, Japan, and the United States) and other countries including Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hejaz (= today's Saudi Arabia), Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Siam (= today's Thailand), Uruguay, and Yugoslavia as as well as Australia, Canada, South Africa,
India, and New Zealand as part of the British Empire. China's representatives refused to sign the treaty because many former
German concessions in China were not returned but handed to Japan instead.
Signed at Montevideo, 26 December 1933 Entered into Force, 26 December 1934 Article 8 reaffirmed by Protocol, 23 December 1936
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States
This treaty was signed at the International Conference of American States in Montevideo, Uruguay
on December 26, 1933. It entered into force on December 26, 1934. The treaty discusses the definition
and rights of statehood.
The Governments represented in the Seventh International Conference of American States:
Wishing to conclude a Convention on Rights and Duties of States, have appointed the following Plenipotentiaries:
Honduras: MIGUEL PAZ BARAONA; AUGUSTO C. COELLO; LUIS BOGRAN
United States of America: CORDELL HULL; ALEXANDER W. WEDDELL; J. REUBEN CLARK; J. BUTLER WRIGHT;
SPRUILLE BRADEN; Miss SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE
El Salvador: HECTOR DAVID CASTRO; ARTURO RAMON AVILA; J. CIPRIANO CASTRO
Dominican Republic: TULIO M. CESTERO
Haiti: JUSTIN BARAU; FRANCIS SALGADO; ANTOINE PIERRE-PAUL; EDMOND MANGONES
Argentina: CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS; JUAN F. CAFFERATA; RAMON S. CASTILLO; CARLOS BREBBIA;
ISIDORO RUIZ MORENO; LUIS A. PODESTA COSTA; RAUL PREBISCH; DANIEL ANTOKOLETZ
Venezuela: CESAR ZUMETA; LUIS CHURTON; JOSE RAFAEL MONTTLLA
Uruguay: ALBERTO MANE; JUAN JOSE AMEZAGA; JOSE G. ANTUNA; JUAN CARLOS BLANCO;
Senora SOFIA A. V. DE DEMICHELI; MARTIN R. ECHEGOYEN; LUIS ALBERTO DE HERRERA; PEDRO MANINI RIOS;
MATEO MARQUES CASTRO; RODOLFO MEZZERA; OCTAVIO MORAT; LUIS MORQUIO; TEOFILO PINEYRO CHAIN;
DARDO REGULES; JOSE SERRATO; JOSE PEDRO VARELA
Paraguay: JUSTO PASTOR BENITEZ; GERONIMO RIART; HORACIO A. FERNANDEZ; Senorita MARIA F. GONZALEZ
Mexico: JOSE MANUEL PUIG CASAURANC; ALFONSO REYES; BASILIO VADILLO; GENARO V. VASQUEZ;
ROMEO ORTEGA; MANUEL J. SIERRA; EDUARDO SUAREZ
Panama: J. D. AROSEMENA; EDUARDO E. HOLGUIN; OSCAR R. MULLER; MAGIN PONS
Bolivia: CASTO ROJAS; DAVID ALVESTEGUI; ARTURO PINTO ESCALIER
Guatemala: ALFREDO SKINNER KLEE; JOSE GONZALEZ CAMPO; CARLOS SALAZAR; MANUEL ARROYO
Brazil: AFRANIO DE MELLO FRANCO; LUCILLO A DA CUNHA BUENO; FRANCISCO LUIS DA SILVA CAMPOS;
GILBERTO AMADO; CARLOS CHAGAS; SAMUEL RIBEIRO
Ecuador: AUGUSTO AGUIRRE APARICIO; HUMBERTO ALBORNOZ; ANTONIO PARRA; CARLOS PUIG VILASSAR;
ARTURO SCARONE
Nicaragua: LEONARDO ARGUELLO; MANUEL CORDERO REYES; CARLOS CUADRA PASOS
Colombia: ALFONSO LOPEZ; RAIMUNDO RIVAS; JOSE CAMACEO CARRENO
Chile: MIGUEL CRUCHAGA TOCORNAL; OCTAVIO SENORET SILVA; GUSTAVO RIVERA; JOSE RAMON GUTIERREZ;
FELIX NIETO DEL RIO; FRANCISCO FIGUEROA SANCHEZ; BENJAMIN COHEN
Peru: ALFREDO SOLE Y MURO; FELIPE BARREDA LAOS; LUIS FERNAN CISNEROS
Cuba: ANGEL ALBERTO GIRAUDY; HERMINIO PORTELL VILA; ALFREDO NOGUEIRA
Who, after having exhibited their Full Powers, which were found to be in good and due order, have agreed upon the following:
Article 1
The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population;
b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
Article 2
The federal state shall constitute a sole person in the eyes of international law.
Article 3
The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has
the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize
itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of
its courts.
The exercise of these rights has no other limitation than the exercise of the rights of other states according to
international law.
Article 4
States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity in their exercise. The rights of each one do not
depend upon the power which it possesses to assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence as a person under international
law.
Article 5
The fundamental rights of states are not susceptible of being affected in any manner whatsoever.
Article 6
The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the
rights and duties determined by international law. Recognition is unconditional and irrevocable.
Article 7
The recognition of a state may be express or tacit. The latter results from any act which implies the intention of recognizing
the new state.
Article 8
No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.
Article 9
The jurisdiction of states within the limits of national territory applies to all the inhabitants.
Nationals and foreigners are under the same protection of the law and the national authorities and the foreigners may
not claim rights other or more extensive than those of the nationals.
Article 10
The primary interest of states is the conservation of peace. Differences of any nature which arise between them should be settled
by recognized pacific methods.
Article 11
The contracting states definitely establish as the rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial
acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in threatening
diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure. The territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object
of military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever even
temporarily.
Article 12
The present Convention shall not affect obligations previously entered into by the High Contracting Parties by virtue of
international agreements.
Article 13
The present Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in conformity with their respective constitutional
procedures. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uruguay shall transmit authentic certified copies to the governments
for the aforementioned purpose of ratification. The instrument of ratification shall be deposited in the archives of the Pan American
Union in Washington, which shall notify the signatory governments of said deposit. Such notification shall be considered as an exchange
of ratifications.
Article 14
The present Convention will enter into force between the High Contracting Parties in the order in which they deposit their
respective ratifications.
Article 15
The present Convention shall remain in force indefinitely but may be denounced by means of one year's notice given to the
Pan American Union, which shall transmit it to the other signatory governments. After the expiration of this period the Convention
shall cease in its effects as regards the party which denounces but shall remain in effect for the remaining High Contracting Parties.
Article 16
The present Convention shall be open for the adherence and accession of the States which are not signatories. The corresponding
instruments shall be deposited in the archives of the Pan American Union which shall communicate them to the other High Contracting Parties.
In witness whereof, the following Plenipotentiaries have signed this Convention in Spanish, English, Portuguese and French
and hereunto affix their respective seals in the city of Montevideo, Republic of Uruguay, this 26th day of December, 1933.
Reservations
The Delegation of the United States of America, in signing the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, does so with the
express reservation presented to the Plenary Session of the Conference on December 22, 1933, which reservation reads as follows:
The Delegation of the United States, in voting "yes" on the final vote on this committee recommendation and proposal, makes the
same reservation to the eleven articles of the project or proposal that the United States Delegation made to the first ten articles during
the final vote in the full Commission, which reservation is in words as follows:
"The policy and attitude of the United States Government toward every important phase of international relationships in this
hemisphere could scarcely be made more clear and definite than they have been made by both word and action especially since
March 4. I [Secretary of State Cordell Hull, chairman of U.S. delegation] have no disposition therefore to indulge in any repetition or
rehearsal of these acts and utterances and shall not do so. Every observing person must by this time thoroughly understand that under
the Roosevelt Administration the United States Government is as much opposed as any other government to interference with the freedom,
the sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes of the governments of other nations.
"In addition to numerous acts and utterances in connection with the carrying out of these doctrines and policies, President Roosevelt,
during recent weeks, gave out a public statement expressing his disposition to open negotiations with the Cuban Government for the purpose
of dealing with the treaty which has existed since 1903. I feel safe in undertaking to say that under our support of the general principle of
non-intervention as has been suggested, no government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt
Administration. I think it unfortunate that during the brief period of this Conference there is apparently not time within which to prepare
interpretations and definitions of these fundamental terms that are embraced in the report. Such definitions and interpretations would
enable every government to proceed in a uniform way without any difference of opinion or of interpretations. I hope that at the earliest
possible date such very important work will be done. In the meantime in case of differences of interpretations and also until they (the
proposed doctrines and principles) can be worked out and codified for the common use of every government, I desire to say that the
United States Government in all of its international associations and relationships and conduct will follow scrupulously the doctrines and
policies which it has pursued since March 4 which are embodied in the different addresses of President Roosevelt since that time and in
the recent peace address of myself on the 15th day of December before this Conference and in the law of nations as generally recognized
and accepted".
The delegates of Brazil and Peru recorded the following private vote with regard to article 11: "That they accept the doctrine in principle
but that they do not consider it codifiable because there are some countries which have not yet signed the Anti-War Pact of Rio de Janeiro 4
of which this doctrine is a part and therefore it does not yet constitute positive international law suitable for codification".
Honduras: M. PAZ BARAONA; AUGUSTO C. COELLO; Luls BOGRXN
United States of America: ALEXANDER W. WEDDELL; J. BUTLER WRIGUT
El Salvador: HECTOR DAVID CASTRO; ARTURO R. AVILA
Dominican Republic: TULIO M. CESTERO
Haiti: J. BARAU; F. SALGADO; EDMOND MANGONES; A. PRRE. PAUL
Argentina: CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS; JUAN F. CAFFERATA; RAMON S. CASTILLO; I. Rulz MORENO; L. A. PODESTA COSTA;
D. ANTOKOLETZ
Venezuela: LUIS CHURION; J. R. MONTILLA
Uruguay: A. MANE; JOSE PEDRO VARELA; MATEO MARQuEs CASTRO; DARDO REGULES; SOFIA ALVAREZ VIGNOLI DE DEMICIIELI;
TEOFILO PINEYRO CHAIN; LUIS A. DE HERRERA; MARTIN R. EcnEcoYEN; JOSE G. ANTUNA; J. C. BLANCO; PEDRO MANINI RIOS;
RODOLFO MEZZERA; OCTAVTO MORATO; LUIS MOROQUIO; JOSE SERRATO
Paraguay: JUSTO PASTOR BENITEZ; MARIA F. GONZALEZ
Mexico: B. VADILLO; M. J. STERRA; EDUARDO SUAREZ
Panama: J. D. AROSEMENA; MAGIN PONS; EDUARDO E. HOLGUIN
Guatemala: M. ARROYO
Brazil: LUCILLO A. DA CUNHA BUENO; GILBERTO AMADO
Ecuador: A. AGUIRRE APARICIO; H. ALBORNOZ; ANTONIO PARRA V.; C. PUIG V.; ARTURO SCARONE
Nicaragua: LEONARDO ARGUELLO; M. CORDERO REYES; CARLOS CUADRA PASOS
Colombia: ALFONSO LOPEZ; RAIMUNDO RIVAS
Chile: MIGUEL CRUCHAGA; J. RAMON GUTIERREZ; F. FIGUEROA; F. NIETO DEL RIO; B. COHEN
Peru: (with the reservation set forth) ALFREDO SOLF Y MURO
Cuba: ALBERTO GIRAUDY; HERMINIO PORTELL VILA; ING. NOGUEIRA
Japan's national policy has always aimed at the domination of Asia and mastery of the Pacific. For more than four
years China has resolutely resisted Japan's aggression, regardless of suffering and sacrifice, in order not only to maintain her national
independence and freedom but also to uphold international law and justice and to promote world peace and human happiness.
China is a peace-loving nation. In taking up arms in self-defense, China entertained the hope that Japan might yet realise the futility
of her plans of conquest. Throughout the struggle all the other powers have shown the utmost forbearance likewise in the hope that Japan
might one day repent and mend her ways in the interest of peace in the entire Pacific region.
Unfortunately Japan's aggressive capacities prove to be incorrigible. After her long and fruitless attempt to conquer China, Japan, far
from showing any signs of penitence, has treacherously launched an attack on China's friends, the United States and Great Britain, thus
extending the theater of her aggressive activities and making herself the arch-enemy of justice and world peace.
This latest act of aggression on the part of Japan lays bare her insatiable ambitions and has created a situation that no nation which
believes in international good faith and human decency can tolerate.
The Chinese Government hereby formally declares war on Japan. The Chinese Government further declares that all treaties, conventions,
agreements and contracts regarding relations between China and Japan are and remain null and void.
(Subscribing to the Principles of the Atlantic Charter, January 1, 1942)
A Joint Declaration by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa,
Yugoslavia.
The Governments signatory hereto,
Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of United States
of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic
Charter.
Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and
to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against
savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world,
DECLARE:
(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and
its adherents with which such government is at war.
(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace
with the enemies.
The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions
in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.
DONE at Washington
January First, 1942
[The signatories to the Declaration by United Nations are as listed above.]
President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Mr. Churchill, together with their respective military
and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa. The following general statement was issued:
"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed
their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.
"The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves
and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she
has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese,
such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other
territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea,
are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.
"With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere
in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."
The Cairo Conference was attended by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and ROC President Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 and took place Nov. 22–26, 1943.
The Cairo Declaration (also called "Cairo Communique") was not a treaty, was not signed, and was released via radio broadcast
on Dec. 1, 1943. It is called Kairo sengen カイロ宣言 in Japanese.
WHEREAS the future development of international civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can become a threat to the general security; and
WHEREAS it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that cooperation between nations and peoples upon which the peace of the world depends;
THEREFORE, the undersigned governments having agreed on certain principles and arrangements in order that international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically;
Have accordingly concluded this Convention to that end.
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION
Article 1
Sovereignty
The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
Article 2
Territory
For the purposes of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State.
Article 3
Civil and state aircraft
(a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to state aircraft. (b) Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be state aircraft. (c) No state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the terms thereof. (d) The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.
Article 4
Misuse of civil aviation
Each contracting State agrees not to use civil aviation for any purpose inconsistent with the alms of this Convention.
CHAPTER II: FLIGHT OVER TERRITORY OF CONTRACTING STATES
Article 5
Right of non-scheduled flight
Each contracting State agrees that all aircraft of the other contracting States, being aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air services shall have the right, subject to the observance of the terms of this Convention, to make flights into or in transit nonstop across its territory and to make stops for non-traffic purposes without the necessity of obtaining prior permission, and subject to the right of the State flown over to require landing. Each contracting State nevertheless reserves the right, for reasons of safety of flight, to require aircraft desiring to proceed over regions which are inaccessible or without adequate air navigation facilities to follow prescribed routes, or to obtain special permission for such flights. Such aircraft, if engaged in the carriage of passengers, cargo, or mail for remuneration or hire on other than scheduled international air services, shall also, subject to the provisions of Article 7, have the privilege of taking on or discharging passengers, cargo, or mail, subject to the right of any State where such embarkation or discharge takes place to impose such regulations, conditions or limitations as it may consider desirable.
Article 6
Scheduled air services
No scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization of that State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or authorization.
Article 7
Cabotage
Each contracting State shall have the right to refuse permission to the aircraft of other contracting States to take on in its territory passengers, mail and cargo carried for remuneration or hire and destined for another point within its territory. Each contracting State undertakes not to enter into any arrangements which specifically grant any such privilege on an exclusive basis to any other State or an airline of any other State, and not to obtain any such exclusive privilege from any other State.
Article 8
Pilotless aircraft
No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall be flown without a pilot over the territory of a contracting State without special authorization by that State and in accordance with the terms of such authorization. Each contracting State undertakes to insure that the flight of such aircraft without a pilot in regions open to civil aircraft shall be so controlled as to obviate danger to civil aircraft.
Article 9
Prohibited areas
(a) Each contracting State may, for reasons of military necessity or public safety, restrict or prohibit uniformly the aircraft of other States from flying over certain areas of its territory, provided that no distinction in this respect is made between the aircraft of the State whose territory ls involved, engaged in international scheduled airline services, and the aircraft of the other contracting States likewise engaged. Such prohibited areas shall be of reasonable extent and location so &s not to lnterfered unnecessarily with air navigation. Descriptions of such prohibited areas in the territory of a contracting State, as well as any subsequent alterations therein, shall be communicated as soon as possible to the other contracting States and to the International Civil Aviation Organization. (b) Each contracting State reserves also the right, in exceptional circumstances or during a period of emergency, or in the interest of public safety, and with immediate effect, temporarily to restrict or prohibit flying over the whole or any part of its territory, on condition that such restriction or prohibition shall be applicable without distinction of nationality to aircraft of all other States. (c) Each contracting State, under such regulations as it may prescribe, may require any aircraft entering the areas contemplated in subparagraphs (a) or (b) above to effect a landing as soon as practicable thereafter at some designated airport within its territory.
Article 10
Landing at customs airport
Except in a case where, under the terms of this Convention or a special authorization, aircraft are permitted to cross the territory of a contracting State without landing, every aircraft which enters the territory of a contracting State shall, if the regulations of that State so require, land at an airport designated by that State for the purpose of customs and other examination. On departure from the territory of a contracting State, such aircraft shall depart from a similarly designated customs airport. Particulars of all designated customs airports shall be published by the State and transmitted to the International Civil Aviation Organization established under Part II of this Convention for communication to all other contracting States.
Article 11
Applicability of air regulations
Subject to the provisions of this Convention, the laws and regulations of a contracting State relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to the aircraft of all contracting States without distinction as to nationality, and shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entering or departing from or while within the territory of that State.
Article 12
Rules of the air
Each contracting State undertakes to adopt measures to insure that every aircraft flying over or maneuvering within its territory and that every aircraft carrying its nationality mark, wherever such aircraft may be, shall comply with the rules and regulations relating to the flight and maneuver of aircraft there in force. Each contracting State undertakes to keep its own regulations in these respects uniform, to the greatest possible extent, with those established from time to time under this Convention. Over the high seas, the rules in force shall be those established under this Convention. Each contracting State undertakes to insure the prosecution of all persons violating the regulations applicable.
Article 13
Entry and clearance regulations
The laws and regulations of a contracting State as to the admission to or departure from its territory of passengers, crew or cargo of aircraft, such as regulations relating to entry, clearance, immigration, passports, customs, and quarantine shall be complied with by or on behalf of such passengers, crew or cargo upon entrance into or departure from, or while within the territory of that State.
Article 14
Prevention of spread of disease
Each contracting State agrees to take effective measures to prevent the spread by means of air navigation of cholera, typhus (epidemic), smallpox, yellow fever, plague, and such other communicable diseases as the contracting States shall from time to time decide to designate, and to that end contracting States will keep in close consultation with the agencies concerned with international regulations relating to sanitary measures applicable to aircraft. Such consultation shall be without prejudice to the application of any existing international convention on this subject to which the contracting States may be parties.
Article 15
Airport and similar charges
Every airport in a contracting State which is open to public use by its national aircraft shall likewise, subject to the provisions of Article 68, be open under uniform conditions to the aircraft of all the other contracting States. The like uniform conditions shall apply to the use, by aircraft of every contracting State, of all air navigation facilities, including radio and meteorological services, which may be provided for public use for the safety and expedition of air navigation. Any charges that may be imposed or permitted to be imposed by a contracting State for the use of such airports and air navigation facilities by the aircraft of any other contracting State shall not be higher, (a) As to aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air services, than those that would be paid by its national aircraft of the same class engaged in similar operations, and (b) As to aircraft engaged in scheduled international air services, than those that would be paid by its national aircraft engaged in similar international air services. All such charges shall be published and communicated to the International Civil Aviation Organization: provided that, upon representation by an interested contracting State, the charges imposed for the use of airports and other facilities shall be subject to review by the Council, which shall report and make recommendations thereon for the consideration of the State or States concerned. No fees, dues or other charges shall be imposed by any contracting State in respect solely of the right of transit over or entry into or exit from its territory of any aircraft of a contracting State or persons or property thereon.
Article 16
Search of aircraft
The appropriate authorities of each of the contracting States shall have the right, without unreasonable delay, to search aircraft of the other contracting States on landing or departure, and to inspect the certificates and other documents prescribed by this Convention.
Aircraft have the nationality of the State in which they are registered.
Article 18
Dual registration
An aircraft cannot be validly registered in more than one State, but its registration may be changed from one State to another.
Article 19
National laws governing registration
The registration or transfer of registration of aircraft in any contracting State shall be made in accordance with its laws and regulations.
Article 20
Display of marks
Every aircraft engaged in international air navigation shall bear its appropriate nationality and registration marks.
Article 21
Report of registrations
Each contracting State undertakes to supply to any other contracting State or to the International Civil Aviation Organization, on demand, information concerning the registration and ownership of any particular aircraft registered in that State. In addition, each contracting State shall furnish reports To the International Civil Aviation Organization, under such regulations as the latter may prescribe, giving such pertinent date as can be made available concerning the ownership and control of aircraft registered in that State and habitually engaged in international air navigation. The data thus obtained by the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be made available by it on request to the other contracting States.
Each contracting State agrees to adopt all practicable measures, through the issuance of special regulations or otherwise, to facilitate and expedite navigation by aircraft between the territories of contracting States, and to prevent unnecessary delays to aircraft, crews, passengers and cargo, especially in the administration of the laws relating to immigration, quarantine, customs and clearance.
Article 23
Customs and immigration procedures
Each contracting State undertakes, so far as it may find practicable, to establish customs and immigration procedures affecting international air navigation in accordance with the practices which may be established or recommended from time to time, pursuant to this Convention. Nothing in this Convention shell be construed as preventing the establishment of customs-free airports.
Article 24
Customs duty
(a) Aircraft on a flight to, from, or across the territory of another contracting State shall be admitted temporarily free of duty, subject to the customs regulations of the State. Fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment and aircraft stores on board an aircraft of a contracting State, on arrival in the territory of another contracting State and retained on board on leaving the territory of that State shall be exempt from customs duty, inspection fees or similar national or local duties and charges. This exemption shall not apply to any quantities or articles unloaded, except in accordance with the customs regulations of the State, which may require that they shall be kept under customs supervision. (b) Spare parts and equipment imported into the territory of a contracting State for incorporation in or use on an aircraft of another contracting State engaged in international air navigation shall be admitted free of customs duty, subject to compliance with the regulations of the State concerned, which may provide that the articles shall be kept under customs supervision and control.
Article 25
Aircraft in distress
Each contracting State undertakes to provide such measures of assistance to aircraft in distress in its territory as it may find practicable, and to permit, subject to control by its own authorities, the owners of the aircraft or authorities of the State in which the aircraft is registered to provide such measures of assistance as may be necessitated by the circumstances. Each contracting State, when undertaking search for missing aircraft, will collaborate in coordinated measures which may be recommended from time to time pursuant to this Convention.
Article 26
Investigation of accidents
In the event of an accident to an aircraft of a contracting State occurring in the territory of another contracting State, and involving death or serious injury, or indicating serious technical defect in the aircraft or air navigation facilities, the State in which the accident occurs will institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the accident, in accordance, so far as its laws permit, with the procedure which may be recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization. The State in which the aircraft is registered shall be given the opportunity to appoint observers to be present at the inquiry and the State holding the inquiry shall communicate the report and findings in the matter to that State.
Article 27
Exemption from seizure on patent claims
(a) While engaged in international air navigation, any authorized entry of aircraft of a contracting State into the territory of another contracting State or authorized transit across the territory of such State with or without landings shall not entail any seizure or detention of the aircraft or any claim against the owner or operator thereof or any other interference therewith by or on behalf of such State or any person therein, on the ground that the construction, mechanism, parts, accessories or operation of the aircraft is an infringement of any patent, design, or model duly granted or registered in the State whose territory is entered by the aircraft, it being agreed that no deposit of security in connection with the foregoing exemption from seizure or detention of the aircraft shall in any case be required in the State entered by such aircraft. (b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this Article shall also be applicable to the storage of spare parts and spare equipment for the aircraft and the right to use and install the same in the repair of an aircraft of a contracting State in the territory of any other contracting State, provided that any patented part or equipment so stored shall not be sold or distributed internally in or exported commercially from the contracting State entered by the aircraft. (c) The benefits of this Article shall apply only to such States, parties to this Convention, as either (1) are parties to the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and to any amendments thereof; or (2) have enacted patent laws which recognize and give adequate protection to inventions made by the nationals of the other States parties to this Convention.
Article 28
Air navigation facilities and standard systems
Each contracting State undertakes, so far as it may find practicable, to: (a) Provide, in its territory, airports, radio services, meteorological services and other air navigation facilities to facilitate international air navigation, in accordance with the standards and practices recommended or established from time to time, pursuant to this Convention; (b) Adopt and put into operation the appropriate standard systems of communications procedure, codes, markings, signals, lighting and other operational practices and rules which may be recommended or established from time to time, pursuant to this Convention; (c) Collaborate in international measures to secure the publication of aeronautical maps and charts in accordance with standards which may be recommended or established from time to time, pursuant to this Convention.
CHAPTER V: CONDITIONS TO BE FULFILLED WITH RESPECT TO AIRCRAFT
Article 29
Documents carried in aircraft
Every aircraft of a contracting State, engaged in international navigation, shall carry the following documents in conformity with the conditions prescribed in this Convention: (a) Its certificate of registration; (b) Its certificate of airworthiness; (c) The appropriate licenses for each member of the crew; (d) Its journey log book; (e) If it is equipped with radio apparatus, the aircraft radio station license; (f) If it carries passengers, a list of their names and places of and destination; (g) If it carries cargo, a manifest and detailed declarations of the cargo.
Article 30
Aircraft radio equipment
(a) Aircraft of each contracting State may, in or over the territory of other contracting States, carry radio transmitting apparatus only if a license to install and operate such apparatus has been issued by the appropriate authorities of the State in which the aircraft is registered. The use of radio transmitting apparatus in the territory of the contracting State whose territory is flown over shall be in accordance with the regulations prescribed by that State. (b) Radio transmitting apparatus may be used only by members of the flight crew who are provided with a special license for the purpose, issued by the appropriate authorities of the State in which the aircraft is registered.
Article 31
Certificates of airworthiness
Every aircraft engaged in international navigation shall be provided with a certificate of airworthiness issued or rendered valid by the State in which it is registered.
Article 32
Licenses of personnel
(a) The pilot of every aircraft and the other members of the operating crew of every aircraft engaged in international navigation shall be provided with certificates of competency and licenses issued or rendered valid by the State in which the aircraft is registered. (b) Each contracting State reserves the right to refuse to recognize, for the purpose of flight above its own territory, certificates of competency and licenses granted to any of its nationals by another contracting State.
Article 33
Recognition of certificates and licenses
Certificates of airworthiness and certificates of competency and licenses issued or rendered valid by the contracting State in which the aircraft is registered, shall be recognized as valid by the other contracting States, provided that the requirements under which such certificates or licenses were issued or rendered valid are equal to or above the minimum standards which may be established from time to time pursuant to this Convention.
Article 34
Journey log books
There shall be maintained in respect of every aircraft engaged in international navigation a Journey log book in which shall be entered particulars of the aircraft, its crew and of each Journey, in such form as may be prescribed from time to time pursuant to this Convention.
Article 35
Cargo restrictions
(a) No munitions of war or implements of war may be carried in or above the territory of a State in aircraft engaged in international navigation, except by permission of such State. Each State shall determine by regulations what constitutes munitions of war or implements of war for the purposes of this Article, giving due consideration, for the purposes of uniformity, to such recommendations as the International Civil Aviation Organization may from time to time make. (b) Each contracting State reserves the right, for reasons of public-order and safety, to regulate or prohibit the carriage in or above its territory of articles other than those enumerated in paragraph (a): provided that no distinction is made in this respect between its national aircraft engaged in international navigation and the aircraft of the other States so engaged; and provided further that no restriction shell be imposed which may interfere with the carriage and use on aircraft of apparatus necessary for the operation or navigation of the aircraft or the safety of the personnel or passengers.
Article 36
Photographic apparatus
Each contracting State may prohibit or regulate the use of photographic apparatus in aircraft over its territory.
CHAPTER VI: INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES
Article 37
Adoption of international procedures
Each contracting State undertakes to collaborate standards and 1in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation. To this end the International Civil Aviation Organization shall adopt and amend from time to time, as may be necessary, international standards and recommended practices and procedures dealing with: (a) Communications systems and air navigation aids, including ground marking; (b) Characteristics of airports and landing strips; (c) Rules of the air and air traffic control practices; (d) Licensing of operating and mechanical personnel; (e) Airworthiness of aircraft; (f) Registration and identification of aircraft; (g) Collection and exchange of meteorological information; (h) Log books; (i) Aeronautical maps and charts; (j) Customs and immigration procedures; (k) Aircraft in distress and investigation of accidents; and such other matters concerned with the safety, regularity, and efficiency of air navigation as may from time to time appear appropriate.
Article 38
Departures from international standards and procedures
Any State which finds it impracticable to comply in all respects with any such international standard or procedure, or to bring its own regulations or practices into full accord with any international standard or procedure after amendment of the latter, or which deems it necessary to adopt regulations or practices differing in any particular respect from those established by an international standard, shall give immediate notification to the International Civil Aviation Organization of the differences between its own practice and that established by the international standard. In the case of amendments to international standards, any State which does not make the appropriate amendments to its own regulations or practices shall give notice to the Council within sixty days of the adoption of the amendment to the international standard, or indicate the action which it proposes to take. In any such case, the Council shall make immediate notification to all other states of the difference which exists between one or more features of an international standard and the corresponding national practice of that State.
Article 39
Endorsement of certificates and licenses
(a) Any aircraft or part thereof with respect to which there exists an 1ntérnational standard of airworthiness or performance, and which failed in any respect to satisfy that standard at the time of its certification, shall have endorsed on or attached to its airworthiness certificate a complete enumeration of the details in respect of which it so failed. (b) Any person holding a license who does not satisfy in full the conditions laid down in the international standard relating to the class of license or certificate which he holds shall have endorsed on or attached to his license a complete enumeration of the particulars in which he does not satisfy such conditions.
Article 40
Validity of endorsed certificates and licenses
No aircraft or personnel having certificates or licenses so endorsed shall participate in international navigation, except with the permission of the State or States whose territory is entered. The registration or use of any such aircraft, or of any certificated aircraft part, in any State other than that in which it was originally certificated shall be at the discretion of the State into which the aircraft or part is imported.
Article 41
Recognition of existing standards of airworthiness
The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to aircraft and aircraft equipment of types of which the prototype is submitted to the appropriate national authorities for certification prior to a date three years after the date of adoption of an international standard of airworthiness for such equipment.
Article 42
Recognition of existing standards of competency
The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to personnel whose licenses are originally issued of personnel prior to a date one year after initial adoption of an international standard of qualification for such personnel; but they shall in any case apply to all personnel whose licenses remain valid five years after the date of adoption of such standard.
An organization to be named the International Civil Aviation Organization is formed by the Convention. It is made up of an Assembly, a Council, and such other bodies as may be necessary.
Article 44
Objectives
The aims and objectives of the Organization are to develop the principles and techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and development of international air transport so as to: (a) Insure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world; (b) Encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for peaceful purposes; (c) Encourage the development of airways, airports, and air navigation facilities for international civil aviation; (d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport; (e) Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competition; (f) Insure that the rights of contracting States are fully respected and that every contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines; (g) Avoid discrimination between contracting States; (h) Promote safety of flight in international air navigation; (i) Promote generally the development of all aspects of international civil aeronautics.
Article 45
Permanent seat
The permanent seat of the Organization shall be at such place as shall be determined at the final meeting of the Interim Assembly of the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization set up by the Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago on December 7, 1944. The seat may be temporarily transferred elsewhere by decision of the Council.
Article 46
First meeting of Assembly
The first meeting of the Assembly shall be summoned by the Interim Council of the above-mentioned Provisional Organization as soon as the Convention has come Into force, to meet at a time and place to be decided by the Interim Council.
Article 47
Legal capacity
The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each contracting State such legal capacity as may be necessary for the performance of its functions. Full Juridical personality shall be granted wherever compatible with the constitution and laws of the State concerned.
(a) The Assembly shall meet annually and shall be convened by the Council at a suitable time and place. Extraordinary meetings of the Assembly may be held at any time upon the call of the Council or at the request of any ten contracting States addressed to the Secretary General. (b) All contracting States shall have an equal right to be represented at the meetings of the Assembly and each contracting State shall be entitled to one vote. Delegates representing contracting States may be assisted by technical advisers who may participate in the meetings but shall have no vote. (c) A majority of the contracting States is required to constitute a quorum for the meetings of the Assembly. Unless otherwise provided in this Convention, decisions of the Assembly shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast.
Article 49
Powers and duties of Assembly
The powers and duties of the Assembly shall be (a) Elect at each meeting its President and other officers; (b) Elect the contracting States to be represented on the Council, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IX; (c) Examine and take appropriate action on the reports of the Council and decide on any matter referred to it by the Council; (d) its own rules of procedure and establish such subsidiary commissions as it may consider to be necessary or desirable; (e) Vote an annual budget and determine the financial arrangements of the Organization, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XII; (f) Review expenditures and approve the accounts of the Organization; (g) Refer, at its discretion, to the Council, to subsidiary commissions, or to any other body any matter within its sphere of action; (h) Delegate to the Council the powers and authority necessary or desirable for the discharge of the duties of the Organization and revoke or modify the delegations of authority at any time; (i) Carry out the appropriate provisions of Chapter XIII; (j) Consider proposals for the modification or amendment of the provisions of this Convention and, if of the proposals, recommend them to the contracting States in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXI; (k) Deal with any matter within the sphere of action of the Organization not specifically assigned to the Council.
(a) The Council shall be a permanent body responsible to the Assembly. It shall be composed of twentyone contracting States elected by the Assembly. An election shall be held at the first meeting of the Assembly and thereafter every three years, and the members of the Council so elected shall hold office until the next following election. (b) In electing the members of the Council, the Assembly shall give adequate representation to (1) the States of chief importance in air transport; (2) the States not otherwise included which make the largest contribution to the provision of facilities for international civil air navigation; and (3) the States not otherwise included whose designation will insure that all the major geographic areas of the world are represented on the Council. Any vacancy on the Council shall be filled by the as soon as possible; any contracting State so elected to the Council shall hold office for the unexpired portion of its predecessor's term of office. (c) No representative of a contracting State on the Council shall be actively associated with the operation of an international air service or financially interested in such a service.
Article 51
President of Council
The Council shall elect its President for a term of three years. He may be reelected. He shall have no vote. The Council shall elect from among its members one or more Vice Presidents who shall retain their right to vote when serving as acting President. The President need not be selected from among the representatives of the members of the Council but, if a representative is elected, his seat shall be deemed vacant and it shall be filled by the State which he represented. The dutles of the President shall be; to: (a) Convene meetings of the Council, the Air Transport Committee, and the Air Navigation Commission; (b) Serve as representative of the Council; and (c) Carry out on behalf of the Council the functions which the Council assigns to him.
Article 52
Voting in Council
Decisions by the Council shall require approval by a majority of its members. The Council may delegate authority with respect to any particular matter to a committee of its members., Decisions of any committee of the Council may be appealed to the Council by any interested contracting State.
Article 53
Participation without a vote
Any contracting State may participate, without a vote, in the consideration by the Council and by its committees and commissions of any question which especially affects its interests. No member of the Council shell vote in the consideration by the of a dispute to which it is a party.
Article 54
Mandatory functions of Council
The Council shall: (a) Submit annual reports to the Assembly; (b) Carry out the directions of the Assembly and discharge the duties and obligations which are laid on it by this Convention; (c) Determine its organization and rules of procedure; (d) Appoint and define the duties of an Air Transport Committee, which shall be chosen from among the representatives of the members of the Council, and which shall be responsible to it; (e) Establish an Air Navigation Commission, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X; (f) Administer the finances of the Organization in accordance with the provisions of Chapters XII end XV; (g) Determine the emoluments of the President of the Council; (h) Appoint a chief executive officer who shall be called the Secretary General, and make provision for the appointment of such other personnel as may be necessary, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XI; (i) Request, collect, examine and publish information relating to the advancement of air navigation and the operation of international air services, including information about the costs of operation and particulars of subsidies paid to airlines from public funds; (j) Report to contracting States any infraction of this Convention, as well as any failure to carry out recommendations or determinations of the Council; (k) Report to the Assembly any infraction of this Convention where a contracting State has failed to take appropriate action within a reasonable time after notice of the infraction; (l) Adopt, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VI of this Convention, international standards and recommended practices; for convenience, designate them as Annexes to this Convention; and notify all contracting States of the action taken; (m) Consider recommendations of the Air Navigation Commission for amendment of the Annexes and take action in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XX; (n) Consider any matter relating to the Convention which any contracting State refers to it.
Article 55
Permissive functions of Council
The Council may: (a) Where appropriate and as experience may show to be desirable, create subordinate air transport commissions on a regional or other basis and define groups of states or airlines with or through which it may deal to facilitate the carrying out of the alms of this Convention; (b) Delegate to the Air Navigation Commission duties additional to those set forth in the Convention and revoke or modify such delegations of authority at any time; (c) Conduct research into all aspects of air transport and air navigation which are of international importance, communicate the results of its research to the contracting States, and facilitate the exchange of information between contracting States on air transport and air navigation matters; (d) Study any matters affecting the organization and operation of international air transport, including the international ownership and operation of international air services on trunk routes, and submit to the Assembly plans in relation thereto; (e) Investigate, at the request of any contracting State, any situation which may appear to present avoidable obstacles to the development of international air navigation; and, after such investigation, issue such reports as may appear to it desirable.
The Air Navigation Commission shall be composed of twelve members appointed by the Council from among persons nominated by contracting States. These persons shall have suitable qualifications and experience in the science and practice of aeronautics. The Council shall request all contracting States to submit nominations. The President of the Air Navigation Commission shall be appointed by the Council.
Article 57
Duties of Commission
The Air Navigation Commission shall: (a) Consider, and recommend to the Council for adoption, modifications of the Annexes to this Convention; (b) Establish technical subcommissions on which any contracting State may be represented, if it so desires; (c) Advise the Council concerning the collection and communication to the contracting States of all information which it considers necessary and useful for the advancement of air navigation.
Subject to any rules laid down by the Assembly and to the provisions of this Convention, the Council shall determine the method of appointment and of termination of appointment, the training, and the salaries, allowances, and conditions of service of the Secretary General and other personnel of the Organization, and may employ or make use of the services of nationals of any contracting State.
Article 59
International character of personnel
The President of the Council, the Secretary General, and other personnel shall not seek or receive instructions in regard to the discharge of their responsibilities from any authority external to the Organization. Each contracting State undertakes fully to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the personnel and not to seek to influence any of its nationals in the discharge of their responsibilities.
Article 60
Immunities and privileges of personnel
Each contracting State undertakes, so far as possible under its constitutional procedure, to accord to the President of the Council, the Secretary General, and the other personnel of the Organization, the immunities and privileges which are accorded to corresponding personnel of other public international organizations. If a general international agreement on the immunities and privileges of international civil servants is arrived at, the immunities and privileges accorded to the President, the Secretary General, and the other personnel of the Organization shall be the immunities and privileges accorded under that general international agreement.
The Council shall submit to the Assembly an annual budget, annual statements of accounts and estimates of all receipts and expenditures. The Assembly shall vote the budget with whatever modification it sees fit to prescribe, and, with the exception of assessments under Chapter XV to States consenting thereto, shall apportion the expenses of the Organization among the contracting States on the basis which it shall from time to time determine.
Article 62
Suspension of voting power
The Assembly may suspend the voting power in the Assembly and in the Council of any contracting State that falls to discharge within a reasonable period its financial obligations to the Organization.
Article 63
Expenses of delegations and other representatives
Each contracting State shall bear the expenses of its own delegation to the Assembly and the remuneration, travel, and other expenses of any person whom it appoints to serve on the Council, and of its nominees or representatives on any subsidiary committees or commissions of the Organization.
The Organization may, with respect to air matters within its competence directly affecting world security, by vote of the Assembly enter into appropriate arrangements with any general organization set up by the nations of the world to preserve peace.
Article 65
Arrangements with other international bodies
The Council, on behalf of the Organization, may enter into agreements with other international bodies for the maintenance of common services and for common arrangements concerning personnel and, with the approval of the Assembly, may enter into such other arrangements as may facilitate the work of the Organization.
Article 66
Functions relating to other agreements
(a) The Organization shall also carry out the functions placed upon it by the International Air Services Transit Agreement and by the International Air Transport Agreement drawn up at Chicago on December 7, 1944, in accordance with the terms and conditions therein set forth. (b) Members of the Assembly and the Council who have not accepted the International Air Services Transit Agreement or the International Air Transport Agreement drawn up at Chicago on December 7, 1944 shall not have the right to vote on any questions referred to the Assembly or Council under the provisions of the relevant Agreement.
Each contracting State undertakes that its international airlines shall, in accordance with requirements laid down by the Council, file with the Council traffic reports, cost statistics and financial statements showing among other things all receipts and the sources thereof.
CHAPTER XV: AIRPORTS AND OTHER AIR NAVIGATION FACILITIES
Article 68
Designation of routes and airports
Each contracting State may, subject to the provisions of this Convention, designate the route to be followed within its territory by any international air service and the airports which any such service may use.
Article 69
Improvement of air navigation facilities
If the Council is of the opinion that the airports or other air navigation facilities, including radio and meteorological services, of a contracting State are not reasonably adequate for the safe, regular, efficient, and economical operation of international air services, present or contemplated, the Council shall consult with the State directly concerned, and other States affected, with a view to finding means by which the situation may be remedied, and may make recommendations for that purpose. No contracting State shall be guilty of an infraction of this Convention if it falls to carry out these recommendations.
Article 70
Financing of air navigation facilities
A contracting State, in the circumstances arising under the provisions of Article 69, may conclude in arrangement with the Council for giving effect to such recommendations, The State may elect to bear all of the costs involved in any such arrangement. If the State does not so elect, the Council may agree, at the request of the State, to provide for all or a portion of the costs.
Article 71
Provision and maintenance of facilities by Council
If a contracting State so requests, the Council may agree to provide, man, maintain, and administer any or all of the airports and other air navigation facilities, including radio and meteorological services, required in its territory for the safe, regular, efficient and economical operation of the international air services of the other contracting States, and may specify just and reasonable charges for the use of the facilities provided.
Article 72
Acquisition or use of land
Where land is needed for facilities financed in whole or in part by the Council at the request of a contracting State, that State shall either provide the land itself, retaining title if it wishes, or facilitate the use of the land by the Council on Just and reasonable terms and in accordance with the laws of the State concerned.
Article 73
Expenditure and assessment of funds
Within the limit of the funds which may be made available to it by the Assembly under Chapter XII, the Council may make current expenditures for the purposes of this Chapter from the general funds of the Organization. The Council shell assess the capital funds required for the purposes of this Chapter in previously agreed proportions over a reasonable period of time to the contracting States consenting thereto whose airlines use the facilities. The Council may also assess to States that consent any working funds that are required.
Article 74
Technical assistance and utilization of revenues
When the Council, at the request of a contracting State, advances funds or provides airports or other facilities in whole or in part, the arrangement may provide, with the consent of that State, for technical assistance in the supervision and operation of the airports and other facilities, and for the payment, from the revenues derived from the operation of the airports and other facilities, of the operating expenses of the airports and the other facilities, and of interest and amortization charges.
Article 75
Taking over of facilities from Council
A contracting State may at any time discharge any obligation into which it has entered under Article 70, and take over airports and other facilities which the Council has provided in its territory pursuant to the provisions of Articles 71 and 72, by paying to the Council an amount which in the opinion of the Council is reasonable in the circumstances. If the State considers that the amount fixed by the Council is unreasonable it may appear to the Assembly against the decision of the Council and the Assembly may confirm or amend the decision of the Council.
Article 76
Return of funds
Funds obtained by the Council through reimbursement under Article 75 and from receipts of interest and amortization payments under Article 74 shall, in the case of advances originally financed by States under Article 73, be returned to the States which were originally assessed in the proportion of their assessments, so determined by the Council.
CHAPTER XVI: JOINT OPERATING ORGANIZATIONS AND POOLED SERVICES
Article 77
Joint operating organizations permitted
Nothing in this Convention shall prevent two or more contracting states from constituting joint air transport operating organizations or international operating agencies and from pooling their air services on any routes or in any regions, but such organizations or agencies and such pooled services shall be subject to all the provisions of this Convention, including those relating to the registration of agreements with the Council. The Council shall determine in what manner the provisions of this Convention relating to nationality of aircraft shall apply to aircraft operated by international operating agencies.
Article 78
Function of Council
The Council may suggest to contracting States concerned that they form joint organizations to operate air services on any routes or in any regions.
Article 79
Participation in operating organizations
A State may participate in joint operating organizations or in pooling arrangements, either through its government or through an airline company or companies designated by its government. The companies may, at the sole discretion of the State concerned, be state-owned or partly state-owned or privately owned.
CHAPTER XVII: OTHER AERONAUTICAL AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS
Article 80
Paris and Habana Conventions
Each contracting State undertakes, immediately upon the coming into force of this Convention, to give notice of denunciation of the Convention relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation signed at Paris on October 13, 1919 or the Convention on Commercial Aviation signed at Habana on February 20, 1928, if it is a party to either. As between contracting States, this Convention supersedes the Conventions of Paris and Habana previously referred to.
Article 81
Registration of existing agreements
All aeronautical agreements which are in existence on the coming into force of this Convention, and which are between a contracting State and any other State or between an airline of a contracting State and any other State or the airline of any other State, shall be forthwith registered with the Council.
Article 82
Abrogation of inconsistent arrangements
The contracting States accept this Convention as abrogating all obligations and understandings between them which are inconsistent with its terms, and undertake not to enter into any such obligations and understandings. A contracting State which, before becoming a member of the Organization has undertaken any obligations toward a non-contracting State or a national of a contracting State or of a non-contracting State inconsistent with the terms of this Convention, shall take immediate steps to procure its release from the obligations. If an airline of any contracting State has entered into any such inconsistent obligations, the State of which it is a national shall use its best efforts to secure their termination forthwith and shall in any event cause them to be terminated as soon as such action can lawfully be taken after the coming into force of this Convention.
Article 83
Registration of new arrangements
Subject to the provisions of the preceding Article, any contracting State may make arrangements not inconsistent with the provisions of this Convention. Any such arrangement shall be forthwith registered with the Council, which shall make it public as soon as possible.
If any disagreement between two or more contracting States relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention and its Annexes cannot be settled by negotiation, it shall, on the application of any State concerned in the disagreement, be decided by the Council. No member of the Council shall vote in the consideration by the Council of any dispute to which it is a party. Any contracting State may, subject to Article 85, appeal from the decision of the Council to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal agreed upon with the other parties to the dispute or to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Any such appeal shall be notified to the Council within sixty days of receipt of notification of the decision of the Council.
Article 85
Arbitration procedure
If any contracting State party to a dispute in which the decision of the Council is under appeal has not accepted the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the contracting States parties to the dispute cannot agree on the choice of the arbitral tribunal, each of the contracting States parties to the dispute shall name a single arbitrator who sshall name an umpire. If either contracting State party to the dispute falls to name an arbitrator within a period of three months from the date of the appeal, an arbitrator shall be named on behalf of that State by the President of the Council from a list of qualified and available persons maintained by the Council. If, within thirty days, the arbitrators cannot agree on an umpire, the President of the Council shall designate an umpire from the list previously referred to. The arbitrators and the umpire shall then Jointly constitute an arbitral tribunal. Any arbitral tribunal established under this or the preceding Article shall settle its own procedure and give its decisions by majority vote, provided that the Council may determine procedural questions in the event of any delay which in the opinion of the Council is excessive.
Article 86
Appeals
Unless the Council decides otherwise, any decision by the Council on whether an international airline is operating in conformity with the provisions of this Convention shall remain in effect unless reversed on appeal. On any other matter, decisions of the Council shall, if appealed from, be suspended until the appeal is decided. The decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice and of an arbitral tribunal shall be final and binding.
Article 87
Penalty for non-conformity of airline
Each contracting State undertakes not to allow the operation of an airline of a contracting State through the airspace above its territory if the Council has decided that the airline concerned is not conforming to a final decision rendered in accordance with the previous Article.
Article 88
Penalty for non-conformity by State
The Assembly shall suspend the voting power in the Assembly and in the Council of any contracting State that is found in default under the provisions of this Chapter.
In case of war, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the freedom of action of any of the contracting States affected, whether as belligerents or as neutrals, The same principle shall apply in the case of any contracting State which declares a state of national emergency and notifies the fact to the Council.
(a) The adoption by the Council of the Annexes described in Article 54, subparagraph (1), shall require the vote of two-thirds of the Council at a meeting called for that purpose and shall then be submitted by the Council to each contracting State. Any such Annex or any amendment of an Annex shall become effective within three months after its submission to the contracting States or at the end of such longer period of time as the Council may prescribe, unless in the meantime a majority of the contracting States register their disapproval with the Council. (b) The Council shall immediately notify all contracting States of the coming into force of any Annex or amendment thereto.
CHAPTER XXI: RATIFICATIONS, ADHERENCES, AMENDMENTS, AND DENUNCIATIONS
Article 91
Ratification of Convention
(a) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America, which shall give notice of the date of the deposit to each of the signatory and adhering States. (b) As soon as this Convention has been ratified or adhered to by twenty-six States it shall come into force between them on the thirtieth day after deposit of the twenty-sixth instrument. It shall come into force for each State ratifying thereafter on the thirtieth day after the deposit of its instrument of ratification. (c) It shall be the duty of the Government of the United States of America to notify the government of each of the signatory and adhering States of the date on which this Convention comes into force.
Article 92
Adherence to Convention
(a) This Convention shall be open for adherence by members of the United Nations and States associated with them, and States which remained neutral during the present world conflict. (b) Adherence shall be effected by a notification addressed to the Government of the United States of America and shall take effect as from the thirtieth day from the receipt of the notification by the Government of the United States of America, which shall notify all the contracting States.
Article 93
Admission of other States
States other than those provided for in Articles 91 and 92(a) may, subject to approval by any general international organization set up by the nations of the world to preserve peace, be admitted to participation in this Convention by means of a four-fifths vote of the Assembly and on such conditions as the Assembly may prescribe: provided that in each case the assent of any State invaded or attacked during the present war by the State seeking admission shall be necessary.
Article 94
Amendment of Convention
(a) Any proposed amendment to this Convention must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly and shall then come into force in respect of States which have ratified such amendment when ratified by the number of contracting States specified by the Assembly., The number so specified shall not be less than two-thirds of the total number of contracting States. (b) If in its opinion the amendment is of such a nature as to Justify this course, the Assembly in its resolution recommending adoption may provide that any State which has not ratified within a specified period after the amendment has come into force shall thereupon cease to be a member of the Organization and a party to the Convention.
Article 95
Denunciation of Convention
(a) Any contracting State may give notice of denunciation of this Conventlon three years after its coming into effect by notification addressed to the Government of the United States of America, which shall at once inform each of the contracting States. (b) Denunciation shall take effect one year from the date of the receipt of the notification and shall operate only as regards the State effecting the denunciation.
For the purpose of this Convention the expression: (a) "Air service" means any scheduled air service performed by aircraft for the public transport of passengers, mail or cargo. (b) "International air service" means an air service which passes through the air space over the territory of more than one State. (c) "Airline" means any air transport enterprise offering or operating an international air service. (d) "Stop for non-traffic purposes" means a landing for any purpose other than taking on or discharging passengers, cargo or mail.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned plenipotentiaries, having been duly authorized, sign this Convention on behalf of their respective governments on the dates appearing opposite their signatures.
DONE at Chicago the seventh day of December 1944, in the English language. A text drawn up in the English, French, and Spanish languages, each of which shall be of equal authenticity, shall be open for signature at Washington, D. C. Both texts shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America, and certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to the governments of all the States which may sign or adhere to this Convention.
FOR AFGHANISTAN:
A. Hosayn AZIZ
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA:
Arthur S. DRAKEFORD
FOR BELGIUM:
Vicomte du PARC
FOR BOLIVIA:
Alfredo PACHECO
FOR BRAZIL:
Fernando LOBO
FOR CANADA:
Herbert James SYMINGTON
FOR CHILE:
Rafael SÁENZ Gregorio BISQUERT Raúl MAGALLANES BARROS
FOR CHINA:
CHANG Kia-ngau 張嘉璈
FOR COLOMBIA:
Gonzalo RESTREPO JARAMILLO
FOR COSTA RICA:
Francisco de P. GUTIÉRREZ ROSS
FOR CUBA:
Guillermo BELT RAMÍREZ
FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA:
Vladimír Ladislav Dionýz Svetozárov HURBAN
FOR DENMARK :
Henrik KAUFFMANN
FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC:
Charles A. MCLAUGHLIN
FOR ECUADOR:
José Antonio CORREA ESCOBAR Francisco GÓMEZ JURADO
FOR EGYPT:
Mahmoud HASSAN Mohamed ROUSHDY Mohamed A. KHALIFA
FOR EL SALVADOR:
Felipe VEGA GÓMEZ
FOR ETHIOPIA:
Leul Ras IMRU Haile Selassie
FOR FRANCE:
Max HYMANS Claude LEBEL André BOURGES Pierre LOCUSSOL
FOR GREECE:
Demetrios T. Noti BOTZARIS Alexander J. ARGYROPOULOS
FOR GUATEMALA:
Oscar MORALES LÓPEZ
FOR HAITI:
G. Edouard ROY
FOR HONDURAS:
Emilio P. LEFEBVRE
FOR ICELAND:
Thor THORS
FOR INDIA:
Gurunath V. BEWOOR
FOR IRAN:
Mohammed SHAYESTEH
FOR IRAQ:
Ali JAWDAT
FOR IRELAND:
Robert BRENNAN John LEYDON John J. HEARNE Timothy J. O'DRISCOLL
FOR LEBANON:
Camille CHAMOUN Faouzi EL-HOSS
FOR LIBERIA:
Walter F. WALKER
FOR LUXEMBOURG:
Hugues LE GALLAIS
FOR MEXICO:
Pedro A. CHAPA
FOR THE NETHERLANDS:
F. H. COPES van HASSELT F. C. ARONSTEIN
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF NEW ZEALAND:
Daniel Giles SULLIVAN
FOR NICARAGUA:
Richard E. FRIZELL
FOR NORWAY:
Wilhelm Munthe de MORGENSTIERNE
FOR PANAMA:
The Delegation of the Republic of Panama signs this Convention ad referendum, and subject to the following
reservations: 1. Because of its strategic position and responsibility in the protection of the means of communication
in its territory, which are of the utmost importance to world trade, and vital to the defense of the Western Hemisphere, the Republic
of Panama reserves the right to take, with respect to all flights through the air space above territory, all measures which in its judgment
may be proper for its own security or the protection of said means of communication. 2. The Republic of Panama understands
that the technical annexes to which reference is made in the Convention constitute recommendations only, and not binding obligations.
FOR PARAGUAY:
Celso Ramon VELÁZQUEZ
FOR PERU:
Armando REVOREDO José S. KOECHLIN Luis ALVARADO Federico ELGUERA Guillermo VAN OORDT LEÓN
FOR THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH:
Jaime HERNÁNDEZ Urbano Alviar ZAFRA Joseph H. FOLEY
FOR POLAND:
Zbyslaw CIOLKOSZ Dr. Henryk J. GÓRECKI Stefan J. KONORSKI Witold A. URBANOWICZ Ludwik H. GOTTLIEB
FOR PORTUGAL:
Mario de FIGUEREDO Alfredo DELESQUE DOS SANTOS CINTRA Duarte CALHIEROS Vasco VIEIRA GARIN
FOR THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA:
Douglas David FORSYTH
FOR SPAIN:
Esteban TERRADAS Germán BARAIBAR Duarte CALHEIROS
FOR SWEDEN:
Ragnar KUMLIN
FOR SWITZERLAND:
Charles BRUGGMANN
FOR SYRIA:
Noureddeen KAHALE
FOR THAILAND:
Mom Rajawongse SENI PRAMOJ
FOR TURKEY:
Sükrü KOCAK Ferruh SAHINBAS Orhan H. EROL
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND:
Philip CUNLIFFE-LISTER (1st Earl of SWINTON)
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Adolf A. BERLE Jr. Alfred L. BULWINKLE Charles A. WOLVERTON Fiorello H. LaGUARDIA Edward WARNER Lloyd Welch POGUE William A. M. BURDEN
The Convention on International Civil Aviation was called guoji minyong hangkong gongyue 國際民用航空公約
or Zhijiage gongyue 芝加哥公約 in Chinese. It went into effect on April 4, 1947, the same day the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was established.
The Convention was signed at the end of the International Civil Aviation Conference which took place from Nov. 1
to Dec. 7, 1944 in Chicago (USA). The table below lists the 55 countries invited to attend the conference plus the US
as host country.
Afghanistan
Australia
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Ethiopia
France
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Iceland
India
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Lebanon
Liberia
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Norway Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Saudi Arabia South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Thailand
Turkey
UK
Uruguay USA
USSR
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
The official ICAO
website lists 52 countries sending delegations to the Chicago conference, and the Convention was signed by 54 countries. Most
of the invited countries sent delegates to the conference and signed the Convention, with the following exceptions:
No delegates sent by—Saudi Arabia, USSR (both did not sign)
No delegates listed by—Denmark, Thailand (both are listed as signatories)
No signatures by—Venezuela, Yugoslavia (both had sent delegates)
Additional explanatory remarks concerning the following countries:
Denmark: Henrik Kauffmann signed the Convention, but the official ICAO website does not list Danish delegates at the conference (invitation was extended to Denmark’s minister in Washington).
Panama: sent delegates—Carlos Icaza (chairman), Inocencio Galindo, Enrique Lefevre, and Narciso E. Garay. Panama was mentioned on the list of signatories (with reservations), but no member of the delegation actually signed with his name.
Saudi Arabia: was invited to the Chicago conference but sent no delegates, did not sign the Convention.
Soviet Union: was invited to the Chicago conference but sent no delegates, did not sign the Convention.
Thailand: Mom Rajawongse Seni Pramoj signed the Convention, but the official ICAO website does not list Thai delegates at the conference (invitation was extended to Thailand’s minister in Washington).
Venezuela: sent delegates—Juan de Dios Celis Paredes as (absent) chairman, Francisco J. Sucre as acting chairman, and Julio Bunco Ustáriz, but none of them signed the Convention.
Yugoslavia: sent delegates—Vladimir M. Vukmirovic as chairman, Nenad Dj. Mirosavljevic, and Predrag Sopalovic, but none of them signed the Convention.
The Chinese delegation consisted of chairman Chang Kia-ngau 張嘉璈 (1889-1979, Jiangsu), Liu Chieh 劉鍇 (1907-1991, Guangdong)
and Mow Pang-tsu 毛邦初 (1904-1987, Shanghai).
The Crimea Conference of the heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which took place from Feb. 4 to 11, came to the following conclusions:
1. That a United Nations conference on the proposed world organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25 April, 1945,
and should be held in the United States of America.
2. The nations to be invited to this conference should be:
(a) the United Nations as they existed on 8 Feb., 1945; and
(b) Such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1 March, 1945. (For this purpose, by the
term "Associated Nations" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the Conference on world organization is held,
the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two
Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e., the Ukraine and White Russia.
3. That the United States Government, on behalf of the three powers, should consult the Government of China and the
French Provisional Government in regard to decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.
4. That the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations conference
should be as follows:
"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union
of Soviet Socialistic Republics and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic invite the Government
of -------- to send representatives to a conference to be held on 25 April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco, in the United States
of America, to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.
"The above-named Governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the proposals for the
establishment of a general international organization which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks conference
and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:
C. Voting
"1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring
votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1
of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.'
"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.
"In the event that the Government of -------- desires in advance of the conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals,
the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments."
Territorial trusteeship:
It was agreed that the five nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United
Nations conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.
The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to
(a) existing mandates of the League of Nations;
(b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war;
(c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and
(d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations conference or in the preliminary consultations,
and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be place under trusteeship.
The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States
of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the people of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly
declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments
in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve
by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.
The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the
liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a
principle of the Atlantic Charter — the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live — the restoration
of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived to them by the aggressor nations.
To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in
any European liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require,
(a) to establish conditions of internal peace;
(b) to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples;
(c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the
earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and
(d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.
The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of
direct interest to them are under consideration.
When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite in Europe make such
action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measure necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this
declaration.
By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations
and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order, under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom
and general well-being of all mankind.
In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with
them in the procedure suggested.
It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:
"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect
to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite
for future peace and security."
The study of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. John Winant,
and Mr. Fedor T. Gusev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.
It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be allocated France. This zone would be formed out of
the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.
It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.
On the Talks Between the Heads of Three Governments at the Crimean Conference on the Question of the German Reparations in Kind
1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received
in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized
victory over the enemy.
2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:
(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany
located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments
abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of
destroying the war potential of Germany.
(b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.
(c) Use of German labor.
3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied reparation commission
will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives — one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom
and one from the United States of America.
4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from
the German aggression, the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:
"The Moscow reparation commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that
the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the Paragraph 2 should be 22 billion dollars and that 50 per cent
should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."
The British delegation was of the opinion that, pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow reparation commission, no figures
of reparation should be mentioned.
The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow reparation commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the commission.
The conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report
in due course after the close of the conference.
The following declaration on Poland was agreed by the conference:
"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of
a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the western part of Poland.
The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion
of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government
of National Unity.
"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of
the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization
of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and
unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi
parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.
"When a Polish Provisional of Government National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R.,
which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the
Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government National Unity, and
will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.
"The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some
regions of five to eight kilometers in favour of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions in territory in the north
and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course of the extent of
these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference."
It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Ivan Subasitch:
(a) That the Tito-Subasitch agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new government formed on the basis of the agreement.
(b) That as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:
(I) That the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina
who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and
(II) That legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification
by a Constituent Assembly; and that this statement should be published in the communiqué of the conference.
Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their
views later.
There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance.
The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden
suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British
and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with Mr. Molotov in Moscow. Mr. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.
Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through
the diplomatic channel.
The conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as
often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.
These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.
It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was
understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreaux Convention, and report to their Governments. The Turkish Government
should be informed at the appropriate moment.
The forgoing protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the Crimean Conference Feb. 11, 1945.
The leaders of the three great powers — the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain — have agreed that in two or
three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war against Japan on the side
of the Allies on condition that:
1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved.
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:
(a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;
(b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded,
and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored;
(c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the
establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded
and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.
It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to maintain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.
The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has
been defeated.
For its part, the Soviet Union expresses it readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance
between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese
yoke.
Joseph Stalin Franklin D. Roosevelt Winston S. Churchill
DECLARATION REGARDING THE
DEFEAT OF GERMANY AND THE ASSUMPTION OF SUPREME AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY BY THE GOVERNMENTS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.
The German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air have been completely defeated and have surrendered unconditionally and Germany,
which bears responsibility for the war, is no longer capable of resisting the will of the victorious Powers. The unconditional surrender
of Germany has thereby been effected, and Germany has become subject to such requirements as may now or hereafter be imposed upon her.
There is no central Government or authority in Germany capable of accepting responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration
of the country and compliance with the requirements of the victorious Powers.
It is in these circumstances necessary, without prejudice to any subsequent decisions that may be taken respecting Germany, to make provision
for the cessation of any further hostilities on the part of the German armed forces, for the maintenance of order in Germany and for the administration
of the country, and to announce the immediate requirements with which Germany must comply.
The Representatives of the Supreme Commands of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and
the French Republic, hereinafter called the "Allied Representatives," acting by authority of their respective Governments and in the interests of
the United Nations, accordingly make the following Declaration:
The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government
of the French Republic, hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government,
the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority. The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of the said
authority and powers does not affect the annexation of Germany.
The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government
of the French Republic, will hereafter determine the boundaries of Germany or any part thereof and the status of Germany or of any area at present
being part of German territory.
In virtue of the supreme authority and powers thus assumed by the four Governments, the Allied Representatives announce the following
requirements arising from the complete defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany with which Germany must comply:
Article 1
Germany, and all German military, naval and air authorities and all forces under German control shall immediately cease
hostilities in all theatres of war against the forces of the United Nations on land, at sea and in the air.
Article 2
(a) All armed forces of Germany or under German control, wherever they may be situated, including land, air, anti-aircraft
and naval forces, the S.S., S.A. and Gestapo, and all other forces of auxiliary organisations equipped with weapons, shall be
completely disarmed, handing over their weapons and equipment to local Allied Commanders or to officers designated by the Allied
Representatives.
(b) The personnel of the formations and units of all the forces referred to in paragraph (a) above shall, at the discretion
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Allied State concerned, be declared to be prisoners of war, pending further
decisions, and shall be subject to such conditions and directions as may be prescribed by the respective Allied Representatives.
(c) All forces referred to in paragraph (a) above, wherever they may be, will remain in their present positions pending
instructions from the Allied Representatives.
(d) Evacuation by the said forces of all territories outside the frontiers of Germany as they existed on the 31st December,
1937, will proceed according to instructions to be given by the Allied Representatives.
(e) Detachments of civil police to be armed with small arms only, for the maintenance of order and for guard duties, will
be designated by the Allied Representatives.
Article 3
(a) All aircraft of any kind or nationality in Germany or German-occupied or controlled territories or waters, military,
naval or civil, other than aircraft in the service of the Allies, will remain on the ground, on the water or aboard ships pending
further instructions.
(b) All German or German-controlled aircraft in or over territories or waters not occupied or controlled by Germany will
proceed to Germany or to such other place or places as may be specified by the Allied Representatives.
Article 4
(a) All German or German-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft, and merchant and other shipping,
wherever such vessels may be at the time of this Declaration, and all other merchant ships of whatever nationality in German ports,
will remain in or proceed immediately to ports and bases as specified by the Allied Representatives. The crews of such vessels will
remain on board pending further instructions.
(b) All ships and vessels of the United Nations, whether or not title has been transferred as the result of prize court or
other proceedings, which are at the disposal of Germany or under German control at the time of this Declaration, will proceed at the
dates and to the ports or bases specified by the Allied Representatives.
Article 5
(a) All or any of the following articles in the possession of the German armed forces or under German control or at German disposal
will be held intact and in good condition at the disposal of the Allied Representatives, for such purposes and at such times and places as
they may prescribe:
(i) all arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds and
all other war materials;
(ii) all naval vessels of all classes, both surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft and all merchant shipping, whether
afloat, under repair or construction, built or building;
(iii) all aircraft of all kinds, aviation and anti-aircraft equipment and devices;
(iv) all transportation and communications facilities and equipment, by land, water or air;
(v) all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, ports and naval bases, storage depots,
permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of
all such fortifications, installations and establishments;
(vi) all factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings
and inventions, designed or intended to produce or to facilitate the production or use of the articles, materials, and facilities referred
to in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) above or otherwise to further the conduct of war.
(b) At the demand of the Allied Representatives the following will be furnished:
(i) the labour, services and plant required for the maintenance or operation of any of the six categories mentioned in paragraph (a)
above; and
(ii) any information or records that may be required by the Allied Representatives in connection with the same.
(c) At the demand of the Allied Representatives all facilities will be provided for the movement of Allied troops and agencies,
their equipment and supplies, on the railways, roads and other land communications or by sea, river or air. All means of transportation will
be maintained in good order and repair, and the labour, services and plant necessary therefor will be furnished.
Article 6
(a) The German authorities will release to the Allied Representatives, in accordance with the procedure to be laid down by them,
all prisoners of war at present in their power, belonging to the forces of the United Nations, and will furnish full lists of these persons,
indicating the places of their detention in Germany or territory occupied by Germany. Pending the release of such prisoners of war, the German
authorities and people will protect them in their persons and property and provide them with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical attention
and money in accordance with their rank or official position.
(b) The German authorities and people will in like manner provide for and release all other nationals of the United Nations who
are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint, and all other persons who may be confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for
political reasons or as a result of any Nazi action, law or regulation which discriminates on the ground of race, colour, creed or political
belief.
(c) The German authorities will, at the demand of the Allied Representatives, hand over control of places of detention to such
officers as may be designated for the purpose by the Allied Representatives.
Article 7
The German authorities concerned will furnish to the Allied Representatives:
(a) full information regarding the forces referred to in Article 2 (a), and, in particular, will furnish forthwith all
information which the Allied Representatives may require concerning the numbers, locations and dispositions of such forces, whether
located inside or outside Germany;
(b) complete and detailed information concerning mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air, and
the safety lanes in connection therewith. All such safety lanes will be kept open and clearly marked; all mines, minefields and other
dangerous obstacles will as far as possible be rendered safe, and all aids to navigation will be reinstated. Unarmed German military
and civilian personnel with the necessary equipment will be made available and utilized for the above purposes and for the removal of
mines, minefields and other obstacles as directed by the Allied Representatives.
Article 8
There shall be no destruction, removal, concealment, transfer or scuttling of, or damage to, any military, naval, air, shipping, port,
industrial and other like property and facilities and all records and archives, wherever they may be situated, except as may be directed
by the Allied Representatives.
Article 9
Pending the institution of control by the Allied Representatives over all means of communication, all radio and telecommunication
installations and other forms of wire or wireless communications, whether ashore or afloat, under German control, will cease transmission
except as directed by the Allied Representatives.
Article 10
The forces, ships, aircraft, military equipment, and other property in Germany or in German control or service or at German disposal,
of any other country at war with any of the Allies, will be subject to the provisions of this Declaration and of any proclamations, orders,
ordinances or instructions issued thereunder.
Article 11
(a) The principal Nazi leaders as specified by the Allied Representatives, and all persons from time to time named or designated by
rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives as being suspected of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes or analogous
offences, will be apprehended and surrendered to the Allied Representatives.
(b) The same will apply in the case of any national of any of the United Nations who is alleged to have committed an offence against
his national law, and who may at any time be named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives.
(c) The German authorities and people will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for the apprehension
and surrender of such persons.
Article 12
The Allied Representatives will station forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany as they may determine.
Article 13
(a) In the exercise of the supreme authority with respect to Germany assumed by the Governments of the United States of America,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the four
Allied Governments will take such steps, including the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, as they deem requisite
for future peace and security.
(b) The Allied Representatives will impose on Germany additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and
other requirements arising from the complete defeat of Germany. The Allied Representatives, or persons or agencies duly designated to
act on their authority, will issue proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions for the purpose of laying down such additional
requirements, and of giving effect to the other provisions of this Declaration. All German authorities and the German people shall
carry out unconditionally the requirements of the Allied Representatives, and shall fully comply with all such proclamations, orders,
ordinances and instructions.
Article 14
This Declaration enters into force and effect at the date and hour set forth below. In the event of failure on the part of the German
authorities or people promptly and completely to fulfill their obligations hereby or hereafter imposed, the Allied Representatives will
take whatever action may be deemed by them to be appropriate under the circumstances.
Article 15
This Declaration is drawn up in the English, Russian, French and German languages. The English, Russian and French are the only
authentic texts.
The Berlin Declaration (in Chinese: Bolin xuanyan 柏林宣言) was signed by the Allied commanders-in-chief:
● Georgy Zhukov for the Soviet Union,
● Dwight D. Eisenhower for the United States,
● Bernard Montgomery for the United Kingdom, and
● Jean de Lattre de Tassigny for France.
The Berlin Conference of the three heads of government of the USSR, USA, and UK, which took place from July 17 to August 2, 1945, came
to the following conclusions:
A. The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory
work for the peace settlements:
(1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
China, France, and the United States.
(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London which shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form.
Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the Council in the absence
of his Foreign Ministers, and by a small staff of technical advisers.
(ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1st 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement
in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time.
(3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations,
treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the
termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the
Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.
(ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory
to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded
as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other Members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are
under discussion.
(iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the Member Governments.
(4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited
to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question.
(ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problems under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary
discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the State
chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem.
B. It was agreed that the three Governments should each address an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this
text and to join in establishing the Council. The text of the approved invitation was as follows:
Council of Foreign Ministers Draft for identical invitation to be sent separately by each of the Three Governments to the Governments of China
and France.
The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the U. S. S. R. consider it necessary to begin without delay the essential
preparatory work upon the peace settlements in Europe. To this end they are agreed that there should be established a Council of the Foreign
Ministers of the Five Great Powers to prepare treaties of peace with the European enemy States, for submission to the United Nations. The Council
would also be empowered to propose settlements of outstanding territorial questions in Europe and to consider such other matters as member
Governments might agree to refer to it.
The text adopted by the Three Governments is as follows:
(Here insert final agreed text of the Proposal)
In agreement with the Governments of the United States and U. S. S. R., His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and U. S. S. R.,
the United States Government, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Government extend a cordial invitation to the Government of China (France) to
adopt the text quoted above and to join in setting up the Council. His Majesty's Government, The United States Government, The Soviet Government
attach much importance to the participation of the Chinese Government (French Government) in the proposed arrangements and they hope to receive
an early and favourable reply to this invitation.
C. It was understood that the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the text would be without
prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodical consultation between the Foreign Secretaries of the United
States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom.
D. The Conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the Agreement to establish the Council of
Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had
furnished for the terms of surrender for Germany, for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria and for the inter-Allied control machinery
in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the coordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and
Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Control Council at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly it was agreed
to recommend that the European Advisory Commission be dissolved.
1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their
respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in
their capacity as members of the Control Council.
2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.
3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are:
(i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for
military production. To these ends:-
(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the SS., SA., SD., and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including
the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations and all other military and semi-military
organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and
finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism;
(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the
Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms. ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented.
(ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they
have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and
suffering inevitable.
(iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure
that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.
(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in
international life by Germany.
4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discriminations on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion
shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.
5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes
shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and
any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.
6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes
shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be
replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in
Germany.
7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful
development of democratic ideas.
8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for
all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion.
9. The administration in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local
responsibility. To this end:-
(i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as
rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation;
(ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;
(iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may
be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government;
(iv) for the time being, no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German
administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications,
foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.
10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious
institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.
B. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES.
11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft
and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a
war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 15.
Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission
on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed.
12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration
of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.
13. In organizing the German Economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.
14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in
regard to:
(a) mining and industrial production and its allocation;
(b) agriculture, forestry and fishing;
(c) wages, prices and rationing;
(d) import and export programs for Germany as a whole;
(e) currency and banking, central taxation and customs;
(f) reparation and removal of industrial war potential;
(g) transportation and communications.
In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions.
15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary:
(a) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament, demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports.
(b) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons
in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries.
(European countries means all European countries excluding the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R.).
(c) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones
so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports.
(d) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions including exports and imports, with the aim of
preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein.
(e) to control all German public or private scientific bodies research and experimental institutions, laboratories, et cetera connected
with economic activities.
16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be
created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus
it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any break-down in these controls
will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited.
17. Measures shall be promptly taken:
(a) to effect essential repair of transport;
(b) to enlarge coal production;
(c) to maximize agricultural output; and
(d) to erect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities.
18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned external
assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.
19. Payment of Reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working
out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The
proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports.
The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4 (a) and 4 (b) of the Reparations Agreement.
1. Reparation claims of the U. S. S. R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U. S. S. R., and from appropriate
German external assets.
2. The U. S. S. R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.
3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the
Western Zones and from appropriate German external assets.
4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U. S. S. R. from its own zone of occupation, the U. S. S. R. shall receive additionally
from the Western Zones:
(a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine
manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for
an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.
(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones,
to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.
Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously.
5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the
latest.
6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination
specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 (a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U. S. S. R.
in agreed installments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment
unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the
Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which
the equipment is to be removed.
7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect to such equipment
as will be determined to he eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6.
8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones
of Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below.
9. The Governments of the U. K. and U. S. A. renounce all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located
in the Eastern Zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria.
10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany.
A. The following principles for the distribution of the German Navy were agreed:
(1) The total strength of the German surface navy, excluding ships sunk and those taken over from Allied Nations, but including ships under
construction or repair, shall be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., U. K., and U. S. A.
(2) Ships under construction or repair mean those ships whose construction or repair may be completed within three to six months, according
to the type of ship. Whether such ships under construction or repair shall be completed or repaired shall be determined by the technical commission
appointed by the Three Powers and referred to below, subject to the principle that their completion or repair must be achieved within the time
limits above provided, without any increase of skilled employment in the German shipyards and without permitting the reopening of any German ship
building or connected industries. Completion date means the date when a ship is able to go out on its first trip, or, under peacetime standards,
would refer to the customary date of delivery by shipyard to the Government.
(3) The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. Not more than thirty submarines shall be preserved and divided equally
between the U. S. S. R., U. K., and U. S. A. for experimental and technical purposes.
(4) All stocks of armament, ammunition and supplies of the German Navy appertaining to the vessels transferred pursuant to paragraphs (1)
and (3) hereof shall be handed over to the respective powers receiving such ships.
(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite naval commission comprising two representatives for each government, accompanied
by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German warships and to handle
other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German fleet. The Commission will hold its first
meeting not later than 15th August, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each Delegation on the Commission will have the right on the
basis of reciprocity to inspect German warships wherever they may be located.
(6) The Three Governments agreed that transfers, including those of ships under construction and repair, shall be completed as soon as
possible, but not later than 15th February, 1946. The Commission will submit fortnightly reports, including proposals for the progressive allocation
of the vessels when agreed by the Commission.
B. The following principles for the distribution of the German Merchant Marine were agreed:-
(1) The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever located, shall be divided equally among the U. S. S. R.,
the U. K., and the U. S. A. The actual transfers of the ships to the respective countries shall take place as soon as practicable after the
end of the war against Japan. The United Kingdom and the United States will provide out of their shares of the surrendered German merchant ships
appropriate amounts for other Allied States whose merchant marines have suffered heavy losses in the common cause against Germany, except that
the Soviet Union shall provide out of its share for Poland.
(2) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships during the Japanese War period shall fall under the cognizance and authority of
the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority.
(3) While actual transfer of the ships shall be delayed until after the end of the war with Japan, a Tripartite Shipping Commission shall
inventory and value all available ships and recommend a specific distribution in accordance with paragraph (1).
(4) German inland and coastal ships determined to be necessary to the maintenance of the basic German peace economy by the Allied Control
Council of Germany shall not be included in the shipping pool thus divided among the Three Powers.
(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite merchant marine commission comprising two representatives for each Government,
accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German merchant ships
and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German merchant ships. The Commission
will hold its first meeting not later than September 1st, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each delegation on the Commission will
have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect the German merchant ships wherever they may be located.
The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government to the effect that pending the final determination of territorial questions at
the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should
pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of
Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia.
The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the
City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above subject to expert examination of the actual frontier.
The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the
forthcoming peace settlement.
The Three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London between British, United States,
Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes under the
Moscow Declaration of October, 1943 have no particular geographical localization. The Three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring these
criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose,
and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of these major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first
list of defendants will be published before 1st September.
The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all
of Austria.
The three governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the
city of Vienna.
It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria.
We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the
formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized
by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government
of National Unity has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.
The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity
as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their territories and under their control,
whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper
facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery
of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.
The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as
practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles
who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens
The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference,
has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all
democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press
shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections.
B. WESTERN FRONTIER OF POLAND.
In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the
Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north 'end west which Poland should receive. The
President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the
Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the
western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.
The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories
cast of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinamunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western
Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former
free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone
of occupation in Germany.
The three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be
terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views.
For their part the three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty for Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks
to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a
material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making
good progress towards reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognized and
democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for
membership of the United Nations.
The three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland,
Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic governments in these States will also enable the three Governments
to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future
in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the
extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.
The three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives
of the Allied press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.
As regards the admission of other States into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and,
in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;
2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the
recommendation of the Security Council.
The three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained
neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above.
The three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favour any application for membership put
forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins,
its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.
The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the question of trusteeship territories as defined in the decision of the
Crimea Conference and in the Charter of the United Nations Organization.
After an exchange of views on this question it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian colonial territories was one to be
decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy and that the question of Italian colonial territory would be considered
by the September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
The three Governments took note that the Soviet Representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary,
have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that
hostilities in Europe have ceased.
The three Governments agreed that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries would now be
undertaken, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice
to the respective countries, and accepting as a basis, in respect of all three countries, the Soviet Government's proposals for Hungary as
annexed hereto. (Annex I)
The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations,
or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place
should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.
Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they
consider that the Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem, with special regard to the question of the
equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives
on the Control Council to report to their Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out having regard
to the present situation in Germany.
The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of
the above and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending an examination by the Governments concerned of the report
from their representatives on the Control Council.
The Conference agreed to set up two bilateral commissions of experts, one to be composed of United Kingdom and Soviet Members and one to
be composed of United States and Soviet Members, to investigate the facts and examine the documents, as a basis for the settlement of questions
arising from the removal of oil equipment in Rumania. It was further agreed that these experts shall begin their work within ten days, on the spot.
It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Tehran, and that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran
should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September, 1945.
A proposal by the Soviet Government was examined and the following decisions were reached:
Having examined the question of the Zone of Tangier, the three Governments have agreed that this Zone, which includes the City of Tangier and
the area adjacent to it, in view of its special strategic importance, shall remain international.
The question of Tangier will be discussed in the near future at a meeting in Paris of representatives of the Governments of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France.
The Three Governments recognized that the Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present-day conditions.
It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and
the Turkish Government.
The Conference considered a proposal of the U. S. Delegation on this subject and agreed to refer it for consideration to the forthcoming
meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.
The British and U. S. Delegations to the Conference informed the Soviet Delegation of the desire of the British and U. S. Governments to
reconvene the European Inland Transport Conference and stated that they would welcome assurance that the Soviet Government would participate
in the work of the reconvened conference. The Soviet Government agreed that it would participate in this conference.
The Three Governments agreed that each would send a directive to its representative on the Control Council for Germany informing him of
all decisions of the Conference affecting matters within the scope of his duties.
The proposal (Annex II) presented by the United States Delegation was accepted in principle by the Conference, but the drafting of an
agreement on the matter was left to be worked out through diplomatic channels.
TEXT OF A LETTER TRANSMITTED ON JULY 12 TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U. S. AND U. K. GOVERNMENTS ON THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
IN HUNGARY
In view of the changed situation in connection with the termination of the war against Germany, the Soviet Government finds it necessary
to establish the following order of work for the Allied Control Commission in Hungary.
1. During the period up to the conclusion of peace with Hungary the President (or Vice-President) of the ACC will regularly call conferences
with the British and American representatives for the purpose of discussing the most important questions relating to the work of the ACC. The
conferences will be called once in 10 days, or more frequently in case of need.
Directives of the ACC on questions or principle will be issued to the Hungarian authorities by the President of the Allied Control Commission
after agreement on these directives with the English and American representatives.
2. The British and American representatives in the ACC will take part in general conferences of heads of divisions and delegates of the ACC,
convoked by the President of the ACC, which meetings will be regular in nature. The British and American representatives will also participate
personally or through their representatives in appropriate instances in mixed commissions created by the President of the ACC for questions
connected with the execution by the ACC of its functions
3. Free movement by the American and British representatives in the country will be permitted provided that the ACC is previously informed
of the time and route of the journeys.
4. All questions connected with permission for the entrance and exit of members of the staff of the British and American representatives
in Hungary will be decided on the spot by the President of the ACC within a time limit of not more than one week.
5. The bringing in and sending out by plane of mail, cargoes and diplomatic couriers will be carried out by the British and American
representatives on the ACC under arrangements and within time limits established by the ACC, or in special cases by previous coordination
with the President of the ACC.
I consider it necessary to add to the above that in all other points the existing Statutes regarding the ACC in Hungary, which was confirmed
on January 20, 1945, shall remain in force in the future.
USE OF ALLIED PROPERTY FOR SATELITE REPARATIONS OR WAR TROPHIES
1. The burden of reparation and "war trophies" should not fall on Allied nationals.
2. Capital Equipment-We object to the removal of such Allied property as reparations, "war trophies", or under any other guise. Loss
would accrue to Allied nationals as a result of destruction of plants and the consequent loss of markets and trading connections. Seizure
of Allied property makes impossible the fulfillment by the satellite of its obligation under the armistice to restore intact the rights and
interests of the Allied Nations and their nationals.
The United States looks to the other occupying powers for the return of any equipment already removed and the cessation of removals. Where
such equipment will not or cannot be returned, the U. S. will demand of the satellite adequate, effective and prompt compensation to American
nationals, and that such compensation have priority equal to that of the reparations payment.
These principles apply to all property wholly or substantially owned by Allied nationals. In the event of removals of property in which
the American as well as the entire Allied interest is less than substantial, the U. S. expects adequate, effective, and prompt compensation.
3. Current Production-While the U. S. does not oppose reparation out of current production of Allied investments, the satellite must
provide immediate and adequate compensation to the Allied nationals including sufficient foreign exchange or products so that they can
recover reasonable foreign currency expenditures and transfer a reasonable return on their investment. Such compensation must also have
equal priority with reparations.
We deem it essential that the satellites not conclude treaties, agreements or arrangements which deny to Allied nationals access, on
equal terms, to their trade, raw materials and industry; and appropriately modify any existing arrangements which may have that effect.
We—The President of the United States, the President of the National Government
of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our
countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.
(2)
The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China,
many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This
military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan
until she ceases to resist.
(3)
The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples
of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is
immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry
and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will
mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation
of the Japanese homeland.
(4)
The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed
militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether
she will follow the path of reason.
(5)
Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook
no delay.
(6)
There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived
and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace security and
justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.
(7)
Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making
power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the
achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.
(8)
The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to
the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.
(9)
The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their
homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.
(10)
We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern
justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese
Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese
people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be
established.
(11)
Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit
the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those [industries] which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end,
access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in
world trade relations shall be permitted.
(12)
The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives
have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people
a peacefully inclined and responsible government.
(13)
We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender
of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The
alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.
The "Potsdam Agreement" was the result of the Potsdam Conference which took place from July 17 to Aug. 2, 1945
in Germany's Potsdam. The delegations of the three participating powers were
represented by US President Harry S. Truman, the British Prime Minister—before
July 26 Winston S. Churchill, after that Clement Attlee—and the Premier of the USSR Joseph V. Stalin.
What is shown above as "B) Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender" also became known as "Potsdam Declaration"
issued by US President Truman, UK Prime Minister Churchill and ROC Chairman of the Nationalist Government Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石.
Below are the Chinese and Japanese translations for both terms "Potsdam Agreement" and "Potsdam Declaration".
After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to
effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure.
We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union
that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration.
To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of Our subjects is the
solemn obligation which has been handed down by Our Imperial Ancestors and which lies close to Our heart.
Indeed, We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization
of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial
aggrandizement.
But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone — the gallant fighting of the
military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the devoted service of Our one hundred million
people — the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned
against her interest.
Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking
the toll of many innocent lives. Should We continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the
Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.
Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our
Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.
We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to Our Allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently cooperated with the Empire
towards the emancipation of East Asia.
The thought of those officers and men as well as others who have fallen in the fields of battle, those who died at their posts of duty,
or those who met with untimely death and all their bereaved families, pains Our heart night and day.
The welfare of the wounded and the war-sufferers, and of those who have lost their homes and livelihood, are the objects of Our profound
solicitude.
The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost
feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a
grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable.
Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial State, We are always with you, Our good and loyal subjects,
relying upon your sincerity and integrity.
Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion which may engender needless complications, or any fraternal contention and strike which
may create confusion, lead you astray and cause you to lose the confidence of the world.
Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith in the imperishability of its sacred
land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibility, and of the long road before it.
Unite your total strength, to be devoted to construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitude, foster nobility of spirit, and
work with resolution — so that you may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State and keep pace with the progress of the world.
Hirohito [signature and official seal]
August 14, 1945
Prime Minister Baron Kantarō Suzuki (signature)
Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa (signature)
Minister of Justice Matsuzaka Hiromasa (signature)
Army Minister Korechika Anami (signature)
Minister of Munitions Toyoda Teijirō (signature)
Minister of Health Okada Tadahiko (signature)
Minister of State Sakurai Hyōgorō (signature)
Minister of State Sakonji Seizō (signature)
Minister of State Shimomura Hirosi (signature)
Finance Minister Hirose Toyosaku (signature)
Minister of Education Ōta Kōzō (signature)
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Ishiguro Tadaatsu (signature)
Interior Minister Abe Genki (signature)
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister for Greater East Asia Tōgō Shigenori (signature)
Minister of State Yasui Tōji (signature)
Minister of Transport Kobiyama Naoto (signature)
The Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War is called "Daitōa-sensō-shūketsu-no-shōsho"
(大東亜戦争終結ノ詔書) in Japanese, abbreviated as "Sensō-no-shōsho" (終戦の詔書).
"Jewel Voice Broadcast" in Japanese: Gyokuon-hōsō (玉音放送). It was broadcast in Japan's radio network on Aug. 15, 1945.
A brief timeline of events at the end of WWII concerning the Japanese theater is shown directly below (all dates
in the year 1945).
July 16
Successful test explosion of an atomic bomb in the desert of New Mexico, US (Project Trinity)
July 17
The Potsdam Conference begins, attended by US President Truman, UK PM Churchill and Soviet leader Stalin (concludes on Aug. 2)
Clement Attlee replaces Winston Churchill as British Prime Minister
Aug. 6
The US drop an atomic bomb (uranium-filled gun-type fission weapon nicknamed "Little Boy") on Hiroshima 廣島 (Honshu 本州, Japan), killing more than 70,000
Aug. 7
The USSR declares war against Japan
Aug. 9
The US drop an atomic bomb (plutonium-filled implosion-type nuclear weapon nicknamed "Fat Man") on Nagasaki 長崎 (Kyushu 九州, Japan), killing more than 60,000
"
The USSR begins its invasion of Japanese-occupied Manchuria (Manchukuo)
Aug. 15
Japan’s Emperor Hirohito proclaims that Japan accepts the terms in the Potsdam Declaration
The Act of Surrender is signed by military officials of Japan and the ROC in Nanjing
Oct. 25
Official retrocession of Taiwan and Penghu to China with a formal transfer ceremony in Taipei
Please note that the numbers of fatalities caused by the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in above table are rough estimates based
on online sources only and do not include long-term deaths due to radiation.
J.C.S. 1467/2
17 August 1945
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
INSTRUMENTS FOR THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN
GENERAL ORDER NO. 1
Note by the Secretaries
General order No. 1 (Enclosure), as approved by the President for issue by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters by direction of
the Emperor, is circulated for information.
The President approved it with the understanding that it is subject to change both by further instructions issued through the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and by changes in matters of detail made by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the light of the operational
situation as known by him.
ENCLOSURE (GENERAL ORDER NO. 1) SWNCC21/8
General Order No. 1
MILITARY AND NAVAL
1. The Imperial General Headquarters by direction of the Emperor, and pursuant to the surrender to the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers of all Japanese armed forces by the Emperor, hereby orders all of its commanders in Japan and abroad to cause the Japanese
armed forces and Japanese-controlled forces under their command to cease hostilities at once, to lay down their arms, to remain in their
present locations and to surrender unconditionally to commanders acting on behalf of the United States, the Republic of China, the
United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as indicated hereafter or as may be further directed
by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Immediate contact will be made with the indicated commanders, or their designated
representatives, subject to any changes in detail prescribed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and their instructions
will be completely and immediately carried out.
a. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa
and French Indo-China north of 16 north latitude shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
b. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 38 north latitude
and Karafuto shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.
c. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the Andamans, Nicobars, Burma, Thailand, French
Indo-China south of 16 degrees north latitude, Malaya, Borneo, Netherlands Indies, New Guinea, Bismarcks and the Solomons, shall surrender
to (the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Command or the Commanding General, Australian Forces—the exact breakdown between Mountbatten
and the Australians to be arranged between them and the details of this paragraph then prepared by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers).
d. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the Japanese Mandated Islands, Ryukyus, Bonins, and
other Pacific Islands shall surrender to the Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet.
e. The Imperial General Headquarters, its senior commanders, and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the main islands of Japan,
minor islands adjacent thereto, Korea south of 38 north latitude, and the Philippines shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces
in the Pacific.
f. The above indicated commanders are the only representatives of the Allied Powers empowered to accept surrenders and all surrenders
of Japanese Forces shall be made only to them or to their representatives.
The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters further orders its commanders in Japan and abroad to disarm completely all forces of Japan or
under Japanese control, wherever they may be situated and to deliver intact and in safe and good condition all weapons and equipment at such
time and at such places as may be prescribed by the Allied Commanders indicated above. (Pending further instructions, the Japanese police force
in the main islands of Japan will be exempt from this disarmament provision. The police force will remain at their posts and shall be held
responsible for the preservation of law and order. The strength and arms of such a police force will be prescribed.)
2. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt
of this order, complete information with respect to Japan and all areas under Japanese control as follows:
(a) Lists of all land, air and anti-aircraft units showing locations and strengths in officers and men.
(b) Lists of all aircraft, military, naval and civil giving complete information as to the number, type, location and condition of such
aircraft.
(c) Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine and auxiliary naval craft in or out of commission
and under construction giving their position, condition and movement.
(d) Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled merchant ships of over 100 gross tons, in or out of commission and under construction,
including merchant ships formerly belonging to any of the United Nations which are now in Japanese hands, giving their position condition and
movement.
(e) Complete and detailed information, accompanied by maps, showing location and layouts of all mines, minefields and other obstacles to
movement by land, sea or air and the safety lanes in connection therewith.
(f) Locations and descriptions of all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, anti-aircraft defenses,
ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas.
(g) Locations of all camps and other places of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees.
3. Japanese armed forces and civil aviation authorities will insure that all Japanese military, naval and civil aircraft remain on the
ground on the water or abroad ship until further notification of the disposition to be made of them.
4. Japanese or Japanese-controlled naval or merchant vessels of all types will be maintained without damage and will undertake no
movement pending instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Vessels at sea will immediately render harmless and throw
overboard explosives of all types. Vessels not at sea will immediately remove explosives of all types to safe storage ashore.
5. Responsible Japanese or Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities will insure that:
a. All Japanese mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea and air, wherever located, be removed according to
instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
b. All aids to navigation be reestablished at once.
c. All safety lanes be kept open and clearly marked pending accomplishment of a. above.
6. Responsible Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities will hold intact and in good condition pending further
instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the following:
a. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds and all other
war material (except as specifically prescribed in Section 4 of this order).
b. All land, water and air transportation and communication facilities and equipment.
c. All military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, anti-aircraft defenses, ports and naval bases,
storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings
of all such fortifications, installations and establishments.
d. All factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and
inventions designed or intended to produce or facilitate the production or use of all implements of war and other material and property used
by or intended for use by any military or paramilitary organizations in connection with their operations.
7. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of
receipt of this order, complete lists of all the items specified in paragraph a, b and d of Section 6 above, indicating the numbers, types
and locations of each.
8. The manufacture and distribution of all arms, ammunition and implements of war will cease forthwith.
9. With respect to United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of Japanese or Japanese-controlled authorities:
a. The safety and well-being of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees will be scrupulously preserved to include the
administrative and supply services essential to provide adequate food shelter, clothing and medical care until such responsibility is undertaken
by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers;
b. Each camp or other place of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees together with its equipment, stores,
records, arms and ammunition will be delivered immediately to the command of the senior officer or designated representative of the prisoner
of war and civilian internees;
c. As directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, prisoners of war and civilian internees will be transported to places of
safety where they can be accepted by allied authorities;
d. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters will furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of the
receipt of this order, complete lists of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees, indicating their location.
10. All Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities shall aid and assist the occupation of Japan and Japanese-controlled
areas by forces of the Allied Powers.
11. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and appropriate Japanese officials shall be prepared on instructions from Allied occupation
commanders to collect and deliver all arms in the possession of the Japanese civilian population.
12. This and all subsequent instructions issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or other allied military authorities will
be scrupulously and promptly obeyed by Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil officials and private persons. Any delay or failure
to comply with the provisions of this or subsequent orders and any action which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers determines to be
detrimental to the Allied Powers, will incur drastic and summary punishment at the hands of allied military authorities and the Japanese Government.
General Order No. 1 was General Douglas MacArthur's first order to the forces of the Empire of Japan following the surrender of Japan, and its final form was approved by US President Harry S. Truman on Aug. 17, 1945. It instructed Japanese forces
to surrender to designated Allied commanders, reveal all current military deployments, and preserve military equipment
for later disarmament. General Order No. 1 became known to the world when it was announced at the Japanese Surrender Ceremony
on Sept. 2, 1945, being issued by Japan's Imperial General Headquarters that day. Please note that this document is also often
referred to as "SCAP General Order No. 1", SCAP standing for "Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers" or "Supreme Command of Allies
in the Pacific" (in Chinese: zhu Ri mengjun zongsiling 駐日盟軍總司令, in Japanese: rengō kokugun saikō
shireikan sōshireibu 連合国軍最高司令官総司令部). Some sources use the heading "Surrender Order of
the Imperial General Headquarters of Japan".
We, acting by command of and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters,
hereby accept the provisions set forth in the declaration issued by the Heads of the Governments of the United States, China, and Great Britain
on 26 July 1945 at Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which four powers are hereafter referred
to as the Allied Powers.
We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese armed
forces and all armed forces under the Japanese control wherever situated.
We hereby command all Japanese forces wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilites forthwith, to preserve and save from
damage all ships, aircraft, and military and civil property and to comply with all requirements which my be imposed by the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers or by agencies of the Japanese Government at his direction.
We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Headquarters to issue at once orders to the Commanders of all Japanese forces and all forces under
Japanese control wherever situated to surrender unconditionally themselves and all forces under their control.
We hereby command all civil, military and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, and orders and directives deemed by
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority and we direct
all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their non-combatant duties unless specifically relieved by him or under
his authority.
We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration
in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever actions may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any
other designated representative of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that Declaration.
We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to liberate all allied prisoners
of war and civilian internees now under Japanese control and to provide for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to
places as directed.
The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender.
Signed at TOKYO BAY, JAPAN at 0904 I on the SECOND day of SEPTEMBER, 1945
Mamoru Shiegemitsu(By Command and on Behalf of the Emperor of Japan and the Japanese Government) Yoshijiro Umezu(By Command and on Behalf of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters)
Accepted at TOKYO BAY, JAPAN at 0903 I on the SECOND day of SEPTEMBER, 1945, for the United States, Republic of China, United Kingdom
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and in the interests of the other United Nations at war with Japan.
Douglas MacArthur(Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) Chester W. Nimitz(United States Representative) Hsu Yung-ch'ang(Republic of China Representative) Bruce Fraser(United Kingdom Representative) Kuzma Derevyanko(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Representative) Thomas Blamey(Commonwealth of Australia Representative) Lawrence Moore Cosgrave(Dominion of Canada Representative) Philippe Leclerc de Hauteclocque(Provisional Government of the French Republic Representative) Conrad E. L. Helfrich(Kingdom of the Netherlands Representative) Leonard M. Isitt(Dominion of New Zealand Representative)
In Japanese, this document is called "Nipponno kōfuku bunsho" (日本の降伏文書). It was signed during a formal ceremony
which took place on the deck of the battleship USS Missouri, marking the end of hostilities in WWII.
1. The Emperor of Japan, the Japanese government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, having recognized the complete military
defeat of the Japanese military forces by the Allied forces and having surrendered unconditionally to the Supreme Commander for the Allied powers.
2. The Supreme Commander for the Allied powers directed by his General Order No. 1 that the senior commanders and all ground, sea, air and
auxiliary forces of Japan within China excluding Manchuria, Formosa and French Indo-China north of 16 degrees north latitude shall surrender
to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
3. We, the Japanese Commanders of all Japanese forces and auxiliaries in the areas named above, also recognizing the complete military defeat
of the Japanese military forces by the Allied forces, hereby surrender unconditionally all of the forces under our command to Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek.
4. All the Japanese forces hereby surrendered will cease hostilities and will remain at the stations they now occupy. They are now non-combatant
troops and in due course will be demobilized.
5. They will assemble, preserve without damage, and turn over to the forces specified by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, all arms, ammunition,
equipment, supplies, records, information and other assets of any kind belonging to the Japanese forces. Pending specific instructions, all Japanese
aircraft, naval units, and merchant ships in the areas named above will be held without damage where they are at present located.
6. All the Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees now under Japanese control in the areas named above will be liberated at once and
the Japanese forces will provide protection, care, maintenance, and transportation to places as directed.
7. Henceforth, all the Japanese forces, hereby surrendered, will be subject to the control of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Their movements
and activities will be dictated by him, and they will obey only the orders and proclamations issued, or authorised, by him, or the orders of
their Japanese commanders based upon his instructions.
8. This act of surrender and all subsequent orders and proclamations of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to the surrender forces will be issued
at once to the appropriate subordinate commanders and forces and it will be the responsibility of all Japanese commanders and forces to see that
such proclamations and orders are immediately and completely complied with.
9. For any failure or delay, by any member of the forces surrendered hereby to act in accordance with this act of surrender or future orders
or proclamations of the Generalissimo, he will summarily and drastically punish both the violator and his responsible commanders.
Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, Signatory under orders of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese government and the Japanese
Imperial General Headquarters, and Commander of the Japanese Forces in Central China. (Signature and official seal)
Signed at 9.00 a.m. on Sept. 9 in the 20th year of Showa (1945 AD) in Nanjing, Republic of China.
The Representative of the Republic of China, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, and the other Allied Forces at war with Japan, accepted this act of surrender at 9.00 a.m. on Sept. 9 in the 34th year of
the Republic of China (1945 AD) in Nanjing, Republic of China.
Army General Ho Ying-chen, Special Envoy of Supreme Commander in the China Theatre Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and
Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Army. (Signature and official seal)
Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS of Supreme Commander for Allied Powers
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
APO 500
20 January 1946
AG 091 (29 Jan 46) GS
(SCAPIN - 677)
MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.
THROUGH: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.
SUBJECT: Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan.
1. The Imperial Japanese Government is directed to cease exercising, or attempting to exercise, governmental or administrative
authority over any area outside of Japan, or over any government officials and employees or any other persons within such areas.
2. Except as authorized by this Headquarters, the Imperial Japanese Government will not communicate with government officials and
employees or with any other persons outside of Japan for any purpose other than the routine operation of authorized shipping,
communications and weather services.
3. For the purpose of this directive, Japan is defined to include the four main islands of Japan (Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and
Shikoku) and the approximately 1,000 smaller adjacent islands, including the Tsushima Islands and the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands north of
30° North Latitude (excluding Kuchinoshima Island); and excluding (a) Utsuryo (Ullung) Island, Liancourt Rocks (Take Island) and
Quelpart (Saishu or Cheju) Island, (b) the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands south of 30° North Latitude (including Kuchinoshima Island), the
Izu, Nanpo, Bonin (Ogasawara) and Volcano (Kazan or Iwo) Island Groups, and all the other outlying Pacific Islands [including the
Daito (Ohigashi or Oagari) Island Group, and Parece Vela (Okino-tori), Marcus (Minami-tori) and Ganges (Nakano-tori) Islands], and
(c) the Kurile (Chishima) Islands, the Habomai (Hapomaze) Island Group (including Suisho, Yuri, Akiyuri, Shibotsu and Taraku Islands)
and Shikotan Island.
4. Further areas specifically excluded from the governmental and administrative jurisdiction of the Imperial Japanese Government
are the following: (a) all Pacific Islands seized or occupied under mandate or otherwise by Japan since the beginning of the World War
in 1914, (b) Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, (c) Korea, and (d) Karafuto.
5. The definition of Japan contained in this directive shall also apply to all future directives, memoranda and orders from this
Headquarters unless otherwise specified therein.
6. Nothing in this directive shall be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate determination of the
minor islands referred to in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration.
7. The Imperial Japanese Government will prepare and submit to this Headquarters a report of all governmental agencies in Japan
the functions of which pertain to areas outside a statement as defined in this directive. Such report will include a statement of the
functions, organization and personnel of each of the agencies concerned.
8. All records of the agencies referred to in paragraph 7 above will be preserved and kept available for inspection by this
Headquarters.
FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER: H. W. Allen Colonel, AGD. Asst. Adjutant General
Adopted 28 July 1951 by United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons
convened under General Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 1950
Entry into force: 22 April 1954, in accordance with Article 43
Considering that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 by the General Assembly have affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination,
Considering that the United Nations has, on various occasions, manifested its profound concern for refugees and endeavoured to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms,
Considering that it is desirable to revise and consolidate previous international agreements relating to the status of refugees and to extend the scope of and the protection accorded by such instruments by means of a new agreement,
Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation,
Expressing the wish that all States, recognizing the social and humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees, will do everything within their power to prevent this problem from becoming a cause of tension between States,
Noting that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is charged with the task of supervising international conventions providing for the protection of refugees, and recognizing that the effective co-ordination of measures taken to deal with this problem will depend upon the co-operation of States with the High Commissioner,
A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee" shall apply to any person who:
(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization;
Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organization during the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of refugee being accorded to persons who fulfil the conditions of paragraph 2 of this section;
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term "the country of his nationality" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national.
B. (1) For the purposes of this Convention, the words "events occurring before 1 January 1951" in article 1, section A, shall be understood to mean either (a) "events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951"; or (b) "events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951"; and each Contracting State shall make a declaration at the time of signature, ratification or accession, specifying which of these meanings it applies for the purpose of its obligations under this Convention.
(2) Any Contracting State which has adopted alternative (a) may at any time extend its obligations by adopting alternative (b) by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
C. This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A if:
(1) He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; or
(2) Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily reacquired it; or
(3) He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality; or
(4) He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution; or
(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality;
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A (1) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of nationality;
(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, able to return to the country of his former habitual residence;
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A (1) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to return to the country of his former habitual residence.
D. This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.
When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention.
E. This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country.
F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;
(b) He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
(c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 2 - General obligations
Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which require in particular that he conform to its laws and regulations as well as to measures taken for the maintenance of public order.
Article 3 - Non-discrimination
The Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin.
Article 4 - Religion
The Contracting States shall accord to refugees within their territories treatment at least as favourable as that accorded to their nationals with respect to freedom to practise their religion and freedom as regards the religious education of their children.
Article 5 - Rights granted apart from this Convention
Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights and benefits granted by a Contracting State to refugees apart from this Convention.
Article 6 - The term "in the same circumstances"
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the same circumstances" implies that any requirements (including requirements as to length and conditions of sojourn or residence) which the particular individual would have to fulfil for the enjoyment of the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by him, with the exception of requirements which by their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling.
Article 7 - Exemption from reciprocity
1. Except where this Convention contains more favourable provisions, a Contracting State shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to aliens generally.
2. After a period of three years' residence, all refugees shall enjoy exemption from legislative reciprocity in the territory of the Contracting States.
3. Each Contracting State shall continue to accord to refugees the rights and benefits to which they were already entitled, in the absence of reciprocity, at the date of entry into force of this Convention for that State.
4. The Contracting States shall consider favourably the possibility of according to refugees, in the absence of reciprocity, rights and benefits beyond those to which they are entitled according to paragraphs 2 and 3, and to extending exemption from reciprocity to refugees who do not fulfil the conditions provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3.
5. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 apply both to the rights and benefits referred to in articles 13, 18, 19, 21 and 22 of this Convention and to rights and benefits for which this Convention does not provide.
Article 8 - Exemption from exceptional measures
With regard to exceptional measures which may be taken against the person, property or interests of nationals of a foreign State, the Contracting States shall not apply such measures to a refugee who is formally a national of the said State solely on account of such nationality. Contracting States which, under their legislation, are prevented from applying the general principle expressed in this article, shall, in appropriate cases, grant exemptions in favour of such refugees.
Article 9 - Provisional measures
Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Contracting State, in time of war or other grave and exceptional circumstances, from taking provisionally measures which it considers to be essential to the national security in the case of a particular person, pending a determination by the Contracting State that that person is in fact a refugee and that the continuance of such measures is necessary in his case in the interests of national security.
Article 10 - Continuity of residence
1. Where a refugee has been forcibly displaced during the Second World War and removed to the territory of a Contracting State, and is resident there, the period of such enforced sojourn shall be considered to have been lawful residence within that territory.
2. Where a refugee has been forcibly displaced during the Second World War from the territory of a Contracting State and has, prior to the date of entry into force of this Convention, returned there for the purpose of taking up residence, the period of residence before and after such enforced displacement shall be regarded as one uninterrupted period for any purposes for which uninterrupted residence is required.
Article 11 - Refugee seamen
In the case of refugees regularly serving as crew members on board a ship flying the flag of a Contracting State, that State shall give sympathetic consideration to their establishment on its territory and the issue of travel documents to them or their temporary admission to its territory particularly with a view to facilitating their establishment in another country.
1. The personal status of a refugee shall be governed by the law of the country of his domicile or, if he has no domicile, by the law of the country of his residence.
2. Rights previously acquired by a refugee and dependent on personal status, more particularly rights attaching to marriage, shall be respected by a Contracting State, subject to compliance, if this be necessary, with the formalities required by the law of that State, provided that the right in question is one which would have been recognized by the law of that State had he not become a refugee.
Article 13 - Movable and immovable property
The Contracting States shall accord to a refugee treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, as regards the acquisition of movable and immovable property and other rights pertaining thereto, and to leases and other contracts relating to movable and immovable property.
Article 14 - Artistic rights and industrial property
In respect of the protection of industrial property, such as inventions, designs or models, trade marks, trade names, and of rights in literary, artistic and scientific works, a refugee shall be accorded in the country in which he has his habitual residence the same protection as is accorded to nationals of that country. In the territory of any other Contracting States, he shall be accorded the same protection as is accorded in that territory to nationals of the country in which he has his habitual residence.
Article 15 - Right of association
As regards non-political and non-profit-making associations and trade unions the Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country, in the same circumstances.
Article 16 - Access to courts
1. A refugee shall have free access to the courts of law on the territory of all Contracting States.
2. A refugee shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he has his habitual residence the same treatment as a national in matters pertaining to access to the courts, including legal assistance and exemption from cautio judicatum solvi.
3. A refugee shall be accorded in the matters referred to in paragraph 2 in countries other than that in which he has his habitual residence the treatment granted to a national of the country of his habitual residence.
1. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage-earning employment.
2. In any case, restrictive measures imposed on aliens or the employment of aliens for the protection of the national labour market shall not be applied to a refugee who was already exempt from them at the date of entry into force of this Convention for the Contracting State concerned, or who fulfils one of the following conditions:
(a) He has completed three years' residence in the country;
(b) He has a spouse possessing the nationality of the country of residence. A refugee may not invoke the benefit of this provision if he has abandoned his spouse;
(c) He has one or more children possessing the nationality of the country of residence.
3. The Contracting States shall give sympathetic consideration to assimilating the rights of all refugees with regard to wage-earning employment to those of nationals, and in particular of those refugees who have entered their territory pursuant to programmes of labour recruitment or under immigration schemes.
Article 18 - Self-employment
The Contracting States shall accord to a refugee lawfully in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage on his own account in agriculture, industry, handicrafts and commerce and to establish commercial and industrial companies.
Article 19 - Liberal professions
1. Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory who hold diplomas recognized by the competent authorities of that State, and who are desirous of practising a liberal profession, treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances.
2. The Contracting States shall use their best endeavours consistently with their laws and constitutions to secure the settlement of such refugees in the territories, other than the metropolitan territory, for whose international relations they are responsible.
Where a rationing system exists, which applies to the population at large and regulates the general distribution of products in short supply, refugees shall be accorded the same treatment as nationals.
Article 21 - Housing
As regards housing, the Contracting States, in so far as the matter is regulated by laws or regulations or is subject to the control of public authorities, shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances.
Article 22 - Public education
1. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education.
2. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees treatment as favourable as possible, and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, with respect to education other than elementary education and, in particular, as regards access to studies, the recognition of foreign school certificates, diplomas and degrees, the remission of fees and charges and the award of scholarships.
Article 23 - Public relief
The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the same treatment with respect to public relief and assistance as is accorded to their nationals.
Article 24 - Labour legislation and social security
1. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the same treatment as is accorded to nationals in respect of the following matters;
(a) In so far as such matters are governed by laws or regulations or are subject to the control of administrative authorities: remuneration, including family allowances where these form part of remuneration, hours of work, overtime arrangements, holidays with pay, restrictions on work, minimum age of employment, apprenticeship and training, women's work and the work of young persons, and the enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining;
(b) Social security (legal provisions in respect of employment injury, occupational diseases, maternity, sickness, disability, old age, death, unemployment, family responsibilities and any other contingency which, according to national laws or regulations, is covered by a social security scheme), subject to the following limitations:
2. The right to compensation for the death of a refugee resulting from employment injury or from occupational disease shall not be affected by the fact that the residence of the beneficiary is outside the territory of the Contracting State.
3. The Contracting States shall extend to refugees the benefits of agreements concluded between them, or which may be concluded between them in the future, concerning the maintenance of acquired rights and rights in the process of acquisition in regard to social security, subject only to the conditions which apply to nationals of the States signatory to the agreements in question.
4. The Contracting States will give sympathetic consideration to extending to refugees so far as possible the benefits of similar agreements which may at any time be in force between such Contracting States and non-contracting States.
1. When the exercise of a right by a refugee would normally require the assistance of authorities of a foreign country to whom he cannot have recourse, the Contracting States in whose territory he is residing shall arrange that such assistance be afforded to him by their own authorities or by an international authority.
2. The authority or authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 shall deliver or cause to be delivered under their supervision to refugees such documents or certifications as would normally be delivered to aliens by or through their national authorities.
3. Documents or certifications so delivered shall stand in the stead of the official instruments delivered to aliens by or through their national authorities, and shall be given credence in the absence of proof to the contrary.
4. Subject to such exceptional treatment as may be granted to indigent persons, fees may be charged for the services mentioned herein, but such fees shall be moderate and commensurate with those charged to nationals for similar services.
5. The provisions of this article shall be without prejudice to articles 27 and 28.
Article 26 - Freedom of movement
Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of residence and to move freely within its territory subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances.
Article 27 - Identity papers
The Contracting States shall issue identity papers to any refugee in their territory who does not possess a valid travel document.
Article 28 - Travel documents
1. The Contracting States shall issue to refugees lawfully staying in their territory travel documents for the purpose of travel outside their territory, unless compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require, and the provisions of the Schedule to this Convention shall apply with respect to such documents. The Contracting States may issue such a travel document to any other refugee in their territory; they shall in particular give sympathetic consideration to the issue of such a travel document to refugees in their territory who are unable to obtain a travel document from the country of their lawful residence.
2. Travel documents issued to refugees under previous international agreements by Parties thereto shall be recognized and treated by the Contracting States in the same way as if they had been issued pursuant to this article.
Article 29 - Fiscal charges
1. The Contracting States shall not impose upon refugees duties, charges or taxes, of any description whatsoever, other or higher than those which are or may be levied on their nationals in similar situations.
2. Nothing in the above paragraph shall prevent the application to refugees of the laws and regulations concerning charges in respect of the issue to aliens of administrative documents including identity papers.
Article 30 - Transfer of assets
1. A Contracting State shall, in conformity with its laws and regulations, permit refugees to transfer assets which they have brought into its territory, to another country where they have been admitted for the purposes of resettlement.
2. A Contracting State shall give sympathetic consideration to the application of refugees for permission to transfer assets wherever they may be and which are necessary for their resettlement in another country to which they have been admitted.
Article 31 - Refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge
1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.
2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country.
Article 32 - Expulsion
1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order.
2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the purpose before competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the competent authority.
3. The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable period within which to seek legal admission into another country. The Contracting States reserve the right to apply during that period such internal measures as they may deem necessary.
Article 33 - Prohibition of expulsion or return ("refoulement")
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (" refouler ") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
Article 34 - Naturalization
The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.
Article 35 - Co-operation of the national authorities with the United Nations
1. The Contracting States undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention.
2. In order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, to make reports to the competent organs of the United Nations, the Contracting States undertake to provide them in the appropriate form with information and statistical data requested concerning:
(a) The condition of refugees,
(b) The implementation of this Convention, and
(c) Laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force relating to refugees.
Article 36 - Information on national legislation
The Contracting States shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the laws and regulations which they may adopt to ensure the application of this Convention.
Article 37 - Relation to previous conventions
Without prejudice to article 28, paragraph 2, of this Convention, this Convention replaces, as between Parties to it, the Arrangements of 5 July 1922, 31 May 1924, 12 May 1926, 30 June 1928 and 30 July 1935, the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 and the Agreement of 15 October 1946.
Any dispute between Parties to this Convention relating to its interpretation or application, which cannot be settled by other means, shall be referred to the International Court of Justice at the request of any one of the parties to the dispute.
Article 39 - Signature, ratification and accession
1. This Convention shall be opened for signature at Geneva on 28 July 1951 and shall thereafter be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It shall be open for signature at the European Office of the United Nations from 28 July to 31 August 1951 and shall be re-opened for signature at the Headquarters of the United Nations from 17 September 1951 to 31 December 1952.
2. This Convention shall be open for signature on behalf of all States Members of the United Nations, and also on behalf of any other State invited to attend the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons or to which an invitation to sign will have been addressed by the General Assembly. It shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. This Convention shall be open from 28 July 1951 for accession by the States referred to in paragraph 2 of this article. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 40 - Territorial application clause
1. Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that this Convention shall extend to all or any of the territories for the international relations of which it is responsible. Such a declaration shall take effect when the Convention enters into force for the State concerned.
2. At any time thereafter any such extension shall be made by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and shall take effect as from the ninetieth day after the day of receipt by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of this notification, or as from the date of entry into force of the Convention for the State concerned, whichever is the later.
3. With respect to those territories to which this Convention is not extended at the time of signature, ratification or accession, each State concerned shall consider the possibility of taking the necessary steps in order to extend the application of this Convention to such territories, subject, where necessary for constitutional reasons, to the consent of the Governments of such territories.
Article 41 - Federal clause
In the case of a Federal or non-unitary State, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the legislative jurisdiction of the federal legislative authority, the obligations of the Federal Government shall to this extent be the same as those of parties which are not Federal States;
(b) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the legislative jurisdiction of constituent States, provinces or cantons which are not, under the constitutional system of the Federation, bound to take legislative action, the Federal Government shall bring such articles with a favourable recommendation to the notice of the appropriate authorities of States, provinces or cantons at the earliest possible moment;
(c) A Federal State Party to this Convention shall, at the request of any other Contracting State transmitted through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, supply a statement of the law and practice of the Federation and its constituent units in regard to any particular provision of the Convention showing the extent to which effect has been given to that provision by legislative or other action.
Article 42 - Reservations
1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1, 3, 4, 16 (1), 33, 36-46 inclusive.
2. Any State making a reservation in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article may at any time withdraw the reservation by a communication to that effect addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 43 - Entry into force
1. This Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the day of deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or accession.
Article 44 - Denunciation
1. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention at any time by a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Such denunciation shall take effect for the Contracting State concerned one year from the date upon which it is received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. Any State which has made a declaration or notification under article 40 may, at any time thereafter, by a notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, declare that the Convention shall cease to extend to such territory one year after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General.
Article 45 - Revision
1. Any Contracting State may request revision of this Convention at any time by a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall recommend the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.
Article 46 - Notifications by the Secretary-General of the United Nations
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all Members of the United Nations and non-member States referred to in article 39:
(a) Of declarations and notifications in accordance with section B of article 1;
(b) Of signatures, ratifications and accessions in accordance with article 39;
(c) Of declarations and notifications in accordance with article 40;
(d) Of reservations and withdrawals in accordance with article 42;
(e) Of the date on which this Convention will come into force in accordance with article 43;
(f) Of denunciations and notifications in accordance with article 44;
(g) Of requests for revision in accordance with article 45.
In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention on behalf of their respective Governments.
Done at Geneva, this twenty-eighth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-one, in a single copy, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic and which shall remain deposited in the archives of the United Nations, and certified true copies of which shall be delivered to all Members of the United Nations and to the non-member States referred to in article 39.
The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, held at Geneva July 2–25, 1951. The Conference was convened pursuant to resolution 429 (V), adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on Dec. 14, 1950.
China is not listed among the signatories but mentioned under the category "Accession" with the date Sept. 24, 1982. Under the headline "Declarations and Reservations", it says that China is "[subject to] reservations on the following articles:
(1). The latter half of article 14, which reads 'In the territory of any other Contracting State, he shall be accorded the same protection as is accorded in that territory to nationals of the country in which he has his habitual residence.'
(2). Article 16 (3)."
Signed at San Francisco, 8 September 1951 Initial entry into force: 28 April 1952
TREATY OFPEACE WITHJAPAN
WHEREAS the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those of nations which, as sovereign equals,
cooperate in friendly association to promote their common welfare and to maintain international peace and security, and are therefore desirous
of concluding a Treaty of Peace which will settle questions still outstanding as a result of the existence of a state of war between them;
WHEREAS Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations and in all circumstances to conform to the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations; to strive to realize the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to seek to
create within Japan conditions of stability and well-being as defined in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and already
initiated by post-surrender Japanese legislation; and in public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair
practices;
WHEREAS the Allied Powers welcome the intentions of Japan set out in the foregoing paragraph;
THE ALLIED POWERS AND JAPAN have therefore determined to conclude the present Treaty of Peace, and have accordingly appointed the
undersigned Plenipotentiaries, who, after presentation of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following
provisions:
(a) The state of war between Japan and each of the Allied Powers is terminated as from the date on which the present Treaty comes into
force between Japan and the Allied Power concerned as provided for in Article 23.
(b) The Allied Powers recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters.
(a) Japan recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart,
Port Hamilton and Dagelet.
(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.
(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over
which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.
(d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations Mandate System, and accepts the action of the
United Nations Security Council of 2 April 1947, extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan.
(e) Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area, whether deriving
from the activities of Japanese nationals or otherwise.
(f) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.
Article 3
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States
as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 deg. north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo
Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the
making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration,
legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.
Article 4
(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this Article, the disposition of property of Japan and of its nationals in the areas
referred to in Article 2, and their claims, including debts, against the authorities presently administering such areas and the residents
(including juridical persons) thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and residents, and of claims, including
debts, of such authorities and residents against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and
such authorities. The property of any of the Allied Powers or its nationals in the areas referred to in Article 2 shall, insofar as this
has not already been done, be returned by the administering authority in the condition in which it now exists. (The term nationals whenever
used in the present Treaty includes juridical persons.)
(b) Japan recognizes the validity of dispositions of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to directives of
the United States Military Government in any of the areas referred to in Articles 2 and 3.
(c) Japanese owned submarine cables connection Japan with territory removed from Japanese control pursuant to the present Treaty shall
be equally divided, Japan retaining the Japanese terminal and adjoining half of the cable, and the detached territory the remainder of the
cable and connecting terminal facilities.
(a) Japan accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular the obligations
(i) to settle its international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered;
(ii) to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;
(iii) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance
to any State against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action.
(b) The Allied Powers confirm that they will be guided by the principles of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations in their
relations with Japan.
(c) The Allied Powers for their part recognize that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security
arrangements.
Article 6
(a) All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the coming into force of the
present Treaty, and in any case not later than 90 days thereafter. Nothing in this provision shall, however, prevent the stationing or
retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which have
been or may be made between one or more of the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other.
(b) The provisions of Article 9 of the Potsdam Proclamation of 26 July 1945, dealing with the return of Japanese military forces to
their homes, to the extent not already completed, will be carried out.
(c) All Japanese property for which compensation has not already been paid, which was supplied for the use of the occupation forces
and which remains in the possession of those forces at the time of the coming into force of the present Treaty, shall be returned to the
Japanese Government within the same 90 days unless other arrangements are made by mutual agreement.
(a) Each of the Allied Powers, within one year after the present Treaty has come into force between it and Japan, will notify Japan
which of its prewar bilateral treaties or conventions with Japan it wishes to continue in force or revive, and any treaties or conventions
so notified shall continue in force or by revived subject only to such amendments as may be necessary to ensure conformity with the present
Treaty. The treaties and conventions so notified shall be considered as having been continued in force or revived three months after the
date of notification and shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. All such treaties and conventions as to which Japan
is not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated.
(b) Any notification made under paragraph (a) of this Article may except from the operation or revival of a treaty or convention any
territory for the international relations of which the notifying Power is responsible, until three months after the date on which notice
is given to Japan that such exception shall cease to apply.
Article 8
(a) Japan will recognize the full force of all treaties now or hereafter concluded by the Allied Powers for terminating the state of
war initiated on 1 September 1939, as well as any other arrangements by the Allied Powers for or in connection with the restoration of
peace. Japan also accepts the arrangements made for terminating the former League of Nations and Permanent Court of International Justice.
(b) Japan renounces all such rights and interests as it may derive from being a signatory power of the Conventions of St. Germain-en-Laye
of 10 September 1919, and the Straits Agreement of Montreux of 20 July 1936, and from Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed
at Lausanne on 24 July 1923.
(c) Japan renounces all rights, title and interests acquired under, and is discharged from all obligations resulting from, the Agreement
between Germany and the Creditor Powers of 20 January 1930 and its Annexes, including the Trust Agreement, dated 17 May 1930, the Convention
of 20 January 1930, respecting the Bank for International Settlements; and the Statutes of the Bank for International Settlements. Japan will
notify to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris within six months of the first coming into force of the present Treaty its renunciation of
the rights, title and interests referred to in this paragraph.
Article 9
Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements
providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas.
Article 10
Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China, including all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the
final Protocol signed at Peking on 7 September 1901, and all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto, and agrees to the abrogation
in respect to Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes and documents.
Article 11
Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts both within
and outside Japan, and will carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan. The power to grant clemency,
to reduce sentences and to parole with respect to such prisoners may not be exercised except on the decision of the Government or Governments
which imposed the sentence in each instance, and on recommendation of Japan. In the case of persons sentenced by the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East, such power may not be exercised except on the decision of a majority of the Governments represented on the Tribunal, and on
the recommendation of Japan.
Article 12
(a) Japan declares its readiness promptly to enter into negotiations for the conclusion with each of the Allied Powers of treaties or
agreements to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis.
(b) Pending the conclusion of the relevant treaty or agreement, Japan will, during a period of four years from the first coming into force
of the present Treaty
(1) accord to each of the Allied Powers, its nationals, products and vessels
(i) most-favoured-nation treatment with respect to customs duties, charges, restrictions and other regulations on or in connection with the
importation and exportation of goods;
(ii) national treatment with respect to shipping, navigation and imported goods, and with respect to natural and juridical persons and their
interests — such treatment to include all matters pertaining to the levying and collection of taxes, access to the courts, the making and
performance of contracts, rights to property (tangible and intangible), participating in juridical entities constituted under Japanese law,
and generally the conduct of all kinds of business and professional activities;
(2) ensure that external purchases and sales of Japanese state trading enterprises shall be based solely on commercial considerations.
(c) In respect to any matter, however, Japan shall be obliged to accord to an Allied Power national treatment, or most-favoured-nation
treatment, only to the extent that the Allied Power concerned accords Japan national treatment or most-favoured-nation treatment, as the case
may be, in respect of the same matter. The reciprocity envisaged in the foregoing sentence shall be determined, in the case of products,
vessels and juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, any non-metropolitan territory of an Allied Power, and in the case of juridical
entities of, and persons domiciled in, any state or province of an Allied Power having a federal government, by reference to the treatment
accorded to Japan in such territory, state or province.
(d) In the application of this Article, a discriminatory measure shall not be considered to derogate from the grant of national or
most-favoured-nation treatment, as the case may be, if such measure is based on an exception customarily provided for in the commercial
treaties of the party applying it, or on the need to safeguard that party's external financial position or balance of payments (except
in respect to shiping and navigation), or on the need to maintain its essential security interests, and provided such measure is proportionate
to the circumstances and not applied in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.
(e) Japan's obligations under this Article shall not be affected by the exercise of any Allied rights under Article 14 of the present
Treaty; nor shall the provisions of this Article be understood as limiting the undertakings assumed by Japan by virtue of Article 15 of the
Treaty.
Article 13
(a) Japan will enter into negotiations with any of the Allied Powers, promptly upon the request of such Power or Powers, for the
conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements relating to international civil air transport.
(b) Pending the conclusion of such agreement or agreements, Japan will, during a period of four years from the first coming into force
of the present Treaty, extend to such Power treatment not less favourable with respect to air-traffic rights and privileges than those exercised
by any such Powers at the date of such coming into force, and will accord complete equality of opportunity in respect to the operation and
development of air services.
(c) Pending its becoming a party to the Convention on International Civil Aviation in accordance with Article 93 thereof, Japan will
give effect to the provisions of that Convention applicable to the international navigation of aircraft, and will give effect to the standards,
practices and procedures adopted as annexes to the Convention in accordance with the terms of the Convention.
(a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war.
Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make
complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the same time meet its other obligations.
Therefore,
1. Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese
forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making
available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question. Such arrangements
shall avoid the imposition of additional liabilities on other Allied Powers, and, where the manufacturing of raw materials is called for,
they shall be supplied by the Allied Powers in question, so as not to throw any foreign exchange burden upon Japan.
2. (I) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (II) below, each of the Allied Powers shall have the right to seize, retain, liquidate
or otherwise dispose of all property, rights and interests of
(a) Japan and Japanese nationals,
(b) persons acting for or on behalf of Japan or Japanese nationals, and
(c) entities owned or controlled by Japan or Japanese nationals,
which on the first coming into force of the present Treaty were subject to its jurisdiction. The property, rights and interests
specified in this subparagraph shall include those now blocked, vested or in the possession or under the control of enemy property authorities
of Allied Powers, which belong to, or were held or managed on behalf of, any of the persons or entities mentioned in (a), (b) or (c) above at
the time such assets came under the controls of such authorities.
(II) The following shall be excepted from the right specified in subparagraph (I) above:
(i) property of Japanese natural persons who during the war resided with the permission of the Government concerned in the territory of
one of the Allied Powers, other than territory occupied by Japan, except property subjected to restrictions during the war and not released
from such restrictions as of the date of the first coming into force of the present Treaty;
(ii) all real property, furniture and fixtures owned by the Government of Japan and used for diplomatic or consular purposes, and all
personal furniture and furnishings and other private property not of an investment nature which was normally necessary for the carrying out
of diplomatic and consular functions, owned by Japanese diplomatic and consular personnel;
(iii) property belonging to religious bodies or private charitable institutions and used exclusively for religious or charitable purposes;
(iv) property, rights and interests which have come within its jurisdiction in consequence of the resumption of trade and financial relations
subsequent to 2 September 1945, between the country concerned and Japan, except such as have resulted from transactions contrary to the laws of
the Allied Power concerned;
(v) obligations of Japan or Japanese nationals, any right, title or interest in tangible property located in Japan, interests in enterprises
organized under the laws of Japan, or any paper evidence thereof; provided that this exception shall only apply to obligations of Japan and its
nationals expressed in Japanese currency.
(III) Property referred to in exceptions (i) through (v) above shall be returned subject to reasonable expenses for its preservation and
administration. If any such property has been liquidated the proceeds shall be returned instead.
(IV) The right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of property as provided in subparagraph (I) above shall be exercised in
accordance with the laws of the Allied Power concerned, and the owner shall have only such rights as may be given him by those laws.
(V) The Allied Powers agree to deal with Japanese trademarks and literary and artistic property rights on a basis as favourable to Japan
as circumstances ruling in each country will permit.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims
of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war,
and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.
Article 15
(a) Upon application made within nine months of the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned,
Japan will, within six months of the date of such application, return the property, tangible and intangible, and all rights or interests of any
kind in Japan of each Allied Power and its nationals which was within Japan at any time between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945, unless
the owner has freely disposed thereof without duress or fraud. Such property shall be returned free of all encumbrances and charges to which
it may have become subject because of the war, and without any charges for its return. Property whose return is not applied for by or on behalf
of the owner or by his Government within the prescribed period may be disposed of by the Japanese Government as it may determine. In cases where
such property was within Japan on 7 December 1941, and cannot be returned or has suffered injury or damage as a result of the war, compensation
will be made on terms not less favourable than the terms provided in the draft Allied Powers Property Compensation Law approved by the Japanese
Cabinet on 13 July 1951.
(b) With respect to industrial property rights impaired during the war, Japan will continue to accord to the Allied Powers and their
nationals benefits no less than those heretofore accorded by Cabinet Orders No. 309 effective 1 September 1949, No. 12 effective 28 January
1950, and No. 9 effective 1 February 1950, all as now amended, provided such nationals have applied for such benefits within the time
limits prescribed therein.
(c) (i) Japan acknowledges that the literary and artistic property rights which existed in Japan on 6 December 1941, in respect to the
published and unpublished works of the Allied Powers and their nationals have continued in force since that date, and recognizes those rights
which have arisen, or but for the war would have arisen, in Japan since that date, by the operation of any conventions and agreements to which
Japan was a party on that date, irrespective of whether or not such conventions or agreements were abrogated or suspended upon or since the
outbreak of war by the domestic law of Japan or of the Allied Power concerned.
(ii) Without the need for application by the proprietor of the right and without the payment of any fee or compliance with any other
formality, the period from 7 December 1941 until the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned
shall be excluded from the running of the normal term of such rights; and such period, with an additional period of six months, shall be
excluded from the time within which a literary work must be translated into Japanese in order to obtain translating rights in Japan.
Article 16
As an expression of its desire to indemnify those members of the armed forces of the Allied Powers who suffered undue hardships while
prisoners of war of Japan, Japan will transfer its assets and those of its nationals in countries which were neutral during the war, or which
were at war with any of the Allied Powers, or, at its option, the equivalent of such assets, to the International Committee of the Red Cross
which shall liquidate such assets and distribute the resultant fund to appropriate national agencies, for the benefit of former prisoners of
war and their families on such basis as it may determine to be equitable. The categories of assets described in Article 14(a)2(II)(ii)
through (v) of the present Treaty shall be excepted from transfer, as well as assets of Japanese natural persons not residents of Japan
on the first coming into force of the Treaty. It is equally understood that the transfer provision of this Article has no application to
the 19,770 shares in the Bank for International Settlements presently owned by Japanese financial institutions.
Article 17
(a) Upon the request of any of the Allied Powers, the Japanese Government shall review and revise in conformity with international
law any decision or order of the Japanese Prize Courts in cases involving ownership rights of nationals of that Allied Power and shall
supply copies of all documents comprising the records of these cases, including the decisions taken and orders issued. In any case in
which such review or revision shows that restoration is due, the provisions of Article 15 shall apply to the property concerned.
(b) The Japanese Government shall take the necessary measures to enable nationals of any of the Allied Powers at any time within one
year from the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned to submit to the appropriate Japanese
authorities for review any judgment given by a Japanese court between 7 December 1941 and such coming into force, in any proceedings in
which any such national was unable to make adequate presentation of his case either as plaintiff or defendant. The Japanese Government
shall provide that, where the national has suffered injury by reason of any such judgment, he shall be restored in the position in which
he was before the judgment was given or shall be afforded such relief as may be just and equitable in the circumstances.
Article 18
(a) It is recognized that the intervention of the state of war has not affected the obligation to pay pecuniary debts arising out of
obligations and contracts (including those in respect of bonds) which existed and rights which were acquired before the existence of a
state of war, and which are due by the Government or nationals of Japan to the Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers, or are
due by the Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers to the Government or nationals of Japan. The intervention of a state of war
shall equally not be regarded as affecting the obligation to consider on their merits claims for loss or damage to property or for personal
injury or death which arose before the existence of a state of war, and which may be presented or re-presented by the Government of one of
the Allied Powers to the Government of Japan, or by the Government of Japan to any of the Governments of the Allied Powers. The provisions
of this paragraph are without prejudice to the rights conferred by Article 14.
(b) Japan affirms its liability for the prewar external debt of the Japanese State and for debts of corporate bodies subsequently
declared to be liabilities of the Japanese State, and expresses its intention to enter into negotiations at an early date with its creditors
with respect to the resumption of payments on those debts; to encourage negotiations in respect to other prewar claims and obligations; and
to facilitate the transfer of sums accordingly.
Article 19
(a) Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of the war or out of
actions taken because of the existence of a state of war, and waives all claims arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces
or authorities of any of the Allied Powers in Japanese territory prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty.
(b) The foregoing waiver includes any claims arising out of actions taken by any of the Allied Powers with respect to Japanese ships
between 1 September 1939 and the coming into force of the present Treaty, as well as any claims and debts arising in respect to Japanese
prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of the Allied Powers, but does not include Japanese claims specificially recognized
in the laws of any Allied Power enacted since 2 September 1945.
(c) Subject to reciprocal renunciation, the Japanese Government also renounces all claims (including debts) against Germany and German
nationals on behalf of the Japanese Government and Japanese nationals, including intergovernmental claims and claims for loss or damage
sustained during the war, but excepting (a) claims in respect of contracts entered into and rights acquired before 1 September 1939, and
(b) claims arising out of trade and financial relations between Japan and Germany after 2 September 1945. Such renunciation shall not
prejudice actions taken in accordance with Articles 16 and 20 of the present Treaty.
(d) Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of occupation under or in consequence of directives
of the occupation authorities or authorized by Japanese law at that time, and will take no action subjecting Allied nationals to civil or
criminal liability arising out of such acts or omissions.
Article 20
Japan will take all necessary measures to ensure such disposition of German assets in Japan as has been or may be determined by those
powers entitled under the Protocol of the proceedings of the Berlin Conference of 1945 to dispose of those assets, and pending the final
disposition of such assets will be responsible for the conservation and administration thereof.
Article 21
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 25 of the present Treaty, China shall be entitled to the benefits of Articles 10 and 14(a)2;
and Korea to the benefits of Articles 2, 4, 9 and 12 of the present Treaty.
If in the opinion of any Party to the present Treaty there has arisen a dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaty,
which is not settled by reference to a special claims tribunal or by other agreed means, the dispute shall, at the request of any party thereto,
be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice. Japan and those Allied Powers which are not already parties to the Statute of
the International Court of Justice will deposit with the Registrar of the Court, at the time of their respective ratifications of the present
Treaty, and in conformity with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council, dated 15 October 1946, a general declaration accepting
the jurisdiction, without special agreement, of the Court generally in respect to all disputes of the character referred to in this Article.
(a) The present Treaty shall be ratified by the States which sign it, including Japan, and will come into force for all the States which
have then ratified it, when instruments of ratification have been deposited by Japan and by a majority, including the United States of America
as the principal occupying Power, of the following States, namely Australia, Canada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of
America. The present Treaty shall come into force of each State which subsequently ratifies it, on the date of the deposit of its instrument
of ratification.
(b) If the Treaty has not come into force within nine months after the date of the deposit of Japan's ratification, any State which has
ratified it may bring the Treaty into force between itself and Japan by a notification to that effect given to the Governments of Japan and
the United States of America not later than three years after the date of deposit of Japan's ratification.
Article 24
All instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America which will notify all the signatory
States of each such deposit, of the date of the coming into force of the Treaty under paragraph (a) of Article 23, and of any notifications made
under paragraph (b) of Article 23.
Article 25
For the purposes of the present Treaty the Allied Powers shall be the States at war with Japan, or any State which previously formed a
part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, provided that in each case the State concerned has signed and ratified the Treaty.
Subject to the provisions of Article 21, the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits on any State which is not an
Allied Power as herein defined; nor shall any right, title or interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision
of the Treaty in favour of a State which is not an Allied Power as so defined.
Article 26
Japan will be prepared to conclude with any State which signed or adhered to the United Nations Declaration of 1 January 1942, and
which is at war with Japan, or with any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, which is
not a signatory of the present Treaty, a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the
present Treaty, but this obligation on the part of Japan will expire three years after the first coming into force of the present Treaty.
Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided
by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.
Article 27
The present Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America which shall furnish each
signatory State with a certified copy thereof.
IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.
DONE at the city of San Francisco this eighth day of September 1951, in the English, French, and Spanish languages, all being equally
authentic, and in the Japanese language.
For Argentina: Hipólito J. PAZ
For Australia: Percy C. SPENDER
For Belgium: Paul VAN ZEELAND SILVERCRUYS
For Bolivia: Luis GUACHALLA
For Brazil: Carlos MARTINS, A. DE MELLO-FRANCO
For Cambodia: PHLENG
For Canada: Lester B. PEARSON, R.W. MAYHEW
For Ceylon: J.R. JAYEWARDENE, G.C.S. COREA, R.G. SENANAYAKE
For Chile: F. NIETO DEL RÍO
For Colombia: Cipríano RESTREPO JARAMILLO, Sebastián OSPINA
For Costa Rica: J. Rafael OREAMUNO, V. VARGAS, Luis DOBLES SÁNCHEZ
For Cuba: O. GANS, L. MACHADO, Joaquín MEYER
For the Dominican Republic: V. ORDÓÑEZ, Luis F. THOMEN
For Ecuador: A. QUEVEDO, R.G. VALENZUELA
For Egypt: Kamil A. RAHIM
For El Salvador: Héctor DAVID CASTRO, Luis RIVAS PALACIOS
For Ethiopia: Men YAYEJIJRAD
For France: SCHUMANN, H. BONNET, Paul-Émile NAGGIAR
For Greece: A.G. POLITIS
For Guatemala: E. CASTILLO A., A.M. ORELLANA, J. MENDOZA
For Haiti: Jacques N. LÉGER, Gust. LARAQUE
For Honduras: J.E. VALENZUELA, Roberto GÁLVEZ B., Raúl ALVARADO T.
For Indonesia: Ahmad SUBARDJO
For Iran: A.G. ARDALAN
For Iraq: A.I. BAKR
For Laos: SAVANG
For Lebanon: Charles MALIK
For Liberia: Gabriel L. DENNIS, James ANDERSON, Raymond HORACE, J. Rudolf GRIMES
For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg: Hugues LE GALLAIS
For Mexico: Rafael DE LA COLINA, Gustavo DÍAZ ORDAZ, A.P. GASGA
For the Netherlands: D.U. STIKKER, J.H. VAN ROIJEN
For New Zealand: C. BERENDSEN
For Nicaragua: G. SEVILLA SACASA, Gustavo MANZANARES
For Norway: Wilhelm Munthe MORGENSTERNE
For Pakistan: ZAFRULLAH KHAN
For Panama: Ignacio MOLINO, José A. REMON, Alfredo ALEMÁN, J. CORDOVEZ
For Peru: Luis Oscar BOETTNER
For the Republic of the Philippines: Carlos P. RÓMULO, J.M. ELIZALDE, Vicente FRANCISCO, Diosdado MACAPAGAL, Emiliano T.
TIRONA, V.G. SINCO
For Saudi Arabia: Asad AL-FAQIH
For Syria: F. EL-KHOURI
For Turkey: Feridun C. ERKIN
For the Union of South Africa: G.P. JOOSTE
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Herbert MORRISON, Kenneth YOUNGER, Oliver FRANKS
For the United States of America: Dean ACHESON, John Foster DULLES, Alexander WILEY, John J. SPARKMAN
For Uruguay: José A. MORA
For Venezuela: Antonio M. ARAUJO, R. GALLEGOS M.
For Viet-Nam: TRAN Van Huu 陳文友, T. VINH, D. THANH, BUU KINH
Neither the ROC nor the PRC were invited to the San Francisco Peace Conference which took place Sept. 4–8, 1951, and
neither were parties to the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT). The ROC concluded a separate peace treaty with Japan in 1952
(see below). Of the 51 nations that had sent delegates to the conference, three (Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union)
did not sign the SFPT, India and Burma were not present at the conference at all.
Below see the translations for the term "San Francisco Peace Treaty" in Chinese and for the term "Treaty of Peace with Japan"
in Japanese.
Entered into force on August 5, 1952, by the exchange of the instruments of ratification at Taipei
Treaty of Peace
The Republic of China and Japan,
Considering their mutual desire for good neighbourliness in view of their historical and cultural ties
and geographical proximity;
Realising the importance of their close cooperation to the promotion of their common welfare and to the
maintenance of international peace and security;
Recognising the need for a settlement of problems that have arisen as a result of the existence of a state
of war between them;
Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace and have accordingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries,
His Excellency the President of the Republic of China: Mr. YEH KUNG-CHAO;
The Government of Japan: Mr. ISAO KAWADA
Who, having communicated to each other their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon
the following Articles:—
Article 1
The state of war between the Republic of China and Japan is terminated as from the date on which the
present Treaty enters into force.
Article 2
It is recognised that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace which Japan signed at the city of San Francisco
on 8 September 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the San Francisco Treaty), Japan has renounced all right, title, and claim
to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratley Islands and the Paracel Islands.
Article 3
The disposition of property of Japan and its nationals in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores), and their claims,
including debts, against the authorities of the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and the
residents thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and residents and their claims, including
debts, against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between the Government of the Republic
of China and the Government of Japan. The terms nationals and residents include juridical persons.
Article 4
It is recognised that all treaties, conventions, and agreements concluded before 9 December 1941 between Japan and China
have become null and void as a consequence of the war.
Article 5
It is recognised that under the provisions of Article 10 of the San Francisco Treaty, Japan has renounced all special rights
and its interests in China, including all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at
Peking on 7 September 1901, and all annexes, notes, and documents supplementary thereto, and has agreed to the abrogation in
respect to Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes, and documents.
Article 6
(a) The Republic of China and Japan will be guided by the principles of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations in
their mutual relations.
(b) The Republic of China and Japan will cooperate in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations
and, in particular, will promote their common welfare through friendly cooperation in the economic field.
Article 7
The Republic of China and Japan will endeavour to conclude, as soon as possible, a treaty or agreement to place their trading,
maritime, and other commercial relations, on a stable and friendly basis.
Article 8
The Republic of China and Japan will endeavour to conclude, as soon as possible, an agreement relating to civil air transport.
Article 9
The Republic of China and Japan will endeavour to conclude, as soon as possible, an agreement providing for the regulation or
limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas.
Article 10
For the purposes of the present Treaty, nationals of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all the inhabitants and
former inhabitants of Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and their descendents who are of the Chinese nationality in
accordance with the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa)
and Penghu (the Pescadores); and juridical persons of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all those registered under
the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu
(the Pescadores).
Article 11
Unless otherwise provided for in the present Treaty and the documents supplementary thereto, any problem arising between the Republic
of China and Japan as a result of the existence of a state of war shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of
the San Francisco Treaty.
Article 12
Any dispute that may arise out of the interpretation or application of the present Treaty shall be settled by negotiation or
other pacific means.
Article 13
The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Taipei as soon as possible.
The present Treaty shall enter into force as from the date on which such instruments of ratification are exchanged.
Article 14
The present Treaty shall be in the Chinese, Japanese, and English languages. In case of any divergence of
interpretation, the English text shall prevail.
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto
their seals.
Done in duplicate at Taipei, this Twenty Eighth day of the Fourth month of the Forty First year of the
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, corresponding to the Twenty Eighth day of the Fourth month of the Twenty Seventh year of SHOWA
of Japan and to the Twenty Eighth day of April in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty Two.
YEH KUNG-CHAO, [L.S.] Minister of Foreign Affairs and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China
ISAO KAWADA, [L.S.] Minister of Foreign Affairs and Plenipotentiary of Japan
The Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan/Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (abbrev. Zhong Ri heping tiaoyue 中日和平條約
or Zhong Ri heyue 中日和約) is commonly also known as the Treaty of Taipei (Taibei heyue 台北和約); in Japanese:
Nippon kokuto Chuka minkoku tono aidano heiwa jōyaku 日本国と中華民国との間の平和条約.
Treaty signed at Washington December 2, 1954;
Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of America February 9, 1955;
Ratified by the President of the United States of America February 11,1955;
Ratified by the Republic of China February 15, 1955;
Ratifications exchanged at Taipei March 3, 1955;
Proclaimed by the President of the United States of America April 1,1955;
Entered into force March 3, 1955.
And exchange of notes
Signed at Washington December 10, 1954
By THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
WHEREAS the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China was signed at Washington
on December 2, 1954 by their respective plenipotentiaries, the original of which Treaty in the English and Chinese languages is
word for word as follows:
Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China
The Parties to this Treaty,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace
with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the West Pacific Area,
Recalling with mutual pride the relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual
ideals to fight side by side against imperialist aggression during the last war,
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against
external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the West
Pacific Area, and
Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending
the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the West Pacific Area,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they
may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered and to
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations.
Article 2
In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and
mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive
activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.
Article 3
The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with each other in the development of
economic progress and social well-being and to further their individual and collective efforts toward these ends.
Article 4
The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the
implementation of this Treaty.
Article 5
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the
Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it world act to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore
and maintain international peace and security.
Article 6
For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms "territorial" and "territories" shall mean in respect of the Republic of China,
Taiwan and the Pescadores: and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its
jurisdiction. The provisions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual
agreement.
Article 7
The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government of the United Stares of America accepts, the right to dispose
such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined
by mutual agreement.
Article 8
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under
the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 9
This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of China in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Taipei.
Article 10
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been
given to the other Party.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.
DONE in duplicate, in the English and Chinese languages, at Washington on this second day of December of the Year
One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty-four, corresponding to the second day of the twelfth month of the Forty-third year
of the Republic of China.
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: John Foster Dulles
[Approved by House vote 409-3 on January 25, 1955 and by Senate vote 85-3 on January 28, 1955]
U.S. Congressional Authorization for the President to Employ the Armed Forces of the United States to Protect Formosa, the Pescadores,
and Related Positions and Territories of That Area
Whereas the primary purpose of the United States, in its relations with all other nations, is to develop and sustain a just and
enduring peace for all; and Whereas certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China are now under
armed attack, and threats and declarations have been and are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is in aid of and
in preparation for armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores,
Whereas such armed attack if continued would gravely endanger the peace and security of the West Pacific Area and particularly of
Formosa and the Pescadores; and
Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential
to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and
Whereas the President of the United States on January 6, 1955, submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification
a Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China, which recognizes that an armed attack in the
West Pacific Area directed against territories, therein described, in the region of Formosa and the Pescadores, would be dangerous to
the peace and safety of the parties to the treaty:
Therefore be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems
necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include
the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other
measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.
This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by
international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.
In Chinese, the Formosa Resolution by the US Congress (Meiguo guohui 美國國會) is called Taiwan jueyi'an
台灣決議案 or Fuermosha jueyi'an 福爾摩沙決議案. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed it into law on Jan. 29, 1955.
It was repealed by the US Congress on Oct. 26, 1974.
The Minister of Defense’s [Peng Dehuai] Proclamation to Taiwan Compatriots
(October 6, 1958)
Military and Civilian Compatriots on Taiwan, Penghu [Islands], Jinmen, Mazu:
We are all Chinese; of the thirty-six stratagems, Peace is the best. The battle for Jinmen is of a punitive nature. Your leaders have for a long time been too outrageous, directing aircraft to fly all over the mainland, reaching as far as Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Xikang, Qinghai, where they scattered leaflets, dropped spies, bombed Fujian, and harassed Jiangsu and Zhejiang. This is beyond intolerable. Therefore, we fired a few cannons, to get your attention.
Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu are Chinese territory. On this point you agree, as can be seen in your leader’s statements, and they are definitely not American territory. Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu are part of China, and not a separate country. There is only one China in the world, there are not two Chinas. On this point you also agree, as can be seen in your leader’s statements. Your leader has signed a military agreement with the Americans, which is one-sided, we don’t accept it, and it ought to be invalidated.
The Americans will certainly one day abandon you, don’t you believe it? The giant that is history will bear evidence to this. The clue is already exposed in Dulles’ September 30 interview. Can you not shiver, standing in your position? After all, American imperialism is our common enemy. 130,000 soldiers and civilians on Jinmen are running out of supplies, suffering from cold and hunger. They cannot go on in this condition. For humanitarian reasons, I have already ordered the front lines in Fujian [to observe] a one week temporary cease fire, starting on October 6, so that you can completely and freely transport supplies, on the condition that there is no American convoy. If there is a convoy then it won’t apply.
This war between us has already been going on for more than thirty years and still hasn’t ended, and that is not good. We propose holding negotiation, to achieve a peaceful settlement. Several years ago Premier Zhou [Enlai] had already told you about this. This is China’s internal affair, a problem between our two sides, it isn’t a bilateral problem involving the United States and China. The U.S. occupation of Taiwan, Penghu, and the Taiwan Straits – that is a bilateral problem between the United States and China, which ought to be resolved through negotiations between the two countries, and there are currently talks being held in Warsaw.
The Americans will have to leave one day, there is no alternative. It would be in the Americans’ interest to leave earlier, because they would retain the initiative. Leaving later won’t be good [for them] because they will be forced. Why did an Eastern Pacific country come to the Western Pacific? The Western Pacific is the Western Pacific people’s Western Pacific, just the same as the Eastern Pacific is the Eastern Pacific people’s Eastern Pacific, this is just common sense, and the Americans ought to understand it. There is no war between the People’s Republic of China and the United States, so there is no so-called cease-fire. To talk about a cease-fire where there is no fire, isn’t it plain nonsense? Friends on Taiwan, there are the fires of war between us, which ought to stop, and be extinguished. This will require negotiations. Of course, to fight for another thirty years would be no big deal, but ultimately it would be preferable to come to an early peaceful resolution. Please, it’s up to you to decide where you want to go.
A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements,
declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining
to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF
file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010
please click here.
By Ely Maurer Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs 1
Since August 23, when the Chinese Communists began their massive bombardment of Quemoy, no item has received as much coverage in the world press as the problems of Formosa and the offshore islands. We are now in a period of relative calm. However, in the 4 months that have elapsed since August 23 considerable discussion and world anxiety have been generated by the matter. In this discussion there have been intertwined elements of policy and of law. I do not intend here to go into the policy issues. I appreciate the opportunity you have afforded me to take up the legal problems. With respect to the questions of law these involve a blend of national and international aspects.
Before going into the legal problems it is desirable to review briefly the geographical and historical background of Formosa and the offshore islands.
Formosa, or Taiwan, is an island about 100 miles from the mainland of China. It has an area equal to that of Maryland and a population of about 10 million people, comprising 8.5 million persons of Chinese descent, 1.5 million mainland Chinese, and 100,000 aborigines. Close to and westward of Formosa are the Pescadores Islands, or Penghus. I shall use the term “Formosa” hereafter as also covering these islands.
Close to the mainland of China, in the vicinity of the city of Amoy and about 5 miles away, is the Quemoy group of islands consisting mainly of Big Quemoy, Little Quemoy, and the two tiny Tan Islands.
About 120 miles up the mainland coast and in the vicinity of Foochow and about 10 miles off the coast is the Matsu group of islands.
Both these groups are in the control of the Republic of China. I shall hereafter speak of them as the offshore islands. These islands have been for a very long time under Chinese sovereignty.
Since the middle of the 17th century and up to 1895 Formosa was a part of the Chinese Empire. In 1895 under the Treaty of Shimonoseki China ceded Formosa to Japan. In the Cairo conference in November 1943 the United States, United Kingdom, and China declared it was their “purpose” that Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores “shall be restored to the Republic of China.” Thereafter in August 1945 in the Potsdam conference the United States, United Kingdom, and China declared that “the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out.” This Potsdam declaration was subsequently adhered to by the U.S.S.R. On September 2, 1945, the Japanese Government, in the instrument of surrender, accepted the provisions of the declaration. The Supreme Allied Commander for the Allied Powers then issued Directive No. 1, under which the Japanese Imperial Headquarters issued General Order No. 1 requiring Japanese commanders in Formosa to surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China. Since September 1945 the United States and the other Allied Powers have accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over the island. In article 2 of the Japanese Peace Treaty, which entered into force April 28, 1952, Japan renounced all “right, title and claim” to Formosa. Neither this agreement nor any other agreement thereafter has purported to transfer the sovereignty of Formosa to China.
In the meantime, since the end of the war in 1945, the Chinese Communists had been engaged in open hostilities with the Republic of China. On October 1, 1949, they proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Two days later the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with this regime. The Chinese Communists made their first attempt to capture Quemoy in late 1949 and were repulsed with heavy losses by the Chinese Government on October 27. The Chinese Government had been transferring its offices to Taipei, Formosa, and early in December 1949 Taipei became the provisional capital of the Republic of China.
On January 5, 1950, President Truman, in a public statement regarding Formosa, declared that the United States had no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory, did not seek any special privileges therein, and would not pursue a course which would lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. 2 However, when the Communists attacked the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950, President Truman issued a public statement noting that the Communists had made clear their intent to use armed invasion and war for purposes of conquest and had defied the Security Council of the United Nations. 3 He thereupon ordered the Seventh Fleet “to prevent any attacks on Formosa” and as a corollary called upon the Chinese Government to cease all operations against the mainland. In addition he stated that “The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.”
On August 24, 1950, the Chinese Communist regime sent a telegram to the President of the United Nations Security Council calling President Truman's action “a direct armed aggression on the territory of China and a total violation of the United Nations Charter.” In a statement on the same day the State Department said the United States would welcome the United Nations consideration of the problem, and on September 21 we formally asked that it be put on the agenda of the General Assembly. The United States made this request at a time when there seemed to be a reasonable prospect that peace and security could be restored in Korea. When these hopes were destroyed by Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, the United States on November 15 asked that consideration of the Formosa question be deferred. In the meantime the Soviet Union had initiated resolutions in the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations condemning the United States for alleged “armed invasion” of Formosa. The General Assembly never endorsed the charges, and they were dropped. The Security Council defeated the Soviet resolution on November 30 by a vote of 9 to 1.
In July of 1954, at the time when the Geneva Accords were being negotiated to end hostilities in Indochina, the Chinese Communist regime launched a massive propaganda campaign for the “liberation of Taiwan.” On September 3 the Chinese Communists began a heavy bombardment of the island of Quemoy, and military attacks spread to coastal islands including the Tachen Islands to the north. Against this background the United States–Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty was signed on December 2, 1954. 4 The territorial coverage of the treaty in respect of China was limited to Formosa. The treaty was accompanied by an exchange of notes of December 10 5 by which the United States and the Republic of China undertook not to use force from the Formosa area or the offshore islands except by joint agreement or in self-defense. It might be pointed out that these defensive arrangements merely formalized and did not in any way extend the United States undertaking for the defense of Formosa going back to June 1950.
The Peiping regime propaganda campaign was stepped up throughout December and January, and the Chinese Communists launched heavy aerial bombardment on the coastal islands and invaded and seized Ichiang Island. These actions were accompanied by broadcast declarations that the actions were preliminary to the taking of Formosa. Following these attacks President Eisenhower on January 24, 1955, requested a resolution from Congress publicly establishing the authority of the President to employ United States forces as he deemed necessary to secure and protect Formosa from armed attack. This joint resolution was passed January 29. 6 The United States also supported in the United Nations Security Council a New Zealand proposal for the consideration of the question of hostilities in the offshore-island area. However, the Peiping regime refused the invitation of the Security Council to be present and participate in the discussion. The Chinese Communists said that the New Zealand resolution was not within the competence of the United Nations because the liberation of Formosa and other coastal islands was a matter of “sovereign right” and an internal affair.
In several statements made in 1955 the President and the Secretary of State reiterated the desire of the United States to find a peaceful solution to the tension in the Formosa area, and ambassadorial talks were opened in Geneva in 1955 with the Chinese Communists relating to this subject as well as other topics. However, these conversations proved abortive since the Chinese Communists refused to agree to a proposal which concerned renunciation of force in the Formosa area.
During the period from February 1955 up to August 23 of this year the Chinese Communist attacks on the Republic of China were relatively infrequent. Then on August 23 the Chinese Communists commenced a massive bombardment of the Quemoy Islands, once again resorting to armed force and precipitating a grave situation in the Formosan Straits. From the beginning of the attacks the United States has shown a desire for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in the Formosa Straits. When the Chinese Communists on September 6 stated a willingness to resume the suspended ambassadorial talks at Geneva, the United States welcomed the prospect. Since that time the United States has, in talks now taking place in Warsaw, been seeking to obtain a cessation of Chinese Communist attacks.
On October 5 the Chinese Communists announced a 1-week suspension of the bombardment, conditional on the discontinuance of the United States escort activities. The Department of State issued a statement welcoming the Communist move and expressing the hope it foreshadowed a permanent end to the attacks. 7 At the end of the week the Chinese Communists extended their cease-fire for another 2 weeks. However, on October 20, justifying their action on alleged escorting activities, the Chinese Communists resumed bombardment but announced shortly thereafter that bombardment of certain areas on Quemoy would only take place on odd numbered days. Since that time bombardment has greatly diminished.
As a result of meetings between Secretary Dulles and Chiang Kai-shek pursuant to article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty a joint communique was issued on October 23. 8 In this communique it was recognized that under the present conditions the defense of the offshore islands is “closely related” to the defense of Formosa. Further, the Republic of China stated that the “principal means” of restoring freedom to its people on the mainland is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's “three people's principles” and “not the use of force.”
This then brings us up to the present. On the basis of this background we can now go into the legal issues presented.
The legal problems concerning Formosa and the offshore islands break down into two main subdivisions: (a) the legal problems with respect to the authority of the Executive under United States law, and (b) the authority of the United States Government under international law. It may be best to consider the national aspect first.
In January 1955, in a period in which the Chinese Communists were taking menacing actions with respect to the offshore islands and Formosa and after we had signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, the President sent a message to Congress urging a resolution by Congress authorizing him, if necessary, to take military action in the Formosa area. The message recited that Formosa constituted a part of the vital island chain of defenses of the United States and free nations in the Western Pacific. The President alluded to Quemoy as “one of the natural approaches to Formosa” and said that attacks upon the offshore islands have been asserted by the Chinese Communists themselves to be “a prelude to the conquest of Formosa.” The President then said:
But, unhappily, the danger of armed attack directed against that area compels us to take into account closely related localities and actions which, under current conditions, might determine the failure or success of such an attack. The authority that may be accorded by the Congress would be used only in situations which are recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries to, an attack against the main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores.
After serious debate Congress passed House Joint Resolution 159 (Public Law 4, 84th Congress, 1st session, chapter 4). This resolution reads in pertinent part:
... the President of the United States be and he is hereby authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.
In the light of the above, let us first take up the question of the authority of the President to take military action to defend Formosa. In this connection it should be recalled that under article V of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Government of China it is provided that an armed attack on the territories of one of the parties would be dangerous to the other party's peace and security and the other party declare that it would act to meet the common danger “in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Under article VI the term “territories” in respect to the Republic of China is limited to Formosa (and the Pescadores). Thus if an armed attack took place on Formosa the question might arise as to the content of the phrase “in accordance with its constitutional processes.” It might be argued that it is only Congress which could take action under the constitutional provision giving it the power to declare war. However, as is well known, it is considered that the President has a large power to take military action in emergency situations for the defense of the United States without awaiting action by Congress. In the present situation, House Joint Resolution 159 eliminates any problem on this score since, in the words of the President's message, the resolution clearly and publicly establishes the authority of the President to take military action in the defense of Formosa as he deems necessary.
The second question concerns the authority of the President to take action to defend the offshore islands. The Mutual Defense Treaty does not cover in its territorial scope the offshore islands, and there is no commitment therein of United States action in their defense. However, House Joint Resolution 159 authorizes the President to protect “such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands” and to take “such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.” What is the meaning of this clause?
It has been argued that the phrase “related positions and territories” refers only to areas that are necessary from the standpoint of military tactics for the defense of Formosa. Thus, this argument runs, the President has only the power to defend Quemoy if Quemoy in a military sense is essential to the defense of Formosa, so that if Quemoy fell the defense of Formosa would be tactically impossible. The argument continues that, since Quemoy is not essential in this sense, the President has no authority to defend it.
It is our view that the language with respect to the offshore islands, read in its natural sense and with relation to the background message of the President and the debate in Congress, permits a broader meaning. (1) The word “related” would seem logically to cover the situation where the position or territory in question is not “essential” to the defense of Formosa but one in which the loss of the position or territory would make that defense harder or more difficult. (2) More importantly, the word “related” would appear to cover the situation in which the offshore islands are part and parcel of a general plan for the seizure of Formosa or preliminary thereto. In the present situation it is evident from the innumerable statements issued by the Chinese Communists that they view their whole action with respect to the offshore islands as related in this way to the “liberation” of Formosa. (3) Further, it is improper in our view to give a too physical interpretation to the word “related.” In this connection it might be pointed out that the offshore islands constitute an extremely important psychological element in the will to resist of the defenders of Formosa. In this sense the loss of the offshore islands is quite clearly related to the defense of Formosa. (4) Fourthly, emphasis should be given to the language “such related positions” as “he judges to be required or appropriate” in assuring the defense of Formosa. Implicit in this language is that discretion is lodged in the President to determine what related positions are required or appropriate in the defense of Formosa. (5) Fifthly, it should be emphasized the President has also power to take “such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate” in the defense of Formosa, and this is not tied down to any phrase as to “related positions.”
Considering the cumulative effect of all these points and taking into account the inherent constitutional powers of the President, it is our view that the President has an extremely broad latitude of decision with respect to taking action to defend the offshore islands. In this connection it will be recalled that in the joint communique issued on October 23 at Taipei, at the conclusion of the Dulles-Chiang discussions, it was stated that “It was recognized that under the present conditions the defense of the Quemoys, together with the Matsus, is closely related” to the defense of Formosa.
On the international front it is best to examine the problem of Formosa separately from the problem of the offshore islands.
In giving the historical background of Formosa it has been pointed out that at Cairo the Allies stated it was their purpose to restore Formosa to Chinese sovereignty and that at the end of the war the Republic of China receive the surrender of Japanese forces on Formosa. It has also been pointed out that under the Japanese Peace Treaty Japan renounced all right, title, and claim to Formosa. However, neither in that treaty nor in any other treaty has there been any definitive cession to China of Formosa. The situation is, then, one where the Allied Powers still have to come to some agreement or treaty with respect to the status of Formosa. Any action, therefore, of the Chinese Communist regime to seize Formosa constitutes an attempt to seize by force territory which does not belong to it. Such a seizure is prohibited by international law and the United Nations Charter as an attempt to settle a claim to territory by force. It would thus appear that the United States is within its legal rights in taking action to defend Formosa.
With respect to the offshore islands the situation is admittedly somewhat different. There is no question that these islands are a part of the state of China. It may be admitted further that these islands are close to the mainland of China. However, the offshore islands have been in the possession and effective control of the Government of the Republic of China since its inception, except for the period of the Japanese war. Since 1949 a status quo has come into existence vis-a-vis the Peiping regime. It is this status quo which the Chinese Communists have threatened with the menace of armed force. It is our view that we have here in fact a situation comparable to that which obtained in Korea preceding the invasion of south Korea by north Korea. In other words, the action of the Chinese Communists in taking warlike measures is an effort to change the status quo and to gain additional territory by force in violation of the prohibitions of the United Nations Charter.
It has been urged that this is essentially a civil war and therefore it is improper for the United States to participate with the Government of the Republic of China in defense of the offshore islands. It should first be pointed out that it is too narrow to look upon the conflict merely as a civil war. Even as early as the end of the war with Japan the Soviet Union, in violation of its treaty with the Chinese Nationalists, turned over large stores of equipment and in other ways furnished material aid to the Chinese Communists. Since that time the Soviet Union has continued giving large assistance to the Chinese Communist regime. Thus much of the ammunition, artillery, and planes that are at present being used by that regime derive from Russian sources. And the Soviet Union is allied by military treaty with the Chinese regime. On the other hand the United States has vital interests in the Formosa area and is allied with the Republic of China in a Mutual Defense Treaty and has agreements to supply arms for defensive purposes. In the circumstances it seems fair to say that we are here involved in what is realistically an international dispute which the Communist regime is attempting to settle by force.
Further with respect to the argument that this is a civil war, it will be recalled that this was the same argument that was made by Vishinsky regarding the north Korean invasion of south Korea. It was an argument however which the United Nations paid no heed to but, instead, viewed the action of the north Koreans as one of aggression which came under the ban of the United Nations Charter. Secretary Dulles has summarized the situation forcefully in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly on September 18. 9 He said:
1. The Chinese Communist regime has never during its 9 years of existence exercised authority over Taiwan, the Penghus, or the Quemoy or Matsu Islands.
2. The Chinese Communist regime is now attempting to extend its authority to these areas by the use of naked force.
The issue is thus a simple one: armed conquest.
In 1950 the United Nations met that issue squarely. By overwhelming vote it found that the attack of north Korea to “unify” Korea was armed aggression. It condemned the Chinese Communist regime as an aggressor because of its part in that armed attack.
I do not ignore the argument that today's Chinese Communist attack is a “civil war” operation. Mr. Vishinsky made a parallel argument in 1950. He told us that the war in Korea was purely a “civil war” and that outsiders who intervened were “aggressors.” The United Nations overwhelmingly rejected that contention. ...
The fact is that, when one regime attempts by force to take additional territory which has long been under the authority of another government, recognized as such by a respectable part of the world community, that is a use of force which endangers world order.
On this phase of the matter it is our view, then, that the United States would be justified from an international standpoint in cooperating with the Republic of China in the defense of the offshore islands and Formosa.
Related to the problems of Formosa and the offshore islands is the question of the recognition policy of the United States. The United States Government has been criticized for its failure to recognize the Chinese Communist regime, some commentators taking the view that, since the Communist regime controls the great mass of mainland China as well as its 600 million inhabitants, the United States must accord recognition. It is the view of the United States Government that international law does not require one government to accord diplomatic recognition to another government. It is our view that the matter of diplomatic recognition is one solely to be determined as the national interest dictates, and in this case on an examination of all facets of the subject the United States Government believes that it would be contrary to our national interest to accord recognition. The various considerations involved in reaching this conclusion were spelled out in press release No. 459 of August 11, 1958, issued by the State Department. 10 This press release embodied the text of a memorandum sent by the Department to its missions abroad.
It is true that, in reviewing whether we should extend recognition, the United States Government, in this as well as in previous administrations, has looked to certain factors which are generally considered significant. These factors are (1) whether the government in question is in control of a certain territory, (2) whether the government reflects the will of the nation substantially declared, (3) whether the government is prepared to honor its international obligations. While the United States examines these factors, we do not view recognition as required upon a satisfactory finding with respect to these factors. Even if that were our view, there is serious question whether the Chinese Communist regime can in any way be considered to reflect the will of the nation; and there is no doubt, in view of flagrant past treaty violations and violations of the United Nations Charter and violations of international law and in view of statements made by the Chinese Communist regime about disregarding preexisting treaties, that the Chinese Communist regime is not prepared to honor its international obligations. Thus, even on this view, the Chinese Communists are not entitled to recognition.
As Secretary Dulles has pointed out, however, our failure to recognize the Chinese Communist regime has not meant that we refuse to deal with them where it is essential to our purpose and inures to our benefit. Thus we are at present carrying on conversations in Warsaw as we have carried on conversations in Geneva; we dealt with them in the Korean armistice negotiations; we dealt with them with respect to the cease-fires in Indochina; and we are prepared to deal with them whenever we believe it to be in the interest of the United States to do so.
As a collateral legal issue related to the Formosa Straits area there has arisen the question of the extent of the territorial sea. The Chinese Communist regime in a declaration dated September 4, 1958 declared their territorial sea to extend to 12 miles. In addition, their declaration indicated that they viewed the baselines from which the 12 miles were to be calculated as being points connecting basepoints on the mainland and on certain islands offshore. On the ground of this declaration they considered all the waters around the Quemoys and Matsus and areas well into the Formosa Straits as being internal or territorial waters, and they have charged the United States forces with more than 40 intrusions of such internal or territorial waters by warships and aircraft. The United States position on this matter is quite clear. The United States only recognizes the Government of the Republic of China; and as far as the United States is concerned the declaration of the Chinese Communist regime has therefore no force or validity. In addition the United States considers that international law recognizes only a 3-mile limit, that it is not possible for a country by unilateral action to take unto itself that which is the common property of all nations, and that this is, moreover, in violation of the universally accepted principle of the freedom of the high seas. The United States position finds support in the report of the United Nations International Law Commission 11 wherein it is stated that “international law does not require states to recognize a breadth [of territorial sea] beyond 3 miles.”
Further, a country is not free to choose whether its territorial sea will be measured from the lowwater mark on the coast, which is the normal baseline, or whether it will use straight baselines connecting salient points or offshore islands. While article 4 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 12 adopted by the recent Geneva Conference on Law of the Sea permits the establishment of straight baselines in localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, it is clear that the Chinese coast along which the straight lines described in the statement of September 4 are drawn does not conform to the geographic conditions which are set forth in article 4. There is even less legal basis for drawing straight baselines from outermost points on a group of islands and claiming waters thereby included as internal waters. Similar attempts by other countries to claim, as internal waters, large areas of high seas within groups of islands or archipelagoes have been protested by many countries. The straight baselines described in the statement of September 4, 1958, are accordingly regarded by the United States as completely arbitrary and without any basis in recognized international law.
Another problem has been raised in the press with respect to United States escort activities of vessels of the Republic of China. Heretofore the United States vessels have avoided entering the territorial sea around Quemoy and the other offshore islands. The question has been raised whether in so doing we have been giving some implied recognition to the claim of the Chinese Communist regime as to its right to this territorial sea. Nothing could be further from the fact. Since the Government of the Republic of China is in effective control of Quemoy and the other offshore islands, we consider that it has the right to the territorial sea around these islands, just as it has the right to the territorial sea around Formosa. Moreover, just as our warships have, with the consent of the Government of the Republic of China, moved through the territorial sea of Formosa, so similarly with the consent of the Government of the Republic of China they could move through the territorial sea of Quemoy and the other offshore islands. There is no question that the Government of the Republic of China would be willing to give the United States such permission with respect to Quemoy and the offshore islands. However, the United States has thought it best as a matter of policy to keep United States warships in what are clearly international waters near Quemoy and the other offshore islands.
In conclusion, it is our view that from a national and international standpoint the President may properly use United States armed forces for the defense of Formosa and the offshore islands; the United States is not required to recognize the Chinese Communist regime; the declaration by the Chinese Communist regime regarding a 12-mile territorial sea has no validity.
Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of
democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,
Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and
well-being in their countries,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in
peace with all peoples and all governments,
Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the
United Nations,
Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,
Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,
Therefore agree as follows:
Article 1
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes
in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice
are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations. The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the
United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more
effectively.
Article 2
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations
by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which
these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate
conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.
Article 3
The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help
and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist
armed attack.
Article 4
The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the
request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is
threatened.
Article 5
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration
of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger
in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as
a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with
the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
Article 6
For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security
in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and
areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan
shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security
Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such
other arrangements as may be agreed upon.
Article 7
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of
the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance
of international peace and security.
Article 8
This Treaty shall be ratified by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have
been exchanged by them in Tokyo.
Article 9
The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America signed at the city of San Francisco
on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.
Article 10
This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States
of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for
the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area. However, after the Treaty has been in force
for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which
case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.
In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.
Done in duplicate at Washington in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day
of January, 1960.
Memorandum from the Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs (L/FE - John J. Czyzak) to Mr. Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser
February 3, 1961
Subject: "Legal Status of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores Islands (Penghu)"
History of status of Formosa and the Pescadores
Prior to the Korean Hostilities
From the middle of the 17th century to 1895, Formosa and the Pescadores were part of the Chinese Empire. China then ceded these
islands to Japan in 1895 in the Treaty of Shimonoseki.
When China declared war on Japan on December 9, 1941, she also declared that all treaties concerning the relations between China
and Japan "are and remain null and void".
In the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the United States, Great Britain and China stated it to be their purpose that "all the territories
that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as ... Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China". These same
three governments on July 26, 1945 issued the Potsdam Proclamation declaring that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried
out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine".
On August 8, 1945 the Soviet Union adhered to the Potsdam Proclamation. In the Instrument of Surrender signed September 2, 1945, the
Japanese Government accepted its provisions.
Pursuant to Japanese Imperial General Headquarters General Order No. 1 issued at the direction of the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers (SCAP), Japanese commanders in Formosa surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek "acting on behalf of the United States,
the Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". Continuously since that
time, the Government of the Republic of China has occupied and administered Formosa and the Pescadores and subsequent to the surrender
declared Formosa to be a part of China. Although there is no indication that the United States ever received official notification of
such declaration, it can be said that the United States was aware of the fact that the Republic of China treated Formosa as a part of
China. The view of the United States government in the post-war period, however, was typified by a statement on April 11, 1947 of
Acting Secretary Acheson that the transfer of sovereignty over Formosa to China "has not yet been formalized". Sovereignty, it would
appear, remained in Japan.
After a prolonged period of civil strife, the Chinese Communists succeeded in driving the Government of the Republic of China off
the Chinese mainland. On October 1, 1949 the Chinese Communists proclaimed the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China. The seat
of the Government of the Republic of China was transferred to Formosa, and in early December 1949, Taipei became its provisional capital.
The Korean Conflict
The outbreak of hostilities in Korea on June 25, 1950 brought to the fore the question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores.
President Truman, in ordering the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, stated that "the determination of the future status
of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations".
[On August 25, 1950] the United States replied to the United Nations Security Council that
"The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the
island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the allied forces in the Pacific. Like
other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government
was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the Island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now."
By a letter dated September 20, 1950, the United States requested that the question of Formosa be placed on the agenda of the fifth
session of the U.N. General Assembly. In an explanatory note of September 21, the United States, citing the Cairo and Potsdam declarations
and the Japanese surrender, stated nevertheless:
"Formal transfer of Formosa to China was to await the conclusion of peace with Japan or some other appropriate formal act."
Consideration of this item by the General Assembly was eventually postponed.
Meanwhile the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council condemning the United States for acts of aggression
and intervention in the internal affairs of China. The USSR also proposed for inclusion on the agenda of the fifth regular session of the
General Assembly the question of "American aggression against China". In both cases the USSR asserted that Taiwan was an inalienable part
of the territory of China. The U.S. delegate in Committee One, John Foster Dulles, answered the Soviet complaint of aggression in part as
follows:
"In connection with this whole question of Formosa, I think it is wise for us to bear in mind that Formosa is still affected with an
international interest. It is a former Japanese colony in the process of detachment. The United States certainly is entitled to some voice
in the determination of the future of Formosa, because if it were not for the tremendous military effort and the great sacrifice which the
United States made in that area of the world, none of us here today would be sitting around talking about Formosa.
"The United States, as one of the principal victors in the war against Japan, has a legitimate voice in what President Truman referred
to as the "determination of the future status of Formosa," which he says, "must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace
settlement with Japan or consideration by the United Nations."
The Security Council defeated the Soviet resolution, and the General Assembly failed to endorse the charges against the U.S.
Japanese Peace Treaty
In September and October 1950, the United States proposed in a brief statement to the members of the Far Eastern Commission general
principles for a Peace Treaty with Japan.
In an aide memoire dated November 20, 1950, the USSR commented:
"2. By the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943 . . . and the Potsdam Agreement of July 26, 1945 . . . the question of returning Formosa
and the Pescadores to China was decided. In a similar manner the Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945 . . . decided the questions of returning
the southern part of Sakhalin Island and the adjacent islands to the Soviet Union and handing over to her the Kurile Islands."
The United States replied in an aide memoire dated December 27, 1950:
" ... 2. The Cairo Declaration of 1943 stated the purpose to restore 'Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores to the Republic of China.' That
declaration, like other wartime declarations such as those of Yalta and Potsdam, was in the opinion of the United States Government subject to
any final peace settlement where all relevant factors should be considered ... "
From September 4 to 8, 1951 a conference for the conclusion and signature of a Treaty of Peace with Japan was held at San Francisco. China
was not represented at the Conference because of the disagreement among the participants as to who actually represented the government of that
country. Reflecting this disagreement is Article 2 of the Peace Treaty as it was signed on September 8 which reads in its pertinent part:
"(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores."
John Foster Dulles, U.S. delegate at the Conference, commented on this provision in Article 2:
"Some Allied Powers suggested that Article 2 should not merely delimit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam, but specify precisely
the ultimate disposition of each of the ex-Japanese territories. This, admittedly, would have been neater. But it would have raised questions
as to which there are now no agreed answers. We had either to give Japan peace on the Potsdam surrender terms or deny peace to Japan while the
allies quarrel about what shall be done with what Japan is prepared, and required, to give up. Clearly, the wise course was to proceed now, so
far as Japan is concerned, leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international solvents other than this treaty."
The delegate of the United Kingdom remarked:
"The treaty also provides for Japan to renounce its sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. The treaty itself does not determine
the future of these islands."
The USSR refused to sign the Treaty. It objected, among other things, to the provision regarding Formosa and the Pescadores:
" ... this draft grossly violates the indisputable rights of China to the return of integral parts of Chinese territory; Taiwan,
the Pescadores, the Paracel and other islands ... the draft contains only a reference to the renunciation by Japan of its rights to these
territories but intentionally omits any mention of the further fate of these territories."
It is clear from these and other statements made at San Francisco, that sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores was not considered to
have finally been determined by the Peace Treaty.
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations also took this view. In its Report on the Treaty dated February 14, 1952, the Committee stated:
"It is important to remember that Article 2 is a renunciatory article and makes no provision for the power or powers which are to succeded
Japan in the possession of and sovereignty over the ceded territory.
"During the negotiation of the Treaty some of the Allied Powers expressed the view that Article 2 of the treaty should not only relieve Japan
of its sovereignty over the territories in question but should indicate specifically what disposition was to be made of each of them. The committee
believes, however, that this would have been an unwise course to pursue. It might have raised differences among the allies which would have complicated
and prolonged the conclusions of the peace. Under the circumstances it seems far better to have the treaty enter into force now, leaving to the future
the final disposition of such areas as South Sakhalin and the Kuriles."
Although China was not a party to the San Francisco Treaty, a separate Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan was signed
in Taipei on April 28, 1952. Article II of that treaty provided:
"It is recognized that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco in the United States of America
on September 8, 1951 ... Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly
Islands and the Paracel Islands."
Article 25 of the Treaty stated that the Treaty shall not confer any rights, title or benefits on any state not a party to the Treaty.
Chinese Mutual Defense Treaty and the Formosa Resolution
Against the background of a massive Chinese Communist propaganda campaign for the "liberation" of Taiwan, supplemented by military action
against Quemoy and other offshore islands, the United States and the Republic of China signed a Mutual defense Treaty on December 2, 1954. The
first paragraph of Article V of the Treaty reads:
"Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be
dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."
Article VI provides that for the purpose of Article V the term "territories" shall mean in respect to the Republic of China, "Taiwan and
the Pescadores". In an exchange of notes accompanying the Treaty, there appears the statement, "The Republic of China effectively controls both
the territory described in Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Defense . . . and other territory".
In its report on the Treaty, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations briefly discussed the question of the status of Formosa and the
Pescadores:
"By the peace treaty of September 8, 1951, signed with the United States and other powers, Japan renounced 'all right, title and claim
to Formosa and the Pescadores.' The treaty did not specify the nation to which such right, title and claim passed. Although the Republic of
China was not a signatory to the Treaty, it and the parties at the conference expressly recognized that it did not dispose finally of Formosa
and the Pescadores . . . .
"Secretary Dulles informed the committee that the reference in Article V to 'the territories of either of the Parties' was language
carefully chosen to avoid denoting anything one way or another as to their sovereignty.
"It is the view of the committee that the coming into force of the present treaty will not modify or affect the existing legal status
of Formosa and the Pescadores. The treaty appears to be wholly consistent with all actions taken by the United States in this matter since
the end of World War II, and does not introduce any basically new element in our relations with the territories in question . . . .
"To avoid any possibility of misunderstanding on this aspect of the treaty, the committee decided it would be useful to include in this
report the following statement: It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying
the legal status or sovereignty of the territories to which it applies."
The question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores was again discussed on January 24, 1955, before a joint executive session of
the Senate committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, in connection with the Formosa Resolution. It is understood that during the
course of these hearings, Secretary Dulles indicated that sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores was not considered to have been transferred
to the Republic of China in the Japanese Peace Treaty and that the question of sovereignty over these islands was not yet finally determined.
Discussion
It may be well at this time to examine the various legal theories outlined [in] this memorandum regarding the status of Formosa and the
Pescadores in the light of the historical analysis set forth above.
1. The most tenable theory regarding the status of Formosa and the Pescadores is that sovereignty over the islands has not yet been
finally determined. The Cairo and Potsdam declarations were statements of intention on the part of the Allied Powers that the islands would
return to "the Republic of China". Chiang Kai-shek was authorized by the Allied Powers to take the surrender of the Japanese on the islands,
and the Government of the Republic of China has continued to occupy and administer the islands ever since. This surrender by Japan of Formosa
and the Pescadores, although providing a legal basis for the continued occupation and administration of the islands by the Government of the
Republic of China, would not appear to have effected a transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of China.
Because of differences among the Allied Powers as to who represented China, no agreement on the disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores
could be reached in the Japanese Peace Treaty. That the San Francisco Peace Treaty was intended to divest Japan of its sovereignty over the
islands without transferring that sovereignty to any other country is abundantly clear from the record. There does not appear to have occurred
anything subsequent to the Peace Treaty which can be said to have effected a transfer of that sovereignty.
An analogy to the status of Formosa as described may be found in the case of Cuba after the Spanish-American War. By Article I of the treaty
of peace between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, Spain relinquished "all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba". Although
the treaty named the United States as occupying power for the relinquished territory, it did not specify to whom sovereignty was to be transferred.
It may be well to point out that the legal status of the offshore islands, the Quemoy and Matsu groups, is different from that of Formosa and
the Pescadores as described here. The offshore islands, although like Formosa and the Pescadores under the control of the Republic of China, have
always been considered as part of "China". As Secretary Dulles explained:
"The legal position is different . . . , by virtue of the fact that technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been
settled. That is because the Japanese Peace Treaty merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to these islands. But the future
title is not determined by the Japanese Peace Treaty nor is it determined by the Peace Treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and
Japan. Therefore the juridical status of these islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, is different from the juridical status of the offshore islands
which have always been Chinese territory."
The usual way in which a formal transfer of territory is effected under international law is by cession, which typically consists of an
agreement between the ceding and acquiring state. No such cession has occurred here. As has been seen, the Republic of China did declare the
islands to be a part of China subsequent to the surrender, and such declaration might be considered an annexation of this territory. However,
in view of the fact that Chiang Kai-shek, in accepting the Japanese surrender, was acting on behalf of the Allied Powers, it may be questioned
whether any such attempted annexation would have validity in international law. Normally, military occupation does not have the effect of
transferring sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant. Furthermore, the whole history of the San Francisco and Sino-Japanese Peace
Treaties casts doubt on this interpretation.
... it has been contended that the transfer of Formosa and the Pescadores to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki was null and void in that
these islands had been taken away from China at that time by force, contrary to international law. However, it is generally accepted that
international law as it existed at that time disregarded "the effect of coercion in the conclusion of a treaty imposed by the victor upon
the vanquished State" [I Oppenheim, International Law 891 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955)].
On February 11, 1945, at Yalta, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin agreed that the USSR would enter the war against Japan on condition,
among others, that the southern part of Sakhalin and all the islands adjacent to it "shall be returned to the Soviet Union" and that the
Kurile Islands "shall be handed over the Soviet Union". The Yalta agreement like the Cairo declaration has been considered by the United States
to be a statement of intention rather than as creating binding international commitments.
The question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores must be viewed in the light of a parallel question regarding the Kurile Islands,
the southern portions of Sakhalin and certain islands adjacent to it. Pursuant to the same instrument which directed Chiang Kai-shek to accept
the Japanese surrender on Formosa and the Pescadores, the Soviet Union accepted the Japanese surrender on these islands had has continuously
thereafter controlled and administered them. The USSR purported to annex the islands by a decree of February 2, 1946. The United States
Government has maintained, however, that the USSR does not possess sovereignty over them.
1668 (XVI). Representation of China in the United Nations.
The General Assembly,
Noting that a serious divergence of views exists among Member States concerning the representation of a
founder Member who is named in the Charter of the United Nations,
Recalling that this matter has been described repeatedly in the General Assembly by all segments of opinion
as vital and crucial and that on numerous occasions its inclusion in the agenda has been requested under rule 15 of the
Assembly's rules of procedure as an item of an important and urgent character,
Recalling further the recommendation contained in its resolution 396 (V) of 14 December 1950 that, whenever
more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this
question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the
purposes and principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case,
Decides, in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations, that any proposal to change the
representation of China is an important question.
According to records provided by the United Nations,
voting summary was as follows: 61 Yes, 34 No, 7 Abstentions, 2 Non-voting. Total voting membership was 104. The following list shows
the voting summary in detail.
Yes
No
Abstentions
Non-voting
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo (Brazzaville)
Congo (Leopoldville)
Costa Rica
Dahomey
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Federation of Malaya
France
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Iceland
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Japan
Jordan
Laos
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Mauritania
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
South Africa
Spain
Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Upper Volta
Uruguay
Venezuela
Afghanistan
Albania
Bulgaria
Burma
Byelorussian SSR
Cambodia
Ceylon
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Ethiopia
Finland
Ghana
Guinea
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iraq
Mali
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Norway
Poland
Romania
Sudan
Sweden
Syria
Tunisia
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
United Arab Republic
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Austria
Cyprus
Nigeria
Pakistan
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Tanganyika
Gabon
Togo
🔴
"Other texts and documents", UN Resolution 2758: Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China
in the United Nations (1971)
Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands
Washington and Tokyo (simultaneously), 17th June, 1971
The United States of America and Japan
Noting that the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Japan reviewed together
on November 19, 20, and 21, 1969 the status of the Ryukyu Islands the Daito Islands, referred to as "Okinawa" in
the Joint Communique between the President and the Prime Minister issued on November 21, 1969, and agreed that
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan should enter immediately into consultations
regarding the specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of these islands to Japan;
Noting that the two Governments have conducted such consultations and have reaffirmed that the reversion of these
islands to Japan be carried out on the basis of the said Joint Communique;
Considering the United States of America desires, with respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, to
relinquish in favour of Japan all rights and interests under Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at
the City of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, and thereby to have relinquished all its rights and interests in all
territories under the said Article; and Considering further that Japan is willing to assume full responsibility and
authority for the exercise of all powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants
of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands;
Therefore, have agreed as follows:
Article 1
1. With respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, as defined in paragraph 2 below, the United States
of America relinquishes in favour of Japan all rights and interests under Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan
signed at the City of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, effective as of the date of entry into force of this Agreements.
Japan, as of such date, assumes full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all and any powers of administration,
legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the said islands.
2. For the purpose of this Agreement, the term "the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands" means all the territories
and their territorial waters with respect to which the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation
and jurisdiction was accorded to the United States of America under Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan other
than those with respect to which such right has already been returned to Japan in accordance with the Agreement concerning
the Amami Islands and the Agreement concerning Nanpo Shoto and Other Islands signed between the United States of America
and Japan, respectively on December 24, 1953 and April 5, 1968.
Article 2
It is confirmed that treaties, conventions and other agreements concluded between the United States of America and
Japan, including, but without limitation, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America
and Japan signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, and its related arrangements and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation between the United States of American and Japan signed at Tokyo on April 2,1953, become applicable to the
Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement.
Article 3
1. Japan will grant the United States of America on the date of entry into force of this Agreement the use of facilities
and areas in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in accordance with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
between the United States of America and Japan signed at Washington on January 19, 1960 and its related arrangements.
2. In the application of Article lV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
between the United States of America and Japan, regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of the United States Armed Forces
in Japan signed on January 19, 1960, to the facilities and areas the use of which will be granted in accordance with paragraph I
above to the United States of America on the date of entry into force of this Agreement, it is understood that the phrase "the
condition in which they were at the time they became available to the United States Armed Forces" in paragraph I of the said
Article IV refers to the condition in which the facilities and areas first came into the use of the United States Armed Forces,
and that the term "improvements" in paragraph 2 of the said Article includes those made prior to the date of entry into force
of this Agreement.
Article 4
1. Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nations against the United States of America and its nationals and against
the local authorities of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces
or authorities of the United States of America in these islands, or from the presence, operations or actions of forces or
authorities of the United States of America having had any effect upon these islands, prior to the date of entry into force
of this Agreement.
2. The waiver in paragraph 1 above does not, however, include claims of Japanese nationals specifically recognized
in the laws of the United States of America or the local laws of these islands applicable during the period of United States
administration of these islands. The Government of the United States of America is authorised to maintain its duly empowered
officials in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in order to deal with and settle such claims on and after the date of
entry into force of this Agreement in accordance with the procedures to be established in consultation with the Government
of Japan.
3. The Government of the United States of America will make ex gratia contributions for restoration of lands to the
nationals of Japan whose lands in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands were damaged prior to July 1, 1950, while placed
under the use of United States authorities, and were released from their use after June 30, 1961 and before the date of entry
into force of this Agreement. Such contributions will be made in an equitable manner in relation under High Commissioner
Ordinance Number 60 of 1967 to claims for damages done prior to July 1, 1950 to the lands released prior to July 1, 1961.
4. Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of the United States administration
of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands under or in consequence of directives of the United States or local authorities,
authorised by existing law during that period, and will take no action subjecting the United States nationals or the residents
of these islands to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts of omissions.
Article 5
1. Japan recognizes the validity of, and will continue in full force and effect, final judgements in civil cases rendered
by any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement, provided
that such recognition or continuation would not be contrary to public policy.
2. Without in any way adversely affecting the substantive rights and positions of the litigants concerned, Japan
will assume jurisdiction over and continue judgement and execution of any civil case pending as of the date of entry into
force of this Agreement in any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.
3. Without in any way adversely affecting the substantive rights of the accused or suspect concerned, Japan
will assume jurisdiction over, and may continue or institute proceedings with respect to, any criminal cases with which
any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands is seized as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement or
would have been seized had the proceedings been instituted prior to such date.
4. Japan may continue the execution of any final judgements rendered in criminal cases by any court in the
Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.
Article 6
1. The properties of the Ryukyu Electric Power Corporation, the Ryukyu Domestic Water Corporation and the Ryukyu
Development Loan Corporation shall be transferred to the Government of Japan on the date of entry into force of this
Agreement, and the rights and obligations of the said Corporations shall be assumed by the Government of Japan on that
date on conformity with the laws and regulations of Japan.
2. All other properties of the Government of the United States of America, existing in the Ryukyu Islands and
the Daito Islands as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement and located outside the facilities and areas provided
on that date in accordance with Article III of this Agreement, shall be transferred to the Government of Japan on that date,
except for those that are located on the lands returned to the landowners concerned before the date of entry into force of
this Agreement and for those the title to which will be retained by the Government of the United States of America after that
date with the consent of the Government of Japan.
3. Such lands in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands reclaimed by the Government of the United States of America
and such other reclaimed lands acquired by it in these islands are held by the Government of the United States of America as of
the date of entry into force of this Agreement become the property of the Government of Japan on that date.
4. The United States of America is not obliged to compensate Japan or its nationals for any alteration made prior to
the date of entry into force of this agreement to the lands upon which the properties transferred to the Government of Japan
under paragraphs I and 2 above are located.
Article 7
Considering, inter alia, that United States assets are being transferred to the Government of Japan under Article VI of
this Agreement, that the Government of the United States of America is carrying out the return of the Ryukyu Islands and the
Daito Islands to Japan in a manner consistent with the policy of the Government of Japan as specified in paragraph 8 of the
Joint Communique of November 21,1969, and that the Government of the United States of America will bear extra costs,
particularly in the area of employment after reversion, the Government of Japan will pay to the Government of the United States
of America in United States dollars a total amount of three hundred and twenty million United States dollars (U.S. $320,000,000)
over a period of five years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Of the said amount, the Government of Japan will
pay one hundred million United States dollars (U.S. $100,000,000) within one week after the date of entry into force of this
Agreement and the remainder in four equal annual instalments in June of each calendar year subsequent to the year in which
this Agreement enters into force.
Article 8
The Government of Japan consents to the continued operation by the Government of the United States of America of
the Voice of America relay station on Okinawa island for a period of five years from the date of entry into force of this
Agreement in accordance with the arrangements to be concluded between the two Governments. The two Governments shall enter
into consultation two years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement on future operation of the Voice of America
on Okinawa Island.
Article 9
This Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Tokyo. This Agreement shall
enter into force two months after the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.
DONE at Washington and Tokyo, this seventeenth day of June, 1971, in duplicate in the English and Japanese language,
both equally authentic.
For the United States of America: WILLIAM P. ROGERS
The U.S. reverted the islands to Japan on May 15, 1972.
The Okinawa Reversion Agreement is called as follows in Chinese and Japanese:
Chinese
Japanese
Chongsheng guihuan xieding 沖繩歸還協定
Okinawa henkan kyōtei 沖縄返還協定
The full formal title (Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands
and the Daito Islands) translates to Japanese as follows: Ryūkyū shotō oyobi Daitō shotō
ni kansuru Nippon kokuto Amerika gasshū koku tono aidano kyōtei
琉球諸島及び大東諸島に関する日本国とアメリカ合衆国との間の協定.
Memorandum from the Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asia and the Pacific (L/EA - Robert I. Starr) to
the Director of the Office of Republic of China Affairs (Charles T. Sylvester)
July 13, 1971
Subject: "Legal Status of Taiwan"
You have asked for a comprehensive memorandum analyzing the question of the legal status of Taiwan in
terms suitable for Congressional presentation. Attached is a paper that should serve this purpose. It is drawn
mainly from the February 3, 1961 Czyzak memorandum, and contains no sensitive information or reference to
classified documents.
Concurrence: L – Mr. Salans
L:L/EA:RIStarr:cdj: 7/13/71 ex 28900
Legal Status of Taiwan
Prior to the Korean Hostilities
From the middle of the 17th century to 1895, Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores (Penghu) were part of the Chinese Empire.
China then ceded these islands to Japan in 1895 in the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shimonoseki.
In the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the United States, Great Britain, and China stated it to be their purpose that "all the
territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as…Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China".
These same three governments on July 26, 1945 issued the Potsdam Proclamation declaring that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall
be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as
we determine". On August 8, 1945 the Soviet Union adhered to the Potsdam Proclamation. By an Imperial Rescript of September 2, 1945,
the Japanese Emperor accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, and in the Instrument of Surrender signed on the same date, the
Japanese Government "and their successors" undertook to carry out the provisions of the Declaration.
Pursuant to Japanese Imperial General Headquarters General Order No. 1, issued at the direction of the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers (SCAP), Japanese commanders in Formosa surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek "acting on behalf of the United States,
the Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". Continuously since that
time, the Government of the Republic of China has occupied and exercised authority over Formosa and the Pescadores.
The view of the U.S. in the intermediate post-war period was typified by a statement on April 11, 1947 of then Acting Secretary of
State Acheson, in a letter to Senator Ball, that the transfer of sovereignty over Formosa to China "has not yet been formalized".
After a prolonged period of civil strife the Chinese Communists succeeded in driving the Government of the Republic of China off
the Chinese mainland. On October 1, 1949 the Chinese Communists proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The seat
of the Government of the Republic of China was transferred to Formosa, and in early December 1949, Taipei became its provisional capital.
Shortly thereafter, President Truman, in a statement of January 5, 1950, referred to a U.N. General Assembly Resolution of December 8,
1949, (Res. 291(IV)) which called on all states to refrain from "(a) seeking to acquire spheres of influence or to create foreign controlled
regimes within the territory of China; (b) seeking to obtain special rights or privileges within the territory of China". He said:
"A specific application of the foregoing principles is seen in the present situation with respect to Formosa …
"The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain
special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time… the United States Government will no pursue a course
which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China."
The Korean Conflict
The outbreak of hostilities in Korea on June 25, 1950 brought to the fore the question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores.
President Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, and as a corollary called upon the Chinese Government
on Formosa to cease all operations against the mainland. In addition, he stated that "the determination of the future status of Formosa
must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations".
On August 24, 1950 the United States explained its position to the United Nations Security Council in the following terms:
"The action of the United States was expressly to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island.
The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the allied forces in the Pacific. Like other such
territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked
by the allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the Island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now."
By a letter dated September 20, 1950, the United States requested that the question of Formosa be placed on the agenda of the fifth
session of the U.N. General Assembly. In an explanatory note of September 21, the United States, citing the Cairo and Potsdam declarations
and the Japanese surrender, stated nevertheless:
"Formal transfer of Formosa to China was to await the conclusion of peace with Japan or some other appropriate formal act."
That note also stated:
"The Government of the United States has made it abundantly clear that the measures it has taken with respect to Formosa were without
prejudice to the long-term political status of Formosa, and the United States has no territorial ambitions and seeks no special position of
privilege with respect to Formosa. The United States believes further that the future of Formosa and of the nearly eight million people
inhabited there should be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."
Japanese Peace Treaty
From September 4 to 8, 1951 a conference for the conclusion and signature of a Treaty of Peace was held at San Francisco. China was
not represented at the Conference because of the disagreement among the participants as to who actually represented the government of that
country. Reflecting this disagreement is article 2 of the Peace Treaty, which reads in its pertinent part:
"(b) Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores."
John Foster Dulles, U.S. delegate at the Conference, commented on this provision in article 2:
"Some Allied Powers suggested that article 2 should not merely delimit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam, but specify precisely
the ultimate disposition of each of the ex-Japanese territories. This, admittedly, would have been neater. But it would have raised questions
as to which there are now no agreed answers. We had either to give Japan peace on the Potsdam Surrender Terms or deny peace to Japan while the
allies quarrel about what shall be done with what Japan is prepared, and required, to give up. Clearly, the wise course was to proceed now, so
far as Japan is concerned, leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international solvents other than this treaty."
The delegate of the United Kingdom remarked:
"The treaty also provides for Japan to renounce its sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. The treaty itself does not
determine the future of these islands."
The USSR refused to sign the Treaty. It objected, among other things, to the provision regarding Formosa and the Pescadores:
"…this draft grossly violates the indisputable rights of China to the return of integral parts of Chinese territory: Taiwan, the
Pescadores, the Paracel and other islands…. The draft contains only a reference to the renunciation by Japan of its rights to these
territories but intentionally omits any mention of the further fate of these territories."
It is clear from these and other statements made at San Francisco, that although the Treaty provision constituted an appropriate act
of renunciation by Japan, the future status of Formosa and the Pescadores was not considered to have finally been determined by the Peace
Treaty.
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations also took this view. In its Report on the Treaty dated February 14, 1952, the Committee stated:
"It is important to remember that article 2 is a renunciatory article and makes no provision for the power or powers which are to succeed
Japan in the possession of and sovereignty over the ceded territory.
"During the negotiation of the Treaty some of the Allied Powers expressed the view that article 2 of the treaty should not only relieve
Japan of its sovereignty over the territories in question but should indicate specifically what disposition was to be made of each of them.
The committee believes, however, that this would have complicated and prolonged the conclusion of the peace. Under the circumstances it seems
far better to have the treaty enter into force now, leaving to the future the final disposition of such areas as South Sakhalin and the Kuriles."
Although China was not a party to the San Francisco Treaty, a separate Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan was signed
in Taipei on April 28, 1952. Article II of that treaty provided:
"It is recognized that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco in the united States of America
on September 8, 1951…, Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores)…."
Explaining this provision to the Legislative Yuan, Foreign Minister Yeh of the Republic of China stated that under the San Francisco Peace
Treaty "no provision was made for the return [of these islands] to China." He continued:
"Inasmuch as these territories were originally owned by us and as they are now under our control and, furthermore, Japan has renounced in
the Sino-Japanese peace treaty these territories under the San Francisco Treaty of Peace, they are, therefore, in fact restored to us."
At another point, Foreign Minister Yeh stated that "no provision has been made either in the San Francisco Treaty of Peace as to the future
of Taiwan and Penghu". During the interpellations of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in the Legislative Yuan, the Foreign Minister was asked, "What
is the status of Formosa and the Pescadores?" He replied:
"Formosa and the Pescadores were formerly Chinese territories. As Japan has renounced her claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, only China has
the right to take them over. In fact, we are controlling them now, and undoubtedly they constitute a part of our territories. However, the delicate
international situation makes it that they do not belong to us. Under present circumstances, Japan has no right to transfer Formosa an the Pescadores
to us; nor can we accept such a transfer from Japan even if she so wishes… In the Sino-Japanese peace treaty, we have made provisions to signify that
residents including juristic persons of Formosa and the Pescadores bear Chinese nationality, and this provision may serve to mend any future gaps
when Formosa and the Pescadores are restored to us."
Chinese Mutual Defense Treaty
Against the background of a Chinese Communist propaganda campaign in July, 1954 for the "liberation" of Taiwan, supplemented in September,
1954 by military action against Quemoy and other offshore islands, the United States and the Republic of China signed a Mutual Defense Treaty on
December 2, 1954. The first paragraph of Article V of the Treaty reads:
"Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be
dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."
Article VI provides that for the purpose of Article V the term "territories" shall mean in respect to the Republic of China, "Taiwan and the
Pescadores". In an exchange of notes accompanying the Treaty, there appears the statement, "The Republic of China effectively controls both the
territory described in Article VI of the Treaty… and other territory".
In its report on the Treaty, the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations discussed the question of the true status of Formosa and the
Pescadores:
"By the peace treaty of September 8, 1951, signed with the United States and other powers, Japan renounced 'all right, title and claim to
Formosa and the Pescadores.' The treaty did not specify the nation to which such right, title and claim passed. Although the Republic of China
was not a signatory to the Treaty, it recognized that it did not dispose finally of Formosa and the Pescadores ….
"…he (Secretary Dulles) informed the committee that the reference in article V to 'the territories of either of the Parties' was language
carefully chosen to avoid denoting anything one way or the other as to their sovereignty.
"It is the view of the committee that the coming in to force of the present treaty will not modify or affect the existing legal status of
Formosa and the Pescadores. The treaty appears to be wholly consistent with all actions taken by the United States in this matter since the end
of World War II, and does not introduce any basically new element in our relations with the territories in question. Both by act and by implication
we have accepted the Nationalist Government as the lawful authority on Formosa."
To avoid any possibility of misunderstanding on this aspect of the treaty, the committee decided it would be useful to include in this report
to following statement: "It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal
status or sovereignty of the territories to which it applies."
In presenting the Committee's report to the Senate on February 9, 1955, Senator Walter George referred to the question of the legal status
of Taiwan: "The view was advance during committee's consideration of the treaty that it may have the effect of recognizing that the government
of Chiang Kai-shek has sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores."
On the one hand, reference was made to the Cairo Declaration which stated that Japan was to be stripped of her island territories in the
Pacific and that territories stolen from the Chinese such as Formosa and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic of China. On the other
hand, reference was made to the fact that while Japan renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, such title was not
conveyed to any nation. After full exploration of this matter with Secretary Dulles, the committee decided that this treaty was not a competent
instrument to resolve doubts about sovereignty over Formosa. It agreed to include in its report the following statement:
"It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the present treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or
the sovereignty of the territories referred to in article VI.
In other words, so far as the United States in concerned, it is our understanding that the legal status of the territories referred to in
article VI, namely, Formosa and the Pescadores – whatever their status may be – is not altered in any way by the conclusion of this treaty."
Quemoy and Matsu
It may be well to note the special status of the offshore islands, the Quemoy and Matsu groups, in contrast to that of Formosa and the
Pescadores as described here. The offshore islands have always been considered as part of "China". As Secretary Dulles explained in 1954:
"The legal position is different..., by virtue of the fact that technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been settled.
That is because the Japanese Peace Treaty merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to these islands. But the future title
is not determined by the Japanese Peace Treaty nor is it determined by the Peace Treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and
Japan. Therefore the juridical status of these islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, is different from the juridical status of the offshore
islands which have always been Chinese territory."
Recent Restatement of the United States Position
The position of the United States was set forth by the States Department in connection with the 1970 Hearings before the Subcommittee on
the United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (91st Cong., 2d Sess.):
"Legal Status of Taiwan as Defined in Japanese Peace Treaty and Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty
"Article 2 of the Japanese Peace treaty, signed on September 8, 1951 at San Francisco, provides that 'Japan renounces all right, title and
claim to Formosa and the Pescadores'. The same language was used in Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace between China and Japan signed on April 28,
1952. In neither treaty did Japan cede this area to any particular entity. As Taiwan and the Pescadores are not covered by any existing
international disposition, sovereignty over the area is an unsettled question subject to future international resolution. Both the Republic
of China and the Chinese Communists disagree with this conclusion and consider that Taiwan and the Pescadores are part of the sovereign state
of China. The United States recognized the Government of the Republic of Taiwan as legitimately occupying and exercising jurisdiction over Taiwan
and the Pescadores."
The future relationship of Taiwan to mainland China and the resolution of disputes dividing the governments in Taipei and Peking involve
issues that the United States cannot resolve. We have made clear that our primary concern is that these issues should be resolved by peaceful
means, without resort to the use of force. Until such a resolution is achieved we may continue to deal respectively with the government of the
People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of China on matters affecting mutual interests, accepting the practical situation
as we find it.
2758 (XXVI). Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations
The General Assembly,
Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Considering the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China is essential both
for the protection of the Charter of the United Nations and for the cause that the United Nations must serve under
the Charter,
Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only
lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five
permanent members of the Security Council,
Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives
of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the
representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the
organizations related to it.
According to records provided by the United Nations,
voting summary was as follows: 76 Yes, 35 No, 17 Abstentions, 3 Non-voting. Total voting membership was 131. The following list
shows the voting summary in detail, ROC diplomatic allies at the time being highlighted
with a red asterisk (*).
Yes
No
Abstentions
Non-voting
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Austria
Belgium *
Bhutan
Botswana *
Bulgaria
Burma
Burundi
Byelorussian SSR
Cameroon
Canada
Ceylon
Chile
Congo (Brazzaville)
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Democratic Yemen
Denmark
Ecuador *
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Ghana
Guinea
Guyana
Hungary
Iceland
India
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Kenya
Kuwait
Laos
Libyan Arab Republic *
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mexico *
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Netherlands
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Peru *
Poland
Portugal *
Romania
Rwanda *
Senegal *
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Somalia
Sudan
Sweden
Syrian Arab Republic
Tanzania
Togo *
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
United Kingdom
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Zambia
Australia *
Bolivia *
Brazil *
Central African Republic *
Chad *
Congo (Leopoldville) *
Costa Rica *
Dahomey *
Dominican Republic *
El Salvador *
Gabon *
Gambia *
Guatemala *
Haiti *
Honduras *
Ivory Coast *
Japan *
Khmer Republic
Lesotho *
Liberia *
Madagascar *
Malawi *
Malta *
New Zealand *
Nicaragua *
Niger *
Paraguay *
Philippines *
Saudi Arabia *
South Africa
Swaziland *
United States *
Upper Volta *
Uruguay *
Venezuela *
Argentina *
Bahrain
Barbados *
Colombia *
Cyprus *
Fiji
Greece *
Indonesia
Jamaica *
Jordan *
Lebanon *
Luxembourg *
Mauritius
Panama *
Qatar
Spain *
Thailand *
China
Maldives *
Oman
On the day of the vote the ROC maintained diplomatic relations with 59 states, 56 of them UN members, but only 33 allies
supported keeping the ROC on China's UN seat, 23 allies denying the ROC support in the vote by voting Yes, abstaining or not
participating in the vote.
10 ROC diplomatic allies voted Yes (i. e. in favour of the PRC and against the ROC): Belgium, Botswana, Ecuador, Libya,
Mexico, Peru, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, and Togo. All of them cut official ties with the ROC before the end of September 1978.
12 ROC diplomatic allies abstained: Argentina, Barbados, Colombia, Cyprus, Greece, Jamaica, Jordan, Lebanon, Luxembourg,
Panama, Spain, and Thailand. All of them (except Panama) cut official ties with the ROC
before the end of February 1980; Panama did so on June 13, 2017.
The Maldives were an ROC diplomatic ally (until April 15, 1972) but are listed as non-voting.
Two UN members which did not maintain formal diplomatic relations with the ROC at the time but supported the ROC by voting
No were the Khmer Republic (today's Cambodia) and South Africa.
The voting list did not include three additional ROC diplomatic allies—South Korea became a UN member on Sept. 17,
1991 (cut official ties with the ROC on Aug. 24, 1992); Vietnam joined the UN on Sept. 20, 1977 (South Vietnam cut official ties with
the ROC on April 30, 1975); and the Vatican is not a UN member but an observer since April 6, 1964.
It should be pointed out that the text of the UN Resolution 2758 does not mention Taiwan at all, so it doesn't support Beijing's
claim that Taiwan 'is part of the PRC'.
🔴
"Other texts and documents", UN Resolution 1668: Representation of China in the United Nations (1961)
1. President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier
Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S.
Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.
2. President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tsetung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and
frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.
3. During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the
normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest
to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.
4. President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured
Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.
5. The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after
so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international
situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.
6. The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation
and the people want revolution—this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal: big nations
should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power
politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and
liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according their own wishes and the right to
safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control
and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples
of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the
Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems
in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program
for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the
stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea". It firmly opposes the revival and outward
expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral
Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the Indo-Pakistan question,
immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and
firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu
and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.
7. The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the
basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and
nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom
and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort
to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of
confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing
to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared
to reexamine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine
their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward
by the Republic of Viet Nam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence
of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of
self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea;
the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean
peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close
bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favours the continuation of the
ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the
ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace,
free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.
8. There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two
sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of
other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without
resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to
their mutual relations.
9. With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:
progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.
10. Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude
with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.
11. The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its
position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States;
the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been
returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and
all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim
at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status
of Taiwan remains to be determined".
12. The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but
one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the
withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military
installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between
the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which
people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such
contacts and exchanges.
13. Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based
on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development
of trade between their two countries.
14. The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative
to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to
exchange views on issues of common interest.
15. The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the
two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American
peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.
16. President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by
the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.
A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements,
declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining
to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF
file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010
please click here.
Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier of the State
Council Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from September 25 to September 30, 1972. Accompanying Prime Minister Tanaka
were Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ohira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido and other government officials.
Chairman Mao Tse-tung met Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on September 27. They had an earnest and friendly conversation.
Prime Minister Tanaka and Minister for Foreign Affairs Ohira had an earnest and frank exchange of views with Premier Chou En-lai
and Minister for Foreign Affairs Chi Peng-fei in a friendly atmosphere throughout on the question of the normalization of relations
between Japan and China and other problems between the two countries as well as on other matters of interest to both sides, and agreed
to issue the following Joint Communique of the two Governments:
Japan and China are neighbouring countries, separated only by a strip of water with a long history of traditional friendship. The
peoples of the two countries earnestly desire to put an end to the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two
countries. The realization of the aspiration of the two peoples for the termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations
between Japan and China will add a new page to the annals of relations between the two countries.
The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people
through war, and deeply reproaches itself. Further, the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of
relations between the two countries from the stand of fully understanding "the three principles for the restoration of relations" put forward
by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.
In spite of the differences in their social systems existing between the two countries, the two countries should, and can, establish
relations of peace and friendship. The normalization of relations and development of good-neighbourly and friendly relations between the two
countries are in the interests of the two peoples and will contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and peace in the world.
1. The abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of China is terminated on the date
on which this Joint Communique is issued.
2. The Government of Japan recognizes that Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.
3. The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's
Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China,
and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Postsdam Proclamation.
4. The Government of Japan and the Government of People's Republic of China have decided to establish diplomatic relations as from
September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to take all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of the functions
of each other's embassy in their respective capitals in accordance with international law and practice, and to exchange ambassadors as speedily
as possible.
5. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese
peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.
6. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to establish relations of perpetual peace and
friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual
non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.
The two Governments confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Japan and China shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.
7. The normalization of relations between Japan and China is not directed against any third country. Neither of the two countries should
seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
8. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to solidifying and developing
the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, the two Governments will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding
a treaty of peace and friendship.
9. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to further promoting relations
between the two countries and to expanding interchanges of people, the two Governments will, as necessary and taking account of the existing
non-governmental arrangements, enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding agreements concerning such matters as trade, shipping,
aviation, and fisheries.
Done at Peking, September 29, 1972
Prime Minister of Japan, Tanaka Kakuei
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Ohira Masayoshi
Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Zhou Enlai
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Ji Pengfei
In Japanese, the "Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the PRC" is called as
follows: Nippon koku seifuto Chūgoku jimmin kyōwakoku seifuno kyōdō seimei
日本国政府と中華人民共和国政府の共同声明.
A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements,
declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining
to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF
file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010
please click here.
Recalling with satisfaction that since the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China
issued a Joint Communique in Peking on September 29, 1972, the friendly relations between the two Governments and the
peoples of the two countries have developed greatly on a new basis.
Confirming that the above-mentioned Joint Communique constitutes the basis of the relations of peace and friendship
between the two countries and that the principles enunciated in the Joint Communique should be strictly observed.
Confirming that the principles of the Charter of the United Nations should be fully respected.
Hoping to contribute to peace and stability in Asia and in the world.
For the purpose of solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries.
Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace and Friendship and for that purpose have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:
● Japan: Minister for Foreign Affairs Sunao Sonoda
● People's Republic of China: Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua
Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:
Article 1
1. The Contracting Parties shall develop relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries
on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression,
non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.
2. The Contracting Parties confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of
the Charter of the United Nations, they shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and
shall refrain from the use or threat of force.
Article 2
The Contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any
other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
Article 3
The Contracting parties shall, in the good-neighbourly and friendly spirit and in conformity with the principles of
equality and mutual benefit and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, endeavor to further develop economic
and cultural relations between the two countries and to promote exchanges between the peoples of the two countries.
Article 4
The present Treaty shall not affect the position of either Contracting Party regarding its relations with third countries.
Article 5
1. The present Treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of
ratification which shall take place at Tokyo. The present Treaty shall remain in force for ten years and thereafter shall
continue to be in force until terminated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2.
2. Either Contracting Party may, by giving one year's written notice to the other Contracting Party, terminate
the present Treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.
DONE in duplicate, in the Japanese and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic, at Peking, this twelfth day of August, 1978.
For the People's Republic of China: Huang Hua (signature)
In Japanese, the "Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the PRC" is called as follows:
Nippon kokuto Chūgoku jimmin kyōwakoku tono aidano heiwa yūkō jōyaku
日本国と中華人民共和国との間の平和友好条約.
A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements,
declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining
to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF
file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010
please click here.
(The communiqué was released on December 15, 1978, in Washington and Beijing.)
1. The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish
diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.
2. The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government
of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations
with the people of Taiwan.
3. The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in
the Shanghai Communiqué and emphasize once again that:
4. Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.
5. Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts
by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
6. Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other
directed at other states.
7. The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is
part of China.
8. Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples
but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.
The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange Ambassadors and establish Embassies on March 1, 1979.
A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements,
declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining
to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF
file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010
please click here.
(The Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress at its Fifth Plenary Session on December 26, 1978
adopted after discussion a message to compatriots in Taiwan.)
Dear Compatriots in Taiwan:
Today is New Year's Day 1979. We hereby extend our cordial and sincere greetings to you on behalf of the people of
all nationalities on the mainland of our motherland.
As an old saying goes, "When festival times come round people think all the more of their loved ones." On this happy
occasion as we celebrate New Year's Day, our thoughts turn all the more to our kith and kin, our old folks, our brothers and
sisters, in Taiwan. We know you have the motherland and your kinsfolk on the mainland in mind too. This mutual feeling of
many years standing grows with each passing day. From the day when Taiwan was unfortunately separated from the motherland
in 1949, we have not been able to communicate with or visit each other, our motherland has not been able to achieve reunification,
relatives have been unable to get together, and our nation, country and people have suffered greatly as a result. All Chinese
compatriots and people of Chinese descent throughout the world look forward to an early end to this regrettable state of
affairs.
The Chinese nation is a great nation. It accounts for almost a quarter of the world's population and has a long history
and brilliant culture, and its outstanding contributions to world civilization and human progress are universally recognized.
Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times. The Chinese nation has great vitality and cohesion. Throughout
its history, foreign invasions and internal strife have failed to split our nation permanently. Taiwan's separation from the
motherland for nearly 30 years has been artificial and against our national interests and aspirations, and this state of affairs
must not be allowed to continue. Every Chinese, in Taiwan or on the mainland, has a compelling responsibility for the survival,
growth and prosperity of the Chinese nation. The important task of reunifying our motherland, on which hinges the future of the
whole nation, now lies before us all; it is an issue no one can evade or should try to. If we do not quickly set about ending
this disunity so that our motherland is reunified at an early date, how can we answer our ancestors and explain to our descendants?
This sentiment is shared by all. Who among the descendants of the Yellow Emperor wishes to go down in history as a traitor?
Radical changes have taken place in China's status in the world over the past 30 years. Our country's international prestige
is rising constantly and its international role becomes ever more important. The people and governments of almost all countries
place tremendous hopes on us in the struggle against hegemonism and in safeguarding peace and stability in Asia and the world as
a whole. Every Chinese is proud to see the growing strength and prosperity of our motherland. If we can end the present disunity
and join forces soon, there will be no end to our contributions to the future of mankind. Early reunification of our motherland
is not only the common desire of all the people of China, including our compatriots in Taiwan, but the common wish of all
peace-loving peoples and countries the world over.
Reunification of China today is consonant with popular sentiment and the general trend of development. The world in general
recognizes only one China, with the government of the People's Republic of China as its sole legal government. The recent conclusion
of the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the normalization of relations between China and the United States show still
more clearly that no one can stop this trend. The present situation in the motherland, one of stability and unity, is better than
ever. The people of all nationalities on the mainland are working hard with one will for the great goal of the four modernizations.
It is our fervent hope that Taiwan returns to the embrace of the motherland at an early date so that we can work together for the
great cause of national development. Our state leaders have firmly declared that they will take present realities into account in
accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the motherland and respect the status quo on Taiwan and the opinions of people in all
walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures in settling the question of reunification so as not to cause the
people of Taiwan any losses. On the other hand, people in all walks of life in Taiwan have expressed their yearning for their
homeland and old friends, stated their desire "to identify themselves with and rejoin their kinsmen," and raised diverse proposals
which are expressions of their earnest hope for an early return to the embrace of the motherland. As all conditions now are favourable
for reunification and everything is set, no one should go against the will of the nation and against the trend of history.
We place hopes on the 17 million people on Taiwan and also the Taiwan authorities. The Taiwan authorities have always taken a
firm stand of one China and have been opposed to an independent Taiwan. We have this stand in common and it is the basis for our
co-operation. Our position has always been that all patriots belong to one family. The responsibility for reunifying the motherland
rests with each of us. We hope the Taiwan authorities will treasure national interests and make valuable contributions to the
reunification of the motherland.
The Chinese government has ordered the People's Liberation Army to stop the bombardment of Jinmen (Quemoy) and other islands as
from today. A state of military confrontation between the two sides still exists along the Taiwan Straits. This can only breed man-made
tension. We hold that first of all this military confrontation should be ended through discussion between the government of the People's
Republic of China and the Taiwan authorities so as to create the necessary prerequisites and a secure environment for the two sides to
make contacts and exchanges in whatever area.
The prolonged separation has led to inadequate mutual understanding between the compatriots on the mainland and on Taiwan and
various inconveniences for both sides. Since overseas Chinese residing in faraway foreign lands can return for visits and tours and
hold reunions with their families, why can't compatriots living so near, on the mainland and on Taiwan, visit each other freely? We
hold that there is no reason for such barriers to remain. We hope that at an early date transportation and postal services between
both sides will be established to make it easier for compatriots of both sides to have direct contact, write to each other, visit
relatives and friends, exchange tours and visits and carry out academic, cultural, sports and technological interchanges.
Economically speaking, Taiwan and the mainland of the motherland were originally one entity. Unfortunately, economic ties have
been suspended for many years. Construction is going ahead vigorously on the motherland and it is our wish that Taiwan also grows
economically more prosperous. There is every reason for us to develop trade between us, each making up what the other lacks, and
carry out economic exchanges. This is mutually required and will benefit both parties without doing any harm to either.
Dear compatriots in Taiwan,
The bright future of our great motherland belongs to us and to you. The reunification of the motherland is the sacred mission
history has handed to our generation. Times are moving ahead and the situation is developing. The earlier we fulfil this mission, the
sooner we can jointly write an unprecedented, brilliant page in the history for our country, catch up with advanced powers and work
together with them for world peace, prosperity and progress. Let us join hands and work together for this glorious goal!
A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements,
declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining
to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF
file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010
please click here.
To help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western
Pacific and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing
the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the
people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
(a) The President—having terminated governmental
relations between the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, the Congress finds that the enactment of this Act is necessary—
(1) to help maintain peace, security, and stability
in the Western Pacific; and
(2) to promote the foreign policy of the United
States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other
relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan.
(b) It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and
friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the
United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China
mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area;
(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are
in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;
(3) to make clear that the United States decision to
establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful
means;
(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the
peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;
(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;
and
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to
resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.
(c) Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene
the interest of the United States in human rights, especially with respect to
the human rights of all the approximately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.
(a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in
section 2 of this Act, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to
enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
(b) The President and the Congress shall determine the
nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon
their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures
established by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include
review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations
to the President and the Congress.
(c) The President is directed to inform the
Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic
system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in
accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.
(a) The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition
shall not affect the application of the laws of the United States with respect
to Taiwan, and the laws of the United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979.
(b) The application of subsection (a) of this section
shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following:
(1) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or
similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with such
respect to Taiwan.
(2) Whenever authorized by or pursuant to the laws
of the United States to conduct or carry out programs, transactions, or other
relations with respect to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or
similar entities, the President or any agency of the United States Government
is authorized to conduct and carry out, in accordance with section 6 of this
Act, such programs, transactions, and other relations with respect to Taiwan
(including, but not limited to, the performance of services for the United
States through contracts with commercial entities on Taiwan), in accordance
with the applicable laws of the United States.
(3) (A) The absence of diplomatic relations and
recognition with respect to Taiwan shall not abrogate, infringe, modify, deny,
or otherwise affect in any way any rights or obligations (including but not
limited to those involving contracts, debts, or property interests of any kind)
under the laws of the United States heretofore or hereafter acquired by or with
respect to Taiwan.
(B) For all purposes under
the laws of the United States, including actions in any court in the United
States, recognition of the People's Republic of China shall not affect in any
way the ownership of or other rights or interests in properties, tangible and
intangible, and other things of value, owned or held on or prior to December
31, 1978, or thereafter acquired or earned by the governing authorities on
Taiwan.
(4) Whenever the application of the laws of the United States depends upon the law that is or was applicable on Taiwan or compliance
therewith, the law applied by the people on Taiwan shall be considered the applicable
law for that purpose.
(5) Nothing in this Act, nor the facts of the
President's action in extending diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic
of China, the absence of diplomatic relations between the people on Taiwan and
the United States, or the lack of recognition by the United States, and
attendant circumstances thereto, shall be construed in any administrative or
judicial proceeding as a basis for any United States Government agency,
commission, or department to make a finding of fact or determination of law,
under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978, to deny an export license application or to revoke an existing export
license for nuclear exports to Taiwan.
(6) For purposes of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, Taiwan may be treated in the manner specified in the first sentence of
section 202(b) of that Act.
(7) The capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued in
courts in the United States, in accordance with the laws of the United States,
shall not be abrogated, infringed, modified, denied, or otherwise affected in
any way by the absence of diplomatic relations or recognition.
(8) No requirement, whether expressed or implied,
under the laws of the United States with respect to maintenance of diplomatic
relations or recognition shall be applicable with respect to Taiwan.
(c) For all purposes, including actions in any
court in the United States, the Congress approves the continuation in force of
all treaties and other international agreements, including multilateral
conventions, entered into by the United States and the governing authorities on
Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to
January 1, 1979, and in force between them on December 31, 1978, unless and
until terminated in accordance with law.
(d) Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for
supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in
any international financial institution or any other international
organization.
(a) During the three-year period beginning on the
date of enactment of this Act, the $1,000 per capita income restriction in
insurance, clause (2) of the second undesignated paragraph of section 231 of
the reinsurance, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall not restrict the
activities of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in determining
whether to provide any insurance, reinsurance, loans, or guaranties with
respect to investment projects on Taiwan.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section,
in issuing insurance, reinsurance, loans, or guaranties with respect to
investment projects on Taiwan, the Overseas Private Insurance Corporation shall
apply the same criteria as those applicable in other parts of the world.
(a) Programs, transactions, and other relations
conducted or carried out by the President or any agency of the United States
Government with respect to Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed
by the President, be conducted and carried out by or through—
(1) The American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia, or
(2) such comparable successor nongovernmental
entity as the President may designate, (hereafter in this Act referred to as
the "Institute").
(b) Whenever the President or any agency of the United
States Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the
United States to enter into, perform, enforce, or have in force an agreement or
transaction relative to Taiwan, such agreement or transaction shall be entered
into, performed, and enforced, in the manner and to the extent directed by the
President, by or through the Institute.
(c) To the extent that any law, rule, regulation,
or ordinance of the District of Columbia, or of any State or political
subdivision thereof in which the Institute is incorporated or doing business,
impedes or otherwise interferes with the performance of the functions of the
Institute pursuant to this Act; such law, rule, regulation, or ordinance shall
be deemed to be preempted by this Act.
(a) The Institute may authorize any of its
employees on Taiwan—
(1) to administer to or take from any person
an oath, affirmation, affidavit, or deposition, and to perform any notarial act
which any notary public is required or authorized by law to perform within the
United States;
(2) To act as provisional conservator of the
personal estates of deceased United States citizens; and
(3) to assist and protect the interests of United States persons by performing other acts such as are authorized to be performed
outside the United States for consular purposes by such laws of the United States as the President may specify.
(b) Acts performed by authorized employees of the
Institute under this section shall be valid, and of like force and effect
within the United States, as if performed by any other person authorized under
the laws of the United States to perform such acts.
(a) The Institute, its property, and its
income are exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United
States (except to the extent that section 11(a)(3) of this Act requires the
imposition of taxes imposed under chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, relating to the Federal Insurance Contributions Act) or by State or local
taxing authority of the United States.
(1) For purposes of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, the Institute shall be treated as an organization described in
sections 170(b)(1)(A), 170(c), 2055(a), 2106(a)(2)(A), 2522(a), and 2522(b).
(a) Any agency of the United States
Government is authorized to sell, loan, or lease property (including interests
therein) to, and to perform administrative and technical support functions and
services for the operations of, the Institute upon such terms and conditions as
the President may direct. Reimbursements to agencies under this subsection
shall be credited to the current applicable appropriation of the agency
concerned.
(b) Any agency of the United States Government is
authorized to acquire and accept services from the Institute upon such terms
and conditions as the President may direct. Whenever the President determines
it to be in furtherance of the purposes of this Act, the procurement of
services by such agencies from the Institute may be effected without regard to
such laws of the United States normally applicable to the acquisition of
services by such agencies as the President may specify by Executive order.
(c) Any agency of the United States
Government making funds available to the Institute in accordance with this Act
shall make arrangements with the Institute for the Comptroller General of the
United States to have access to the; books and records of the Institute and the
opportunity to audit the operations of the Institute.
(a) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States
Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United
States to render or provide to or to receive or accept from Taiwan, any
performance, communication, assurance, undertaking, or other action, such
action shall, in the manner and to the. extent directed by the President, be
rendered or Provided to, or received or accepted from, an instrumentality
established by Taiwan which the President determines has the necessary
authority under the laws applied by the people on Taiwan to provide assurances
and take other actions on behalf of Taiwan in accordance with this Act.
(b) The President is requested to extend to the
instrumentality established by Taiwan the same number of offices and complement
of personnel as were previously operated in the United States by the governing
authorities on Taiwan recognized as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979.
(c) Upon the granting by Taiwan of comparable
privileges and immunities with respect to the Institute and its appropriate
personnel, the President is authorized to extend with respect to the Taiwan instrumentality and its appropriate; personnel, such privileges and immunities
(subject to appropriate conditions and obligations) as may be necessary for the
effective performance of their functions.
(a) (1) Under such terms and conditions as
the President may direct, any agency of the United States Government may
separate from Government service for a specified period any officer or employee
of that agency who accepts employment with the Institute.
(2) An
officer or employee separated by an agency under paragraph (1) of this
subsection for employment with the Institute shall be entitled upon termination
of such employment to reemployment or reinstatement with such agency (or a
successor agency) in an appropriate position with the attendant rights,
privileges, and benefits with the officer or employee would have had or
acquired had he or she not been so separated, subject to such time period and
other conditions as the President may prescribe.
(3) An
officer or employee entitled to reemployment or reinstatement rights under
paragraph (2) of this subsection shall, while continuously employed by the
Institute with no break in continuity of service, continue to participate in
any benefit program in which such officer or employee was participating prior
to employment by the Institute, including programs for compensation for
job-related death, injury, or illness; programs for health and life insurance;
programs for annual, sick, and other statutory leave; and programs for
retirement under any system established by the laws of the United States; except
that employment with the Institute shall be the basis for participation in such
programs only to the extent that employee deductions and employer
contributions, as required, in payment for such participation for the period of
employment with the Institute, are currently deposited in the program's or
system's fund or depository. Death or retirement of any such officer or
employee during approved service with the Institute and prior to reemployment
or reinstatement shall be considered a death in or retirement from Government
service for purposes of any employee or survivor benefits acquired by reason of
service with an agency of the United States Government.
(4) Any officer or
employee of an agency of the United States Government who entered into service
with the Institute on approved leave of absence without pay prior to the
enactment of this Act shall receive the benefits of this section for the period
of such service.
(b) Any agency of the United States Government employing
alien personnel on Taiwan may transfer such personnel, with accrued allowances,
benefits, and rights, to the Institute without a break in service for purposes
of retirement and other benefits, including continued participation in any
system established by the laws of the United States for the retirement of
employees in which the alien was participating prior to the transfer to the
Institute, except that employment with the Institute shall be creditable for
retirement purposes only to the extent that employee deductions and employer contributions,
as required, in payment for such participation for the period of employment
with the Institute, are currently deposited in the system' s fund or
depository.
(c) Employees of the Institute shall not be
employees of the United States and, in representing the Institute, shall be
exempt from section 207 of title 18, United States Code.
(1) For
purposes of sections 911 and 913 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, amounts
paid by the Institute to its employees shall not be treated as earned income. Amounts
received by employees of the Institute shall not be included in gross income,
and shall be exempt from taxation, to the extent that they are equivalent to
amounts received by civilian officers and employees of the Government of the United States as allowances and benefits which are exempt from taxation under section 912
of such Code.
(2) Except to
the extent required by subsection (a)(3) of this section, service performed in
the employ of the Institute shall not constitute employment for purposes of
chapter 21 of such Code and title II of the Social Security Act.
(a) The Secretary of State shall transmit to the
Congress the text of any agreement to which the Institute is a party. However,
any such agreement the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the
opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United
States shall not be so transmitted to the Congress but shall be transmitted to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives under an appropriate injunction of
secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President.
(b) For purposes of subsection (a), the term "agreement"
includes—
(1) any agreement entered into between the
Institute and the governing authorities on Taiwan or the instrumentality
established by Taiwan; and
(2) any agreement entered into between the
Institute and an agency of the United States Government.
(c) Agreements and transactions made or to be made
by or through the Institute shall be subject to the same congressional
notification, review, and approval requirements and procedures as if such
agreements and transactions were made by or through the agency of the United
States Government on behalf of which the Institute is acting.
(d) During the two-year period beginning on the effective
date of this Act, the Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the
House and Senate House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations
of Foreign Relations the Senate, every six months, a report describing and
reviewing economic relations between the United States and Taiwan, noting any
interference with normal commercial relations.
The President is authorized to
prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem appropriate to carry out
the purposes of this Act. During the three-year period beginning on the
effective date speaker of this Act, such rules and regulations shall be
transmitted promptly to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Such action shall.not, however,
relieve the Institute of the responsibilities placed upon it by this Act.'
(a) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and other
appropriate committees of the Congress shall monitor—
(1) the implementation of the provisions of this
Act;
(2) the operation and procedures of the Institute;
(3) the legal and technical aspects of the
continuing relationship between the United States and Taiwan; and
(4) the implementation of the policies of the United States concerning security and cooperation in East Asia.
(b) Such committees shall report, as appropriate, to
their respective Houses on the results of their monitoring.
(1) the term "laws of the United States" includes
any statute, rule, regulation, ordinance, order, or judicial rule of decision
of the United States or any political subdivision thereof; and
(2) the term "Taiwan" includes, as the context may
require, the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores, the people on those islands,
corporations and other entities and associations created or organized under the
laws applied on those islands, and the governing authorities on Taiwan
recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1,
1979, and any successor governing authorities (including political
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities thereof).
In
addition to funds otherwise available to carry out the provisions of this Act,
there are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State for the fiscal
year 1980 such funds as may be necessary to carry out such provisions. Such
funds are authorized to remain available until expended.
If any
provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision
to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.
The Nagoya Resolution represents a decision by the IOC Executive Board allowing teams both from Taiwan/the ROC
and China/the PRC to participate in future Olympic Games, with precise specifications
for admissible flag, emblem, and team name. The resolution was published in English and French, but no officially
authorized Chinese version was released. More information concerning the name issue can be found here.
AGREEMENT between the INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, Lausanne
and the CHINESE TAIPEI OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, Taipei
Agreement has been reached on this twenty-third day of March Nineteen Hundred and Eighty One (1981) between
the International Olympic Committee (hereinafter called the IOC) and the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (hereinafter
called the CTOC or the NOC as the case may be) that both parties (hereinafter collectively called “the parties”) agree to settle
their differences on the following understandings terms and conditions:
WHEREAS Understandings by the parties
a) All rules, by-laws, instructions and other regulations governing the Olympic Movement are contained in the Olympic Charter with
the amendments approved by the 82nd IOC Session, as attached to this Agreement (exhibit 1).
b) Rule 24 F. of the Olympic Charter reads as follows: “The flag and the emblem used by an NOC at the Olympic Games shall be submitted to and approved by the IOC Executive Boards.”
c) Rule 30, 1st paragraph of the Olympic Charter reads as follows: “Since only NOCs recognised by the IOC may enter competitors in the Olympic Games, a country without an NOC must form such
a Committee and have it recognised by the IOC before it is permitted to take part in the Olympic Games.”
d) Rule 3 of the Olympic Charter reads as follows: “The Olympic Games take place every four years. They unite Olympic competitors of all countries in fair and equal competition.
“The International Olympic Committee (IOC) shall secure the widest possible audience for the Olympic Games.
“No discrimination in them is allowed against any country or person on grounds of race, religion or politics.”
NOW BOTH PARTIES HEREBY AGREE as follows:
-1-
The name of the NOC shall be CHINESE TAIPEI OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, and is as such hereby approved by the IOC.
-2-
The CTOC hereby submits its flag and emblem as per attached specimens (exhibits 2 and 3) which are hereby approved by the IOC.
-3-
The IOC hereby confirms to the CTOC that the latter is entitled to participate in the future Olympic Games as well as other activities sponsored
by the IOC like every recognised National Olympic Committee, with the same status and the same full rights, in compliance with the Olympic Charter.
-4-
The IOC will assist the CTOC in its application for and/or reinstatement of membership in the various international federations affiliated to the IOC.
The Lausanne Agreement was signed by IOC chairman Juan Antonio Samaranch and CTOT
president Shen Chia-ming 沈家銘 in English. No official Chinese-language version was published.
Chairman Ye Jianying’s Elaborations on Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan To Motherland and Peaceful Unification
Ye Jianying, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, in an interview with a Xinhua correspondent on September 30, 1981, elaborated on the policy concerning the return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of China’s peaceful reunification.
The full text of his statement follows:
Today, on the eve of the 32nd anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China and at the approach of the 70th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, I wish, first of all, to extend my festive greetings and cordial regards to the people of all, to extend my festive greetings and cordial regards to the people of all nationalities throughout the country, including the compatriots in Taiwan, Xianggang (Hong Kong) and Aomen (Macao), and Chinese nationals residing in foreign countries.
On New Year’s Day 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress issued a message to the compatriots in Taiwan, in which it proclaimed the policy of striving to reunify the motherland peacefully. The message received warm support and active response from the people of all nationalities throughout China, including the compatriots in Taiwan, Xianggang and Aomen, and those residing abroad. A relaxed atmosphere has set in across the Taiwan Straits. Now, I would taken this opportunity to elaborate on the policy concerning the return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of peaceful reunification:
In order to bring an end to the unfortunate separation of the Chinese nation as early as possible, we propose that talks be held between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang of China on a reciprocal basis so that the two parties will co-operate for the third time to accomplish the great cause of national reunification. The two sides may first send people to meet for an exhaustive exchange of views.
It is the urgent desire of the people of all nationalities on both sides of the straits to communicate with each other, reunite with their families and relatives, develop trade and increase mutual understanding. We propose that the two sides make arrangements to facilitate the exchange of mails, trade, air and shipping services, family reunions and visits by relatives and tourists as well as academic, cultural and sports exchanges, and reach an agreement there upon.
After the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and it can retain its armed forces. The Central Government will not interfere with local affairs on Taiwan.
Taiwan’s current socio-economic system will remain unchanged, so will its way of life and its economic and cultural relations with foreign countries. There will be no encroachment on the proprietary rights and lawful right of inheritance over private property, houses, land and enterprises, or on foreign investments.
People in authority and representative personages of various circles in Taiwan may take up posts of leadership in national political bodies and participate in running the state.
When Taiwan’s local finance is in difficulty, the Central Government may subsidize it as is fit for the circumstances.
For people of all nationalities and public figures of various circles in Taiwan who wish to come and settle on the mainland, it is guaranteed that proper arrangements will be made for them, that there will be no discrimination against them, and that they will have the freedom of entry and exit.
Industrialists and businessmen in Taiwan are welcome to invest and engage in various economic undertakings on the mainland, and their legal rights, interests and profits are guaranteed.
The reunification of the motherland is the responsibility of all Chinese. We sincerely welcome people of all nationalities, public figures of all circles and all mass organizations in Taiwan to make proposals and suggestions regarding affairs of state through various channels and in various ways.
Taiwan’s return to the embrace of the motherland and the accomplishment of the great cause of national reunification is a great and glorious mission history has bequeathed on our generation. China’s reunification and prosperity is in the vital interest of the Chinese people of all nationalities-not only those on the mainland, but those in Taiwan as well. It is also in the interest of peace in the Far East and the world.
We hope that our compatriots in Taiwan will give full play to their patriotism and work energetically for the early realization of the great unity of our nation and share the honor of it. We hope that our compatriots in Xianggang and Aomen and Chinese nationals residing abroad will continue to act in the role of a bridge and contribute their share to the reunification of the motherland.
We hope that the Kuomintang authorities will stick to their one-China position and their opposition to “two Chinas” and that they will put national interests above everything else, forget previous will and join hands with us in accomplishing the great cause of national reunification and the great goal of making China prosperous and strong, so as to win glory for our ancestors, being benefit to our posterity and write a new and glorious page in the history of the Chinese nation!
(Xinhua News Agency, September 30, 1981, Beijing)
Source: Beijing Review 1981, No. 40
(October 5 edition), p. 10-11; retrieved from Taiwan Info
Ye Jianying 葉劍英 (1897-1986) was a Communist military leader and between March 1978 and June 1983 chairman
of the standing committee of the National People's Congress (quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui weiyuanzhang
全國人民代表大會常務委員會委員長), i. e. at the time the PRC's head of state—a ceremonial position but less powerful than the post
of chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission (zhonggong zhongyang junshi weiyuanhui
中共中央軍事委員會, abbrev. CCP CMC).
The formal term of Ye Jianying’s “Nine-Point Policy” is “Nine Principles for the Peaceful Reunification with Taiwan”
(youguan heping tongyi Taiwan de jiutiao fangzhen zhengce 有關和平統一台灣的九條方針政策, abbrev. Ye jiutiao
葉九條), in English it is also often referred to as “Ye’s Nine Principles” or “Nine-Article Statement”. On Jan. 11, 1982
Deng Xiaoping revealed to foreign guests that Ye’s Nine-Point Policy actually means “One
Country, Two Systems” (yiguo liangzhi 一國兩制, abbrev. 1C2S) and would also apply to the issue of Hong Kong. In this context Deng on June 26, 1983 explained his “Six Conceptions
for the Peaceful Reunification” (guanyu shixian Taiwan han zuguo dalu heping tongyide liutiao gouxiang
關於實現台灣和祖國大陸和平統一的六條構想, abbrev. Deng liutiao 鄧六條) which are shown further below.
A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements,
declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining
to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF
file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010
please click here.
On July 14,
1982, James Lilley, at the time director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the US's nominally
unofficial representative body in Taiwan, called on ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國. In US President Ronald Reagan's name, Lilley
delivered orally—not in writing—six assurances regarding US policy toward Taiwan. Lilley explained:
The United States...
had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to the Republic of China;
had not agreed to hold prior consultations with the PRC regarding arms sales to the Republic of China;
would not play a mediation role between the PRC and the Republic of China;
In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on January 1, 1979, issued by
the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America, the United States
of America recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China, and it
acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. Within that context, the two
sides agreed that the people of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial
relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between China and the United States were normalized.
The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two
countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side stated that it
would raise the issue again following normalization. Recognizing that this issue would seriously hamper the development of
China-United States relations, they have held further discussions on it, during and since the meetings between Premier
Zhao Ziyang and President Ronald Reagan and between Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua and Secretary of State
Alexander M. Haig, Jr. in October 1981.
Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal
affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding China-United States relations. These principles were confirmed in
the Shanghai Communiqué of February 28, 1972 and reaffirmed in the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of
Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on January 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically state that these principles continue
to govern all aspects of their relations.
The Chinese Government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair. The Message to Compatriots
in Taiwan issued By China on January 1, 1979 promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification of the
motherland. The Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981 represented a further major effort under this
fundamental policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.
The United States Government attaches great importance to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no
intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing
a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." The United States Government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy
of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question as indicated in China's Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued on
January 1, 1979 and the Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981. The new situation which has emerged with
regard to the Taiwan question also provides favourable conditions for the settlement of China-United States differences over
United States arms sales to Taiwan.
Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out
a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative
terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States,
and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution. In so stating,
the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue.
In order to bring about, over a period of time, a final settlement of the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan, which
is an issue rooted in history, the two Governments will make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to the through
settlement of this issue.
The development of United States–China relations is not only in the interests of the two peoples but also conducive to peace
and stability in the world. The two sides are determined, on the principle of equality and mutual benefit, to strengthen their ties in
the economic, cultural, educational, scientific, technological and other fields and make strong, joint efforts for the continued
development of relations between the Governments and peoples of the United States and China.
In order to bring about the healthy development of United States–China relations, maintain world peace and oppose aggression
and expansion, the two Governments reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique and the Joint Communique
on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. The two sides will maintain contact and hold appropriate consultations on bilateral and
international issues of common interest.
A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements,
declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining
to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF
file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010
please click here.
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental
shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no EEZ or continental shelf.
Meeting with Professor Yang Liyu
from Seton Hall University of the US on June 26, 1983, Deng Xiaoping elaborated the concept of “One Country, Two Systems”.
The core of the Taiwan question is the Taiwan question is the reunification has become the common aspiration of both the Communist Party and the Kuomintang and thus has constituted the ground for the third cooperation between the two parties.
While maintaining the one-China policy, the two sides can adopt different systems, but the People’s Republic of China should be the sole representative of China in the international community.
Taiwan’s “absolute autonomy” is not allowed. The “absolute autonomy” actually means two Chinas. There should be some restrictions on autonomy, and the bottom line is that the interest of a unified state must not be harmed.
After reunification, as a special administrative region, Taiwan can adopts systems different from those on the mainland and enjoys privileges, which other provinces and autonomous regions may not share. The region can have the powers of a legislature, judiciary and final adjudication. The region can also have its own army as long as it poses no threat to the mainland. The central government will not send officials. Affairs pertaining to Taiwan’s political parties, government and army shall be managed by Taiwan itself, while the central government will reserve some positions for Taiwan.
Peaceful reunification does not mean the mainland will swallow Taiwan, or vice versa. To reunify China with the “Three People’s Principles” is not practical.
The proper way for peaceful reunification is to hold negotiations between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang on an equal footing. After the two sides reach an agreement, an official announcement can be made. Foreign powers cannot be allowed to interfere with this affair, because it would otherwise mean China has not achieved independence and would only give use to endless future troubles.
Most Chinese sources have omitted the precise numbering which in this version was derived from the
website of the PRC embassy in Japan
but does not exactly correspond with the numbering shown in the
official English version.
A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements,
declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining
to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF
file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010
please click here.
Adopted by the Legislative Yuan on June 23, 1987, promulgated by the President on July 1, 1987, effective as of July 15, 1987.
(Note: This is a translation from the Chinese text of the law. In case of any discrepancy between the Chinese and English texts, the Chinese text shall govern.)
Article 1
The present law is hereby enacted to safeguard national security and maintain social stability during the period of national mobilization for suppression of the Communist rebellion.
Matters for which the present law does not provide shall be governed by other relevant laws.
Article 2
No person may violate the Constitution or advocate Communism or the division of national territory in the exercise of the people’s freedom of assembly and association.
The assembly and association stated in the preceding paragraph shall be governed by laws to be enacted separately.
Article 3
For entry into and exit from the Taiwan Region1, all persons shall apply for permission from the Entry and Exit Service Bureau of the National Police Administration, Ministry of the Interior. A person without permission may not enter into or depart from the Taiwan Region.
Applications for entry or exit permission may be denied if the applicants:
(1) have been sentenced under a final criminal judgment to punishments of imprisonment or greater but have not served or completed the term of sentence, or have been wanted by the judicial authorities, or have been otherwise denied exit permission by the civilian or military judicial authorities; or
(2) have been strongly suspected, on the bases of sufficient factual evidence, to be grave security risks to national security or social stability; or
(3) have been denied entry or exit permission pursuant to other laws.
Applicants denied such permission shall be notified in writing with reasons for denial and with directions appended regarding remedial procedures.
The Ministry of the Interior shall organize a review committee compsed of, inter alia, generally recognized impartial personages to review cases of denial decided pursuant to subparagraph (2), paragraph 2 of the present Article.
Article 4
The police authorities may, when necessary, conduct searches and inspection on the following persons, goods, and transports:
(1) entry and exit passengers and their belongings;
(2) entry and exit vessels, aircraft and other transports;
(3) inland vessels, rafts, aircraft and the passengers and cargo aboard;
(4) sailors, flight crews, fishermen, and other working members of the transports stated in the preceding two subparagraphs, and their belongings.
Article 5
To safeguard coastal defenses, military installations and mountain areas, the Ministry of National Defense may, in consultation with the Ministry of the Interior, designate and declare certain sea coasts, mountain areas or important military facilities as restricted zones.
All persons desiring entry into and exit from the restricted zones stated in the preceding paragraph shall apply for permission from the authorities in charge.
Within these restriced zones stated in paragraph 1, construction may be restricted or prohibited as required by military considerations; the scope of which shall be determined jointly Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, and other related agencies.
Taxes and other levies on the land on which construction is restricted or prohibited shall be reduced or exempted.
Article 6
A person who violated paragraph 1 of Article 3 by entering into or departing from the Taiwan Region without permission shall be punished with imprisonment of not more than three years, detention, and/or a fine of not more than 30,000 yuan.
A person who without justifiable reason refuses or evades searches or inspections conducted pursuant to Article 4 shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than six months, detention, and/or a fine of not more than 5,000 yuan.
Article 7
A person who without reason violates paragraph 2 of Article 5 by entering into or departing from the restricted zones without applying for permission and refuses to leave after having been notified to do so shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than six months, detention, and/or a fine of not more than 5,000 yuan.
A person who without reason violates paragraph 3 of Article 5 concerning prohibited or restricted construction and refuses to comply with instructions to cease construction shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than six months, detention, and/or a fine of not more than 5,000 yuan.
Article 8
Except for military personnel in active military service, no civilian shall be subjected to military trial.
All military personnel in active military service who have committed a criminal offense shall be prosecuted and tried by military judicial authorities unless the criminal offense committed is not provided for under the Criminal Code of the Armed Forces or other special enactments thereof but is provided for under Article 61 of the Criminal Code.
Article 9
Criminal cases regarding civilians who, having been tried or being tried by military courts in areas in which the Chieh-yen2 (Emergency) Decree had been in effect, shall be dealt with according to the following provisions after the termination of the Chieh-yen (Emergency) Decree:
(1) Where military trial proceedings have not been completed, cases undergoing investigation shall be transferred to competent (civilian) public prosecutor for investigation; cases pending trial shall be transferred to a competent (civilian) court for trial.
(2) Where criminal judgments have become final, appeal or interlocutory appeal to a competent (civilian) court shall not be allowed; however, where grounds for retrial or extraordinary appeal exist, applications for retrial or extraordinary appeal may be made pursuant to the law.
(3) Where final criminal judgments have not yet been executed, or are being executed, they shall be transferred to a competent (civilian) public prosecutor for execution under his direction.
Article 10
The enforcement regulations of the present law and the date of its coming into force shall be made and determined respectively by the Executive Yuan.
Translator’s notes:
1. The term “Taiwan Region” refers to Taiwan, the Pescadores, Kinmen (Quemoy), Matsu and other territories currently under the effective control of the Republic of China government.
2. The term “Chieh-yen” is generally but inadequately translated as “martial law”. Under the Republic of China’s legal system, which is continental-European in origin, the Chieh-yen Law and the Chieh-yen Decree are two different matters. The former does not apply unless and until activated by the president’s issuance of the latter. When the Chieh-yen Decree is lifted, the Chieh-yen Law remains on the books but becomes inoperative.
When the National Security Law During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion
(dongyuan kanluan shiqi guojia anquanfa 動員戡亂時期國家安全法) was promulgated on July 1, 1987, martial law was still
in force in Taiwan. The name of the law was changed to National Security Act (guojia anquanfa 國家安全法) by ROC President Lee
Teng-hui on July 29, 1992. Its legislative history is as follows:
Enacted and Promulgated by President Order Hua-Tsung (1)-Yi-Tzu No. 2360 on July 1, 1987.
Amended and promulgated by President Order Hua-Tsung (1)-Yi-Tzu No. 3667 on July 29, 1992.
Amended and promulgated by President Order Hua-Tsung (1)-Yi-Tzu No. 8500027120 on Feb. 5, 1996.
Amended and promulgated by President Order Hua-Tsung (1)-Yi-Tzu No. 10000259741 on Nov. 23, 2011.
Amended and promulgated by President Order Hua-Tsung (1)-Yi-Tzu No. 10200156111 on Aug. 21, 2013.
Amended on July 3, 2009.
Amended on June 8, 2022.
The source for the English text is the Republic of China Yearbook 1989, p. 724-725.
Adopted by the National Unification Council at its third meeting on February 23, 1991, and by
the Executive Yuan Council at its 2223rd meeting on March 14, 1991.
I. Foreword
The unification of China is meant to bring about a strong and prosperous nation with a long-lasting, bright future for its people;
it is the common wish of Chinese people at home and abroad. After an appropriate period of forthright exchange, cooperation and
consultation conducted under the principles of reason, peace, parity, and reciprocity, the two sides of the Taiwan Straits should foster
a consensus of democracy, freedom, and equal prosperity and together build anew a unified China. Based on this understanding,
these Guidelines have been specially formulated with the express hope that all Chinese throughout the world will work with one mind
toward their fulfillment.
II. Goal
To establish a democratic, free and equitably prosperous China.
III. Principles
Both the mainland and Taiwan areas are parts of Chinese territory. Helping to bring about national unification should be the common
responsibility of all Chinese people. The unification of China should be for the welfare of all its people and not be subject to partisan conflict.
China's unification should aim at promoting Chinese culture, safeguarding human dignity, guaranteeing fundamental human rights, and
practicing democracy and the rule of law. The timing and manner of China's unification should first respect the rights and interests of the
people in the Taiwan area, and protect their security and welfare. It should be achieved in gradual phases under the principles of reason,
peace, parity, and reciprocity.
IV. Process
1. Short term, a phase of exchanges and reciprocity.
(1) To enhance understanding through exchanges between the two sides of the Strait and eliminate hostility through reciprocity; and
to establish a mutually benign relationship by not endangering each other's security and stability while in the midst of exchanges and not
denying the other's existence as a political entity while in the midst of effecting reciprocity.
(2) To set up an order for exchanges across the Strait, to draw up regulations for such exchanges, and to establish intermediary
organizations so as to protect people's rights and interests on both sides of the Strait; to gradually ease various restrictions and expand
people-to-people contacts so as to promote the social prosperity of both sides.
(3) In order to improve the people's welfare on both sides of the Strait with the ultimate objective of unifying the nation, in the mainland
area economic reform should be carried out forthrightly, the expression of public opinion there should be gradually allowed, and both democracy
and the rule of law should be implemented while in the Taiwan area efforts should be made to accelerate constitutional reform and promote
national development to establish a society of equitable prosperity.
(4) The two sides of the Strait should end the state of hostility and, under the principle of one China solve all disputes through peaceful
means, and furthermore respect, not reject, each other in the international community, so as to move toward a phase of mutual trust and
cooperation.
2. Medium term, a phase of mutual trust and cooperation.
(1) Both sides of the Strait should establish official communication channels on equal footing.
(2) Direct postal, transport and commercial links should be allowed and both sides should jointly develop the southeastern coastal area
of the Chinese mainland and then gradually extend this development to other areas of the mainland in order to narrow the gap in living standards
between the two sides.
(3) Both sides of the Strait should work together and assist each other in taking part in international organizations and activities.
(4) Mutual visits by high-ranking officials on both sides should be promoted to create favourable conditions for consultation and unification.
3. Long term, a phase of consultation and unification
A consultative organization for unification should be established through which both sides, in accordance with the will of the people in both
the mainland and Taiwan areas, and while adhering to the goals of democracy, economic freedom, social justice and nationalization of the
armed forces, jointly discuss the grand task of unification and map out a constitutional system to establish a democratic, free, and equitably
prosperous China.
"An investigative study conducted by the Executive Yuan into the February 28 Incident, an incident that no one had dared mention before the end of martial law and that had caused social unease in Taiwan, was to be used by the government as a reference in the settlement of the aftermath of the February 28 Incident." Therefore, in January 1991, the "February 28 Incident Research Group" was established with eight members, Chen Chung-Kuang, Yeh Ming-hsun, Li Yunhan, Chih Ching-Teh, Chang Yu-fa, Marvin Ho, Chen San-ching and Lai Jeh-hang, and with Chen Chung-Kuang and Yeh Ming-hsun as conveners and Lai Jeh-hang as chief writer. Apart from Lai Jeh-hang, the group also invited four other professors, Huang Fu-san, Wu Wenxing, Huang Xiuzheng, and Hsu Hsueh-chi, to join the writers panel. Chen Mei-fei, Chien Jung-tsung and Fang Huifang were part-time researchers, respectively assisting Huang Fu-san, Huang Xiuzheng and Yeh Ming-hsun, the so called "Working Team."
"The above-mentioned authors conducted archive and literature research and oral history recording in accordance with their academic conscience and non-partisan positions." Although the research period was only one year, they were able to gain access to first hand materials from the government and to interview hundreds of witnesses before systematically and objectively analyzing the incident in its entirety.
"When it came to the collection of material, in addition to sourcing from the existing archives of the Taiwanese government, researchers also went to China and other countries to collect relevant data of high value, including documents concerning the February 28 Incident donated by George H. Kerr to Stanford University's Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Tamsui Consulate documents provided by the Public Record Office of the United Kingdom, documents provided by the Second Historical Archives of China in Nanjing, etc. The material obtained by the research team can be counted as some of the richest among all overseas and domestic research programs in relation to this topic.
"After the publication of the February 28 Incident investigation report on February 22, 1992, it was generally accepted by the public in spite of disagreements over some details." Referring to further information, the authors edited and supplemented the original report and had it published by China Times Publishing Co. on February 20, 1994. This was how "Research Report on the February 28 Incident" came into being.
There is no doubt that "Research Report on the February 28 Incident" is the primary source that people should refer to if they wish to understand this incident. However, a total of 504 pages can be quite burdensome for members of our busy modern society. The "Conclusion" chapter of the report, which spans from page 405 to page 412, provides a brief description and review of the February 28 Incident, allowing readers to understand the cause, progression and aftermath of the incident. Therefore, the Memorial Foundation of 228 especially chose this chapter as the core of this article, which is divided into eight sections and supplemented with footnotes to strengthen the clarity of the main text. Footnotes are all quoted from the "Research Report" except where specified otherwise. It is expected that readers of this article can gain a comprehensive idea of the February 28 Incident within an hour. Of course, if you wish to understand the entire incident in more detail, you should refer to the original report.
The February 28 Massacre (Footnote 1) took place less than a year and a half after the end of the Second World War (Footnote 2). The background of the incident is extremely complicated and cannot be explained in terms of only one factor. First of all, fifty years of Japanese colonial rule led to a general lack of understanding of both the political system and societal circumstances of China. Therefore, disillusionment with the new regime became apparent before the end of 1945 (Footnote 3). Secondly, on the political front, the system of the Chief Executive's Office (Footnote 4) was beset with many defects and problems, including the corrupt and ineffective behaviors of government officials (Footnote 5) and soldiers (Footnote 6), unfair distribution of political resources (Footnote 7), etc. On the economic front, improper policies for controlling the economy (Footnote 8) resulted in an industrial slump (Footnote 9), hyperinflation (Footnote 10) and severe unemployment. On the societal front, Taiwanese veterans who served in the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy (Footnote 11) could find hardly any employment opportunities after returning from the battlefields and ended up destitute, which resulted in the gradual formation of an undercurrent of anti-government sentiment. In addition, the obstinate personality of Chief Executive Chen Yi (Footnote 12) made it impossible for him to understand the feelings of the Taiwanese people, which resulted in the deterioration of the relationship between the government and the people. The above-mentioned factors contributed to a premonition of an imminent crisis among people of insight (Footnote 13) well before the Chief Executive's Office became aware of it (Footnote 14).
The time frame of "Research Report on the February 28 Incident" spans from February 27, 1947, when the conflict around contraband tobacco occurred, to May 16, when the "village purging" ended. [Foreword]
Due to the long-time censoring of information, Taiwanese people who lived under Japanese colonial rule did not know much about their Ancestral Country. Because of this, Taiwanese people tended to compare the governance of the Chinese Nationalist government, which extended its rule to Taiwan after the Second World War, with the Japanese colonial government, especially when it came to military, political, economic and societal aspects. Seeing the stark contrast between the two regimes, Taiwanese people started to feel that newcomers from their Ancestral Country were worse than the Japanese and feelings of contempt and disdain were thus rooted in their minds. In addition, the schism between Taiwanese locals and people from different provinces of China was further widened because some people from the Chinese mainland cajoled Taiwanese women into fake marriages, and the lifestyles, values and ethics of the newcomers conflicted with those of the locals due to incompatible social backgrounds and a lack of modern knowledge. Taiwanese people's expectations of this regime that came from their Ancestral Country were too high, and their general disappointment was soon followed by widespread contempt. (Page 27)
According to the Taiwan Province Chief Executive's Office Organization Act, the Chief Executive's Office was entrusted by the Central Government to manage its administrative affairs. The Chief Executive had the power to mandate and supervise departments of the Central Government in Taiwan and to issue office orders and separate regulations within the scope of his responsibilities. At the same time, he also assumed post of commander-in-chief of the Taiwan Garrison Command. It can be seen that the Chief Executive's Office system was a form of centralized leadership which placed the judicial, legislative, military, and administrative powers of Taiwan province in the Chief Executive himself. The Chief Executive was appointed by the Central Government, which was different to the directorial system used in other Chinese provinces. The implementation of the directorial system in all provincial governments meant that the members of directorial boards and chairmen were all senior ranking officials; while all the people working for the departments of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office (such as Departments of Secretariat, Civil Affairs, Education, Finance, Agriculture, Forestry, Industry and Mining, Transportation, Police and Accounting) and secretary-generals were all contracted staff members of the Chief Executive himself. In addition, an organic law committee, propaganda committee and assessment and design committee were also set up in Taiwan. The system of banking and currency was also different to China. Chen Yi believed that the Taiwan dollar and Taiwanese financial institutions should maintain their own original systems and the current legal tender of China should be prevented from circulating in Taiwan, so that "Taiwan could avoid the consequences of hyperinflation which was out of control in the Chinese mainland provinces caused by the over-issuing of the legal tender." Therefore, Chen Yi proposed that "the priority was to maintain stability by issuing an independent New Taiwan dollar so that prosperity could be achieved in Taiwan without being affected by the serious depreciation of legal tender used on the mainland." Before Chen Yi came to Taiwan, his proposal was approved by President Chiang Kai-shek, who later personally instructed Soong Tse-ven to implement Chen Yi's idea. Because of this, four banks and two financial entities (Central Bank, Bank of China, Bank of Communications, Farmers Bank, Central Trust of China and General Post Office) that originally intended to set up branches in Taiwan were not allowed to do so. The Ministry of Finance also issued Regulations Concerning the Currency Exchange Between Taiwan and the Mainland, which stipulated that "no banks except the Central Bank and those that are endorsed by the government are allowed to undertake currency exchanges between the Taiwan dollar and the legal tender of China." (Page 6) Many Taiwanese people believed that the financial arrangement of the Nationalist government treated them as if they were being colonized, and they felt discontented with the government. (Page 4)
Government officials not only did not serve the citizens on weekdays, but also put on official airs or acted irresponsibly and inattentively when they were approached. These drawbacks dramatically contrasted the diligence and efficiency of officials from the Japanese colonial period. (Page 20) A lack of political efficiency and an overly bureaucratic manner were things that Taiwanese people had not experienced during the Japanese colonial period. Within one year and a half, it became evident that the Taiwan Province Executive's Office was outperformed greatly by its Japanese predecessor. Newspapers often reported that government officials were involved in scandals like going to bars, lack of discipline and corruption. For example, on February 22, 1947, Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News published an editorial opinion piece "On the Problem of Corruption," which not only disclosed a stunning number of corruption cases, but also pointed out the fact that many government officials frequently attended ballrooms, tea houses, restaurants and casinos in the cities, showing that there were too many unnecessary employees in the government, as well as the fact that people's impression of government officials was very poor. Corruption cases were not limited to general officials. Prosecutors, court presidents, and even teachers were found to be corrupt. Soldiers not abiding by the law or not paying when shopping or traveling was very common, and there was even public looting. Many of these corruption cases exceeded 10 million Taiwan dollars in amount. (Page 21)
The troops stationed in Taiwan had a poor reputation. Soldiers often "forcibly borrowed money, raped women, and shot and wounded people. It was not uncommon to see soldiers buying five-dollar eggs with only one dollar. Disputes in the markets were commonplace." Robbery and theft were also commonly seen. (Page 23)
During the Japanese colonial period, it was difficult for Taiwanese people to gain fair political treatment for administrative, professional and technological advancement. After the Second World War, many Taiwanese people harbored the fantasy of an autonomous Taiwan and believed they should be able to self-rule from then on. To the contrary, among 18 directors and deputy directors from nine important departments of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office, only one deputy director was from Taiwan. Among 17 mayors of cities and counties, only Taipei Mayor You Mijian, Hsinchu County Mayor Liu Qiguang, Kaohsiung Mayor Huang Zhongtu (formerly Lian Mou), and Kaohsiung County Mayor Xie Dongyu (formerly Huang Daping at the time of the February 28 Incident) were Taiwanese, but they were all Puànn-suann-á, meaning officials of Taiwanese heritage who had returned from Chongqing, the former capital of the Chinese Nationalist government, and were not welcome by Taiwanese locals. What made Taiwanese people even more upset was the treatment of "unequal pay for the same work" and the difficulty associated with becoming employed by the government or public institutions. (Page 19)
Foreign trade is extremely important to the economy of an island region. If an island region does not rely on foreign trade, it must have a considerable amount of resources. Because Taiwan was not considered to be resource-rich, it still needed to trade with the world. However, Chen Yi did not seem to understand the situation. After he arrived in Taiwan, he began to implement a controlled economy... Although he knew that this would invoke opposition from businesspeople, Chen Yi believed that this economic policy was for the benefit of the public, not for private interests.
"What Chen Yi wanted to pursue was not to fatten the pockets of a few people but to gradually deal with the livelihood issues facing Taiwanese people in terms of food, clothes, and amenities." Chen Yi's attitude showed his longing for socialist ideas, which, coupled with his obstinate and stubborn character, resulted in considerable criticism and condemnation of his economic policies. This became one of the catalysts triggering the February 28 Incident. (Page 7)
Because of the uniqueness of Taiwan's administrative arrangement, the Taiwan Province Executive's Office did not welcome influences from outside the island. This mentality was evident in the rejection of Chinese banks seeking to operate in Taiwan, including the above-mentioned "four banks and two financial entities" and other private banks, which "brought a halt to the operation of any private trade enterprises except the ones run by government officials and police." This situation also caused the government banks on the Chinese mainland to use "the currency exchange problem" as an excuse to adopt a blockade policy in retaliation against Taiwan, which made Taiwan become self-isolated. As a result, ferry and air tickets were not allowed to be sold, Taiwanese customs lost tax revenue, and ships were not permitted to leave ports, impeding the transportation of goods to the outside world. In addition, the controlled economy policy implemented by the Taiwan Province Executive's Office, which in reality amounted to the dominance of the government in trade business and an unpredictable exchange rate, demotivated businesspeople. Because of this, shipping and selling goods in Taiwan became difficult, which resulted in a self-isolated situation in which foreign goods could not reach Taiwan and Taiwanese goods could not ship overseas. (Page 25)
On January 10, 1946, a Taiwanese compatriot petitioned the Executive Yuan that "the Central Government should abolish government-run trade enterprises and any other similar intermediary institutions that compromised the free market and revoke all types of military laws to lighten the load on the people." This showed that the people were dissatisfied with Chen Yi's policy of a controlled economy. (Page 22)
(Chen Yi) not only set up the Monopoly Bureau to continue the monopoly system that the Japanese colonial government had implemented in Taiwan, but also controlled the Trade Bureau that managed transportation to and from Taiwan. His regime monopolized almost every aspect of the island's trade and industries, hindering the development of private enterprises and causing discontent and disillusion among locals. Therefore, these two institutions became the target that reform-minded people sought to abolish during the February 28 Incident. (Page 26)
The economic crisis in Taiwan was mainly caused by inflation and soaring prices, especially food prices. Taiwan was originally known for its production of rice. During the Japanese colonial period, crop production dropped dramatically "due to the war…" Soon after the Chinese Nationalist government extended its rule to Taiwan in 1946…Taiwan experienced a serious food shortage that was evident in the rocketing price of rice, such that some people at the time believed that the price level in Taiwan was higher than that in any province of China. Famine broke out in many places, and social unrest even occurred in rice production areas, such as in Taichung and Tainan. More and more people lost their jobs over time. Daylight robbery and burglary were everywhere. (Page 23)
From October 1945 to December 1946, Taiwan's price level had inflated more than a hundredfold. The problem of food prices was particularly serious. (Page 25)
600 grams of rice originally sold for only 1.5 Taiwan dollars. However, in early 1946, the price for this much rice had already risen to more than 10 Taiwan dollars. On February, 1947, the price reached 32 Taiwan dollars per 600 grams. This was not something that Taiwanese people had experienced before, so they were particularly angry about the food price crisis. (Page 8)
Surrounded by immoral staff, Chen Yi trusted his subordinates too much and was too permissive with them. Chiang Wei-chuan, the then chairman of the Taipei Chamber of Commerce, once criticized Chen Yi in person, saying that he resided in the deep end of the palace surrounded by corrupt officialdom and a few opportunists who claimed to be the bridge between the government and the people but who knew nothing about society or the people, resulting in a situation where public opinions were blocked from reaching him. (Page 12)
Less than three months after Taiwan fell under the rule of the Chinese Nationalist government, many Taiwanese people were already criticizing Chen Yi for his inappropriate approach in Taiwan. In early 1946, the situation in Taiwan had deteriorated dramatically, causing concerns in China and the West. Mintai News Agency urged the government to pay more attention to the problems in Taiwan. Millard's Review from Shanghai published the article "Taiwan moving 50 years backward," saying that "in five months Taiwan would become the ‘Ireland' of China." In early 1946, a report presented by the U.S. Consulate in Taiwan to the U.S. ambassador to China and the U.S. Department of State, wrote, "Taiwan is already on the verge of an armed rebellion." By early 1947, many acute observers had already realized the graveness of the situation. For example, the Taiwan correspondent of a Shanghai magazine The Observers predicted on February 2, 1947, just before the February 28 Incident: "Taiwan is in the middle of a crisis. The situation is precarious. At any time, disturbance or rebellion could occur here." It was clear that many people in China and the West had already seen that Taiwan was on the brink of social upheaval. (Page 10)
In the aspects of politics and the economy, Taiwanese people were greatly disappointed by the government. Nonetheless, Chen Yi, who sought to gloss over the domestic problems in Taiwan, still managed to send the government army stationed on the island to the Chinese mainland to crack down on communist activities, which left Taiwan in a militarily vulnerable position. Because of this, radicals were made to believe that they could definitely overturn Chen Yi's regime and fearlessly encouraged ordinary people to rebel against the government. (Page 25)
The February 28 Massacre resulted from the misconduct of contraband investigators and police and military police authorities in regards to contraband tobacco confiscation (Footnote 15), which gave rise to mass petition and protest and strike actions from laborers and shopkeepers in Taipei on February 28 (Footnote 16). An incident in which guards shot at protesters at the headquarters of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office the same day (Footnote 17) meant the unrest was further exacerbated and became unstoppable. The petition for punishing the perpetrators was turned into a fight against the Taiwan Province Executive's Office (Footnote 18). Conflict between Taiwanese locals and people from other Chinese provinces was thus provoked (Footnote 19). Resistance and conflict spread throughout the whole island in no time, transforming an originally quite simple public security incident into a political movement. Local leaders took advantage of this opportunity to demand total reform. Military conflicts broke out in some areas after insurgents took control of weapons that belonged to the military and police (Footnote 20).
The February 28 Massacre was triggered by an accident regarding contraband tobacco confiscation near Chien-Cheng Circle. An outline of what happened in the incident is as follows. At about 11 a.m. on February 27, 1947, the Monopoly Bureau received an intelligence that around 50 boxes of matches and tobacco had been smuggled in through Tamsui Port. Later, six contraband investigators, Yeh Te-ken, Chung Yen-chou, Chao Tzu-chien, Liu Chao-chun, Sheng Tie-fu and Fu Hsueh-tung, along with four policemen from the local police squad, were sent by the bureau to Tamsui, where they only confiscated five boxes of smuggled goods. Soon after, another intelligence showed that the rest of the smuggled goods had been shipped to somewhere near Tianma Tea House, situated on Taipei's Nanjing West Road (formerly known as Taiheicho, on the current Yanping North Road). This area was renowned for being the largest destination of contraband. The investigators and policemen first went to Hsiao Hsiang Yuan (which was near Taiheicho) for dinner, so that they could proceed with their investigation nearby. At 7:30 p.m., they arrived at Tianma Tea House to discover that the contraband sellers had already left, except for Lin Chiang-mai, a 40-year-old widow who was selling both legal and smuggled cigarettes, which were soon confiscated along with the cash she had. Lin Chiang-mai practically knelt down to beg the investigators and said: "If you confiscate all my belongings, I will have no money to buy food. You should at least return my cash money and the cigarettes produced by the Monopoly Bureau to me…." However, the investigators ignored her request. At the time, there was a crowd of bystanders, many of whom also started to implore the investigators on her behalf. All of a sudden, Lin Chiang-mai frantically grasped at one of the investigators, not letting him go. Seeing this, another investigator, Yeh Te-ken, hit her head with the barrel of his gun, making her head bleed profusely. Witnessing the violent scene, the crowd of bystanders burst into anger and surrounded the investigators, passionately shouting, "A-suann (a derogatory name for Chinese Mainlanders) are too unreasonable," "These pigs are monstrous" and "Return the cigarettes." As soon as the investigators realized they had got themselves into trouble, they tried to escape from the crowd chasing close behind. One investigator called Fu Hsueh-tung pulled his trigger in an attempt to escape, but he accidentally shot Chen Wen-si, a fellow citizen who had been watching the incident in front of his house, who died the next day. Investigators escaped to Eirakuchō (Xinin) Police Station before they went to the Police Headquarters right next to Zhongshan Hall. The angry protesters smashed the glass windows of the investigators' truck and pushed it over on the roadside. Later they surrounded the police station, demanding the murderer to be handed over and brought to justice. After Li Chiung, a member of the Standing Committee of the Monopoly Bureau, and Yang Tzu-tsai, the leader of the fourth group of the sales department, learned of the conflict at about 9 p.m. they rushed to the conflict site, where their truck was attacked by around 100 protesters assembled there. Li and Yang quickly went to the Taipei City Police Station, where a crowd of about 600 to 700 people followed them. Li and Yang promised the protesters that they would punish the investigators, but the crowd insisted that they should hand over the criminals. Li and Yang, accompanied by the director of the Taipei City Police Station, had no choice but to send the six investigators to the Military Police Corps. However, the people were not satisfied with the measure, demanding the six investigators should be arrested immediately. Seeking an excuse to pacify the crowd, Li and Yang kept saying that they were "not authorized to reply to the request because the laws clearly stipulated how to punish the perpetrators and penalize the wrongdoing," but they were not understood. After the protesters learned that the investigators had been sent to the Military Police Corps, located to the opposite of the Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News office, they moved to surround the building, demanding the criminals be handed over. The regiment leader Zhang Mutao firmly denied the request and ordered a platoon of military police soldiers get into shooting position. Seeing this, the protesters hid in the arcade of the Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News office. Chou Chuang-chih, who had witnessed the whole situation, remembered that Wu Chin-lien, the Chief Editor of the Japanese version of Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News, had walked outside to see what was going on out of curiosity before he saw and greeted Chou Chuang-chih smilingly. Chou asked him, "Do you have gongs?" Wu said, "Yes." He went back to the office to fetch copper gongs. Soon after a rainstorm, the gongs were banged loudly and the protesters went on surrounding the Military Police Corps again. There were also some young people shouting out loud "Taiwanese people must get revenge" and "People who don't get revenge are not Taiwanese" while banging their gongs on the streets overnight. Some people went to ask Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News to cover the conflict. The Chief Editor Wu Chin-lien declined the request, saying that the Propaganda Commission of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office had ordered the newspaper not to report on the incident. In response, the protesters threatened to burn down the newspaper with gasoline, which forced Li Wanju, the chief executive officer of Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News, to talk to the protesters. Soon after Li Wanju agreed to publish the news, protesters started to leave the site. The next day, Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News reported on the conflict using number five font size in approximately a hundred words. (Page 48) Following the news coverage, the injuries and killings caused by the anti-contraband operation ignited public anger that had been simmering for over a year. The outraged people went to burn cars and surround the police stations and Military Police Corps, requesting the government execute the perpetrators. Not satisfied with the response from the government, the mass of protesters remained on the site not wanting to leave, which culminated in intensified conflict the following day. (Page 51)
On February 28 at 9 a.m., protestors continued to bang their gongs on the streets to announce a shutdown of all commercial activities, as the injuries and killings that had occurred in the anti-contraband operation had not been resolved. Citizens and shops immediately joined the strike and one after another shut their doors. A group of protesters marched to Taihei-cho Ni-chome Police Station, where the police station director, Huang, attempted to stop the rally. Remembering that Huang had been very abusive to the people living in his precinct, the protesters started to attack him and smashed the windows and belongings of the police station. As time passed, more and more people joined the rally, and, at about 10 a.m., they broke into the Taipei branch of the culpable Monopoly Bureau, located in Honmachi (today's Chongqing South Road), to discover a few contraband investigators inside the building. The protesters believed one of the investigators to be the murderer from last night, so they beat him and a policeman to death and injured four other people. They also took the matches, tobacco, alcohol, car and seven or eight bicycles that were stored in the building out to the street and burned them. The fire had not died off completely by the next day. By that time, there were about 2000 to 3000 people watching nearby. Military police and police were sent there in no time, but they did not dare deal with the conflict and eventually left… At midday, the protesters moved to the Monopoly Bureau headquarters located near the South Gate, where they continued to demand the punishment of the murderer. But military police and police authorities had already prepared themselves for the coming protesters so that only windows were broken… Because the protesters' request was not accepted by the Monopoly Bureau headquarters, they later headed to the Taiwan Province Executive's Office…The factory near the South Gate that belonged to the Monopoly Bureau was also damaged by the protesters, which showed how fierce the public resentment toward the Monopoly Bureau was. (Page 51)
Around 1 p.m., a rally of about 400 to 500 shouting, chanting protesters was led by the banging gongs to march from Taipei Railway Station to the headquarters of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office. It was said that many people who had suffered the consequences of the market rice shortage followed the march to the headquarters, hearing that rice was being given away there. As a result, the march seemed to become a formidable force, until it was obstructed at the Zhongshan Road intersection by well-equipped soldiers with rifles pointed at the protesters before they reached the square of the headquarters. In no time, waves of bullets forced the protesters to escape, leaving some people wounded or dead on the road. This was the Executive's Office Guard Shooting Incident, which was a key factor in the exacerbation of the whole situation. (Page 52)
After the shooting outside the headquarters of the Taiwan Province Executive's Office, large-scale confrontation became inevitable. The clash between Taiwanese locals and new immigrants from China that had been intensifying since the end of the Second World War was turned into violent conflict. While Taiwanese locals were fighting against the government, they also initiated a series of violent actions, "Attack A-suann," targeting the new Chinese immigrants. At around 2 p.m. on February 28, the protesters gathered at Taipei Park (now known as the 228 Peace Memorial Park) before they occupied the Taiwan Radio Station to broadcast to the whole island. While on air, they accused the government of corruption and criticized its forced rice exportation policies and the economic turmoil, as well as urged the public to ostracize the corrupt officials for the sake of self-preservation. However, it is said that the transmission station in Banqiao boycotted the uprising so that the radio proclamation was not passed on to the rest of the island and the message only circulated in the Taipei area. Whether true or not, Taiwan being small in territory meant that its relative ease of travel and communication did not hinder the conflict that occurred in Taipei on February 28 from spreading to the rest of island, where the request for punishing the perpetrators was heightened to a political struggle movement. At 3 p.m., seeing the dire situation, the Taiwan Garrison Command announced the imposition of martial law and sent armed police and soldiers to patrol the streets and machine-gun civilians. Nevertheless, protesters continued surrounding the Monopoly Bureau headquarters, Railway Police Bureau and Department of Transportation and other government agencies, where many civilians, including students, were killed in the conflict with police and soldiers. According to a "briefing" from the Taiwan Garrison Command, more than 1000 people gathered at the General Post Office refused to be dispersed by police and soldiers in the afternoon, and the ensuing clash resulted in the injury or death of about ten people. (Page 54)
Taiwanese people also vented their anger at the new immigrants from China, indiscriminately making reprisals against innocent people. Cheng Hwa Travel Agency and Tiger Brand's Yong An Tang, both located at former Honmachi, suffered the first blows. Not only were their windows smashed, their belongings were also moved out to be burned in open fires. At about 5 p.m., Sin Tai Company, the largest department store in Taipei run by the Sakaecho Trade Bureau, was also broken into and its products were taken out for public burning. Anyone who seized the chance to steal would be beaten up. People who were driving cars or trucks were asked to leave behind their vehicles, which were later pushed to Taipei Railway Station and Chien-Cheng Circle and burned. According to data, more than ten vehicles were set on fire. In addition to wreaking havoc, Taiwanese people also indiscriminately attacked new immigrants from China. In Honmachi, Taipei Railway Station, Taipei Park, Sakaecho, Eirakucho, Taiheicho and Wanhua, many new Chinese immigrants were reported to have been attacked by locals for no obvious reason. Hsinchu County Mayor, Wen-bo Chu, and the director of Taipei City Government's Department of Land were both publicly humiliated and beaten up. It is generally believed that these series of riots against new Chinese immigrants were unleashed by an explosion of pent-up anger accumulated in the one year and a half since the end of Second World War. Innocent low-ranking civil servants and their families, and Chinese businesspeople who came to travel or do business in Taiwan, became scapegoats of the public indignation. Many appalling violent acts were also reported… Wang Yi-ting, who served at the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration back then, witnessed these acts himself. But he said in most cases the attacks were done with bats or rod, and he did not see people using samurai swords. Not many assaults were carried out against women or aged people. Rape was not commonly reported. It was said that at least 15 newly-immigrated Chinese people were beaten to death and some others were paralyzed in wooden bat attacks. (Page 55)
Zhang Mutao, the leader of the Military Police Corps, also pointed out that the situation in Taiwan was reaching the stage of "treasonous uprising," with local governments completely losing their ability to control. Many police stations and army battalions around Taiwan were disarmed by the rioters, who took away at least 4000 firearms in total. Zhang accused Chen Yi of "seeming not to understand the severity of the situation and of still trying to paint an illusion of peace." (Page 203)
Taipei City was in the eye of this political storm before it engulfed the whole island. The February 28 Incident Settlement Committee (Footnote 21) in Taipei and its branches in many municipalities were the main actors in the political turmoil. During this period of turbulence, certain government officials who were already despised by the local people before the conflict quit their positions and escaped one by one, which meant that even those government officials who were willing to maintain the public order and cooperate with the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee were forced by the changing situation to temporarily hide away for their safety. The February 28 Incident Settlement Committee in Taipei and its branches in other municipalities all bore heavy responsibility for gathering public opinion, maintaining the public order and promoting political reforms, as well as communicating with the Chief Executive's Office (Footnote 22). This meant that at times they almost replaced the function of the Chief Executive's Office and local governments (Footnote 23). However, there were divergent opinions and conflicting policies within the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee and there were no unified administrative guidelines for its local branches to follow, which resulted in its failure to fully perform its function of pacifying the political situation.
After the outbreak of the incident, conflicts at different places were intensified, which gave the opportunity for the Chinese Communist Party and its allies to interfere politically. For example, Hsieh Hsueh-hung and Yang Ke-huang directed the Taichung area insurgence of the March 2 Incident (Footnote 24). Hsieh Hsueh-hung not only convened an "assembly of citizens" to take advantage of the power of demonstrators in completely taking over official institutions of the Taichung City Government, but also mobilized young people and students to organize the 27 Brigade (Footnote 25), which was a militarized force striving for the complete democratization of Taiwan. The path of armed uprising was thus created beyond the parliamentary approach adopted by the Settlement Committee.
The Chiayi area showed different characteristics from other places following the March 2 Incident (Footnote 26). First of all, local people formed an armed group and joined the military operation attacking an armory near Lantan Lake and Shueishang Airport (Footnote 27). Most of the participants in these actions were not professional soldiers. Secondly, many people in the Chiayi area supported these uprising actions. Because of this, Mayor Sun Chih-chun believed that the intensity of the battle and the casualties of civil servants and teachers were possibly the highest among all municipalities in Taiwan.
From March 3, Kaohsiung had experienced social unrest triggered by furious locals, who took increasingly drastic actions as time went by and later besieged the 105 Military Hospital and the headquarters of the Kaohsiung Military Police Corps (Footnote 28). Peng Meng-Chi, the commander of the Kaohsiung Military Fortress, believed that the besiegement already constituted a rebellion and was ready to resort to military crackdown. On March 6 at around 2 p.m., Peng Meng-Chi detained the delegates of the opposition (Footnote 29) and suppressed the uprising with a swift military operation (Footnote 30), which although stabilized the tumultuous situation in Kaohsiung, resulted in casualties inside the Kaohsiung City Government building (Footnote 31) and outside the railway station (Footnote 32). In the village purging that came afterwards, 1500 suspected "criminals" were arrested, some of whom were even executed in public. This is said to be one of the important reasons the trauma of the conflict could not be properly healed for a long time.
To reflect public opinion, the Taipei City Council invited Taiwanese members of the National Assembly, the Taiwan Provincial Assembly and the National Political Council to attend the inaugural conference of the Contraband Cigarette Murder Investigation Committee at 10 a.m. on March 1 at Zhongshan Hall. During the conference, a resolution was passed to delegate Huang Chao-chin (the speaker of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly), Chou Yan-shou (member of the Taipei City Council), Wang Tien-teng (member of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly) and Lin Chung (member of the National Political Council) to meet the Chief Executive and make several requests, including the abolishment of martial law, the release of civilians who had been arrested, the refraining of police and soldiers from shooting people, the organization of a settlement committee consisting of both representatives from the government and civil society, and the above-mentioned requests to be broadcast by Chen Yi to the whole population of Taiwan. Chen Yi accepted all the requests and thought that the Committee would be better renamed the "February 28 Incident Settlement Committee," which is how the organization came to have this name. (Page 57)
The February 28 Incident Settlement Committee on the one hand was trying to strengthen its function, while at the same time to promote itself. On the afternoon of March 6, the Settlement Committee hosted its inaugural conference at Zhongshan Hall chaired by Wang Tien-teng. In the conference, two people from the National Political Council (Lin Hsien-tang, Chen Yi-song), four from the National Assembly (Li Wanju, Lien Chen-tung, Lin Lien-Chung, Huang Kuo-shu), five from the Taipei City Council (Chou Yan-shou, Pan Chu-yuan, Chien Sheng-yu, Hsu Chun-ching, Wu Chun-lin) and six from the Taiwan Provincial Assembly (Wang Tien-teng, Huang Chao-chin, Su Wei-liang, Huang Chun-ching, Lin Wei-gong, Kuo Kuo-chi) were elected as standing members. Hung Huo-lien and Wu Kuo-hsin were placed on the waiting list. (Page 66)
On March 7, Chen Yi sent a letter to the Settlement Committee saying the many disputes and competing opinions among all parties in civil society should be discussed and integrated by the Commission before it presented proposals to the Chief Executive's Office. (Page 70)
From March 3 to 5, municipal branches of the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee were set up one after another across Taiwan, which indicated that the power of the Chief Executive's Office had been undermined. (Page 66)
On the morning of March 2, Taichung locals gathered at the Theater of Taichung to…join a civic assembly. Yang Ke-huang, a faculty member from the private Chienkuo Polytechnic School, hosted the meeting, and made a presentation on the origin of the incident in Taipei and the people's petition activities, as well as explained the political movement in Taipei and the requests made by the protestors. Later, the attendants unanimously chose the principal of Chienkuo Polytechnic School, Hsieh Hsueh-hung, to be the chairperson of the assembly. After assuming this position, Hsieh "described in detail the repressive rule by Chen Yi and the political atmosphere in Taiwan after the end of the Second World War, emphasizing that if Taiwanese people wanted to liberate themselves from the agony, they must unite to end the one-party authoritarian rule of the Chinese Nationalist Party and immediately implement the democratic autonomy of Taiwan. To achieve this, they must join the heroic resistance of the people of Taipei. They must struggle and fight for total victory regardless of the sacrifice that must be made." After Hsieh finished her speech, Wu Yong-chang, representing the Taiwan Political Construction Association, and lawyer Chang Feng-mo also gave speeches, which were considered to "be subversive to the government and provocative of the anti-newcomer sentiments in the Taiwanese population." At about 10 a.m., the attendees of the event decided to demonstrate on the street to show their support for the movement. Protesters turned on the sirens of fire engines to call on the people of Taichung to join the active resistance in this revolution. In no time, Taichung was shaken by the wave of uprising to the point that extreme tension could be felt everywhere in the city. (Page 84)
On March 6, Hsieh Hsueh-hung, who wished to thoroughly pursue her political agenda, decided to continue her resistance activity. She mustered around 400 young students to form the 27 Brigade inside the 8th Troop. Hsieh Hsueh-hung assumed the role of the brigade chief commander and appointed Chung Yi-jen and Tsai Tieh-cheng to be captain and chief of staff respectively. Important cadre members included Yang Ke-huang, Li Chiao-sung and Gu Rui-yun. The core troops consisted of the Puli Combat Team, headed by Chung Yi-jen's trusted aide Huang Hsin-chin; the Taichung Commercial School Combat Team, headed by Ho Tsip-huai and Tsai Po-hsun (with some communists as its team members); the Taichung Normal School Combat Team, headed by communist Lu Huan-chang; the Public Security Team, headed by Huang Chin-tao; and the Chienkuo Polytechnic School Combat Team, headed by Li Bing-kun. In addition, members also included farmers who had been enlisted by the Japanese Army; students from Yanping College; former second-lieutenants and engineers from the Japanese Army, and some people who voluntarily joined the fight. The establishment of the 27 Brigade was a manifestation of armed struggle against the local governments. "This militia represented an armed struggle alternative to the parliamentary route of the Settlement Commission. Among all the military resistance forces in central and southern Taiwan, the 27 Brigade was the one that endured the longest." (Page 91)
On March 2 at 3 p.m., a couple of dozen young people from Changhua and Taichung headed south to Chiayi Railway Station and Chiayi Fountain Circle. Among them, a rifle-carrying man whose age was about 30 or 40 was shouting on the street, urging his fellow citizens to burn down Mayor Sun Chih-chun's official residence. Seeing the dire situation, Mayor Sun jumped over the wall, having decided to seek refuge at the local military corps. Unfortunately, a large crowd of protesters followed him behind, appearing as a dangerous threat to the mayor's life. He was fortunate to encounter two City Council members, Lin Bao and Lin Wen-shu, who helped him get to the headquarters of the military police corps.
When Mayor Sun Chih-chun was trying to escape, actions like attacking newcomers from China, surrounding police stations, and taking over weapons could already be seen occurring on the streets. Because police officers had started to leave their posts one after another, the city center was in chaos. At 5 p.m., Mayor Sun Chih-chun tried to contact the garrison on the phone and asked Chiayi City Council Speaker Chung Chia-cheng to maintain the public order. On March 3, the day the assembly of citizens was convened, Chiayi City's branch of the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee was established with Chen Fu-chih (director of the Chiayi branch of the Preparatory Office of the Three People's Principles Youth Corps) as director and combat commander, and Li Hsiao-fang as secretary. Different groups and teams in the Committee were set up under its supervision. (Page 105)
After a couple of hours of negotiations, Chiayi City's branch of the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee decided to take over the radio station and broadcast its voluntary soldier recruitment message across the whole of Chiayi City and other places in Taiwan. Responding to this appeal, many people from Budai, Puzi, Yanshui, Jiali, Liujiao, Fanlu, Douliu, Taichung, Puli and Tainan Technical College came to Chiayi to join the movement. Under Mayor Sun's request, Luo Di-guang, the commander of the battalion (1st Battalion, Independent Regiment, 21st Division) stationed at Tomoncho sent his soldiers to crack down on the uprising activity in the city center, which made the development of the situation more uncertain. Given that the powerful weapons held by the government army could easily cause significant casualties, the Chiayi Settlement Committee delegated City Council members to negotiate with the military police corps with the aim of solving the conflict in a peaceful manner. However, both parties could not agree on the terms of a peaceful settlement.
On the same day, about 3000 volunteers who came to Chiayi to join the resistance force started to attack the Military Police Corps, Lantan Lake 19th Armory, Shueishang Airport and Tomoncho Battalion. On March 3 at 9 p.m., the Chiayi City Government was taken over by the resistance force and all police officers who were recent immigrants from China retreated to Tomoncho under the guidance of Police Chief Lin Tian-gang. (Page 106)
On March 3, "hundreds of villains" who had come down from Taipei were brought to the city center on trucks, and students from Tainan Technical College also arrived in Kaohsiung. This was the beginning of Kaohsiung's version of the February 28 Incident. At first, a platoon of the government army (1st Platoon, 7th Company, Independent Regiment) stationed at the 105 Military Hospital was attacked. At the same time, about 400 to 500 people were gathering at Yancheng attempting to attack the military corps. The beating up, humiliation and robbing of new immigrants from China and their businesses was heard of from time to time. The city center of Kaohsiung was in the grips of a severe public security crisis. In the evening, Police Chief Tung Pao-chao sought refuge at the Military Fortress after his car was set on fire by protesters. Before dawn, the police station's telephone line was cut off and its weapons were taken away. Many Taiwanese police officers fled with their guns. Some went home directly, no longer willing to be responsible for maintaining the public order. Some joined the resistance force. (Page 115)
On March 6 at 9 a.m., Kaohsiung City Mayor Huang Chung-tu and six other people, Peng Ching-Kao (City Council speaker), Tu Guang-ming, Fan Tsang-rung, Tseng Feng-ming, Lin Chieh (Lingya District mayor) and Li Fo-hsu (director of Taipower Kaohsiung Office) ascended the mountain to the Military Fortress Command in desperation. According to Huang Chung-tu, when he was planning to ask the Military Fortress Command about what the crackdown approach should be, tens of people broke into the City Government Office with guns, knives and grenades, and verbally abused him. The head of the group Tu Guang-ming put forward some illegal requests in an attempt to make unacceptable demands from the government army. He forced the city mayor and City Council speaker at gunpoint to take some members of his group to the Military Fortress Command… After the seven people entered the reception room of the Fortress Command, Commander Peng Meng-Chi walked in through another door. They sat at a round table. The mayor and speaker sat next to Commander Peng, while the other five people sat in front of him. The mayor later produced "nine peace clauses" to the commander. Commander Peng Meng-chi did not intend to negotiate, but to buy some time. He angrily bashed the table with his hand and shouted "ridiculous," before asking soldiers outside the room to come in to search each of the seven people. According to Peng Meng-chi, Tu Guang-ming was found to have a gun and Fan Tsang-rung and Tseng Feng-ming were both found to have grenades. Tu, Fan and Tseng were arrested immediately, while the others waited in the reception room watched by guards. (Page 117)
Under the guidance of Peng Meng-chi, his troops were divided onto three routes: one passed through Jianguo 3rd Road; another marched straight down from the Fortress Command on Shoushan, passed Gushan 1st Road and the Dagong Road Bridge, and arrived at the Kaohsiung City Government; the other went past the level crossing and entered Wufu 4th Road. Every route had three squads, consisting of about 100 soldiers in total per route. (Page 119)
The military group that was ordered to attack the Kaohsiung City Government building on the afternoon of March 6 was the one led by Chen Guo-ru. Seeing that machine guns were installed on the building, the government army confirmed that those who occupied the Kaohsiung City Government building were insurgents. Because of this, the military group did not follow the order of firing a warning shot in the air. Instead, soldiers threw grenades into the building and shot anyone they could see, which meant that the insurgents could hardly resist the attack and suffered significant casualties. There were 50 to 60 people who lost their lives, including City Council members Hsu Chiu-tsung, Huang Tzu, and Wang Ting-shih… When City Council member Chiu Tao-te stepped into the Kaohsiung City Government building, the floor was covered with corpses and blood as thick as sludge. (Page 119)
The troops tasked with the mission of attacking Kaohsiung Railway Station and Kaohsiung Senior High School were led by Ho Chun-Chang (3rd Battalion, 21st Division). The attack was divided into two routes. When the troops arrived at the railway station, a graduate of Kaohsiung Senior High School, Yan Tsai-tse, was leading his fellow students at Chang Chun Hotel to shoot the coming soldiers in an attempt to disperse them. Knowing the inferiority of his side, he risked his life to rush out of the hotel. When Yan Tsai-tse was shot and critically wounded, people in front of the railway station soon started to flee. Some hid in the underground passage, where the military later indiscriminately fired, leading to many deaths and injuries. (Page 119)
After the incident had spread and escalated, Chen Yi, who understood the insufficiency of his government's military strength (Footnote 33) and strived to maintain his powerful position, originally intended to downplay the severity of the situation and focus on resolving the conflict with a political approach. At first, the civil society leaders who had participated in the operation of the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee were only concerned with the murder that had occurred in a contraband cigarette operation (Footnote 34). However, the Chief Executive's Office did not handle it well, turning the original simple petition of prosecuting the murderer into a political reform movement that took advantage of the groundswell of public anger to gradually increase its demands from the government (Footnote 35). Due to the loose nature of the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee's organizational structure in Taiwan, the Central Government believed that the Committee was engaged in treasonous activities, which constituted an excuse for military crackdown in the eyes of public security agencies. Why did the government suppress the social unrest militarily? Existing archives, various literature and oral history records that the Central Government's response was deeply influenced by the opinions of those who dominated politics in Taiwan. At the beginning of the incident, Chen Yi and Ko Yuan-fen, who were in charge of the administration and military in Taiwan, did not understand the uniqueness of Taiwanese society, believing that the requests proposed by the Taiwanese people and the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee were unreasonable and disingenuous. As a result, the authorities in Taiwan employed divide and conquer tactics (Footnote 40) and infiltration strategy to try to de-escalate the crisis on the one hand; while constantly exaggerating the severity of the conflict so that they could demand more troops from the Central Government for military crackdown on the other.
As shown in government archives, the chairman of the Nationalist Government Chiang Kai-shek did not advocate a military crackdown at first, instead simply agreeing to dispatch a strengthened corps to Taiwan. The intention was to relocate troops back to where they were originally stationed to prevent the situation from worsening in Taiwan. Later, after Chiang Kai-shek received requests from Chen Yi and intelligence agencies, he changed his attitude to characterize the incident as an insurgency organized by rebels, ignored the petitions from Taiwanese civil society (Footnote 41), and decided to send in troops to clamp down on the resistance movement (Footnote 42). The military crackdown could be roughly divided into two main parts: armed raids and "village cleansing." Due to the thorough planning and military deployment by the Chief Executive's Office and the deliberate exaggeration of the actual situation of the rebellious movement, the armed raids were far more effective than initially expected. Except for some residual resistance from the 27 Brigade in central Taiwan (Footnote 43), confrontations rarely occurred in other parts of the island (Footnote 44). However, when executing the military crackdown in various regions, the government army engaged in retaliatory behavior, resulting in innocent casualties and the shooting of suspects on the spot without trial (Footnote 45).
The military crackdown was followed by "village cleansing," the main objectives of which were to arrest suspects (Footnote 46), confiscate weapons, check on residents, process those who turned themselves in (Footnote 47), and collect "Guarantees to Report Outlaws" from households. All of the above-mentioned tasks were fulfilled in time. However, in reality, many suspects were falsely incriminated or reported by revengeful individuals. Military police and police authorities rushed to arrest and interrogate these suspects without first obtaining sufficient evidence, which resulted in many cases of miscarriages of justice. There were also some convicted criminals who bribed their way out of charges or were helped free from jail by some people with special connections. Some unscrupulous soldiers and police took advantage of the opportunity to blackmail, extort and rob civilians of their personal possessions, causing public resentment to boil. There is little doubt that this was because the military authorities at the time failed to effectively prevent wrongdoing and control the situation, and failed to enforce effective discipline on soldiers. The military authorities should be held responsible for a great number of innocent causalities.
The February 28 Massacre is one of the greatest tragedies in Taiwanese history (Footnote 48). This tragedy can be looked at from two different perspectives. For Taiwanese people who fell victim to the massacre, it was ironic that it was not at the hands of imperialists during the Japanese colonial period that they perished, but at those of a military crackdown by a regime that came from the "ancestral land" to which they had always hoped to return (Footnote 49). They may have criticized the government or advocated for Taiwanese autonomy, actions far from treasonous in their minds, but they were executed by the authorities anyway. Most of the executions occurred after not first being subject to public trial, and secret executions, after which the bodies were carelessly disposed of, were no exception. These practices should have no place in a civilized society. Many victims who did not even participate in the anti-government movement were accidentally shot dead on the street by soldiers. From the perspective of the Chinese immigrants who came to work in Taiwan after the Second World War, although corruption and malfeasance were not uncommon in the army and the public service, not every single recently immigrated Chinese official was corrupt. However, in this incident, some recent immigrants from China became scapegoats, were injured or killed after being blindly attacked by furious mobs. Even though the number of these casualties was not as high as the Taiwanese victims, these attacks so horrified some of the recently immigrated public officials and teachers that they eventually left Taiwan. Cases like this widened the schism between both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Without doubt, those who beat up new immigrants from China, attacked government institutions or airports, or even committed homicide should be subject to legal prosecution. Therefore, not everyone who was injured or killed in the February 28 Massacre was an innocent victim, and must be differentiated.
In terms of military capacity in Taiwan, there was only a total of 5251 soldiers (an independent regiment and an engineer battalion from the 21st Division and three corps at the Fortress Command) stationed on the island before the incident. The three corps at the Fortress Command had 1532 soldiers; the engineer battalion responsible for protecting the area to the north of Taichung had 517 soldiers; the independent regiment responsible for protecting the area to the south of Chiayi had 2500 soldiers. The headquarters of the Taiwan Garrison Command could only maneuver soldiers from one battalion of the independent regiment, which only had approximately 700 soldiers. A military capacity this weak was not sufficient for the mission of guarding the Taipei area. (Page 201)
On March 6, Wang Tien-teng read a report regarding the truth of the February 28 Incident over broadcast radio to a domestic and foreign audience, hoping to eliminate doubt on all sides. The main content of this report was to clarify that the goal of the Settlement Committee was "not to prevent compatriots from other provinces from participating in the improvement of Taiwanese politics, but to remove corrupt officials and strive for political reform in Taiwan." In the report, solutions to the aftermath of the incident were proposed, which included seven articles regarding the "handling of the current situation" and 25 articles regarding "core solutions" (consisting of three military and 22 political solutions). This was the famous "32 Demands." The full proposal is as follows: A: On the handling of the current situation
1. The troops of the government army stationed in various places in Taiwan should immediately order their soldiers to temporarily disarm themselves and hand over their weapons to the joint custody of the Settlement Committee local branches and local military corps, so that further bloodshed can be prevented.
2. After the disarmament of the troops, local public order shall be maintained by military police, unarmed police officers and civil organizations.
3. When there is no threat from government army troops, no armed fighting is permitted anywhere. If there is a corrupt official, whether he is from Taiwan or other provinces of China, the only action that can be taken is to report him to the Settlement Committee, which will ask the military police and police authorities to arrest the corrupt official. He will be strictly prosecuted according to the law. No one is permitted to resort to any extrajudicial punishment.
4. Any suggestions regarding political reform can be written down in a list before being submitted to the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee, which will work on a total resolution.
5. It is highly advisable that the government should suspend all military operations immediately in Taiwan. The Central Government should not be asked under any circumstances to dispatch troops to Taiwan. Any attempt to solve the incident militarily will only bring more bloodshed, resulting in international intervention.
6. Before the political problems can be fundamentally resolved, every governmental policy (whether it is military or political) must be discussed with the Settlement Committee. This will prevent people from doubting the sincerity of the government, and avoid any kind of misunderstanding.
7. Regarding this incident, the government should not hold any member of the public accountable. In the future, there is no excuse for the government to arrest anyone involved in this incident. Victims of this incident should be preferentially compensated. B: Core solutions a: Regarding the military
8. Troops with inadequate education and training are absolutely not allowed to be stationed in Taiwan.
9. The Central Government can dispatch officials to conscript Taiwanese soldiers for the purpose of protecting Taiwan.
10. Before the end of the Civil War on the Chinese mainland, any form of conscription in Taiwan is strongly opposed except that which is meant for protecting the island in order to prevent Taiwan from being implicated in the warfare. b: Regarding political reform
11. A self-government act should be legislated as the foundation of Taiwanese politics in order to realize the ideas Sun Yat-sen formulated in his Fundamentals of National Reconstruction.
12. City and county mayors should be democratically elected before June this year. Re-election of city and county council members should be held at the same time.
13. Candidates for directorships of departments in the Taiwan Provincial Government should be approved by the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, which will be called the "Taiwan Provincial Council" after reorganization. The re-election for the members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly should be held before June this year. For the moment, candidates for department directorships should be suggested by the Chief Executive before they are reviewed by the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee.
14. More than two thirds of positions for department directors in the Taiwan Provincial Government should be taken by people who have lived in Taiwan for at least 10 years (it is recommended that the same logic be applied to the departments of Secretary General, Civil Administration, Finance, Industry and Mining, Agriculture and Forestry, Education, and Police).
15. The director positions of the Police Department and all municipal police stations should be given to Taiwanese locals. The provincial Police Squad, Railway Police and Industry and Mining Police should be abolished immediately.
16. At least half of the members of the Legal Affairs Commission should be Taiwanese locals. The chair of the commission should be elected from among the members.
17. No other authorities except police authorities can arrest suspects.
18. Military police can only arrest suspects affiliated to the army.
19. Any politically-motivated arrest and incarceration is prohibited.
20. The rights to freedom of unarmed assembly and to freedom of association with others should be absolutely protected.
21. The rights to freedom of speech, publication, and strike should be absolutely protected. The application registration system for newspaper publications should be abolished.
22. The Civil Organization Act should be repealed immediately.
23. The regulation regarding the verification of candidates' qualifications in legislative elections should be repealed.
24. It is recommended that the legislative election procedure at all levels should be improved.
25. Uniform progressive taxation should be implemented for all income tax. Besides luxury tax and inheritance tax, no other additional taxes should be imposed.
26. All the director positions of state-owned enterprises should be taken by Taiwanese people.
27. Democratically elected monitoring committees should be set up in all state-owned enterprises. The responsibility for dealing with any remaining Japanese-owned properties should be entrusted to the Taiwan Provincial Government. When nationalizing the factories and mines previously owned by the Japanese, administration committees should be set up and more than half of the committee members should be Taiwanese.
28. The Monopoly Bureau should be abolished. Rationing of life essentials should be implemented.
29. The Trade Bureau should be abolished.
30. The Propaganda Commission should be abolished.
31. The president and chief prosecutor positions of all district courts should be taken by Taiwanese people.
32. More than half of judicial officers, such as judges and prosecutors, should be Taiwanese citizens. (Page 66)
On the afternoon of March 7, the Settlement Committee held a plenary meeting, in which the original 32 demands were passed along with 10 additional demands. Among these 10 demands, two demands about military affairs and eight demands about political affairs completed the so-called "42 Demands." The additional demands are as follows:
1. The armed forces in Taiwan should recruit as many Taiwanese citizens as possible.
2. The Chief Executive's Office should be reorganized into the Taiwan Provincial Government. Before this proposal is endorsed by the Central Government, the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee's Political Affairs Bureau should be responsible for the re-organization and the recruitment of judicious and talented people for the future government.
3. The Political Affairs Bureau should be set up under the Settlement Committee before March 15. One candidate will be chosen by the representatives of each township before he can be elected by the municipal legislative councils. The member quotas for each municipality are as follows: two for Taipei, three for Taipei County, one for Keelung City, three for Hsinchu County, one for Taichung City, four for Taichung County, one for Changhua City, one for Chiayi City, one for Tainan City, four for Tainan County, one for Kaohsiung City, three for Kaohsiung County, one for Pingtung City, one for Penghu County, one for Hualien County, and one for Taitung County, making a total of 30 (actually 29).
4. The Political Affairs Bureau will be in charge of reviewing and authorizing the abolishment and merging of labor camps and other unnecessary institutions.
5. The processing of Japanese-owned properties should be entrusted to the Taiwan Provincial Government.
6. The Taiwan Garrison Command should be abolished so that military power is not abused.
7. Aboriginal people's political and economic rights and interests should be protected.
8. Labor protection law should be implemented on June 1 this year.
9. Taiwanese prisoners of war and traitor suspects who are imprisoned should be released immediately with no conditions attached.
10. Taiwan should be reimbursed the estimated value of 150000 tons of sugar previously given to the Central Government. (Page 70)
On the one hand, Chen Yi agreed with the demands made by the Taiwanese legislative representatives that the Settlement Committee should be set up as a joint effort of the government and civil society. On the other hand, Chen Yi, Ko Yuan-fen and Chang Mu-tao contacted Chiang Wei-chuan in an attempt to sabotage the unity of the Settlement Committee's leadership. National Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (NBIS) agent Hsu Te-huei became the leader of the Chung Yi Service Squad and the head of the Public Order section of the Settlement Committee. The head of the NBIS Taipei Branch Lin Ting-li was appointed by the Taiwan Garrison Command as leader of the Yi Yong Squad, which was set up for the mission of "dividing the unity of rebels and using the power of the people to attack them. Behind the scenes, factions of the Chinese Nationalist Party, the government and the army were allegedly competing with each other for greater power. The party-directed intelligence agency, the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (CBIS) accused Chiang Wei-chuan and Wang Tien-teng of being political opportunists who continued fanning the flames of public fury. Ko Yuan-fen, who represented the NBIS, the Central Government's military intelligence agency, criticized Chiang and Wang for both being bullies recently recruited by the party's headquarters. In the early days of the Settlement Committee, its members were predominantly from the Chinese Nationalist Party. However, the party's office in Taiwan did not try to guide the development of the Settlement Committee. Instead, it chose to watch it decline and fall from the sidelines. As a result, under different influences, the Settlement Committee continued to increase the magnitude of its requests, which later became justification for the Chief Executive's Office decision in favour of military crackdown. (Page 201)
According to Su Sin, who later defected to the Chinese Communist Party, the "32 Demands" was drafted by left-wing youth surrounding Wang Tien-teng, such as Pan Tsin-sin, Hsiao You-san, Tsai Ching-jong and Su Sin. Their participation in the drafting was endorsed by the underground leader of the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan… Chen Yi-song, a former member of the National Political Council, said that there were indeed left-wing young people drafting for Wang Tien-teng, but Taiwanese Communist Party members tended to exaggerate their contributions during the February 28 Incident after they defected to China, so the credibility of their claims is questionable. According to a member of the NBIS who investigated the Tsai Hsiao-chien communist spy case, the Chinese Communist Party had a very limited influence in Taiwan at the time and the Taiwanese Communist Party was not the same thing as the Chinese Communist Party. (Page 69)
It is said that when the "32 Demands" was proposed, intelligence officers from the NBIS and the CBIS, such as Bai Cheng-chi and Lu Bo-hsiung from the CBIS and Hsu Te-huei from the NBIS, were present. The additional 10 demands, which were used as an excuse for military crackdown by the government, were deliberately suggested by the NBIS and CBIS employees present at the meeting. For example, the 29th political demand that "Taiwanese prisoners of war and traitor suspects who are imprisoned should be released immediately" was suggested by Wu Kuo-hsin, National Assembly member and secretary of the Chinese Nationalist Party's special branch of Taiwan Railways, and was passed with a cheering crowd. It was also heard that there were originally only 12 demands and the other 32 demands and additional 10 demands were passed by an applauding crowd made up by members of the Constitutional Association. (Page 71)
On March 8, the Settlement Committee released a statement overturning the resolution passed the day before, saying that too many people participating in the meeting had resulted in the passing of 42 impetuous and inappropriate demands, such as "abolishing the Taiwan Garrison Command and demilitarizing the government army. Demands like these were on the verge of a rebellion against the Central Government and were not in line with the public opinion of Taiwanese people." (Page 72)
After the outbreak of the incident, it is said that Liou Chi-Kuang advocated a compete military crackdown and Ko Yuan-fen (the chief of staff of the Taiwan Garrison Command), Chen Ta-yuan (director of the investigative department of the Taiwan Garrison Command), and Lin Ting-li (the head of the NBIS Taipei Branch) suggested "using the people's power to fight against the people's power." On February 28, Ko Yuan-fen ordered intelligence officers to investigate and monitor the major figures inside the Settlement Committee. The Chief Executive's Office understood the government army was not strong enough to deliver a military crackdown and, instead of oppression from outside, the best way to suppress a social movement was to infiltrate the movement to divide and destroy it from within. The Chief Executive's Office soon adopted the latter strategy, taking advantage of Chiang Wei-chuan's Taiwan Political Construction Association to weaken the power of the Settlement Committee by infiltrating it with intelligence officers waiting for an opportunity to undermine its operation. From February 28 to March 1, the commander of the 4th Military Police Regiment wrote to Chiang Wei-chuan twice, urging him to "clear up the mess." On March 1, Ko Yuan-fen also wrote to Chiang Wei-chuan, inviting him to help with the precarious situation. This showed that the Chief Executive's Office had already planned a strategy for infiltration and sabotage of the Settlement Committee. (Page 59)
On March 3, the Settlement Committee resolved to telegraph Chairman Chiang Kai-shek, informing him of the truth of the whole incident. On the same day at 4 p.m., a telegraph was sent in the name of the Taiwanese People's Congress, accusing the Chief Executive's Office of allowing soldiers and police to randomly attack civilians and shoot innocent people, of causing public anger among the Taiwanese population, of being permissive of government misconduct and unlawful business, and of ignoring complaints from the Taiwanese people. In the same telegraph, the Taiwanese People's Congress also urged the Central Government to send high officials to investigate in Taiwan so that public anger could be soothed, and demanded local autonomy soon be implemented in Taiwan. On the same day, Li Kuang-wei, the chairman of the Taiwanese Compatriot Association in Shanghai, submitted a request to Chiang Kai-shek, demanding him to seriously investigate the incident, to punish those who were politically and morally responsible for the incident, and to restore Taiwanese people's trust in the government by purging corrupt officials. All the above showed that Chiang Kai-shek not only fully grasped the intelligence and opinions regarding the incident, but also understood the feelings and expectations of Taiwanese people. (Page 203)
On March 15, the government army was advancing toward Puli, narrowing the encirclement… The 27 Brigade was in the very disadvantaged situation of not being able to communicate with the outside world after two major external traffic routes were blockaded. Soon, Chen Ming-chung was delegated as the head of a guerrilla force that was divided into three columns to attack the government army stationed near Sun Moon Lake. At the same time, Huang Chin-tao, head of the Public Security Team, led a squad safeguarding the Wu-niu-lan Bridge in order to prevent the government army from attacking from the back. The guerrilla force engaged in a fierce battle with a troop of the government army (4th Company, 2nd Battalion, Regiment 436) near Sun Moon Lake, which resulted in severe casualties in the government army and forced it to retreat to Shuili. However, running out of ammunition, the 27 Brigade's guerrilla force also suffered a massive casualty toll. The next day (March 16), soldiers from two battalions of the government army (2nd and 3rd Battalion, Regiment 436) engaged in another fierce battle with Huang Chin-tao's squad at Wu-niu-lan Bridge. At first, the squad took advantage of a good location to heavily ambush the government army, causing mass causalities. Due to a lack of sufficient firepower and battle experience, Huang Chin-tao's squad gradually found itself in the dire situation of being besieged by the encroaching troops of the government army. Huang Chin-tao had no choice but to break through the blockage with another fighter, escaping to seek help from the headquarters of the 27 Brigade. But after arriving at the Puli Martial Arts Hall, where the 27 Brigade's headquarters was based, chaos and panic reigned among the rebels, and fewer than 20 people were willing to help. In the evening of the same day, faced with a besiegement that made it impossible to replenish weapons and ammunition and to communicate with other resistance forces, the 27 Brigade could not keep on fighting and decided to temporarily disband. Some of its members joined Chen Tsuan-di's guerilla force in Meishan, Chiayi; some just returned to their homes. At around 11 p.m., after the members had buried their weapons, the 27 Brigade was officially disbanded. (Page 221)
On March 14, the government army stationed in Chiayi City started to attack Douliou, battling on the street with the remains of Chen Tsuan-di's guerilla force (a public order team that was led by the director of Douliou Township Chien An Hospital, Chen Tsuan-di, and was not part of the 27 Brigade). Outnumbered by its rivals, Chen Tsuan-di fled with his guerilla force to Meishan, Chiayi. On March 16, the government army (8th Company, Regiment 436) pressed to the east of Meishan, where it battled fiercely with about 200 remaining insurgents. The battle ended with 10 guerillas being shot dead and with 20 rifles, two machine guns, one grenade launcher and one mountain gun being captured. Two days after the battle, another company of the government army (7th Company, Regiment 436) also engaged in a tense fight with approximately 100 guerillas, killing about 60 insurgents, arresting 12 and capturing a load of ammunition. On March 19, Chen Tsuan-di retreated to the mountainous area with his troops in preparation for long-lasting guerilla warfare, taking away all the weapons, ammunition, food and bullock carts that belonged to the nearby residents. Chen Tsuan-di urged those who joined the resistance from other places to hide in the mountains for a year-long operational plan. On March 20, the 21st Division and the 22nd Division were concerned about the remaining rebels hiding in the mountains, so a company (8th Company, Regiment 436) was sent to Meishan, from which the remaining guerillas were forced to flee, leaving behind a load of weapons and ammunition after several hours of fierce battle.
Due to its intimidating terrain, the Meishan and Changhu areas were easy to defend but hard to attack. Later, even though the government army had sent troops to these areas and killed many of the remaining guerillas, it could still not eradicate the insurgents. Even after Wei Tao-ming assumed the role of chairman of the Taiwan Provincial Government on May 16 and announced the lifting of martial law as well as the end of "village cleansing," and after the Taiwan Garrison Command turned the areas designated for military crackdown into security areas, the remnants of Chen Tsuan-di's guerilla force were fighting in Meishan and Changhu. (Page 221)
By March 21, the Keelung Military Fortress had more or less completed the military crackdown mission. According to data, from February 28 to March 10, the weapons and ammunition that it captured from the rebels consisted of six light machine guns (all required fixing) and 139 rifles (most required fixing). During this period, the Fortress used: 34643 rifle bullets, 39897 light machine gun bullets, 5183 pistol bullets, 9592 heavy machine gun bullets, 549 grenades, and 35 pieces of pounder ammunition. The ammunition used in the operation consisted of as many as 100000 bullets, which shows that the military crackdown by the Keelung Military Fortress was extremely severe. Given the amount of ammunition used, it is unlikely that the number of casualties was only about 100 people. The true number is still awaiting investigation. (Page 237)
It would seem that the Keelung Military Fortress allowed its soldiers to execute suspects as they wished in their own designated areas. Examples include: Kuo Chang-yuan and six others, who were murdered in front of the Toucheng Matsu Temple; the Badu Railway Station Massacre; the executions of Chen Cheng-yue, Chang Yun-chang, Chao Tong (all three from Luodong), Yang Yuan-ting (from Keelung), Hsu Jih-sheng, Hsu Chia-chang, Hsu Shih-ming, Chien Te-fa, Chen Chin-pi, Tian Wen-kuan and Shi Chin-jong (all seven from Jinshan). The families of the victims confirmed that these individuals were publicly executed without due legal process, which means that no list of the suspects or reports were left, making it hard for the general public to believe the official death tolls. When soldiers raided the streets, anyone who did not escape in time was shot dead on the spot or detained without a legitimate reason. However, those who were willing to use money or valuables to bribe the soldiers were set free. Many people were tortured and tormented to death. Six Taiwanese compatriot organizations in Shanghai summarized the news reports and hearsay in a joint statement, writing: "Soldiers in Keelung penetrated people's feet with metal wires and tied them up in groups of three or five. If it was just one person, he would be put in a sack before being thrown out to sea. It was recently reported that floating bodies were visible on the sea surface near Keelung." And: "Soldiers in Keelung cut off the ears, noses and genitals of about 20 young students before stabbing them to death." Many interviewees said they had also witnessed horrible scenes like those described in the statement while trying to find the bodies of their family members. (Page 237)
The February 28 Incident is the most tragic massacre in Taiwan's history, with thousands or potentially tens of thousands of casualties. The victims ranged from elites to common people. Countless numbers were murdered without any justifiable reason, which has resulted in a widespread unforgiveness held by victims' families and society toward the incident. This unfortunate event caused by manmade factors has led to the Taiwanese independence movement, the rise of left-leaning ideologies and conflict between people who already lived in Taiwan before the war (and their offspring) and people who moved to Taiwan from China after the war (and their offspring). The consequences of the incident have seriously impacted the harmony and future development of Taiwanese society. (Preface 2)
The last words of Kuo Chang-yuan, the director of Yilan Public Hospital, were: "The land I was born to is not my ancestral country, where I shall return after death. Death and life are decided by Heaven, about which I do not have any second thoughts." (Lee Shiao-feng, Taiwanese elites who disappeared in the February 28 Incident, p. 170.)
The first group of victims were those officially determined guilty. Since the government regarded the February 28 Incident as treasonous, it was inevitable that anyone who took part in the organized insurgence and rioted would be included in the so-called "blacklist" (Footnote 51) before they were arrested and sentenced. However, an investigation shows that many malpractices were discovered in relation to the identification of who was involved and the application of due process of law. Firstly, most participants believed that they had not had any intention of overturning the regime and only advocated the reform of Taiwanese politics. It was not surprising that people who were convicted of "attempting to subvert the government" could not accept the government's justifications. Secondly, some of the victims were arrested secretly and the cause of their death could not be confirmed. Was it an execution that was carried out after the trial in accordance with the conviction? Or was it revenge instigated by their enemies? The families of the victims did not know the answers and hence have lived in sorrow since the massacre. In 2007, a report investigating responsibility for the massacre was published, confirming that Chiang Kai-shek, the chairman of the Nationalist government at the time, should be mainly held responsible for the losses of the February 28 Incident.
The second group of victims were those who did violate martial law. It was understandable that the Nationalist government declared martial law because of the civil war. However, Taiwanese compatriots had not experienced the rule of martial law in the past and did not understand what martial law was. Many local people who did not speak the national language Mandarin or other local languages of China were shot dead on their way to school or work during curfew hours, simply because they did not understand the soldiers' verbal warnings (Footnote 52). The way these people were treated was extremely unjust and unpardonable.
The third group of victims were those killed by immoral soldiers (Footnote 53). After the founding of the Republic of China in 1912, the country had been torn apart by incessant military conflicts. Eight years of fighting against Japanese invasion had a particularly great impact on military education, resulting in failure to reform the military administration and an ill-disciplined army. Therefore, countless wrongdoings and malfeasance (Footnote 54) emerged during the military crackdown in Taiwan. The most common was using one's position in the government to revenge for something personal. Some people were killed because of disagreements; others were murdered after being robbed of their possessions (Footnote 55). Although commanders of the government's army tried to educate their soldiers and correct their behaviors (Footnote 56), illegality was still hard to eradicate. In addition, due to policies of rewarding those who reported suspects secretly (Footnote 57) or identified gangsters (Footnote 58) to the government, many innocent people were also unjustly treated due to some personal grievances and wrongly killed in the end. Some people were deliberately set up and put to death by the government, such as those victims who died in Yuanshan (Footnote 59) on March 8, 1947.
The organizations that victims joined included the Settlement Committee, Taiwan Political Construction Association, Taiwan Autonomy Youth Alliance, Three People's Principles Youth Corps, newspapers, and communist groups. It goes without saying that the organizations that were most greatly impacted by the incident were political ones, especially those that had previously criticized politics or taken part in political activities. (Page 266)
According to the Name List of Criminals that Chen Yi presented to Chairman Chiang Kai-shek on March 13, 1947, there were 20 fugitives that participated in the February 28 Incident, who were Wang Tien-teng (member of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly), Hsu Cheng (lecturer at Yanping College, member of the Working Committee of Taiwan Province of the Chinese Communist Party), Lee Jen-kuei (Taipei City Council member), Hsu Chun-ching (Taipei City Council member), Tan Him, Lim Bo-seng (professor at National Taiwan University), Sung Fei-ju (the director of People's Herald News), Ai Lu-sheng (the founder of the Great Light Post), Juan Chao-ji (the General Manager of Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News), Wu Chin-lien (the Chief Editor of Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News), Liao Chin-ping, Huang Chao-sheng (Taipei City Council member), Lin Lien-Chung (member of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly), Wang Ming-chao (a staff member of the Taiwan Province Railway Management Commission), Si Kang-lam, Lee Ruei-han (lawyer), Lee Ruei-feng (lawyer), Chang Kuang-tsu (the head of gangsters in Taipei), Horiuchi Kinjo (a technologist at the Industrial Research Institute), and Uesaki Torasaburo. According to the official archive, Chang Kuang-tsu, an influential gangster in Taipei, was indicted for being the culprit who instigated the killing of people from other provinces and led his subordinates to assist in the rebellion. Horiuchi and Uesaki were believed to be Japanese spies. The other 17 people on the list were targeted for conspiring in the rebellion. These 17 people went missing after being arrested by the government's army soon after it entered Taipei on March 9. The majority of these 17 people joined one or two political organizations. Six of them, Wang Tien-teng, Lee Jen-kuei, Hsu Chun-ching, Liao Chin-ping, Huang Chao-sheng and Lin Lien-Chung (Taichung), joined the Settlement Committee. Seven of them, Wang Tien-teng, Lee Jen-kuei, Tan Him, Wu Chin-lien, Liao Chin-ping, Huang Chao-sheng and Si Kang-lam, joined the Taiwan Political Construction Association (and some also joined the Settlement Committee at the same time). In addition, Wang Tien-teng also joined the Three People's Principles Youth Corps and assumed the role of director at the Taipei Branch of the Corps in Taiwan. On March 11 and 13, respectively, Chen Yi declared the Settlement Committee and Taiwan Political Construction Association were illegal organizations, before he ordered them to disband and indicted their members for participating in rebellious activities. However, whether or not these two organizations were actually involved in rebellious activities was not put on trial, meaning the due process of law was lacking. Moreover, almost half of the people on the list, Hsu Cheng, Sung Fei-ju, Ai Lu-sheng, Juan Chao-ji, Wang Ming-chao, Lee Ruei-han and Lee Ruei-feng (eight in total), did not belong to the above-mentioned political organizations. The so-called "rebellion" was also unclearly defined (Page 267). According to the archive, only Tan Him was put on trial and sentenced to the death penalty among the above-mentioned fugitives (Page 271).
Chen Yi urged the public to restore education and economic activities. However, some obedient students went back to school and were accidentally killed by soldiers. Many Taiwanese people who were milk delivery workers, newspaper delivery workers, telecommunication workers, vegetable vendors and rickshaw-pullers, were also accidentally killed just because they did not understand the regulations of martial law……According to interviews, the main reason these people were killed was because most Taiwanese people had not experienced the rule of martial law before and did not understand it and because the majority of Taiwanese people did not speak Mandarin and could not communicate with soldiers (Page 294).
The corrupt political atmosphere also led to unscrupulous government officials taking the opportunity to retaliate against private individuals for personal reasons. One of the most sensational examples was the murder of Wu Hong-chi, a High Court judge, and seven other people…….At midnight on March 15, multiple gunshots were heard near Nangang Bridge. The next morning, the bodies of Wu Hong-chi and seven other people were discovered near the bridge (Page 295). The official explanation said that "an assassination group was formed by gangsters in the city of Taipei, dedicated to killing military officers, people from other Chinese provinces and the officials of Taiwanese background who used their power to abuse other people. This group has started its actions and possibly killed those eight people who died near Nangang Bridge……" There was also an unofficial explanation of the assassination group: it was based at the addiction rehab center on Baoan Street and formed by gangsters who were hired by the regime……to kill dissidents. Both the public and Wu's family believed that Wu died as a result of personal vengeance……Wu was honest and forthright. He often criticized the wickedness of the legal system and often chastised his colleagues for their wrongdoings, which might have offended some people. The prosecutor whose surname was Wang was believed to be suspicious. Wu's wife claimed that on the name card that her husband left behind, a character "Wang" had been clearly etched out using a nail, which seemed to be a hint that the prosecutor Wang was the murderer (Page 297). The murder of Ong Iok-lim was probably triggered by a personal vengeance from a government official. Ong Iok-lim was the first prosecutor of Taiwanese background during the Japanese colonial period. After the Second World War, Ong Iok-lim worked as a prosecutor at the Hsinchu District Prosecutors Office……Ong Iok-lim was a man of integrity and impartiality by nature who had prosecuted many corrupt officials. Among them, the most famous was the Hsinchu City Mayor Kuo Shao-tsung who was involved in the misappropriation of milk powder donated by the United States. As soon as Ong Iok-lim found that the culprit of this scandal was the Hsinchu City Mayor Kuo Shao-tsung, he went to arrest him. Unexpectedly, the director of the Hsinchu City Police Department ordered his fellow policemen to encircle the prosecutor and take away his arrest warrant. Afterwards, Ong Iok-lim's superior was surprisingly injudicious and wanted to hold him accountable for the loss of the arrest warrant. Outraged by this treatment, Ong Iok-lim resigned from the post of prosecutor and became a teacher at Jianguo High School in Taipei. It was said that after the arrival of the additional government's army, Kuo Shao-tsung took the opportunity to revenge himself and sent police to Taipei to arrest Ong Iok-lim and executed him. (Page 299)
During the February 28 Incident, Taiwanese people not only fought against the Chief Executive's Office, but also attacked immigrants who had moved from China after the Second World War. Because of this, the Nationalist government's army took retaliatory actions against Taiwanese people. The recently arrived troops from China were known for their lack of discipline and ethics, which was evidenced by endless instances of unfathomable crimes. The archive of all sorts of news coverage and interviews proves that the government's army started its indiscriminate massacre in Taiwan after landing in Keelung on March 8. The Taiwan Garrison Command at some point even gave its clerical workers pistols and authorized them to pull the trigger for self-defense. The Nationalist government's army was also ordered to kill all traitors and rebels. Some soldiers even showed off their shooting skills by targeting civilians. When the government's army entered the city of Taipei, anyone who did not speak Mandarin was shot dead, which resulted in the streets being scattered with corpses from March 8 to 13 (Page 294).
For example, on March 10, somewhere on Changchun Road in Taipei came a group of soldiers who wanted to rob people of their money, watches or personal belongings. Surprisingly, their unlawful behaviors actually resulted in the death of many local people. (Page 295)
On the morning of March 11, the Nationalist government's army declared the rule of marital law after it entered Tainan. When soldiers were checking pedestrians near the railway station, Tu Ping-chang (a private from the 7th Company of the 3rd Battalion, Independent Corps of the 21st Army) confiscated without authorization a few thousand Taiwan dollars and a watch from a Taiwanese person's pockets. When the deputy leader of the battalion noticed the wrongdoing, he not only returned the money and the watch back to that Taiwanese person, but also stripped Tu Ping-chang of his private's uniform and executed him on the spot (Page 255).
In order to fully accomplish the mission, the Taiwan Garrison Command further published a reward and punishment notice, which stipulated that anyone who reported criminals or informed the government of people secretly owning weapons would be rewarded a prize that ranged from 1,000 to 10,000 Taiwan dollars; while anyone who hid intelligence and did not report to the government would be prosecuted for being a conspirator (Page 214). Therefore, some ill-intentioned people (both Taiwanese and recent immigrants from China) took the opportunity to get rid of their enemies and get some money (Page 303).
The heads of villages were forced to report a certain number of gangsters in their home villages. If not, they would be severely punished. This led many village heads who were frightened by the potential punishment to randomly report innocent villagers, resulting in many unnecessary deaths, such as people from Beitou District (Page 303). Some village heads who did not want to engage in such unethical practice were killed. Yu Chu-gen, a village head from Jinguashi, Ruifang, was one of the victims. After the Nationalist government's army entered Jinguashi, he was forced to hand in guns and a list of gangsters from his village. Yu Chu-gen refused to give in, saying that "our village is very peaceful and simple and has never taken part in the incident." In the end, he was tortured to near death before being executed (Page 306).
It is said that the Yuanshan Massacre on March 8 was orchestrated by Ko Yuan-fen and executed by Lin Ting-li and Hsu Te-huei. According to Liao, the deputy leader of the Chung Yi Service Squad, he had brought more than a hundred students to Yuanshan to take over guns, which would be used for maintaining public order. However, after encountering gunshot from soldiers, these students tried to surround the soldiers and poured water on them. The students' actions may have infuriated the soldiers, who took revenge on them in the evening of March 8. More than a hundred students were killed. The next morning on March 9, Ko Yuan-fen took Yang Liang-kung to the square in front of the Yuanshan Army warehouse to identify about a hundred (or about twenty according to a different source) corpses of the so-called rebels that the Nationalist government's soldiers claimed to have killed the previous night. It was said that Yang Liang-kung was suspicious of Ko Yuan-fen's claims and said to his colleagues that it was very strange that only high school students who were about 18 or 19 years old were killed and there were no signs of fighting nearby (Page 210).
Soon after the social unrest had ended and public order restored, the Chief Executive's Office launched a compensatory program (Footnote 60) at the end of March, giving relief funds to government officials and teachers and their dependants and domestic workers who had experienced loss of life and property, and helping them to overcome the hardship in their lives. However, this job was not done satisfactorily. There were many reasons for this, including a) the compensatory program was only targeted at government officials, teachers and their dependants and domestic workers, and it did not cover the losses that the general public experienced; b) not all of the compensatory program was reasonable, resulting in some people who endured great losses but only received a disproportionately small compensation, and some people who experienced not much loss but applied for an exceedingly large compensation; c) due to the scarcity of the relief fund, some ill-intentioned government officials and teachers pretended to raise funds from the general public (especially wealthy people), but actually they were extorting money for their personal use (Footnote 61). This left an extremely bad impression on Taiwanese people. Furthermore, because not many government officials or teachers were compensated, the general public and the families of victims thought that the government had not started any compensatory program dedicated to the losses of either Taiwanese people or immigrants coming from China after the Second World War. Therefore, many people requested that the government should draft the compensatory measures as soon as possible.
In order to compensate the government officials and teachers that belonged to the Chief Executive's Office and its subsidiary departments, the Chief Executive's Office announced nine articles of Compensatory measures dedicated to compensate government officials and teachers of the Chief Executive's Office and its subsidiary departments for their losses in the February 28 Incident. The complete content of the measures was as follows:
Article 1: The compensation or relief for the losses endured by government officials and teachers of the Chief Executive's Office and its subsidiary departments is undertaken in accordance with these regulations.
Article 2: The range of compensation and relief is limited to death, injury and loss of personal belongings.
Article 3: The deceased is given a single payment of 200,000 Taiwan dollars as relief for the funeral expenses. This article is also applied to the spouse, direct blood relatives, and servants.
Article 4: All medical expenses for the injured are reimbursed at the actual cost upon production of a hospital receipt. Those who have not been hospitalized for further treatment and have been certified by his or her direct superior can receive a relief fund of 5,000 Taiwan dollars if it is a minor injury and 50,000 Taiwan dollars if it is a serious injury. The seriousness of the injury is evaluated as stipulated in the Criminal Code. This article is not applicable to those whose medical expenses have already been paid by the government. This article is applicable to the spouse, direct blood relatives or servants of government officials.
Article 5: Relief for the loss of personal belongings is primarily focused on clothing and bedding. If there is a loss of clothing, the relief fund is 10,000 Taiwan dollars for a set of clothes and the number is limited to two sets, one for summer and one for winter. The relief fund for bedding is 20,000 Taiwan dollars for a set and the number is limited to one set.
Article 6: Those who have experienced particularly severe injury or loss of personal belongings can be granted special relief funding after their competent authority provides the details of the injury and possession losses for further approval on a case-by-case basis.
Article 7: If the issuance of relief funds that are mentioned in Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 for funeral expenses, for compensation, or for the loss of personal belongings falls under the responsibility of provincial level departments, it should be reimbursed by the provincial government; if it falls under municipal level departments, it should be reimbursed by local governments; if it falls under state-owned enterprises, it should be reimbursed by the enterprises themselves. All the issuance of relief funds should be accompanied by receipts that will be submitted to the Chief Executive's Office for future reference.
Article 8: Applications for relief funds must be verified by the section chiefs and the heads of the departments of all the levels above. If there is any fraudulence, the managers of all the levels who have attested the authenticity of the application will be severely punished.
Article 9: This regulation is in effect from the date of announcement. (Page 370)
On June 15, 1947, all Taiwanese newspapers published a letter written by Yang Liang-kung, the Control Yuan's investigator responsible for the Fujian and Taiwan area, demanding that the Taiwan Provincial Government ban all municipal government officials from requesting donations from private individuals and civil organizations, and that local councils should be prevented from using any excuse to seek donations from the public, which is perceived as extortion in reality. Many government officials used their own position to frame private individuals who did not cooperate. Therefore, the Taiwan Provincial Government ordered that all officials from all departments could not use the losses in the February 28 Incident as an excuse to seek donations from the public. If any officials continued to use their positions to extort money from the public by threatening to frame them, they would be severely punished. The evidence above shows that government officials at the time did use the February 28 Incident as an excuse to extort money from the public. (Page 397)
The purpose of this report is to illustrate the truth of the incident. There is no intention to hold anyone accountable. However, the actions that several key figures took in the incident cannot be ignored.
Although Chen Yi intended to promote good governance upon arrival in Taiwan (Footnote 62) and was trying to use political measures to resolve the crisis at the beginning of the February 28 Incident (Footnote 63), he requested the central government to dispatch troops for suppressing the social unrest (Footnote 64) after realizing that he no longer could control the development of the situation (Footnote 65). After the troops landed in Taiwan, Chen Yi, as highest official in charge of the military administration in Taiwan, could not effectively ensure the behaviors of soldiers and policemen who carried out the crackdown were within the bounds of lawfulness (Footnote 66), resulting in things such as "police and soldiers from the Taiwan Garrison Command resorting to retaliatory measures (Footnote 67) to beat up and arrest rebels" and "the ordering of the special force of the military police stationed in Taiwan to secretly arrest the National Assembly members" (Footnote 68). Chen Yi's approach targeted people who were not involved in the incident, causing panic and resentment among the Taiwanese population. However, in the wake of the incident, he only acknowledged that it was all his personal failure and refused to admit that the policies he adopted were at fault, which of course cannot be forgiven by the Taiwanese people.
Ko Yuan-fen, the head of staff of the Taiwan Garrison Command back then, believed that the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee was a conspiracy (Footnote 69) to weaken the role of the government, therefore he adopted policies of infiltration and divide and rule when dealing with the committee, hoping to punish its members after the incident escalated (Footnote 70). It was clear that Ko Yuan-fen was ill-intentioned from the very start. Pai Tsung-hsi, the defense minister who represented the government to pacify the Taiwanese people (Footnote 71), pointed out (Footnote 72) that Ko Yuan-fen's attitude in dealing with the incident was "he would rather kill ninety-nine innocent people than leave one real rebel at large." The result was many innocent people were killed in the military crackdown, triggering widespread panic among the Taiwanese population. Because of this, Pai Tsung-hsi believed that "Ko Yuan-fen was a reckless and impatient person who abused his office, made many mistakes in dealing with the incident, and refused to reflect on his failure because of his stubborn nature." Pai Tsung-hsi, therefore, suggested that Ko Yuan-fen needed to be dismissed from his position as severe punishment in order to appease the public's anger.
Peng Meng-chi, the Commander of the Kaohsiung Fortress Headquarters at the time of the incident, suddenly resorted to military crackdown at 2 p.m. on March 6 (Footnote 73), preventing the social turmoil from escalating. From the perspective of the government, Peng Meng-chi had achieved greatly. However, from the perspective of Kaohsiung citizens, Peng Meng-chi's decision to indiscriminately machine-gun local people, causing great casualty in local communities, made his status disputable.. After the incident, to people's surprise, Peng Meng-chi was promoted to head of the Taiwan Garrison Command, which caused deep fear and uneasiness among Taiwanese people.
What Chang Mu-tao, the head of the 4th Military Police Regiment, did at the time was very controversial. He first invited Wei-Chuan to mediate the disputes between the government and the public and encouraged him to join the Settlement Committee to proceed with divide and rule tactics. Secondly, when the reinforcement troops of the government's army landed in Taiwan at midday on March 8, Chang Mu-tao continued to lie to the members of the Settlement Committee (Footnote 74) that if the public did not try to disarm soldiers, the government would not adopt any military operations against Taiwanese people. Chang's intention was to reduce their vigilance, so that people who originally wanted to escape would stay where they were. Therefore, these people became easy targets for the soldiers after the reinforcement troops landed. In addition, Chang Mu-tao's military police subordinates also arrested many people at many different places after the rule of military law was declared, causing a lot of controversy. When Pai Tsung-hsi, the defense minister, came to Taiwan to try to appease the Taiwanese public, he once ordered that all the arrests should only be carried out by the Taiwan Garrison Command. However, military police corps continued to arrest civilians (Footnote 75), which showed that Chang Mu-tao's defiance of the order of his superior was very blatant.
Furthermore, intelligence workers in Taiwan were also believed to have misled the government. After the outbreak of the incident, the National Bureau of Investigation and Statistics and the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (Footnote 76) both exaggerated the seriousness of the incident, claiming that some people were not purely advocating political reforms, but were conspiring to rebel against the regime, seek Taiwanese independence, and overturn the government. They also exaggerated the casualty of their mainland Chinese compatriots and the number of people who joined the riots. Therefore, Chairman Chiang Kai-shek was convinced that the situation was dire and thus organized the 21st Division to clamp down on the social unrest in Taiwan. Although Chairman Chiang had reiterated that soldiers should not engage in any form of retaliation against Taiwanese people, his subordinates did not listen to his order.
Without doubt, Chiang Kai-shek played an undeniable role in the settlement of the February 28 Incident. Chiang Kai-shek, as the head of the country, was certainly responsible for sending troops to clamp down on insurgencies. However, we cannot ignore questions such as whether or not the decision of military crackdown was made in due process, and whether there were any abuses in delivering the decision. Judging from literature from different sources, what the Settlement Committee did was only to demand a high level of autonomy for Taiwan as a whole, and there was no intention of rebelling against the central government. Unfortunately, Chiang Kai-shek was preoccupied with military operation in the Chinese Civil War and did not have time to verify the intelligence he received. He also blindly trusted Chen Yi and accepted his request for more enforcement troops in Taiwan. All of the above-mentioned inevitably led to a conclusion that Chiang Kai-shek was culpable due to his oversight over this matter. Even if Chiang Kai-shek understood the truth afterwards, the historical mistakes could not be overturned. Furthermore, it was also a shame that some soldiers did not avoid retaliation against the locals and committed breaches of discipline during the military crackdown. Although Chiang Kai-shek repeated his emphasis on military discipline and banned retaliatory activities (Footnote 77), he could not prevent misconducts from happening. In the aftermath of the incident, government officials of Taiwanese heritage such as Qiu Nian-tai and Tsai Pei-huo suggested the government to punish those who were guilty of dereliction of duty so that the public's anger could be appeased. But Chiang Kai-shek did not accept the proposal and left the historical trauma undealt with for a long time, which was further evidence of his lack of consideration.
When Chen Yi arrived in Taiwan on October 24, 1945, he rested a bit at Songshan Airport before he announced his policies, saying that he "came to Taiwan to make contributions, not to be a government official. I have confidence in building Taiwan and resolve to launch political reform and eradicate corruption and bad governance. I demand the cooperation of all Taiwanese compatriots in working on the construction of a new Taiwan." (Page 4)
At the beginning of the incident, Chen Yi did not take a tough stance on it, partly because there were not sufficient soldiers stationed on the island to respond to the social unrest and partly because he as Taiwan's Chief Executive did not want any scandal to undermine his political status and prestige (See Footnote 21 for more details). Therefore, it was likely that Chen Yi was trying to play down the seriousness of the conflict or even gloss over it. (Page 202)
On March 6, Chen Yi prepared a detailed report on the incident for Chairman Chiang Kai-shek and appointed Lee Yi-chung, the director of the Chinese Nationalist Party's Taiwan Province Division, to fly to Nanjing on March 7 to present it in detail to Chiang in person. The letter particularly emphasized that after the outbreak of the incident, the "treacherous party" (Chinese Communist Party) members, pro-Japanese gentry from the former colonial time, and hooligans had taken the opportunity to stir up anti-Chinese and anti-government sentiments. They seized firearms from the army and police and besieged local government buildings, which "showed that it was less an ordinary mass movement than well-planned, well-organized rebellion." Therefore, it should be of no doubt that participants needed to be severely punished. Chen Yi believed that "if he had eradicated the pro-Japanese gentry and had strengthened the armed force in Taiwan when he first assumed the office, the incident would not have deteriorated to the current situation." In order to mitigate the damage caused by the incident and solve the problem completely, Chen Yi proposed a few measures: firstly, in terms of politics, the government should change the feudalist ideology harbored by a majority of Taiwanese people, as well as restructure the Chief Executive's Office into the Taiwan Provincial Government and experiment with democratic elections of county and city mayors, so that Taiwanese people could have more trust in the government. Secondly, "the affiliates of the treacherous party must be forcibly annihilated and must not be allowed to exist." Chen Yi believed that only after the well-trained, two well-equipped divisions of the government's army were dispatched to Taiwan could the government have sufficient strength to deal with the treacherous party members and to exterminate the rebellious attempts to gain Taiwanese independence…The reason many members of Taiwanese intelligentsia were arrested and murdered one after another during the military crackdown could be understood from this letter. (Page 204)
However, the later development of the situation was not expected by Chen Yi. It turned out that the political discontent and economic despair that Taiwanese people had put up with for about a year had already reached a tipping point. The Settlement Committee realized it could take advantage of the public's anger and thus announced a series of demands consisting of political and economic requests, which were found unacceptable by Chen Yi. One of the reasons was that the institution of the Chief Executive's Office with all-encompassing power was designed and proposed by Chen Yi. Now Chen Yi's administration was on the brink of total disintegration, dealing a heavy blow to his political prestige and status. (Page 202)
According to the archive, Chairman Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Yi were opposed to the retaliatory policies. On March 10, Chen Yi told Hsu Shih-hsien, the director of the Department of Martial Law, and Ko Yuan-fen, the Chief of Staff, that many soldiers were found to have humiliated Taiwanese people and leaders of platoons and companies must constantly keep a watch on their soldiers to stop these sorts of behaviors. On the same day, Ko Yuan-fen also requested his subordinates to follow this order. On March 11, Hsu Shih-hsien made a report, saying that since the declaration of martial law, a total of 135 civilians had been arrested. Problems were usually found after interrogation, meaning that the "real reasons these people were arrested were extremely different to the reality." The suspects were either seriously injured or robbed of their belongings by soldiers while being escorted. Therefore, Hsu Shih-hsien suggested Chen Yi should make distinction between good and bad people to avoid implicating the innocent. He also urged Chen Yi to order his subordinate soldiers and officers "not to recklessly retaliate against local people," which showed that things like indiscriminate arrest, killing and robbery were not uncommon at the time. This was also confirmed by victims during oral history interviews. (Page 300)
According to the report that the Military Police Command and Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics presented to Chairman Chiang Kai-shek on March 12, the retaliatory operation was soon started after the government's army arrived in Taiwan on March 9 and 10. The Investigation and Statistics Department of the Chinese Nationalist Party's branch in Taiwan also suggested the government should seize the opportunity to eradicate the rebels and sent the list of wanted people to the Taiwan Garrison Command. On the evening of March 10, the government started to purge the "traitors in the cities." (Page 213)
Chen Yi ordered the Military Police's Special Investigations Branch in Taiwan to secretly arrest Lin Lien-chung (member of the National Assembly), Lin Kuei-tuan, Lee Ruei-feng, and the most wanted fugitive Tseng Bi-chung. Chiang Wei-chuan had already absconded. (Page 214)
During the night of February 28, Ko Yuan-fen, the Chief of Staff, also wrote in his diary that "the outbreak of this incident was, of course, incited by some traitors from within. However, we failed to take much precaution to avoid it because of our political unpreparedness, lack of sufficient attention to the mass movement, and the failure to manage and lead the crowds, all of which were the biggest mistakes that our party and our army had ever made." (Page 200)
On March 4, Ko Yuan-fen wrote in his diary that "after careful consideration, I have decided to prepare militarily as soon and thoroughly as possible. I will resort to military crackdown immediately after evidence of their treasonous behaviors is released." (Page 201)
On March 28, Pai Tsung-hsi instructed six measures for dealing with the aftermath of the February 28 Incident. 1) In terms of people who have been arrested, the government is required to provide a list during Pai Tsung-hsi's visit containing the responsible agencies and number and names of people it has incarcerated or executed. Except for those who have committed serious crimes, those who have been incarcerated should be treated leniently. 2) In terms of arresting criminals, only communists and culprits of the incident can be arrested, responsible agencies can only arrest people after they are directed to do so by the Taiwan Garrison Command, and suspects should be put on trial as soon as they are arrested. 3) In terms of dealing with students, all students need to go back to school immediately. After resuming school, students cannot be arrested unless they are communists. If they are found of any misconduct, they will be punished by school authorities in accordance with school rules. 4) The crackdown operation should be carried out by city and county government staff members and assisted by the government's army. 5) Injured government officials and teachers and civilians who do not have clothing and food should be aided urgently. 6) Military discipline should be strictly maintained. (Page 215)
After Peng Meng-chi dispatched troops to conduct the military crackdown in the afternoon of March 6, he telegraphed Chen Yi, who later scolded him, saying that the problems in Taiwan should be solved politically instead. Chen Yi said to Peng Meng-chi that he should be held accountable for the deterioration of the situation in Kaohsiung in the last few days as he had acted recklessly. Chen Yi ordered Peng Meng-chi to retreat all his troops back to the battalion and wait for further notice within two days after the reception of the telegraph. After Peng Meng-chi successfully clamped down the resistance in Kaohsiung, he sent another telegraph to Chen Yi, explaining the reason behind his military operation and requesting permission to execute Tu Guang-ming and the other two leaders of the local rebellion. After this telegraph was sent, the Taiwan Garrison Command replied immediately, saying that Peng Meng-chi should be complimented for his appropriate handling of the situation and granting approval for his execution requests. The reason Chen Yi changed his attitude was because he wanted to placate Peng Meng-chi who was in charge of the military crackdown in southern Taiwan. (Page 229)
At midday on March 8, Chang Mu-tao, the leader of the Military Police Corps, met with members of the Settlement Committee, saying that "the political reforms demanded by Taiwanese people were legitimate and the central government would definitely not dispatch troops to Taiwan." Chang also urged the Taiwanese compatriots "not to provoke the central government" and swore on his life that the central government would absolutely not launch any warfare on the island (Page 72). In fact, during the incident, Ko Yuan-fen, Chang Mu-tao and other intelligence workers had already made all kinds of preparations in Taipei to accommodate the imminent military operation. The enforcement troops had already landed in Keelung in the afternoon of the same day (March 8). (Page 206)
On March 31, the Taiwan Garrison Command followed Pai Tsung-hsi's instructions to notify all the troops on the island that they could not arrest suspects without receiving an order from the Command and that if they had to arrest someone urgently, they needed to inform the Command as soon as possible. However, on April 4, the 4th Military Police Regiment sought permission from the Taiwan Garrison Command to perform its tasks as it wished based on the legal authorities of military police as military prosecutors and judiciary police. (Page 216)
On March 1... before dawn, the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics received an urgent telegraph from its investigative office in Taiwan reporting the February 28 Incident. After that, the Bureau received urgent telegraphs twice a day. Yeh Hsiu-Feng, the director of the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, suggested Chiang Kai-shek to send three well-trained army divisions to Taiwan. The Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics deliberately exaggerated the seriousness of the incident. For example, it claimed in its telegraph on March 5 that most participants of the rebellion were samurais that had been employed by the Japanese army from overseas and that there were approximately 120,000 of them in Taiwan. (Page 203)
On March 12, the Military Police Command and the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics reported to Chiang Kai-shek that Chen Yi arbitrarily retaliated against Taiwanese people after the landing of the enforcement troops. On March 13, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Chen Yi urgently, saying, "please strictly forbid all the military personnel from engaging in retaliation or you will be prosecuted for insubordination." Chiang's tone was extremely stern and severe. On the same day, Chen Yi also sent an urgent telegraph back to Chiang, saying even though he had already banned military personnel from retaliation, he would continue to firmly remind his subordinates. On March 14, Chen Yi once again ordered all the military personnel not to engage in any retaliation. Although the same message had been repeated again and again, retaliation against local Taiwanese people was still common in the military, which was very baffling. (Page 300)
The February 28 Incident is indeed one of the major tragedies in the history of modern Taiwan, and is the result of the interaction of many factors. In the previous 50 years of Japanese colonial rule, the Japanese had deliberately designed an isolation policy that created a schism between the Taiwanese people and China. Moreover, with the deliberate implementation of Japanese education, the ideas and values of the Taiwanese people had become obviously different to the Chinese mainlanders. On the other side of Formosa Strait, the Chinese officialdom and population were also extremely unfamiliar with the situation in Taiwan. Overwhelmed by the deteriorating situation of the anti-communist warfare on the Chinese mainland, the Nationalist government was unable to pay as much attention to Taiwan as it should have. And the Chief Executive did not consider the public opinions on the island and chose to suppress Taiwanese people's political rights. Moreover, officials' incompetence and widespread corruption deepened the public's dissatisfaction with the government. Given Taiwan was severely damaged during the Second World War (Footnote 78), the fact that the Nationalist government was unable to support Taiwan's reconstruction (Footnote 79) and complete the restoration in the short term (Footnote 80) due to its turbulent political situation and incessant warfare against the Chinese Communist Party in China was not generally understood by the Taiwanese people. Therefore, the outbreak of the tragedy was caused by both subjective factors and objective factors, which were not something that could be fully controlled by the Chief Executive.
Following investigative studies conducted by many parties, an approximate outline of the truth of the February 28 Incident can already be drawn. Unfortunately, an accurate number of the casualties in the incident could not be ascertained after thorough collection of information, interviews, and statistical analysis. During the interviews, our research fellows could deeply feel the trauma and sorrow that the families of the victims have experienced for decades. Their helplessness, grief, and expectations are not only difficult for us to forget, but also something that the Taiwanese authorities should not ignore. We must not forget history as it can guide us in the future. We should learn the sorrowful lessons of this tragic incident and prevent the future occurrence of such a dramatic schism. It is hoped that the Taiwanese authorities do not avoid accountability for the inappropriate crackdown, and do give compensations to the innocent victims of the February 28 Incident. Meanwhile, we also hope people from all walks of life can understand the special situation of the time, that the trauma inflicted by the tragedy can be soothed with forgiveness and peacefulness, and that a better future can be together worked toward.
At the end of the Second World War, Taiwan was constantly bombed by the Allies, resulting in considerable damage to Taipei, Keelung, Hsinchu, Chiayi and Kaohsiung. For example, Keelung, which was bombed 25 times from October 1944 to the end of the war in 1945, was most severely bombed as it was in the fortified region. "The total bombed area was 3,051,000 square meters and 56 percent of the city was damaged. 5,056 buildings were ruined in the bombing and 9,030 buildings were estimated to have stood before the war, which means 56 percent of the buildings were damaged." In addition, the roads and waterways were also damaged to a similar degree. Manufacturing, mining, and electricity facilities were among the most seriously damaged. In terms of electricity, before the takeover of the Nationalist government, the power supply had already dropped to about 30,000 kWh, which was less than one third of that in 1943. Also, the acquisition of raw materials was not easy and talents were hard to find. Therefore, in the early days of the new regime, the Chief Executive's Office was planning to ask Japanese industrial and mining technicians to stay in Taiwan to maintain production activities. However, after the objection of the U.S. government, they had to be repatriated. This was why the production level was difficult to restore to the pre-war status in the short run. (Page 5)
As the Chinese Civil War was constantly escalating, a nationwide economic crisis broke out. The rise in prices, disorder in society, and widespread panic among the Chinese population were reasons the central Nationalist government could not dedicate itself to properly managing Taiwan. (Page 27)
After the war, the whole world was working on reconstruction from the debris. Inflation was haunting the globe, and China was no exception. The Taiwanese economy was increasingly unstable after being implicated in the escalation of anti-communist warfare in China. Back then, Taiwan encountered various problems, including insufficient industrial raw materials, damage to production capabilities, a lack of transport facilities, fiscal difficulties, and an inability to replenish the loss of technicians. (Page 23)
「在蒐集資料方面,除了徵集台灣現有之政府檔案外,研究人員並分赴海外及大陸地區,蒐集相關之珍貴檔案,例如美國史丹福大學胡佛研究所檔案館所藏George H. Kerr先生所捐贈的『二二八事件』檔案、英國公共檔案局(Public Record Office)的淡水領事館檔案,以及南京第二歷史檔案館的資料...等。研究小組所獲資料之豐富,在當前海內外進行此一問題之研究計劃中,堪稱無出其右。」
The February 28 Incident Research Report (ererba shijian yanjiu baogao 二二八事件研究報告) was published
on Feb. 22, 1992 by the "Ad Hoc Research Group into the 228 Incident" (xingzhengyuan yanjiu ererba shijian zhuan'an
xiaozu 行政院研究二二八事件專案小組) of the ROC Executive Yuan in Chinese and English. Please note
that in both the Chinese and the English version the footnotes 36 to 39 and 50 are nowhere mentioned in the text.
For additional information about the February 28 Incident the chief researcher
recommends the classic "Formosa
Betrayed" by George H. Kerr, published in 1965. Another noteworthy account about the topic is the book "Taiwan 1947:
The Uprising against the Kuomintang", written by German-British sinologist, translator and linguist Günter Whittome and
published in 1991 by the Institut für Asienkunde (Institute for Asian Studies, abbrev. IfA) in Hamburg, available in English and German. (The IfA was renamed German
Institute for Global and Area Studies—abbrev. GIGA—in 2006.)
It is the sacred right of each and every sovereign State and a fundamental principle of international law to safeguard national unity and territorial integrity. The Charter of the United Nations specifically stipulates that the United Nations and its Members shall refrain from any action against the territorial integrity or political independence of any of its Members or any State and shall not intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. The United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations points out that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity, territorial integrity or political independence of a State or country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
The modern history of China was a record of subjection to aggression, dismemberment and humiliation by foreign powers. It was also a chronicle of the Chinese people's valiant struggles for national independence and in defense of their state sovereignty, territorial integrity and national dignity. The origin and evolution of the Taiwan question are closely linked with that period of history. For various reasons Taiwan is still separated from the mainland. Unless and until this state of affairs is brought to an end, the trauma on the Chinese nation will not be healed and the Chinese people's struggle for national reunification and territorial integrity will continue.
What is the present state of the Taiwan question? What is the crux of the problem? What are the position and views of the Chinese Government regarding the settlement of this issue? In order to facilitate a better understanding by the international community, it is necessary to elucidate the following points.
Lying off the southeastern coast of the China mainland, Taiwan is China's largest island and forms an integral whole with the mainland.
Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times. It was known as Yizhou or Liuqiu in antiquities. Many historical records and annals documented the development of Taiwan by the Chinese people in earlier periods. References to this effect were to be found, among others, in Seaboard Geographic Gazetteer compiled more than 1,700 years ago by Shen Ying of the State of Wu during the period of the Three Kingdoms. This was the world's earliest written account of Taiwan. Several expeditions, each numbering over ten thousand men, had been sent to Taiwan by the State of Wu (third century A.D.) and the Sui Dynasty (seventh century A.D.) respectively. Since early seventeenth century the Chinese people began to step up the development of Taiwan. Their numbers topped one hundred thousand at the end of the century. By 1893 (19th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu) their population exceeded 2.54 million people in 507,000 or more households. That was a 25-fold increase in 200 years. They brought in a more advanced mode of production and settled the whole length and breadth of Taiwan. Thanks to the determined efforts and hard toil of the pioneers, the development of the island as a whole greatly accelerated. This was the historical fact of how Taiwan, like the other parts of China, came to be opened up and settled by the Chinese people of various nationalities. From the very beginning the Taiwan society derived from the source of the Chinese cultural tradition. This basic fact had not changed even during the half century of Japanese occupation. The history of Taiwan's development is imbued with the blood, sweat, and ingenuity of the Chinese people including the local ethnic minorities.
Chinese governments of different periods set up administrative bodies to exercise jurisdiction over Taiwan. As early as in the mid-12th century the Song Dynasty set up a garrison in Penghu, putting the territory under the jurisdiction of Jinjiang County of Fujian's Quanzhou Prefecture. The Yuan Dynasty installed an agency of patrol and inspection in Penghu to administer the territory. During the mid- and late 16th century the Ming Dynasty reinstated the once abolished agency and sent reinforcements to Penghu in order to ward off foreign invaders. In 1662 (first year of the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi) General Zheng Chenggong (known in the West as Koxinga) instituted Chengtian Prefecture on Taiwan. Subsequently, the Qing government expanded the administrative structure in Taiwan, thereby strengthening its rule over the territory. In 1684 (23rd year of the reign of Emperor Kangxi) a Taiwan-Xiamen Patrol Command and a Taiwan Prefecture Administration were set up under the jurisdiction of Fujian Province. These in turn exercised jurisdiction over three counties on the island: Taiwan (present-day Tainan), Fengshan (present-day Gaoxiong) and Zhuluo (present-day Jiayi). In 1714 (53rd year of the reign of Emperor Kangxi) the Qing government ordered the mapping of Taiwan to determine its size. In 1721 (60th year of the reign of Emperor Kangxi) an office of imperial supervisor of inspecting Taiwan was created and the Taiwan-Xiamen Patrol Command was renamed Prefecture Administration of Taiwan and Xiamen, incorporating the subsequently-created Zhanghua County and Danshui Canton. In 1727 (5th year of the reign of Emperor Yongzheng) the administration on the island was reconstituted as the Prefecture Administration of Taiwan (which was later renamed Prefecture Command for Patrol of Taiwan) and incorporated the new Penghu Canton. The territory then became officially known as Taiwan. In order to upgrade the administration of Taiwan, the Qing government created Taibei Prefecture, Jilong Canton and three counties of Danshui, Xinzhu and Yilan in 1875 (1st year of the reign of Emperor Guangxu). In 1885 (11th year of the reign of Emperor Guangxu), the government formally made Taiwan a full province covering three prefectures and one subprefecture and incorporating 11 counties and 5 cantons. Liu Mingchuan was appointed first Governor of Taiwan. During his tenure of office, railways were laid, mines opened, telegraph service installed, merchant ships built, industries started and new-style schools set up. Considerable social, economic and cultural advancement in Taiwan was achieved as a result.
After the Chinese people's victory in the war against Japanese aggression in 1945, the Chinese government reinstated its administrative authority in Taiwan Province.
Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits carried out a prolonged, unremitting struggle against foreign invasion and occupation of Taiwan. Since the late 15th century Western colonialists started to grab and conquer colonies in a big way. In 1624 (4th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Tianqi) Dutch colonialists invaded and occupied the southern part of Taiwan. Two years later Spanish colonialists seized the northern part of Taiwan. In 1642 (15th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Chongzhen) the Dutch evicted the Spaniards and took over north Taiwan. The Chinese people on both sides of the Straits waged various forms of struggle including armed insurrections against the invasion and occupation of Taiwan by foreign colonialists. In 1661 (18th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Shunzhi) General Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) led an expedition to Taiwan and expelled the Dutch colonialists from the island in the following year.
Japan launched a war of aggression against China in 1894 (20th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu). In the ensuing year, as a result of defeat the Qing government was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, ceding Taiwan to Japan. This wanton betrayal and humiliation shocked the whole nation and touched off a storm of protests. A thousand or more candidates from all 18 provinces including Taiwan who had assembled in Beijing for the Imperial Examination signed a strongly-worded petition opposing the ceding of Taiwan. In Taiwan itself, people wailed and bemoaned the betrayal and went on general strikes. General Liu Yongfu and others of the garrison command stood with Taiwan compatriots and put up a fierce fight against the Japanese landing forces. To support this struggle, people on the mainland, particularly in the southeastern region, showed their solidarity by generous donations or organizing volunteers to Taiwan to fight the Japanese forces. Taiwan compatriots never ceased their dauntless struggle throughout the Japanese occupation. Initially, they formed insurgent groups to wage guerrilla warfare for as long as seven years. When the Revolution of 1911 overthrew the Qing monarchy they in turn lent support to their mainland compatriots by staging more than a dozen armed insurrections. The 1920s and 1930s witnessed surging waves of mass action sweeping across the island against Japanese colonial rule.
In 1937 the Chinese people threw themselves into an all-out war of resistance against Japanese aggression. In its declaration of war against Japan, the Chinese Government proclaimed that all treaties, conventions, agreements, and contracts regarding relations between China and Japan, including the Treaty of Shimonoseki, had been abrogated. The declaration stressed that China would recover Taiwan, Penghu and the four northeastern provinces. After eight years of grueling war against Japanese aggression the Chinese people won final victory and recovered the lost territory of Taiwan in 1945. Taiwan compatriots displayed an outburst of passion and celebrated the great triumph of their return to the fold of the motherland by setting off big bangs of fireworks and performing rites to communicate the event to their ancestors.
The international community has acknowledged the fact that Taiwan belongs to China. The Chinese people's war of resistance against Japanese aggression, being part of the world-wide struggle against Fascism, received extensive support from people all over the world. During the Second World War China, the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and others formed an alliance to oppose the Axis of Germany, Japan and Italy. The Cairo Declaration issued by China, the United States and Great Britain on 1 December 1943 stated: "It is the purpose of the three great Allies that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores [Penghu], shall be restored to China." The Potsdam Proclamation signed by China, the United States and Great Britain on 26 July 1945 (subsequently adhered to by the Soviet Union) reiterated: "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." On 15 August of the same year, Japan declared surrender. The instrument of Japan's surrender stipulated that "Japan hereby accepts the provisions in the declaration issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, China and Great Britain on July 26, 1945 at Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." On 25 October the ceremony for accepting Japan's surrender in Taiwan Province of the China war theater of the Allied powers was held in Taibei. On the occasion the chief officer for accepting the surrender proclaimed on behalf of the Chinese government that from that day forward Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago had again been incorporated formally into the territory of China and that the territory, people, and administration had now been placed under the sovereignty of China. From that point in time forward, Taiwan and Penghu had been put back under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty.
Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, 157 countries have established diplomatic relations with China. All these countries recognize that there is only one China and that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China and Taiwan is part of China.
Taiwan was returned to China de jure and de facto at the end of the Second World War. It became an issue only as an aftermath of the ensuing anti-popular civil war started by Kuomintang, and more especially because of intervention by foreign forces.
Taiwan question and civil war launched by Kuomintang. During the war of resistance against Japanese aggression the Chinese Communist Party and other patriotic groups pressed Kuomintang into a national united front with the Communist Party to fight Japanese imperialist aggression. After victory of the war the two Parties should have joined hands to work for the resurgence of China. But the Kuomintang clique headed by Chiang Kaishek flouted the people's fervent aspirations for peace and for building an independent, democratic and prosperous new China. Relying on U.S. support, this clique tore up the 10 October 1945 agreement between the two Parties and launched an all-out anti-popular civil war. The Chinese people were compelled to respond with a people's liberation war which was to last more than three years under the leadership of the Communist Party. Since the Kuomintang clique had already been spurned by the people of all nationalities for its reign of terror, the government of the "Republic of China" in Nanjing was finally overthrown by the Chinese people. The People's Republic of China was proclaimed on 1 October 1949 and the Government of the new People's Republic became the sole legal government of China. A group of military and political officials of the Kuomintang clique took refuge in Taiwan and, with the support of the then U.S. administration, created the division between the two sides of the Straits.
Taiwan question and responsibility of the United States. Against the backdrop of East-West confrontation in the wake of the Second World War and guided by its conceived global strategy and national interest considerations, the U.S. government gave full support to the Kuomintang, providing it with money, weapons and advisors to carry on the civil war and block the advance of the Chinese people's revolution. However, the U.S. government never achieved its objective. The White Paper on United States Relations with China released by the Department of State in 1949 and Secretary of State Dean Acheson's letter of transmittal to President Harry S. Truman had to admit this. Dean Acheson lamented in his letter: "The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. ... Nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not."
At the time of the founding of the People's Republic of China the then U.S. administration could have pulled itself from the quagmire of China's civil war. But it failed to do so. Instead, it adopted a policy of isolation and containment of New China. When the Korean War broke out, it started armed intervention in the inter-Taiwan Straits relations which were entirely China's internal affairs. On 27 June 1950 President Truman announced: "I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa." Thus the Seventh Fleet invaded the Taiwan Straits and the U.S. 13th Air Force set up base in Taiwan. In December 1954 the U.S. concluded with the Taiwan authorities a so-called mutual defense treaty placing China's Taiwan Province under U.S. "protection". The erroneous policy of the U.S. government of continued interference in China's internal affairs led to prolonged and intense confrontation in the Taiwan Straits area and henceforth the Taiwan question became a major dispute between China and the United States.
In order to ease tension in the Taiwan Straits area and seek ways of solving the dispute between the two countries, the Chinese Government started dialogues with the United States from the mid-1950s onwards. The two countries held 136 sessions of talks at ambassadorial level from August 1955 to February 1970. However, no progress had been made in that period on the key issue of easing and removing tension in the Taiwan Straits area. It was not until late 1960s and early 1970s when the international situation had undergone changes and as New China had gained in strength that the U.S. began to readjust its China policy and the relations between the two countries started a thawing. In October 1971 the United Nations General Assembly adopted at its 26th session Resolution 2758 which restored all the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and expelled the "representatives" of the Taiwan authorities from the U.N. U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China in February 1972 in the course of which the two countries issued a joint communiqu'e?? in Shanghai stating that: "The U.S. side declared: the United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position."
In December 1978 the U.S. Government accepted the three principles proposed by the Chinese Government for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, namely, the United States should sever "diplomatic relations" and abrogate the "mutual defense treaty" with the Taiwan authorities and withdraw U.S. military forces from Taiwan. On 1 January 1979 China and the United States formally established diplomatic relations. The Communiqu'e on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations said that: "The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan ... ... The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." Normalization of Sino-U.S. relations was thus achieved.
Regrettably, however, scarcely three months after the event, a so-called Taiwan Relations Act was passed by the U.S. Congress and signed into law by the President. A domestic legislation of the U.S. as it was, this Act contained many clauses that contravened the communiqu'e? on the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S. and the principles of international law, and seriously prejudiced the rights and interests of the Chinese people. Invoking this legislation, the U.S. Government has continued its arms sales to Taiwan, interference in China's internal affairs and obstruction to Taiwan's reunification with the mainland.
In order to resolve the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the Chinese and the U.S. governments negotiated and reached an agreement on 17 August 1982. A communique? bearing the same date became the third joint communique? governing Sino-U.S. relations. In that communique? the U.S. Government stated that: "It does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution." Yet in the past dozen or more years the U.S. Government has not only failed to implement the communiqu'e? in earnest, but has repeatedly contravened it. In September 1992 the U.S. Government even decided to sell 150 F-16 high-performance fighter aircraft to Taiwan. This action of the U.S. Government has added a new stumbling block in the way of the development of Sino-U.S. relations and settlement of the Taiwan question.
It is clear from the foregoing that the U.S. Government is responsible for holding up the settlement of the Taiwan question. Since the 1970s many Americans of vision and goodwill in or outside the administration have contributed much by way of helping to resolve the differences between China and the U.S. on the Taiwan question. The aforesaid three joint communiqu'e?s testify to their effort and contribution of which the Chinese Government and people are highly appreciative. On the other hand, one cannot fail to note that there are people in the U.S. who still do not want to see a reunified China. They have cooked up various pretexts and exerted influence to obstruct the settlement of the Taiwan question.
The Chinese Government is convinced that the American and the Chinese peoples are friendly to each other and that the normal development of the relations between the two countries accords with the long-term interests and common aspiration of both peoples. Both countries should cherish the three hard-won joint communiqu'e?s guiding the development of bilateral relations. As long as both sides abide by the principles enshrined in those communique?s, respect each other and set store by their overall common interests, it will not be difficult to settle the Taiwan question that has been left over from history and Sino-U.S. relations will surely see steady improvement and development ahead.
To settle the Taiwan question and achieve national reunification -- this is a sacrosanct mission of the entire Chinese people. The Chinese Government has persistently worked towards this end since the founding of the People's Republic. Its basic position on this question is: peaceful reunification; one country, two systems.
Peaceful reunification; one country, two systems -- how has this position been formulated? The Chinese Government conceived a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question as early as in the 1950s. In May 1955 the late Premier Zhou Enlai said at a NPC Standing Committee meeting that two alternatives were open to the Chinese people for the solution of the Taiwan question -- by resort to war or by peaceful means. The Chinese people would strive for a peaceful solution wherever possible, he affirmed. In April 1956 the late Chairman Mao Zedong put forward thoughts for policymaking such as "peace is the best option", "all patriots are of one family" and "it is never too late to join the ranks of patriots". However, those wishes have not come to fruition for reasons such as interference by foreign forces.
Major changes took place in and outside China in the 1970s. Diplomatic ties were established and relations normalized between China and the United States. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to shift the focus of the work of the Party and the State to the economic modernization programme. In the meantime, people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, compatriots of Hong Kong and Macao as well as overseas Chinese and people of Chinese descent all expressed their fervent hope that the two sides of the Straits would join hands to work for a resurgence of China. It was against this historical background that the Chinese Government formulated the position of "peaceful reunification; one country, two systems". The position takes the overall national interests and the future of the country into consideration. It respects history as well as the prevailing situation. It is realistic and takes care of the interests of all.
On 1 January 1979 the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China issued a message to compatriots in Taiwan, pronouncing the Chinese Government's basic position regarding peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. It called for the holding of talks between the two sides of the Straits to seek an end to the military confrontation. It pledged that in the pursuit of national reunification, the Government "will respect the status quo on Taiwan and the views of people of all walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures".
In a statement on 30 September 1981 the late Chairman Ye Jianying of the NPC Standing Committee further elaborated the policy and principles for the settlement of the Taiwan question. He affirmed that "after the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region" and proposed that talks be held on an equal footing between the ruling Parties on each side of the Straits, namely, the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang.
Referring to Ye Jianying's remarks, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping pointed out on 11 January 1982 that this in effect meant "one country, two systems", i.e., on the premise of national reunification, the main body of the nation would continue with its socialist system while Taiwan could maintain capitalism.
On 26 June 1983 Deng Xiaoping further enunciated the concept of peaceful reunification, stressing that the crucial point was national reunification. He went on to expound the Government's policy on reunification and on the creation of a Taiwan special administrative region.
On 12 October 1992 General Secretary Jiang Zemin of the CPC Central Committee pointed out: "We shall work steadfastly for the great cause, adhering to the principles of peaceful reunification and 'one country, two systems' ... ... We reiterate that the Chinese Communist Party is ready to establish contact with the Chinese Kuomintang at the earliest possible date to create conditions for talks on officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits and gradually realizing peaceful reunification. Representatives from other parties, mass organizations and all circles on both sides of the Taiwan Straits could be invited to join in such talks."
Basic Contents of "peaceful reunification; one country, two systems". This position is an important component of the theory and practice of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and a fundamental state policy of the Chinese Government which will not change for a long time to come. Its basic contents are as follows:
1. Only one China. There is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and the seat of China's central government is in Beijing. This is a universally recognized fact as well as the premise for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question.
The Chinese Government is firmly against any words or deeds designed to split China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It opposes "two Chinas", "one China, one Taiwan", "one country, two governments" or any attempt or act that could lead to "independence of Taiwan". The Chinese people on both sides of the Straits all believe that there is only one China and espouse national reunification. Taiwan's status as an inalienable part of China has been determined and cannot be changed. "Self- determination" for Taiwan is out of the question.
2. Coexistence of two systems. On the premise of one China, socialism on the mainland and capitalism on Taiwan can coexist and develop side by side for a long time without one swallowing up the other. This concept has largely taken account of the actual situation in Taiwan and practical interests of our compatriots there. It will be a unique feature and important innovation in the state system of a reunified China.
After reunification, Taiwan's current socio-economic system, its way of life as well as economic and cultural ties with foreign countries can remain unchanged. Private property, including houses and land, as well as business ownership, legal inheritance and overseas Chinese and foreign investments on the island will all be protected by law.
3. A high degree of autonomy. After reunification, Taiwan will become a special administrative region. It will be distinguished from the other provinces or regions of China by its high degree of autonomy. It will have its own administrative and legislative powers, an independent judiciary and the right of adjudication on the island. It will run its own party, political, military, economic and financial affairs. It may conclude commercial and cultural agreements with foreign countries and enjoy certain rights in foreign affairs. It may keep its military forces and the mainland will not dispatch troops or administrative personnel to the island. On the other hand, representatives of the government of the special administrative region and those from different circles of Taiwan may be appointed to senior posts in the central government and participate in the running of national affairs.
4. Peace negotiations. It is the common aspiration of the entire Chinese people to achieve reunification of the country by peaceful means through contacts and negotiations. People on both sides of the Straits are all Chinese. It would be a great tragedy for all if China's territorial integrity and sovereignty were to be split and its people were to be drawn into a fratricide. Peaceful reunification will greatly enhance the cohesion of the Chinese nation. It will facilitate Taiwan's socio-economic stability and development and promote the resurgence and prosperity of China as a whole.
In order to put an end to hostility and achieve peaceful reunification, the two sides should enter into contacts and negotiations at the earliest possible date. On the premise of one China, both sides can discuss any subject, including the modality of negotiations, the question of what Parties, groups and personalities may participate as well as any other matters of concern to the Taiwan side. So long as the two sides sit down and talk, they will always be able to find a mutually acceptable solution.
Taking into account the prevailing situation on both sides of the Straits, the Chinese Government has proposed that pending reunification the two sides should, according to the principle of mutual respect, complementarity and mutual benefit, actively promote economic cooperation and other exchanges. Direct trade, postal, air and shipping services and two-way visits should be started in order to pave the way for the peaceful reunification of the country.
Peaceful reunification is a set policy of the Chinese Government. However, any sovereign state is entitled to use any means it deems necessary, including military ones, to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Chinese Government is under no obligation to undertake any commitment to any foreign power or people intending to split China as to what means it might use to handle its own domestic affairs.
It should be pointed out that the Taiwan question is purely an internal affair of China and bears no analogy to the cases of Germany and Korea which were brought about as a result of international accords at the end of the Second World War. Therefore, the Taiwan question should not be placed on a par with the situation of Germany or Korea. The Chinese Government has always opposed applying the German or Korean formulas to Taiwan. The Taiwan question should and entirely can be resolved judiciously through bilateral consultations and within the framework of one China.
The present division between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits is a misfortune for the Chinese nation. All the Chinese people are yearning for an early end to this agonizing situation.
In order to enable normal movement of people across the Straits and to achieve reunification of the country, the Chinese Government has made proposals towards this end and, at the same time, adopted measures to step up the development of inter-Straits relations.
On the political plane, policy adjustments have been made with a view to breaking down the mentality of hostility. The Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate have decided respectively that people who had gone to Taiwan would no longer be prosecuted for offenses prior to the founding of the People's Republic of China.
On the military plane, initiatives have been taken to ease military confrontation across the Straits. Shelling of Jinmen and other islands have been discontinued. Some forward defense positions and observation posts along the Fujian coast have been transformed into economic development zones or tourist attractions.
On the economic plane, doors have been flung open to facilitate the flow of goods and people. Businessmen from Taiwan are welcome to invest or trade on the mainland. They are accorded preferential treatment and legal safeguards.
The Chinese Government has also adopted a positive attitude and taken measures to encourage bilateral exchanges and cooperation in areas such as two-way travels, post and communications as well as scientific, cultural, sports, academic and journalistic activities. A non-governmental Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits has been set up and authorized by the Government to liaise with the Straits Exchange Foundation and other relevant non-governmental bodies in Taiwan for the purpose of upholding the legitimate rights and interests of people on both sides and promoting inter-Straits relations.
Such policies and measures of the Chinese Government have won the understanding and support of more and more Taiwan compatriots, compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao as well as overseas Chinese and people of Chinese descent. On their part, Taiwan compatriots have contributed tremendously to the development of inter-Straits relations. In recent years the Taiwan authorities have in turn made readjustments in their policy regarding the mainland. They have taken steps to ease the situation, such as allowing people to visit relatives on the mainland, gradually reducing the restrictions on people-to-people exchanges and contact, expanding indirect trade, permitting indirect investment and cutting red tape in inter-Straits post, telecommunications and bank remittance services. All these are conducive to better interchanges. The past few years have witnessed rapid growth of economic relations and trade as well as increasing mutual visits and sundry exchanges across the Straits. The Wang Daohan--Koo Chen-fu Talks in April 1993 resulted in four agreements, marking a step forward of historic significance in inter-Straits relations. Thus an atmosphere of relaxation prevails in the Taiwan Straits for the first time in the past four decades. This is auspicious to peaceful reunification.
It should be pointed out that notwithstanding a certain measure of easing up by the Taiwan authorities, their current policy vis-a-vis the mainland still seriously impedes the development of relations across the Straits as well as the reunification of the country. They talk about the necessity of a reunified China, but their deeds are always a far cry from the principle of one China. They try to prolong Taiwan's separation from the mainland and refuse to hold talks on peaceful reunification. They have even set up barriers to curb the further development of the interchanges across the Straits.
In recent years the clamours for "Taiwan independence" on the island have become shriller, casting a shadow over the course of relations across the Straits and the prospect of peaceful reunification of the country. The "Taiwan independence" fallacy has a complex social-historical root and international background. But the Taiwan authorities have, in effect, abetted this fallacy by its own policy of rejecting peace negotiations, restricting interchanges across the Straits and lobbying for "dual recognition" or "two Chinas" in the international arena. It should be affirmed that the desire of Taiwan compatriots to run the affairs of the island as masters of their own house is reasonable and justified. This should by no means be construed as advocating "Taiwan independence". They are radically distinct from those handful of "Taiwan independence" protagonists who trumpet "independence" but vilely rely on foreign patronage in a vain attempt to detach Taiwan from China, which runs against the fundamental interests of the entire Chinese people including Taiwan compatriots. The Chinese Government is closely following the course of events and will never condone any manoeuvre for "Taiwan independence".
Certain foreign forces who do not want to see a reunified China have gone out of their way to meddle in China's internal affairs. They support the anti-Communist stance of the Taiwan authorities of rejecting peace talks and abet the secessionists on the island, thereby erecting barriers to China's peaceful reunification and seriously wounding the national feelings of the Chinese people.
The Chinese Government is convinced that Taiwan compatriots want national reunification and that this is also true with most of the political forces in or out of office in Taiwan. The people on both sides of the Straits will overcome all the barriers and stumbling blocks by their joint efforts and ensure a better development of relations across the Straits.
As has been elucidated in the foregoing, there is only one China in the world, of which Taiwan is an inalienable part. The Government of the People's Republic of China has been recognized by the United Nations and throughout the world as the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people. In the interest of safeguarding state sovereignty and realizing national reunification the Chinese Government has always stood firm on the principle of one China and ensured the interests of Taiwan compatriots in international relations involving Taiwan. The Chinese Government has no doubt that its position will be respected by all other governments and people.
The Chinese Government deems it necessary to reiterate its position and policy on the following matters.
(1) Relations between Taiwan and countries maintaining diplomatic ties with China
All countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China have, in conformity with international law and the principle of one China, undertaken in formal agreement or understanding with the Chinese Government not to establish any ties of an official nature with Taiwan. According to international law, a sovereign state can only be represented by a single central government. As a part of China, Taiwan has no right to represent China in the international community, nor can it establish diplomatic ties or enter into relations of an official nature with foreign countries. Nevertheless, considering the needs of Taiwan's economic development and the practical interests of Taiwan compatriots, the Chinese Government has not objected to non-governmental economic or cultural exchanges between Taiwan and foreign countries.
In recent years the Taiwan authorities have vigorously launched a campaign of "pragmatic diplomacy" to cultivate official ties with countries having diplomatic relations with China in an attempt to push "dual recognition" and achieve the objective of creating a situation of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". The Chinese Government is firmly against this scheme.
It is noted that the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world cherish friendly relations with China and abide by their agreement or understanding with China on the issue of Taiwan. The Chinese Government appreciates this. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that, in disregard of their international credibility, certain countries have breached the undertaking made at the time of the establishment of diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China by evolving official relations with Taiwan, thereby putting a spoke in the wheel of China's reunification. The Chinese Government sincerely hopes that the governments in question will take measures to rectify the situation.
(2) Relations between international organizations and Taiwan
The sovereignty of each State is an integral whole which is indivisible and unsharable. The Government of the People's Republic of China, as the sole legal government of China, has the right and obligation to exercise state sovereignty and represent the whole of China in international organizations. The Taiwan authorities' lobbying for a formula of "one country, two seats" in international organizations whose membership is confined to sovereign states is a manoeuvre to create "two Chinas". The Chinese Government is firmly opposed to such an attempt. Its principled position fully conforms to the fundamental interests of the entire Chinese people including Taiwan compatriots and overseas Chinese. Only on the premise of adhering to the principle of one China and in the light of the nature and statutes of the international organizations concerned as well as the specific circumstances, can the Chinese Government consider the question of Taiwan's participation in the activities of such organizations and in a manner agreeable and acceptable to the Chinese Government.
All the specialized agencies and organizations of the United Nations system are inter-governmental organizations composed of sovereign states. After the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, all the specialized agencies and organizations of the U.N. system have formally adopted resolutions restoring to the People's Republic of China its lawful seat and expelling the "representatives" of the Taiwan authorities. Since then the issue of China's representation in the U.N. system has been resolved once and for all and Taiwan's re-entry is out of the question. However, it should be pointed out that recently some elements of the Taiwan authorities have been clamouring for "returning to the United Nations". Apparently, this is an attempt to split state sovereignty, which is devoid of any legal or practical basis. The Chinese Government is convinced that all governments and organizations of the U.N. system will be alert to this scheme and refrain from doing anything prejudicial to China's sovereignty.
In principle, Taiwan is also ineligible for membership in other categories of inter-governmental organizations. As to regional economic organizations such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Taiwan's participation is subject to the terms of agreement or understanding reached between the Chinese Government and the parties concerned which explicitly prescribe that the People's Republic of China is a full member as a sovereign state whereas Taiwan may participate in the activities of those organizations only as a region of China under the designation of Taipei, China (in ADB) or Chinese Taipei (in APEC). This is only an ad hoc arrangement and cannot constitute a "model" applicable to other inter-governmental organizations or international gatherings.
As regards participation in non-governmental international organizations, the relevant bodies of the People's Republic of China may reach an agreement or understanding with the parties concerned so that China's national organizations would use the designation of China, while Taiwan's organizations may participate under the designation of Taipei, China or Taiwan, China.
(3) Aviation services between Taiwan and countries having diplomatic relations with China
Airspace is an inalienable part of a country's territory. The 1919 Paris Aviation Convention and the 1944 Chicago Convention affirm the principle of complete and exclusive sovereignty of each country over its airspace. Therefore, the opening of aviation services with Taiwan by any airlines, including privately-operated ones, of countries having diplomatic relations with China is a political issue affecting China's sovereignty and cannot be regarded as a non-political transaction. State-run airlines of countries having diplomatic relations with China certainly must not operate air services to Taiwan. Privately-operated airlines must seek China's consent through consultations between their government and the Chinese Government before they can start reciprocal air services with privately-operated airlines of Taiwan. As a matter of fact, according to the afore-said principle the Chinese Government has consented to such services between privately-operated airlines of Britain, Germany, Canada, etc. and their counterparts in Taiwan.
As for countries which already had aviation services with Taiwan before the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, they can negotiate with the Chinese Government to change the official nature of such services so as to be able to continue the operations as privately-run commercial transportation undertakings.
(4) Arms sales to Taiwan by countries having diplomatic relations with China
The Chinese Government has always firmly opposed any country selling any type of arms or transferring production technology of the same to Taiwan. All countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China should abide by the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and refrain from providing arms to Taiwan in any form or under any pretext. Failure to do so would be a breach of the norms of international relations and an interference in China's internal affairs.
All countries, and especially big powers shouldering major responsibilities for world peace, are obligated to strictly abide by the guidelines laid down by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to restrict the proliferation of conventional weapons so as to contribute to maintaining and promoting regional peace and security. However, at a time when relations across the Taiwan Straits are easing up, certain powers have seen fit to renege on their undertakings under international agreements and to flout the Chinese Government's repeated strong representations by making arms sales to Taiwan, thereby whipping up tension between the two sides of the Straits. This not only constitutes a serious threat to China's security and an obstacle to China's peaceful reunification, but also undermines peace and stability in Asia and the world at large. It stands to reason that the Chinese people should voice strong resentment against this conduct.
In international affairs the Chinese Government always pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and adheres to the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful Co-existence. It actively seeks to develop friendly relations with all countries of the world and will never undermine any country's interests nor interfere in its internal affairs. By the same token it expects all other governments to refrain from undermining China's interests or interfering in China's internal affairs and to correctly handle their relations with Taiwan.
Reunification of the country embodies the fundamental interest of the Chinese nation.
After national reunification the two sides of the Taiwan Straits can pool their resources and make common cause in economic development and work towards China's resurgence. Numerous problems that have been besetting Taiwan would be judiciously resolved within the framework of one China. Taiwan compatriots will share the pride and glory of a great nation with their kith and kin from the other parts of the motherland.
Taiwan question has long been a destabilizing factor in the Asia-Pacific region. Reunification of China will not only bolster the stability and development of the country itself, but also contribute to the further enhancement of the friendly relations and cooperation between China and other countries as well as to peace and development in the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole.
The Chinese Government is confident that it can count on the understanding and support of governments and people of all countries in the pursuit of its just cause of safeguarding its state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
This white paper was issued on Aug. 31, 1993 and was the first of altogether three white papers the PRC issued
on Taiwan so far. The second white paper on the topic was issued on Feb. 21, 2000,
the third on Aug. 10, 2022.
See also the URLs leading to the sources of this white paper in English and Chinese.
A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements,
declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining
to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF
file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010
please click here.
On June 30,
1998, during his nine-day state visit to the PRC, US President Bill Clinton made a statement on his new Taiwan position at the Shanghai Library
(上海圖書館):
[...] I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don't support independence for Taiwan,
or two Chinas, or one Taiwan—one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member of any organization
for which statehood is a requirement. [...]
Whereas at no time since the
establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, has Taiwan been under the control of the People's Republic
of China;
Whereas the United States began its long, peaceful, friendly relationship with Taiwan in 1949;
Whereas since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, the policy of the United States has been based on the
expectation that the future relationship between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan would be determined by peaceful means;
Whereas in March 1996, the People's Republic of China held provocative military maneuvers, including missile launch exercises
in the Taiwan Strait, in an attempt to intimidate the people of Taiwan during their historic, free and democratic presidential election;
Whereas officials of the People's Republic of China refuse to renounce the use of force against democratic Taiwan;
Whereas Taiwan has achieved significant political and economic strength as one of the world's premier democracies and as
the nineteenth largest economy in the world;
Whereas Taiwan is the seventh largest trading partner of the United States and imports more than twice as much annually from
the United States as does the People's Republic of China; and
Whereas no treaties exist between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan that determine the future status of Taiwan: Now
therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),
That Congress—
(1) affirms its longstanding commitment to Taiwan and the people of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act
(Public Law 96-8);
(2) affirms its expectation, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means,
and considers any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to the peace and security of the Western
Pacific and of grave concern to the United States;
(3) affirms its commitment, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and
defense services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;
(4) affirms its commitment, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, that only the President and Congress shall determine the nature
and quantity of defense articles and services for Taiwan based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan; and
(5) urges the President of the United States to seek a public renunciation by the People's Republic of China of any use of force, or
threat to use force, against democratic Taiwan.
The title was amended so as to read: 'Affirming U.S. Commitments Under the Taiwan Relations Act'.
Additional information concerning the US Senate Resolution 107 can be found on relevant page of the US Congress;
please click here.
The title of this document can be translated to Chinese as follows: Meiguo canyiyuan yilingqi hao gongtong jueyi'an
美國參議院 107 號共同決議案.
Whereas at no time since the
establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, has Taiwan been under the control of the People's Republic
of China;
Whereas the United States began its long, peaceful, friendly relationship with Taiwan in 1949;
Whereas since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, the policy of the United States has been based on the expectation
that the further relationship between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan would be determined by peaceful means;
Whereas in March 1996, the People's Republic of China held provocative military maneuvers including missile launch exercises in
the Taiwan Strait, in an attempt to intimidate the people of Taiwan during their historic, free, and democratic Presidential election;
Whereas officials of the People's Republic of China refuse to renounce the use of force against democratic Taiwan;
Whereas Taiwan has achieved significant political and economic strength as one of the world's premier democracies and as the
19th largest economy in the world;
Whereas Taiwan is the 7th largest trading partner of the United States;
Whereas no agreements exist between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan that determine the future status of Taiwan; and
Whereas the House of Representatives passed a resolution by a vote of 411-0 in June 1998 urging the President to seek, during his
recent summit meeting in Beijing, a public renunciation by the People's Republic of China of any use of force, or threat of use of force, against
democratic Taiwan: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),
That Congress—
(1) affirms its longstanding commitment to Taiwan and the people of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8);
(2) affirms its expectation, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, that the future status of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means,
and that the people of both sides of the Taiwan Strait should determine their own future, and considers any effort to determine or influence the
future status of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific region and of grave concern to
the United States;
(3) affirms its commitment, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services,
including appropriate ballistic missile defenses, in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability;
(4) affirms its commitment, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, that only the President and Congress shall determine the nature and
quantity of defense articles and services for Taiwan based solely upon their judgment of the defensive needs of Taiwan;
(5) urges the President, once again, to seek a public renunciation by the People's Republic of China of any use of force, or threat of use
of force, against the free people of Taiwan; and
(6) affirms its strong support, in accordance with the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act, of appropriate membership for Taiwan in international
financial institutions and other international organizations.
Additional information concerning the US Senate Resolution 107 can be found on relevant page of the US Congress;
please click here.
The title of this document can be translated to Chinese as follows: Meiguo zhongyiyuan sanlingyi hao gongtong jueyi'an
美國眾議院 301 號共同決議案.
On July 9, 1999, ROC president Lee
Teng-hui made a statement on the relations between the ROC and the PRC during an interview with journalists of German broadcasting
station Deutsche Welle:
[...] The 1991 constitutional amendments have designated cross-strait relations as a state-to-state
relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship, rather than an internal relationship between a legitimate government and a
renegade group, or between a central government and a local government. Thus, the Beijing authorities' characterization of Taiwan as
a "renegade province" is historically and legally untrue. [...]
On October 1, 1949, the Chinese people won a great victory in the new democratic revolution and founded the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Kuomintang (KMT) ruling clique retreated from the mainland to entrench in China's Taiwan Province in confrontation with the Central Government with the support of foreign forces. This is the origin of the Taiwan issue. Settlement of the Taiwan issue and realization of the complete reunification of China embody the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. The Chinese government has worked persistently toward this goal in the past 50 years. From 1979, the Chinese government has striven for the peaceful reunification of China in the form of "one country, two systems" with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort. Economic and cultural exchanges and people-to-people contacts between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits have made rapid progress since the end of 1987. Unfortunately, from the 1990s, Lee Teng-hui, the leader of the Taiwan authorities, has progressively betrayed the One-China Principle, striving to promote a separatist policy with "two Chinas" at the core, going so far as to openly describe the cross-Straits relations as "state to state relations, or at least special state to state relations." This action has seriously damaged the basis for peaceful reunification of the two sides, harmed the fundamental interests of the entire Chinese nation including the Taiwan compatriots, and jeopardized peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The Chinese government has consistently adhered to the One-China Principle and resolutely opposed any attempt to separate Taiwan from China. The struggle between the Chinese government and the separatist forces headed by Lee Teng-hui finds its concentrated expression in the question of whether to persevere in the One-China Principle or to create "two Chinas" or "One-China, one Taiwan."
In August 1993, we issued a white paper entitled "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China," which systematically expounds the fact concerning Taiwan as an inalienable part of China, the origin of the Taiwan issue and the Chinese government's basic principles and related policies regarding resolution of the Taiwan question. We deem it necessary here to further explain to the international community the Chinese government's position and policy on the One-China Principle.
The One-China Principle has been evolved in the course of the Chinese people's just struggle to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its basis, both de facto and de jure, is unshakable.
Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. All the facts and laws about Taiwan prove that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. In April 1895, through a war of aggression against China, Japan forced the Qing government to sign the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki, and forcibly occupied Taiwan. In July 1937, Japan launched an all-out war of aggression against China. In December 1941, the Chinese government issued the Proclamation of China's Declaration of War Against Japan, announcing to the world that all treaties, agreements and contracts concerning Sino-Japanese relations, including the Treaty of Shimonoseki, had been abrogated, and that China would recover Taiwan. In December 1943, the Cairo Declaration was issued by the Chinese, U.S. and British governments, stipulating that Japan should return to China all the territories it had stolen from the Chinese, including Northeast China, Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago. The Potsdam Proclamation signed by China, the United States and Britain in 1945 (later adhered to by the Soviet Union) stipulated that "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." In August of that year, Japan declared surrender and promised in its instrument of surrender that it would faithfully fulfill the obligations laid down in the Potsdam Proclamation. On October 25, 1945, the Chinese government recovered Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago, resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan.
On October 1, 1949, the Central People's Government of the PRC was proclaimed, replacing the government of the Republic of China to become the only legal government of the whole of China and its sole legal representative in the international arena, thereby bringing the historical status of the Republic of China to an end. This is a replacement of the old regime by a new one in a situation where the main bodies of the same international laws have not changed and China's sovereignty and inherent territory have not changed therefrom, and so the government of the PRC naturally should fully enjoy and exercise China's sovereignty, including its sovereignty over Taiwan.
Since the KMT ruling clique retreated to Taiwan, although its regime has continued to use the designations "Republic of China" and "government of the Republic of China," it has long since completely forfeited its right to exercise state sovereignty on behalf of China and, in reality, has always remained only a local authority in Chinese territory.
The formulation of the One-China Principle and its basic meaning. On the day of its founding, the Central People's Government of the PRC declared to governments of all countries in the world, "This government is the sole legitimate government representing the entire people of the People's Republic of China. It is ready to establish diplomatic relations with all foreign governments that are willing to abide by the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty." Shortly afterwards, the Central People's Government telegraphed the United Nations, announcing that the KMT authorities had "lost all basis, both de jure and de facto, to represent the Chinese people," and therefore had no right to represent China at all. One principle governing New China's establishment of diplomatic relations with a foreign country is that it recognizes the government of the PRC as the sole legitimate government representing the whole of China, severs or refrains from establishing diplomatic relations with the Taiwan authorities.
These propositions of the Chinese government met with obstruction by the U.S. government. On January 5, 1950, the U.S. President Truman issued a statement, saying that the U.S. and other Allied countries recognized China's exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan Island in the four years since 1945. However, after the start of the Korean War in June 1950, to isolate and contain China the U.S. government not only sent troops to occupy Taiwan, but it also dished out such fallacies as "the status of Taiwan has yet to be determined" and later, step by step, lobbied for "dual recognition" among the international community in order to create "two Chinas." Naturally, the Chinese government resolutely opposed this, insisting that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China. China has evolved the One-China Principle precisely in the course of the endeavor to develop normal diplomatic relations with other countries and the struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The above propositions constitute the basic meaning of the One-China Principle, the crucial point being to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
During the 30 or 40 years after 1949, although the Taiwan authorities did not recognize the legitimate status of the government of the PRC as the representative of the whole of China, they did insist that Taiwan is a part of China and that there is only one China, and opposed "two Chinas" and "Taiwan independence. " This shows that for a long time there has been a common understanding among the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits on the fundamental question that there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory. As far back as October 1958, when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was engaged in the battle to bombard Jinmen, Chairman Mao Zedong declared to the Taiwan authorities, "There is only one China, not two, in the world. You agree with us on this point, as indicated in your leaders' proclamations." In January 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) issued a Message to Taiwan Compatriots, pointing out that "the Taiwan authorities have always stood firm on the one China position and opposed the independence of Taiwan. This is our common stand and our basis for cooperation."
The Chinese government's solemn and reasonable stand for the One-China Principle has gained the understanding and support of more and more countries and international organizations, and the One-China Principle has been gradually accepted by the international community at large. In October 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted at its 26th session Resolution 2758, which expelled the representatives of the Taiwan authorities and restored the seat and all the lawful rights of the government of the PRC in the United Nations. In September 1972, China and Japan signed a Joint Statement, announcing establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and that Japan recognizes the government of the PRC as the only legitimate government of China, fully understands and respects the Chinese government's position that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC, and promises to adhere to the position as prescribed in Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation. In December 1978, China and the U.S. issued the Joint Communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations, in which the U.S. " recognizes the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China" and "acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China. " Up to now, 161 countries have established diplomatic relations with the PRC; they all acknowledge the One-China Principle and promise to handle their relations with Taiwan within the one-China framework.
The One-China Principle is the foundation stone for the Chinese government's policy on Taiwan. On Comrade Deng Xiaoping's initiative, the Chinese government has, since 1979, adopted the policy of peaceful reunification and gradually evolved the scientific concept of "one country, two systems." On this basis, China established the basic principle of "peaceful reunification, and one country, two systems." The key points of this basic principle and the relevant policies are: China will do its best to achieve peaceful reunification, but will not commit itself to ruling out the use of force; will actively promote people-to-people contacts and economic and cultural exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, and start direct trade, postal, air and shipping services as soon as possible; achieve reunification through peaceful negotiations and, on the premise of the One-China Principle, any matter can be negotiated. After reunification, the policy of "one country, two systems" will be practiced, with the main body of China (Chinese mainland) continuing with its socialist system, and Taiwan maintaining its capitalist system for a long period of time to come. After reunification, Taiwan will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, and the Central Government will not send troops or administrative personnel to be stationed in Taiwan. Resolution of the Taiwan issue is an internal affair of China, which should be achieved by the Chinese themselves, and there is no call for aid by foreign forces. The afore-mentioned principles and policies embody the basic stand and spirit of adhering to the One-China Principle, and fully respect Taiwan compatriots' wish to govern and administer Taiwan by themselves. On January 30, 1995, President Jiang Zemin put forward eight propositions on the development of relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits and the promotion of peaceful reunification of China, explicitly pointing out: "Adhering to the One-China Principle is the basis and prerequisite for peaceful reunification. "
Only by adhering to the One-China Principle can peaceful reunification be achieved. The Taiwan issue is one left over by the Chinese civil war. As yet, the state of hostility between the two sides of the Straits has not formally ended. To safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and realize the reunification of the two sides of the Straits, the Chinese government has the right to resort to any necessary means. Peaceful means would be favourable to the common development of the societies on both sides of the Straits, and to the harmony and unity of the compatriots across the Straits. Peaceful means is therefore the best means. The Chinese government's declaration in 1979 on implementing the principle of peaceful reunification was based on the premise that the Taiwan authorities at that time upheld the principle that there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is a part of China. Meanwhile, the Chinese government took into account the fact that the U.S. government, which for many years had supported the Taiwan authorities, had accepted that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the only legitimate government of China, and saw this acknowledgment as being beneficial to the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. While carrying out the policy of peaceful reunification, the Chinese government always makes it clear that the means used to solve the Taiwan issue is a matter of China's internal affairs, and China is under no obligation to commit itself to rule out the use of force. This is by no means directed against Taiwan compatriots, but against the scheme to create an "independent Taiwan" and against the foreign forces interfering in the reunification of China, and is intended as a necessary safeguard for the striving for peaceful reunification. Resort to force would only be the last choice made under compelling circumstances.
As for Taiwan, upholding the principle of one China indicates that it acknowledges that China's sovereignty and territory are inalienable. In this way, both sides of the Taiwan Straits will have a common basis and premise and may find ways to solve their political differences and realize peaceful reunification through consultation on an equal footing. If Taiwan denies the One-China Principle and tries to separate Taiwan from the territory of China, the premise and basis for peaceful reunification will cease to exist. As for the United States, if it promises to follow a one-China policy, it should earnestly implement the three communiques between the Chinese and U.S. governments and fulfill the series of promises it has made. It should maintain only cultural, commercial and other non-governmental relations with Taiwan; oppose "Taiwan independence," "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" and not to stand in the way of the reunification of China. Acting otherwise will destroy the external conditions necessary for the Chinese government to strive for peaceful reunification.
As for countries in the Asia-Pacific region and other regions in the world, the situation across the Taiwan Straits has always been closely linked with the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Adherence to the policy of one China by countries concerned will be beneficial to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and favourable for China to develop friendly relations with other countries, and therefore conforms to the interests of the Asia-Pacific region and other countries in the world.
The Chinese government is actively and sincerely striving for peaceful reunification. To achieve peaceful reunification, the Chinese government has appealed time and again for cross-Straits negotiations on the basis of equality and the One-China Principle. Taking Taiwan's political reality into full account and out of consideration for the Taiwan authorities' request for the negotiations to be held on an equal footing, we have put forward one proposal after another, such as that the negotiations should be held between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese KMT on a reciprocal basis and that the talks between the two parties may include representatives from all parties and mass organizations of Taiwan, and we have never spoken of negotiations between the "central and local authorities." The Chinese government has also proposed that dialogues may start first, including political dialogues, which may gradually move on to procedural consultations for political talks to solve the name, the topics for discussion and the forms of official talks before political talks are held. Political talks may be carried out step by step. First, negotiations should be held and an agreement reached on an official end to the state of hostility between the two sides under the principle of one China so as to jointly safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and work out plans for the development of the future cross-Straits relations. In January 1998, to seek and expand the political basis for relations between the two sides, the Chinese government explicitly proposed to the Taiwan side that before the realization of reunification and in handling affairs concerning inter-Straits relations, especially during the talks between the two sides, the One-China Principle should be upheld, namely that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is not to be separated. The Chinese government hopes that on the basis of the One-China Principle, the two sides will hold consultations on an equal footing and discuss national reunification together.
To strive for peaceful reunification, the Chinese government has adopted a series of positive policies and measures to promote the comprehensive development of cross-Straits relations. From the end of 1987, when the state of isolation between the two sides was terminated, to the end of 1999, the number of Taiwan compatriots coming to the mainland of China for visiting their relatives, sightseeing or exchanges reached 16 million by turnstile count. The total indirect trade volume between the two sides of the Straits has exceeded US$ 160 billion; the agreed capital to be invested by Taiwan business people in the mainland has exceeded US$ 44 billion, of which US$ 24 billion has been actually used. Great progress has been made in the exchange of mail and telecommunications across the Straits; and some progress has been made in the exchange of air and shipping services too. The NPC and its Standing Committee, the State Council, and local governments have worked out a sequence of laws and regulations to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan compatriots. To properly solve the concrete issues arising from the people-to-people contacts between the two sides through consultations, in November 1992 the mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation reached the common understanding during talks on routine affairs that each of the two organizations should express verbally that "both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the One-China Principle." On this basis, the leaders of these two organizations successfully held the "Wang Daohan-Koo Chen-fu talks" and signed several agreements on protecting the legitimate rights and interests of the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits in April 1993. In October 1998, the leaders of the two organizations met in Shanghai, starting political dialogue across the Straits. The talks between the two organizations were carried out on an equal footing. Practice has proved that on the basis of the One-China Principle, it is entirely possible to find a proper way for holding talks, based on equality, between the two sides. Since Hong Kong and Macao's return to China, people-to-people contacts and exchanges between Hong Kong and Taiwan and between Macao and Taiwan have continued and developed on the basis of the One-China Principle.
Separatist forces in Taiwan are bent on violating the One-China Principle. In 1988, after Lee Teng-hui became the leader of the Taiwan authorities, he publicly stated time and again that the basic policy of the Taiwan authorities was that "there is only one China, not two," and "we have always maintained that China should be reunited, and we adhere to the principle of 'one China.'” However, since the early 1990s, Lee Teng-hui has gradually deviated from the One-China Principle, trumpeting "two governments," "two reciprocal political entities," "Taiwan is already a state with independent sovereignty," and "At the present stage the Republic of China is on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China is on the mainland." Moreover, he went back on his words, saying that "I have never said that there is only one China." In addition, he has connived at and provided support for the separatists who advocate "Taiwan independence" and their activities, thus helping the rapid development of the "Taiwan independence" forces and the spread of the "Taiwan independence" ideology. Under the direction of Lee Teng-hui, the Taiwan authorities have adopted a series of measures toward actual separation. In matters of Taiwan's form of government, the Taiwan authorities are seeking to transform Taiwan into an "independent political entity" through a "constitutional reform," so as to suit the needs of creating "two Chinas." In foreign relations, the Taiwan authorities have spared no effort to carry out the activities for "expanding the international space of survival," with the aim of creating "two Chinas." Since 1993, for seven years running, the Taiwan authorities have maneuvered for participation in the United Nations. In military affairs, the Taiwan authorities have bought large quantities of advanced weapons from foreign countries and sought to join the Theater Missile Defense system (TMD), in an attempt to establish a military alliance of a disguised form with the United States and Japan.
In ideology and culture, the Taiwan authorities have endeavored to obliterate the Chinese awareness of Taiwan compatriots, especially young people, and their identification with the motherland, in order to create misunderstanding of the motherland among Taiwan compatriots and estrange them from her, thus cutting off the ideological and cultural ties between the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. Since 1999, Lee Teng-hui has stepped up his separatist activities. In May, he published the book The Road to Democracy, which advocates the division of China into seven regions, each enjoying "full autonomy." On July 9, he went so far as to publicly distort the cross-Straits relations as "state to state relations, or at least special state to state relations," in an attempt to fundamentally change the status of Taiwan as a part of China, sabotage the relations between both sides of the Taiwan Straits, especially the basis for cross-Straits political dialogues and negotiations, and wreck the foundation for peaceful reunification. Lee Teng-hui has become the general representative of Taiwan's separatist forces, a saboteur of the stability of the Taiwan Straits, a stumbling-block preventing the development of relations between China and the United States, and a troublemaker for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.
The Chinese government firmly defends the One-China Principle. The Chinese government and people have always maintained sharp vigilance and fought resolutely against the secessionist activities of the Taiwan separatists, represented by Lee Teng-hui.
After Lee Teng-hui's "private" visit to the United States in June 1995, the Chinese government has waged a resolute struggle against separation and against "Taiwan independence," and made strong protests and representations to the U.S. government for openly allowing Lee Teng-hui to visit the U.S., violating its promises made in the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques, and seriously prejudicing China's sovereignty. This struggle has shown the Chinese government and people's firm resolve and ability to safeguard state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and exerted an important and far-reaching influence. Compatriots in Taiwan have further realized the serious harm "Taiwan independence" can cause. Lee Teng-hui has received a heavy blow for his separatist activities in the international community, so that some of the " Taiwan independence" protagonists have had to abandon certain extremist propositions aimed at division. The international community has further realized the necessity of upholding the one-China policy. The U.S. government has explicitly undertaken not to support "Taiwan independence," not to support "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan," and not to support Taiwan joining any international organization whose membership is restricted to sovereign states.
The Chinese government and people have fought more unremittingly after Lee Teng-hui cooked up his "two states" theory. The relevant department of the Chinese government has clearly stated that the attempt of the Taiwan separatists to implement the "two states" theory in "legal" form was an even more serious and dangerous step toward division and a grave provocation against peaceful reunification. Were the attempt to succeed, it would be impossible for China to achieve peaceful reunification. The struggle against this attempt has grown in momentum with Chinese both at home and abroad condemning the "two states" theory with one voice. Most countries in the world have reaffirmed their position of upholding the One-China Policy. The U.S. government has also reasserted its adherence to the One-China Policy and its commitment to the "Three Non-supports" for Taiwan. Finally, the Taiwan authorities have been compelled to announce that they will not amend their "constitution" and "laws" according to the "two states" theory.
Nevertheless, separatists in Taiwan are still attempting to detach Taiwan "de jure" from China in the name of the "Republic of China" by various forms, including "formulating a new constitution," "amending the constitution," and "explaining the constitution" or through "legislation." Special vigilance should be maintained to the fact that the Taiwan separatists are continually scheming to disrupt the Sino-U.S. relations and provoke conflicts and confrontation between the two nations to achieve their aim of dividing China.
Facts prove that a serious crisis still exists in the situation of the Taiwan Straits. To safeguard the interests of the entire Chinese people including compatriots in Taiwan and maintain the peace and development of the Asia-Pacific region, the Chinese government remains firm in adhering to "peaceful reunification" and "one country, two systems"; upholding the eight propositions put forward by President Jiang Zemin for the development of cross-Straits relations and the acceleration of the peaceful reunification of China; and doing its utmost to achieve the objective of peaceful reunification. However, if a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries, or if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese government will only be forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force, to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and fulfill the great cause of reunification. The Chinese government and people absolutely have the determination and ability to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will never tolerate, condone or remain indifferent to the realization of any scheme to divide China. Any such scheme is doomed to failure.
Chinese territory and sovereignty has not been split, and the two sides of the Straits are not two states. The Taiwan authorities support their position on "two Chinas," including the "two states" theory proposed by Lee Teng-hui, with the following arguments:
Since 1949, the territories on either side of the Straits have been divided and governed separately, with neither side having jurisdiction over the other; the government of the PRC has never ruled Taiwan; and since 1991 Taiwan has witnessed a form of government that has nothing to do with that of the Chinese mainland. These arguments are absolutely untenable, and can never lead to the conclusion that Taiwan may declare itself a state under the name of the "Republic of China," or that the two sides of the Straits have been divided into two states. Firstly, state sovereignty is inseparable. The territory is the space in which a state exercises its sovereignty. In the territory of a country there can only be a central government exercising sovereignty on behalf of the state. As we have already said, Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and, after replacing the government of the Republic of China in 1949, the government of the PRC has become the sole legal government of China, enjoying and exercising sovereignty over the whole of China, including Taiwan.
Although the two sides of the Straits remain to be reunified, the long-term existence of this abnormal situation has not imbued Taiwan with a status and rights in international law, nor can it change the legal status of Taiwan as a part of China. The problem now is that the separatists in Taiwan and some foreign anti-China forces seek to change this state of affairs, and it is this that the Chinese government and people are firmly against.
We firmly oppose changing Taiwan's status as a part of China by referendum. The Taiwan separatists' attempt to change Taiwan's status as a part of China by referendum on the pretext that " sovereignty belongs to the people" is futile. Firstly, under both domestic and international laws Taiwan's legal status as a part of Chinese territory is unequivocal, and there can be no premise for using referendum to decide any matter of self-determination. Secondly, the phrase "sovereignty belongs to the people" refers to all the people of state, and not certain people or the people of a certain area. The sovereignty over Taiwan belongs to all the Chinese people including Taiwan compatriots, and not to some of the people in Taiwan. Thirdly, at no time in history has Taiwan been a state in its own right, and since 1945 Taiwan has not been a foreign colony, nor has it been under foreign occupation. The issue of national self-determination, therefore, does not exist. In short, from the time that China recovered Taiwan in 1945, there has been no question at all of changing Taiwan's status as a part of China by holding a referendum. The only future for Taiwan is reunification with the China mainland, and certainly not separation. Any attempt to separate Taiwan from China through so-called referendum would only lead the Taiwan people to disaster.
The "two German states formula" cannot be applied to the settlement of the Taiwan issue. Some people in Taiwan have suggested that cross-Straits relations should be dealt with according to the "two German states formula," since Germany was divided into two states after the Second World War, and was later reunified. This proposal shows a misunderstanding of history and reality. The division of Germany after the war and the temporary division between the two sides of the Straits are questions of a different nature, the difference lying mainly in three aspects. The first is the reasons for, and the nature of, the division. After its defeat in the Second World War in 1945, Germany was divided into zones occupied separately by the four victorious nations of the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union according to a declaration on the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority and the subsequent Potsdam Agreement. The reunification of Germany became a focus of the confrontation in Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war. The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were established in the zones occupied by the U.S., Britain and France, and that occupied by the Soviet Union. Thus Germany was divided into two states. Obviously, the German question arose entirely from external factors, while the Taiwan issue, left over by China's civil war, is a matter of China 's internal affairs. The second aspect is the difference in status between the two under international law. Germany was divided according to a series of international treaties during and after the Second World War, while the Taiwan question involves provisions of the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and other international treaties, stating that Japan must return Taiwan, which it had stolen from China, to the Chinese. The third is the difference between the two in their actual conditions of existence.
Against the backdrop of the confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the two German states had foreign troops stationing in their territories and so were compelled to recognize each other and co-exist in the international community. The Chinese government has always persisted in the principle of one China. Before Lee Teng-hui assumed power, and during his early days in office, the Taiwan authorities recognized only one China and opposed "two Chinas," and the One-China Principle has also been widely accepted by the international community. For these reasons, the Taiwan issue and the German issue cannot be placed in the same category, nor can the "two German states formula" be copied to settle the Taiwan question. Any question can be discussed under the One-China Principle. The Chinese government advocates that the final purpose of cross-Straits negotiations is to achieve peaceful reunification; and that to achieve this purpose, talks should be held based on the principle of one China. However, the proposals for " Taiwan independence," "two Chinas" and "two states," aiming for separation instead of reunification, violate the One-China Principle, and are naturally unacceptable to the Chinese government. Provided that it is within the framework of one China, any question can be discussed, including the various issues that are of concern to the Taiwan side. The Chinese government believes that Taiwan's international space for economic, cultural and social activities compatible with its status, the political status of the Taiwan authorities and other questions can be finally settled in the process of peaceful reunification through political negotiations within this framework.
The so-called controversy about democracy and system is an excuse for obstructing the reunification of China. In recent years the Taiwan authorities have repeatedly declared that " democratization on the China mainland is the key to the reunification of China" and that "the real essence of the cross-Straits issue is a contest between systems." This is an excuse for postponing and resisting reunification, as well as a scheme to deceive compatriots in Taiwan and world opinion. The CPC and the Chinese government have consistently striven to achieve socialist democracy. To achieve peaceful reunification in the form of "one country, two systems," and to allow the two different social systems on both sides of the Straits to coexist without imposing them on one or the other--this is best able to embody the wishes of compatriots on both sides of the Straits and is itself democratic. The different social systems across the Straits, therefore, should not constitute any barrier to peaceful reunification. Moreover, the Chinese government acknowledges the differences between Taiwan on the one hand and Hong Kong and Macao on the other and, after peaceful reunification, is prepared to apply a looser form of the "one country, two systems" policy in Taiwan than in Hong Kong and Macao. It is totally unreasonable and undemocratic for the Taiwan authorities to seek to obstruct reunification on the pretext of the "controversy about democracy and system" and to force the more than 1.2 billion people living on the Chinese mainland to practice the political and economic systems in Taiwan. The demand for democracy should not be used as a reason for refusing reunification. The essence of the difference between the two sides of the Straits on this question lies by no means in the controversy over whether to practice democracy or in the controversy over what system to practice, but rather a controversy over the choice between reunification and separation.
The Chinese government has expressed its appreciation to the international community for widely pursuing a one-China policy. In August 1993, we published the white paper The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China. In Chapter V of this document, "Several Questions Involving Taiwan in International Relations," we explained our position and policy on a number of issues, including relations between Taiwan and countries maintaining diplomatic ties with China, relations between international organizations and Taiwan, aviation services between Taiwan and countries having diplomatic relations with China, and arms sales to Taiwan by countries having diplomatic relations with China. Here, we would like to reaffirm our related position and policy.
Taiwan is ineligible for membership of the United Nations and other international organizations whose membership is confined to sovereign states. The United Nations is an inter-governmental international organization composed of sovereign states. After the restoration of the lawful rights of the PRC in the United Nations, the issue of China's representation in the UNO was resolved once and for all and Taiwan's re-entry became totally out of the question. The Taiwan authorities have asserted that Resolution 2758 of the UN resolved only "the problem of China's representation," but not "the problem of Taiwan's representation," and demanded participation in the UN. We will never permit such a separatist act of creating "two Chinas' or "one China, one Taiwan."
All members of the UN should adhere to the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and related UN resolutions, abide by norms governing international relations, including mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and never, in any form, support Taiwan's joining the UN or other international organizations whose membership is confined to sovereign states.
On the basis of the principle of one China, the Chinese government has made arrangements for Taiwan's participation in some inter-governmental international organizations which accept region membership in an agreeable and acceptable way according to the nature, regulations and actual conditions of these international organizations. As a region of China, Taiwan has participated in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) respectively in the names of " Taipei, China" and "Chinese Taipei." In September 1992, the chairman of the council of the predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), stated that Taiwan may participate in this organization as "a separate Taiwan-Penghu-Jinmen-Mazu tariff zone" (abbreviated as Chinese Taipei) after the PRC's entry to GATT. The WTO should persist in the principle defined in the afore-said statement when examining the acceptance of Taiwan's entry to the organization. This is only an ad hoc arrangement and cannot constitute a model applicable to other inter-governmental international organizations or international gatherings.
No country maintaining diplomatic relations with China should provide arms to Taiwan or enter into military alliance of any form with Taiwan. All countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China should abide by the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and refrain from providing arms to Taiwan or helping Taiwan produce arms in any form or under any pretext.
The Taiwan question is the most crucial and most sensitive issue in the relations between China and the U.S. The three Sino-U.S. joint communiques are the basis for the healthy and stable development of relations between the two countries. For over twenty years, the U.S. has promised to adhere to a One-China Policy, which has brought to itself benefits such as the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, the development of Sino-U.S. relations and the relative stability of the Taiwan situation. Regrettably, the U.S. has repeatedly contravened its solemn undertakings to China made in the August 17 Communique and continued its sale of advanced arms and military equipment to Taiwan. Recently, some people in the U.S. Congress have cooked up the so-called Taiwan Security Enhancement Act and are attempting to include Taiwan in the TMD. This is gross interference in China 's internal affairs and a grave threat to China's security, obstructing the peaceful reunification of China and jeopardizing the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. The Chinese government is firmly against such actions.
The Chinese government adheres to the One-China Principle in dealing with Taiwan's contacts with the outside world. The Taiwan authorities have spared no effort to promote "pragmatic diplomacy" in the international arena and enlarge their "international space of survival," the essence of these being to create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." It is only natural that the Chinese government should firmly oppose these. Meanwhile, considering the needs of Taiwan's socio-economic development and the actual benefits of compatriots in Taiwan, the Chinese government has no objection to Taiwan's non-governmental economic and cultural contacts with foreign countries; in fact, on the premise of one China, it has adopted many flexible measures to make Taiwan's economic, trade and cultural contacts with foreign countries more convenient. For example, Taiwan may stay on the International Olympic Committee in the name of "Chinese Taipei." As a matter of fact, Taiwan has maintained extensive economic, trade and cultural relations with many countries and regions in the world. Every year, a million Taiwan compatriots go abroad for travel, business or study, as well as for academic, cultural or sports exchanges, and Taiwan's annual import and export trade volume has exceeded the US$200-billion mark. This has demonstrated that adhering to the One-China Principle has not prevented Taiwan compatriots from engaging in non-governmental international exchanges or affected the needs of Taiwan's normal economic, trade and cultural activities.
The Chinese government safeguards all the justified and lawful rights and interests of Taiwan compatriots abroad. The people of Taiwan are of the same flesh and blood with us. The Chinese government has always worked for safeguarding their justified and lawful rights and interests abroad. Chinese embassies and consulates stationed abroad have always considered it their duties to strengthen their ties with Taiwan compatriots, listen to their suggestions and requests and safeguard their interests, and done everything they can to help them overcome their difficulties. During the Gulf War, the Chinese embassy helped Taiwanese labor service personnel stranded in Kuwait pull out of dangerous places safely. After the big earthquakes in Osaka and Kobe, Japan, the Chinese embassy and consulate general there promptly extended their sympathies to stricken Taiwan compatriots. When the civil war in Cambodia broke out, the Chinese embassy lost no time in helping Taiwanese business people and tourists whose lives and property were seriously imperiled by the war to move to safe places. All the above-mentioned facts reflect the Chinese government's care for Taiwan compatriots. When both sides of the Taiwan Straits are reunified, Taiwan compatriots will, together with people of all ethnic groups in the country, have more possibilities to fully enjoy the dignity and honor of the PRC in the world.
China has a long history of 5,000 years. The Chinese people have lived and multiplied on this land where all ethnic groups have mixed together, in the course of which they have evolved powerful cohesiveness, and the values of cherishing and safeguarding unity. Over the long course of history, the Chinese nation has witnessed changes of dynasties, transfers of governments, local separatist regimes, and foreign invasions, especially the untold invasions and dismemberment by foreign powers in modern history. However, unity has always been the main trend in the development of Chinese history. After every separation, the country was invariably reunified, only to be followed in its wake by rapid political, economic, cultural, scientific and technological development. Our compatriots in Taiwan have a glorious tradition of patriotism, and have performed brilliant exploits in the struggles against foreign invasions of Taiwan. Since the founding of the PRC, the Chinese people have particularly valued their hard-earned national independence, firmly upheld state sovereignty and territorial integrity and struggled unswervingly for reunification of the motherland. The 5,000-year history and culture have been implanted deeply in the minds of the Chinese people, sprouting the strong national consciousness of the need for national unification.
The Chinese government hopes that the international community will follow the principle of one China now and always and that the U.S. government will earnestly fulfil all the principles concerning the Taiwan issue in the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques, and its solemn promise to uphold the One-China Principle.
As the Chinese government has successively resumed the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao, the people of the whole of China are eager to resolve the Taiwan issue as early as possible and realize the total reunification of the country. They cannot allow the resolution of the Taiwan issue to be postponed indefinitely. We firmly believe that the total reunification of China will be achieved through the joint efforts of the entire Chinese people including compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits and those living overseas.
This white paper was issued on Feb. 21, 2000 and was the second of altogether three white papers the PRC issued
on Taiwan so far. The first white paper on the topic had been issued on Aug. 31, 1993,
the third was issued on Aug. 10, 2022.
See also the URLs leading to the sources of this white paper in English and Chinese.
A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements,
declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining
to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF
file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010
please click here.
The Governments of the Member States of ASEAN and the Government of the People's Republic of China,
REAFFIRMING their determination to consolidate and develop the friendship and cooperation existing between their people and
governments with the view to promoting a 21st century-oriented partnership of good neighbourliness and mutual trust;
COGNIZANT of the need to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious environment in the South China Sea between ASEAN
and China for the enhancement of peace, stability, economic growth and prosperity in the region;
COMMITTED to enhancing the principles and objectives of the 1997 Joint Statement of the Meeting of the Heads of State/Government
of the Member States of ASEAN and President of the People's Republic of China;
DESIRING to enhance favourable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and disputes among countries concerned;
HEREBY DECLARE the following:
1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1982 UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and other universally
recognized principles of international law which shall serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state relations;
2. The Parties are committed to exploring ways for building trust and confidence in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and
on the basis of equality and mutual respect;
3. The Parties reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided
for by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;
4. The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or
use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles
of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;
5. The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and
stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and
to handle their differences in a constructive manner.
Pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes, the Parties concerned undertake to intensify efforts to seek ways, in
the spirit of cooperation and understanding, to build trust and confidence between and among them, including:
a. holding dialogues and exchange of views as appropriate between their defense and military officials;
b. ensuring just and humane treatment of all persons who are either in danger or in distress;
c. notifying, on a voluntary basis, other Parties concerned of any impending joint/combined military exercise; and
d. exchanging, on a voluntary basis, relevant information.
6. Pending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the disputes, the Parties concerned may explore or undertake cooperative activities.
These may include the following:
a. marine environmental protection;
b. marine scientific research;
c. safety of navigation and communication at sea;
d. search and rescue operation; and
e. combating transnational crime, including but not limited to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in
arms.
The modalities, scope and locations, in respect of bilateral and multilateral cooperation should be agreed upon by the Parties concerned
prior to their actual implementation.
7. The Parties concerned stand ready to continue their consultations and dialogues concerning relevant issues, through modalities to be agreed
by them, including regular consultations on the observance of this Declaration, for the purpose of promoting good neighbourliness and transparency,
establishing harmony, mutual understanding and cooperation, and facilitating peaceful resolution of disputes among them;
8. The Parties undertake to respect the provisions of this Declaration and take actions consistent therewith;
9. The Parties encourage other countries to respect the principles contained in this Declaration;
10. The Parties concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in
the region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective.
Done on the Fourth Day of November in the Year Two Thousand and Two in Phnom Penh, the Kingdom of Cambodia.
For Brunei Darussalam: Mohamed Bolkiah, Minister of Foreign Affairs
For the People's Republic of China: Wang Yi 王毅, Special Envoy and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
For the Kingdom of Cambodia: Hor Namhong, Senior Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
For the Republic of Indonesia: Dr. Hassan Wirayuda, Minister of Foreign Affairs
For the Lao People's Democratic Republic: Somsavat Lengsavad, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
For Malaysia: Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, Minister of Foreign Affairs
For the Union of Myanmar: Win Aung, Minister of Foreign Affairs
For the Republic of the Philippines: Blas F. Ople, Secretary of Foreign Affairs
For the Republic of Singapore: Prof. S. Jayakumar, Minister of Foreign Affairs
For the Kingdom of Thailand: Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai, Minister of Foreign Affairs
For the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam: Nguyen Dy Nien 阮怡年, Minister of Foreign Affairs
The text of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was published on
the website of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), please click
here.
On
Oct. 25, 2004, Colin Powell, US Secretary of State [Jan. 2001 to Jan. 2005], stated in an interview with Anthony Yuen (阮次山) of Hong Kong-based
Phoenix TV (鳳凰衛視) in Beijing's China World Hotel (中國大飯店):
[...] Our policy is clear, there is only one China. Taiwan is not independent. It does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation, and that remains our policy,
our firm policy. [...]
ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
No. 34
The Anti-Secession Law,
adopted at the Third Session of the Tenth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on March 14, 2005, is
hereby promulgated and shall go into effect as of the date of promulgation.
Hu Jintao
President of the People's Republic of China
March 14, 2005
Anti-Secession Law
(Adopted at the Third Session of the Tenth National People's Congress on March 14, 2005)
Article 1
This Law is formulated, in accordance with the Constitution, for the purpose of opposing and checking Taiwan's
secession from China by secessionists in the name of "Taiwan independence", promoting peaceful national reunification,
maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, preserving China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and
safeguarding the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation.
Article 2
There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China's sovereignty and
territorial integrity brook no division. Safeguarding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common
obligation of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included.
Taiwan is part of China. The state shall never allow the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces to make
Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means.
Article 3
The Taiwan question is one that is left over from China's civil war of the late 1940s.
Solving the Taiwan question and achieving national reunification is China's internal affair, which subjects to
no interference by any outside forces.
Article 4
Accomplishing the great task of reunifying the motherland is the sacred duty of all Chinese people, the Taiwan
compatriots included.
Article 5
Upholding the principle of one China is the basis of peaceful reunification of the country.
To reunify the country through peaceful means best serves the fundamental interests of the compatriots on both
sides of the Taiwan Straits. The state shall do its utmost with maximum sincerity to achieve a peaceful reunification.
After the country is reunified peacefully, Taiwan may practice systems different from those on the mainland and
enjoy a high degree of autonomy.
Article 6
The state shall take the following measures to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and promote
cross-Straits relations:
(1) to encourage and facilitate personnel exchanges across the Straits for greater mutual understanding and
mutual trust;
(2) to encourage and facilitate economic exchanges and cooperation, realize direct links of trade, mail and air and
shipping services, and bring about closer economic ties between the two sides of the Straits to their mutual benefit;
(3) to encourage and facilitate cross-Straits exchanges in education, science, technology, culture, health and sports,
and work together to carry forward the proud Chinese cultural traditions;
(4) to encourage and facilitate cross-Straits cooperation in combating crimes; and
(5) to encourage and facilitate other activities that are conducive to peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and
stronger cross-Straits relations.
The state protects the rights and interests of the Taiwan compatriots in accordance with law.
Article 7
The state stands for the achievement of peaceful reunification through consultations and negotiations on an equal
footing between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. These consultations and negotiations may be conducted in steps and
phases and with flexible and varied modalities.
The two sides of the Taiwan Straits may consult and negotiate on the following matters:
(1) officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides;
(2) mapping out the development of cross-Straits relations;
(3) steps and arrangements for peaceful national reunification;
(4) the political status of the Taiwan authorities;
(5) the Taiwan region's room of international operation that is compatible with its status; and
(6) other matters concerning the achievement of peaceful national reunification.
Article 8
In the event that the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause
the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur,
or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful
means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The State Council and the Central Military Commission shall decide on and execute the non-peaceful means and
other necessary measures as provided for in the preceding paragraph and shall promptly report to the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress.
Article 9
In the event of employing and executing non-peaceful means and other necessary measures as provided for in this Law,
the state shall exert its utmost to protect the lives, property and other legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan
civilians and foreign nationals in Taiwan, and to minimize losses. At the same time, the state shall protect the rights
and interests of the Taiwan compatriots in other parts of China in accordance with law.
Article 10
This Law shall come into force on the day of its promulgation.
A useful commentary written by German law expert Christoph Henke LL.D. about the PRC's "Anti-Secession Law" can be found
here.
A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements,
declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining
to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF
file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010
please click here.
Facing rising concerns posed by the East China Sea situation, President Ma Ying-jeou proposed the East China Sea Peace Initiative
on August 5, based on the principle of “safeguarding sovereignty, shelving disputes, pursuing peace and reciprocity, and promoting joint
exploration and development.” He called upon all parties concerned to demonstrate restraint and avoid escalating confrontational acts, to
shelve controversies and not abandon dialogue, to respect international law and deal with disputes through peaceful means, to seek
consensus and draft a East China Sea Code of Conduct, and to establish a mechanism for cooperation on exploring and developing
resources in the East China Sea.
These guidelines are proposed to enhance the effectiveness and impact of the East China Sea Peace Initiative.
I. Implementation
The East China Sea Peace Initiative is to be implemented in two stages:
1. Peaceful dialogue and mutually reciprocal negotiation
This stage involves promoting the idea of resolving the East China Sea dispute through peaceful means, and establishing channels
for Track I and Track II dialogue and encouraging all parties concerned to address key East China Sea issues via bilateral or multilateral
negotiation mechanisms in order to bolster mutual trust and collective benefit.
2. Sharing resources and cooperative development
This stage involves institutionalizing all forms of dialogue and negotiation and encouraging all parties concerned to implement substantive
cooperative projects and establish mechanisms for joint exploration and development of resources that form a network of peace and cooperation
in the East China Sea area.
II. Key issues
1. Fishing industry—Convening bilateral and multilateral fishing industry meetings and other forms of fishing industry cooperation and
exchange, and establishing a mechanism for fishing industry cooperation and administration.
2. Mining industry—Promoting joint exploration in the territorial waters to the north of Taiwan and establishing a mechanism for joint
exploration, development and management.
3. Marine science research and maritime environmental protection—Conducting multi-national marine and ecological research projects
pertaining to the East China Sea.
4. Maritime security and unconventional security—Implementing bilateral and multilateral law enforcement exchanges and marine rescue
agency cooperation, and establishing a collaborative marine security and crime-enforcement mechanism.
5. East China Sea Code of Conduct—Implementing mechanisms for Track I and Track II dialogue and negotiating mechanisms for
resolving disputes through peaceful means that will bolster mutual trust and encourage all parties concerned to sign the East China Sea Code
of Conduct.
III. Implementation Objectives
In its role as a facilitator of peace in the international community, the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) has proposed
the East China Sea Peace Initiative and its implementation guidelines in the sincere hope that all parties concerned replace confrontation
with negotiation, and set aside their controversies by means of temporary measures, so as to maintain peace and stability in the region.
Over the long run, we can move from three parallel tracks of bilateral dialogue (between Taiwan and Japan, Taiwan and the Chinese mainland,
and Japan and the mainland) to one track of trilateral negotiations and realize peace and cooperation in the East China Sea.
The East China Sea Peace Initiative (donghai heping changyi 東海和平倡議, abbrev. ECSPI) was first suggested
by ROC President Ma Ying-jeou on Aug. 5, 2012 when he was attending activities
commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. The
following bilateral exchange with Japan resulted in the signing of the Taiwan-Japan
Fisheries Agreement (Tai Ri yuye xieyi 台日漁業協議) on April 10, 2013 which gave Taiwanese fishermen the right to
operate in a 7,400 km² area around the Diaoyutai Islands; leaders of the negotiating
delegations were Liao Liou-yi 廖了以 and Ohashi Mitsuo 大橋 光夫. A bilingual brochure in PDF format, published by the ROC MOFA in December 2012, provided explanations about the ECSPI (click here).
A unanimous Award has been issued today by the Tribunal constituted
under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the
"Convention") in the arbitration instituted by the Republic of the Philippines
against the People's Republic of China.
This arbitration concerned the role of historic rights and the source
of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, the status of certain maritime
features and the maritime entitlements they are capable of generating, and the
lawfulness of certain actions by China that were alleged by the Philippines to
violate the Convention. In light of limitations on compulsory dispute
settlement under the Convention, the Tribunal has emphasized that it does not
rule on any question of sovereignty over land territory and does not delimit
any boundary between the Parties.
China has repeatedly stated that "it will neither accept nor
participate in the arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines."
Annex VII, however, provides that the "[a]bsence of a party or failure of a
party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings." Annex
VII also provides that, in the event that a party does not participate in the
proceedings, a tribunal "must satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction
over the dispute but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law."
Accordingly, throughout these proceedings, the Tribunal has taken steps to test
the accuracy of the Philippines' claims, including by requesting further written
submissions from the Philippines, by questioning the Philippines both prior to
and during two hearings, by appointing independent experts to report to the
Tribunal on technical matters, and by obtaining historical evidence concerning
features in the South China Sea and providing it to the Parties for comment.
China has also made clear—through the publication of a Position Paper
in December 2014 and in other official statements—that, in its view, the
Tribunal lacks jurisdiction in this matter. Article 288 of the Convention
provides that: "In the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has
jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of that court or
tribunal." Accordingly, the Tribunal convened a hearing on jurisdiction and
admissibility in July 2015 and rendered an Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility on 29 October 2015, deciding some issues of jurisdiction and
deferring others for further consideration. The Tribunal then convened a
hearing on the merits from 24 to 30 November 2015.
The Award of today's date addresses the issues of jurisdiction not
decided in the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility and the merits of the
Philippines' claims over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction. The Award is
final and binding, as set out in Article 296 of the Convention and Article 11
of Annex VII.
Historic Rights and the 'Nine-Dash Line': The Tribunal found that it has
jurisdiction to consider the Parties' dispute concerning historic rights and
the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea. On the merits, the
Tribunal concluded that the Convention comprehensively allocates rights to
maritime areas and that protections for pre-existing rights to resources were
considered, but not adopted in the Convention. Accordingly, the Tribunal
concluded that, to the extent China had historic rights to resources in the
waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished to the extent they
were incompatible with the exclusive economic zones provided for in the
Convention. The Tribunal also noted that, although Chinese navigators and
fishermen, as well as those of other States, had historically made use of the
islands in the South China Sea, there was no evidence that China had
historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources.
The Tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for China to claim
historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the 'nine-dash
line'.
Status of Features: The Tribunal next considered entitlements to
maritime areas and the status of features. The Tribunal first undertook an
evaluation of whether certain reefs claimed by China are above water at high tide.
Features that are above water at high tide generate an entitlement to at least
a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, whereas features that are submerged at high
tide do not. The Tribunal noted that the reefs have been heavily modified by
land reclamation and construction, recalled that the Convention classifies
features on their natural condition, and relied on historical materials in
evaluating the features. The Tribunal then considered whether any of the
features claimed by China could generate maritime zones beyond 12 nautical miles.
Under the Convention, islands generate an exclusive economic zone of 200
nautical miles and a continental shelf, but "[r]ocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone
or continental shelf." The Tribunal concluded that this provision depends upon
the objective capacity of a feature, in its natural condition, to sustain
either a stable community of people or economic activity that is not dependent
on outside resources or purely extractive in nature. The Tribunal noted that
the current presence of official personnel on many of the features is dependent
on outside support and not reflective of the capacity of the features. The
Tribunal found historical evidence to be more relevant and noted that the
Spratly Islands were historically used by small groups of fishermen and that several
Japanese fishing and guano mining enterprises were attempted. The Tribunal
concluded that such transient use does not constitute inhabitation by a stable
community and that all of the historical economic activity had been extractive.
Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that none of the Spratly Islands is capable
of generating extended maritime zones. The Tribunal also held that the Spratly
Islands cannot generate maritime zones collectively as a unit. Having found
that none of the features claimed by China was capable of generating an
exclusive economic zone, the Tribunal found that it could—without delimiting a boundary—declare
that certain sea areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the
Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any possible entitlement
of China.
Lawfulness of Chinese Actions: The Tribunal next considered the
lawfulness of Chinese actions in the South China Sea. Having found that certain
areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, the Tribunal
found that China had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights in its
exclusive economic zone by (a) interfering with Philippine fishing and
petroleum exploration, (b) constructing artificial islands and (c) failing to
prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone. The Tribunal also held that
fishermen from the Philippines (like those from China) had traditional fishing
rights at Scarborough Shoal and that China had interfered with these rights in
restricting access. The Tribunal further held that Chinese law enforcement vessels
had unlawfully created a serious risk of collision when they physically
obstructed Philippine vessels.
Harm to Marine Environment: The Tribunal considered the
effect on the marine environment of China's recent large-scale land reclamation
and construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands
and found that China had caused severe harm to the coral reef environment and
violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems and the
habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species. The Tribunal also found
that Chinese authorities were aware that Chinese fishermen have harvested
endangered sea turtles, coral, and giant clams on a substantial scale in the
South China Sea (using methods that inflict severe damage on the coral reef environment)
and had not fulfilled their obligations to stop such activities.
Aggravation of Dispute: Finally, the Tribunal considered whether China's
actions since the commencement of the arbitration had aggravated the dispute
between the Parties. The Tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider
the implications of a stand-off between Philippine marines and Chinese naval
and law enforcement vessels at Second Thomas Shoal, holding that this dispute
involved military activities and was therefore excluded from compulsory
settlement. The Tribunal found, however, that China's recent large-scale land
reclamation and construction of artificial islands was incompatible with the
obligations on a State during dispute resolution proceedings, insofar as China
has inflicted irreparable harm to the marine environment, built a large
artificial island in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone, and destroyed evidence
of the natural condition of features in the South China Sea that formed part of
the Parties' dispute.
An expanded summary of the Tribunal's decisions is set out below.
The Tribunal was constituted on 21 June 2013 pursuant to the
procedure set out in Annex VII of the Convention to decide the dispute
presented by the Philippines. The Tribunal is composed of Judge Thomas A. Mensah
of Ghana, Judge Jean-Pierre Cot of France, Judge Stanislaw Pawlak of Poland,
Professor Alfred H.A. Soons of the Netherlands, and Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum of
Germany. Judge Thomas A. Mensah serves as President of the Tribunal. The Permanent
Court of Arbitration acts as the Registry in the proceedings.
Further information about the case may be found at
www.pcacases.com/web/view/7, including the Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, the Rules of Procedure, earlier Press Releases, hearing
transcripts, and photographs. Procedural Orders, submissions by the
Philippines, and reports by the Tribunal's experts will be made available in
due course, as will unofficial Chinese translations of the Tribunal's Awards.
The
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is an intergovernmental organization
established by the 1899 Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes. The PCA has 121 Member States. Headquartered at the
Peace Palace in The Hague, the Netherlands, the PCA facilitates arbitration, conciliation,
fact-finding, and other dispute resolution proceedings among various
combinations of States, State entities, intergovernmental organizations, and
private parties. The PCA's International Bureau is currently administering 8
interstate disputes, 73 investor-State arbitrations, and 34 cases arising under
contracts involving a State or other public entity. The PCA has administered 12
cases initiated by States under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea.
In July 2013, the Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration
appointed the PCA to serve as Registry for the proceedings. The Tribunal's
Rules of Procedure provide that the PCA shall "maintain an archive of the arbitral
proceedings and provide appropriate registry services as directed by the
Arbitral Tribunal." Such services include assisting with the identification and
appointment of experts; publishing information about the arbitration and
issuing press releases; organizing the hearings at the Peace Palace in The
Hague; and the financial management of the case, which involves holding a
deposit for expenses in the arbitration, such as to pay arbitrator fees,
experts, technical support, court reporters etc. The Registry also serves as
the channel of communications amongst the Parties and the Tribunal and observer
States.
Photograph: Hearing in session, July 2015, Peace Palace, The Hague.
Clockwise from top left: Registrar and PCA Senior Legal Counsel Judith Levine;
Judge Stanislaw Pawlak; Professor Alfred H. A. Soons; Judge Thomas A. Mensah
(Presiding Arbitrator); Judge Jean-Pierre Cot; Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum; PCA
Senior Legal Counsel Garth Schofield; former Secretary for Foreign Affairs of
the Philippines, Mr. Albert F. Del Rosario; former Solicitor General Mr. Florin
T. Hilbay, Counsel for the Philippines; Mr. Paul S. Reichler; Professor
Philippe Sands; Professor Bernard H. Oxman; Professor Alan E. Boyle; Mr.
Lawrence H. Martin.
The South China Sea Arbitration between the Philippines and China
concerned an application by the Philippines for rulings in respect of four
matters concerning the relationship between the Philippines and China in the
South China Sea. First, the Philippines sought a ruling on the source of the
Parties' rights and obligations in the South China Sea and the effect of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("Convention") on China's
claims to historic rights within its so-called 'nine-dash line'. Second, the Philippines
sought a ruling on whether certain maritime features claimed by both China and
the Philippines are properly characterized as islands, rocks, low-tide
elevations or submerged banks under the Convention. The status of these
features under the Convention determines the maritime zones they are capable of
generating. Third, the Philippines sought rulings on whether certain Chinese
actions in the South China Sea have violated the Convention, by interfering
with the exercise of the Philippines' sovereign rights and freedoms under the
Convention or through construction and fishing activities that have harmed the
marine environment. Finally, the Philippines sought a ruling that certain
actions taken by China, in particular its large-scale land reclamation and
construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands since this
arbitration was commenced, have unlawfully aggravated and extended the Parties'
dispute.
The Chinese Government has adhered to the position of neither
accepting nor participating in these arbitral proceedings. It has reiterated
this position in diplomatic notes, in the "Position Paper of the Government of the
People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea
Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines" dated 7 December 2014
("China's Position Paper"), in letters to members of the Tribunal from the
Chinese Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and in many public statements.
The Chinese Government has also made clear that these statements and documents
"shall by no means be interpreted as China's participation in the arbitral
proceeding in any form."
Two provisions of the Convention address the situation of a party
that objects to the jurisdiction of a tribunal and declines to participate in
the proceedings:
(a) Article 288 of the Convention provides that: "In the
event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the
matter shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal."
(b) Article 9 of Annex VII to the Convention provides
that:
If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear
before the arbitral tribunal or fails to defend its case, the other party may
request the tribunal to continue the proceedings and to make its award. Absence
of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar
to the proceedings. Before making its award, the arbitral tribunal must satisfy
itself not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute but also that the
claim is well founded in fact and law.
Throughout these proceedings, the Tribunal has taken a number of
steps to fulfil its duty to satisfy itself as to whether it has jurisdiction
and whether the Philippines' claims are "well founded in fact and law". With respect
to jurisdiction, the Tribunal decided to treat China's informal communications
as equivalent to an objection to jurisdiction, convened a Hearing on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility on 7 to 13 July 2015, questioned the Philippines
both before and during the hearing on matters of jurisdiction, including
potential issues not raised in China's informal communications, and issued an
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility on 29 October 2015 (the "Award on
Jurisdiction"), deciding some issues of jurisdiction and deferring others for
further consideration in conjunction with the merits of the Philippines'
claims. With respect to the merits, the Tribunal sought to test the accuracy of
the Philippines' claims by requesting further written submissions from the
Philippines, by convening a hearing on the merits from 24 to 30 November 2015,
by questioning the Philippines both before and during the hearing with respect
to its claims, by appointing independent experts to report to the Tribunal on
technical matters, and by obtaining historical records and hydrographic survey
data for the South China Sea from the archives of the United Kingdom Hydrographic
Office, the National Library of France, and the French National Overseas
Archives and providing it to the Parties for comment, along with other relevant
materials in the public domain.
The
Philippines made 15 Submissions in these proceedings, requesting the Tribunal
to find that:
(1) China's maritime entitlements
in the South China Sea, like those of the Philippines, may not extend beyond
those expressly permitted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea;
(2) China's claims to sovereign
rights jurisdiction, and to "historic rights", with respect to the maritime
areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the so-called "nine-dash line" are
contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they
exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China's maritime entitlements
expressly permitted by UNCLOS;
(3) Scarborough Shoal generates
no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf;
(4) Mischief Reef, Second Thomas
Shoal, and Subi Reef are low-tide elevations that do not generate entitlement
to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, and are not
features that are capable of appropriation by occupation or otherwise;
(5) Mischief Reef and Second
Thomas Shoal are part of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of
the Philippines;
(6) Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef
(including Hughes Reef) are low-tide elevations that do not generate
entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or continental shelf,
but their low-water line may be used to determine the baseline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea of Namyit and Sin Cowe, respectively, is
measured;
(7) Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef
and Fiery Cross Reef generate no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf;
(8) China has unlawfully
interfered with the enjoyment and exercise of the sovereign rights of the Philippines
with respect to the living and non-living resources of its exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf;
(9) China has unlawfully failed
to prevent its nationals and vessels from exploiting the living resources in
the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines;
(10) China has unlawfully prevented
Philippine fishermen from pursuing their livelihoods by interfering with
traditional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal;
(11) China has violated its obligations under
the Convention to protect and preserve the marine environment at Scarborough
Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef,
Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef and Subi Reef;
(12) China's occupation of and construction
activities on Mischief Reef
(a) violate the provisions of the Convention
concerning artificial islands, installations and structures;
(b) violate China's duties to protect and preserve the
marine environment under the Convention; and
(c) constitute unlawful acts of attempted
appropriation in violation of the Convention;
(13) China has breached its obligations under
the Convention by operating its law enforcement vessels in a dangerous manner,
causing serious risk of collision to Philippine vessels navigating in the vicinity
of Scarborough Shoal;
(14) Since the commencement of this
arbitration in January 2013, China has unlawfully aggravated and extended the
dispute by, among other things:
(a) interfering with the Philippines' rights of
navigation in the waters at, and adjacent to, Second Thomas Shoal;
(b) preventing the rotation and resupply of Philippine
personnel stationed at Second Thomas Shoal;
(c) endangering the health and well-being of
Philippine personnel stationed at Second Thomas Shoal; and
(d) conducting dredging, artificial island-building and
construction activities at Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef,
Gaven Reef, Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef and Subi Reef; and
(15) China shall respect the rights and
freedoms of the Philippines under the Convention, shall comply with its duties
under the Convention, including those relevant to the protection and
preservation of the marine environment in the South China Sea, and shall
exercise its rights and freedoms in the South China Sea with due regard to
those of the Philippines under the Convention.
With respect to jurisdiction, the Philippines has asked the Tribunal
to declare that the Philippines' claims "are entirely within its jurisdiction
and are fully admissible."
China does not accept and is not participating in this arbitration
but stated its position that the Tribunal "does not have jurisdiction over this
case." In its Position Paper, China advanced the following arguments:
– The essence of the subject-matter of
the arbitration is the territorial sovereignty over several maritime features
in the South China Sea, which is beyond the scope of the Convention and does not
concern the interpretation or application of the Convention;
– China and the Philippines have
agreed, through bilateral instruments and the Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea, to settle their relevant disputes through
negotiations. By unilaterally initiating the present arbitration, the
Philippines has breached its obligation under international law;
– Even assuming, arguendo, that the
subject-matter of the arbitration were concerned with the interpretation or
application of the Convention, that subject-matter would constitute an integral
part of maritime delimitation between the two countries, thus falling within
the scope of the declaration filed by China in 2006 in accordance with the
Convention, which excludes, inter alia, disputes concerning maritime
delimitation from compulsory arbitration and other compulsory dispute
settlement procedures;
Although China has not made equivalent public statements with respect
to the merits of the majority of the Philippines' claims, the Tribunal has
sought throughout the proceedings to ascertain China's position on the basis of
its contemporaneous public statements and diplomatic correspondence.
The Tribunal has addressed the scope of its jurisdiction to consider
the Philippines' claims both in its Award on Jurisdiction, to the extent that
issues of jurisdiction could be decided as a preliminary matter, and in its Award
of 12 July 2016, to the extent that issues of jurisdiction were intertwined
with the merits of the Philippines' claims. The Tribunal's Award of 12 July 2016
also incorporates and reaffirms the decisions on jurisdiction taken in the
Award on Jurisdiction.
For completeness, the Tribunal's decisions on jurisdiction in both
awards are summarized here together.
a. Preliminary Matters
In its Award on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal considered a number of
preliminary matters with respect to its jurisdiction. The Tribunal noted that
both the Philippines and China are parties to the Convention and that the
Convention does not permit a State to except itself generally from the
mechanism for the resolution of disputes set out in the Convention. The
Tribunal held that China's non-participation does not deprive the Tribunal of
jurisdiction and that the Tribunal had been properly constituted pursuant to
the provisions of Annex VII to the Convention, which include a procedure to
form a tribunal even in the absence of one party. Finally, the Tribunal
rejected an argument set out in China's Position Paper and held that the mere
act of unilaterally initiating an arbitration cannot constitute an abuse of the
Convention.
b. Existence of a Dispute
Concerning Interpretation and Application of the Convention
In its Award on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal considered whether the
Parties' disputes concerned the interpretation or application of the
Convention, which is a requirement for resort to the dispute settlement mechanisms
of the Convention.
The Tribunal rejected the argument set out in China's Position Paper
that the Parties' dispute is actually about territorial sovereignty and
therefore not a matter concerning the Convention. The Tribunal accepted that
there is a dispute between the Parties concerning sovereignty over islands in
the South China Sea, but held that the matters submitted to arbitration by the
Philippines do not concern sovereignty. The Tribunal considered that it would
not need to implicitly decide sovereignty to address the Philippines'
Submissions and that doing so would not advance the sovereignty claims of
either Party to islands in the South China Sea.
The Tribunal also rejected the argument set out in China's Position
Paper that the Parties' dispute is actually about maritime boundary
delimitation and therefore excluded from dispute settlement by Article 298 of
the Convention and a declaration that China made on 25 August 2006 pursuant to
that Article. The Tribunal noted that a dispute concerning whether a State has
an entitlement to a maritime zone is a distinct matter from the delimitation of
maritime zones in an area in which they overlap. The Tribunal noted that entitlements,
together with a wide variety of other issues, are commonly considered in a
boundary delimitation, but can also arise in other contexts. The Tribunal held
that it does not follow that a dispute over each of these issues is necessarily
a dispute over boundary delimitation.
Finally, the Tribunal held that each of the Philippines' Submissions
reflected a dispute concerning the Convention. In doing so, the Tribunal
emphasized (a) that a dispute concerning the interaction between the Convention
and other rights (including any Chinese "historic rights") is a dispute
concerning the Convention and (b) that where China has not clearly stated its
position, the existence of a dispute may be inferred from the conduct of a
State or from silence and is a matter to be determined objectively.
c. Involvement of Indispensable Third-Parties
In its Award on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal considered whether the
absence from this arbitration of other States that have made claims to the
islands of the South China Sea would be a bar to the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
The Tribunal noted that the rights of other States would not form "the very
subject-matter of the decision," the standard for a third-party to be
indispensable. The Tribunal further noted that in December 2014, Viet Nam had
submitted a statement to the Tribunal, in which Viet Nam asserted that it has
"no doubt that the Tribunal has jurisdiction in these proceedings." The
Tribunal also noted that Viet Nam, Malaysia, and Indonesia had attended the
hearing on jurisdiction as observers, without any State raising the argument that
its participation was indispensable.
In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal noted that it had received
a communication from Malaysia on 23 June 2016, recalling Malaysia's claims in
the South China Sea. The Tribunal compared its decisions on the merits of the
Philippines' Submissions with the rights claimed by Malaysia and reaffirmed its
decision that Malaysia is not an indispensable party and that Malaysia's
interests in the South China Sea do not prevent the Tribunal from addressing
the Philippines' Submissions.
d. Preconditions to Jurisdiction
In its Award on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal considered the
applicability of Articles 281 and 282 of the Convention, which may prevent a
State from making use of the mechanisms under the Convention if they have
already agreed to another means of dispute resolution.
The Tribunal rejected the argument set out in China's Position Paper
that the 2002 China–ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea prevented the Philippines from initiating arbitration. The Tribunal held
that the Declaration is a political agreement and not legally binding, does not
provide a mechanism for binding settlement, does not exclude other means of
dispute settlement, and therefore does not restrict the Tribunal's jurisdiction
under Articles 281 or 282. The Tribunal also considered the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and the Convention on Biological Diversity, and
a series of joint statements issued by the Philippines and China referring to
the resolution of disputes through negotiations and concluded that none of
these instruments constitute an agreement that would prevent the Philippines
from bringing its claims to arbitration.
The Tribunal further held that the Parties had exchanged views
regarding the settlement of their disputes, as required by Article 283 of the
Convention, before the Philippines initiated the arbitration. The Tribunal concluded
that this requirement was met in the record of diplomatic communications
between the Philippines and China, in which the Philippines expressed a clear
preference for multilateral negotiations involving the other States surrounding
the South China Sea, while China insisted that only bilateral talks could be considered.
e. Exceptions and Limitations to Jurisdiction
In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal considered whether the
Philippines' Submissions concerning Chinese historic rights and the 'nine-dash
line' were affected by the exception from jurisdiction for disputes concerning
"historic title" in Article 298 of the Convention. The Tribunal reviewed the
meaning of "historic title" in the law of the sea and held that this refers to
claims of historic sovereignty over bays and other near-shore waters. Reviewing
China's claims and conduct in the South China Sea, the Tribunal concluded that
China claims historic rights to resources within the 'nine-dash line', but does
not claim historic title over the waters of the South China Sea. Accordingly,
the Tribunal concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider the Philippines'
claims concerning historic rights and, as between the Philippines and China,
the 'nine-dash line'.
In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal also considered whether
the Philippines' Submissions were affected by the exception from jurisdiction
in Article 298 for disputes concerning sea boundary delimitation. The Tribunal
had already found in its Award on Jurisdiction that the Philippines'
Submissions do not concern boundary delimitation as such, but noted that
several of the Philippines' Submissions were dependent on certain areas forming
part of the Philippines' exclusive economic zone. The Tribunal held that it
could only address such submissions if there was no possibility that China
could have an entitlement to an exclusive economic zone overlapping that of the
Philippines and deferred a final decision on its jurisdiction. In its Award of
12 July 2016, the Tribunal reviewed evidence about the reefs and islands
claimed by China in the South China Sea and concluded that none is capable of
generating an entitlement to an exclusive economic zone. Because China has no
possible entitlement to an exclusive economic zone overlapping that of the
Philippines in the Spratly Islands, the Tribunal held that the Philippines'
submissions were not dependent on a prior delimitation of a boundary.
In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal also considered whether
the Philippines' Submissions were affected by the exception from jurisdiction
in Article 298 for disputes concerning law enforcement activities in the
exclusive economic zone. The Tribunal recalled that the exception in Article
298 would apply only if the Philippines' Submissions related to law enforcement
activities in China's exclusive economic zone. Because, however, the
Philippines' Submissions related to events in the Philippines' own exclusive
economic zone or in the territorial sea, the Tribunal concluded that Article
298 did not pose an obstacle to its jurisdiction.
Lastly, in its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal considered whether
the Philippines' submissions were affected by the exception from jurisdiction
in Article 298 for disputes concerning military activities. The Tribunal
considered that the stand-off between Philippine marines on Second Thomas Shoal
and Chinese naval and law enforcement vessels constituted military activities
and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the Philippines' Submission No.
14(a)-(c). The Tribunal also considered whether China's land reclamation and
construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands
constituted military activities, but noted that China had repeatedly emphasized
the non-military nature of its actions and had stated at the highest level that
it would not militarize its presence in the Spratlys. The Tribunal decided that
it would not deem activities to be military in nature when China itself had
repeatedly affirmed the opposite. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that
Article 298 did not pose an obstacle to its jurisdiction.
a. The 'Nine-Dash Line' and
China's Claim to Historic Rights in the Maritime Areas of the South China Sea
In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal considered the
implications of China's 'nine-dash line' and whether China has historic rights
to resources in the South China Sea beyond the limits of the maritime zones
that it is entitled to pursuant to the Convention.
The Tribunal examined the history of the Convention and its provisions
concerning maritime zones and concluded that the Convention was intended to
comprehensively allocate the rights of States to maritime areas. The Tribunal
noted that the question of pre-existing rights to resources (in particular
fishing resources) was carefully considered during the negotiations on the
creation of the exclusive economic zone and that a number of States wished to
preserve historic fishing rights in the new zone. This position was rejected, however,
and the final text of the Convention gives other States only a limited right of
access to fisheries in the exclusive economic zone (in the event the coastal
State cannot harvest the full allowable catch) and no rights to petroleum or
mineral resources. The Tribunal found that China's claim to historic rights to
resources was incompatible with the detailed allocation of rights and maritime
zones in the Convention and concluded that, to the extent China had historic
rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were
extinguished by the entry into force of the Convention to the extent they were
incompatible with the Convention's system of maritime zones.
The Tribunal also examined the historical record to determine whether
China actually had historic rights to resources in the South China Sea prior to
the entry into force of the Convention. The Tribunal noted that there is
evidence that Chinese navigators and fishermen, as well as those of other
States, had historically made use of the islands in the South China Sea,
although the Tribunal emphasized that it was not empowered to decide the
question of sovereignty over the islands. However, the Tribunal considered that
prior to the Convention, the waters of the South China Sea beyond the
territorial sea were legally part of the high seas, in which vessels from any
State could freely navigate and fish. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that historical
navigation and fishing by China in the waters of the South China Sea
represented the exercise of high seas freedoms, rather than a historic right,
and that there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive
control over the waters of the South China Sea or prevented other States from
exploiting their resources.
Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that, as between the Philippines
and China, there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to
resources, in excess of the rights provided for by the Convention, within the sea
areas falling within the 'nine-dash line'.
b. The Status of Features in the
South China Sea
In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal considered the status of
features in the South China Sea and the entitlements to maritime areas that
China could potentially claim pursuant to the Convention.
The Tribunal first undertook a technical evaluation as to whether
certain coral reefs claimed by China are or are not above water at high tide.
Under Articles 13 and 121 of the Convention, features that are above water at
high tide generate an entitlement to at least a 12 nautical mile territorial
sea, whereas features that are submerged at high tide generate no entitlement
to maritime zones. The Tribunal noted that many of the reefs in the South China
Sea have been heavily modified by recent land reclamation and construction and
recalled that the Convention classifies features on the basis of their natural
condition. The Tribunal appointed an expert hydrographer to assist it in
evaluating the Philippines' technical evidence and relied heavily on archival
materials and historical hydrographic surveys in evaluating the features. The
Tribunal agreed with the Philippines that Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef,
Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef are high-tide features and that Subi Reef,
Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, and Second Thomas Shoal were submerged at high tide
in their natural condition. However, the Tribunal disagreed with the
Philippines regarding the status of Gaven Reef (North) and McKennan Reef and
concluded that both are high tide features.
The Tribunal then considered whether any of the features claimed by
China could generate an entitlement to maritime zones beyond 12 nautical miles.
Under Article 121 of the Convention, islands generate an entitlement to an
exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and to a continental shelf, but
"[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf." The Tribunal noted
that this provision was closely linked to the expansion of coastal State
jurisdiction with the creation of the exclusive economic zone and was intended
to prevent insignificant features from generating large entitlements to
maritime zones that would infringe on the entitlements of inhabited territory
or on the high seas and the area of the seabed reserved for the common heritage
of mankind. The Tribunal interpreted Article 121 and concluded that the
entitlements of a feature depend on (a) the objective capacity of a feature,
(b) in its natural condition, to sustain either (c) a stable community of people
or (d) economic activity that is neither dependent on outside resources nor
purely extractive in nature.
The Tribunal noted that many of the features in the Spratly Islands
are currently controlled by one or another of the littoral States, which have
constructed installations and maintain personnel there. The Tribunal considered
these modern presences to be dependent on outside resources and support and
noted that many of the features have been modified to improve their
habitability, including through land reclamation and the construction of
infrastructure such as desalination plants. The Tribunal concluded that the
current presence of official personnel on many of the features does not
establish their capacity, in their natural condition, to sustain a stable
community of people and considered that historical evidence of habitation or
economic life was more relevant to the objective capacity of the features.
Examining the historical record, the Tribunal noted that the Spratly Islands
were historically used by small groups of fishermen from China, as well as other
States, and that several Japanese fishing and guano mining enterprises were
attempted in the 1920s and 1930s. The Tribunal concluded that temporary use of
the features by fishermen did not amount to inhabitation by a stable community
and that all of the historical economic activity had been extractive in nature.
Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that all of the high-tide features in the
Spratly Islands (including, for example, Itu Aba, Thitu, West York Island, Spratly
Island, North-East Cay, South-West Cay) are legally "rocks" that do not
generate an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
The Tribunal also held that the Convention does not provide for a
group of islands such as the Spratly Islands to generate maritime zones
collectively as a unit.
c. Chinese Activities in the
South China Sea
In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal considered the lawfulness
under the Convention of various Chinese actions in the South China Sea.
Having found that Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Reed Bank
are submerged at high tide, form part of the exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf of the Philippines, and are not overlapped by any possible
entitlement of China, the Tribunal concluded that the Convention is clear in
allocating sovereign rights to the Philippines with respect to sea areas in its
exclusive economic zone. The Tribunal found as a matter of fact that China had
(a) interfered with Philippine petroleum exploration at Reed Bank, (b)
purported to prohibit fishing by Philippine vessels within the Philippines'
exclusive economic zone, (c) protected and failed to prevent Chinese fishermen
from fishing within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone at Mischief Reef
and Second Thomas Shoal, and (d) constructed installations and artificial
islands at Mischief Reef without the authorization of the Philippines. The
Tribunal therefore concluded that China had violated the Philippines' sovereign
rights with respect to its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.
The Tribunal next examined traditional fishing at Scarborough Shoal
and concluded that fishermen from the Philippines, as well as fishermen from
China and other countries, had long fished at the Shoal and had traditional
fishing rights in the area. Because Scarborough Shoal is above water at high
tide, it generates an entitlement to a territorial sea, its surrounding waters
do not form part of the exclusive economic zone, and traditional fishing rights
were not extinguished by the Convention. Although the Tribunal emphasized that
it was not deciding sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal, it found that China had
violated its duty to respect to the traditional fishing rights of Philippine
fishermen by halting access to the Shoal after May 2012. The Tribunal noted,
however, that it would reach the same conclusion with respect to the
traditional fishing rights of Chinese fishermen if the Philippines were to
prevent fishing by Chinese nationals at Scarborough Shoal.
The Tribunal also considered the effect of China's actions on the
marine environment. In doing so, the Tribunal was assisted by three independent
experts on coral reef biology who were appointed to assist it in evaluating the
available scientific evidence and the Philippines' expert reports. The Tribunal
found that China's recent large scale land reclamation and construction of
artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands has caused severe
harm to the coral reef environment and that China has violated its obligation
under Articles 192 and 194 of the Convention to preserve and protect the marine
environment with respect to fragile ecosystems and the habitat of depleted,
threatened, or endangered species. The Tribunal also found that Chinese
fishermen have engaged in the harvesting of endangered sea turtles, coral, and
giant clams on a substantial scale in the South China Sea, using methods that
inflict severe damage on the coral reef environment. The Tribunal found that
Chinese authorities were aware of these activities and failed to fulfill their
due diligence obligations under the Convention to stop them.
Finally, the Tribunal considered the lawfulness of the conduct of
Chinese law enforcement vessels at Scarborough Shoal on two occasions in April
and May 2012 when Chinese vessels had sought to physically obstruct Philippine
vessels from approaching or gaining entrance to the Shoal. In doing so, the
Tribunal was assisted by an independent expert on navigational safety who was
appointed to assist it in reviewing the written reports provided by the
officers of the Philippine vessels and the expert evidence on navigational safety
provided by the Philippines. The Tribunal found that Chinese law enforcement
vessels had repeatedly approached the Philippine vessels at high speed and
sought to cross ahead of them at close distances, creating serious risk of
collision and danger to Philippine ships and personnel. The Tribunal concluded
that China had breached its obligations under the Convention on the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, and Article
94 the Convention concerning maritime safety.
d. Aggravation of the Dispute
between the Parties
In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal considered whether China's
recent large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands at
seven features in the Spratly Islands since the commencement of the arbitration
had aggravated the dispute between the Parties. The Tribunal recalled that
there exists a duty on parties engaged in a dispute settlement procedure to
refrain from aggravating or extending the dispute or disputes at issue during
the pendency of the settlement process. The Tribunal noted that China has (a)
built a large artificial island on Mischief Reef, a low-tide elevation located
in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines; (b) caused permanent,
irreparable harm to the coral reef ecosystem and (c) permanently destroyed
evidence of the natural condition of the features in question. The Tribunal
concluded that China had violated its obligations to refrain from aggravating
or extending the Parties' disputes during the pendency of the settlement
process.
e. Future Conduct of the Parties
Finally, the Tribunal considered the Philippines' request for a
declaration that, going forward, China shall respect the rights and freedoms of
the Philippines and comply with its duties under the Convention. In this respect,
the Tribunal noted that both the Philippines and China have repeatedly accepted
that the Convention and general obligations of good faith define and regulate
their conduct. The Tribunal considered that the root of the disputes at issue
in this arbitration lies not in any intention on the part of China or the
Philippines to infringe on the legal rights of the other, but rather in
fundamentally different understandings of their respective rights under the
Convention in the waters of the South China Sea. The Tribunal recalled that it
is a fundamental principle of international law that bad faith is not presumed
and noted that Article 11 of Annex VII provides that the "award . . . shall be
complied with by the parties to the dispute." The Tribunal therefore considered
that no further declaration was necessary.
On Jan. 22, 2013, the Republic of the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings against the People's Republic
of China (PRC) under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The arbitration concerned
the role of historic rights and the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, the status of certain maritime
features in the South China Sea, and the lawfulness of certain actions by the PRC in the South China Sea that the Philippines
alleged to be in violation of UNCLOS. The PRC adopted a position of non-acceptance and non-participation in the proceedings.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) based in The Hague (Netherlands) served as Registry in this arbitration. Relevant
case information is listed on the PCA website (click here),
the full texts of the South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016 can be found on that website as well—PCA Case
Nº 2013-19 (English, PDF, 501 pages) and its
unofficial Chinese translation (南海問題仲裁 2016 年 7 月 12 日裁决非官方翻譯,
PDF, 345 pages). For above press release
click here.
Please note that the PCA ruling in the South China Sea arbitration was rejected by both the PRC and the ROC.
The New Southbound Policy is a crucial part of Taiwan’s economic and trade strategy, which aims to redefine Taiwan’s important role in Asia’s development, identify a new direction and a new driving force for a new stage of economic development, and create future value. In light of this, President Tsai Ing-wen convened a meeting on international economic and trade strategy on August 16, 2016. During the meeting, participants approved the adoption of policy guidelines for the New Southbound Policy. The guidelines clearly set forth the guiding principles of the New Southbound Policy and its short-, medium-, and long-term goals. They will also guide action and serve as a framework for implementation.
These guidelines will shape the direction of government undertakings, coalesce resources and forces in our society, and make it clear to the international community (especially the nations of ASEAN and South Asia) that Taiwan has bona fide intentions to push forward with cooperation projects and engage in talks and dialogue, in order to lay a solid foundation for implementing the New Southbound Policy across the board.
The following is a translation of the full text of the guidelines for the New Southbound Policy.
The New Southbound Policy is a crucial part of Taiwan’s economic and trade strategy. As an important member of both Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, Taiwan must respond to changing global conditions and the trend toward regional integration by making appropriate adjustments. The New Southbound Policy has been adopted in order to identify a new direction and a new driving force for a new stage of Taiwan’s economic development, to redefine Taiwan’s important role in Asia’s development, and to create future value. At the same time, via this policy, our government hopes to start up wide-ranging negotiation and dialogue with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia, with an eye to establishing close cooperation and together achieving regional development and prosperity.
(1) Foster links between Taiwan and the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia in the areas of economic and trade relations, science and technology, and culture; share resources, talent, and markets; and create a new cooperation mode that seeks mutual benefits and win-win situations. By these undertakings, we seek to forge a “sense of economic community.”
(2) Establish mechanisms for wide-ranging negotiation and dialogue; form a consensus for cooperation with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia; effectively resolve related problems and disagreements; and gradually build up mutual trust and a sense of community.
2. Short- to mid-term goals
(1) Use a combination of national will, policy incentives, and business opportunities to spur and expand bilateral exchanges in the areas of economic and trade relations, investment, tourism, culture, and talent.
(2) In support of a New Model for Economic Development, encourage industry to adopt a New Southbound strategy in planning their next moves.
(3) Cultivate more people with the skills needed to support the New Southbound Policy, thereby resolving a developmental bottleneck.
(4) Expand multilateral and bilateral negotiation and dialogue to enhance economic cooperation and resolve disputes and disagreements.
1. Settle in for the long haul, forge a sense of economic community
Taiwan already has a strong foundation and favourable conditions for implementation of the New Southbound Policy, but we know from experience and actual circumstances that we cannot expect to achieve instant success, for the road ahead is full of challenges. We must be unwavering and firm in purpose, settle in for the long haul, and seek comprehensive development. We must establish strategic partnerships with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia, and gradually forge a sense of economic community. That is how we will bolster our capabilities and overcome a wide variety of difficulties and bottlenecks.
2. Properly define Taiwan’s future role in regional development
Taiwan’s success in economic development came about because our actions were in line with our comparative advantages — outward-looking strategy and strength in contract manufacturing. This earned Taiwan a place in global supply chains and, within Asia, a key role as a provider of capital and technology and an integrator of resources. Faced with a reshuffling of global supply chains and the rise of emerging economies, Taiwan must redefine its role in the process of regional development. We intend to create a New Model for Economic Development based on the core elements of innovation, employment, and equitable distribution. We further intend to bring about new modes of production and new ways of living that will make Taiwan a model for Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. We hope to act as “an innovator, a sharer, and a provider of services.”
3. Pursue a strategy of four key links
(1) Soft power links
Countries throughout the world expend great efforts to maintain good ties with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia. Taiwan’s main strengths, meanwhile, lie in its soft power in areas such as technology, people and culture. Taiwan should pay especially close attention to soft power as a core aspect of its strategy to link up with other countries. We need to take advantage of Taiwan’s broad experience in medical care, education, technology, and agricultural cooperation as well as small and medium enterprises to promote multilateral and bilateral cooperation with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia.
(2) Supply chain links
In the area of trade and investment, there is a high degree of complementarity between Taiwan and the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia. Due to the impact of structural factors, however, some industries in recent years have stopped growing or even gone into decline. To spur trade and investment, we need to first deal with supply chain integration. This integration is needed in such sectors as information and communications technology (ICT), domestic-demand-driven industries, energy and petrochemicals, new agriculture, and financial services. Division of labour and cooperation in next-generation industries and international trade is another area where we need to act early to put the pieces in place, starting with the five major innovative industries, so as to leave ourselves room for multilateral participation and cooperation. Cooperation involving small and medium enterprises should also be included as a key focal point of cooperation.
(3) Linking regional markets
The nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia are spread out across a vast region, and there are pronounced differences among them in terms of level of development, culture, customs, and legal systems. To boost two-way investment and trade and spur more vigorous economic cooperation, we must strengthen linkages among different markets within the region. Accordingly, investing in soft and hard infrastructure and fostering links with regional markets are key to cooperation with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia, and offer immense business opportunities. Taiwan will need to make an active effort, using the resources at its disposal, to take part in the building of infrastructure in the aforementioned areas. We will also have to capitalize on Taiwan’s technical edge in ICT software to promote online links with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia. In addition, we must at the same time push to adjust our legislation in order to expand links with regional markets.
(4) People-to-people links
Travel and tourism are at the core of people-to-people ties, and a catalyst for intercultural exchange and fusion. If we are to establish close ties with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia, promoting people-to-people links is a core task. We should use tourism and cultural resources to promote two-way ties and exchanges, thereby implementing a people-centred New Southbound spirit.
4. Cultivate more people with the skills needed to support the New Southbound Policy
Overcoming a shortage of people with relevant skill sets is key to the success of the New Southbound Policy. We need to cultivate long-term talent and turn out increased numbers of short-term talent so there will be a deeper labour pool to support the New Southbound Policy. The government must invest more resources. It must provide technical and vocational education, stimulate industrial development, and cultivate more “New Southbound personnel” in order to provide companies with the long- and short-term personnel they need. The government must also encourage immigrants in Taiwan to get involved in the “New Southbound” undertaking, and mainstream language instruction to cultivate personnel with expertise in languages relevant to the New Southbound Policy.
5. Pursue institutionalized bilateral and multilateral cooperation
We have consistently pursued the goals of promoting institutionalized economic cooperation with our major trading partners and taking part in the process of regional economic integration. We need to continue working to sign bilateral investment and taxation agreements with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia, and should actively seek to sign economic cooperation agreements or enter into economic cooperation projects with our major trading partners. Doing so will build up a stronger foundation and momentum for our efforts to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
6. Formulate a comprehensive set of coordinated measures and effective risk controls
If the New Southbound Policy is to endure, we need to engage in comprehensive efforts. Government agencies must play their proper roles by planning out the establishment of comprehensive sets of coordinated measures, including deregulation and steps to ensure the free movement of people, goods, and money. We need to provide convenient financing channels, technical support, and plentiful information, and complement these efforts with foreign aid to support implementation of the New Southbound Policy. On another front, we also need to take risk management seriously and be fully aware of the possible political and economic risks associated with the New Southbound Policy. In pursuing links and cooperation with other countries, we need to adopt plans that are appropriate given local political realities and conditions within local Taiwanese expatriate communities. At the same time, we need to establish early warning and response mechanisms for major incidents in order to effectively control risks.
7. Participate actively in international cooperation
The nations of ASEAN and South Asia are important emerging economies. The United States, Japan, and mainland China all have proactive strategies for developing relations with them, and international organizations such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have all expended resources to assist with regional development. Taiwan should take an active part in international cooperation and establish strategic alliances with friendly countries and together with these countries foster links with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia.
8. Comprehensively enhance mechanisms for talks and dialogue
Pursuing the New Southbound Policy and engaging in wide-ranging communication and dialogue with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia are very important tasks. Taiwan should comprehensively enhance mechanisms for negotiation and dialogue. With the office for international economic and trade negotiations to be established under the auspices of the Executive Yuan, we will further strengthen the international negotiating capabilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and similar agencies, so that we can engage in multi-level and comprehensive negotiations and dialogue with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia aimed at eliminating barriers and impediments rooted in systems and policies.
9. Good-faith cross-strait interactions and cooperation
The two sides of the Taiwan Strait both bear a great responsibility for regional peace and development, and share numerous common interests. In seeking economic cooperation with the nations of ASEAN and South Asia as well as New Zealand and Australia, the two sides each have different resources and advantages. By working together we can multiply our strengths. Therefore, we do not rule out the possibility of engaging in negotiation and dialogue with the other side of the Strait on related matters at opportune moments, so that the New Southbound Policy and cross-strait relations can be mutually reinforcing undertakings, and the two sides can together set a model for regional cooperation.
10. Make good use of private-sector organizations and vitality
The New Southbound Policy has to be thoroughly implemented in all aspects of private-sector exchanges, so it is necessary to make good use of private-sector organizations such as academic, research, religious, cultural, artistic, industrial and commercial groups, as well as associations of Taiwan-invested enterprises and NGOs. We need to encourage and help them to take part in New Southbound Policy endeavours so that private-sector firms can bring their energy fully into play and form a vanguard in implementation of the New Southbound Policy.
The New Southbound Policy is very broad in its impact. The Office of the President, National Security Council, Executive Yuan, and related Cabinet agencies need to adopt policy guidelines addressing their own areas of responsibility. They need to promote related projects and programs, including flagship programs in different fields, and undertake the relevant work with clear plans, procedures and priorities.
2. Establishing a mechanism for liaison with elected officials and local governments
To fully launch and implement the New Southbound Policy requires the support of elected officials and participation of local governments. For this reason, the central government must establish a mechanism for coordination and liaison with the Legislative Yuan and local governments, in order to consolidate collective strengths in support of the New Southbound Policy, so that it will yield positive results for the country.
The "New Southbound Policy" (xin nanxiang zhengce 新南向政策, abbrev. NSP) is a political concept
by ROC President Tsai Ing-wen introduced at the beginning of her first term. It unfolded as follows:
2015, Sept. 22: The NSP is mentioned for the first time by DPP chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen
2017, Dec. 13: ROC Presidential Office Spokesman Alex Huang 黃重諺 announces that the New Southbound Policy Office is slated to be shut down in 2018
2018, Jan. 1: The New Southbound Policy Office closes
2018, Jan. 28: ROC Premier Lai Ching-te 賴清德 approves the formation of a 10-person New Southbound Policy Task Force (xin nanxiang gongzuo xiaozu 新南向工作小組)
2022, Jan. 5: President Tsai appoints Lin Chia-lung 林佳龍 ambassador-at-large (wurensuo dashi 無任所大使) for digital NSP initiatives
The Executive Yuan today (September 5, 2016) unveiled a plan to promote the New Southbound Policy that aims to strengthen Taiwan’s trade and economic ties with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Asian countries, as well as New Zealand and Australia.
Centered on the values of “settling in for the long haul, seeking comprehensive development, and creating mutual benefits,” the plan is based on policy guidelines approved by President Tsai Ing-wen August 16 during a meeting on international economic and trade strategy.
Under the plan, the government will integrate the resources and strengths of the public and private sectors to forge a new mutually beneficial model of cooperation and a sense of economic community with those countries. The plan consists of four main components:
Rather than regarding ASEAN and South Asia as contract manufacturing bases for exports, Taiwan will forge new partnerships by integrating with those countries’ supply chains, connecting with their domestic demand markets, and cooperating on infrastructure projects.
a. Supply chains:
Based on the capacities and demands of industries in those countries, Taiwan’s competitive industries should integrate with their supply chains. For instance, starting with the five major innovative industries (biomedicine, an Asian Silicon Valley, intelligent machinery, green energy technology and national defense), Taiwan can export or help set up internet-of-things systems for electronic toll collection, smart health care and intelligent school campuses. The government will also set up a Taiwan Desk using local resources to help overseas Taiwanese enterprises form business clusters. A single window for southbound economy and trade expansion will serve as the platform for seeking, creating, integrating and promoting bilateral trade opportunities.
b. Domestic demand markets:
Use cross-border electronic and physical distribution channels to sell quality and affordable products. Export new service industries including education, health, medical care and dining. Shape Taiwan’s industrial brand image.
c. Infrastructure projects:
Create a collaborative platform for exporting infrastructure construction services and turnkey projects. Form export teams on energy, petrochemical and environmental infrastructure. Build strategic alliances with third-country service providers.
With a focus on people, deepen bilateral exchange and cultivation of young scholars, students and industry professionals. Share and complement human resources with partner countries.
a. Education ties:
Expand scholarships to draw more students from ASEAN and South Asia. Depending on domestic industry needs, create courses on academia-industry cooperation and foreign youth technical training, and provide job matching services after their graduation. Encourage universities and colleges to set up campuses or courses abroad or offer preparatory programs. Offer elementary and junior high school language courses for new immigrants, and encourage universities and colleges to cultivate more Southeast Asian language experts and regional trade professionals.
b. Industry talent:
Assess and establish a points-based system allowing residency extensions for eligible foreign professional or technical workers in Taiwan, and encourage them to obtain job skills training and professional certification. Promote exchanges of professional talent by protecting social welfare benefits for workers returning to Taiwan, streamline procedures for foreign workers coming to Taiwan, match workers to employers, and help domestic businesses find talent.
c. New immigrants:
Help first-generation immigrants use their linguistic and cultural advantages to obtain work certification and job opportunities (such as language teaching and tourism-related work). Help second-generation immigrants connect with their ancestral countries by encouraging universities to establish appropriate departments or curriculums, and give admission priority to students speaking Southeast Asian languages.
Capitalize on Taiwan’s soft powers to promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation in culture, tourism, medical care, technology, agriculture, and small and medium-sized enterprises. Improve quality of life in partner countries and expand Taiwan’s economic footprint.
a. Health care:
Cooperate with ASEAN, South Asia, New Zealand and Australia on bilateral pharmaceutical certifications and new drug and medical equipment development. Help ASEAN and South Asia cultivate medical care and public health workers.
b. Culture:
Use film, broadcasting and online games to market Taiwan’s cultural brand. Encourage Taiwan’s local governments to engage in exchanges and cooperation with cities in ASEAN, South Asia, New Zealand and Australia.
c. Tourism:
Ease visa requirements for ASEAN and South Asian tourists to Taiwan. Promote Taiwan tourism through different channels, raise the quality and quantity of tour guides, create a Muslim-friendly travel environment.
d. Technology:
Build technology exchange platforms, strengthen international connections at Taiwan’s science parks and research institutes, promote exchanges in smart disaster prevention technologies.
e. Agriculture:
Establish a “Taiwan international agricultural development company” to promote Taiwan’s brand to overseas markets. Provide agricultural technology assistance, expand use of biomaterials and agricultural machinery, improve the business capabilities of partner countries.
Systematize bilateral and multilateral cooperation with partner countries, strengthen negotiations and dialogue. Change previous patterns of individual effort and draw on the collective strength of private groups, overseas Taiwanese networks and third countries. Advance regional safety and prosperity.
a. Regional integration:
Actively pursue economic cooperation agreements or individual economic cooperation provisions with India and major ASEAN trade partners. Update and strengthen current bilateral investment and taxation treaties, improve risk management by creating major event alert and emergency response mechanisms.
b. Negotiations and dialogue:
Promote multilevel and all-encompassing negotiations and dialogue with ASEAN, South Asia, New Zealand and Australia. Open dialogue and negotiations with China at a suitable time on relevant topics and cooperation matters.
c. Strategic alliances:
Reallocate foreign aid resources, build a comprehensive foreign aid mechanism, encourage more businesses to participate in local development projects of other countries. Join third countries (such as Japan and Singapore) in efforts to tap markets in ASEAN, South Asia, New Zealand and Australia. Strengthen cooperation between private corporations and nongovernmental organizations.
d. Overseas Taiwanese networks:
Create an overseas Taiwanese database and exchange platform (including for foreign graduates of Taiwan universities, Taiwanese businesses operating abroad, and overseas ethnic Chinese). Connect with overseas ethnic Chinese and overseas Taiwanese business networks and strengthen their links with Taiwanese corporations.
The global and domestic circumstances of Taiwan’s economy have undergone rapid changes in recent years. In the global economy, mainland China is facing many obstacles following three decades of rapid economic development, such as industrial structural transformation, adjustments in laws and institutions, a sharp increase in production costs, and a slowdown in economic growth. Meanwhile, the economies of Southeast and South Asia have continued to expand, raising their consumers’ purchasing power. These countries also actively participate in regional economic integration to maximize their firms’ competitiveness, creating greater business opportunities.
This region has consequently emerged as a bright spot of global economic growth. Currently, the total GDP of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which have a combined population of approximately 620 million, has reached US$2.4 trillion. The six South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan) have a total population of nearly 1.7 billion and a GDP of US$2.7 trillion. According to Global Insight forecasts, the average annual economic growth rates for the ASEAN and South Asian countries will reach 4.9% and 7.4%, respectively, over the next five years (2017-2021), which is notably higher than the global average of 3.1%. Following this economic growth, a new middle class with remarkable purchasing power will gradually emerge in these countries, forming markets full of business opportunities.
Domestically, Taiwan is entering a critical period of industrial transformation and structural adjustment, in which wage growth has stagnated, talented people are in short supply, and economic growth is decelerating. Although Taiwan has previously maintained trade and economic relations with many emerging markets in Asia, most of these relations are based on export processing and related investment, not on the local markets themselves. Moreover, the majority of these export items are manufactured goods with little value added. Due to Taiwan’s difficulties in participating in regional economic integration, these products are greatly affected by tariffs and trade barriers, and Taiwanese companies face severe competition. These problems are hindering Taiwan’s export and economic growth. Taiwan also has a high concentration of trade and outbound investment in mainland China, which poses potential risks to Taiwan’s economy and security.
Under these new circumstances, Taiwan’s strategy for economic and foreign relations in the Asia-Pacific region is to engage in structural adjustment to promote growth and support the transformation of domestic industries. In this context, President Tsai Ing-wen in her inaugural speech on May 20, 2016, highlighted the importance of promoting the New Southbound Policy to improve Taiwan’s stance and versatility in the international economy, stating that Taiwan should step away from relying on a single market, and re-establish ties with the rest of Asia.
On August 16, 2016, President Tsai convened a meeting on international economic and trade strategy, formally adopting the Guidelines for the New Southbound Policy. She positioned the New Southbound Policy as a key component of Taiwan’s overall international economic and trade strategy, asserting that Taiwan should seek out new directions and capacities for a new stage of economic development, and redefine Taiwan’s position in the development of Asia to create value for the future. In response, the Executive Yuan introduced the New Southbound Policy Promotion Plan on September 5 of that year, and consequently directed the Office of Trade Negotiations to coordinate all tasks concerning the New Southbound Policy.
The guidelines elucidate the vision and short- to mid-term goals of the New Southbound Policy. One of these goals entails creating a new model of mutually beneficial cooperation between Taiwan and these 18 countries by promoting links in trade, technology, and culture, as well as by sharing resources, talent, and markets. Another goal is to establish extensive negotiation and dialogue channels to form a consensus for cooperation with countries included in the New Southbound Policy and effectively resolve relevant problems and disagreements, thereby gradually building mutual trust and ultimately forging a sense of economic community.
By achieving these goals, Taiwan will partner with New Southbound Policy target countries to pursue economic prosperity, talent and resource sharing, quality-of-life innovation, and international connection and reciprocity. Therefore, the New Southbound Policy will follow the core ideas of “Settling in for the long haul, comprehensive engagement, and two-way reciprocity”. It will also integrate the resources and efforts of various ministries, local governments, and the private sector to achieve the four objectives of economic and trade cooperation, talent exchange, resource sharing, and regional integration. Moreover, the policy will focus on lateral connections with countries included in the New Southbound Policy to create a new and mutually beneficial model of cooperation and economic community.
It is against this background that the policy pursues four main tasks: In promoting economic and trade cooperation, it aims to facilitate Taiwanese firms moving beyond the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) production model; connecting with countries in the New Southbound Policy area; enhance cooperation among industries and in infrastructure projects; and export integrated systems services.
In terms of talent exchange, the policy aims to adopt a people-centred, two-way exchange strategy while balancing the needs of Taiwan and countries in the New Southbound Policy area. It is not geared toward a unilateral employment of foreign workers, but rather the bilateral fostering of talent, thereby enhancing the complementarities and cooperation of human resources. In resource sharing, the policy aims to maximize the soft power advantages of Taiwan’s medical, cultural, tourism, technology, and agriculture industries, and use them as a stepping stone to establishing and reinforcing relations with New Southbound Policy target countries, thereby creating bilateral or multilateral cooperation opportunities. In regional integration, the policy aims to promote bilateral or multilateral institutionalized cooperation, to elevate the level of negotiations and dialogue between Taiwan and these countries. Moreover, it relies on international cooperation to establish Taiwan’s partnership with these countries.
Overall, the New Southbound Policy is a component of Taiwan’s comprehensive economic and foreign relations strategy to keep abreast of current international and domestic trends. The policy aims not only to diversify trade and economic risks, but also to seek market opportunities, identify new driving forces for Taiwan’s economy, and redefine Taiwan’s role in the international supply chain. Through meaningful participation in international communities, Taiwan intends to help achieve regional peace and prosperity.
Taiwan has long-standing and strong economic and trade relations with a number of Southeast Asian countries. However, these countries generally serve as production bases for OEM processing, export trade or investment, focusing less on domestic markets. In recent years, many Southeast Asian and South Asian economies have flourished, drastically increasing spending power. These advancements, coupled with the rise of a new middle class, have created domestic markets with immense business potential, emerging as the new focus of global economic growth.
To enable Taiwanese businesses to reap the benefits brought about by the growth of Southeast Asian and South Asian economies, the economic and trade cooperation objective of the New Southbound Policy is to allow Taiwanese companies to transcend their previous export processing models for ASEAN and South Asia, and establish bilateral industrial cooperation and trade exchange models with countries included in the New Southbound Policy, using the markets of the New Southbound countries to expand domestic markets.
From the perspective of foreign investment motivation, Taiwanese businesses should shift from defensive, cost-centred investment strategies to expansive, market-centred strategies. From a strategic perspective, they should shift from processing and manufacturing operations to create own-brand and distribution operations. From a mode of operations perspective, they should shift from a one-product-fits-all production and sales model to one that manufactures and markets products suited to different markets. Moreover, businesses should enhance the added value of their products and services, such as converting single-item products or services into software-hardware integrated systems and package plant export.
In context of the development of local spending and infrastructure as well as the demand for industrial transition, the economic and trade cooperation between Taiwan and New Southbound Policy target countries can be initiated by supporting the integration of industry value chains, domestic market connections, infrastructure construction cooperation, and systems integration services in order to pave the way for the next generation of industrial and trade cooperation. Medium-to-high-income urban consumers should be selected as the target customers in formulating customized marketing strategies that utilize cross-border e-commerce and physical distribution channels to overcome marketing obstructions and promote trade and investment. Moreover, Taiwanese businesses should secure strategic alliances with multinational corporations to compete for infrastructure construction projects and opportunities to collaborate with emerging industries. Taiwanese businesses should also strive to eliminate market entry obstructions by establishing a dedicated service window for collecting market data and establishing interpersonal networks, thereby promoting the mutual prosperity of Taiwan’s economy and the economies of countries included in the New Southbound Policy.
1.2. Policy Objectives
(1)
To accurately understand the industrial development conditions, industrial development demands, and opportunities for reciprocal cooperation in New Southbound Policy target countries; establish bilateral dialogue through the involvement of industry associations and corporate bodies; and promote industry cooperation that profits both parties.
(2)
To review and adjust existing trade expansion activities, enhance their effectiveness, and ensure cost-effectiveness; utilize and innovate competitive Taiwanese products and services (e.g., agricultural products) to expand marketing activities and pro-actively expand into the domestic markets of countries included in the New Southbound Policy.
(3)
To organize exhibitions in major cities to promote the image and products of Taiwan and reinforce the promotion of Taiwan in general exhibitions and marketing events.
(4)
To provide sufficient information on industry, investment, trade, and tax laws and regulations in New Southbound Policy target countries to Taiwanese enterprises; and to provide necessary risk management assistance and guidance to enterprises.
(5)
To utilize organizational and collective efforts in securing consultation and advisory services or providing construction tenders for competitive infrastructure construction and systems integration export bidding.
(6)
To increase the capital and funding for the Import-Export Bank of the ROC and overseas trusts; provide adequate funds (e.g., financing, bonds, securities, and buyer’s credit) to businesses for expanding into overseas markets by utilizing the resources of commercial and government-run banks; as well as encouraging Taiwanese banks to establish branches in countries included in the New Southbound Policy to provide local services to Taiwanese enterprises.
1.3. Operational Guidelines and Specifications
The newly passed or added operational guidelines and projects for 2017 are as follows:
1.3.1. Industry Cooperation and Trade/Economic Expansion
(1)
Promoting two-way industry cooperation: This aims to prioritize think tanks and research teams to promote national and industrial development features, and clearly assess cooperation regions and methods, thereby establishing and reinforcing long-term and stable industrial links, promoting two-way industry associations and positive exchanges between think tanks and technical entities, and stipulating official economics and trade discussion outlines. The goal is to garner industry cooperation opportunities with no fewer than four New Southbound target countries, establish industrial exchange platforms and activities, and sign at least one cooperation agreement or memorandum each year.
(2)
Engaging in comprehensive trade expansion: This aims to select potential products, such as locally in-demand consumables, machines, tools, and medical equipment, and services, such as digital content, franchises, information services, healthcare, and catering, for overseas expansion, with dispatching interdisciplinary consultation service teams and establishing e-commerce channels as the focus for trade expansion. A marketing centre for Taiwanese products and a machine buyer alliance will be established to foster technical operators in the target market. Innovative marketing methods, such as arranging a Taiwan Industry Day, can be adopted to achieve comprehensive trade expansion. The goal is to provide over 17,500 services to enterprises in e-commerce and e-marketing, creating at least US$420 million in purchasing value. In terms of service expansion, the goal is to serve over 50 enterprises and create at least US$30 million in business value. Moreover, no fewer than three machine buyer alliances will be established to serve no fewer than 300 local alliance members.
(3)
Expanding e-commerce in southbound markets: This aims to provide assistance to local e-commerce providers to expand into ASEAN markets and cooperate with local businesses or operate domestically. Assistance will also be provided to e-commerce providers such as PChome, Momo and Uitox in seeking out local distributors or support providers in establishing local cash and material flow service systems and reinforcing local competitiveness. Moreover, local businesses will be aided in integrating into local community operations to improve Taiwanese e-commerce platforms and enhance the popularity and circulation of key products, thereby ensuring the integrity of the cross-border operation ecosystems in ASEAN countries. The goal is to get no fewer than 3,000 products from 200 Taiwanese brands on shelves per year.
(4)
Reinforcing the export of agricultural products: This aims to establish the International Taiwan Agriculture Development Company to create an export and supply system that provides stable product quantity and quality. Subsequently, fresh and frozen produce will be the main export products. The goal is to ship fresh and frozen products to the 18 countries included in the New Southbound Policy in 2017 and increase export volume by 10% compared with 2015.
(5)
Reinforcing Taiwan’s overall image: The goal is to organize no fewer than four Taiwanese exhibitions in key cities in New Southbound Policy target countries and establish Taiwan boutique displays in at least 11 overseas exhibition events to increase the level of acceptance of Taiwanese products by Southeast Asian customers by 3% per year.
(6)
Assisting the expansion of Taiwanese businesses: This aims to establish Taiwanese offices in a number of New Southbound Policy target countries, including Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Myanmar, and India, to provide Taiwanese businesses with information concerning domestic laws, accounting, taxation, and industries. The goal is to provide no fewer than 1,000 investment consultation services, including investment environment safety reports in the countries included in the New Southbound Policy, as well as risk management assistance.
1.3.2. Infrastructure Construction Cooperation and Systems Integration Exports
(1)
Promoting infrastructure construction cooperation: This aims to combine five major fields, namely Electronic Toll Collection (ETC), Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) systems, environmental engineering, power plants, and petrochemical plants, with potential businesses to establish an export team. The team aims to provide consultation and advisory services and construction export in New Southbound Policy target countries. The team will establish a construction globalization platform and related meetings to coordinate and overcome the challenges which the construction industry’s offshore operations face. The goal is to secure at least one consultation and advisory contract for international ETC in 2017, at least one consultation and advisory contract for MRT maintenance and electronic ticketing, at least one offshore construction or expansion contract concerning environmental protection or resource mining, at least one contract for the construction of a power plant, and at least one contract for the construction of a petrochemical plant.
(2)
Enhancing systems integration exports: This aims to combine seven major fields — namely green transportation, smart logistics, smart healthcare, smart campus technology, e-government, light-emitting diode (LED) technology, and cloud systems — with potential businesses to establish an export team. The goal is to secure at least five contracts in New Southbound Policy target countries; establish four industry alliances for information and communication, engineering, security control, and green energy; and establish three teams to secure government procurement contracts in New Southbound Policy countries.
1.3.3. Financial Support
(1)
Augmenting the finance functions of the Import-Export Bank of the ROC: This aims to gradually increase relevant capital to NT$3.2 billion by 2018. The already-established Export Loan Platform for the Systems, Finishing Plant, and Construction Industries will be combined with the financial resources of government-run and commercial banks to enhance the financing services provided to enterprises, provide discount financing and assurance conditions, upgrade insurance premiums, and provide discounts for buyer credit fees. The goal is to secure an approval rate of 4.95% from the Import-Export Bank for loans related to the New Southbound Policy, and achieve an annual assurance quota growth of 2%.
(2)
Enhancing the assurance function of overseas trusts and funds: This aims to expand funds and project finance assurances in Southeast Asia to include New Southbound countries. The goal is to increase the limit for each project to US$2 million and achieve an annual assurance quota growth of 6% for offshore credit guarantee funds.
(3)
Increase the number of offshore branches of Taiwanese banks: This aims to provide assistance to local banks to establish three offshore branches in New Southbound Policy target countries. The goal is to approve the establishment of three offshore branches each year.
Based on geography, the overseas Taiwanese community, and industry development policies, Taiwan’s talent exchanges with ASEAN and South Asian countries have been largely unidirectional. Seldom are these exchanges bilateral. To satisfy the demands of both parties, a people-centred, two-way exchange strategy will be implemented to reinforce education, industrial talent exchange, and supplementation and cooperation between the talent resources of Taiwan and those in ASEAN and South Asian countries. The talent exchange objective of the New Southbound Policy transcends the previous narrow considerations of domestic demand; instead, the policy aims to attract blue-collar workers from the New Southbound countries to satisfy the demands of and promote growth in all countries (for blue- and white-collar workers alike). The policy focuses on two-way exchange to develop lifelong learning plans and environmental measures for talent in both countries. The policy not only aims to enhance the quality of talent in New Southbound countries, but also to foster relevant talent for enterprises in Taiwan, increasing employment and income in Taiwan as well as the New Southbound countries, thereby promoting mutually beneficial relationships.
The success factor of the New Southbound Policy is that it eliminates the talent shortage bottleneck in these countries. By supplying short-term talents and fostering long-term talents, New Southbound countries can develop robust talent pools. There are currently about 590,000 blue-collar workers and 150,000 foreign spouses in Taiwan. These are human resources who should be fully utilized to develop talent in order to manage New Southbound markets and serve as a bridge between Taiwan and the New Southbound countries. Moreover, the policy aims to foster second-generation immigrants in Taiwan to become the candidates to actuate the New Southbound Policy.
In addition, in order to satisfy the demands of industries in Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and South Asia, the policy aims to utilize the technical education advantage of Taiwan to invest in professional talent cultivation and skills training in Southeast Asia and South Asia, including two-way student exchanges, two-way education collaboration, and generalized language training, thereby fostering short- and long-term talents who meet industry requirements.
2.2. Policy Objectives
(1)
To provide training to students in New Southbound countries in the areas of Taiwanese experience, technical practices, and communication, thereby increasing acceptance towards the higher education and technical training quality of Taiwan; and to form strong associations through the efforts of Taiwanese associations.
(2)
To provide training to students in Taiwan in the areas of economics and trade management, cultural understanding, and ASEAN languages, thereby reinforcing their understanding and acknowledgement of New Southbound countries and fostering talent with an understanding of regional economics and trade as well as relevant laws and regulations.
(3)
To assist Taiwanese vendors and companies in cultivating domestic professionals, increasing the human resources in New Southbound enterprises, developing key industries, and enhancing competitiveness.
(4)
To make foreign workers and international students into suitable candidates to promote industrial development in Taiwan or manage Taiwanese companies in Southeast Asia, thereby creating a mutually beneficial situation.
(5)
To encourage the involvement of Southeast Asian immigrants and urge them to promote their culture, thereby expediting cultural exchanges and strengthening ties between Taiwan and New Southbound countries.
2.3. Operational Guidelines and Specifications
The newly ratified or promoted operational guidelines and specification for 2017 are as follows:
2.3.1. Talent Cultivation
(1)
Integrating and increasing scholarships to attract international students: This objective aims to integrate and increase Taiwanese scholarships, Taiwanese language scholarships, short-term research scholarships, government scholarships, the Southern Sunshine Scholarship, and the TEEP scholarships to attract outstanding international students to study in Taiwan. In addition, the aim is to increase elite international student scholarships, outstanding international student scholarships to help colleges and universities establish research institutes, as well as subsidized scholarships for low-income overseas Taiwanese students. The goal is to achieve 10% annual growth in the number of applications for the Taiwan New Southbound Subsidization and Grants program in accordance with the New Southbound Policy, increase the number of students enrolled in technical training courses for international students (the target is 1,400, 1,540, 1,680, and 1,820 for 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively), and multiply the number of students enrolled in technical and vocational courses for international students (the target goal is 1,500 every year between 2017 and 2020).
(2)
Encouraging students to study in ASEAN and South Asian countries: The objective is to establish government-sponsored scholarships for New Southbound countries and expand the Pilot Overseas Internship Project to ASEAN and South Asian countries. The goal is to allocate government-sponsored, research, or internship scholarships to no less than 200 students in New Southbound countries.
(3)
Establishing the Contact Taiwan recruitment platform and promoting the Taiwan Connection Project: This objective aims to establish the Contact Taiwan recruitment platform to connect foreign and domestic international students with enterprises and help enterprises find the talent they require. Moreover, the Taiwan Connection Project will be promoted in Taiwan to integrate overseas offices, Taiwanese education centres, Taiwanese school teachers, Taiwanese alumni associations, Taiwanese academic seminars, Taiwanese schools in Southeast Asia, and Taiwanese vendor organizations. The goal is to establish 10 new connections through the Taiwan Connection project in 2017.
2.3.2 Industry/Labour Cooperation
(1)
Organizing academic-industry cooperation (AIC) and technical training courses: This objective aims to arrange AIC courses (degree courses), short-term technical training courses (non-degree courses), and short-term professional teacher-training courses (non-degree courses) for international students from the New Southbound countries. The goal is to train 1,600, 200, and 200 students in the respective courses by the end of 2017.
(2)
Subsidizing internship programs: The goal is to provide subsidies to 500 Taiwanese trainees and interns in Taiwanese companies or multinational corporations in ASEAN and South Asian countries in the fields of commerce, engineering, medicine, agriculture, and education in 2017, as well as scholarships to 120 Taiwanese international trade students interning in companies or institutes in Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and India.
(3)
Attracting experienced foreign technical professionals: This objective is aimed at planning and establishing an assessment system for experienced foreign technical professionals and increasing the assessments of southbound developing industries in the Government Cooperation Policy in order to encourage Taiwanese vendors in New Southbound countries to continue operating in Taiwan or expand overseas. The goal is to task the Consultative Group on Transnational Workforce Policy in formulating an assessment system for experienced foreign technical professionals in Taiwan in 2017.
(4)
Establishing a business and recruitment information platform for Taiwanese vendors: The goal is to complete the establishment and activation of a business and recruitment information platform for Taiwanese vendors in 2017. The platform will serve as a search engine for foreign workers in Taiwan, enabling them to seek further employment with Taiwanese vendors in New Southbound countries once their work contracts have expired.
2.3.3. Immigrant Training
(1)
Fostering second-generation immigrants: This objective aims to organize the Southeast Asian Languages and Industry Credit Program for second-generation immigrants and provide them with internship opportunities. In addition, exchange programs for members of the Southeast Asian Immigrant International Study Camp, subsidization for secondgeneration immigrants to learn more about the key fields and languages of ASEAN and South Asian countries, and postgraduation employment consultation will be provided. The goal is to foster 20 students and encourage no fewer than 200 children of immigrants to travel to their parents’ original countries during summer and winter vacations in 2017.
(2)
Fostering immigrant service docents: This objective aims to assist immigrants in becoming docents for providing Southeast Asian language services and promoting language and cultural experience activities. The goal is to foster no fewer than 20 immigrants from four countries (Vietnam, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Thailand) to become service docents, serving no fewer than 300 people in 2017.
To create a new development model for Taiwan’s economy and enhance the configuration and diversity of Taiwan’s international economics and trade, it is essential that cooperation with the New Southbound countries be reinforced. Without diplomatic ties with ASEAN countries, South Asian countries, New Zealand, and Australia, Taiwan must utilize its soft power advantages in the fields of medicine, culture, tourism, technology, and agriculture as stepping stones to establish and reinforce relationships with the New Southbound countries and identify bilateral or multilateral cooperation opportunities. Moreover, economic and trade cooperation, talent exchange, and regional integration should be integrated to facilitate the mutual growth of economies, industries, and human resources in Taiwan and the New Southbound countries, maximizing the support of external powers in Taiwan’s structural adjustment, thereby achieving mutually beneficial situations and cocreating regional development and prosperity.
The New Southbound Policy focuses on people-centred concepts and encourages the diversification of exchanges to develop the social and cultural relationships between Taiwan and the New Southbound countries. Moreover, the policy details the utilization of Taiwan’s advantages in medicine, technology, and agriculture to enhance the quality and convenience of life in the New Southbound countries.
The Taiwanese government will assess the needs of the New Southbound countries and integrate the resources of various ministry departments, local governments, and private enterprises and organizations to share its experience in the fields of medicine and public health, agricultural technology, and technology development with the New Southbound countries to create bilateral or multilateral cooperation. The policy further aims to reinforce the interpersonal relationships between Taiwan and New Southbound countries through tourism and cultural exchanges, thereby creating mutually beneficial partnerships with the New Southbound countries.
3.2. Policy Objectives
(1)
Medicine: To promote cooperation with the New Southbound countries in terms of medicine, public health, and epidemic prevention, including exchanges and cooperation between medical institutions, medical accreditation, and new medicine or instrument development; foster medical personnel in the New Southbound countries; provide medical services and resources in the New Southbound countries; and assist ASEAN and South Asian countries in epidemic surveys and prevention tasks.
(2)
Tourism: To lift visa restrictions and enhance the convenience of visiting Taiwan; extensively uncovering new customers by broadly marketing Taiwan through Taiwanese support groups; foster tourism professionals to help them improve the tourism environment; and maximize the cultural resources of indigenous peoples to promote tribal tours.
(3)
Culture: To actively engage in exchanges with the New Southbound countries at various levels; combine the efforts of local governments to expand cultural relationships; reinforce the marketing of Taiwan’s features and cultures; improve cultural exchanges with the southern islands; promote Hakka southbound international exchanges; and promote cultural exchanges with the National Palace Museum.
(4)
Agriculture: To assist in improving the agricultural capability of ASEAN and South Asian countries; establish and promote Taiwan’s agricultural network; shape Taiwan into a high-technology agriculture nation and diversely promote Taiwan’s agricultural products, techniques, and services in overseas markets; and negotiate agricultural cooperation and development to ensure food safety.
(5)
Technology: To establish a New Southbound technology development strategy in Taiwan; establish a long-term and stable regional research-and-development linking and resource-sharing platform; promote dialogue and cooperation at the executive level; and expand disaster prevention exchanges.
3.3. Operational Guidelines and Specifications
The newly ratified or promoted operational guidelines and specifications for 2017 are as follows:
3.3.1. Medical and Public Health Cooperation
(1)
Promoting international cooperation: This objective aims to encourage domestic medical institutes to cooperate with New Southbound countries and international organizations. The objective is to establish top medical education teams in Taiwan and foster seed teachers in New Southbound countries. The goal is to attract five doctors from New Southbound countries to train in Taiwan. This objective also facilitates cooperation between Taiwanese medical institutes and international organizations, such as the ICS Humanitarian Medical Assistance Program organized by the Kaohsiung Medical University Chung-Ho Memorial Hospital, to recruit outstanding surgeons to work in Indonesia. The goal is to increase the number of cooperation instances by 10% every year and expand into different New Southbound countries.
(2)
Promoting laboratory accreditation and drug/instrument testing and technical cooperation: The goal is to evaluate the feasibility of mutually accrediting at least two laboratories in the New Southbound countries; establish inspection and technical specifications for medical products and cooperation mechanisms concerning the testing of medical equipment in New Southbound countries, completing standardized testing and comparison of at least one type of medical equipment in the New Southbound countries; and reinforce the food safety net between Taiwan and New Southbound countries.
(3)
Promoting the reconciliation of medical regulations: The objective is to research the medical equipment regulations and management systems in New Southbound countries, compare differences in regulations, and create a report concerning suggestions for technical cooperation between Taiwan and the New Southbound countries. The goal is to organize at least one international conference to analyse regulations in 2017, and establish a dedicated medical window with the New Southbound countries to reinforce the professional competency of Taiwanese legal experts on the medical equipment regulations and management systems in the New Southbound countries.
(4)
Training medical and health professionals: The goal is to train 15 medical and health professional in New Southbound countries in 2017; collaborate with Taiwanese hospitals in sending teams to New Southbound countries to provide at least 100 professional skills training or education and training courses in 2017; organize competency training courses for global health and epidemic prevention based on GCTF and invite at least 10 ASEAN officials and experts to participate in the courses.
(5)
Providing medical and humanitarian support: The goal is to provide national medical services or medical supplies in accordance with the New Southbound Policy at least twice in 2017.
(6)
Promoting epidemic prevention cooperation: The objective is to assist New Southbound countries in identifying and diagnosing viruses such as dengue and zika, and other emerging infectious diseases. The goal is to organize at least one training session with at least 20 participants from 10 countries in 2017; establish an information and detection system for infectious diseases and promote the current GIS used in Taiwan to analyse dengue fever and other infectious diseases to other countries; and facilitate the training of epidemiologists in ASEAN and South Asian countries.
3.3.2. Tourism Promotion
(1)
Implementing convenient Taiwan visas: This objective is aimed at accelerating the promotion of visa-free travel between Taiwan and ASEAN/South Asian countries; increasing the number of countries eligible for the Online Application for Taiwan Travel Authorization Certificate and the Operating Regulations for Approving Visas to Taiwan for Quality Southeast Asian Tour Groups; and expanding the scope of applicability of e-visas.
(2)
Encouraging tourism in Taiwan: This objective aims to utilize Taiwanese vendors, international students, and overseas Taiwanese networks to provide travel information, discounts, and incentives for employees of Taiwanese vendors and students’ family members to visit Taiwan; reinforce the relationship between Taiwan and its international students and overseas Taiwanese students; encourage county and city governments to step up their marketing in southbound markets; urge private unions and associations to organize southbound empowerment activities; promote Muslim-friendly environments; reinforce the relationship between the tourism industry and overseas Taiwanese students as well as facilitating connectivity between them; and arrange delegations or exploration tribal tours to promote Taiwan’s indigenous tourism industry. If an offshore office can be established in Bangkok, Thailand, an estimated 1.8 million, 2 million, and 2.2 million visitors can be attracted to Taiwan in 2017, 2018, and 2019, respectively.
3.3.3. Cultural Exchange
(1)
Facilitating cultural exchanges: This objective aims to enhance two-way exchange subsidization for cultural professionals in New Southbound countries, with a goal of engaging in at least 200 art and culture exchanges in 2017; invite international non-profit organizations to establish branches in Taiwan, with a goal of helping at least one Southeast Asian organization establish an offshore office in Taiwan in 2017; establish diplomatic locations in New Southbound cities, with a goal of organizing at least one visitation or exchange activity in each location every year to promote intercity exchanges; reinforce cultural, creative, and industrial exchanges between countries, promote two-way cultural publishing, art group exchange, and film and television cooperation; and organize the Southeast Asia Art Festival.
(2)
Improving indigenous cultural exchanges: This objective aims to improve the economics and trade between Taiwan and the indigenous people of New Zealand, tribal tourism, and language revival, with the goal of organizing at least one international indigenous-language conference, arrange at least one film and television exchange with New Zealand’s Maori Television Station, and provide at least 10 indigenous college students with exchange opportunities to New Zealand; establish a permanent organization for re-establishing the Forum of Austronesia Cooperation and Exchange with the goal of organizing an annual International Austronesia Conference and inviting leaders and expert scholars in at least eight Austronesian countries and regions to collectively discuss the development of indigenous societies, thereby advocating Austronesian identity and promoting the development of regional societies and establishing a cooperation platform; construct visitor-friendly museum environments to attract visitors from New Southbound countries to Taiwan and promoting inter-museum exchanges and talent cultivation.
(3)
Encouraging Hakka cultural exchanges: This objective is aimed at enhancing the substantial cooperation and exchange of Hakka groups in New Southbound countries, with the goal of dispatching personnel to Southeast Asian regions to promote exchange in 2017; invite scholars and new Hakka immigrants and their children to visit/return to native Hakka regions to collect data and survey the communities; and dispatch domestic Hakka teams to Hakka communities in Southeast Asia to promote community development, local cultural information surveys, and interactive exchanges, with the goal of organizing international cooperation and exchanges with at least 100 participants.
3.3.4. Agricultural Cooperation
(1)
Improving agricultural technical cooperation: This objective is aimed at enhancing agricultural operations in ASEAN and South Asian countries through technical cooperation, assistance, and training, and support the Agricultural Development Project, the work of Thailand’s Royal Project Foundation, the Myanmar Agriculture Course, and the Agriculture Development Course, with the goal of increasing training volume by 5% each year.
(2)
Improving agricultural production and marketing and storage/logistics cooperation: The objective is to promote two-way cooperation on production, marketing, storage, and logistics in the agricultural industry and enter into cooperation agreements or conventions with Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, Myanmar, India, and Indonesia, with a goal of achieving at least 10 agriculture-related technical cooperation contracts.
(3)
Assisting private vendor cooperation: This objective is aimed at establishing at least three demonstration gardens in New Southbound countries in 2017, importing Taiwanese species, fertilizers, and agricultural machinery to achieve largescale cooperation, replenish products in short supply in Taiwan, and ensure food safety.
3.3.5. Technological Cooperation
(1)
Analysing technical cooperation strategies: This objective is aimed at systematically exploring standards for new technology research and innovation cooperation between Taiwan and the New Southbound countries, establishing a technical cooperation standards analysis database for six countries, and creating short-, mid-, and long-term promotional strategies, with the goal of providing subsidization for the establishment of at least two research centres and 20 research projects in ASEAN and South Asian countries.
(2)
Subsidizing AIC projects: This objective is aimed at subsidizing industrial research projects based on the technical strengths of Taiwan (environmental protection, energy, and ICT) and addressing livelihood and science education issues. The goal is to establish at least two research teams to engage in goal-oriented research projects, and complete the subtitling and voice-overs of at least 20 outstanding science education videos produced by the Ministry of Science and Technology into Southeast Asian languages, which would facilitate the market expansion of relevant Taiwanese industries.
(3)
Promoting academic cooperation and resource sharing: This objective is aimed at formulating goal-oriented research projects, establishing regional disaster/epidemic prevention networks to address common regional problems, such as disaster prevention, global science, climate change, and new regional infectious diseases by participating in APEC activities and two-way technical support. The goal is to subsidize at least 12 professional training courses to help an estimated 500 students in New Southbound countries each year, subsidize at least 10 goal-oriented research teams, and attract at least 200 technical professionals in New Southbound countries to participate in research projects in Taiwan.
Restricted by the international political situation, Taiwan has focused on maintaining long-term economic and trade relations with New Southbound countries, including import and export trade or local investment with Taiwanese businesses.
However, the investment models of Taiwanese businesses largely centre on export processing, greatly limiting the relationship between Taiwanese businesses and local markets/society. Although Taiwan has engaged in a number of government agreements, international cooperation projects, dialogue platforms, and other interactive mechanisms, most of these mechanisms are based on specific fields such as economics and trade or agricultural techniques, highlighting the need for innovation in these fields and models of cooperation.
To reduce costs, many Taiwanese businesses that originally invested in Southeast Asia have gradually shifted to mainland China since the 1990s. The influence of Taiwanese businesses in Southeast Asia has decreased in recent years. By comparison, these countries have become strategic regions for Japan, South Korea, mainland China, Europe, and the United States, all of which have established strong footholds there. Taiwan is thus challenged with competing with various countries despite extremely limited resources.
As a result, Taiwan must reinforce regional integration with Southeast Asian and South Asian countries, and establish bilateral or multilateral systematic cooperation models with these countries, undertaking actions such as entering economic cooperation agreements (ECAs), updating and strengthening existing investment and tax agreements, and prioritizing negotiation and dialogue. Taiwan must also shift the previous solitary models to those that embrace cooperation resource integration and advantage complementarities. Efforts should centre on niche fields, and the mutual benefits shared by Taiwan and the New Southbound countries should be maximized by fostering partnerships with international organizations, utilizing the resources of private organizations and overseas Taiwanese networks, as well as engaging in third-party cooperation.
4.2. Policy Objectives
(1)
To deepen substantial relationships through systematised cooperation; enter or update economic cooperation agreements, investment agreements and tax agreements; promote multi-level, multi-faceted dialogues; adjust and improve the allocation of foreign aid; and cooperate with other countries, private companies, and NGOs to expand various substantial relationships.
(2)
To establish an overseas Taiwanese database and exchange platform and integrate or expand the functions of Taiwanese businesses and organizations, thereby promoting cooperation between overseas Taiwanese businesses and domestic companies.
4.3. Operational Guidelines and Specifications
The newly ratified or promoted operational guidelines and specifications for 2017 are as follows:
4.3.1. Regional Integration
(1)
Promote the signing and updating of bilateral investment agreements: This aims to actively encourage New Southbound countries that have yet to sign an agreement with Taiwan to enter into agreements and reinforce the content of existing agreements with other countries, such as Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and India.
(2)
Promote the signing of double taxation avoidance and bilateral economic cooperation agreements.
4.3.2. Regular Consultation Mechanisms
(1)
Establish or reinforce bilateral consultation mechanisms: This aims to establish or reinforce the bilateral dialogue mechanisms between Taiwan and New Southbound countries. The goal is to engage in no less than 12 dialogues with New Southbound countries each year, overcome trade obstacles, promote industrial/investment/SME cooperation, and secure no fewer than 20 bilateral cooperation projects.
(2)
Organize the Taiwan-ASEAN Dialogue Forum: The goal is to organize at least one forum each year and invite the participation of industry and academic experts from New Southbound countries, thereby forming a regular track oneand-a-half dialogue mechanism.
(3)
Promote benign cross-strait interaction and cooperation: This aims to encourage dialogue and negotiation to address specific issues and promote cooperation with mainland China on proper occasions in accordance with overall cross-strait development.
4.3.3. Strategic Alliances
(1)
Utilize Taiwan’s foreign aid resources: This aims to promote the Taiwan Digital Opportunity Center (TDOC) project; promote capacity-building cooperation in the areas of agriculture and fishing, solar energy generation, e-commerce, and occupational training. The goal is to establish a TDOC in New Southbound countries each year and increase the number of trainees by 10% each year.
(2)
Leverage third-country resources: This aims to leverage Taiwan’s advantages in industrial and operations management to participate in the new strategic plans of global and multinational Japanese businesses, and seize opportunities to promote third-party supply chain cooperation between Taiwanese and Japanese businesses. The goal is to hold matchmaking events and facilitate cooperation or talks among no less than 30 enterprises.
(3)
Reinforce cooperation with private organizations: This aims to organize bilateral economic and trade meetings and mutual visits among industrial and commercial organizations in New Southbound countries; encourage Taiwanese NGOs to participate in humanitarian care, environmental protection, and youth exchange activities in New Southbound countries. The goal is to recruit no fewer than 2,200 youth volunteers to participate in overseas activities.
4.3.4 Overseas Taiwanese Networks
(1)
Enhance organizational functions of Taiwanese vendors: This aims to establish an overseas Taiwanese database; elucidate the operating and market conditions of Taiwanese businesses; and assist Taiwanese businesses in their recruitment efforts. The goal is to organize no fewer than three regional job fairs for Taiwanese businesses in Southeast Asia each year.
(2)
Assist Taiwanese businesses in organizing diverse economic and trade activities: This aims to provide assistance to overseas Taiwanese organizations so as to provide offshore investment counselling, employment training, and other economic and trade services to Taiwanese people in the region. The goal is to organize no fewer than 100 economic and trade events in 2017.
(3)
Establish interpersonal exchange networks: This objective aims to promote and establish an interpersonal database for the New Southbound Policy, with the goal of increasing the size of the database by 5% each year; and encourage the establishment of a cooperation and exchange platform linking domestic and overseas Taiwanese.
To encourage visits between the United States and Taiwan at all levels, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Taiwan Travel Act".
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), enacted in 1979, has continued for 37 years to be a cornerstone of relations
between the United States and Taiwan and has served as an anchor for peace and security in the Western Pacific area.
(2) The Taiwan Relations Act declares that peace and stability in the Western Pacific area are in the political, security, and economic
interests of the United States and are matters of international concern.
(3) The United States considers any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or
embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.
(4) Taiwan has succeeded in a momentous transition to democracy beginning in the late 1980s and has been a beacon of democracy
in Asia, and Taiwan's democratic achievements inspire many countries and people in the region.
(5) Visits to a country by United States Cabinet members and other high-ranking officials are an indicator of the breadth and depth of ties
between the United States and such country.
(6) Since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, relations between the United States and Taiwan have suffered from insufficient
high-level communication due to the self-imposed restrictions that the United States maintains on high-level visits with Taiwan.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS; STATEMENT OF POLICY.
(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States government should encourage visits between officials from
the United States and Taiwan at all levels.
(b) Statement of Policy.—It should be the policy of the United States to—
(1) allow officials at all levels of the United States Government, including Cabinet-level national security officials, general officers, and
other executive branch officials, to travel to Taiwan to meet their Taiwanese counterparts;
(2) allow high-level officials of Taiwan to enter the United States, under conditions which demonstrate appropriate respect for the dignity
of such officials, and to meet with officials of the United States, including officials from the Department of State and the Department of Defense and
other Cabinet agencies; and
(3) encourage the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, and any other instrumentality established by Taiwan, to conduct
business in the United States, including activities which involve participation by Members of Congress, officials of Federal, State, or local
governments of the United States, or any high-level official of Taiwan.
(a) United States Commitment to Taiwan.— It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to support the close economic, political, and security relationship between Taiwan and the United States;
(2) to faithfully enforce all existing United States Government commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8), the 3 joint communiques, and the Six Assurances agreed to by President Ronald Reagan in July 1982; and
(3) to counter efforts to change the status quo and to support peaceful resolution acceptable to both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
(b) Arms Sales to Taiwan.— The President should conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from the People's Republic of China, including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile, survivable, and cost-effective capabilities, into its military forces.
(c) Travel.— The President should encourage the travel of highlevel United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 164 (2018):
Dec. 4, considered and passed Senate.
Dec. 12, considered and passed House, amended.
Dec. 19, Senate concurred in House amendment.
DAILY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS (2018):
Dec. 31, Presidential statement.
The “Commitment to Taiwan” is part of the “Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018” which was signed into law by US President Donald Trump on Dec. 31, 2018.
Only Sec. 209 of that law is considered relevant in this context by the chief researcher, hence
its other sections are omitted here.
Working Together to Realize Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation and Advance China’s Peaceful Reunification
Speech at the Meeting Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Issuance of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan
January 2, 2019
Xi Jinping
Comrades, my compatriots, and friends, today, we are meeting here to solemnly commemorate the 40th anniversary of the issuance of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. As a new year begins, on behalf of the people on the mainland, I extend sincere greetings and best wishes to our compatriots in Taiwan.
It has been 70 years since Taiwan and the mainland were separated. The emergence and evolution of the Taiwan question has, since China entered the modern times, been inextricably interwoven with the history of the Chinese nation. The Opium War of 1840 and ensuing wars of aggression launched by Western powers plunged China into an anguished state of turmoil and foreign threat, with its lands torn apart, and Taiwan fell under foreign occupation that was to last half a century. Wave upon wave, the Chinese people were engaged in an epic struggle to resist foreign invasion, liberate the Chinese nation, and realize the country’s reunification. Our compatriots in Taiwan made a huge contribution to this struggle. In 1945, together with peoples around the world, the Chinese people won victory in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, a part of the global War against Fascism. Taiwan was thus recovered and returned to China. It was not long, however, before the two sides of the Taiwan Straits fell into a special state of protracted political confrontation due to the civil war in China and the interference of foreign forces.
Since 1949, the Communist Party of China, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people have endeavored to pursue the historic mission of resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s complete reunification. Working with our compatriots in Taiwan, we have de-escalated tense confrontation across the Taiwan Straits, improved cross-Straits relations, and set out on a path of peaceful development and continually made breakthroughs in cross-Straits relations.
Over the past 70 years, we have, responding to the longing of people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, ended the absence of contact between the two sides. We have achieved overall direct two-way “three links” (mail, business and transport) and have initiated substantial exchanges, communication, and cooperation between the two sides. Cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation have steadily expanded and grown increasingly closer, and mutual affinity has deepened. Our compatriots in Taiwan have made a major contribution to the mainland’s reform and opening up and they in turn have also shared the mainland’s development opportunities.
Over the past 70 years, we have, acting in a spirit of seeking common ground while setting aside differences and on the basis of the one-China principle, enabled the two sides to reach the “1992 Consensus” that “both sides of the Taiwan Straits belong to one China and will work together toward national reunification.” The two sides have thus initiated consultations and negotiation and promoted cross-Straits party-to-party exchanges. We have opened up a path for promoting the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and realized a historic meeting between leaders of both sides, thus elevating cross-Straits political interactions to a new height.
Over the past 70 years, we have, keeping in mind the changes over time in the growth of cross-Straits relations, proposed the policy of seeking a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question and the well-conceived concept of “one country, two systems”, and established the fundamental guideline of “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems”. On this basis, we have formulated a fundamental strategy of upholding the principle of “one country, two systems” and promoting national reunification. With this we have responded to the call of our time, namely, to promote, in the new era, the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and unite our compatriots in Taiwan to strive for our country’s rejuvenation and peaceful reunification.
Over the past 70 years, we have, holding high the banner of peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit, and on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, forged friendship and strengthened cooperation with other countries and consolidated the international community’s commitment to the one-China principle. More and more countries and people have gained a better understanding of National reunification endeavor and given their support to it.
Over the past 70 years, we have, bearing in mind the overall and long-term interests of the Chinese nation, stood firm in safeguarding China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Rallying all the Chinese people around us, we have resolutely defeated all attempts to create “two Chinas,” “one China, one Taiwan,” or “Taiwan independence,” and have achieved major victories in the fight against the separatist activities for “Taiwan independence”.
As the evolution of cross-Straits relations attests, the historical and legal fact that Taiwan is part of China and the two sides belong to one and same China can never be changed by any force or anyone. We people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are Chinese and share a natural affinity and national identity built of kinship and mutual assistance, a fact that can never be altered by any force or anyone. The tide of our times — the cross-Straits situation moving toward peace and stability and cross-Straits relations continuing to move forward — is a tide that cannot be stopped by any force or anyone. The historical trend toward a stronger China, national rejuvenation, and reunification cannot be stopped by any force or anyone!
Comrades, my compatriots, and friends, by reviewing the past, we can draw inspiration for both the present and the future. Our country must be reunified, and will surely be reunified. This is a historical conclusion drawn from the evolution of cross-Straits relations over the past seven decades; it is also critical to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in the new era. We Chinese on both sides of the Straits, all of us Chinese at home and abroad, should jointly uphold the national interest, follow the historical trend, and work together for the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and China’s peaceful reunification.
First, we should work together to promote China’s rejuvenation and achieve its peaceful reunification.
The rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and reunification of our country are a surging popular trend. It is where the greater national interest lies, and it is what the people desire. We face each other just across a strip of water, yet our two sides are still far apart. The fact that until now, we have not yet been reunified is a wound left by history on the Chinese nation. We Chinese on both sides should work together to achieve reunification and heal this wound. All our compatriots in Taiwan are members of the Chinese nation and should be proud of their Chinese identity, fully consider the position and role of Taiwan in national rejuvenation and pursue both the complete reunification and rejuvenation of China as an honorable cause.
The future of Taiwan lies in national reunification and the wellbeing of the people in Taiwan hinges on the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The peaceful development of cross-Straits relations is the right path for safeguarding peace, promoting common development and benefiting people on both sides. Thus, the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations is something people on both sides should jointly promote, safeguard, and enjoy. The Chinese Dream is a dream shared by people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits; only China’s rejuvenation and prosperity can deliver a life of plenty and happiness to us Chinese on both sides. As the Chinese nation moves toward rejuvenation, our compatriots in Taiwan will certainly not miss out. We people on both sides should join hands to fulfill the Chinese Dream, shoulder the responsibility and share the glory of national rejuvenation. The Taiwan question originated in a weak and ravaged China, and it will definitely end with China’s rejuvenation!
Second, we should explore a “two systems” solution to the Taiwan question and enrich practical efforts toward peaceful reunification.
The concept of “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems” is the best approach to realizing national reunification. It embodies the Chinese wisdom that we thrive by embracing each other, gives full account to Taiwan’s reality and is conducive to the long-term stability in Taiwan after reunification.
Difference in systems is not an obstacle to reunification; it is certainly no excuse for separation. The principle of “one country, two systems” was proposed precisely to accommodate Taiwan’s actual conditions and to safeguard the interests and wellbeing of our compatriots in Taiwan. In terms of how the principle should be carried out in Taiwan, we will fully consider Taiwan’s reality, give full consideration to the views and proposals from all walks of life on both sides and fully accommodate the interests and sentiments of our compatriots in Taiwan. Provided that China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests are ensured, after peaceful reunification, Taiwan’s social system and its way of life will be fully respected, and the private property, religious beliefs, and lawful rights and interests of our compatriots in Taiwan will be fully protected.
We people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are of one family; issues between our two sides are domestic affairs, which, as such, should naturally be discussed and resolved by family members. Peaceful reunification means achieving it through consultation and discussion as equals. The long-standing political differences between the two sides are the root cause that affects the steady growth of cross-Straits relations, but we should not allow this problem to be passed down from one generation to the next. We both sides must live up to our responsibility to our nation and to future generations; we should put our heads together, show creativity, and reduce difference and seek common ground. Doing so will enable us to resolve the political antagonism at an early date, ensure lasting peace across the Taiwan Straits, and agree on a vision for national reunification, so that our future generations can live and grow up in a shared home with peace, stability, prosperity, and dignity.
On the basis of adhering to the one-China principle, there will be no obstacles in exchanges between political parties and groups in Taiwan and the mainland. Only when dialogue replaces confrontation, cooperation replaces disputes, and win-win mindset replaces zero-sum mentality, will cross-Straits relations move steadily and progress far. We are willing to engage in broad exchanges of views with all parties, groups, or individuals in Taiwan regarding political issues between the two sides and the promotion of China’s peaceful reunification, in order to forge social consensus and advance political negotiation.
Here we wish to make a solemn proposal: on the common political foundation of adhering to the “1992 Consensus” and opposing “Taiwan independence,” all political parties and all sectors of society on both sides recommend representatives who will engage in extensive and in-depth democratic consultations on cross-Straits relations and the future of the nation and work toward institutional arrangements for promoting the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations.
Third, we should adhere to the one-China principle and ensure the prospects for peaceful reunification.
Although our two sides have yet to be reunified, the sovereignty and territory of China has never been severed and the fact that the mainland and Taiwan belong to one and same China has never changed. The one-China principle is the political foundation of cross-Straits relations. When we adhere to this principle, cross-Straits relations will improve and grow and our compatriots in Taiwan will benefit. However, if we deviate from it, cross-Straits relations will become strained and volatile, and the interests of our compatriots in Taiwan will be harmed.
China’s reunification is a historical trend and the right path, while “Taiwan independence” goes against the tide of history, and it is a path to nowhere. Our compatriots in Taiwan have a glorious patriotic tradition and share a close kinship with us. We remain committed to the principle of placing our hopes on the people of Taiwan. We will continue, as ever, to respect, care about, work with, and rely on them, and we will do our utmost to help them overcome difficulties and meet their needs. Our compatriots in Taiwan, regardless of political affiliation, religious belief, social status, or origin of birth, whether civilian or military: You must see that “Taiwan independence” will only bring disaster. You should resolutely oppose “Taiwan independence” and join hands with us to pursue the bright prospects of peaceful reunification. We are willing to create vast space for peaceful reunification; but we will definitely not leave any room for separatist activities aimed at “Taiwan independence” in any form.
We Chinese should not fight each other. We will work with the greatest sincerity and exert utmost efforts to achieve peaceful reunification, because this works best for the people on both sides and for our whole nation. We do not renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. This is to guard against external interference and a tiny number of separatists and their separatist activities for “Taiwan independence”. It does in no way target our compatriots in Taiwan. We people on both sides should work together to pursue peace, protect peace, and enjoy peace.
Fourth, we should deepen integrated development of the two sides and cement the foundation for peaceful reunification.
People on both sides of the Taiwan Straits share the bonds of kinship. Just as loved ones wish each other well, we Chinese should help each other. We treat our compatriots in Taiwan as equals, and will continue paving the way for them to share first the mainland’s development opportunities and ensure that our compatriots and enterprises from Taiwan receive the same treatment as those from the mainland, thus giving them a greater sense of fulfillment. After the peaceful reunification, Taiwan will enjoy lasting peace and the people there will live in peace and contentment. Backed by a strong motherland, our compatriots in Taiwan will enjoy better life, have more opportunities for development, and they will have stronger confidence, greater sense of security and dignity in the international community.
We should take active steps to institutionalize cross-Straits economic cooperation and create a common market for the two sides, so as to increase momentum for development and vitality of cooperation and strengthen the economy of the Chinese nation. We on the two sides should promote connectivity wherever necessary, including trade and economic cooperation, infrastructure building, energy and resources development, and sharing industrial standards. We can start by supplies of water, electricity, gas, and construction of sea-crossing bridges from coastal areas in Fujian province to Kinmen and Mazu in Taiwan. We should promote cooperation in culture, education, and healthcare, and the sharing of social security and public resources, and we should support neighbouring areas or areas with similar conditions on the two sides in providing equal, universal, and accessible basic public services.
Fifth, we should forge closer bonds of heart and mind between people on both sides and strengthen our joint commitment to peaceful reunification.
The soul of a nation is molded and cast by its culture. We on the mainland and in Taiwan share the same roots, culture, and ethnic identity; it is Chinese culture that has instilled vitality in us and given us a sense of belonging. The key to kinship lies in mutual understanding. No matter the extent of interference and obstructions we may encounter, exchanges and cooperation between our people on both sides must never be diminished, suspended, or stopped.
We people on both sides should together pass on the fine traditional Chinese culture and promote its evolution and growth in new and creative ways. We should engage in exchanges and mutual learning, promote dialogue and inclusiveness, enhance empathy, deepen mutual understanding, strengthen mutual trust, and increase our shared sense of identity. We should maintain our bonds of kinship and shared values, adhere to the right approach to our history, our nation, and our country in raising awareness of younger generations, and keep alive the great spirit of our nation. Between loved ones, there is no knot of perception that cannot be untied. With perseverance, we are sure to forge closer bonds of heart and mind between people on both sides.
Supporting and pursuing reunification is a righteous cause of the Chinese nation, and this commitment should be recognized by all of us Chinese. Our great country will always stand firm behind patriots working for reunification. It is our sincere hope that all our compatriots in Taiwan will treasure peace as they do the gift of sight, pursue reunification with the same zeal with which they pursue a better life, and play an active part in advancing the just cause of China’s peaceful reunification.
The young are the hope of the country and the future of the nation. Young people on both sides should shoulder responsibility, forge solidarity and friendship, and work together for a better future. Young people from Taiwan are welcome to pursue and fulfill their dreams on the mainland. We Chinese on both sides must be united and work together to seek happiness for ourselves and create a bright future for our nation.
Comrades, my compatriots, and friends, over the years, our compatriots in Hong Kong, Macao, and overseas have shown understanding for and supported the great cause of reunification, and have made a positive contribution to this cause. I hope that they will remain committed and further contribute to the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and China’s peaceful reunification.
Comrades, my compatriots, and friends, there is only one China in the world. The one-China principle is a generally recognized norm in international relations, and it represents a general consensus of the international community. The international community has extended understanding and support for the Chinese people’s just cause of opposing “Taiwan independence” separatist activities and striving for national reunification; the Chinese government expresses its appreciation and gratitude for such understanding and support. The affairs of us Chinese must be decided by ourselves. The Taiwan question is an internal affair that involves China’s core interests and the Chinese people’s national sentiments, and no external interference in this issue will be tolerated.
China’s reunification will not harm any other country’s legitimate interests, including its economic interests in Taiwan. On the contrary, it will bring the world more opportunities for development, create more positive momentum for the prosperity and stability of the Asia Pacific and the rest of the world. Indeed, it will make greater contribution to building a community with a shared future for mankind, to the cause of global peace and development, and to the cause of human progress.
Comrades, my compatriots, and friends, we cannot choose our history, but we can steer the current course and shape the future. The new era is an era for the Chinese nation to achieve major development and make major accomplishment; it is also an era for the people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits to achieve major development and make major accomplishment. The path ahead may not be all smooth, but when we stand and work together, we can surely create a promising future for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and we can surely achieve the great cause of national reunification!
A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements,
declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining
to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF
file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010
please click here.
Mar. 26, 2020—[S.1678] - Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019.
An Act
To express United States support for Taiwan's diplomatic alliances around the world.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019".
SEC. 2. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.
(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8) states that it is the policy of the United States "to preserve and promote
extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan".
(2) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 states that it is the policy of the United States "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist
any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan".
(3) Taiwan is a free, democratic, and prosperous nation of 23,000,000 people and an important contributor to peace and stability around
the world.
(4) Since the election of President Tsai Ing-wen as President of Taiwan in 2016, the Government of the People's Republic of China has
intensified its efforts to pressure Taiwan.
(5) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands,
and Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favour of diplomatic relations with China.
(6) Taiwan currently maintains full diplomatic relations with 15 nations around the world.
(7) Taiwan's unique relationship with the United States, Australia, India, Japan, and other countries are of significant benefit in strengthening
Taiwan's economy and preserving its international space.
(8) According to President Tsai Ing-wen, the severance of diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favour of diplomatic relations with China is "part of a
series of diplomatic and military acts of coercion" by China.
(9) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409) states that—
(A) it is United States policy "to support the close economic, political, and security relationship between Taiwan and the United States"; and
(B) the President should—
(i) "conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from the People's
Republic of China, including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile,
survivable, and cost-effective capabilities, into its military forces"; and
(ii) "encourage the travel of high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act".
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United States and Taiwan have built a strong economic partnership, with the United States now Taiwan's second largest trading partner
and with Taiwan the 11th largest trading partner of the United States and a key destination for United States agricultural exports;
(2) strong United States-Taiwan economic relations have been a positive factor in stimulating economic growth and job creation for the people
of both the United States and Taiwan; and
(3) the United States Trade Representative should consult with Congress on opportunities for further strengthening bilateral trade and economic
relations between the United States and Taiwan.
SEC. 4. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH REGARD TO TAIWAN'S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
It should be the policy of the United States—
(1) to advocate, as appropriate—
(A) for Taiwan's membership in all international organizations in which statehood is not a requirement and in which the United States is also
a participant; and
(B) for Taiwan to be granted observer status in other appropriate international organizations;
(2) to instruct, as appropriate, representatives of the United States Government in all organizations described in paragraph (1) to use the voice,
vote, and influence of the United States to advocate for Taiwan's membership or observer status in such organizations; and
(3) for the President or the President's designees to advocate, as appropriate, for Taiwan's membership or observer status in all organizations
described in paragraph (1) as part of any relevant bilateral engagements between the United States and the People's Republic of China, including
leader summits and the U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue.
SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING OF TIES WITH TAIWAN.
(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States government should—
(1) support Taiwan in strengthening its official diplomatic relationships as well as other partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region
and around the world;
(2) consider, in certain cases as appropriate and in alignment with United States interests, increasing its economic, security, and diplomatic
engagement with nations that have demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan; and
(3) consider, in certain cases as appropriate, in alignment with United States foreign policy interests and in consultation with Congress, altering
its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that take serious or significant actions to undermine the security or prosperity of Taiwan.
(b) Report.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State shall
report to the appropriate congressional committees on the steps taken in accordance with subsection (a).
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.
116th Congress Public Law 260
From the U.S. Government Publishing Office
[Page 1181]
CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2021
[...]
Subtitle B—Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020
SEC. 311. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the "Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020".
SEC. 312. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) April 10, 2019, marked the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8).
(2) Since 1949, the close relationship between the United States and Taiwan has benefitted both parties and the broader Indo-Pacific region.
(3) The security of Taiwan and its democracy are key elements of continued peace and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, which is in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States.
(4) The People's Republic of China is currently engaged in a comprehensive military modernization campaign to enhance the power-projection capabilities of the People's Liberation Army and its ability to conduct joint operations, which is shifting the military balance of power across the Taiwan Strait.
(5) Taiwan and its diplomatic partners continue to face sustained pressure and coercion from the People's Republic of China, which seeks to isolate Taiwan from the international community.
(6) It is the policy of the United States to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act in a manner consistent with the "Six Assurances" and in accordance with the United States "One China" policy.
(7) In the Taiwan Travel Act, which became law on March 16, 2018, Congress observed that the "self-imposed restrictions that the United States maintains on high-level visits" between the United States and Taiwan have resulted in insufficient high-level communication.
SEC. 313. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) Taiwan is a vital part of the United States Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy;
(2) the United States Government—
(A) supports Taiwan's continued pursuit of asymmetric capabilities and concepts; and
(B) urges Taiwan to increase its defense spending in order to fully resource its defense strategy; and
(3) the United States should conduct regular sales and transfers of defense articles to Taiwan in order to enhance its self-defense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, including undersea warfare and air defense capabilities, into its military forces.
SEC. 314. TAIWAN'S INCLUSION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the People's Republic of China's attempts to dictate the terms of Taiwan's participation in international organizations, has, in many cases, resulted in Taiwan's exclusion from such organizations even when statehood is not a requirement, and that such exclusion—
(1) is detrimental to global health, civilian air safety, and efforts to counter transnational crime;
(2) negatively impacts the safety and security of citizens globally; and
(3) negatively impacts the security of Taiwan and its democracy.
(b) Statement of Policy.—It is the policy of the United States to advocate for Taiwan's meaningful participation in the United Nations, the World Health Assembly, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, and other international bodies, as appropriate, and to advocate for Taiwan's membership in the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and other international organizations for which statehood is not a requirement for membership.
SEC. 315. REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE TAIWAN GUIDELINES.
(a) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall conduct a review of the Department of State's guidance that governs relations with Taiwan, including the periodic memorandum entitled "Guidelines on Relations with Taiwan" and related documents, and reissue such guidance to executive branch departments and agencies.
(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Department of State's guidance regarding relations with Taiwan—
(1) should be crafted with the intent to deepen and expand United States-Taiwan relations, and be based on the value, merits, and importance of the United States-Taiwan relationship;
(2) should be crafted giving due consideration to the fact that Taiwan is governed by a representative democratic government that is peacefully constituted through free and fair elections that reflect the will of the people of Taiwan, and that Taiwan is a free and open society that respects universal human rights and democratic values; and
(3) should ensure that the conduct of relations with Taiwan reflects the longstanding, comprehensive, and values-based relationship the United States shares with Taiwan, and contribute to the peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues.
(c) Reporting Requirements.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that includes a description of—
(1) the results of the review pursuant to subsection (a) of the Department of State's guidance on relations with Taiwan, including a copy of the reissued "Guidelines of Relations with Taiwan" memorandum; and
(2) the implementation of the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135) and any changes to guidance on relations with Taiwan that are the result of such implementation.
Vol. 165 (2019): Jan. 10, considered and passed House.
Vol. 166 (2020): Jan. 15, considered and passed Senate, amended.
Dec. 21, House concurred in Senate amendment with an amendment. Senate concurred in House amendment.
The “Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020” is part of the “Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021” which was signed into law by US President Donald Trump on Dec. 27, 2020.
As the latter text comprises hundreds of pages, only the part considered relevant by the chief
researcher is shown here.
Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China's complete reunification is a shared aspiration of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation. It is indispensable for the realization of China's rejuvenation. It is also a historic mission of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The CPC, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people have striven for decades to achieve this goal.
The 18th National Congress of the CPC in 2012 heralded a new era in building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Under the strong leadership of the CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping at the core, the CPC and the Chinese government have adopted new and innovative measures in relation to Taiwan. They have continued to chart the course of cross-Straits relations, safeguard peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits, and promote progress towards national reunification. However, in recent years the Taiwan authorities, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), have redoubled their efforts to divide the country, and some external forces have tried to exploit Taiwan to contain China, prevent the Chinese nation from achieving complete reunification, and halt the process of national rejuvenation.
The CPC has united the Chinese people and led them in fulfilling the First Centenary Goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects as scheduled, and in embarking on a new journey towards the Second Centenary Goal of building China into a modern socialist country.
The Chinese nation has achieved a historic transformation from standing upright to becoming prosperous and growing in strength, and national rejuvenation is driven by an unstoppable force. This marks a new starting point for reunification.
The Chinese government has published two previous white papers on Taiwan. One was The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China in August 1993, and the other was The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue in February 2000. These two white papers provided a comprehensive and systematic elaboration of the basic principles and policies regarding the resolution of the Taiwan question. This new white paper is being released to reiterate the fact that Taiwan is part of China, to demonstrate the resolve of the CPC and the Chinese people and their commitment to national reunification, and to emphasize the position and policies of the CPC and the Chinese government in the new era.
Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times. This statement has a sound basis in history and jurisprudence. New archeological discoveries and research findings regularly attest to the profound historical and cultural ties between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. A large number of historical records and annals document the development of Taiwan by the Chinese people in earlier periods.
The earliest references to this effect are to be found, among others, in Seaboard Geographic Gazetteer compiled in the year 230 by Shen Ying of the State of Wu during the Three Kingdoms Period. The royal court of the Sui Dynasty had on three occasions sent troops to Taiwan, called Liuqiu at that time. Starting from the Song and Yuan dynasties, the imperial central governments of China all set up administrative bodies to exercise jurisdiction over Penghu and Taiwan.
In 1624, Dutch colonialists invaded and occupied the southern part of Taiwan. In 1662, General Zheng Chenggong, hailed as a national hero, led an expedition and expelled them from the island. Subsequently, the Qing court gradually set up more administrative bodies in Taiwan. In 1684, a Taiwan prefecture administration was set up under the jurisdiction of Fujian Province. In 1885, Taiwan's status was upgraded and it became the 20th province of China.
In July 1894, Japan launched a war of aggression against China. In April 1895, the defeated Qing government was forced to cede Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to Japan. During the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1931-1945), China's Communists called for the recovery of Taiwan. Talking with American journalist Nym Wales on May 15, 1937, Mao Zedong said that China's goal was to achieve a final victory in the war - a victory that would recover the occupied Chinese territories in Northeast China and to the south of the Shanhai Pass, and secure the liberation of Taiwan.
On December 9, 1941, the Chinese government issued a declaration of war against Japan, and proclaimed that all treaties, conventions, agreements, and contracts regarding relations between China and Japan had been abrogated, and that China would recover Taiwan and the Penghu Islands.
The Cairo Declaration issued by China, the United States and the United Kingdom on December 1, 1943 stated that it was the purpose of the three allies that all the territories Japan had stolen from China, such as Northeast China, Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, should be restored to China.
The Potsdam Proclamation was signed by China, the United States and the United Kingdom on July 26, 1945, and subsequently recognized by the Soviet Union. It reiterated: "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." In September of the same year, Japan signed the instrument of surrender, in which it promised that it would faithfully fulfill the obligations laid down in the Potsdam Proclamation. On October 25 the Chinese government announced that it was resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan, and the ceremony to accept Japan's surrender in Taiwan Province of the China war theater of the Allied powers was held in Taibei (Taipei). From that point forward, China had recovered Taiwan de jure and de facto through a host of documents with international legal effect.
On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was founded, becoming the successor to the Republic of China (1912-1949), and the Central People's Government became the only legitimate government of the whole of China. The new government replaced the previous KMT regime in a situation where China, as a subject under international law, did not change and China's sovereignty and inherent territory did not change. As a natural result, the government of the PRC should enjoy and exercise China's full sovereignty, which includes its sovereignty over Taiwan.
As a result of the civil war in China in the late 1940s and the interference of external forces, the two sides of the Taiwan Straits have fallen into a state of protracted political confrontation. But the sovereignty and territory of China have never been divided and will never be divided, and Taiwan's status as part of China's territory has never changed and will never be allowed to change.
At its 26th session in October 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758, which undertook "to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it". This resolution settled once and for all the political, legal and procedural issues of China's representation in the UN, and it covered the whole country, including Taiwan. It also spelled out that China has one single seat in the UN, so there is no such thing as "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan".
The specialized agencies of the UN later adopted further resolutions restoring to the PRC its lawful seat and expelling the representatives of the Taiwan authorities. One of these is Resolution 25.1 adopted at the 25th World Health Assembly in May 1972. It was clearly stated in the official legal opinions of the Office of Legal Affairs of the UN Secretariat that "the United Nations considers 'Taiwan' as a province of China with no separate status", and the "'authorities' in 'Taipei' are not considered to... enjoy any form of government status". At the UN the island is referred to as "Taiwan, Province of China" [1].
Resolution 2758 is a political document encapsulating the one-China principle whose legal authority leaves no room for doubt and has been acknowledged worldwide. Taiwan does not have any ground, reason, or right to join the UN, or any other international organization whose membership is confined to sovereign states.
In recent years some elements in a small number of countries, the US foremost among them, have colluded with forces in Taiwan, to falsely claim that the resolution did not conclusively resolve the issue of Taiwan's representation. Puffing up the illegal and invalid Treaty of San Francisco [2] and disregarding the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and other international legal documents, they profess that the status of Taiwan has yet to be determined, and declare their support for "Taiwan's meaningful participation in the UN system". What they are actually attempting to do is to alter Taiwan's status as part of China and create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" as part of a political ploy - using Taiwan to contain China. These actions in violation of Resolution 2758 and international law are a serious breach of political commitments made by these countries. They damage China's sovereignty and dignity, and treat the basic principles of international law with contempt. The Chinese government has condemned and expressed its resolute opposition to them.
The one-China principle represents the universal consensus of the international community; it is consistent with the basic norms of international relations. To date, 181 countries including the United States have established diplomatic relations with the PRC on the basis of the one-China principle. The China-US Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, published in December 1978, states: "The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." It also states: "The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan."
The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) in December 1982, stipulates: "Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China. It is the inviolable duty of all Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland."
The Anti-Secession Law, adopted at the Third Session of the 10th NPC in March 2005, stipulates: "There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division. Safeguarding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included. Taiwan is part of China. The state shall never allow the 'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means."
The National Security Law, adopted at the 15th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 12th NPC in July 2015, stipulates: "The sovereignty and territorial integrity of China brook no violation or separation. Safeguarding national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity is the common duty of all Chinese citizens, including Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan compatriots."
We are one China, and Taiwan is part of China. This is an indisputable fact supported by history and the law. Taiwan has never been a state; its status as part of China is unalterable. Any attempt to distort these facts and dispute or deny the one-China principle will end in failure.
The CPC has always been dedicated to working for the wellbeing of the Chinese people and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Soon after its founding in 1921, the CPC set itself the goal of freeing Taiwan from colonial rule, reuniting it with the rest of the country and liberating the whole nation, including compatriots in Taiwan. It has made a tremendous effort to achieve this goal.
The CPC is committed to the historic mission of resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China's complete reunification. Under its resolute leadership, people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits have worked together to de-escalate tension across the Straits. They have set out on a path of peaceful development and made many breakthroughs in improving cross-Straits relations.
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, China's Communists, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, proposed the essential guideline, underlying principle, and basic policy for peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. The CPC prepared and worked for the liberation of Taiwan, thwarted the Taiwan authorities' plans to attack the mainland, and foiled attempts to create "two Chinas" and "one China, one Taiwan". Through their efforts, the lawful seat and rights of the PRC in the United Nations were restored and the one-China principle was subscribed to by the majority of countries, laying important groundwork for peaceful reunification. The CPC central leadership established high-level contact with the Taiwan authorities through proper channels in pursuit of a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.
Following the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1978, with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States, China's Communists, led by Deng Xiaoping, defined the fundamental guideline for peaceful reunification in the vital interests of the country and the people and on the basis of the consensus for peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. The CPC introduced the creative and well-conceived concept of One Country, Two Systems, and applied it first in resolving the questions of Hong Kong and Macao. It took action to ease military confrontation across the Taiwan Straits, restore contact, and open up people-to-people exchanges and cooperation, opening a new chapter in cross-Straits relations.
After the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee in 1989, China's Communists, led by Jiang Zemin, made eight proposals for the development of cross-Straits relations and the peaceful reunification of China [3]. The CPC facilitated agreement across the Straits on the 1992 Consensus, which embodies the one-China principle. It initiated cross-Straits consultations and negotiations, resulting in the first talks between heads of the non-governmental organizations authorized by the two sides of the Straits, and expanded cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation in various fields. The CPC took firm action against separatist activities led by Lee Teng-hui, and struck hard at the separatist forces seeking "Taiwan independence". It ensured the smooth return of Hong Kong and Macao to China, and applied the policy of One Country, Two Systems, which had a constructive impact on the settlement of the Taiwan question.
After the 16th CPC National Congress in 2002, China's Communists, led by Hu Jintao, highlighted the importance of peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. The CPC pushed for the enactment of the Anti-Secession Law to curb separatist activities in Taiwan, hosted the first talks between the leaders of the CPC and the Kuomintang in six decades since 1945, and defeated attempts by Chen Shui-bian to fabricate a legal basis for "independence". The CPC effected profound changes in moving the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations forward by promoting institutionalized consultations and negotiations that produced fruitful results, establishing overall direct two-way links in mail, business and transport, and facilitating the signing and implementation of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement.
After the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012, China's Communists, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, took a holistic approach to cross-Straits relations in keeping with changing circumstances, added substance to the theory on national reunification and the principles and policies concerning Taiwan, and worked to keep cross-Straits relations on the right track. The CPC developed its overall policy for resolving the Taiwan question in the new era, and set out the overarching guideline and a program of action.
At its 19th National Congress in October 2017, the CPC affirmed the basic policy of upholding One Country, Two Systems and promoting national reunification, and emphasized its resolve never to allow any person, any organization, or any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from China.
In January 2019, Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and president of China, addressed a meeting marking the 40th anniversary of the release of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan. In his speech, Xi Jinping proposed major policies to advance the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and the peaceful reunification of China in the new era. These are: first, working together to promote China's rejuvenation and its peaceful reunification; second, seeking a Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question and making innovative efforts towards peaceful reunification; third, abiding by the one-China principle and safeguarding the prospects for peaceful reunification; fourth, further integrating development across the Straits and consolidating the foundations for peaceful reunification; fifth, forging closer bonds of heart and mind between people on both sides of the Straits and strengthening joint commitment to peaceful reunification.
The CPC and the Chinese government have thereby adopted a series of major measures for charting the course of cross-Straits relations and realizing China's peaceful reunification:
- The CPC and the Chinese government have facilitated the first meeting and direct dialogue between leaders of the two sides since 1949, raising exchanges and interactions to new heights, opening up a new chapter, and creating new space for cross-Straits relations. This is a new milestone. The departments in charge of cross-Straits affairs on both sides have established regular contact and communication mechanisms on a common political foundation, and the heads of the two departments have exchanged visits and set up hotlines.
- Upholding the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, the CPC and the Chinese government have facilitated exchanges between political parties across the Straits, and conducted dialogues, consultations, and in-depth exchanges of views on cross-Straits relations and the future of the Chinese nation with relevant political parties, organizations, and individuals in Taiwan. These efforts have resulted in consensus on multiple issues, and promoted a number of joint initiatives exploring the Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question with all sectors of Taiwan society.
- Guided by the conviction that people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are of the same family, the CPC and the Chinese government have promoted peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and integrated development of the two sides for the benefit of both the mainland and Taiwan. We have also refined the institutional arrangements, policies and measures to promote cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation, designed to advance the wellbeing of the people of Taiwan. These include the delivery of water from the coastal province of Fujian to Kinmen Island, electronic travel passes for Taiwan residents to enter or leave the mainland, residence permits for Taiwan residents, progressively ensuring that Taiwan compatriots have equal access to public services so as to facilitate their studying, starting businesses, working and living on the mainland, and an ongoing effort to pave the way for Taiwan to benefit first from the mainland's development opportunities.
- While countering interference and obstruction from separatist forces, the CPC and the Chinese government have called on the people of Taiwan to promote effective and in-depth cooperation and people-to-people exchanges in various fields across the Straits. Having overcome the impact of COVID-19, we have held a number of exchange events such as the Straits Forum, and maintained the momentum of cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation.
- Resolute in defending state sovereignty and territorial integrity and opposing separatist activities and external interference, the CPC and the Chinese government have safeguarded peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. We have taken lawful action against and effectively deterred separatist forces. We have handled Taiwan's external exchanges in a sound manner, and consolidated the international community's commitment to the one-China principle.
Under the guidance of the CPC, great progress has been made in cross-Straits relations over the past seven decades, especially since the estrangement between the two sides was ended. Increased exchanges, broader cooperation and closer interactions have brought tangible benefits to people across the Straits, especially of Taiwan. This fully demonstrates that cross-Straits amity and cooperation are mutually beneficial.
The volume of cross-Straits trade was only US$46 million in 1978. It rose to US$328.34 billion in 2021, up by a factor of more than 7,000. The mainland has been Taiwan's largest export market for the last 21 years, generating a large annual surplus for the island. The mainland is also the largest destination for Taiwan's off-island investment. By the end of 2021 Taiwan businesses had invested in almost 124,000 projects on the mainland, to a total value of US$71.34 billion [4].
In 1987 less than 50,000 visits were made between the two sides; by 2019 this number had soared to about 9 million. In the past three years, affected by COVID-19, online communication has become the main form of people-to-people interactions across the Straits, and the numbers of people participating in and covered by online communication are reaching new highs.
The CPC has always been the spine of the Chinese nation, exercising strong leadership in realizing national rejuvenation and reunification. Its consistent efforts over the decades to resolve the Taiwan question and achieve complete national reunification are based on the following:
First, the one-China principle must be upheld, and no individual or force should be allowed to separate Taiwan from China.
Second, it is imperative to strive for the wellbeing of all Chinese people, including those in Taiwan, and to realize the aspirations of all Chinese people for a better life.
Third, we must follow the principles of freeing the mind, seeking truth from facts, maintaining the right political orientation, and breaking new ground, and defend the fundamental interests of the nation and the core interests of the state in formulating principles and policies on work related to Taiwan.
Fourth, it is necessary to have the courage and skill to fight against any force that attempts to undermine China's sovereignty and territorial integrity or stands in the way of its reunification.
Fifth, extensive unity and solidarity must be upheld to mobilize all factors to fight against any force that would divide the country, and pool strengths to advance national reunification.
Against a backdrop of profound and complex changes in the domestic and international situation, our cause of complete national reunification is facing new challenges. The CPC and the Chinese government have the strength and the confidence to deal with complexities and overcome risks and threats, and the ability to take great strides forward on the path to national reunification.
1. Complete Reunification Is Critical to National Rejuvenation
Throughout China's 5,000-year history, national reunification and opposition to division have remained a common ideal and a shared tradition of the whole nation. In the modern era from the mid-19th century, due to the aggression of Western powers and the decadence of feudal rule, China was gradually reduced to a semi-feudal, semi-colonial society, and went through a period of suffering worse than anything it had previously known. The country endured intense humiliation, the people were subjected to great pain, and the Chinese civilization was plunged into darkness. Japan's 50-year occupation of Taiwan epitomized this humiliation and inflicted agony on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. Our two sides face each other just across a strip of water, yet we are still far apart. The fact that we have not yet been reunified is a scar left by history on the Chinese nation. We Chinese on both sides should work together to achieve reunification and heal this wound.
National rejuvenation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation since the modern era began. Only by realizing complete national reunification can the Chinese people on both sides of the Straits cast aside the shadow of civil war and create and enjoy lasting peace. National reunification is the only way to avoid the risk of Taiwan being invaded and occupied again by foreign countries, to foil the attempts of external forces to contain China, and to safeguard the sovereignty, security, and development interests of our country. It is the most effective remedy to secessionist attempts to divide our country, and the best means to consolidate Taiwan's status as part of China and advance national rejuvenation. It will enable us to pool the strengths of the people on both sides, build our common home, safeguard our interests and wellbeing, and create a brighter future for the Chinese people and the Chinese nation. As Dr Sun Yat-sen, the great pioneer of China's revolution, once said, "Unification is the hope of all Chinese nationals. If China can be unified, all Chinese will enjoy a happy life; if it cannot, all will suffer."
In exploring the path to rejuvenation and prosperity, China has endured vicissitudes and hardships. "Unification brings strength while division leads to chaos." This is a law of history. The realization of complete national reunification is driven by the history and culture of the Chinese nation and determined by the momentum towards and circumstances surrounding our national rejuvenation. Never before have we been so close to, confident in, and capable of achieving the goal of national rejuvenation. The same is true when it comes to our goal of complete national reunification. The Taiwan question arose as a result of weakness and chaos in our nation, and it will be resolved as national rejuvenation becomes a reality. When all the Chinese people stick together and work together, we will surely succeed in realizing national reunification on our way to national rejuvenation.
2. National Development and Progress Set the Direction of Cross-Straits Relations
China's development and progress are a key factor determining the course of cross-Straits relations and the realization of complete national reunification. In particular, the great achievements over four decades of reform, opening up and modernization have had a profound impact on the historical process of resolving the Taiwan question and realizing complete national reunification. No matter which political party or group is in power in Taiwan, it cannot alter the course of progress in cross-Straits relations or the trend towards national reunification.
International Monetary Fund statistics show that in 1980 the GDP of the mainland was about US$303 billion, just over 7 times that of Taiwan, which was about US$42.3 billion; in 2021, the GDP of the mainland was about US$17.46 trillion, more than 22 times that of Taiwan, which was about US$790 billion. [5]
China's development and progress, and in particular the steady increases in its economic power, technological strength, and national defense capabilities, are an effective curb against separatist activities and interference from external forces. They also provide broad space and great opportunities for cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation. As more and more compatriots from Taiwan, especially young people, pursue their studies, start businesses, seek jobs, or go to live on the mainland, cross-Straits exchanges, interaction and integration are intensified in all sectors, the economic ties and personal bonds between the people on both sides run deeper, and our common cultural and national identities grow stronger, leading cross-Straits relations towards reunification.
The CPC has united the Chinese people and led them in embarking on the new journey of building China into a modern socialist country in all respects. Following the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the mainland has improved its governance and maintained long-term economic growth; it enjoys a solid material foundation, a wealth of human resources, a huge market, strong resilience in development, and social stability. It therefore has many strengths and favourable conditions for further development, and these have become the driving force for reunification.
Grounding its effort in the new development stage, the mainland is committed to applying the new development philosophy, creating a new development dynamic, and promoting high-quality development. As a result, the overall strength and international influence of the mainland will continue to increase, and its influence over and appeal to Taiwan society will keep growing. We will have a more solid foundation for resolving the Taiwan question and greater ability to do so. This will give a significant boost to national reunification.
3. Any Attempt by Separatist Forces to Prevent Reunification Is Bound to Fail
Taiwan has been an integral part of China's territory since ancient times. Moves to separate Taiwan from China represent the serious crime of secession, and undermine the common interests of compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. They will lead nowhere.
The DPP authorities have adopted a separatist stance, and colluded with external forces in successive provocative actions designed to divide the country. They refuse to recognize the one-China principle, and distort and deny the 1992 Consensus. They assert that Taiwan and the mainland should not be subordinate to each other, and proclaim a new "two states" theory. On the island, they constantly press for "de-sinicization" and promote "incremental independence". They incite radical separatists in and outside the DPP to lobby for amendments to their "constitution" and "laws". They deceive the people of Taiwan, incite hostility against the mainland, and obstruct and undermine cross-Straits exchanges, cooperation and integrated development. They have steadily built up their military forces with the intention of pursuing "independence" and preventing reunification by force. They join with external forces in trying to sow the seeds of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". The actions of the DPP authorities have resulted in tension in cross-Straits relations, endangering peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, and undermining the prospects and restricting the space for peaceful reunification. These are obstacles that must be removed in advancing the process of peaceful reunification.
Taiwan belongs to all the Chinese people, including the 23 million Taiwan compatriots. The Chinese people are firm in their resolve and have a deep commitment to safeguarding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation, and this resolve and commitment will frustrate any attempt to divide the country. When Taiwan was invaded by a foreign power more than 100 years ago, China was a poor and weak country. More than 70 years ago, China defeated the invaders and recovered Taiwan. Today, China has grown into the world's second largest economy. With significant growth in its political, economic, cultural, technological, and military strength, there is no likelihood that China will allow Taiwan to be separated again. Attempts to reject reunification and split the country are doomed, because they will founder against the history and culture of the Chinese nation as well as the resolve and commitment of more than 1.4 billion Chinese people.
4. External Forces Obstructing China's Complete Reunification Will Surely Be Defeated
External interference is a prominent obstacle to China's reunification. Still lost in delusions of hegemony and trapped in a Cold War mindset, some forces in the US insist on perceiving and portraying China as a major strategic adversary and a serious long-term threat. They do their utmost to undermine and pressurize China, exploiting Taiwan as a convenient tool. The US authorities have stated that they remain committed to the one-China policy and that they do not support "Taiwan independence". But their actions contradict their words. They are clouding the one-China principle in uncertainty and compromising its integrity. They are contriving "official" exchanges with Taiwan, increasing arms sales, and colluding in military provocation. To help Taiwan expand its "international space", they are inducing other countries to interfere in Taiwan affairs, and concocting Taiwan-related bills that infringe upon the sovereignty of China. They are creating confusion around what is black and white, right and wrong. On the one hand, they incite separatist forces to create tension and turmoil in cross-Straits relations. On the other hand, they accuse the mainland of coercion, pressurizing Taiwan, and unilaterally changing the status quo, in order to embolden these forces and create obstacles to China's peaceful reunification.
The important principles of respecting state sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations are the cornerstones of modern international law and basic norms of international relations. It is the sacred right of every sovereign state to safeguard national unity and territorial integrity. It goes without saying that the Chinese government is entitled to take all measures necessary to settle the Taiwan question and achieve national reunification, free of external interference.
Behind the smokescreens of "freedom, democracy, and human rights" and "upholding the rules-based international order", some anti-China forces in the US deliberately distort the nature of the Taiwan question - which is purely an internal matter for China - and try to deny the legitimacy and justification of the Chinese government in safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This clearly reveals their intention of using Taiwan to contain China and obstruct China's reunification, which should be thoroughly exposed and condemned.
These external forces are using Taiwan as a pawn to undermine China's development and progress, and obstruct the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. They are doing so at the cost of the interests, wellbeing and future of the people of Taiwan rather than for their benefit. They have encouraged and instigated provocative actions by the separatist forces; these have intensified cross-Straits tension and confrontation, and undermined peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. This runs counter to the underlying global trends of peace, development and win-win cooperation, and goes against the wishes of the international community and the aspiration of all peoples.
Shortly after the PRC was founded, even though the country itself had to be rebuilt on the ruins of decades of war, China and its people won a resounding victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea (1950-1953). We defeated a powerful and well-armed enemy through gallantry and tenacity. In doing so, we safeguarded the security of the newly founded People's Republic, reestablished the status of China as a major country in the world, and demonstrated our heroic spirit, our lack of fear, and our will to stand up against the abuse of the powerful.
China is firmly committed to peaceful development. At the same time, it will not flinch under any external interference, nor will it tolerate any infringement upon its sovereignty, security and development interests. Relying on external forces will achieve nothing for Taiwan's separatists, and using Taiwan to contain China is doomed to fail.
Tranquility, development and a decent life are the expectations of our Taiwan compatriots, and the common aspiration of those on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. Under the strong leadership of the CPC, the Chinese people and the Chinese nation have stood upright, won prosperity, and grown in strength. A moderately prosperous society in all respects has been built on the mainland, where a large population once lived in dire poverty. We now have better conditions, more confidence, and greater capabilities. We can complete the historic mission of national reunification, so that both sides of the Straits can enjoy a better life. The wheel of history rolls on towards national reunification, and it will not be stopped by any individual or any force.
Taking into consideration the overall goal of national rejuvenation in the context of global change on a scale unseen in a century, the CPC and the Chinese government have continued to follow the CPC's fundamental guidelines on the Taiwan question and implement its principles and policies towards Taiwan, and have made concrete efforts to promote peaceful cross-Straits relations, integrate the development of the two sides, and work towards national reunification.
1. Upholding the Basic Principles of Peaceful Reunification and One Country, Two Systems
National reunification by peaceful means is the first choice of the CPC and the Chinese government in resolving the Taiwan question, as it best serves the interests of the Chinese nation as a whole, including our compatriots in Taiwan, and it works best for the long-term stability and development of China. We have worked hard to overcome hardships and obstacles to peaceful reunification over the past decades, showing that we cherish and safeguard the greater good of the nation, the wellbeing of our compatriots in Taiwan, and peace on both sides.
The One Country, Two Systems principle is an important institutional instrument created by the CPC and the Chinese government to enable peaceful reunification. It represents a great achievement of Chinese socialism. Peaceful reunification and One Country, Two Systems are our basic principles for resolving the Taiwan question and the best approach to realizing national reunification. Embodying the Chinese wisdom - we thrive by embracing each other - they take full account of Taiwan's realities and are conducive to long-term stability in Taiwan after reunification.
We maintain that after peaceful reunification, Taiwan may continue its current social system and enjoy a high degree of autonomy in accordance with the law. The two social systems will develop side by side for a long time to come. One Country is the precondition and foundation of Two Systems; Two Systems is subordinate to and derives from One Country; and the two are integrated under the one-China principle.
We will continue working with our compatriots in Taiwan to explore a Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question and increase our efforts towards peaceful reunification. In designing the specifics for implementing One Country, Two Systems, we will give full consideration to the realities in Taiwan and the views and proposals from all walks of life on both sides, and fully accommodate the interests and sentiments of our compatriots in Taiwan.
Ever since the One Country, Two Systems principle was proposed, certain political forces have been misrepresenting and distorting its objectives. The DPP and the authorities under its leadership have done everything possible to target the principle with baseless criticisms, and this has led to misunderstandings about its aims in some quarters of Taiwan. It is a fact that since Hong Kong and Macao returned to the motherland and were reincorporated into national governance, they have embarked on a broad path of shared development together with the mainland, and each complements the others' strengths. The practice of One Country, Two Systems has been a resounding success.
For a time, Hong Kong faced a period of damaging social unrest caused by anti-China agitators both inside and outside the region. Based on a clear understanding of the situation there, the CPC and the Chinese government upheld the One Country, Two Systems principle, made some appropriate improvements, and took a series of measures that addressed both the symptoms and root causes of the unrest. Order was restored and prosperity returned to Hong Kong. This has laid a solid foundation for the law-based governance of Hong Kong and Macao and the long-term continuation of One Country, Two Systems.
To realize peaceful reunification, we must acknowledge that the mainland and Taiwan have their own distinct social systems and ideologies. The One Country, Two Systems principle is the most inclusive solution to this problem. It is an approach that is grounded in democratic principles, demonstrates good will, seeks peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, and delivers mutual benefit. The differences in social system are neither an obstacle to reunification nor a justification for secessionism. We firmly believe that our compatriots in Taiwan will develop a better understanding of the principle, and that the Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question will play its full role while compatriots on both sides work together towards peaceful reunification.
Peaceful reunification can only be achieved through consultation and discussion as equals. The long-standing political differences between the two sides are the fundamental obstacles to the steady improvement of cross-Straits relations, but we should not allow this problem to be passed down from one generation to the next. We can phase in flexible forms of consultation and discussion. We are ready to engage with all parties, groups, or individuals in Taiwan in a broad exchange of views aimed at resolving the political differences between the two sides based on the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus. Representatives will be recommended by all political parties and all sectors of society on both sides, and they will engage in democratic consultations on peaceful development of cross-Straits relations, integrated development of the two sides, and the peaceful reunification of our country.
2. Promoting Peaceful Cross-Straits Relations and Integrated Development
Peaceful cross-Straits relations and integrated development pave the way for reunification and serve to benefit our people on both sides. Thus, both sides should work together towards this goal. We will extend integrated development, increase exchanges and cooperation, strengthen bonds, and expand common interests in the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. In this way, we will all identify more closely with the Chinese culture and Chinese nation, and heighten the sense of our shared future. This lays solid foundations for peaceful reunification.
We will explore an innovative approach to integrated development and take the lead in setting up a pilot zone for integrated cross-Straits development in Fujian Province, advancing integration through better connectivity and more preferential policies, and based on mutual trust and understanding. Both sides should continue to promote connectivity in any area where it is beneficial, including trade and economic cooperation, infrastructure, energy and resources, and industrial standards. We should promote cooperation in culture, education, and health care, and the sharing of social security and public resources. We should support neighbouring areas or areas with similar conditions on the two sides in providing equal, universal, and accessible public services. We should take active steps to institutionalize cross-Straits economic cooperation and create a common market for the two sides to strengthen the Chinese economy.
We will improve the systems and policies to guarantee the wellbeing of Taiwan compatriots and ensure that they are treated as equals on the mainland, and we will protect their legitimate rights and interests here in accordance with the law. We will support our fellow Chinese and enterprises from Taiwan in participating in the Belt and Road Initiative, major regional development strategies, and the strategy for coordinated regional development. We will help them integrate into the new development dynamic, participate in high-quality development, share in more development opportunities, and benefit from national socio-economic development.
We will expand cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation in various fields and overcome any obstacles and obstruction. We will encourage our people on both sides to pass on the best of traditional Chinese culture and ensure that it grows in new and creative ways. We will strengthen communication among the general public and the younger generations on both sides, and encourage more fellow Chinese in Taiwan - young people in particular - to pursue studies, start businesses, seek jobs, or live on the mainland. This will help people on both sides to expand mutual understanding, strengthen mutual trust, consolidate a shared sense of identity, and forge closer bonds of heart and mind.
3. Defeating Separatism and External Interference
Separatism will plunge Taiwan into the abyss and bring nothing but disaster to the island. To protect the interests of the Chinese nation as a whole, including our compatriots in Taiwan, we must resolutely oppose it and work for peaceful reunification. We are ready to create vast space for peaceful reunification; but we will leave no room for separatist activities in any form.
We Chinese will decide our own affairs. The Taiwan question is an internal affair that involves China's core interests and the Chinese people's national sentiments, and no external interference will be tolerated. Any attempt to use the Taiwan question as a pretext to interfere in China's internal affairs or obstruct China's reunification will meet with the resolute opposition of the Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan. No one should underestimate our resolve, will and ability to defend China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
We will work with the greatest sincerity and exert our utmost efforts to achieve peaceful reunification. But we will not renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. This is to guard against external interference and all separatist activities. In no way does it target our fellow Chinese in Taiwan. Use of force would be the last resort taken under compelling circumstances. We will only be forced to take drastic measures to respond to the provocation of separatist elements or external forces should they ever cross our red lines.
We will always be ready to respond with the use of force or other necessary means to interference by external forces or radical action by separatist elements. Our ultimate goal is to ensure the prospects of China's peaceful reunification and advance this process.
Some forces in the US are making every effort to incite groups inside Taiwan to stir up trouble and use Taiwan as a pawn against China. This has jeopardized peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits, obstructed the Chinese government's efforts towards peaceful reunification, and undermined the healthy and steady development of China-US relations. Left unchecked, it will continue to escalate tension across the Straits, further disrupt China-US relations, and severely damage the interests of the US itself. The US should abide by the one-China principle, deal with Taiwan-related issues in a prudent and proper manner, stand by its previous commitments, and stop supporting Taiwan separatists.
4. Working with Our Fellow Chinese in Taiwan Towards National Reunification and Rejuvenation
National reunification is an essential step towards national rejuvenation. The future of Taiwan lies in China's reunification, and the wellbeing of the people in Taiwan hinges on the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, an endeavor that bears on the future and destiny of the people on both sides. A united and prosperous China will be a blessing for all Chinese, while a weak and divided China will be a disaster. Only China's rejuvenation and prosperity can bring lives of plenty and happiness to both sides. But it requires the joint efforts of both sides, as does the complete reunification of the country.
Separatist propaganda and the unresolved political dispute between the two sides have created misconceptions over cross-Straits relations, problems with national identity, and misgivings over national reunification among some fellow Chinese in Taiwan. Blood is thicker than water, and people on both sides of the Straits share the bond of kinship. We have great patience and tolerance and we will create conditions for closer exchanges and communication between the two sides, and to increase our compatriots' knowledge of the mainland and reduce these misconceptions and misgivings, in order to help them resist the manipulation of separatists.
We will join hands with our fellow Chinese in Taiwan to strive for national reunification and rejuvenation. We hope they will stand on the right side of history, be proud of their Chinese identity, and fully consider the position and role of Taiwan in China's rejuvenation. We hope they will pursue the greater good of the nation, resolutely oppose separatism and any form of external interference, and make a positive contribution to the just cause of China's peaceful reunification.
Once peaceful reunification is achieved under One Country, Two Systems, it will lay new foundations for China to make further progress and achieve national rejuvenation. At the same time, it will create huge opportunities for social and economic development in Taiwan and bring tangible benefits to the people of Taiwan.
1. Taiwan Will Have a Vast Space for Development
Taiwan boasts a high level of economic growth, industries with distinctive local features, and robust foreign trade. Its economy is highly complementary with that of the mainland. After reunification, the systems and mechanisms for cross-Straits economic cooperation will be further improved. Backed up by the vast mainland market, Taiwan's economy will enjoy broader prospects, become more competitive, develop steadier and smoother industrial and supply chains, and display greater vitality in innovation-driven growth. Many problems that have long afflicted Taiwan's economy and its people can be resolved through integrated cross-Straits development with all possible connectivity between the two sides. Taiwan's fiscal revenues can be better employed to improve living standards, bringing real benefits to the people and resolving their difficulties.
Taiwan's cultural creativity will also enjoy a great boost. Both sides of the Taiwan Straits share the culture and ethos of the Chinese nation. Nourished by the Chinese civilization, Taiwan's regional culture will flourish and prosper.
2. The Rights and Interests of the People in Taiwan Will Be Fully Protected
Provided that China's sovereignty, security and development interests are guaranteed, after reunification Taiwan will enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region. Taiwan's social system and its way of life will be fully respected, and the private property, religious beliefs, and lawful rights and interests of the people in Taiwan will be fully protected. All Taiwan compatriots who support reunification of the country and rejuvenation of the nation will be the masters of the region, contributing to and benefitting from China's development. With a powerful motherland in support, the people of Taiwan will enjoy greater security and dignity and stand upright and rock-solid in the international community.
3. Both Sides of the Taiwan Straits Will Share the Triumph of National Rejuvenation
The people of Taiwan are brave, diligent and patriotic, and have made unremitting efforts to improve themselves. They revere their ancestry and love their homeland. Working together and applying their talents, people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits will create a promising future. After reunification, we Chinese will bridge gaps and differences caused by long-term separation, share a stronger sense of national identity, and stand together as one. After reunification, we can leverage complementary strengths in pursuit of mutual benefit and common development. After reunification, we can join hands to make the Chinese nation stronger and more prosperous, and stand taller among all the nations of the world.
The people separated by the Taiwan Straits share the same blood and a common destiny. After reunification, China will have greater international influence and appeal, and a stronger ability to shape international public opinion, and the Chinese people will enjoy greater self-esteem, self-confidence and national pride. In Taiwan and on the mainland the people will share the dignity and triumph of a united China and be proud of being Chinese. We will work together to refine and implement the Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question, to improve the institutional arrangements for implementing the One Country, Two Systems policy, and to ensure lasting peace and stability in Taiwan.
4. Peaceful Reunification of China Is Conducive to Peace and Development in the Asia-Pacific and the Wider World
Peaceful cross-Straits reunification is of benefit not only to the Chinese nation, but to all peoples and the international community as a whole. The reunification of China will not harm the legitimate interests of any other country, including any economic interests they might have in Taiwan. On the contrary, it will bring more development opportunities to all countries; it will create more positive momentum for prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific and the rest of the world; it will contribute more to building a global community of shared future, promoting world peace and development, and propelling human progress.
After reunification, foreign countries can continue to develop economic and cultural relations with Taiwan. With the approval of the central government of China, they may set up consulates or other official and quasi-official institutions in Taiwan, international organizations and agencies may establish offices, relevant international conventions can be applied, and relevant international conferences can be held there.
Over its 5,000-year history, China has created a splendid culture that has shone throughout the world from past times to present, and has made an enormous contribution to human society. After a century of suffering and hardship, the nation has overcome humiliation, emerged from backwardness, and embraced boundless development opportunities. Now, it is striding towards the goal of national rejuvenation.
Embarking on a new journey in a new era, the CPC and the Chinese government will continue to rally compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, and lead the efforts to answer the call of the times, shoulder historic responsibilities, grasp our fate and our future in our own hands, and work hard to achieve national reunification and rejuvenation.
The journey ahead cannot be all smooth sailing. However, as long as we Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits devote our ingenuity and energy to the same goal, let there be no doubt - we will tolerate no foreign interference in Taiwan, we will thwart any attempt to divide our country, and we will combine as a mighty force for national reunification and rejuvenation. The historic goal of reuniting our motherland must be realized and will be realized.
[1] United Nations Juridical Yearbook 2010, p. 516.
[2] Between September 4 and 8, 1951, the United States gathered a number of countries in San Francisco for what they described as the San Francisco Peace Conference. Neither the PRC nor the Soviet Union received an invitation. The treaty signed at this meeting, commonly known as the Treaty of San Francisco, included an article under which Japan renounced all rights, title and claim to Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. This treaty contravened the provisions of the Declaration by United Nations signed by 26 countries - including the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China - in 1942, the fundamental principles of the UN Charter, and the basic norms of international law. The PRC was excluded from its preparation, drafting and signing, and its rulings on the territory and sovereign rights of China - including the sovereignty over Taiwan - are therefore illegal and invalid. The Chinese government has always refused to recognize the Treaty of San Francisco, and has never from the outset deviated from this stance. Other countries, including the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam, have also refused to recognize the document's authority.
[3] In his speech titled "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland" on January 30, 1995, Jiang Zemin, then general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and president of China, made eight proposals for the development of cross-Straits relations and peaceful national reunification. He emphasized, "Adhering to the one-China principle is the basis and prerequisite for peaceful reunification", and "in not promising to renounce the use of force, we are in no way targeting our Taiwan compatriots, but rather foreign forces conspiring to interfere in China's peaceful reunification and bring about Taiwan independence". (See Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. I, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 2009, pp. 407-412.)
[4] This figure does not include reinvestment by Taiwan investors through a third place.
[5] From the statistics of the April 2022 edition of the World Economic Outlook databases of the International Monetary Fund.
This white paper was issued on Aug. 10, 2022 and was the third of altogether three white papers the PRC issued
on Taiwan so far. The first white paper on the topic had been issued on Aug. 31, 1993,
the second on Feb. 21, 2000.
See also the URLs leading to the sources of this white paper in English and Chinese.
A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements,
declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining
to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF
file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010
please click here.
When the ROC was formally founded in 1912, Hong Kong was not part of it—the Qing had been forced to give up three swaths
of territory to the UK under military pressure: Hong Kong (Xianggang 香港) in 1842, Kowloon (Jiulong 九龍) in 1860,
and the New Territories (Xinjie 新界) in 1898. The three parts were administrated by the UK as one crown colony. In the 1980s
the PRC and the UK began negotiations about the return of the British colony to Chinese rule, and in 1984 the "Joint Declaration of
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the
Question of Hong Kong" (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu han Da buliedian ji Bei aierlan lianhe wangguo zhengfu guanyu
Xianggang wentide lianhe shengming 中華人民共和國政府和大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府關於香港問題的聯合聲明), short "Sino-British Declaration on Hong Kong", was signed. Both sides agreed that Hong Kong would
be allowed to keep its own judiciary and a legal system separate from the PRC for 50 years, but the Declaration did not specify
how Hong Kong would be governed after 2047, and it contained no sanctions that could be imposed for violations of clauses in
the Declaration.
With the handover on July 1, 1997 Hong Kong became part of the PRC as Special Administrative Region (tebie xingzhengqu
特别行政區, abbrev. SAR) under the principle of “one country, two systems” (yiguo liangzhi
一國兩制, abbrev. 1C2S). Its legal foundation is the Basic Law (jibenfa 基本法) which was endorsed by the PRC’s National People's
Congress (quanguo renmin daibiao dahui 全國人民代表大會, abbrev. quanguo renda 全國人大 in Chinese and NPC in English) on
April 4, 1990 and took effect with the handover.
Since the democratization process in the ROC began in 1987, pro-democracy advocates in Hong Kong have been inspired by the rights
and freedoms ROC citizens enjoy in Taiwan and engaged in frequent exchanges with politicians in Taiwan. Not only did the Hong Kong activists
want to preserve their freedom of opinion and assembly as they were allowed to exercise at the time of the handover, they also persistently
pushed for universal suffrage—in other words, more freedoms.
Meanwhile, the top priority for the PRC leadership has been to maintain maximum political control in Hong Kong under the 1C2S formula.
The pro-democracy movements, protests and unrest which have been recurring in Hong Kong since the early 2000s have been regarded by Beijing
as a serious challenge and threat to stability and their political control over Hong Kong. To counter those threats, the PRC sought to tighten
their grip on Hong Kong—in other words, less freedoms.
Hotspot for discontent
First attempts to introduce national security legislation in connection with Basic Law Article 23
triggered widespread protests and were eventually abandoned in 2003. At that time the question of introducing universal suffrage by 2012 was
under discussion, later such a measure was considered for the year 2017. The Standing Committee of the PRC National People’s Congress
(Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui 中華人民共和國全國人民代表大會常務委員會, abbrev. quanguo
renda changweihui 全國人大常委會 in Chinese and NPCSC in English) in 2014 proposed direct voting for Hong Kong's Chief Executive (xingzheng
zhangguan 行政長官) in 2017 as long as the candidates were nominated by a committee. Critics regarded the offer as too favourable to Beijing,
and disaffected students started the ensuing Umbrella Movement (yusan geming 雨傘革命) aka Occupy Movement (zhanling xingdong
佔領行動).
In this context two threadbare CCP euphemisms are noteworthy: electoral reform with reduction of seats filled by popular vote was
coined "improving HKSAR's electoral system" (wanshan Xianggang tequ xuanju zhidu 「完善香港特區選舉制度」), and disqualifying
pro-democracy candidates from running in elections came under the label "patriots administering Hong Kong" (aiguozhe zhi Gang
「愛國者治港」).
The main bone of contention for activists in the Umbrella Movement was the imposed patriotic rule—on Aug. 31, 2014 the NPCSC had decided
that "the Chief Executive shall be a person who loves the country and loves Hong Kong" (行政長官必須由愛國愛港人士擔任) and stipulated
"the method for selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage must provide corresponding institutional safeguards for this purpose"
(行政長官普選辦法必須為此提供相應的制度保障). Following massive protests HKSAR Chief Executive Carrie Lam 林鄭月娥 stated that the
development of democracy in Hong Kong was not a top priority and that the Hong Kong government should focus on livelihood issues
first. This strongly indicated that universal suffrage would never be implemented in HKSAR.
The next confrontation between the HKSAR leadership and pro-democracy activists came in 2019. It originated in a murder case that
took place in Taiwan—on Feb. 17, 2018, Hong Kong citizen Chan Tong-kai 陳同佳 killed his girlfriend Poon Hiu-wing 潘曉穎 in a room of
the Purple Garden Hotel (ziyuan lüdian 紫園旅店) in Taipei, stuffed her body in a suitcase and
disposed of both separately in a park near an MRT station in New Taipei City, returning to Hong Kong
before the Taiwanese authorities named him a suspect in the crime. Since an extradition agreement did not exist between Hong Kong and Taiwan,
Chan could not be prosecuted. (A detailed account of the events can be found on Wikipedia.)
As a reaction to the situation, the HKSAR government introduced the "Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
Legislation [Amendment] Bill 2019" (erlingyijou nian taofan ji xingshi shiyi xianghu falü xiezhu fali (xiuding) tiaoli cao’an 2019
年逃犯及刑事事宜相互法律協助法例(修訂)條例草案), short "Extradition Bill" (taofan tiaoli 逃犯條例), in February 2019. Critics feared that
the bill could be used to target activists and journalists. It was argued that it risked exposing Hongkongers to unfair trials and violent treatment,
and the pro-democracy camp rejected plans to allow extradition to mainland China as well. A sit-in at the government headquarters on March 15, 2019
marked the beginning of the protests, and a demonstration on June 9 that year was attended by hundreds of thousands. The protests were at times
fierce and violent, with police firing live bullets and protesters attacking officers and throwing petrol bombs. Chief Executive Carrie Lam
eventually withdrew the bill on Sept. 4, 2019. Nevertheless, elections for the Hong Kong District Councils on Nov. 24, 2019 resulted in an
unprecedented landslide victory for the pro-democracy camp.
Destruction of liberties
After years of recurring unrest and anti-government protests, another attempt to criminalize dissent was finally pushed through Hong Kong’s
legislature, with profound impact on Hong Kong’s politics and society. The "Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region" (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo Xianggang tebie xingzhengqu weihu guojia anquanfa
中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法)—short "Hong Kong National Security Law"
(Gang qu guo'anfa 港區國安法)—was promulgated on June 30, 2020 and went into force immediately, establishing the crimes of
secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces. Under the law, an Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central
People’s Government in the HKSAR (zhongyang renmin zhengfu zhu Xianggang tebie xingzhengqu weihu guojia anquan gongshu
中央人民政府駐香港特别行政區維護國家安全公署, abbrev. CPGNSO), i. e. an investigative office under the PRC government authority
immune from HKSAR jurisdiction, was set up on July 8, 2020.
The HKSAR National Security Law changed
the political atmosphere in Hong Kong fundamentally, and voices of dissent have effectively been silenced. Anti-government demonstrations,
annual candlelight vigils commemorating the 1989 June 6 Tiananmen Massacre (liusi Tianmen shijian 六四天門事件 aka liusi shijian
六四事件 or Tiananmen shijian 天安門事件) and other forms of protest can be prosecuted under the pretext of national security and punished
with prison time, and the law also sparked a wave of mass emigration from the city. Needless to say, the political developments in HKSAR since
early 2020 have done nothing to increase the appeal of 1C2S in Taiwan.
Follow-up legislation included the "Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National
Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region" (Gang qu guo'anfa di sishisan tiao shishi xize 港區國安法第四十三條實施細則),
short "Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the HKSAR National Security Law", which were gazetted
on July 6, 2020 and became effective the following day. The most recent piece of legislation in this context was the "Safeguarding National Security Ordinance" (weihu guojia anquan tiaoli
維護國家安全條例, abbrev. SNSO) promulgated on March 23, 2024.
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu han da buliezhen ji bei Aierlan lianhe wangguo zhengfu guanyu Xianggang wentide lianhe shengming 中華人民共和國政府和大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府關於香港問題的聯合聲明
JOINT
DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic
of China have reviewed with satisfaction the friendly relations existing between the two Governments and peoples in recent years
and agreed that a proper negotiated settlement of the question of Hong Kong, which is left over from the past, is conducive to the
maintenance of the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and to the further strengthening and development of the relations between
the two countries on a new basis. To this end, they have, after talks between the delegations of the two Governments, agreed to
declare as follows:
1. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that to recover the Hong Kong area (including Hong Kong Island,
Kowloon and the New Territories, hereinafter referred to as Hong Kong) is the common aspiration of the entire Chinese people, and that
it has decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997.
2. The Government of the United Kingdom declares that it will restore Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China with effect from 1 July 1997.
3. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that the basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong
are as follows:
(1) Upholding national unity and territorial integrity and taking account of the history of Hong Kong and its realities, the People's Republic
of China has decided to establish, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, a Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region upon resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong.
(2) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be directly under the authority of the Central People's Government of the People's
Republic of China. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs
which are the responsibilities of the Central People's Government.
(3) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of
final adjudication. The laws currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged.
(4) The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive will be
appointed by the Central People's Government on the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally. Principal officials will
be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for appointment by the Central People's Government. Chinese
and foreign nationals previously working in the public and police services in the government departments of Hong Kong may remain in employment.
British and other foreign nationals may also be employed to serve as advisers or hold certain public posts in government departments of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
(5) The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and freedoms, including
those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation,
of academic research and of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private property, ownership of
enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will be protected by law.
(6) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the status of a free port and a separate customs territory.
(7) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the status of an international financial centre, and its markets for foreign exchange,
gold, securities and futures will continue. There will be free flow of capital. The Hong Kong dollar will continue to circulate and remain freely convertible.
(8) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will have independent finances. The Central People's Government will not levy taxes on the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
(9) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may establish mutually beneficial economic relations with the United Kingdom and other
countries, whose economic interests in Hong Kong will be given due regard.
(10) Using the name of "Hong Kong, China", the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own maintain and develop economic
and cultural relations and conclude relevant agreements with states, regions and relevant international organisations.
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own issue travel documents for entry into and exit from Hong Kong.
(11) The maintenance of public order in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be the responsibility of the Government of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
(12) The above-stated basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong and the elaboration of them in Annex I to this Joint
Declaration will be stipulated, in a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, by the National People's
Congress of the People's Republic of China, and they will remain unchanged for 50 years.
4. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China declare that, during the transitional period between
the date of the entry into force of this Joint Declaration and 30 June 1997, the Government of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the administration
of Hong Kong with the object of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity and social stability; and that the Government of the People's Republic
of China will give its co-operation in this connection.
5. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China declare that, in order to ensure a smooth transfer of
government in 1997, and with a view to the effective implementation of this Joint Declaration, a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group will be set up when this
Joint Declaration enters into force; and that it will be established and will function in accordance with the provisions of Annex II to this Joint Declaration.
6. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China declare that land leases in Hong Kong and other
related matters will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Annex III to this Joint Declaration.
7. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to implement the preceding declarations and
the Annexes to this Joint Declaration.
8. This Joint Declaration is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which shall take
place in Beijing before 30 June 1985. This Joint Declaration and its Annexes shall be equally binding.
Done in duplicate at Beijing on December 19, 1984 in the English and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic.
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Margaret Thatcher
For the Government of the People's Republic of China Zhao Ziyang
Elaboration by the government of the People's Republic of China of its basic policies regarding Hong Kong
The Government of the People's Republic of China elaborates the basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong
as set out in paragraph 3 of the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government
of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong as follows:
The Constitution of the People's Republic of China stipulates in Article 31 "that the state may establish special administrative regions when
necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by laws enacted by the National People's Congress
in the light of the specific conditions." In accordance with this Article, the People's Republic of China shall, upon the resumption of the exercise of
sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997, establish the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. The
National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China shall enact and promulgate a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Basic Law) in accordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic
of China, stipulating that after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region the socialist system and socialist policies shall
not be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and that Hong Kong's previous capitalist system and life-style shall remain
unchanged for 50 years.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be directly under the authority of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic
of China and shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Except for foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People's
Government, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that
of final adjudication. The Central People's Government shall authorise the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to conduct on its own those
external affairs specified in Section XI of this Annex.
Chief Executive. Principal Officials. The Legislature
The government and legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central
People's Government. Principal officials (equivalent to Secretaries) shall be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region and appointed by the Central People's Government. The legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by
elections. The executive authorities shall abide by the law and shall be accountable to the legislature.
Language
In addition to Chinese, English may also be used in organs of government and in the courts in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Regional flag and emblem
Apart from displaying the national flag and national emblem of the People's Republic of China, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
may use a regional flag and emblem of its own.
After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong (i.e. the common law, rules
of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law) shall be maintained, save for any that contravene the Basic Law and subject to
any amendment by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature.
Legislative power
The legislative power of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. The legislature may on its own authority enact laws in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and legal procedures, and report them
to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record. Laws enacted by the legislature which are in accordance with the Basic Law
and legal procedures shall be regarded as valid.
Laws of the SAR
The laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the Basic Law, and the laws previously in force in Hong Kong and laws enacted
by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature as above.
After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the judicial system previously practised in Hong Kong shall be maintained
except for those changes consequent upon the vesting in the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the power of final adjudication.
Judicial power; Precedents
Judicial power in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The
courts shall exercise judicial power independently and free from any interference. Members of the judiciary shall be immune from legal action in respect
of their judicial functions. The courts shall decide cases in accordance with the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and may refer to
precedents in other common law jurisdictions.
Appointment and removal of judges
Judges of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region courts shall be appointed by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region acting in accordance with the recommendation of an independent commission composed of local judges, persons from the legal profession and
other eminent persons. Judges shall be chosen by reference to their judicial qualities and may be recruited from other common law jurisdictions. A judge
may only be removed for inability to discharge the functions of his office, or for misbehaviour, by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region acting in accordance with the recommendation of a tribunal appointed by the chief judge of the court of final appeal, consisting of not fewer than
three local judges. Additionally, the appointment or removal of principal judges (i.e. those of the highest rank) shall be made by the chief executive with
the endorsement of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature and reported to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
for the record. The system of appointment and removal of judicial officers other than judges shall be maintained.
Power of final judgment
The power of final judgment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the court of final appeal in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, which may as required invite judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the court of final appeal.
Prosecutions
A prosecuting authority of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall control criminal prosecutions free from any interference.
Legal practitioners
On the basis of the system previously operating in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall on its own make
provision for local lawyers and lawyers from outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to work and practise in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
Reciprocal juridical assistance
The Central People's Government shall assist or authorise the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to make appropriate
arrangements for reciprocal juridical assistance with foreign states.
Public servants and members of judiciary previously serving in H.K.
After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, public servants previously serving in Hong Kong in all government
departments, including the police department, and members of the judiciary may all remain in employment and continue their service with pay,
allowances, benefits and conditions of service no less favourable than before. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall
pay to such persons who retire or complete their contracts, as well as to those who have retired before 1 July 1997, or to their dependants, all
pensions, gratuities, allowances and benefits due to them on terms no less favourable than before, and irrespective of their nationality or place
of residence.
Foreign nationals in public service
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may employ British and other foreign nationals previously serving in the public
service in Hong Kong, and may recruit British and other foreign nationals holding permanent identity cards of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region to serve as public servants at all levels, except as heads of major government departments (corresponding to branches or departments at
Secretary level) including the police department, and as deputy heads of some of those departments. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Government may also employ British and other foreign nationals as advisers to government departments and, when there is a need, may recruit
qualified candidates from outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to professional and technical posts in government departments.
The above shall be employed only in their individual capacities and, like other public servants, shall be responsible to the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government.
Appointment and promotion of public servants
The appointment and promotion of public servants shall be on the basis of qualifications, experience and ability. Hong Kong's previous system
of recruitment, employment, assessment, discipline, training and management for the public service (including special bodies for appointment, pay
and conditions of service) shall, save for any provisions providing privileged treatment for foreign nationals, be maintained.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall deal on its own with financial matters, including disposing of its financial resources and
drawing up its budgets and its final accounts. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall report its budgets and final accounts to the
Central People's Government for the record.
Taxation and public expenditure
The Central People's Government shall not levy taxes on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall use its financial revenues exclusively for its own purposes and they shall not be handed over to the Central People's Government. The
systems by which taxation and public expenditure must be approved by the legislature, and by which there is accountability to the legislature for all
public expenditure, and the system for auditing public accounts shall be maintained.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the capitalist economic and trade systems previously practised in Hong Kong.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall decide its economic and trade policies on its own. Rights concerning the ownership
of property, including those relating to acquisition, use, disposal, inheritance and compensation for lawful deprivation (corresponding to the real value
of the property concerned, freely convertible and paid without undue delay) shall continue to be protected by law.
Free port and free trade policy
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall retain the status of a free port and continue a free trade policy, including the free movement
of goods and capital. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own maintain and develop economic and trade relations with all states
and regions.
Customs territory.
GATT.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a separate customs territory. It may participate in relevant international organisations and
international trade agreements (including preferential trade arrangements), such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and arrangements
regarding international trade in textiles. Export quotas, tariff preferences and other similar arrangements obtained by the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall be enjoyed exclusively by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have authority
to issue its own certificates of origin for products manufactured locally, in accordance with prevailing rules of origin.
Trade missions
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, as necessary, establish official and semi-official economic and trade missions in foreign
countries, reporting the establishment of such missions to the Central People's Government for the record.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall retain the status of an international financial centre. The monetary and financial systems
previously practised in Hong Kong, including the systems of regulation and supervision of deposit taking institutions and financial markets, shall
be maintained.
Monetary and financial policies
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may decide its monetary and financial policies on its own. It shall safeguard the
free operation of financial business and the free flow of capital within, into and out of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. No exchange
control policy shall be applied in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures shall
continue.
Hong Kong dollar
The Hong Kong dollar, as the local legal tender, shall continue to circulate and remain freely convertible. The authority to issue Hong Kong
currency shall be vested in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government
may authorise designated banks to issue or continue to issue Hong Kong currency under statutory authority, after satisfying itself that any issue of
currency will be soundly based and that the arrangements for such issue are consistent with the object of maintaining the stability of the currency.
Hong Kong currency bearing references inappropriate to the status of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic
of China shall be progressively replaced and withdrawn from circulation.
Exchange Fund
The Exchange Fund shall be managed and controlled by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, primarily for regulating
the exchange value of the Hong Kong dollar.
Previous systems of shipping management and regulation
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain Hong Kong's previous systems of shipping management and shipping regulation,
including the system for regulating conditions of seamen. The specific functions and responsibilities of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Government in the field of shipping shall be defined by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government on its own. Private shipping
businesses and shipping-related businesses and private container terminals in Hong Kong may continue to operate freely.
Shipping registers and issue of certificates
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be authorised by the Central People's Government to continue to maintain a shipping register
and issue related certificates under its own legislation in the name of 'Hong Kong, China'.
Access to HKSAR ports
With the exception of foreign warships, access for which requires the permission of the Central People's Government, ships shall enjoy access
to the ports of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the status of Hong Kong as a centre of international and regional aviation. Airlines
incorporated and having their principal place of business in Hong Kong and civil aviation related businesses may continue to operate. The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall continue the previous system of civil aviation management in Hong Kong, and keep its own aircraft register in
accordance with provisions laid down by the Central People's Government concerning nationality marks and registration marks of aircraft. The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall be responsible on its own for matters of routine business and technical management of civil aviation, including the
management of airports, the provision of air traffic services within the flight information region of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the
discharge of other responsibilities allocated under the regional air navigation procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organisation.
Air services
The Central People's Government shall, in consultation with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, make arrangements
providing for air services between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other parts of the People's Republic of China for airlines
incorporated and having their principal place of business in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other airlines of the People's
Republic of China. All Air Service Agreements providing for air services between other parts of the People's Republic of China and other states
and regions with stops at the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and air services between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
and other states and regions with stops at other parts of the People's Republic of China shall be concluded by the Central People's Government.
For this purpose, the Central People's Government shall take account of the special conditions and economic interests of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region and consult the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. Representatives of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government may participate as members of delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of China in air service
consultations with foreign governments concerning arrangements for such services.
Air Service Agreements
Acting under specific authorisations from the Central People's Government, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may:
renew or amend Air Service Agreements and arrangements previously in force; in principle, all such Agreements and arrangements may be
renewed or amended with the rights contained in such previous Agreements and arrangements being as far as possible maintained;
negotiate and conclude new Air Service Agreements providing routes for airlines incorporated and having their principal place of business in
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and rights for overflights and technical stops; and
negotiate and conclude provisional arrangements where no Air Service Agreement with a foreign state or other region is in force.
All scheduled air services to, from or through the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region which do not operate to, from or through the mainland
of China shall be regulated by Air Service Agreements or provisional arrangements referred to in this paragraph.
The Central People's Government shall give the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government the authority to:
negotiate and conclude with other authorities all arrangements concerning the implementation of the above Air Service Agreements and
provisional arrangements;
issue licences to airlines incorporated and having their principal place of business in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
designate such airlines under the above Air Service Agreements and provisional arrangements; and
issue permits to foreign airlines for services other than those to, from or through the mainland of China.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the educational system previously practised in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government shall on its own decide policies in the fields of culture, education, science and technology, including
policies regarding the educational system and its administration, the language of instruction, the allocation of funds, the examination system, the
system of academic awards and the recognition of educational and technological qualifications. Institutions of all kinds, including those run by
religious and community organisations, may retain their autonomy. They may continue to recruit staff and use teaching materials from outside
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Students shall enjoy freedom of choice of education and freedom to pursue their education
outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Subject to the principle that foreign affairs are the responsibility of the Central People's Government, representatives of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government may participate, as members of delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of China, in negotiations
at the diplomatic level directly affecting the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region conducted by the Central People's Government. The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region may on its own, using the name 'Hong Kong, China', maintain and develop relations and conclude and implement
agreements with states, regions and relevant international organisations in the appropriate fields, including the economic, trade, financial and monetary,
shipping, communications, touristic, cultural and sporting fields. Representatives of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may
participate, as members of delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of China, in international organisations or conferences in appropriate
fields limited to states and affecting the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, or may attend in such other capacity as may be permitted by the Central
People's Government and the organisation or conference concerned, and may express their views in the name of 'Hong Kong, China'. The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region may, using the name 'Hong Kong, China', participate in international organisations and conferences not limited to states.
International agreements
The application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of international agreements to which the People's Republic of China is or becomes
a party shall be decided by the Central People's Government, in accordance with the circumstances and needs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, and after seeking the views of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. International agreements to which the People's Republic
of China is not a party but which are implemented in Hong Kong may remain implemented in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Central
People's Government shall, as necessary, authorise or assist the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to make appropriate arrangements
for the application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of other relevant international agreements. The Central People's Government shall take
the necessary steps to ensure that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall continue to retain its status in an appropriate capacity in those
international organisations of which the People's Republic of China is a member and in which Hong Kong participates in one capacity or another. The
Central People's Government shall, where necessary, facilitate the continued participation of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in an appropriate
capacity in those international organisations in which Hong Kong is a participant in one capacity or another, but of which the People's Republic of China is
not a member.
Consular and other missions
Foreign consular and other official or semi-official missions may be established in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region with the approval
of the Central People's Government. Consular and other official missions established in Hong Kong by states which have established formal diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of China may be maintained. According to the circumstances of each case, consular and other official missions of
states having no formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China may either be maintained or changed to semi-official missions. States
not recognised by the People's Republic of China can only establish non-governmental institutions.
The United Kingdom may establish a Consulate-General in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
The maintenance of public order in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the responsibility of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Government. Military forces sent by the Central People's Government to be stationed in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for the
purpose of defence shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Expenditure for these military forces shall
be borne by the Central People's Government.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall protect the rights and freedoms of inhabitants and other persons in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region according to law. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall maintain the rights and freedoms as
provided for by the laws previously in force in Hong Kong, including freedom of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, to form
and join trade unions, of correspondence, of travel, of movement, of strike, of demonstration, of choice of occupation, of academic research, of belief,
inviolability of the home, the freedom to marry and the right to raise a family freely.
Legal advice and judicial remedies
Every person shall have the right to confidential legal advice, access to the courts, representation in the courts by lawyers of his choice, and to obtain
judicial remedies. Every person shall have the right to challenge the actions of the executive in the courts.
Religion
Religious organisations and believers may maintain their relations with religious organisations and believers elsewhere, and schools, hospitals
and welfare institutions run by religious organisations may be continued. The relationship between religious organisations in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region and those in other parts of the People's Republic of China shall be based on the principles of non-subordination, non-interference
and mutual respect.
International Covenants
The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force.
The following categories of persons shall have the right of abode in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and, in accordance with the
law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, be qualified to obtain permanent identity cards issued by the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Government, which state their right of abode:
all Chinese nationals who where born or who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region for a continuous period of 7 years or more, and persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of such Chinese nationals;
all other persons who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for
a continuous period of 7 years or more and who have taken Hong Kong as their place of permanent residence before or after the establishment of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and persons under 21 years of age who were born of such persons in Hong Kong before or after the
establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
any other persons who had the right of abode only in Hong Kong before the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Passports etc
The Central People's Government shall authorise the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to issue, in accordance with the law,
passports of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China to all Chinese nationals who hold permanent identity cards
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and travel documents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
China to all other persons lawfully residing in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The above passports and documents shall be valid for all
states and regions and shall record the holder's right to return to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Use of travel documents
For the purpose of travelling to and from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
may use travel documents issued by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, or by other competent authorities of the People's Republic
of China, or of other states. Holders of permanent identity cards of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may have this fact stated in their travel
documents as evidence that the holders have the right of abode in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of persons from other parts of China shall continue to be regulated in accordance with the
present practice.
Immigration controls
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may apply immigration controls on entry, stay in and departure from the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region by persons from foreign states and regions.
Freedom to leave SAR
Unless restrained by law, holders of valid travel documents shall be free to leave the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region without special
authorisation.
Visa abolition agreements
The Central People's Government shall assist or authorise the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to conclude visa abolition
agreements with states or regions.
1. In furtherance of their common aim and in order to ensure a smooth transfer of government in 1997, the Government of the United
Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed to continue their discussions in a friendly spirit and to develop
the cooperative relationship which already exists between the two Governments over Hong Kong with a view to the effective implementation
of the Joint Declaration.
2. In order to meet the requirements for liaison, consultation and the exchange of information, the two Governments have agreed to set up
a Joint Liaison Group.
3. The functions of the Joint Liaison Group shall be:
a) to conduct consultations on the implementation of the Joint Declaration;
b) to discuss matters relating to the smooth transfer of government in 1997;
c) to exchange information and conduct consultations on such subjects as may be agreed by the two sides.
Matters on which there is disagreement in the Joint Liaison Group shall be referred to the two Governments for solution through consultations.
4. Matters for consideration during the first half of the period between the establishment of the Joint Liaison Group and 1 July 1997 shall include:
a) action to be taken by the two Governments to enable the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to maintain its economic relations as a
separate customs territory, and in particular to ensure the maintenance of Hong Kong's participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
the Multifibre Arrangement and other international arrangements; and
b) action to be taken by the two Governments to ensure the continued application of international rights and obligations affecting Hong Kong.
5. The two Governments have agreed that in the second half of the period between the establishment of the Joint Liaison Group and 1 July 1997
there will be need for closer cooperation, which will therefore be intensified during that period. Matters for consideration during this second period shall include:
a) procedures to be adopted for the smooth transition in 1997;
b) action to assist the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to maintain and develop economic and cultural relations and conclude agreements
on these matters with states, regions and relevant international organisations.
6. The Joint Liaison Group shall be an organ for liaison and not an organ of power. It shall play no part in the administration of Hong Kong or the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Nor shall it have any supervisory role over that administration. The members and supporting staff of the
Joint Liaison Group shall only conduct activities within the scope of the functions of the Joint Liaison Group.
7. Each side shall designate a senior representative who shall be of Ambassadorial rank, and four other members of the group. Each side may
send up to 20 supporting staff.
8. The Joint Liaison Group shall be established on the entry into force of the Joint Declaration. From 1 July 1988 the Joint Liaison Group shall have
its principal base in Hong Kong. The Joint Liaison Group shall continue its work until 1 January 2000.
9. The Joint Liaison Group shall meet in Beijing, London and Hong Kong. It shall meet at least once in each of the three locations in each year. The
venue for each meeting shall be agreed between the two sides.
10. Members of the Joint Liaison Group shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities as appropriate when in the three locations. Proceedings
of the Joint Liaison Group shall remain confidential unless otherwise agreed between the two sides.
11. The Joint Liaison Group may by agreement between the two sides decide to set up specialist sub-groups to deal with particular subjects
requiring expert assistance.
12. Meetings of the Joint Liaison Group and sub-groups may be attended by experts other than the members of the Joint Liaison Group. Each
side shall determine the composition of its delegation to particular meetings of the Joint Liaison Group or sub-group in accordance with the subjects
to be discussed and the venue chosen.
13. The working procedures of the Joint Liaison Group shall be discussed and decided upon by the two sides within the guidelines laid down
in this Annex.
The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with effect from the entry into
force of the Joint Declaration, land leases in Hong Kong and other related matters shall be dealt with in accordance with the following provisions:
1. All leases of land granted or decided upon before the entry into force of the Joint Declaration and those granted thereafter in accordance with
paragraph 2 or 3 of this Annex, and which extend beyond 30 June 1997, and all rights in relation to such leases shall continue to be recognised and
protected under the law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
2. All leases of land granted by the British Hong Kong Government not containing a right of renewal that expire before 30 June 1997, except short
term tenancies and leases for special purposes, may be extended if the lessee so wishes for a period expiring not later than 30 June 2047 without
payment of an additional premium. An annual rent shall be charged from the date of extension equivalent to 3 per cent of the rateable value of the
property at that date, adjusted in step with any changes in the rateable value thereafter. In the case of old schedule lots, village lots, small houses
and similar rural holdings, where the property was on 30 June 1984 held by, or, in the case of small houses granted after that date, the property is
granted to, a person descended through the male line from a person who was in 1898 a resident of an established village in Hong Kong, the rent
shall remain unchanged so long as the property is held by that person or by one of his lawful successors in the male line. Where leases of land not
having a right of renewal expire after 30 June 1997, they shall be dealt with in accordance with the relevant land laws and policies of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region.
3. From the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997, new leases of land may be granted by the British Hong Kong Government
for terms expiring not later than 30 June 2047. Such leases shall be granted at a premium and nominal rental until 30 June 1997, after which date they
shall not require payment of an additional premium but an annual rent equivalent to 3 per cent of the rateable value of the property at that date, adjusted
in step with changes in the rateable value thereafter, shall be charged.
4. The total amount of new land to be granted under paragraph 3 of this Annex shall be limited to 50 hectares a year (excluding land to be granted
to the Hong Kong Housing Authority for public rental housing) from the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997.
5. Modifications of the conditions specified in leases granted by the British Hong Kong Government may continue to be granted before 1 July 1997
at a premium equivalent to the difference between the value of the land under the previous conditions and its value under the modified conditions.
6. From the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997, premium income obtained by the British Hong Kong Government from land
transactions shall, after deduction of the average cost of land production, be shared equally between the British Hong Kong Government and the future
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. All the income obtained by the British Hong Kong Government, including the amount of the
above-mentioned deduction, shall be put into the Capital Works Reserve Fund for the financing of land development and public works in Hong Kong.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government's share of the premium income shall be deposited in banks incorporated in Hong Kong
and shall not be drawn on except for the financing of land development and public works in Hong Kong in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 7(d) of this Annex.
7. A Land Commission shall be established in Hong Kong immediately upon the entry into force of the Joint Declaration. The Land Commission
shall be composed of an equal number of officials designated respectively by the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the
People's Republic of China together with necessary supporting staff. The officials of the two sides shall be responsible to their respective governments.
The Land Commission shall be dissolved on 30 June 1997.
The terms of reference of the Land Commission shall be:
a) to conduct consultations on the implementation of this Annex;
b) to monitor observance of the limit specified in paragraph 4 of this Annex, the amount of land granted to the Hong Kong Housing Authority for
public rental housing, and the division and use of premium income referred to in paragraph 6 of this Annex;
c) to consider and decide on proposals from the British Hong Kong Government for increasing the limit referred to in paragraph 4 of this Annex;
d) to examine proposals for drawing on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government's share of premium income referred to in
paragraph 6 of this Annex and to make recommendations to the Chinese side for decision.
Matters on which there is disagreement in the Land Commission shall be referred to the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government
of the People's Republic of China for decision.
8. Specific details regarding the establishment of the Land Commission shall be finalised separately by the two sides through consultations.
In connection with the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government
of the People's Republic of China on the question of Hong Kong to be signed this day, the Government of the United Kingdom declares that, subject
to the completion of the necessary amendments to the relevant United Kingdom legislation:
a)
All persons who on 30 June 1997 are, by virtue of a connection with Hong Kong, British Dependent Territories Citizens (BDTCs) under the
law in force in the United Kingdom will cease to be BDTCs with effect from 1 July 1997, but will be eligible to retain an appropriate status which,
without conferring the right of abode in the United Kingdom, will entitle them to continue to use passports issued by the Government of the United
Kingdom. This status will be acquired by such persons only if they hold or are included in such a British passport issued before 1 July 1997, except
that eligible persons born on or after 1 January 1997 but before 1 July 1997 may obtain or be included in such a passport up to 31 December 1997.
b)
No person will acquire BDTC status on or after 1 July 1997 by virtue of a connection with Hong Kong. No person born on or after 1 July 1997
will acquire the status referred to as being appropriate in sub-paragraph (a).
c)
United Kingdom consular officials in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and elsewhere may renew and replace passports of persons
mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) and may also issue them to persons, born before 1 July 1997 of such persons, who had previously been included in the
passport of their parent.
d)
Those who have obtained or been included in passports issued by the Government of the United Kingdom under sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) will
be entitled to receive, upon request, British consular services and protection when in third countries.
Beijing, 19 December 1984.
Chinese Memorandum
The Government of the People's Republic of China has received the memorandum from the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland dated 19 December 1984.
Under the Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, all Hong Kong Chinese compatriots, whether they are holders of the 'British Dependent
Territories Citizens' Passport' or not, are Chinese nationals.
Taking account of the historical background of Hong Kong and its realities, the competent authorities of the Government of the People's Republic
of China will, with effect from 1 July 1997, permit Chinese nationals in Hong Kong who were previously called 'British Dependent Territories Citizens' to
use travel documents issued by the Government of the United Kingdom for the purpose of travelling to other states and regions.
The above Chinese nationals will not be entitled to British consular protection in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other parts of
the People's Republic of China on account of their holding the above-mentioned British travel documents.
Chapter II - Relationship between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Article 23
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession,
sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political
organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or
bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.
While the wording of Article 23 itself has remained unchanged since the 1997 handover, controversial Basic Law Article 23 legislation
was enacted on March 23, 2024, notably the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance. In this
context, the HKSAR Security Bureau (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo Xianggang tebie xingzhengqu zhengfu baoanju
中華人民共和國香港特別行政區政府保安局) has published pamphlets for justification.
The full text of the HKSAR Basic Law is available here on two separate PDF files in English and Chinese (May 2021 edition).
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016
(Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People’s Congress at its Tenth Session on 31 August, 2014)
Editorial Notes:
1. This instrument was not given a chapter number under the Legislation Publication Ordinance (Cap. 614). An unofficial reference number, however, is assigned to this instrument in Hong Kong e-Legislation (http://www.elegislation.gov.hk) for identification purposes. This also enables users to carry out a search by reference to the unofficial reference number.
2. This English translation is for reference only and has no legislative effect.
The Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People’s Congress considered at its Tenth Session the Report by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on whether there is a need to amend the methods for selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2017 and for forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2016 submitted by Leung Chun-ying, the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, on 15 July 2014. In the course of deliberation, the relevant views and suggestions of the Hong Kong community were given full consideration.
The Session points out that according to the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage adopted by the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress at its Thirty-first Session on 29 December 2007, the election of the fifth Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the year 2017 may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage; at an appropriate time prior to the selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by universal suffrage, the Chief Executive shall make a report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress as regards the issue of amending the method for selecting the Chief Executive in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Hong Kong Basic Law and the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, and a determination thereon shall be made by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. From 4 December 2013 to 3 May 2014, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region conducted an extensive and in-depth public consultation on the methods for selecting the Chief Executive in 2017 and for forming the Legislative Council in 2016. In the course of consultation, the Hong Kong community generally expressed the hope to see the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage in 2017, and broad consensus was reached on important principles such as: the method for selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage shall comply with the Hong Kong Basic Law and the relevant Decisions of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and the Chief Executive shall be a person who loves the country and loves Hong Kong. With respect to the methods for selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage in 2017 and for forming the Legislative Council in 2016, the Hong Kong community put forward various views and suggestions. It was on this basis that the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region made a report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on issues relating to amending the methods for selecting the Chief Executive in 2017 and for forming the Legislative Council in 2016. The Session is of the view that the report complies with the requirements of the Hong Kong Basic Law, the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Hong Kong Basic Law and the relevant Decisions of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, and reflects comprehensively and objectively the views collected during the public consultation; and is thus a positive, responsible and pragmatic report.
The Session is of the view that implementing universal suffrage for the selection of the Chief Executive represents a historic progress in Hong Kong’s democratic development and a significant change in the political structure of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Since the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and the sovereignty, security and development interests of the country are at stake, there is a need to proceed in a prudent and steady manner. The selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by universal suffrage has its origin in Paragraph 2 of Article 45 of the Hong Kong Basic Law: “The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.” The formulation of the method for selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage must strictly comply with the relevant provisions of the Hong Kong Basic Law, accord with the principle of “one country, two systems”, and befit the legal status of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. It must meet the interests of different sectors of the society, achieve balanced participation, be conducive to the development of the capitalist economy, and make gradual and orderly progress in developing a democratic system that suits the actual situation in Hong Kong. Given the divergent views within the Hong Kong community on how to implement the Hong Kong Basic Law provisions on universal suffrage for selecting the Chief Executive, and in light of the constitutional responsibility of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for the proper implementation of the Hong Kong Basic Law and for deciding on the method for the selection of the Chief Executive, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress finds it necessary to make provisions on certain core issues concerning the method for selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage, so as to facilitate the building of consensus within the Hong Kong community and the attainment of universal suffrage for the selection of the Chief Executive smoothly and in accordance with law.
The Session is of the view that since the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be accountable to both the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Central People’s Government in accordance with the provisions of the Hong Kong Basic Law, the principle that the Chief Executive has to be a person who loves the country and loves Hong Kong must be upheld. This is a basic requirement of the policy of “one country, two systems”. It is determined by the legal status as well as important functions and duties of the Chief Executive, and is called for by the actual need to maintain long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and uphold the sovereignty, security and development interests of the country. The method for selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage must provide corresponding institutional safeguards for this purpose.
The Session is of the view that the amendments made to the method for forming the fifth term Legislative Council in 2012 represented major strides towards the direction of enhancing democracy. The existing formation method and voting procedures for the Legislative Council as prescribed in Annex II to the Hong Kong Basic Law will not be amended, and will continue to apply in respect of the sixth term Legislative Council in 2016. This is consistent with the principle of gradual and orderly progress in developing a democratic system that suits Hong Kong’s actual situation and conforms to the majority view in the Hong Kong community. It also helps the various sectors of the Hong Kong community to focus their efforts on addressing the issues concerning universal suffrage for selecting the Chief Executive first, thus creating the conditions for attaining the aim of electing all the members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage after the implementation of universal suffrage for the selection of the Chief Executive.
Accordingly, pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China and the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress makes the following decision:
I. Starting from 2017, the selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage.
II. When the selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is implemented by the method of universal suffrage:
(1) A broadly representative nominating committee shall be formed. The provisions for the number of members, composition and formation method of the nominating committee shall be made in accordance with the number of members, composition and formation method of the Election Committee for the Fourth Chief Executive.
(2) The nominating committee shall nominate two to three candidates for the office of Chief Executive in accordance with democratic procedures. Each candidate must have the endorsement of more than half of all the members of the nominating committee.
(3) All eligible electors of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region have the right to vote in the election of the Chief Executive and elect one of the candidates for the office of Chief Executive in accordance with law.
(4) The Chief Executive-elect, after being selected through universal suffrage, will have to be appointed by the Central People’s Government.
III. The specific method of universal suffrage for selecting the Chief Executive shall be prescribed in accordance with legal procedures through amending Annex I to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China: The Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The bill on the amendments and the proposed amendments to such bill shall be introduced by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the Hong Kong Basic Law and the provisions of this Decision. Such amendments shall obtain the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Legislative Council and the consent of the Chief Executive before being submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for approval.
IV. If the specific method of universal suffrage for selecting the Chief Executive is not adopted in accordance with legal procedures, the method used for selecting the Chief Executive for the preceding term shall continue to apply.
V. The existing formation method and voting procedures for the Legislative Council as prescribed in Annex II to the Hong Kong Basic Law will not be amended. The formation method and procedures for voting on bills and motions of the fifth term Legislative Council will continue to apply to the sixth term Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2016. After the election of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage, the election of all the members of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage. At an appropriate time prior to the election of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage, the Chief Executive elected by universal suffrage shall submit a report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Hong Kong Basic Law and the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China as regards the issue of amending the method for forming the Legislative Council. A determination thereon shall be made by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.
The Session stresses that it is the consistent position of the central authorities to implement resolutely and firmly the principles of “one country, two systems”, “Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong” and a high degree of autonomy, strictly adhere to the Hong Kong Basic Law and steadily take forward the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage in 2017. It is hoped that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government and all sectors of the Hong Kong community will act in accordance with the provisions of the Hong Kong Basic Law and this Decision and jointly work towards the attainment of the aim of selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage.
Chapter III: Offences and Penalties
—Part 1: Secession
—Part 2: Subversion
—Part 3: Terrorist Activities
—Part 4: Collusion with a Foreign Country or with External Elements to Endanger National Security
—Part 5: Other Provisions on Penalty
—Part 6: Scope of Application
This Law is enacted, in accordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, and the Decision of the National People's Congress on
Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement Mechanisms for Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, for the purpose of:
ensuring the resolute, full and faithful implementation of the policy of One Country, Two Systems under which
the people of Hong Kong administer Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy;
safeguarding national security;
preventing, suppressing and imposing punishment for the offences of secession, subversion, organisation and perpetration
of terrorist activities, and collusion with a foreign country or with external elements to endanger national security in relation
to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
maintaining prosperity and stability of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; and
protecting the lawful rights and interests of the residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Article 2
The provisions in Articles 1 and 12 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on the legal status of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region are the fundamental provisions in the Basic Law. No institution, organisation or individual
in the Region shall contravene these provisions in exercising their rights and freedoms.
Article 3
The Central People's Government has an overarching responsibility for national security affairs relating to the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
It is the duty of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under the Constitution to safeguard national security and the Region
shall perform the duty accordingly.
The executive authorities, legislature and judiciary of the Region shall effectively prevent, suppress and impose punishment for any
act or activity endangering national security in accordance with this Law and other relevant laws.
Article 4
Human rights shall be respected and protected in safeguarding national security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
The rights and freedoms, including the freedoms of speech, of the press, of publication, of association, of assembly, of procession and of
demonstration, which the residents of the Region enjoy under the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
as applied to Hong Kong, shall be protected in accordance with the law.
Article 5
The principle of the rule of law shall be adhered to in preventing, suppressing, and imposing punishment for offences endangering national
security. A person who commits an act which constitutes an offence under the law shall be convicted and punished in accordance with the law. No
one shall be convicted and punished for an act which does not constitute an offence under the law.
A person is presumed innocent until convicted by a judicial body. The right to defend himself or herself and other rights in judicial proceedings
that a criminal suspect, defendant, and other parties in judicial proceedings are entitled to under the law shall be protected. No one shall be liable to
be tried or punished again for an offence for which he or she has already been finally convicted or acquitted in judicial proceedings.
Article 6
It is the common responsibility of all the people of China, including the people of Hong Kong, to safeguard the sovereignty, unification and
territorial integrity of the People's Republic of China.
Any institution, organisation or individual in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall abide by this Law and the laws of the Region
in relation to the safeguarding of national security, and shall not engage in any act or activity which endangers national security.
A resident of the Region who stands for election or assumes public office shall confirm in writing or take an oath to uphold the Basic Law of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China and swear allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People's Republic of China in accordance with the law.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall complete, as early as possible, legislation for safeguarding national security as stipulated
in the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and shall refine relevant laws.
Article 8
In order to safeguard national security effectively, the law enforcement and judicial authorities of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
shall fully enforce this Law and the laws in force in the Region concerning the prevention of, suppression of, and imposition of punishment for acts
and activities endangering national security.
Article 9
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall strengthen its work on safeguarding national security and prevention of terrorist activities.
The government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall take necessary measures to strengthen public communication, guidance,
supervision and regulation over matters concerning national security, including those relating to schools, universities, social organisations, the media,
and the internet.
Article 10
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall promote national security education in schools and universities and through social
organisations, the media, the internet and other means to raise the awareness of Hong Kong residents of national security and of the obligation
to abide by the law.
Article 11
The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be accountable to the Central People's Government for affairs
relating to safeguarding national security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and shall submit an annual report on the performance
of duties of the Region in safeguarding national security.
The Chief Executive shall, at the request of the Central People's Government, submit in a timely manner a report on specific matters relating
to safeguarding national security.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall establish the Committee for Safeguarding National Security. The Committee shall be
responsible for affairs relating to and assume primary responsibility for safeguarding national security in the Region. It shall be under the supervision
of and accountable to the Central People's Government.
Article 13
The Chief Executive shall be the chairperson of the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. The other members of the Committee shall be the Chief Secretary for Administration, the Financial Secretary, the Secretary for Justice,
the Secretary for Security, the Commissioner of Police, the head of the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force
established under Article 16 of this Law, the Director of Immigration, the Commissioner of Customs and Excise, and the Director of the Chief Executive's
Office.
A secretariat headed by a Secretary-General shall be established under the Committee. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the
Central People's Government upon nomination by the Chief Executive.
Article 14
The duties and functions of the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be:
(1) analysing and assessing developments in relation to safeguarding national security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, making
work plans, and formulating policies for safeguarding national security in the Region;
(2) advancing the development of the legal system and enforcement mechanisms of the Region for safeguarding national security; and
(3) coordinating major work and significant operations for safeguarding national security in the Region.
No institution, organisation or individual in the Region shall interfere with the work of the Committee. Information relating to the work of the
Committee shall not be subject to disclosure. Decisions made by the Committee shall not be amenable to judicial review.
Article 15
The Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have a National Security Adviser, who
shall be designated by the Central People's Government and provide advice on matters relating to the duties and functions of the Committee. The
National Security Adviser shall sit in on meetings of the Committee.
Article 16
The Police Force of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall establish a department for safeguarding national security with law
enforcement capacity.
The head of the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force shall be appointed by the Chief Executive.
The Chief Executive shall seek in writing the opinion of the Office established under Article 48 of this Law before making the appointment. When
assuming office, the head of the Department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force shall swear to uphold the Basic Law
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, swear allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of the People's Republic of China, and swear to abide by the law and to observe the obligation of secrecy.
The department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force may recruit qualified professionals and technical personnel from
outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to provide assistance in the performance of duties for safeguarding national security.
Article 17
The duties and functions of the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force shall be:
(1) collecting and analysing intelligence and information concerning national security;
(2) planning, coordinating and enforcing measures and operations for safeguarding national security;
(3) investigating offences endangering national security;
(4) conducting counter-interference investigation and national security review;
(5) carrying out tasks of safeguarding national security assigned by the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region; and
(6) performing other duties and functions necessary for the enforcement of this Law.
Article 18
The Department of Justice of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall establish a specialised prosecution division responsible
for the prosecution of offences endangering national security and other related legal work. The prosecutors of this division shall be appointed by
the Secretary for Justice after obtaining the consent of the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region.
The head of the specialised prosecution division of the Department of Justice shall be appointed by the Chief Executive, who shall seek in writing
the opinion of the Office established under Article 48 of this Law before making the appointment. When assuming office, the head of the specialised
prosecution division shall swear to uphold the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, swear
allegiance to the Hong Kong Special administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, and swear to abide by the law and to observe the obligation
of secrecy.
Article 19
The Financial Secretary of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, upon approval of the Chief Executive, appropriate from the general
revenue a special fund to meet the expenditure for safeguarding national security and approve the establishment of relevant posts, which are not subject
to any restrictions in the relevant provisions of the laws in force in the Region. The Financial Secretary shall submit an annual report on the control and
management of the fund for this purpose to the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
A person who organises, plans, commits or participates in any of the following acts, whether or not by force or threat of force, with a view to
committing secession or undermining national unification shall be guilty of an offence:
(1) separating the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or any other part of the People's Republic of China from the People's Republic
of China;
(2) altering by unlawful means the legal status of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or of any other part of the People's Republic
of China; or
(3) surrendering the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or any other part of the People's Republic of China to a foreign country.
A person who is a principal offender or a person who commits an offence of a grave nature shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or fixed-term
imprisonment of not less than ten years; a person who actively participates in the offence shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less
than three years but not more than ten years; and other participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years,
short-term detention or restriction.
Article 21
A person who incites, assists in, abets or provides pecuniary or other financial assistance or property for the commission by other persons of
the offence under Article 20 of this Law shall be guilty of an offence. If the circumstances of the offence committed by a person are of a serious
nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than ten years; if the circumstances of the
offence committed by a person are of a minor nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, short-term
detention or restriction.
A person who organises, plans, commits or participates in any of the following acts by force or threat of force or other unlawful means with a
view to subverting the State power shall be guilty of an offence:
(1) overthrowing or undermining the basic system of the People's Republic of China established by the Constitution of the People's Republic
of China;
(2) overthrowing the body of central power of the People's Republic of China or the body of power of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
(3) seriously interfering in, disrupting, or undermining the performance of duties and functions in accordance with the law by the body of central
power of the People's Republic of China or the body of power of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; or
(4) attacking or damaging the premises and facilities used by the body of power of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to perform
its duties and functions, rendering it incapable of performing its normal duties and functions.
A person who is a principal offender or a person who commits an offence of a grave nature shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or
fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years; a person who actively participates in the offence shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment
of not less than three years but not more than ten years; and other participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three
years, short-term detention or restriction.
Article 23
A person who incites, assists in, abets or provides pecuniary or other financial assistance or property for the commission by other persons of
the offence under Article 22 of this Law shall be guilty of an offence. If the circumstances of the offence committed by a person are of a serious
nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than ten years; if the circumstances of the
offence committed by a person are of a minor nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, short-term
detention or restriction.
A person who organises, plans, commits, participates in or threatens to commit any of the following terrorist activities causing or intended to
cause grave harm to the society with a view to coercing the Central People's Government, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region or an international organisation or intimidating the public in order to pursue political agenda shall be guilty of an offence:
(1) serious violence against a person or persons;
(2) explosion, arson, or dissemination of poisonous or radioactive substances, pathogens of infectious diseases or other substances;
(3) sabotage of means of transport, transport facilities, electric power or gas facilities, or other combustible or explosible facilities;
(4) serious interruption or sabotage of electronic control systems for providing and managing public services such as water, electric power,
gas, transport, telecommunications and the internet; or
(5) other dangerous activities which seriously jeopardise public health, safety or security.
A person who commits the offence causing serious bodily injury, death or significant loss of public or private property shall be sentenced to
life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years; in other circumstances, a person who commits the offence shall be sentenced
to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years.
Article 25
A person who organises or takes charge of a terrorist organisation shall be guilty of an offence and shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or
fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years, and shall be subject to confiscation of property; a person who actively participates in a terrorist
organisation shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years and shall be imposed with a
criminal fine; and other participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, short-term detention or restriction,
and shall be liable to a criminal fine.
For the purpose of this Law, a terrorist organisation means an organisation which commits or intends to commit the offence under Article 24 of
this Law or participates or assists in the commission of the offence.
Article 26
A person who provides support, assistance or facility such as training, weapons, information, funds, supplies, labour, transport, technologies
or venues to a terrorist organisation or a terrorist, or for the commission of a terrorist activity; or manufactures or illegally possesses substances such
as explosive, poisonous or radioactive substances and pathogens of infectious diseases or uses other means to prepare for the commission of a
terrorist activity, shall be guilty of an offence. If the circumstances of the offence committed by a person are of a serious nature, the person shall be
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than ten years, and shall be imposed with a criminal fine or subject to
confiscation of property; in other circumstances, a person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, short-term detention
or restriction, and shall be imposed with a criminal fine.
If the act referred to in the preceding paragraph also constitutes other offences, the person who commits the act shall be convicted and sentenced
for the offence that carries a more severe penalty.
Article 27
A person who advocates terrorism or incites the commission of a terrorist activity shall be guilty of an offence. If the circumstances of the offence
committed by a person are of a serious nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than
ten years, and shall be imposed with a criminal fine or subject to confiscation of property; in other circumstances, a person shall be sentenced to
fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, short-term detention or restriction, and shall be imposed with a criminal fine.
Article 28
The provisions of this Part shall not affect the prosecution of terrorist offences committed in other forms or the imposition of other measures such
as freezing of property in accordance with the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Part 4: Collusion with a Foreign Country or with External Elements to Endanger National Security
Article 29
A person who steals, spies, obtains with payment, or unlawfully provides State secrets or intelligence concerning national security for a foreign
country or an institution, organisation or individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People's Republic of China shall be guilty of
an offence; a person who requests a foreign country or an institution, organisation or individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the
People's Republic of China, or conspires with a foreign country or an institution, organisation or individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong and
Macao of the People's Republic of China, or directly or indirectly receives instructions, control, funding or other kinds of support from a foreign country
or an institution, organisation or individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People's Republic of China, to commit any of the
following acts shall be guilty of an offence:
(1) waging a war against the People's Republic of China, or using or threatening to use force to seriously undermine the sovereignty, unification
and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of China;
(2) seriously disrupting the formulation and implementation of laws or policies by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
or by the Central People's Government, which is likely to cause serious consequences;
(3) rigging or undermining an election in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which is likely to cause serious consequences;
(4) imposing sanctions or blockade, or engaging in other hostile activities against the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or the
People's Republic of China; or
(5) provoking by unlawful means hatred among Hong Kong residents towards the Central People's Government or the Government of the
Region, which is likely to cause serious consequences.
A person who commits the offence shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years;
a person who commits an offence of a grave nature shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years.
The institution, organisation and individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People's Republic of China referred to in the first
paragraph of this Article shall be convicted and punished for the same offence.
Article 30
A person who conspires with or directly or indirectly
receives instructions, control, funding or other kinds of support from a
foreign country or an institution, organisation, or individual outside the
mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People's Republic of China to commit the
offences under Article 20 or 22 of this Law shall be liable to a more severe
penalty in accordance with the provisions therein respectively.
An incorporated or unincorporated body such as a company or an organisation which commits an offence under this Law shall be imposed
with a criminal fine.
The operation of an incorporated or unincorporated body such as a company or an organisation shall be suspended or its licence or business
permit shall be revoked if the body has been punished for committing an offence under this Law.
Article 32
Proceeds obtained from the commission of an offence under this Law including financial aid, gains and rewards, and funds and tools used or
intended to be used in the commission of the offence shall be seized and confiscated.
Article 33
A lighter penalty may be imposed, or the penalty may be reduced or, in the case of a minor offence, exempted, if an offender, criminal suspect,
or defendant:
(1) in the process of committing an offence, voluntarily discontinues the commission of the offence or voluntarily and effectively forestalls its
consequences;
(2) voluntarily surrenders himself or herself and gives a truthful account of the offence; or
(3) reports on the offence committed by other person, which is verified to be true, or provides material information which assists in solving other
criminal case.
Sub-paragraph (2) of the preceding paragraph shall apply to a criminal suspect or defendant who is subjected to mandatory measures and
provides a truthful account of other offences committed by him or her under this Law which are unknown to the law enforcement or judicial authorities.
Article 34
A person who is not a permanent resident of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may be subject to deportation as the sole or an
additional punishment if he or she commits an offence under this Law.
A person who is not a permanent resident of the Region may be subject to deportation if he or she contravenes the provisions of this Law but
is not prosecuted for any reason.
Article 35
A person who is convicted of an offence endangering national security by a court shall be disqualified from standing as a candidate in the elections
of the Legislative Council and district councils of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, holding any public office in the Region, or serving as
a member of the Election Committee for electing the Chief Executive. If a person so convicted is a member of the Legislative Council, a government
official, a public servant, a member of the Executive Council, a judge or a judicial officer, or a member of the district councils, who has taken an oath or
made a declaration to uphold the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China and swear allegiance to
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, he or she shall be removed from his or her office upon conviction, and
shall be disqualified from standing for the aforementioned elections or from holding any of the aforementioned posts.
The disqualification and removal from offices referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be announced by the authorities responsible for
organising and managing the relevant elections or for the appointment and removal of holders of public office.
This Law shall apply to offences under this Law which are committed in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by any person. An offence
shall be deemed to have been committed in the Region if an act constituting the offence or the consequence of the offence occurs in the Region.
This Law shall also apply to offences under this Law committed on board a vessel or aircraft registered in the Region.
Article 37
This Law shall apply to a person who is a permanent resident of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or an incorporated or
unincorporated body such as a company or an organisation which is set up in the Region if the person or the body commits an offence under
this Law outside the Region.
Article 38
This Law shall apply to offences under this Law committed against the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region from outside the Region
by a person who is not a permanent resident of the Region.
Article 39
This Law shall apply to acts committed after its entry into force for the purpose of conviction and imposition of punishment.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have jurisdiction over cases concerning offences under this Law, except under
the circumstances specified in Article 55 of this Law.
Article 41
This Law and the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall apply to procedural matters, including those related to criminal
investigation, prosecution, trial, and execution of penalty, in respect of cases concerning offence endangering national security over which the
Region exercises jurisdiction.
No prosecution shall be instituted in respect of an offence endangering national security without the written consent of the Secretary for Justice.
This provision shall not prejudice the arrest and detention of a person who is suspected of having committed the offence or the application for bail
by the person in accordance with the law.
Cases concerning offence endangering national security within the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be tried
on indictment.
The trial shall be conducted in an open court. When circumstances arise such as the trial involving State secrets or public order, all or part of the
trial shall be closed to the media and the public but the judgment shall be delivered in an open court.
Article 42
When applying the laws in force in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region concerning matters such as the detention and time limit for
trial, the law enforcement and judicial authorities of the Region shall ensure that cases concerning offence endangering national security are handled
in a fair and timely manner so as to effectively prevent, suppress and impose punishment for such offence.
No bail shall be granted to a criminal suspect or defendant unless the judge has sufficient grounds for believing that the criminal suspect or
defendant will not continue to commit acts endangering national security.
Article 43
When handling cases concerning offence endangering national security, the department for safeguarding national security of the Police Force of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may take measures that law enforcement authorities, including the Hong Kong Police Force, are allowed
to apply under the laws in force in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in investigating serious crimes, and may also take the following measures:
(1) search of premises, vehicles, vessels, aircraft and other relevant places and electronic devices that may contain evidence of an offence;
(2) ordering any person suspected of having committed an offence endangering national security to surrender travel documents, or prohibiting
the person concerned from leaving the Region;
(3) freezing of, applying for restraint order, charging order and confiscation order in respect of, and forfeiture of property used or intended to be
used for the commission of the offence, proceeds of crime, or other property relating to the commission of the offence;
(4) requiring a person who published information or the relevant service provider to delete the information or provide assistance;
(5) requiring a political organisation of a foreign country or outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People's Republic of China, or
an agent of authorities or a political organisation of a foreign country or outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People's Republic of
China, to provide information;
(6) upon approval of the Chief Executive, carrying out interception of communications and conducting covert surveillance on a person who is
suspected, on reasonable grounds, of having involved in the commission of an offence endangering national security; and
(7) requiring a person, who is suspected, on reasonable grounds, of having in possession information or material relevant to investigation, to
answer questions and furnish such information or produce such material.
The Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be responsible for supervising the
implementation of the measures stipulated in the first paragraph of this Article by law enforcement authorities including the department for safeguarding
national security of the Hong Kong Police Force.
The Chief Executive shall be authorised, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, to make relevant implementation rules for the purpose of applying the measures under the first paragraph of this Article.
Article 44
The Chief Executive shall designate a number of judges from the magistrates, the judges of the District Court, the judges of the Court of First
Instance and the Court of Appeal of the High Court, and the judges of the Court of Final Appeal, and may also designate a number of judges from
deputy judges or recorders, to handle cases concerning offence endangering national security. Before making such designation, the Chief Executive
may consult the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Chief Justice of the Court of
Final Appeal. The term of office of the aforementioned designated judges shall be one year.
A person shall not be designated as a judge to adjudicate a case concerning offence endangering national security if he or she has made any
statement or behaved in any manner endangering national security. A designated judge shall be removed from the designation list if he or she makes
any statement or behaves in any manner endangering national security during the term of office.
The proceedings in relation to the prosecution for offences endangering national security in the magistrates' courts, the District Court, the High Court
and the Court of Final Appeal shall be handled by the designated judges in the respective courts.
Article 45
Unless otherwise provided by this Law, magistrates' courts, the District Court, the High Court and the Court of Final Appeal shall handle proceedings
in relation to the prosecution for offences endangering national security in accordance with the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Article 46
In criminal proceedings in the Court of First Instance of the High Court concerning offences endangering national security, the Secretary for Justice
may issue a certificate directing that the case shall be tried without a jury on the grounds of, among others, the protection of State secrets, involvement
of foreign factors in the case, and the protection of personal safety of jurors and their family members. Where the Secretary for Justice has issued the
certificate, the case shall be tried in the Court of First Instance without a jury by a panel of three judges.
Where the Secretary for Justice has issued the certificate, the reference to "a jury" or "a verdict of the jury" in any provision of the laws of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region applicable to the related proceedings shall be construed as referring to the judges or the functions of
the judge as a judge of fact.
Article 47
The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall obtain a certificate from the Chief Executive to certify whether an act involves
national security or whether the relevant evidence involves State secrets when such questions arise in the adjudication of a case. The certificate shall
be binding on the courts.
The Central People's Government shall establish in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region an office for safeguarding national security.
The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall perform its
mandate for safeguarding national security and exercise relevant powers in accordance with the law.
The staff of the Office shall be jointly dispatched by relevant national security authorities under the Central People's Government.
Article 49
The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall perform
the following mandate:
(1) analysing and assessing developments in relation to safeguarding national security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and providing
opinions and making proposals on major strategies and important policies for safeguarding national security;
(2) overseeing, guiding, coordinating with, and providing support to the Region in the performance of its duties for safeguarding national security;
(3) collecting and analysing intelligence and information concerning national security; and
(4) handling cases concerning offence endangering national security in accordance with the law.
Article 50
The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall perform
its mandate in strict compliance with the law and be subject to supervision in accordance with the law. It shall not infringe upon the lawful rights and
interests of any individual or organisation.
The staff of the Office shall abide by the laws of the Hong Kong Special administrative Region as well as national laws.
The staff of the Office shall be subject to the supervision of the national supervisory authorities in accordance with the law.
Article 51
The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be
funded by the Central People's Government.
Article 52
The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall strengthen
working relations and cooperation with the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Office
of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the Hong Kong Garrison of the Chinese
People's Liberation Army.
Article 53
The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall establish
a mechanism of coordination with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to oversee and
provide guidance on the work of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for safeguarding national security.
The working departments of the Office shall establish mechanisms for collaboration with the relevant authorities of the Region responsible for
Safeguarding national security to enhance information sharing and operations coordination.
Article 54
The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Office
of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Hong Kong Special administrative Region shall, together with the Government of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, take necessary measures to strengthen the management of and services for organs of foreign countries and
international organisations in the Region, as well as non-governmental organisations and news agencies of foreign countries and from outside the
mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao of the People's Republic of China in the Region.
Article 55
The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, upon
approval by the Central People's Government of a request made by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or by the Office
itself, exercise jurisdiction over a case concerning offence endangering national security under this Law, if:
(1) the case is complex due to the involvement of a foreign country or external elements, thus making it difficult for the Region to exercise jurisdiction
over the case;
(2) a serious situation occurs where the Government of the Region is unable to effectively enforce this Law; or
(3) a major and imminent threat to national security has occurred.
Article 56
In exercising jurisdiction over a case concerning offence endangering national security pursuant to Article 55 of this Law, the Office for Safeguarding
National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall initiate investigation into the case, the
Supreme People's Procuratorate shall designate a prosecuting body to prosecute it, and the Supreme People's Court shall designate a court to
adjudicate it.
Article 57
The Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China and other related national laws shall apply to procedural matters, including those
related to criminal investigation, examination and prosecution, trial, and execution of penalty, in respect of cases over which jurisdiction is exercised
pursuant to Article 55 of this Law.
When exercising jurisdiction over cases pursuant to Article 55 of this Law, the law enforcement and judicial authorities referred to in Article 56 of
this Law shall exercise powers in accordance with the law. The legal documents issued by these authorities on their decisions to take mandatory and
investigation measures and on their judicial decisions shall have legal force in the Hong Kong Special administrative Region. The institutions, organisations
and individuals concerned must comply with measures taken by the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the law.
Article 58
In a case over which jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to Article 55 of this Law, a criminal suspect shall have the right to retain a lawyer to represent
him or her from the day he or she first receives inquiry made by the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the
Hong Kong Special administrative Region or from the day a mandatory measure is taken against him or her. A defence lawyer may provide legal assistance
to a criminal suspect or defendant in accordance with the law.
A criminal suspect or defendant who is arrested in accordance with the law shall be entitled to a fair trial before a judicial body without undue delay.
Article 59
In a case over which jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to Article 55 of this Law, any person who has information pertaining to an offence endangering
national security under this Law is obliged to testify truthfully.
Article 60
The acts performed in the course of duty by the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region and its staff in accordance with this Law shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region.
In the course of performing duty, a holder of an identification document or a document of certification issued by the Office and the articles including
vehicles used by the holder shall not be subject to inspection, search or detention by law enforcement officers of the Region.
The Office and its staff shall enjoy other rights and immunities provided by laws of the Region.
Article 61
The relevant departments of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall provide necessary facilitation and support
to the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in performing
its mandate in accordance with this Law, and shall stop any act obstructing the performance of such mandate and hold those who commit such act
liable in accordance with the law.
This Law shall prevail where provisions of the local laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region are inconsistent with this Law.
Article 63
The law enforcement and judicial authorities and their staff who handle cases concerning offence endangering national security under this Law,
or the law enforcement and judicial authorities of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and their staff who handle other cases concerning
offence endangering national security, shall keep confidential State secrets, trade secrets or personal information which they come to know in the
process of handling such cases.
A lawyer who serves as defence counsel or legal representative shall keep confidential State secrets, trade secrets or personal information which
he or she comes to know in the practice of law.
The relevant institutions, organisations and individuals who assist with the handling of a case shall keep confidential any information pertaining to
the case.
Article 64
In the application of this Law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the terms "fixed-term imprisonment", "life imprisonment",
"confiscation of property" and "criminal fine" in this Law respectively mean "imprisonment", "imprisonment for life", "confiscation of proceeds of
crime" and "fine"; "short-term detention" shall be construed, with reference to the relevant laws of the Region, as "imprisonment", "detention in a
detention centre" or "detention in a training centre"; "restriction" shall be construed, with reference to the relevant laws of the Region, as "community
service" or "detention in a reformatory school"; and "revoke licence or business permit" means "revoke registration or exemption from registration,
or revoke licence" as provided for in the relevant laws of the Region.
Article 65
The power of interpretation of this Law shall be vested in the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.
Article 66
This Law shall come into force on the date of its promulgation.
Following the promulgation of the law on June 30, 2020, the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the
Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (zhongyang renmin zhengfu zhu Xianggang
tebie xingzhengqu weihu guojia anquan gongshu 中央人民政府駐香港特别行政區維護國家安全公署, abbrev. CPGNSO)
was established on July 8, 2020 to ensure and supervise the implementation of the law. The office is not subject to
Hong Kong jurisdiction, and Zheng Yanxiong 鄭雁雄 (b. 1963, Guangdong) was appointed as its inaugural director
(shuzhang 署長).
The source for the English text of the HKSAR National Security Law as shown above is the PRC's
Xinhuanet.
IMPLEMENTATION RULES FOR ARTICLE 43 OF THE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON SAFEGUARDING
NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Implementation Rules) were gazetted today (July 6) and will take effect on July 7.
The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) passed on June 30 the Law of the People's Republic of China
on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (the National Security Law) and listed the legislation in
Annex III to the Basic Law in accordance with the procedures under Article 18 of the Basic Law. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(HKSAR) Government promulgated the National Security Law in the gazette for implementation at 11pm the same day. Article 43 of the National
Security Law stipulates various measures that the department for safeguarding national security of the Police Force of HKSAR may take when
handling cases concerning offence endangering national security, and authorises the Chief Executive of the HKSAR, in conjunction with the
Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the HKSAR (National Security Committee) to make relevant implementation rules for the
purpose of applying the measures stipulated under Article 43.
At the first meeting of the National Security Committee today, the Chief Executive, in conjunction with the National Security Committee,
exercised the power under Article 43 of the National Security Law to make relevant implementation rules for law enforcement agencies such as
the department for Safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force to implement the measures stipulated under Article 43. The
Implementation Rules provide for rules that relevant officers should observe when carrying out the specific measures concerned to prevent,
suppress and impose punishment for offences endangering national security, and relevant offences and penalties for the effective implementation
of the measures, so as to improve the enforcement mechanisms for the HKSAR to safeguard national security.
The Government spokesman pointed out that the aforementioned Implementation Rules, formulated for the exercise of various measures by
relevant officers, clearly set out in detail the procedural requirements, circumstances that must be met and conditions for approval, etc. when
implementing those measures. The purpose is to ensure that when relevant officers exercise powers and apply measures under Article 43 of
the National Security Law to enforce the Law, the objectives of preventing, suppressing and imposing punishment for any acts and activities
endangering national security can be achieved, while the requirement under the General Principles of the National Security Law to respect and
protect human rights, as well as the protection of various rights and freedom in accordance with the law can be complied with.
The Implementation Rules have the force of law, and details are as follows:
1. Search of Places for Evidence
The relevant rules are formulated with reference to various existing ordinances regarding the permission to conduct urgent search under
exceptional circumstances, including the Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance (Cap. 238) and the Import and Export Ordinance (Cap. 60). For
investigation of an offence endangering national security, a police officer may apply to a magistrate for a warrant to enter and search a place for
evidence. Under exceptional circumstances (for instance, in urgent situations), a police officer not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner of
Police may authorise his officers to enter the relevant place to search for evidence without a warrant.
2. Restriction on Persons under Investigation from Leaving Hong Kong
With reference to provisions under the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Cap. 201) which restrict a person under investigation from leaving
Hong Kong, the rules authorise police officers to apply to a magistrate for a warrant to require a person who is suspected to have committed
offences endangering national security to surrender his travel document, and to restrict that person from leaving Hong Kong, lest some of the
persons involved in the case abscond overseas. A person who has surrendered a travel document may make application in writing to the
Commissioner of Police or to a magistrate for its return and for permission to leave Hong Kong.
3. Freezing, Restraint, Confiscation and Forfeiture of Property Related to Offences Endangering National Security
The arrangements concerned are formulated with reference to the existing powers and provisions under the Organized and Serious Crimes
Ordinance (Cap. 455) and the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Ordinance (Cap. 575). If the Secretary for Security has reasonable
grounds to suspect that any property is property related to an offence endangering national security, he may, by notice in writing, direct that a
person must not deal with the property. The Court of First Instance may, on the application by the Secretary for Justice, order the confiscation
of the property related to the offence. Anyone who knows or suspects that any property is property related to an offence endangering national
security is obliged to make a disclosure to the Police Force as soon as is reasonably practicable, and must not disclose to another person any
information which is likely to prejudice any investigation which might be conducted following that first-mentioned disclosure. In addition, the Secretary
for Justice may make an application to the Court of First Instance for a restraint order or charging order to prohibit any person from dealing with any
realisable property, or impose on any realisable property that is specified in the order a charge for securing the payment of money to the Government.
Furthermore, the Secretary for Justice may also make an application to the court for confiscating the proceeds arising from an offence endangering
national security and ordering the amount due be paid within a fixed period.
4. Removal of Messages Endangering National Security and Request for Assistance
If the Commissioner of Police has reasonable grounds to suspect that an electronic message published on an electronic platform is likely to
constitute an offence endangering national security or is likely to cause the occurrence of an offence endangering national security, he may, with
the approval of the Secretary for Security, authorise a designated police officer to request the relevant message publisher(s), platform service
provider(s), hosting service provider(s) and/or network service provider(s) to remove the message; restrict or cease access by any person to
the message; or restrict or cease access by any person to the platform or its relevant part(s). It is a reasonable defence if the technology
necessary for complying with the requirement was not reasonably available to the publisher or relevant service provider; or there was a risk
of incurring substantial loss to, or otherwise substantially prejudicing the right of, a third party.
If the publisher fails to cooperate immediately, and the relevant information on the Internet will continue to seriously affect members of the
public, police officers may apply to the magistrate for a warrant to seize the relevant electronic device and take any action for removing that
information as soon as practicable. Relevant officers may also apply to the magistrate for a warrant under specific circumstances to authorise
police officers to request the relevant service provider to provide the identification record or decryption assistance as the case requires.
5. Requiring Foreign and Taiwan Political Organisations and Agents to Provide Information on Activities Concerning
Hong Kong
If the Commissioner of Police reasonably believes that it is necessary for the prevention and investigation of an offence endangering national
security, the Commissioner of Police may, with the approval of the Secretary for Security, by written notice served on a foreign political organisation
or Taiwan political organisation, or a foreign agent or a Taiwan agent, require the organisation or agent to provide the Commissioner of Police with
the prescribed information (including the activities, the personal particulars, as well as the assets, income, sources of income, and expenditure of the
organisation in Hong Kong) in a prescribed manner within the specified period. The relevant rules are formulated with reference to the prevailing
provisions of the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151) under which Societies Officers may request the provision of information from societies.
6. Application on Authorisation for Interception of Communications and Covert Surveillance
To effectively prevent and detect offences endangering national security and protect the confidentiality of information related to national security,
all applications for interception of communications and covert surveillance operations must be approved by the Chief Executive. Applications for the
less intrusive covert surveillance may be made to a directorate officer of the Police Force designated by the Chief Executive. The authorising authority
has to ensure that the covert operation concerned satisfies the proportionality and necessity tests before granting the authorisation. According to Article
43 of the National Security Law, the National Security Committee shall be responsible for supervising the implementation of the stipulated measures by
the Police Force. On the other hand, the Implementation Rules provide that the Chief Executive may appoint an independent person to assist the
National Security Committee in performing the aforementioned supervising responsibility. Furthermore, the Secretary for Security issues Operating
Principles and Guidelines for the purpose of providing operating principles and guidance to officers of the HKPF regarding the making of relevant
applications and the exercise of powers. Officers of the HKPF are required to comply with the provisions in the Operating Principles and Guidelines
when performing any function under the relevant rules. The Operating Principles and Guidelines will be gazetted at the same time with the
Implementation Rules.
7. Requirement to Furnish Information and Produce Materials
For the purpose of assisting an investigation into an offence endangering national security or the proceeds obtained with the commission of the
relevant offence, the Secretary for Justice or police officers may apply to the court for an order to require the person concerned to answer questions
within a specified time period, or to furnish or produce the relevant information or material. The provisions are formulated with reference to the
relevant powers and provisions under the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 455) and the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures)
Ordinance (Cap. 575) currently.
To ensure the effective implementation of the above relevant measures, there is also a need to provide in the Implementation Rules relevant
penalties for contravention of the requirements. For instance, if a person who published a message fails to comply with the requirement of the
police to remove the message endangering national security without reasonable excuse, the person is liable on conviction to a fine of $100,000
and to imprisonment for one year. If a service provider fails to comply with the requirement to remove messages endangering national security,
or to restrict or cease access to messages or platforms, or the request to provide assistance, the service provider is liable on conviction to a fine
of $100,000 and to imprisonment for six months. Furthermore, a foreign political organisation or Taiwan political organisation, or a foreign agent
or a Taiwan agent, who fails to provide information as requested by the Police is liable on conviction to a fine of $100,000 and to imprisonment for
six months unless it can prove that it has exercised due diligence and there have been reasons beyond its control. If any information provided is false,
incorrect, or incomplete, the person who provided the information is liable on conviction to a fine of $100,000 and to imprisonment for two years,
unless the person has grounds to believe that the relevant information was true, correct and complete. As for other items, the relevant offences and
defence (if specified) are largely the same as the existing provisions in the laws that the Implementation Rules have made reference to. The provision
of defence provisions under appropriate circumstances provide appropriate defence for people who fail to comply with the requirements. The above
Implementation Rules are in compliance with the requirements concerned under the National Security Law and the Basic Law, including the requirements
concerning the respect and protection of human rights.
Government representatives will attend a joint panel meeting of the Panel on Security, the Panel on Administration of Justice and Legal Services
and the Panel on Constitutional Affairs of the Legislative Council on July 7 to brief Members on the content of National Security Law and the Implementation
Rules.
The English text of the Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on
Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was published in a
press release by
the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
(a) to resolutely, fully and faithfully implement the policy of “one country, two systems” under which the people of Hong Kong administer Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy;
(b) to establish and improve the legal system and enforcement mechanisms for the HKSAR to safeguard national security; and
(c) to prevent, suppress and punish acts and activities endangering national security in accordance with the law, to protect the lawful rights and interests of the residents of the HKSAR and other people in the HKSAR, to ensure the property and investment in the HKSAR are protected by the law, to maintain prosperity and stability of the HKSAR:
AND WHEREAS there are requirements under the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and the following law, decision and interpretation for the HKSAR to perform the constitutional duty to safeguard national security and to improve the law for safeguarding national security in the HKSAR—
(a) the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, including the provisions of Article 23 of that Law;
(b) the Decision of the National People’s Congress on Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement Mechanisms for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to Safeguard National Security (a translation of “《全國人民代表大會關於建立健全香港特別行政區維護國家安全的法律制度和執行機制的決定》”) adopted at the Third Session of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress on 28 May 2020;
(c) the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (a translation of “《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法》”); and
(d) the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 14 and Article 47 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (a translation of “《全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於〈中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法〉第十四條和第四十七條的解釋》”) adopted at the 38th Session of the Standing Committee of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress on 30 December 2022:
AND WHEREAS—
(a) the executive, legislative and judicial authorities of the HKSAR must effectively prevent, suppress and punish acts and activities endangering national security in accordance with the law; and
(b) the residents of the HKSAR must safeguard the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the state; any institution, organization and individual in the HKSAR must abide by the law of the HKSAR applicable for safeguarding national security, must not engage in acts and activities endangering national security, and must provide assistance in accordance with the law in response to a request made by the authorities when conducting the work on safeguarding national security in accordance with the law:
NOW, THEREFORE, it is enacted by the Legislative Council as follows—
Editorial Note: This instrument was not given a chapter number under the Legislation Publication Ordinance (Cap. 614). An unofficial reference number, however, is assigned to this instrument in Hong Kong e-Legislation (https://www.elegislation.gov.hk) for identification purposes. This also enables users to carry out a search by reference to the unofficial reference number.
Short title This Ordinance may be cited as the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance.
2.
Principles of this Ordinance This Ordinance is based on the following principles—
(a) the highest principle of the policy of “one country, two systems” is to safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests;
(b) human rights are to be respected and protected, the rights and freedoms, including the freedoms of speech, of the press and of publication, the freedoms of association, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration, enjoyed under the Basic Law, the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applied to the HKSAR, are to be protected in accordance with the law; and
(c) for acts and activities endangering national security, there must be adherence to active prevention in accordance with the principle of the rule of law, and suppression and punishment in accordance with the law, and accordingly—
(i) a person whose act constitutes an offence under the law is to be convicted and punished in accordance with the law; no one is to be convicted and punished for an act that does not constitute an offence under the law;
(ii) a person is to be presumed innocent before the person is convicted by a judicial authority;
(iii) the right to defend, and other rights in a legal action, enjoyed in accordance with the law by a criminal suspect, defendant and other participants in the action are to be protected; and
(iv) a person who has already been finally convicted or acquitted of an offence in judicial proceedings is not to be tried or punished again for the same act.
3.
Interpretation
(1) In this Ordinance—
Central Authorities (中央) means the body of central power under the constitutional order established by the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, including (but not limited to) the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China and its Standing Committee, the President of the People’s Republic of China, the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China;
Chinese armed force (中國武裝力量) means an armed force of China, that is the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force or the militia;
Court (法院) means any of the following courts or tribunals of the Judiciary of the HKSAR—
(a) the Court of Final Appeal;
(b) the Court of Appeal;
(c) the Court of First Instance;
(d) the Competition Tribunal;
(e) the District Court;
(f) a Magistrates’ Court;
(g) the Lands Tribunal;
(h) the Labour Tribunal;
(i) the Small Claims Tribunal;
(j) the Obscene Articles Tribunal;
(k) the Coroner’s Court;
designated judge (指定法官), in relation to a Court, means a judicial officer designated among the judicial officers of the Court under Article 44 of the HK National Security Law;
external force (境外勢力)—see section 6;
external place (境外) means a region or place outside the HKSAR (other than the Mainland and Macao);
function (職能) includes a power and a duty;
HK National Security Law (《香港國安法》) means the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (a translation of “《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法》”), as applied in the HKSAR under the Promulgation of National Law 2020 (L.N. 136 of 2020)*;
international organization (國際組織) means—
(a) an organization the members of which include 2 or more countries, regions, places, or entities entrusted with functions by any country, region or place; or
(b) an organization established by or under a treaty, convention or agreement made by 2 or more countries, regions or places, and includes an institution (however described) under the organization;
judicial officer (司法人員) means—
(a) a judicial officer holding a judicial office specified in Schedule 1 to the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission Ordinance (Cap. 92); or
(b) a judicial officer appointed by the Chief Justice.
(2) In this Ordinance, a reference to a case concerning national security includes—
(a) a case in connection with an offence endangering national security;
(b) a case in connection with any measures taken for, or in connection with, safeguarding national security, whether under the HK National Security Law, this Ordinance or any other law; and
(c) any proceedings in connection with the case mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b).
Editorial Note: * See Instrument A302.
4.
Meaning of national security
In this Ordinance or any other Ordinance, a reference to national security is a reference to the status in which the state’s political regime, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major interests of the state are relatively free from danger and internal or external threats, and the capability to maintain a sustained status of security.
Note—See Article 2 of the National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China (a translation of “《中華人民共和國國家安全法》”)—“National security means the status in which the state’s political regime, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major interests of the state are relatively free from danger and internal or external threats, and the capability to maintain a sustained status of security.” (a translation of “國家安全是指國家政權、主權、統一和領土完整、人民福祉、經濟社會可持續發展和國家其他重大利益相對處於沒有危險和不受內外威脅的狀態,以及保障持續安全狀態的能力。”).
5.
Meaning of colluding with external force
For the purposes of an offence under this Ordinance, a person colludes with an external force to do an act if one or more of the following circumstances exist—
(a) the person participates in an activity planned or otherwise led by an external force, and the act is an act that the person’s participation in the activity involves;
(b) the person does the act on behalf of an external force;
(c) the person does the act in cooperation with an external force;
(d) the person does the act under the control, supervision or direction of, or on request by, an external force;
(e) the person does the act with the financial contributions, or the support by other means, of an external force.
6.
Meaning of external force
(1) In this Ordinance—external force (境外勢力) means—
(a) a government of a foreign country;
(b) the authority of an external place;
(c) a political party in an external place;
(d) any other organization in an external place that pursues political ends;
(e) an international organization;
(f) a related entity of a government, authority, political party or organization mentioned in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e); or
(g) a related individual of a government, authority, political party, organization or entity mentioned in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f).
(2) In paragraph (f) of the definition of external force in subsection (1), a reference to a related entity of a government or authority is a reference to—
(a) a company that falls within either or both of the following descriptions—
(i) the directors of the company are accustomed, or under an obligation (whether formal or informal), to act in accordance with the directions, instructions or wishes of the government or authority;
(ii) the government or authority is in a position to exercise, by virtue of other factors, substantial control over the company; or
(b) a body that is not a company and that falls within either or both of the following descriptions—
(i) the members of the executive committee (however called) of the body are accustomed, or under an obligation (whether formal or informal), to act in accordance with the directions, instructions or wishes of the government or authority;
(ii) the government or authority is in a position to exercise, by virtue of other factors, substantial control over the body.
(3) In paragraph (f) of the definition of external force in subsection (1), a reference to a related entity of a political party in an external place, any other organization in an external place that pursues political ends or an international organization (the organization) is a reference to—
(a) a company that falls within either or both of the following descriptions—
(i) the directors of the company are accustomed, or under an obligation (whether formal or informal), to act in accordance with the directions, instructions or wishes of the organization;
(ii) the organization is in a position to exercise, by virtue of other factors, substantial control over the company;
(b) a body that is not a company and that falls within either or both of the following descriptions—
(i) the members of the executive committee (however called) of the body are accustomed, or under an obligation (whether formal or informal), to act in accordance with the directions, instructions or wishes of the organization;
(ii) the organization is in a position to exercise, by virtue of other factors, substantial control over the body; or
(c) a body that falls within the following description: the law, constitution, rules or other governing documents by which the body is constituted (or according to which the body operates) contain either or both of the following requirements—
(i) a director, senior officer or employee of the body is required to be a member of the organization;
(ii) any part of the body is required to constitute a part (however called) of the organization.
(4) In paragraph (g) of the definition of external force in subsection (1), a reference to a related individual of a government, authority, political party, organization or entity is a reference to an individual that falls within either or both of the following descriptions—
(a) the individual is accustomed, or under an obligation (whether formal or informal), to act in accordance with the directions, instructions or wishes of the government, authority, political party, organization or entity;
(b) the government, authority, political party, organization or entity is in a position to exercise, by virtue of other factors, substantial control over the individual.
7.
Meaning of offence endangering national security
To avoid doubt, in this Ordinance or any other Ordinance, a reference to an offence endangering national security includes—
(a) the four types of offences under the HK National Security Law (which are the offence of secession, the offence of subversion, the offence of terrorist activities and the offence of collusion with a foreign country or with external elements to endanger national security (a translation of “分裂國家罪、顛覆國家政權罪、恐怖活動罪及勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪”));
(b) the offences under the Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (a translation of “《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法第四十三條實施細則》”)*;
(c) the offences under this Ordinance; and
(d) other offences endangering national security under the law of the HKSAR.
Editorial Note: * See Instrument A303.
8.
Interpretation of other Ordinances etc.
(1) If this Ordinance and another Ordinance would be inconsistent but for this subsection, that other Ordinance is to be read in a way that have the best regard to the object and purposes of this Ordinance.
(2) A reference to the security of the HKSAR (including a phrase that means the same as “security of the HKSAR”) in another Ordinance is to be read as including national security.
(3) If the law of the HKSAR confers any function on a person—
(a) the function is to be read as including a duty to safeguard national security; and
(b) accordingly, any person, in making any decision in the performance of the function, must regard national security as the most important factor, and give appropriate consideration to it accordingly,
and a reference in any Ordinance in connection with such a function is to be read accordingly.
9.
Persons to whom offence provisions apply
Unless otherwise provided in a provision, an offence under this Ordinance applies to every person in the HKSAR. If an offence has extra-territorial effect, the extra-territorial effect is provided in the relevant Part.
(a) joins an external armed force that is at war with China, or is a part of the armed force;
(b) with intent to prejudice the situation of China in a war, assists an enemy at war with China in a war;
(c) levies war against China;
(d) instigates a foreign country or an external armed force to invade China with force; or
(e) with intent to endanger the sovereignty, unity or territorial integrity of China, uses force or threatens to use force,
commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to life imprisonment.
(2) In this section—enemy at war with China (與中國交戰的敵方) includes a government of a foreign country or external armed force that is at war with China;
external armed force (外來武裝力量) means an armed force that does not belong to China.
11.
Publicly manifest intention to commit offence of treason
A Chinese citizen who intends to commit an offence under section 10(1) and publicly manifests such intention commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 14 years.
12.
Requirement on disclosure of commission by others of offence of treason
(1) If a Chinese citizen (the person) knows that another person has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offence under section 10(1) (commission of offence), the person must disclose the commission of offence and the material facts in connection with the commission of offence within the person’s knowledge to a police officer as soon as reasonably practicable after the person knows of the commission of offence, unless the commission of offence has been in the public domain.
(2) A Chinese citizen who contravenes subsection (1) commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 14 years.
(3) This section does not affect any claims, rights or entitlements on the ground of legal professional privilege.
(4) This section provides for the offence of misprision of treason under common law as a statutory provision with appropriate improvements.
13.
Unlawful drilling
(1) If—
(a) a person, without the permission of the Secretary for Security or the Commissioner of Police, provides specified drilling to any other person; or
(b) a person is present, for the purpose of providing specified drilling to any other person, at a meeting held for the purpose of providing specified drilling, and the meeting is held without the permission of the Secretary for Security or the Commissioner of Police, the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.
(2) A person who—
(a) receives specified drilling at a meeting mentioned in subsection (1)(b); or
(b) is present at a meeting mentioned in subsection (1)(b) for the purpose of receiving specified drilling, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 3 years.
(3) A person who, without the permission of the Secretary for Security or the Commissioner of Police—
(a) receives or participates in specified drilling the conduct of which is planned or otherwise led by an external force; or
(b) receives or participates in specified drilling conducted under the control, direction, financial contributions or support of an external force, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 5 years.
(4) A person who, without the permission of the Secretary for Security or the Commissioner of Police—
(a) provides specified drilling in a meeting the holding of which is planned or otherwise led by an external force;
(b) provides specified drilling on behalf of an external force;
(c) provides specified drilling in cooperation with an external force;
(d) provides specified drilling under the control, supervision or direction of, or on request by, an external force; or
(e) provides specified drilling under the financial contributions, or support by other means, of an external force, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.
(5) Subsections (3) and (4) do not apply if—
(a) the specified act is necessary for the person to discharge the person’s duty as a public servant;
(b) the specified drilling is conducted under the law of the HKSAR;
(c) the person is not a Chinese citizen and has the nationality of a foreign country, and the person does the specified act because the person serves in an armed force of a government of the foreign country or serves as a law enforcement officer of a government of the foreign country;
(d) the person has the nationality or residency of a foreign country, and the person does the specified act because the person serves in an armed force of a government of the foreign country for complying with the legal requirement of the foreign country;
(e) China participates in the specified drilling, and the person does the specified act as a serviceman or law enforcement officer; or
(f) the specified drilling is provided by the military, national defence or police department of a government of a foreign country, and the drilling is a part of a course or extra-curricular activity held or arranged by an educational establishment for the students receiving full-time education at the educational establishment.
(6) If—
(a) a person does an act before the commencement* of this section, and the act continues on or after that commencement; or
(b) a person does an act on or after that commencement under an arrangement or agreement made before that commencement, and the person would have committed an offence under subsection (3) or (4) for the act but for this subsection, then the person must not be convicted of the offence for the act.
(7) Where an act is done or continues to be done after the expiry of 6 months after the commencement of this section, subsection (6) does not apply in relation to the act.
(8) In this section—
educational establishment (教育機構)—
(a) means a university, college, school or other similar educational establishment; but
(b) does not include an educational establishment specialized in providing military training or drilling course;
specified act (指明作為), in relation to an offence under subsection (3) or (4), means an act that constitutes the offence;
specified drilling (指明操練)—
(a) means training or drilling in—
(i) the use of an offensive weapon as defined by section 2(1) of the Public Order Ordinance (Cap. 245);
(ii) the practice of military exercises; or
(iii) the practice of evolutions; but
(b) does not include an activity that is training or drilling mentioned in paragraph (a)(i) but conducted solely for leisure purpose.
Editorial Note: * Commencement date: 23 March 2024.
14.
Extra-territorial effect of this Part
(1) If—
(a) a HKSAR resident who is a Chinese citizen does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under section 10(1) had it been done in the HKSAR,
the resident commits the offence.
(2) If—
(a) any—
(i) Hong Kong permanent resident;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under section 13(3) or (4) had it been done in the HKSAR,
the resident or body commits the offence.
(3) In this section—HKSAR resident (特區居民) means—
(a) a Hong Kong permanent resident; or
(b) a person who is qualified to be issued with an identity card under the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177) but has no right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115).
(a) a person joins an armed force, or is a part of an armed force, that is in an armed conflict with a Chinese armed force;
(b) a person, with intent to prejudice the situation of a Chinese armed force in an armed conflict, assists an armed force (that armed force) that is in an armed conflict with a Chinese armed force, or assists the government, authority or organization to which that armed force belongs;
(c) a person initiates armed conflict against a Chinese armed force; or
(d) a person—
(i) with intent to endanger the sovereignty, unity or territorial integrity of China or the public safety of the HKSAR as a whole; or
(ii) being reckless as to whether the sovereignty, unity or territorial integrity of China, or the public safety of the HKSAR as a whole, would be endangered, does a violent act in the HKSAR, the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to life imprisonment.
16.
Extra-territorial effect of this Division
(1) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident who is a Chinese citizen;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR, does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under section 15 had it been done in the HKSAR, the resident or body commits the offence.
(2) In this section—HKSAR resident (特區居民) means—
(a) a Hong Kong permanent resident; or
(b) a person who is qualified to be issued with an identity card under the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177) but has no right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115).
Division 2: Incitement of Members of Chinese Armed Force to Mutiny, Assisting Those Members to Abandon Duties, etc.
17.
Incitement of members of Chinese armed force to mutiny
(1) A person who knowingly incites a member of a Chinese armed force—
(a) to abandon the duties and abandon the allegiance to China; or
(b) to organize, initiate or participates in a mutiny, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to life imprisonment.
(2) In this section—Mutiny (叛變) means an act done by 2 or more persons who are, or at least 2 of whom are, members of a Chinese armed force—
(a) to overthrow the lawful authority in a Chinese armed force or in an army or force of a government or organization of a foreign country that is acting in cooperation with a Chinese armed force; or
(b) to resist such lawful authority in such a manner as to substantially prejudice the operational efficiency of a Chinese armed force or of, or of a part of, an army or force of a government or organization of a foreign country that is acting in cooperation with a Chinese armed force.
18.
Assisting members of Chinese armed force to abandon duties or absent without leave
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years if the person, knowing that a member of a Chinese armed force is about to abandon the duties or absent himself or herself without leave, assists the member in so doing.
(2) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years if the person, knowing that a member of a Chinese armed force is about to abandon the duties or absent himself or herself without leave, colludes with an external force to assist the member in so doing.
(3) A person who, knowing that a member of a Chinese armed force has abandoned the duties or has absented himself or herself without leave—
(a) conceals the member;
(b) assists the member in concealing himself or herself; or
(c) assists the member in escaping from lawful custody, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.
(4) A person who, knowing that a member of a Chinese armed force has abandoned the duties or has absented himself or herself without leave, colludes with an external force to—
(a) conceal the member;
(b) assist the member in concealing himself or herself; or
(c) assist the member in escaping from lawful custody, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.
Division 3: Incitement to Disaffection etc.
19.
Inciting disaffection of public officers
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years if the person knowingly incites a public officer to abandon upholding the Basic Law and abandon the allegiance to the HKSAR.
(2) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years if the person colludes with an external force to knowingly incite a public officer to abandon upholding the Basic Law and abandon the allegiance to the HKSAR.
(3) In this section—public officer (公職人員) means—
(a) a person holding an office of emolument under the Government, whether such office be permanent or temporary;
(b) any of the following persons (if the person is not a person mentioned in paragraph (a))—
(i) a principal official of the Government appointed in accordance with the Basic Law;
(ii) the Monetary Authority appointed under section 5A of the Exchange Fund Ordinance (Cap. 66) or a person appointed under section 5A(3) of that Ordinance;
(iii) the Chairman of the Public Service Commission;
(iv) a staff member of the Independent Commission Against Corruption;
(v) The Ombudsman or a person appointed under section 6 of The Ombudsman Ordinance (Cap. 397);
(vi) the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data or a person employed or engaged by the Commissioner under the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486);
(vii) the Chairperson or a member of the Equal Opportunities Commission, or a person employed or engaged by the Commission under the Sex Discrimination Ordinance (Cap. 480);
(viii) a judicial officer or a staff member of the Judiciary;
(c) a member of the Executive Council;
(d) a member of the Legislative Council;
(e) a member of a District Council;
(f) a member of the Election Committee as defined by section 2(1) of the Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap. 569); or
(g) a person of a class specified under section 20.
20.
Specification of public officers
For the purposes of section 19, the Chief Executive in Council may, by order published in the Gazette, specify a class of persons as public officers if the Chief Executive in Council reasonably considers that it is necessary for safeguarding national security to specify the class of persons as public officers.
21.
Inciting disaffection of personnel of offices of Central Authorities in Hong Kong
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years if the person knowingly incites any of the personnel of any of the following offices of the Central Authorities in Hong Kong (personnel of a CA office in HK) to abandon the duties and abandon the allegiance to China—
(a) the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
(b) the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
(c) the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
(2) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years if the person colludes with an external force to knowingly incite any of the personnel of a CA office in HK to abandon the duties and abandon the allegiance to China.
22.
Possession of documents or articles of incitement nature with intent to commit specified offence
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 3 years if the person, with intent to commit a specified offence, possesses a document or other article of such a nature that the distribution of a document or article of that nature to a relevant officer would constitute the specified offence.
(2) In this section—relevant officer (相關人員) means—
(a) in relation to an offence under section 17—a member of a Chinese armed force;
(b) in relation to an offence under section 19—a public officer within the meaning of that section;
(c) in relation to an offence under section 21—any of the personnel of a CA office in HK within the meaning of that section; specified offence (指明罪行) means an offence under section 17, 19 or 21.
Division 4: Acts with Seditious Intention etc.
23.
Seditious intention
(1) For the purposes of this Division—
(a) a person does an act with a seditious intention if the person does the act with one or more of the intentions specified in subsection (2); and
(b) an act, word or publication is an act, word or publication that has a seditious intention if the act, word or publication has one or more of the intentions specified in subsection (2).
(2) The intentions are as follows—
(a) an intention to bring a Chinese citizen, Hong Kong permanent resident or a person in the HKSAR into hatred, contempt or disaffection against the following system or institution—
(i) the fundamental system of the state established by the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China;
(ii) a state institution under the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China; or
(iii) the following offices of the Central Authorities in Hong Kong—
(A) the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
(B) the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
(C) the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; or
(D) the Hong Kong Garrison of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army;
(b) an intention to bring a Chinese citizen, Hong Kong permanent resident or a person in the HKSAR into hatred, contempt or disaffection against the constitutional order, executive, legislative or judicial authority of the HKSAR;
(c) an intention to incite any person to attempt to procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of—
(i) any matter established in accordance with the law by the Central Authorities in relation to the HKSAR; or
(ii) any matter established in accordance with the law in the HKSAR;
(d) an intention to cause hatred or enmity amongst different classes of residents of the HKSAR or amongst residents of different regions of China;
(e) an intention to incite any other person to do a violent act in the HKSAR;
(f) an intention to incite any other person to do an act that does not comply with the law of the HKSAR or that does not obey an order issued under the law of the HKSAR.
(3) However—
(a) if a person does an act only with any of the intentions specified in subsection (4), the act is not done with a seditious intention; and
(b) if an act, word or publication only has any of the intentions specified in subsection (4), the act, word or publication is not an act, word or publication that has a seditious intention.
(4) The intentions are as follows—
(a) an intention to give an opinion on the system or constitutional order mentioned in subsection (2)(a) or (b), with a view to improving the system or constitutional order;
(b) an intention to point out an issue on a matter in respect of an institution or authority mentioned in subsection (2)(a) or (b), with a view to giving an opinion on the improvement of the matter;
(c) an intention to persuade any person to attempt to procure the alteration, by lawful means, of—
(i) any matter established in accordance with the law by the Central Authorities in relation to the HKSAR; or
(ii) any matter established in accordance with the law in the HKSAR;
(d) an intention to point out that hatred or enmity amongst different classes of residents of the HKSAR or amongst residents of different regions of China is produced, or that there is a tendency for such hatred or enmity to be produced, with a view to removing the hatred or enmity.
24.
Offences in connection with seditious intention
(1) A person who—
(a) with a seditious intention—
(i) does an act that has a seditious intention; or
(ii) utters a word that has a seditious intention;
(b) knowing that a publication has a seditious intention, prints, publishes, sells, offers for sale, distributes, displays or reproduces the publication; or
(c) imports a publication that has a seditious intention,
commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.
(2) A person who colludes with an external force to do the following—
(a) with a seditious intention—
(i) do an act that has a seditious intention; or
(ii) utter a word that has a seditious intention;
(b) knowing that a publication has a seditious intention, print, publish, sell, offer for sale, distribute, display or reproduce the publication; or
(c) import a publication that has a seditious intention,
commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.
(3) A person who, without reasonable excuse, possesses a publication that has a seditious intention commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 3 years.
(4) In this section—publish (發布) includes—
(a) to communicate in any form, including speaking, writing, displaying notices, broadcasting, screening and playing of tapes or other recorded material; and
(b) to disseminate or make available.
25.
Proof of intention to incite public disorder or to incite violence not necessary
(1) In proceedings for an offence under section 24(1)(a) or (2)(a)—
(a) it is not necessary to prove that the person does the act or utters the word with the intention to incite any other person to do an act causing public disorder; and
(b) unless the intention under section 23(2)(e) constitutes an element of the offence, it is not necessary to prove that the person does the act or utters the word with the intention to incite any other person to do a violent act.
(2) In proceedings for an offence under section 24(1), (2) or (3)—
(a) it is not necessary to prove that the act, word or publication (as appropriate) has the intention to incite any other person to do an act causing public disorder; and
(b) unless the intention under section 23(2)(e) constitutes an element of the offence, it is not necessary to prove that the act, word or publication (as appropriate) has the intention to incite any other person to do a violent act.
26.
Defence for offence under section 24(1)(c) or (2)(c)
(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 24(1)(c) or (2)(c) to establish that, at the time of the alleged offence, the person did not know that the publication is a publication that has a seditious intention.
(2) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (1) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Division 5: Miscellaneous Provisions
27.
Power to remove or obliterate publications that have seditious intention
(1) A law enforcement officer—
(a) may, subject to subsection (3), enter any premises or place; and
(b) may stop and board any conveyance, and may remove or obliterate any publication that has a seditious intention from there.
(2) A law enforcement officer may take all or any of the following actions—
(a) to enter (by reasonable force if necessary) any premises or place that the officer is authorized under this section to enter;
(b) to remove by reasonable force any person or article obstructing the officer from exercising the power of removal or obliteration which the officer is authorized under this section to exercise;
(c) to detain any conveyance until all publications that have a seditious intention have been removed or obliterated from the conveyance;
(d) to remove any person (by reasonable force if necessary) from any conveyance while any publication that has a seditious intention is removed or obliterated.
(3) If the publication that has a seditious intention is not visible from a public place, the powers conferred by subsection (1)(a) may only be exercised—
(a) with the prior permission of the occupier of the premises or place; or
(b) under and in accordance with a warrant issued by a magistrate for such purpose.
(4) In this section—conveyance (運輸工具) includes a vehicle, vessel, aircraft and hovercraft;
law enforcement officer (執法人員) means—
(a) a police officer; or
(b) an officer of a law enforcement agency who is authorized by the Secretary for Security to perform the functions under this section.
28.
Extra-territorial effect of Divisions 2, 3 and 4
(1) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident who is a Chinese citizen;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under section 17(1) had it been done in the HKSAR,
the resident or body commits the offence.
(2) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under a provision specified in subsection (3) had it been done in the HKSAR, the resident or body commits the offence.
(3) The provision specified for the purposes of subsection (2) is—
(a) section 18(1), (2), (3) or (4);
(b) section 19(1) or (2);
(c) section 21(1) or (2); or
(d) section 24(1) or (2).
(4) In this section—HKSAR resident (特區居民) means—
(a) a Hong Kong permanent resident; or
(b) a person who is qualified to be issued with an identity card under the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177) but has no right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115).
Division 1: Offences in connection with State Secrets
29.
Interpretation
In this Division—
disclose (披露), in relation to a document or other article, includes parting with possession of the document or article, and disclosing the information contained in the document or article;
government contractor (政府承辦商) means a person who is not a public officer but who provides, or is employed in the provision of, goods or services—
(a) for the purposes of the Government; or
(b) under an agreement or arrangement that is certified by the Chief Executive as being an agreement or arrangement to which the authority of a region or place, the government of a foreign country (including an institution under the government) or an international organization is a party, or that is subordinate to, or made for the purposes of implementing, any such agreement or arrangement;
information (資料), except in section 33 or 34, includes—
(a) information stored by electronic means; and
(b) message or intelligence that is not stored on any medium;
public officer (公職人員) means—
(a) a person holding an office of emolument under the Government, whether such office be permanent or temporary;
(b) any of the following persons (if the person is not a person mentioned in paragraph (a))—
(i) a principal official of the Government appointed in accordance with the Basic Law;
(ii) the Monetary Authority appointed under section 5A of the Exchange Fund Ordinance (Cap. 66) or a person appointed under section 5A(3) of that Ordinance;
(iii) the Chairman of the Public Service Commission;
(iv) a staff member of the Independent Commission Against Corruption;
(v) The Ombudsman or a person appointed under section 6 of The Ombudsman Ordinance (Cap. 397);
(vi) the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data or a person employed or engaged by the Commissioner under the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486);
(vii) the Chairperson or a member of the Equal Opportunities Commission, or a person employed or engaged by the Commission under the Sex Discrimination Ordinance (Cap. 480);
(viii) a judicial officer or a staff member of the Judiciary;
(c) a member of the Executive Council;
(d) a member of the Legislative Council;
(e) a member of a District Council;
(f) a member of the Election Committee as defined by section 2(1) of the Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap. 569); or
(g) a person of a class specified under section 31; region (地區) means a region, not being a country, outside the HKSAR;
specified disclosure (指明披露)—see section 30;
state secret (國家秘密) means one of the following secrets the disclosure, without lawful authority, of which would likely endanger national security—
(a) a secret concerning major policy decision on affairs of China or the HKSAR;
(b) a secret concerning the construction of national defence of China or concerning a Chinese armed force;
(c) a secret concerning diplomatic or foreign affair activities of China, a secret concerning external affairs of the HKSAR, or a secret that China or the HKSAR is under an external obligation to preserve secrecy;
(d) a secret concerning the economic or social development of China or the HKSAR;
(e) a secret concerning the technological development or scientific technology of China or the HKSAR;
(f) a secret concerning activities for safeguarding national security or the security of the HKSAR or for the investigation of offences;
(g) a secret concerning the relationship between the Central Authorities and the HKSAR (including information on affairs relating to the HKSAR for which the Central Authorities are responsible under the Basic Law).
30.
Meaning of specified disclosure
(1) In this Division—specified disclosure (指明披露), in relation to any information, document or other article, means the disclosure of the information, document or article in the following circumstances—
(a) the purpose of making the disclosure is to reveal—
(i) circumstances in which the Government’s performance of its functions in accordance with the law is seriously affected; or
(ii) a serious threat to public order, public safety or public health;
(b) the disclosure is of an extent that does not exceed what is necessary for revealing the matter mentioned in paragraph (a)(i) or (ii); and
(c) having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the public interest served by making the disclosure manifestly outweighs the public interest served by not making the disclosure.
(2) In determining whether a person discloses any information, document or other article in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (c) of the definition of specified disclosure in subsection (1), regard must be had to—
(a) the seriousness of the matter mentioned in paragraph (a)(i) or (ii) of that definition;
(b) whether there is any reasonably practicable step in place of the disclosure, and if so, whether the person has taken those steps before making the disclosure;
(c) whether the person has reasonable grounds to believe that the disclosure is in the public interest;
(d) the public interest served by the disclosure;
(e) the extent of the damage or risk of damage brought about by the disclosure; and
(f) whether the disclosure is made under an emergency.
31.
Specification of public officers
For the purposes of this Division, the Chief Executive in Council may, by order published in the Gazette, specify a class of persons as public officers if the Chief Executive in Council reasonably considers that it is necessary for safeguarding national security to specify the class of persons as public officers.
32.
Unlawful acquisition of state secrets
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 5 years if the person—
(a) knowing that any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret; or
(b) having reasonable grounds to believe any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret, and with intent to endanger national security,
and without lawful authority, acquires the information, document or article.
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1)(a) to prove that the purpose of acquiring the information, document or article is to make a specified disclosure of the information, document or article.
(3) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years if the person, knowing that any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret, and—
(a) with intent to endanger national security; or
(b) being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered,
and without lawful authority, acquires the information, document or article.
(4) In this section, a reference to a person acquiring any information, document or other article—
(a) includes the person asking for, collecting, recording or copying the information, document or article; but
(b) does not include—
(i) the information, document or article coming into the person’s physical possession without the person’s knowledge; or
(ii) the information, document or article coming into the person’s possession or knowledge without the person taking any step.
33.
Unlawful possession of state secrets
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 3 years if the person—
(a) knowing that any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret; or
(b) having reasonable grounds to believe any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret, and with intent to endanger national security,
and without lawful authority, possesses the information, document or article.
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1)(a) to prove that the purpose of possessing the information, document or article is to make a specified disclosure of the information, document or article.
(3) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 5 years if the person, knowing that any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret, and—
(a) with intent to endanger national security; or
(b) being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered,
and without lawful authority, possesses the information, document or article.
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) or (3) to establish that—
(a) the person has taken all reasonable steps to do the following as soon as possible after the time at which the alleged offence commences (commencement time)—
(i) surrender the information, document or article mentioned in that subsection to a police officer; or
(ii) dispose of the information, document or article mentioned in that subsection in accordance with the direction of a police officer; and
(b) since the commencement time and until the happening of the event mentioned in paragraph (a)(i) or (ii), the person has taken all reasonable steps to ensure that the information, document or article is not disclosed.
(5) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (4) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(6) In this section—information (資料)—
(a) includes information stored by electronic means; but
(b) does not include message or intelligence that is not stored on any medium.
34.
Unlawful possession of state secrets when leaving HKSAR
(1) A person who is (or was) a public officer commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years if the person—
(a) acquires or possesses (or acquired or possessed) any information, document or other article by virtue of the person’s capacity as a public officer;
(b) knows that the information, document or article is or contains a state secret; and
(c) with intent to endanger national security or being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered, and without lawful authority, possesses the information, document or article when leaving the HKSAR.
(2) For a person leaving the HKSAR on a departure conveyance, a reference in subsection (1) to the person possessing any information, document or other article includes any of the following circumstances—
(a) the information, document or article being part of the personal belongings of the person carried on the conveyance;
(b) the information, document or article being in the checked baggage of the person (whether or not carried, or to be carried, on the same conveyance).
(3) In this section—departure conveyance (離境運輸工具) means a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, hovercraft or other means of transport engaged on a journey leaving the HKSAR;
information (資料)—
(a) includes information stored by electronic means; but
(b) does not include message or intelligence that is not stored on any medium.
35.
Unlawful disclosure of state secrets
(1) If a specified person, without lawful authority, discloses any information, document or other article that is or contains a specified state secret and that is (or was) acquired or possessed by the person by virtue of the person’s specified capacity, the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.
(2) It is a defence for a specified person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to establish that, at the time of the alleged offence, the person did not know and had no reasonable grounds to believe that the information, document or article was or contained a specified state secret.
(3) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (2) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(4) A specified person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years if the person—
(a) acquires or possesses (or acquired or possessed) any information, document or other article by virtue of the person’s specified capacity;
(b) knows that the information, document or article is or contains a state secret (other than a specified state secret); and
(c) without lawful authority, discloses the information, document or article.
(5) A specified person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years if the person—
(a) acquires or possesses (or acquired or possessed) any information, document or other article by virtue of the person’s specified capacity;
(b) knows that the information, document or article is or contains a state secret (other than a specified state secret); and
(c) with intent to endanger national security, or being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered, and without lawful authority, discloses the information, document or article.
(6) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 5 years if the person—
(a) knowing that any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret; or
(b) having reasonable grounds to believe any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret, and with intent to endanger national security,
and without lawful authority, discloses the information, document or article.
(7) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (6)(a) to prove that the disclosure of the information, document or article is a specified disclosure.
(8) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years if the person, knowing that any information, document or other article is or contains a state secret, and—
(a) with intent to endanger national security; or
(b) being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered,
and without lawful authority, discloses the information, document or article.
(9) In this section, a reference to disclosing any information, document or other article does not include—
(a) surrendering the information, document or article to a police officer; or
(b) disposing of the information, document or article in accordance with the direction of a police officer.
(10) In this section—
specified capacity (指明身分)—
(a) in relation to a person who is (or was) a public officer—means the capacity of the person as a public officer; or
(b) in relation to a person who is (or was) a government contractor—means the capacity of the person as a government contractor;
specified person (指明人士) means a person who is (or was) a public officer or government contractor;
specified state secret (指明國家秘密) means a state secret that is a secret mentioned in paragraph (b), (c) or (g) of the definition of state secret in section 29.
36.
Unlawful disclosure of information etc. acquired by espionage
(1) A person commits an offence if the person, without lawful authority, discloses any information, document or other article that the person knows (or has reasonable grounds to believe) to have come into the person’s possession as a result of a contravention of section 43(1).
(2) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.
37.
Unlawful disclosure of information etc. that appears to be confidential matter
(1) If—
(a) a specified person, with intent to endanger national security, and without lawful authority—
(i) discloses any information, document or other article; and
(ii) in making the disclosure, represents or holds out that the information, document or article is (or was) acquired or possessed by the person by virtue of the person’s specified capacity; and
(b) the information, document or article would be (or likely to be) a confidential matter if it were true,
the person commits an offence regardless of whether the information, document or article is true or not, and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 5 years.
(2) If—
(a) a specified person colludes with an external force, with intent to endanger national security, and without lawful authority—
(i) discloses any information, document or other article; and
(ii) in making the disclosure, represents or holds out that the information, document or article is (or was) acquired or possessed by the person by virtue of the person’s specified capacity; and
(b) the information, document or article would be (or likely to be) a confidential matter if it were true,
the person commits an offence regardless of whether the information, document or article is true or not, and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.
(3) It is a defence for a specified person charged with an offence under subsection (1) or (2) to establish that, at the time of the alleged offence, the person did not know and had no reasonable grounds to believe that the information, document or article fell within subsection (1)(b) or (2)(b) (as the case may be).
(4) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (3) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(5) In this section—
confidential matter (機密事項) means a matter the disclosure, without lawful authority, of which would prejudice the interest of the Central Authorities or the Government;
specified capacity (指明身分)—
(a) in relation to a person who is (or was) a public officer—means the capacity of the person as a public officer; or
(b) in relation to a person who is (or was) a government contractor—means the capacity of the person as a government contractor;
specified person (指明人士) means a person who is (or was) a public officer or government contractor.
38.
Authorized disclosures
(1) For the purposes of this Division, a disclosure by a public officer is made with lawful authority if, and only if, it is made in accordance with the officer’s official duty.
(2) For the purposes of this Division, a disclosure by a government contractor is made with lawful authority if, and only if, it is made—
(a) in accordance with an official authorization; or
(b) for the purposes of the functions by virtue of which the contractor is a government contractor and without contravening an official restriction.
(3) For the purposes of this Division, a disclosure by a person who is neither a public officer nor a government contractor is made with lawful authority if, and only if, it is made in accordance with an official authorization.
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 35, 36 or 37 to establish that, at the time of the alleged offence, the person believed that the person had lawful authority to make the disclosure and had no reasonable grounds to believe otherwise.
(5) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (4) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(6) In this section—
official authorization (正式授權) means an authorization duly given by a public officer or government contractor;
official restriction (正式限制) means a restriction duly imposed by a public officer or government contractor.
39.
Safeguarding of information
(1) Subsection (2) applies if—
(a) a specified person possesses or controls any information, document or other article (relevant information, document or article) by virtue of the person’s capacity as a specified person; and
(b) the specified person would commit an offence under section 35 or 36 if the person discloses, without lawful authority, the relevant information, document or article.
(2) The specified person commits an offence if—
(a) being a public officer—the specified person retains the relevant information, document or article contrary to the person’s official duty; or
(b) being a government contractor—the specified person fails to comply with an official direction for the return or disposal of the relevant information, document or article,
or if the specified person fails to take such care to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of the relevant information, document or article as a person in the specified person’s position may reasonably be expected to take.
(3) It is a defence for a public officer charged with an offence under subsection (2)(a) to establish that, at the time of the alleged offence, the officer believed that the officer was acting in accordance with the officer’s official duty and had no reasonable grounds to believe otherwise.
(4) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (3) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(5) Where a person possesses or controls any information, document or other article that it would be an offence under section 35 or 36 for the person to disclose without lawful authority, the person commits an offence if—
(a) the person fails to comply with an official direction for the return or disposal of the information, document or article; or
(b) the person—
(i) obtained the information, document or article from a specified person on terms requiring the information, document or article to be held in confidence; or
(ii) obtained the information, document or article from a specified person in circumstances in which the specified person could reasonably expect that the information, document or article would be held in confidence,
and the person fails to take such care to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of the information, document or article as a person in the person’s position may reasonably be expected to take.
(6) A person who commits an offence under subsection (2) or (5) is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine at level 4 and to imprisonment for 3 months.
(7) A person commits an offence if the person discloses any official information, document or other article that can be used for the purpose of obtaining access to any information, document or other article protected against disclosure by section 35 or 36 and the circumstances in which it is disclosed are such that it would be reasonable to expect that the official information, document or article might be used for that purpose without authority.
(8) For the purposes of subsection (7), any information, document or article disclosed by the person is official information, document or article if—
(a) the person possesses (or possessed) the information, document or article by virtue of the person’s capacity as a specified person; or
(b) the person knows (or has reasonable grounds to believe) that a specified person possesses (or possessed) the information, document or article by virtue of the specified person’s capacity as a specified person.
(9) A person who commits an offence under subsection (7) is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of $500,000 and to imprisonment for 2 years.
(10) In this section—
official direction (正式指示) means a direction duly given by a specified person;
specified person (指明人士) means a public officer or government contractor.
40.
Extra-territorial effect of this Division
(1) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under section 32(1) or (3), 33(1) or (3), 35(6) or (8) or 36(1) had it been done in the HKSAR, the resident or body commits the offence.
(2) If a person does any act outside the HKSAR, and the act would have constituted an offence under section 35(1), (4) or (5) or 37(1) or (2) had it been done in the HKSAR, the person commits the offence.
(3) In this section—HKSAR resident (特區居民) means—
(a) a Hong Kong permanent resident; or
(b) a person who is qualified to be issued with an identity card under the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177) but has no right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115).
Division 2: Offences in connection with Espionage
41.
Interpretation
(1) In this Division—
conveyance (運輸工具) includes a vehicle, vessel, aircraft and hovercraft;
document (文件) includes part of a document;
munitions (軍火) includes the whole or any part of any vessel, aircraft, tank or similar engine, arms and ammunition, torpedo or mine, intended or adapted for use in war or armed conflict, and any other article, material or device, whether actual or proposed, intended for such use;
place (地方) means any place, and includes—
(a) any conveyance; and
(b) any tent or structure (whether or not movable or offshore);
prohibited place (禁地) means any of the following that is situated in the HKSAR—
(a) a work of defence, arsenal or military or national defence establishment;
(b) a place declared as a military restricted zone under Article 12 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Garrisoning of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (a translation of “《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區駐軍法》”);
(c) a station, factory, dockyard, mine, minefield, camp, vessel or aircraft belonging to or occupied by or on behalf of the Central Authorities or the Government (relevant Authority) and used for military or national defence purpose;
(d) a place that—
(i) belongs to or is occupied by or on behalf of a relevant Authority; and
(ii) may only be entered by a person performing a function in relation to that place, and is designed for placing one or more of the following items or relevant facilities—
(e) a place belonging to or occupied by or on behalf of a relevant Authority and used for the purpose of building, repairing, making or storing any munitions, vessel, aircraft, arms or materials or instruments for use in time of war or armed conflict, or any information, document or other article relating to such munitions, vessel, aircraft, arms or materials or instruments, or for the purpose of getting any metals, oil or minerals of use in time of war or armed conflict;
(f) a place not belonging to the relevant Authorities where any munitions, or any information, document or other article relating to such munitions, are being made, repaired, obtained or stored under a contract with, or with a person on behalf of, a relevant Authority, or otherwise on behalf of a relevant Authority; or
(g) a place declared under section 42 as a prohibited place;
radiocommunications installation (無線電通訊裝置) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap. 106);
telecommunications installation (電訊裝置) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap. 106);
telecommunications line (電訊線路) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap. 106);
telecommunications network (電訊網絡) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap. 106);
telecommunications system (電訊系統) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap. 106);
unmanned tool (無人工具) means a conveyance or other power driven machine that is operated with no person on board.
(2) In this Division—
(a) an expression referring to communicating includes any communicating, whether in whole or in part, and whether the information, document or other article itself or the substance, effect or description of the information, document or other article only be communicated;
(b) an expression referring to the communication of any information, document or other article includes the transfer or transmission of the information, document or other article, and also includes providing means of obtaining or accessing the information, document or other article; and
(c) an expression referring to obtaining any information, document or other article includes copying or causing to be copied the whole or any part of the information, document or other article.
42.
Declaration of prohibited places and authorization of guards
(1) For the purposes of this Division, the Chief Executive may, by order published in the Gazette, declare a place situated in the HKSAR as a prohibited place if, having regard to the matters specified in subsection (2), the Chief Executive reasonably considers that it is necessary for safeguarding national security to declare the place as a prohibited place.
(2) The matters are—
(a) the use of the place;
(b) the owner or occupier of the place;
(c) the nature of any information kept, stored or processed in the place; and
(d) the nature of any technology, equipment or material situated at the place.
(3) An order made under subsection (1) may be made in respect of a particular place and may also be made in respect of a description of place.
(4) The Chief Executive may authorize any person or any class of persons as a person or persons to discharge duty as a guard or sentry in respect of any prohibited place.
43.
Espionage
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 20 years if the person, with intent to endanger national security, does an act specified in subsection (2).
(2) The act is—
(a) approaching, inspecting, passing over or under, entering or accessing a prohibited place, or being in the neighbourhood of a prohibited place (including doing such act by electronic or remote means);
(b) causing an unmanned tool to approach, inspect, pass over or under, enter or access a prohibited place, or to be in the neighbourhood of a prohibited place (including doing such act by electronic or remote means); or
(c) obtaining (including by interception of communication), collecting, recording, producing or possessing, or communicating to any other person, any information, document or other article that is calculated to be, or is intended to be, directly or indirectly useful to an external force.
(3) If a person colludes with an external force to publish to the public a statement of fact that is false or misleading, and—
(a) the person—
(i) with intent to endanger national security or being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered, so publishes the statement; and
(ii) knows that the statement is false or misleading; or
(b) the person—
(i) with intent to endanger national security, so publishes the statement; and
(ii) has reasonable grounds to believe that the statement is false or misleading,
the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3)—
(a) a statement is a statement of fact if a reasonable person would consider it to be a representation of fact after reading or hearing it or after it comes to the person’s knowledge by other means; and
(b) a statement of fact is false if it is wholly false or false in a material respect, whether on its own or in the context in which it appears.
(5) In this section—
communication (通訊) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance (Cap. 589);
interception (截取) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance (Cap. 589).
44.
Entering prohibited places without lawful authority etc.
A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 2 years if the person—
(a) without reasonable excuse or lawful authority—
(i) inspects, passes over or under, enters or accesses a prohibited place (including doing such act by electronic or remote means); or
(ii) causes an unmanned tool to inspect, pass over or under, enter or access a prohibited place (including doing such act by electronic or remote means); and
(b) knows (or has reasonable grounds to believe) that the person has no lawful authority to do the act mentioned in paragraph (a)(i) or (ii) at the time when doing the act.
45.
Powers exercisable in relation to prohibited places
(1) A specified officer may order—
(a) any person not to do or cease to do an act specified in section 43(2)(a) or (b);
(b) a person who has entered or accessed (including having entered or accessed by electronic or remote means) a prohibited place to leave the prohibited place immediately;
(c) a person who is in the neighbourhood of a prohibited place to leave the neighbourhood immediately; or
(d) a person who drives or operates a conveyance that is in a prohibited place or in the neighbourhood of a prohibited place (relevant place), or who operates an unmanned tool that is in a relevant place, to remove the conveyance or the unmanned tool from the relevant place.
(2) A specified officer may arrange—
(a) a conveyance or unmanned tool in a relevant place to be removed from the relevant place; or
(b) a conveyance or unmanned tool to be moved from a place within a relevant place to another place within a relevant place.
(3) A specified officer must not exercise a power conferred by subsection (1) or (2) unless the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that it is necessary for safeguarding national security to exercise the power.
(4) A person who contravenes an order made under subsection (1) commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 2 years.
(5) In this section—specified officer (指明人員)—
(a) in relation to a prohibited place—means any of the following persons—
(i) a police officer;
(ii) a person authorized under section 42(4) in respect of the prohibited place; or
(b) in relation to a prohibited place belonging to or occupied by or on behalf of the Central Authorities—means a person assigned by the institution in charge of the prohibited place to discharge duty as a guard or sentry in respect of the prohibited place.
46.
Obstruction etc. in the vicinity of prohibited places
(1) If a specified officer is discharging duty in respect of a prohibited place, and another person, in the vicinity of the prohibited place—
(a) wilfully obstructs the specified officer from discharging the duty;
(b) knowingly misleads the specified officer in circumstances concerning the discharge of the duty by the specified officer; or
(c) otherwise wilfully interferes with or impedes the specified officer in the discharge of the duty,
that other person commits an offence.
(2) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 2 years.
(3) In this section—
specified officer (指明人員)—
(a) in relation to a prohibited place—means any of the following persons—
(i) a police officer;
(ii) a person authorized under section 42(4) in respect of the prohibited place; or
(b) in relation to a prohibited place belonging to or occupied by or on behalf of the Central Authorities—means a person assigned by the institution in charge of the prohibited place to discharge duty as a guard or sentry in respect of the prohibited place.
47.
Participating in or supporting external intelligence organizations, or accepting advantages offered by them, etc.
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 14 years if the person—
(a) with intent to endanger national security; or
(b) being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered,
knowingly does a prohibited act in relation to an external intelligence organization.
(2) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years if—
(a) the person, being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered, does an act (relevant act);
(b) the relevant act constitutes a prohibited act done in relation to an external intelligence organization; and
(c) the person is reckless as to whether the relevant act would constitute the prohibited act.
(3) The Chief Executive may issue a certifying document to certify whether an organization is an external intelligence organization, and the document is binding on a Court.
(4) In this section—
advantage (利益) means—
(a) any gift, loan, fee, reward or commission consisting of money, of any valuable security or of other property or interest in property of any description;
(b) any office, employment or contract;
(c) any payment, release, discharge or liquidation of any loan, obligation or other liability, whether in whole or in part;
(d) any other service, or favour (other than entertainment), including protection from any penalty or disability incurred or apprehended or from any action or proceedings of a disciplinary, civil or criminal nature, whether or not already instituted;
(e) the exercise, or forbearance from the exercise, of any right, power or duty; and
(f) any offer, undertaking or promise, whether conditional or unconditional, of any advantage within the meaning of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e);
economic resources (經濟資源) means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds but can be used to obtain funds, goods or services;
entertainment (款待) means the provision of food or drink, for consumption on the occasion when it is provided, and of any other entertainment relating to, or provided at the same time as, such provisions;
external intelligence organization (境外情報組織) means an organization established by an external force and engaging in the following work or activity (however described)—
(a) intelligence work; or
(b) subversion or sabotage of other countries or places;
financial support (財政支援) means any funds or other financial assets or economic resources;
funds (資金) includes—
(a) gold coin, gold bullion, cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders and other payment instruments;
(b) deposits with financial institutions or other entities, balances on accounts, debts and debt obligations;
(c) securities and debt instruments (including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, debentures, debenture stock and derivatives contracts);
(d) interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by property;
(e) credit, rights of set-off, guarantees, performance bonds or other financial commitments;
(f) letters of credit, bills of lading and bills of sale;
(g) documents evidencing an interest in funds or financial resources; and
(h) any other instrument of export financing;
prohibited act (受禁作為), in relation to an external intelligence organization, means—
(a) becoming a member of the organization;
(b) accepting a task or training from the organization (or a person acting on behalf of the organization);
(c) offering substantial support (including providing financial support or information and recruiting members for the organization) to the organization (or a person acting on behalf of the organization); or
(d) accepting substantial advantage offered by the organization (or a person acting on behalf of the organization).
48.
Extra-territorial effect of this Division
(1) If a person does any act outside the HKSAR, and the act would have constituted an offence under section 43(1) (in respect of an act specified in section 43(2)(a) or (b)) or an offence under section 44 had it been done in the HKSAR, the person commits the offence.
(2) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident who is a Chinese citizen;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under section 43(1) (in respect of an act specified in section 43(2)(c)) or an offence under section 47(1) or (2) had it been done in the HKSAR, the resident or body commits the offence.
(3) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under section 43(3) had it been done in the HKSAR,
the resident or body commits the offence.
(4) In this section—HKSAR resident (特區居民) means—
(a) a Hong Kong permanent resident; or
(b) a person who is qualified to be issued with an identity card under the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177) but has no right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115).
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 20 years if the person—
(a) with intent to endanger national security; or
(b) being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered,
damages or weakens a public infrastructure.
(2) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to life imprisonment if the person—
(a) with intent to endanger national security; or
(b) being reckless as to whether national security would be endangered,
colludes with an external force to damage or weaken a public infrastructure.
(3) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2), an act is weakening a public infrastructure if the act causes any of the following effects (whenever caused) on the infrastructure (including any thing or software that constitutes the infrastructure)—
(a) making the infrastructure vulnerable to abuse or damage;
(b) making the infrastructure vulnerable to be accessed or altered by persons who are not entitled to access or alter the infrastructure;
(c) causing the infrastructure not to be able to function as it should in whole or in part;
(d) causing the infrastructure not to operate in a way as set by its owner or the owner’s representative (even if the act would not reduce the reliability of the operation of the infrastructure, of the thing or software constituting the infrastructure or of the information stored in the infrastructure).
(4) In this section—
public infrastructure (公共基礎設施) means—
(a) the following item that belongs to the Central Authorities or the Government or is occupied by or on behalf of the Central Authorities or the Government (whether it is situated in the HKSAR or not)—
(i) infrastructure;
(ii) facility or equipment;
(iii) network or computer or electronic system;
(iv) office premises; or
(v) military or national defence facility or equipment;
(b) public means of transport, public transport infrastructure or public transport facility that is situated in the HKSAR (including an airport and relevant facility); or
(c) the following item that is situated in the HKSAR—
(i) the following item providing or maintaining public services (such as finance, logistics, water, electricity, energy, fuel, drainage, communication, the Internet)—
(A) infrastructure; or
(B) facility; or
(ii) computer or electronic system providing or managing the services mentioned in subparagraph (i).
50.
Doing acts endangering national security in relation to computers or electronic systems
(1) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 20 years if—
(a) the person, with intent to endanger national security and without lawful authority, does an act in relation to a computer or electronic system;
(b) the person knows that the person has no lawful authority to do the act at the time of doing the act; and
(c) the act endangers (or is likely to endanger) national security.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), a person who does an act in relation to a computer or electronic system (the person) does the act without lawful authority if—
(a) the person is not a person who is responsible for the computer or electronic system and is entitled to decide whether the act could be done (responsible person); and
(b) the person does the act without the consent of a responsible person.
(3) In this section—
computer or electronic system (電腦或電子系統) includes any thing or software that constitutes the computer or electronic system.
51.
Extra-territorial effect of this Part
If a person does any act outside the HKSAR, and the act would have constituted an offence under section 49(1) or (2) or 50(1) had it been done in the HKSAR, the person commits the offence.
Division 1: External Interference Endangering National Security
52.
External interference endangering national security
A person who—
(a) with intent to bring about an interference effect, collaborates with an external force to do an act; and
(b) uses improper means when so doing the act,
commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 14 years.
53.
Meaning of bringing about interference effect
(1) In this Division, a reference to bringing about an interference effect is a reference to bringing about one or more of the following effects—
(a) influencing the Central People’s Government or the executive authorities of the HKSAR in—
(i) the formulation or execution of any policy or measures; or
(ii) the making or execution of any other decision,
including influencing an official of the Central People’s Government or of the executive authorities of the HKSAR, or any other officer who is authorized to perform the above function of the official, in performing that function;
(b) influencing the Legislative Council in performing functions (including influencing a member of the Legislative Council in performing functions as such a member), or interfering with any process in connection with the Legislative Council;
(c) influencing a Court in performing functions (including influencing a judicial officer in performing functions as such an officer), or interfering with the administration of justice in the HKSAR;
(d) interfering with any election or any process in connection with an election, including—
(i) influencing any other person in exercising the right to vote, or the right to stand for election, of the person enjoyed in relation to any election under the Basic Law;
(ii) interfering with the process of constituting the Election Committee under section 8 of the Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap. 569); and
(iii) interfering with the process under which any other person becomes a member of a District Council under the District Councils Ordinance (Cap. 547);
(e) prejudicing any one or more of the following relationships—
(i) the relationship between China and any foreign country;
(ii) the relationship between the Central Authorities and the HKSAR;
(iii) the relationship between the Central Authorities and any other region of China;
(iv) the relationship between the HKSAR and any other region of China;
(v) the relationship between the HKSAR and any foreign country.
(2) In this section—election (選舉) means an election set out in section 4(1) of the Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Conduct) Ordinance (Cap. 554).
54.
Meaning of collaborating with external force
For the purposes of this Division, a person collaborates with an external force to do an act if one or more of the following circumstances exist—
(a) the person participates in an activity planned or otherwise led by an external force, and the act is an act that the person’s participation in the activity involves;
(b) the person does the act on behalf of an external force;
(c) the person does the act in cooperation with an external force;
(d) the person does the act under the control, supervision or direction of, or on request by, an external force;
(e) the person does the act with the financial contributions, or the support by other means, of an external force.
55.
Meaning of using improper means
(1) For the purposes of section 52, the person mentioned in that section (subject person) uses improper means when doing the act mentioned in that section if the person falls within at least one of the descriptions in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c)—
(a) the subject person knowingly makes to a person a material misrepresentation when doing the act or any part of it;
(b) the act or any part of it is done by any one or more of the following ways—
(i) using or threatening to use violence against a person;
(ii) destroying or damaging, or threatening to destroy or damage, a person’s property;
(iii) causing financial loss to a person by other means, or threatening to cause financial loss to a person by other means;
(iv) damaging or threatening to damage a person’s reputation;
(v) causing psychological harm to, or placing undue psychological pressure on, a person;
(c) the act or any part of it constitutes an offence.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), a material misrepresentation—
(a) may be made orally or by written representation, and may be made by other conduct; and
(b) may be express or implied.
(3) In this section, a reference to making to a person a material misrepresentation is a reference to making to the person a false or misleading representation that has the effect of preventing the person from discerning—
(a) the fact that the subject person, with intent to bring about an interference effect, does the act; or
(b) the fact that the subject person collaborates with an external force to do the act.
56.
Presumption of doing acts on behalf of external force
(1) In proceedings brought against a person (defendant) for an offence under section 52, if the prosecution proves that the defendant, with intent to bring about an interference effect, did an act, the defendant is to be presumed, for the purposes of section 54(b), to have done the act on behalf of an external force as long as the prosecution further proves that—
(a) the defendant communicated with the external force in relation to the intent or a matter in connection with the intent before so doing the act; and
(b) the defendant knew or ought to have known that the act or any part of it—
(i) would result in the external force achieving its aims; or
(ii) would otherwise benefit the external force.
(2) However, the presumption under subsection (1) is rebutted by the defendant if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue that the defendant did not do the act on behalf of the external force; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
57.
Extra-territorial effect of this Division
(1) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident who is a Chinese citizen;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under section 52 had it been done in the HKSAR,
the resident or body commits the offence.
(2) In this section—HKSAR resident (特區居民) means—
(a) a Hong Kong permanent resident; or
(b) a person who is qualified to be issued with an identity card under the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177) but has no right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115).
Division 2: Organizations Engaging in Activities Endangering National Security
Subdivision 1: Preliminary
58.
Interpretation
In this Division—
authorized officer (獲授權人員) means a public servant appointed under section 67;
connection (聯繫), in relation to an organization that is a political body, means the following circumstances—
(a) the organization solicits or accepts financial contributions, financial sponsorships or financial support of any kind or loans, or substantive support by other means, directly or indirectly, from a political organization of an external place;
(b) the organization is affiliated directly or indirectly with a political organization of an external place;
(c) any policy of the organization is determined directly or indirectly by a political organization of an external place; or
(d) a political organization of an external place directs, controls, supervises, dictates or participates, directly or indirectly, in the decision making process of the organization;
office-bearer (幹事)—
(a) in relation to an organization, means the president, vice-president, secretary or treasurer of the organization, or a member of the committee or governing body of the organization, or a person who holds in the organization an office or position analogous to any of those mentioned above; or
(b) in relation to a prohibited organization, means a person holding any office or position in the prohibited organization other than that of an ordinary member;
organization (組織) means—
(a) a society as defined by section 2(1) of the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151);
(b) a person listed in the Schedule to that Ordinance; or
(c) any other body, whatever its nature and regardless of whether the body is formed or established pursuant to, or is operated in accordance with, any object or aim;
political body (政治性團體) means—
(a) a political party or an organization that purports to be a political party; or
(b) an organization whose principal function or main object is to promote or prepare a candidate for an election set out in section 4(1) of the Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Conduct) Ordinance (Cap. 554);
political organization of an external place (境外政治性組織) includes—
(a) a government of a foreign country or a political subdivision of the government;
(b) the authority of an external place or a political subdivision of the authority;
(c) an agent of the government or authority or an agent of the political subdivision of the government or authority; and
(d) a political party in an external place or an agent of the political party;
prohibited organization (受禁組織) means an organization in relation to which an order made under section 60(1) or (2) is in force.
59.
This Division does not affect operation of Societies Ordinance
This Division does not affect the operation of the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151).
Subdivision 2: Prohibition of Operation of Organizations Engaging in Activities Endangering National Security in HKSAR
60.
Prohibition of operation of organizations
(1) If the Secretary for Security reasonably believes that it is necessary for safeguarding national security to prohibit the operation or continued operation of an organization specified in subsection (3) in the HKSAR, the Secretary for Security may, by order published in the Gazette, prohibit the operation or continued operation of the organization in the HKSAR.
(2) If an organization specified in subsection (3)(a) (local organization) is a political body and has a connection with a political organization of an external place, the Secretary for Security may, by order published in the Gazette, prohibit the operation or continued operation of the local organization in the HKSAR.
(3) The organization specified for subsections (1) and (2) is—
(a) an organization that is organized and established in the HKSAR or has its headquarters or chief place of business in the HKSAR, but does not include—
(i) a company registered under the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622) (CO);
(ii) a company registered under the former Companies Ordinance (as defined by section 2(1) of the CO); or
(iii) a non-Hong Kong company as defined by section 2(1) of the CO (non-Hong Kong company); or
(b) an organization that is organized and established outside the HKSAR and has its headquarters or chief place of business outside the HKSAR (but excluding a non-Hong Kong company), to which one or more of the following circumstances apply—
(i) the organization conducts any activity in the HKSAR;
(ii) any person in the HKSAR acts as an office-bearer or member of the organization or professes or claims to be an office-bearer or member of the organization;
(iii) any person in the HKSAR manages or assists in the management of the organization;
(iv) any person in the HKSAR conducts any activity in the HKSAR on behalf of, or in cooperation with, or under the control, supervision or direction of, the organization;
(v) the organization incites, induces or invites any person in the HKSAR to become a member of, or manage or assist in the management of, the organization;
(vi) any person in the HKSAR pays money or gives aid of other kinds to or for the purposes of the organization;
(vii) the organization solicits or accepts financial contributions, loans, or financial sponsorships of any kind, or aid of other kinds, directly or indirectly from any person in the HKSAR;
(viii) the organization provides financial contributions, loans, or financial sponsorships of any kind, or aid of other kinds, directly or indirectly to any person in the HKSAR.
(4) The Secretary for Security must not make an order under subsection (1) or (2) without first affording the organization an opportunity to be heard or to make written representations as the organization considers appropriate as to why such an order should not be made.
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply if the Secretary for Security reasonably believes that affording the organization an opportunity to be heard or to make written representations would not be practicable in the circumstances of that case.
(6) An order made under subsection (1) or (2) must as soon as practicable be—
(a) served on the organization;
(b) published in a Chinese language newspaper and an English language newspaper in general circulation in the HKSAR designated by the Secretary for Security;
(c) published in the Gazette; and
(d) published on an internet website designated by the Secretary for Security.
(7) An order made under subsection (1) or (2)—
(a) takes effect on publication in the Gazette; or
(b) if specified to take effect on a subsequent date—takes effect on the specified date.
61.
Matters following prohibition of operation of local organizations
(1) If the operation or continued operation in the HKSAR of any organization specified in section 60(3)(a) is prohibited under section 60 (local prohibited organization), the organization is dissolved on the taking effect of the order prohibiting the operation or continued operation of the organization under section 60(7).
(2) After the dissolution of a local prohibited organization, the liability (if any) of every office-bearer and member of the organization continues and may be enforced as if the organization had not been dissolved.
(3) If, immediately before the taking effect of an order prohibiting the operation or continued operation of a local prohibited organization under section 60(7), the organization is registered (however described, and carried out in whatever manner) under a specified Ordinance, subsections (4) and (5) apply to the organization.
(4) If the organization is dissolved under subsection (1), the registration mentioned in subsection (3) is cancelled, and the specified authority must—
(a) if a register (however described) is required to be kept in relation to the registration under the specified Ordinance—update the register in view of the cancellation of the registration; and
(b) publish a notice of the cancellation of the registration in the Gazette.
(5) Where the organization is dissolved under subsection (1)—
(a) if there is any provision in the specified Ordinance that applies after the dissolution of the organization under the specified Ordinance—the provision applies as if the organization were dissolved under the specified Ordinance; and
(b) if there is any provision that applies to the winding up of the organization, or any other provision that has the same effect, in the specified Ordinance—the provision applies to the organization.
(6) Subsection (7) applies to a local prohibited organization if—
(a) the organization is not an organization mentioned in subsection (3); or
(b) the organization is an organization mentioned in subsection (3), but there is neither a provision that applies to the winding up of the organization nor any other provision that has the same effect in the specified Ordinance.
(7) Where a local prohibited organization is dissolved under subsection (1), sections 360E, 360F, 360G, 360H, 360I, 360J, 360K, 360L and 360M of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32) apply, with necessary modifications, to the organization as if the organization were a company that had been struck off the Companies Register, and had been dissolved, under section 360C of that Ordinance.
(8) In this section—specified authority (指明當局), in relation to a registration mentioned in subsection (3), means—
(a) if a person is required to keep a register (however described) in relation to the registration under the specified Ordinance—the person; or
(b) in any other case—the Secretary for Security;
specified Ordinance (指明條例) means an Ordinance other than the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622) and the former Companies Ordinance as defined by section 2(1) of the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622).
Subdivision 3: Offences in connection with Prohibited Organizations
62.
Prohibition of participation in activities of prohibited organizations
(1) A person who, after the operation or continued operation of an organization in the HKSAR is prohibited under section 60—
(a) is or acts as an office-bearer of the organization, or professes or claims to be an officer-bearer of the organization; or
(b) manages or assists in the management of the organization,
commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of $1,000,000 and imprisonment for 14 years.
(2) A person who, after the operation or continued operation of an organization in the HKSAR is prohibited under section 60—
(a) is or acts as a member of the organization, or professes or claims to be a member of the organization;
(b) conducts any activity on behalf of, or in cooperation with, or under the control, supervision or direction of, the organization;
(c) participates in a meeting of the organization; or
(d) pays money or gives aid of other kinds to or for the purposes of the organization, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of $250,000 and imprisonment for 10 years.
(3) The following act does not constitute an offence under subsection (1) or (2)—
(a) doing an act with the prior written permission of the Secretary for Security;
(b) participating in any proceedings, whether in one’s own capacity or as a representative of an organization that is a party to the proceedings;
(c) seeking, providing or accepting any legal services, or making or receiving any payment for the services; or
(d) doing any act that is incidental to the act referred to in paragraph (b) or (c).
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) or (2) to establish that, at the time of the alleged offence, the person did not know and had no reasonable grounds to believe that the operation or continued operation of the organization in the HKSAR was prohibited under section 60.
(5) Without affecting subsection (4)—
(a) it is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1), for being or acting as an office-bearer of a prohibited organization, to establish that the person has taken all reasonable steps and exercised due diligence to terminate the status as such an office-bearer; or
(b) it is a defence for a person who is charged with an offence under subsection (2), for being or acting as a member of a prohibited organization, to establish that the person has taken all reasonable steps and exercised due diligence to terminate the membership.
(6) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (4) or (5) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
63.
Allowing meetings of prohibited organizations to be held on premises
A person who knowingly allows a meeting of a prohibited organization, or of members of a prohibited organization, to be held in or on any place or premises belonging to or occupied by the person, or over which the person has control, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of $250,000 and to imprisonment for 7 years.
64.
Inciting etc. others to become members of prohibited organizations
A person who incites, induces or invites any other person to become a member of or assist in the management of a prohibited organization, or uses any violence, threat or intimidation towards any other person in order to induce that other person to become a member of or to assist in the management of a prohibited organization, commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of $250,000 and to imprisonment for 7 years.
65.
Procuring subscription or aid for prohibited organizations
A person who procures or attempts to procure from any other person any subscription or aid for the purposes of a prohibited organization commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of $250,000 and to imprisonment for 7 years.
66.
Shadow organizations of prohibited organizations
(1) In section 62(1)(a) and (b) and (2)(a), (b), (c) and (d), a reference to the organization includes a shadow organization of the organization.
(2) In sections 63, 64 and 65, a reference to a prohibited organization includes a shadow organization of a prohibited organization.
(3) For the purposes of this section, if an organization (Organization A) holds itself out to be another organization (Organization B), Organization A is a shadow organization of Organization B.
Subdivision 4: Miscellaneous Provisions
67.
Authorized officers
The Secretary for Security may appoint a public servant in writing to be an authorized officer for the purposes of this Division.
68.
Information to be provided by organizations
(1) An authorized officer may, by written notice, require any organization to provide in writing information that is reasonably necessary for the Secretary for Security to perform a function of the Secretary for Security under section 60.
(2) The notice under subsection (1) must be served on—
(a) the organization; or
(b) any office-bearer of the organization or any person who manages or assists in the management of the organization in the HKSAR.
(3) The information required to be provided under subsection (1) may include the income, the source of income and the expenditure of the organization.
(4) The notice under subsection (1) must specify the time within which (being not less than 7 days) the information must be provided.
(5) The authorized officer may, on application made to the officer and on good reason being shown, grant an extension of time at the officer’s discretion.
69.
Persons responsible for providing information
(1) The obligations imposed on any organization under section 68 are binding on every office-bearer of the organization, and on every person managing or assisting in the management of the organization in the HKSAR, who has been served with the notice under that section.
(2) If an organization fails to comply with the whole or part of a notice served under section 68, each of the persons mentioned in subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction to a fine at level 4 unless the person establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the person has exercised due diligence and has failed to comply with the notice for reasons beyond the person’s control.
(3) If any information provided to the Secretary for Security in compliance with a notice served under section 68 is false, incorrect, or incomplete in a material particular, the person who has provided the information is liable on summary conviction to a fine at level 4 unless the person establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the person had good reason to believe that the information was true, correct and complete.
70.
Power to inspect non-domestic premises
For the purpose of enabling the Secretary for Security to perform a function of the Secretary for Security under section 60, if a police officer of the rank of Superintendent or above reasonably believes that any non-domestic premises are kept or used by an organization or any of its members as a place for conducting any meeting or activity or a place of business, the police officer (or a police officer authorized by that officer) may, at the time during which the meeting or activity is conducted, at the time during which the business is carried on, or at any other reasonable time, enter and inspect the non-domestic premises.
71.
Power to search places in specific circumstances
(1) If a magistrate is satisfied by information on oath by an authorized officer that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that any specified evidence is in a place, the magistrate may issue a warrant.
(2) The warrant may authorize an authorized officer and any other person specified in the warrant to take all or any of the following actions—
(a) to enter and search the place;
(b) to seize, remove or impound anything that appears to that officer or that other person to be specified evidence;
(c) to remove by force a person or thing obstructing that officer or that other person from exercising a power conferred on that officer or that other person by this section;
(d) to detain a person found in the place until the place has been searched.
(3) If—
(a) a police officer of the rank of Superintendent or above has reasonable grounds to suspect that any specified evidence is in a place; and
(b) the delay necessary to obtain a warrant is likely to result in the loss or destruction of evidence or for any other reason it would not be reasonably practicable to obtain such a warrant,
the police officer (or a police officer authorized by that officer) may exercise any of the powers referred to in subsection (2) in respect of the place without a warrant issued under subsection (1).
(4) In this section—
place (地方) means any place, and includes—
(a) any vehicle, vessel, aircraft, hovercraft or other conveyance;
(b) any tent or structure (whether or not movable or offshore); and
(c) any electronic equipment;
specified evidence (指明證據) means anything that is or contains, or that is likely to be or contain, evidence necessary for the Secretary for Security to perform a function of the Secretary for Security under section 60.
72.
Forfeiture
Any books, accounts, writings, banners, insignia or other movable property belonging to any prohibited organization must, on order of a magistrate, be forfeited and given to the Secretary for Security for disposal in the manner that the Secretary for Security considers appropriate.
73.
Service of notices etc.
A notice or order that must be served on a person or organization under this Division is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, deemed to be so served if—
(a) for an individual, the notice or order is—
(i) delivered to the individual;
(ii) left at the individual’s last known address for service, or at the individual’s last known place of residence or business;
(iii) sent by post to the individual at the individual’s last known address for service, or at the individual’s last known postal address, whether or not the address is in the HKSAR;
(iv) sent by electronic mail transmission, fax transmission or other similar method to the individual at the individual’s last known address for service, or at the individual’s last known postal address, or at the individual’s last known place of residence or business, whether or not the address or place is in the HKSAR; or
(v) published through the Internet or a similar electronic network for the purpose of bringing the matter that the notice or order concerns to the attention of the individual;
(b) for an organization, the notice or order is—
(i) given to or served on an office-bearer of the organization, or a person managing or assisting in the management of the organization;
(ii) left at the organization’s last known address for service, or at its last known address;
(iii) sent by post to the organization at its last known address for service, or at its last known postal address, whether or not the address is in the HKSAR;
(iv) sent by electronic mail transmission, fax transmission or other similar method to the organization at its last known address for service, or at its last known postal address, or at its last known address, whether or not the address is in the HKSAR; or
(v) published through the Internet or a similar electronic network for the purpose of bringing the matter that the notice or order concerns to the attention of an office-bearer of the organization, or a person managing or assisting in the management of the organization.
Division 1: Enforcement Powers, and Other Matters in connection with Investigation
Subdivision 1: Applications may be Made to Court for Extension of Detention Period for Investigation of Offences Endangering National Security
74.
Interpretation
(1) In this Subdivision—
arrested person (被捕人)—see section 75(2);
Cap. 232 (《第232章》) means the Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232);
first detention period (首段羈留期) means the period of 48 hours referred to in section 75(2);
hospital (醫院) means—
(a) a hospital specified in Schedule 1 or 2 to the Hospital Authority Ordinance (Cap. 113); or
(b) a clinic for medical diagnosis or treatment that is maintained or managed by the Government.
(2) In calculating a period under this Subdivision, any time during which the arrested person receives medical diagnosis or treatment in hospital, or is on the way there or back, is not included, except for any time during which the person is being questioned in hospital or on the way there or back by a police officer for the purpose of obtaining evidence in respect of an offence.
75.
Application of this Subdivision to persons arrested for offences endangering national security
(1) This Subdivision applies in relation to a person who—
(a) is arrested for being reasonably suspected of having committed an offence endangering national security; and
(b) is required under section 52 of Cap. 232 to be brought before a magistrate as soon as practicable.
(2) Subject to section 78(1), the person who is detained in police custody (arrested person) must be brought before a magistrate as soon as practicable, and in any event, not later than the first sitting of a Magistrates’ Court after the expiry of the period of 48 hours after the person’s arrest.
76.
Applications to Court for extension of detention period
(1) A police officer of the rank of Chief Superintendent or above or a police officer authorized by that officer may, by application supported by information on oath, apply to a magistrate for an extension, or further extension, of the period of detention of an arrested person in police custody without charge.
(2) The information in support of the application—
(a) must be laid by a police officer of the rank of Chief Inspector or above; and
(b) must state—
(i) the nature of the offence;
(ii) the general nature of the evidence on which the arrested person was arrested;
(iii) what inquiries have been made by the police in relation to the offence and what further inquiries are proposed to be made by them; and
(iv) the reasons why further detention of the arrested person is necessary.
77.
Court hearings of applications for extension of detention period
(1) A magistrate must not hear the application unless—
(a) the arrested person has been given a copy of the application (the information in support of the application need not be given to the arrested person); and
(b) the arrested person has been brought before the magistrate for the hearing of the application.
(2) If the arrested person is not represented by a solicitor or counsel but wishes to be so represented—
(a) the magistrate may adjourn the hearing of the application for a reasonable period to enable the person to be represented by a solicitor or counsel, and the period must not exceed—
(i) for the first application after the arrested person’s arrest—7 days after the expiry of the first detention period; and
(ii) for any subsequent application—7 days after the expiry of the last period of extension, or 14 days after the expiry of the first detention period, whichever is the earlier; and
(b) the arrested person is to be delivered to the police for detention in their custody during the adjournment.
78.
Court decisions on applications for extension of detention period
(1) If the magistrate hearing the application is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an extension (or further extension) of the period of detention of the arrested person in police custody is justified, the magistrate may authorize the period of detention of the arrested person in police custody without charge to be—
(a) for the first application after the arrested person’s arrest—extended for a period not exceeding 7 days after the expiry of the first detention period; and
(b) for any subsequent application—further extended, with each period of extension not exceeding 7 days, and with the period of extension also not causing the total period of detention of the arrested person to exceed 14 days after the expiry of the first detention period.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an extension (or further extension) of the period of detention of the arrested person in police custody is justified only if—
(a) the investigation of the offence is being diligently and expeditiously conducted by the police, and cannot reasonably be completed before the date of the application; and
(b) the detention of the arrested person without charge is necessary for securing or preserving the evidence of the offence or for obtaining the evidence by questioning the person.
(3) An authorization given under subsection (1)—
(a) must be in writing; and
(b) must state—
(i) the time at which the authorization is given; and
(ii) the period for which the arrested person is delivered to the police for detention in their custody is authorized.
(4) If the magistrate authorizes, under subsection (1), an extension (or further extension) of the period of detention of the arrested person in police custody (extended period), then, unless the person is charged, the person must be discharged, in circumstances in which section 52(3) of Cap. 232 applies, on or before the expiry of the extended period.
(5) If the magistrate refuses the application under subsection (1), then, unless the arrested person is charged, the arrested person must be discharged, in circumstances in which section 52(3) of Cap. 232 applies—
(a) for the first application after the arrested person’s arrest—
(i) on or before the expiry of the first detention period; or
(ii) if the first detention period has expired when the application is refused—at the conclusion of the hearing of the application; and
(b) for any subsequent application—
(i) on or before the expiry of the last extended period; or
(ii) if the last extended period has expired when the application is refused—at the conclusion of the hearing of the application.
(6) Despite subsections (4) and (5), if, before the expiry of the period under subsection (4) or (5) (as applicable), the police officer who laid the information no longer has reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances specified in subsection (2) exist, then, unless the arrested person is charged, the person must be discharged, in circumstances in which section 52(3) of Cap. 232 applies, immediately.
Subdivision 2: Applications may be Made to Court for Imposition of Appropriate Restrictions in relation to Consultation with Legal Representatives in View of Circumstances Endangering National Security
79.
Consultation with relevant particular legal representatives may be restricted in view of circumstances endangering national security
(1) This section applies if a person is arrested for being reasonably suspected of having committed an offence endangering national security and is detained in police custody, and during the detention in police custody, the person requests to consult, or is consulting, a particular legal representative or particular legal representatives.
(2) A police officer of the rank of Chief Superintendent or above or a police officer authorized by that officer may, by ex parte application supported by information on oath, apply to a magistrate for the issue by the magistrate of a warrant in relation to the person under this section.
(3) If the magistrate hearing the application is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances specified in subsection (4) exist, the magistrate may issue a warrant authorizing a police officer to impose the following restriction on the person—
(a) the person must not, during the person’s detention in police custody—
(i) consult the particular legal representative or legal representatives; or
(ii) if the particular legal representative or legal representatives is or are in the practice of the law in a certain Hong Kong firm or certain Hong Kong firms—consult any legal representative in the practice of the law in the firm or firms; but
(b) the person may consult any other legal representative of the person’s choosing.
(4) The circumstances are—
(a) the person’s consultation with any legal representative referred to in subsection (3)(a) (relevant legal representative) during the person’s detention in police custody will endanger national security or cause bodily harm to any person;
(b) the person has benefited from the offence, and the person’s consultation with the relevant legal representative during the person’s detention in police custody will hinder the recovery of the benefit unless the authorization is given; or
(c) the person’s consultation with the relevant legal representative during the person’s detention in police custody will pervert or obstruct the course of justice unless the authorization is given.
(5) If the information under subsection (2) is laid during the person’s consultation with a particular legal representative or particular legal representatives, then, before a magistrate makes any decision on the information—
(a) if the application that is supported by the information requests for the imposition of restrictions in relation to the person’s consultation with the particular legal representative or legal representatives—the person must suspend consultation with the particular legal representative or legal representatives, but may consult any other legal representative of the person’s choosing; or
(b) if the particular legal representative or legal representatives is or are in the practice of the law in a certain Hong Kong firm or certain Hong Kong firms, and the application requests for the imposition of restrictions in relation to the person’s consultation with any legal representative who is in the practice of the law in the firm or firms (relevant firm or firms)—the person must suspend consultation with the particular legal representative or legal representatives, and must not consult any other legal representative of the relevant firm or firms, but may consult any other legal representative of the person’s choosing.
(6) If, after the issue of the warrant and during the person’s detention in police custody, the police officer who laid the information no longer has reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances specified in subsection (4) exist, a police officer must immediately cease to impose on the person the restriction mentioned in subsection (3).
(7) In this section—
Hong Kong firm (香港律師行) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Legal Practitioners Ordinance (Cap. 159);
legal representative (法律代表) means a solicitor or counsel.
80.
Consultation with legal representatives may be restricted in view of circumstances endangering national security
(1) This section applies if a person is investigated for being reasonably suspected of having committed an offence endangering national security, regardless of whether the person has been arrested.
(2) A police officer of the rank of Chief Superintendent or above or a police officer authorized by that officer may, by ex parte application supported by information on oath, apply to a magistrate for the issue by the magistrate of a warrant in relation to the person under this section.
(3) If the magistrate hearing the application is satisfied that—
(a) if the person has not been arrested—
(i) there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the person has committed the offence;
(ii) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is about to be arrested; and
(iii) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances specified in subsection (4) exist; or
(b) if the person has been arrested—there are reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances specified in subsection (4) exist, the magistrate may issue a warrant authorizing a police officer to restrict the person’s consultation with a legal representative during the period of detention of the person in police custody within the period of 48 hours after the person’s arrest (specified period).
(4) The circumstances are—
(a) the person’s consultation with a legal representative during the specified period will endanger national security or cause bodily harm to any person;
(b) the person has benefited from the offence, and the person’s consultation with a legal representative during the specified period will hinder the recovery of the benefit unless the authorization is given; or
(c) the person’s consultation with a legal representative during the specified period will pervert or obstruct the course of justice unless the authorization is given.
(5) If the warrant is issued before the person is arrested, the magistrate may direct that the warrant is only in force before the date that is specified.
(6) After the issue of the warrant, if, before the expiry of the specified period, the police officer who laid the information no longer has reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances specified in subsection (4) exist, a police officer must immediately cease to restrict the person’s consultation with a legal representative.
(7) In this section—legal representative (法律代表) means a solicitor or counsel.
Subdivision 3: Applications may be Made to Court for Imposition of Appropriate Restrictions in relation to Persons on Bail for Prevention or Investigation of Offences Endangering National Security
81.
Interpretation
In this Subdivision—
movement restriction order (行動限制令)—see section 83(1);
person on bail (獲保釋人)—see section 82;
recognizance (擔保) means a recognizance entered into in accordance with section 52(3) of the Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232);
specified (指明) means specified in a movement restriction order.
82.
Application of this Subdivision to persons arrested for offences endangering national security and on bail
If—
(a) a person is arrested for being reasonably suspected of having committed an offence endangering national security; and
(b) the person is about to be, or has been, discharged (whether or not a recognizance is required) by the police,
this Subdivision applies in relation to the person (person on bail).
83.
Applications to Court for movement restriction orders in relation to period of bail
(1) A police officer of the rank of Chief Superintendent or above or a police officer authorized by that officer may, by ex parte application supported by information on oath, apply to a magistrate for the making by the magistrate of an order (movement restriction order) directing that a person on bail must comply with the specified requirements and the specified conditions imposed in relation to those requirements.
(2) The magistrate may specify one or more of the following requirements—
(a) the following requirements on the place of residence of the person on bail—
(i) the person on bail must reside in the specified place during the specified period;
(ii) the person on bail must report to the police by the specified deadline information as to the identity of any person who also resides in the specified place;
(iii) the person on bail must remain in the specified place during the specified time;
(b) the person on bail must not enter the specified area or place during the specified period, or may only enter the area or place if the specified conditions are met;
(c) the person on bail must not, by any means or through any person, associate or communicate with the specified person during the specified period, or may only associate or communicate with the specified person if the specified conditions are met;
(d) the person on bail must report to the police at the specified police station at the specified time.
(3) The information in support of the application—
(a) must be laid by a police officer of the rank of Chief Inspector or above; and
(b) must state—
(i) the nature of the offence;
(ii) the general nature of the evidence on which the person on bail was arrested;
(iii) what inquiries have been made by the police in relation to the offence and what further inquiries are proposed to be made by them; and
(iv) the reasons why imposing any of the requirements mentioned in subsection (2) on the person on bail is necessary.
84.
Court may make movement restriction orders
(1) If the magistrate hearing the application is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances specified in subsection (2) exist, the magistrate may make a movement restriction order in relation to a person on bail.
(2) The circumstances are—
(a) the person on bail will not report to the police in accordance with the conditions specified by the police unless the person on bail is subject to the requirements requested to be imposed on the person on bail in the application (relevant requirements);
(b) there will be perversion or obstruction of the course of justice unless the person on bail is subject to the relevant requirements; or
(c) national security will be endangered unless the person on bail is subject to the relevant requirements.
(3) A movement restriction order—
(a) must be in writing; and
(b) must state the requirements imposed on the person on bail and the conditions imposed in relation to the requirements.
(4) A movement restriction order is valid for 3 months, and the validity period must not begin before the date on which the movement restriction order is served under subsection (5).
(5) A movement restriction order must be served personally on the person on bail.
(6) A magistrate may, on application by a police officer mentioned in section 83(1) (relevant officer), extend (or further extend) the validity period of a movement restriction order made in relation to a person on bail, with each period of extension being 1 month, if the magistrate is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that—
(a) a circumstance specified in subsection (2) remains in existence; and
(b) the investigation of the offence is being diligently and expeditiously conducted by the police, and cannot reasonably be completed before the date of the application.
(7) A magistrate may, on the application by a relevant officer or a person on bail, vary or discharge a movement restriction order made in relation to the person on bail.
(8) A magistrate must not grant an application made under subsection (7) unless the magistrate is satisfied that, in all the circumstances of the case, it is reasonable and necessary, and would not be contrary to the interests of national security, to do so.
85.
Review of movement restriction orders
(1) If a magistrate refuses an application made by a person on bail under section 84(7), the person on bail may make an application to a judge of the Court of First Instance for the first-mentioned application to be granted (review application).
(2) The judge of the Court of First Instance must not grant the review application unless the judge is satisfied that, in all the circumstances of the case, it is reasonable and necessary, and would not be contrary to the interests of national security, to do so.
(3) Subject to subsection (2), the judge of the Court of First Instance may, by order, confirm, vary or revoke the magistrate’s decision and may make any other order in relation to relevant matters as the judge of the Court of First Instance considers just.
86.
Contravention of movement restriction orders
If a person on bail, without reasonable excuse, contravenes—
(a) any requirement in a movement restriction order made in relation to the person; or
(b) any condition imposed in relation to the requirement,
the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 1 year.
Subdivision 4: Miscellaneous Provisions and Offences in connection with Investigation
87.
Applications under this Division to be heard in closed court in general
(1) An application under this Division must be heard in a closed court.
(2) Despite subsection (1), the judge of the Court of First Instance or the magistrate (as applicable) hearing the application may, either on his or her own motion or on application by any party to the hearing, order the application to be heard in open court.
(3) However, the judge of the Court of First Instance or the magistrate concerned may only make an order under subsection (2) on being satisfied that doing so is necessary in the interests of justice and would not be contrary to the interests of national security.
88.
No prejudicing of investigation of offences endangering national security
If a person knows or suspects that an investigation of an offence endangering national security is being conducted—
(a) the person—
(i) with intent to prejudice the investigation; or
(ii) being reckless as to whether the investigation will be prejudiced,
without reasonable excuse or lawful authority, makes any disclosure; or
(b) the person—
(i) knowing or suspecting that any material is likely to be relevant to the investigation; and
(ii) with intent to conceal the facts disclosed by the material from persons conducting the investigation,
without reasonable excuse, falsifies, conceals, destroys or otherwise disposes of the material, or causes or permits the material to be falsified, concealed, destroyed or otherwise disposed of,
the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.
Division 2: Absconders in respect of Offences Endangering National Security
Subdivision 1: Specification of Relevant Absconders
89.
Power of Secretary for Security to specify an absconder for application of certain measures against the absconder
(1) If the Secretary for Security reasonably believes that it is necessary for safeguarding national security to specify a person to which this subsection applies for the purposes of subsection (4), the Secretary for Security may, by notice published in the Gazette, specify the person for the purposes of that subsection.
(2) Subsection (1) applies to a person if—
(a) a Court has issued, in relation to an offence endangering national security, a warrant to arrest the person;
(b) reasonable steps have been taken to inform the person of the issue of the warrant, or the Secretary for Security reasonably believes that the person knew of the issue of the warrant;
(c) the person has not been brought before a judge or magistrate (as the case may be); and
(d) the Secretary for Security reasonably believes that the person is not in the HKSAR.
(3) The Secretary for Security must revoke a specification made in relation to a person under subsection (1) if—
(a) the warrant mentioned in subsection (2)(a) in respect of the person has been revoked; or
(b) the person has been brought before a judge or magistrate (as the case may be).
(4) If the Secretary for Security specifies a person under subsection (1), the Secretary for Security may, during the period within which the specification is in force, by notice published in the Gazette, further specify that any one or more provisions in Subdivision 2 of this Division that the Secretary for Security reasonably considers to be suitable in all the circumstances of the case apply in relation to the person.
(5) The Secretary for Security may, by notice published in the Gazette, vary or revoke a specification made under subsection (4).
Subdivision 2: Measures that may Apply against Relevant Absconders
90.
Prohibition against making available funds etc. or dealing with funds etc.
(1) If it is specified under section 89(4) (including by virtue of section 89(5)) that this section applies in relation to a person, the person is a relevant absconder for the purposes of this section during the period within which the specification is in force.
(2) Except under the authority of a licence granted under section 97, a person must not—
(a) make available, directly or indirectly, any funds or other financial assets or economic resources to, or for the benefit of, a relevant absconder; or
(b) deal with, directly or indirectly, any funds or other financial assets or economic resources belonging to, or owned or controlled by, a relevant absconder.
(3) A person who contravenes subsection (2) commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to establish that the person did not know and had no reason to believe—
(a) for a contravention of subsection (2)(a)—that the funds or other financial assets or economic resources concerned were, or were to be, made available to, or for the benefit of, a relevant absconder; or
(b) for a contravention of subsection (2)(b)—that the person was dealing with the funds or other financial assets or economic resources belonging to, or owned or controlled by, a relevant absconder.
(5) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (4) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(6) A person is not to be regarded as having contravened subsection (2) by reason only of having credited any of the following to an account belonging to, or directly or indirectly owned or controlled by, a relevant absconder—
(a) interest or other earnings due on that account;
(b) payment due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose before the date on which the relevant absconder became a relevant absconder.
(7) In this section—
deal with (處理) means—
(a) in respect of funds—
(i) use, alter, move, allow access to or transfer;
(ii) deal with in any other way that would result in any change in volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character or destination; or
(iii) make any other change that would enable use, including portfolio management; and
(b) in respect of other financial assets or economic resources—use to obtain funds, goods or services in any way, including by selling, hiring out or mortgaging the assets or resources;
economic resources (經濟資源) means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds but can be used to obtain funds, goods or services;
funds (資金) includes—
(a) gold coin, gold bullion, cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders and other payment instruments;
(b) deposits with financial institutions or other entities, balances on accounts, debts and debt obligations;
(c) securities and debt instruments (including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, debentures, debenture stock and derivatives contracts);
(d) interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by property;
(e) credit, rights of set-off, guarantees, performance bonds or other financial commitments;
(f) letters of credit, bills of lading and bills of sale;
(g) documents evidencing an interest in funds or financial resources; and
(h) any other instrument of export financing.
91.
Prohibition against certain activities in connection with immovable property
(1) If it is specified under section 89(4) (including by virtue of section 89(5)) that this section applies in relation to a person, the person is a relevant absconder for the purposes of this section during the period within which the specification is in force.
(2) Except under the authority of a licence granted under section 97, a person must not—
(a) lease, or otherwise make available, immovable property, directly or indirectly, to a relevant absconder; or
(b) lease immovable property, directly or indirectly, from a relevant absconder.
(3) A person who contravenes subsection (2) commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to establish that the person did not know and had no reason to believe—
(a) for a contravention of subsection (2)(a)—that the immovable property concerned was leased, or otherwise made available, to a relevant absconder; or
(b) for a contravention of subsection (2)(b)—that the immovable property concerned was leased from a relevant absconder.
(5) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (4) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(6) If a person does an act mentioned in subsection (2) under a contract, agreement or obligation that arose before the date on which the relevant absconder became a relevant absconder, the person is not to be regarded as having contravened that subsection by reason only of that act.
92.
Prohibition in connection with joint ventures or partnerships with relevant absconders
(1) If it is specified under section 89(4) (including by virtue of section 89(5)) that this section applies in relation to a person, the person is a relevant absconder for the purposes of this section during the period within which the specification is in force.
(2) Except under the authority of a licence granted under section 97, a person must not—
(a) establish a joint venture, partnership or any like relationship with a relevant absconder; or
(b) invest in such a joint venture, partnership or any like relationship.
(3) A person who contravenes subsection (2) commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to establish that the person did not know and had no reason to believe that the joint venture, partnership or like relationship concerned was one with a relevant absconder.
(5) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (4) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(6) If a person does an act mentioned in subsection (2) under a contract, agreement or obligation that arose before the date on which the relevant absconder became a relevant absconder, the person is not to be regarded as having contravened that subsection by reason only of that act.
93.
Suspension of qualification to practise
(1) If it is specified under section 89(4) (including by virtue of section 89(5)) that this section applies in relation to a person, the person is a relevant absconder for the purposes of this section during the period within which the specification is in force.
(2) If, at any time during the period within which the specification is in force (material time), a relevant absconder holds a qualification to practise in a profession under any Ordinance, the qualification to practise is, for all purposes, to be regarded as suspended at the material time (regardless of whether the Ordinance itself provides for the suspension (however described) of the qualification to practise).
(3) If, under any Ordinance, a person is required to keep a register (however described) in relation to the qualification to practise, the person must from time to time update the register in view of the operation of subsection (2).
(4) Also, if, under any Ordinance, had the qualification to practise been suspended (however described) under the Ordinance, a provision would apply accordingly, then, where the qualification to practise is regarded as suspended under subsection (2), the provision also applies, with necessary modifications, accordingly as if the qualification to practise is suspended (however described) under the Ordinance.
(5) In subsection (4), a reference to any provision does not include a provision that concerns an appeal or review against the suspension of the qualification to practise.
(6) This section does not affect any power that a person may exercise under any Ordinance in relation to a relevant absconder.
94.
Permission or registration for carrying on business or for employment not in effect temporarily
(1) If it is specified under section 89(4) (including by virtue of section 89(5)) that this section applies in relation to a person, the person is a relevant absconder for the purposes of this section during the period within which the specification is in force.
(2) If, at any time during the period within which the specification is in force (material time), there is in effect, in relation to a relevant absconder (but not in effect in relation to the relevant absconder together with any other person)—
(a) a permission (however described, and given in whatever manner) under any Ordinance; or
(b) a registration (however described, and carried out in whatever manner) under any Ordinance,
that is necessary for the relevant absconder to carry on any business or to be employed for any work, the permission or registration is, for all purposes, to be regarded as being not in effect temporarily at the material time (regardless of whether the Ordinance itself provides for the permission or registration being not in effect temporarily (however described)).
(3) If, under any Ordinance, a person is required to keep a register (however described) in relation to the permission or registration, the person must from time to time update the register in view of the operation of subsection (2).
(4) Also, if, under any Ordinance, had the permission or registration been not in effect temporarily (however described) under the Ordinance, a provision would apply accordingly, then, where the permission or registration is regarded as being not in effect temporarily under subsection (2), the provision also applies, with necessary modifications, accordingly as if the permission or registration is not in effect temporarily (however described) under the Ordinance.
(5) In subsection (4), a reference to any provision does not include a provision that concerns an appeal or review against the permission or registration being not in effect temporarily.
(6) This section does not affect any power that a person may exercise under any Ordinance in relation to a relevant absconder, or in relation to the business carried on by the relevant absconder or the work for which the relevant absconder is employed.
95.
Temporary removal from office of director
(1) If it is specified under section 89(4) (including by virtue of section 89(5)) that this section applies in relation to a person, the person is a relevant absconder for the purposes of this section during the period within which the specification is in force.
(2) If, at any time during the period within which the specification is in force (material time), a relevant absconder holds the office of director of any company, the relevant absconder is, for all purposes, to be regarded as being removed temporarily from that office of director at the material time, and accordingly, the relevant absconder must not directly or indirectly take part or be concerned in the management of the company temporarily.
(3) If, under any Ordinance, a person is required to keep a register (however described) in relation to that office of director, the person must from time to time update the register in view of the operation of subsection (2).
(4) This section does not affect—
(a) any power that a person may exercise under the law of the HKSAR in relation to a relevant absconder; or
(b) any power that a person may exercise under the constitution, rules or other governing documents by which the company is constituted (or according to which the company operates) in relation to a relevant absconder.
(5) In this section—
company (公司) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622);
director (董事) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622).
96.
Cancellation of HKSAR passports etc.
(1) If it is specified under section 89(4) (including by virtue of section 89(5)) that this section applies in relation to a person, the person is a relevant absconder for the purposes of this section during the period within which the specification is in force.
(2) If—
(a) a relevant absconder holds a HKSAR passport; and
(b) the passport is valid immediately before the specification is made,
the passport is, for all purposes, to be regarded as being cancelled at the time when the specification is made, and accordingly, the Director of Immigration may take possession of the passport.
(3) If an application for a HKSAR passport is made by a relevant absconder, the application is, for the purposes of section 3(1) of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Passports Ordinance (Cap. 539) and all other purposes, to be regarded as being invalid.
(4) In this section—HKSAR passport (特區護照) means a passport issued by the Director of Immigration under section 3 of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Passports Ordinance (Cap. 539).
Subdivision 3: Licences
97.
Grant of licences
(1) The Secretary for Security may, on application, grant a licence for doing an act prohibited by section 90, 91 or 92.
(2) The Secretary for Security must not grant a licence under subsection (1) unless the Secretary for Security is satisfied that, in all the circumstances of the case, it is reasonable and necessary, and would not be contrary to the interests of national security, to do so.
98.
Provision of false or misleading information or documents for purpose of obtaining licences
(1) A person who, for the purpose of obtaining a licence, makes any statement or provides or produces any information or document that the person knows to be false or misleading in a material particular commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 3 years.
(2) A person who, for the purpose of obtaining a licence, recklessly makes any statement or provides or produces any information or document that is false or misleading in a material particular commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 3 years.
Division 3: Procedure in Legal Actions: General Provisions
99.
Application of procedure under HK National Security Law to offences under this Ordinance
To avoid doubt, any case in connection with an offence under this Ordinance is a case mentioned in Article 41 of the HK National Security Law, and the procedure under Chapter IV of the HK National Security Law applies to such a case.
100.
Cases concerning national security to be adjudicated by designated judges
(1) If a case adjudicated by a Court is a case concerning national security by virtue of section 3(2)(b), the case must be adjudicated by a designated judge.
(2) Subsection (1) does not limit the application of any other enactment to any case to the extent that the other enactment is not inconsistent with that subsection.
Division 4: Criminal Procedure for Cases in connection with Offences Endangering National Security
101.
Application
This Division applies to a case in connection with an offence endangering national security, regardless of whether the case is also in connection with any other offence.
102.
Interpretation
In this Division—
Cap. 227 (《第227章》) means the Magistrates Ordinance (Cap. 227);
return day (提訊日) has the meaning given by section 71A of Cap. 227.
103.
Remand during committal proceedings
In applying section 79(1) of Cap. 227, the requirement in that section for remand not to exceed 8 clear days (and the exception to the requirement) must be disregarded.
104.
Appointment of return day
(1) Subsection (2) applies in place of section 80A(3) of Cap. 227.
(2) The return day must not, unless the prosecutor and the accused consent or the magistrate, on reasonable cause being shown, determines otherwise, be less than 10 days nor more than 28 days from the day on which the return day is appointed.
105.
Translations of documents
(1) Subsection (2) applies in place of section 80B(2)(c) and (3) of Cap. 227.
(2) Unless the magistrate, on application by the accused, orders, for the purposes of section 80B(1) of Cap. 227, that a statement of a witness, or a documentary exhibit, of which a copy is served under that section must be accompanied by the following translation—
(a) if the statement or documentary exhibit is written in a language other than English—an English translation;
(b) if the statement or documentary exhibit is written in a language other than Chinese—a Chinese translation,
the statement or documentary exhibit need not be accompanied by the translation.
(3) In deciding whether to make an order under subsection (2), the magistrate must consider the need for the case to be handled in a fair and timely manner.
106.
Preliminary inquiries dispensed with
(1) Subsection (2) applies in place of sections 80C, 81, 81A, 82, 83, 84 and 85 of Cap. 227.
(2) When the accused appears or is brought before a magistrate on the return day—
(a) the prosecutor must, if the requirements of section 80B(1) of Cap. 227 are satisfied, hand into court the originals of the documents referred to in that section; and
(b) the magistrate must, after an application is made by or on behalf of the Secretary for Justice, take the action under section 80C(4) of Cap. 227, and if the accused then pleads not guilty to the charge, the magistrate must order that the accused stand committed for trial in the Court of First Instance, and inform the accused of this fact or cause the accused to be informed of this fact.
(3) Accordingly—
(a) in applying section 80A of Cap. 227—
(i) subsections (4)(c) and (d) of that section must be disregarded; and
(ii) subsection (4)(e) of that section is to be read as requiring that the magistrate must, on first appointing the return day, inform the accused of the matters mentioned in subsection (4) of this section;
(b) in applying section 81B of Cap. 227—
(i) a reference to section 80C(4)(a) or 82(1) of Cap. 227 in subsection (1) of that section 81B is to be read as a reference to subsection (2)(b) of this section;
(ii) subsection (1) of that section 81B is to be read as requiring that the magistrate must inform the accused of the matters mentioned in subsection (4) of this section in the circumstances described in that subsection (1); and
(iii) the reference to “where the accused pleads guilty in proceedings under section 80C,” in subsection (2)(a) of that section 81B must be disregarded;
(c) in applying section 85A of Cap. 227, a reference to section 80C(4) or 85(2) of Cap. 227 in subsection (1) of that section 85A is to be read as a reference to subsection (2)(b) of this section;
(d) in applying section 86 of Cap. 227—
(i) the reference to section 80C(4) of Cap. 227 in subsection (1)(b) of that section 86 is to be read as a reference to subsection (2)(b) of this section; and
(ii) the reference to section 80C(1) of Cap. 227 in subsection (1)(b) of that section 86 is to be read as a reference to subsection (2)(a) of this section;
(e) in applying section 33 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200), the reference to section 80C(1) of Cap. 227 in paragraph (a) of that section 33 is to be read as a reference to subsection (2)(a) of this section;
(f) in applying section 14 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221) (Cap. 221), the reference to section 80C(4) of Cap. 227 in subsection (1)(a) of that section 14 is to be read as a reference to subsection (2)(b) of this section;
(g) in applying section 16 of Cap. 221—
(i) the reference to section 80C(4) of Cap. 227 in subsection (1) of that section 16 is to be read as a reference to subsection (2)(b) of this section; and
(ii) the reference to section 80C(1) of Cap. 227 in subsection (1) of that section 16 is to be read as a reference to subsection (2)(a) of this section; and
(h) if an application is made under section 77A of the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336) for the proceedings to be transferred to the Court of First Instance, the following must be disregarded in applying that section—
(i) the requirement in subsection (4) of that section that the judge may only make an order allowing the application subject to subsection (5) of that section;
(ii) subsections (5) and (6) of that section; and
(iii) the condition in subsection (7) of that section that the accused elects under subsection (5) of that section to have a preliminary inquiry.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3)(a)(ii) and (b)(ii), the matters are that if the accused pleads not guilty to the charge, the court will have the accused committed for trial in the Court of First Instance, and if the accused pleads guilty to the charge, the court will have the accused committed to the Court of First Instance for sentence on that charge.
107.
Accused not to apply for discharge without hearing after committal
(1) If a certificate is issued in relation to a case under Article 46 of the HK National Security Law, section 16 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221) has no effect in relation to the case.
(2) Accordingly, in applying section 85A of Cap. 227, subsection (1)(e) of that section must be disregarded.
(3) This section does not limit the application of any other provision of this Division to the case to the extent that the other provision of this Division is not inconsistent with this section.
108.
Lifting of restrictions on reports of committal proceedings
(1) This section applies in place of section 87A(2) of Cap. 227.
(2) Despite section 87A(1) of Cap. 227, a magistrate may, on application by the prosecution or the accused, order that the section does not apply to relevant reports of the committal proceedings.
(3) However, the magistrate may only make an order under subsection (2) on being satisfied that doing so is necessary in the interests of justice and would not be contrary to the interests of national security.
(4) An order made under subsection (2) must be entered in the Magistrate’s Case Register.
(5) If there are more than one accused in the case, the reference to the accused in subsection (2) is a reference to one of the accused.
(6) For the purposes of sections 86(1)(f) and 87A(4) and (7) of Cap. 227, an order made under subsection (2) is to be regarded as an order made under section 87A(2) of Cap. 227.
Division 5: Penalties for Inchoate Offences
109.
Penalty for conspiracy, incitement or attempt to commit offence under HK National Security Law
To avoid doubt, despite any other Ordinance—
(a) if a person is convicted of conspiracy to commit any offence under the HK National Security Law (NSL offence), any provision concerning the penalty for the NSL offence under the HK National Security Law also applies to the penalty for the conspiracy;
(b) if a person is convicted of incitement to commit any NSL offence, any provision concerning the penalty for the NSL offence under the HK National Security Law also applies to the penalty for the incitement unless the HK National Security Law itself provides for the penalty for incitement to commit the NSL offence; and
(c) if a person is convicted of attempt to commit any NSL offence, any provision concerning the penalty for the NSL offence under the HK National Security Law also applies to the penalty for the attempt.
Chief Executive in Council may make subsidiary legislation for safeguarding national security
(1) The Chief Executive in Council may make subsidiary legislation for the needs of safeguarding national security and the better carrying into effect of the following laws and interpretation—
(a) the HK National Security Law, including provisions in its Chapter V concerning the mandate of the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
(b) the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 14 and Article 47 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (a translation of “《全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於〈中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法〉第十四條和第四十七條的解釋》”)* adopted at the 38th Session of the Standing Committee of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress on 30 December 2022;
(c) this Ordinance.
(2) Any subsidiary legislation made under this section may provide that a contravention of the subsidiary legislation is an indictable offence and may prescribe penalties for it of a fine not exceeding $500,000 and imprisonment not exceeding 7 years.
Editorial Note: * See Instrument A304.
111.
Administrative instructions in connection with safeguarding national security
(1) The Chief Executive may issue an administrative instruction to any department or agency of the Government or any public servant to give directions in relation to any of the following matters—
(a) the implementation of any instruction given by the Central People’s Government in relation to safeguarding national security;
(b) the work on safeguarding national security;
(c) the provision of rights, exemptions, facilitation and support that are necessary for the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in performing its mandate under Chapter V of the HK National Security Law in accordance with the law;
(d) any other matter that the Chief Executive considers conducive to safeguarding national security.
(2) Any department or agency of the Government or any public servant must comply with an administrative instruction mentioned in subsection (1).
112.
Judgements and decisions of National Security Committee
(1) A meeting of the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (National Security Committee) is to be convened by the chairperson. The National Security Adviser is to sit in on meetings of the National Security Committee. The National Security Adviser is to provide advice on matters relating to the duties and functions of the National Security Committee.
(2) The secretariat of the National Security Committee is to convey, and assist in the follow-up of and the giving of effect to, the judgements and decisions made by the National Security Committee in its performance of duties and functions under the provisions of the HK National Security Law.
(3) If the law of the HKSAR confers any function on a person, any person, in making any decision in the performance of the function, must respect, and implement in accordance with the law, the judgements and decisions of the National Security Committee.
113.
Provision of advice, or giving of directions, in relation to national security education etc.
The Chief Secretary for Administration may provide advice, or give any direction, to any person whom the Chief Secretary for Administration considers appropriate, for promoting national security education, raising the awareness of residents of the HKSAR of national security and of the obligation to abide by the law, or strengthening public communication, guidance, supervision and regulation of the work on safeguarding national security and prevention of terrorist activities.
114.
Public servants to assist in work on safeguarding national security
(1) A public servant must provide all such assistance that is necessary for the work on safeguarding national security.
(2) Accordingly, a public servant must provide any department or agency that is responsible for the work on safeguarding national security, and its personnel, in the HKSAR, with all reasonable facilitation, support, backing and protection in a timely manner, including providing the necessary manpower and other necessary resources in a timely manner.
(3) A public servant must exercise all powers and discretions that the public servant has (including any power and discretion concerning the giving of any exemption) to discharge the obligation under this section.
115.
Chief Executive to issue certificate in relation to question of whether national security or state secrets involved
(1) Apart from in the circumstances mentioned in Article 47 of the HK National Security Law, the Chief Executive may also, in circumstances that the Chief Executive considers appropriate, issue a certificate to certify whether an act or matter involves national security or whether any material involves state secrets.
(2) A certificate under subsection (1)—
(a) may be issued whether or not any proceedings have been commenced; and
(b) may be issued by the Chief Executive on the Chief Executive’s own motion.
(3) If a Court receives in any proceedings a certificate issued by the Chief Executive certifying a question under this section, the court is to be regarded as having obtained a certificate issued by the Chief Executive certifying the question under Article 47 of the HK National Security Law.
116.
Adjudication of cases concerning national security etc.
(1) The Courts are to adjudicate cases concerning national security independently in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Basic Law and the HK National Security Law, free from any interference. A person must respect and safeguard the Courts’ adjudication of cases concerning national security in accordance with the law.
(2) The Department of Justice is to control criminal prosecutions of cases in connection with offences endangering national security in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Basic Law and the HK National Security Law, free from any interference.
(3) The Government must take necessary measures to ensure the personal safety, and the safety of the property and place of residence, of any specified person and any aider, are subject to necessary protection.
(4) In this section—
aider (協助者) means an informer of, or a witness in, a case concerning national security;
specified person (指明人士 ) means—
(a) any of the personnel of any department or agency that handles cases concerning national security, or is responsible for the work on safeguarding national security, in the HKSAR; or
(b) a judicial officer, staff member of the Judiciary, counsel or solicitor, who handles a case concerning national security.
117.
Signing or certification of legal documents in respect of specified cases etc.
(1) This section applies to a document in respect of a specified case (relevant document) if an Ordinance or a direction of a Court—
(a) requires the document to be signed or certified by any of the following persons—
(i) a party to the case;
(ii) a specified person representing a party to the case;
(b) requires the document to state the name of any of the following persons—
(i) a party to the case;
(ii) a specified person representing a party to the case;
(c) permits the document to be signed or certified by any of the following persons—
(i) a party to the case;
(ii) a specified person representing a party to the case; or
(d) permits the document to state the name of any of the following persons—
(i) a party to the case;
(ii) a specified person representing a party to the case.
(2) However, this section does not apply to—
(a) an affidavit or any other document made on oath;
(b) a statutory declaration;
(c) a document made by a person as a witness for stating the truth; or
(d) a statement of truth made under an Ordinance or a direction of a Court for verifying a document.
(3) Where the relevant document—
(a) is one that falls within subsection (1)(a)(i) or (c)(i)—the document may be signed or certified by a specified person representing the party, and need not be signed or certified by the party; and
(b) is one that falls within subsection (1)(b)(i) or (d)(i)—the document may state the name of a specified person representing the party, and need not state the name of the party.
(4) Where the relevant document—
(a) is one that falls within subsection (1)(a)—the requirement under subsection (1)(a) is met if the document contains a signature specified in subsection (5);
(b) is one that falls within subsection (1)(b)—the requirement under subsection (1)(b) is met if the document contains a name specified in subsection (6);
(c) is one that falls within subsection (1)(c)—the document may contain a signature specified in subsection (5); and
(d) is one that falls within subsection (1)(d)—the document may contain a name specified in subsection (6).
(5) The signature specified for the purposes of subsection (4)(a) and (c) is—
(a) if the relevant document must or may (including may by virtue of subsection (3)(a)) be signed by a specified person and the specified person is a public servant—a signature made in the name of the department or agency represented by the specified person;
(b) if the relevant document must or may (including may by virtue of subsection (3)(a)) be signed by a specified person and the specified person is a counsel—a signature made in the name of the department or agency (or solicitors’ firm) represented by the person who gives instructions to the specified person; or
(c) if the relevant document must or may (including may by virtue of subsection (3)(a)) be signed by a specified person and the specified person is a solicitor—a signature made in the name of the solicitors’ firm represented by the specified person.
(6) The name specified for the purposes of subsection (4)(b) and (d) is—
(a) if the relevant document must or may (including may by virtue of subsection (3)(b)) state the name of a specified person and the specified person is a public servant—the name of the department or agency represented by the specified person;
(b) if the relevant document must or may (including may by virtue of subsection (3)(b)) state the name of a specified person and the specified person is a counsel—the name of the department or agency (or solicitors’ firm) represented by the person who gives instructions to the specified person; or
(c) if the relevant document must or may (including may by virtue of subsection (3)(b)) state the name of a specified person and the specified person is a solicitor—the name of the solicitors’ firm represented by the specified person.
(7) For the purposes of subsection (1), if—
(a) a case is a case concerning national security; or
(b) proceedings are brought against a person for an offence endangering national security, and the person is a party to a case,
the case is a specified case.
(8) For the purposes of subsection (7)(b), proceedings for an offence endangering national security are brought against a person if—
(a) a magistrate issues a warrant or summons against the person under section 72 of the Magistrates Ordinance (Cap. 227) in respect of the offence;
(b) the person is arrested for the offence (whether or not the person is released on bail);
(c) the person is charged with the offence after being taken into custody without a warrant; or
(d) an indictment charging the person with the offence is preferred by the direction or with the consent of a judge under section 24A(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221).
(9) In this section—specified person (指明人士) means a public servant, counsel or solicitor;
state (述明), in relation to a name, means mark, print, set out or otherwise provide the name.
118.
Unlawful disclosure of personal data of persons handling cases or work concerning national security
(1) If a person commits an offence under section 64(3A) of the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486), and—
(a) the data subject referred to in that section is—
(i) a specified person;
(ii) a family member of a specified person;
(iii) an aider; or
(iv) a family member of an aider; and
(b) the person commits the offence—
(i) with intent to prevent or deter the specified person’s performance of his or her functions as a specified person or the aider’s provision of assistance in relation to a case concerning national security; or
(ii) in consequence of a thing done (or attempted to be done) by the specified person in the lawful performance of his or her functions as a specified person or by the aider in providing assistance in relation to a case concerning national security,
the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 7 years.
(2) If a person commits an offence under section 64(3C) of the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486), and—
(a) the data subject referred to in that section is—
(i) a specified person;
(ii) a family member of a specified person;
(iii) an aider; or
(iv) a family member of an aider; and
(b) the person commits the offence—
(i) with intent to prevent or deter the specified person’s performance of his or her functions as a specified person or the aider’s provision of assistance in relation to a case concerning national security; or
(ii) in consequence of a thing done (or attempted to be done) by the specified person in the lawful performance of his or her functions as a specified person or by the aider in providing assistance in relation to a case concerning national security,
the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.
(3) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under subsection (1) or (2) had it been done in the HKSAR,
the resident or body commits the offence.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), a reference to commit an offence under the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486) in subsection (1) or (2) is to be read as including to do an act that—
(a) is done outside the HKSAR; and
(b) would have constituted the offence had it been done in the HKSAR.
(5) In this section—
aider (協助者) means an informer of, or a witness in, a case concerning national security;
family member (家人), in relation to a person, means another person who is related to the person by blood, marriage, adoption or affinity;
HKSAR resident (特區居民) means—
(a) a Hong Kong permanent resident; or
(b) a person who is qualified to be issued with an identity card under the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177) but has no right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115);
specified person (指明人士) means—
(a) any of the personnel of any department or agency that handles cases concerning national security, or is responsible for the work on safeguarding national security, in the HKSAR; or
(b) a judicial officer, staff member of the Judiciary, counsel or solicitor, who handles a case concerning national security.
119.
Unlawful harassment of persons handling cases or work concerning national security
(1) If—
(a) a person (Party A), with intent to cause alarm or distress or specified harm to a specified person (or a family member of the specified person) or an aider (or a family member of the aider) (Party B)—
(i) uses any intimidating, abusive or offensive words to Party B by any means, or otherwise makes to Party B any intimidating, abusive or offensive communication; or
(ii) does any intimidating, abusive or offensive act towards Party B by any means;
(b) a reasonable person, having regard to all the circumstances, would have anticipated that so using the words to Party B, making the communication to Party B or doing the act towards Party B would cause alarm or distress or specified harm to Party B;
(c) the words, communication or act, in fact, causes alarm or distress or specified harm to Party B; and
(d) Party A falls within the description in any of subparagraphs (i) and (ii)—
(i) Party A uses the words, makes the communication, or does the act with intent to prevent or deter the specified person’s performance of his or her functions as a specified person or the aider’s provision of assistance in relation to a case concerning national security;
(ii) Party A uses the words, makes the communication, or does the act in consequence of—
(A) a thing done (or attempted to be done) by the specified person in the lawful performance of his or her functions as a specified person; or
(B) a thing done (or attempted to be done) by the aider in providing assistance in relation to a case concerning national security,
Party A commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.
(2) If a person is charged with an offence under subsection (1) and the charge alleges that the person falls within the description in subsection (1)(d)(ii), it is a defence for the person to establish that it was reasonable in the circumstances to use the words, make the communication, or do the act.
(3) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (2) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(4) In this section—
aider (協助者) means an informer of, or a witness in, a case concerning national security;
family member (家人), in relation to a person, means another person who is related to the person by blood, marriage, adoption or affinity;
specified harm (指明傷害), in relation to a person, means—
(a) psychological harm to the person;
(b) harm causing the person to be concerned for the person’s safety or well-being; or
(c) harm causing the person to be concerned for damage to the property of the person;
specified person (指明人士) means—
(a) any of the personnel of any department or agency that handles cases concerning national security, or is responsible for the work on safeguarding national security, in the HKSAR; or
(b) a judicial officer, staff member of the Judiciary, counsel or solicitor, who handles a case concerning national security.
120.
Specified Court may on application take anonymity measures
(1) If a specified Court is satisfied that it is necessary for safeguarding national security to take certain measures in relation to any existing or contemplated proceedings (regardless of whether the proceedings concern a case concerning national security, and regardless of whether the proceedings take place in that Court or any other Court) to protect the identity of any specified person from disclosure, the specified Court may, on ex parte application by the Secretary for Justice, order the measures be taken.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), an order made under that subsection may prohibit a person from disclosing—
(a) information that shows the identity of a specified person; or
(b) information from which the identity of a specified person may be inferred.
(3) A hearing of an application under subsection (1) must take place in a closed court.
(4) If an order is made under subsection (1), a person affected by the order may apply to the specified Court to vary or revoke the order.
(5) The specified Court must not vary or revoke the order unless the specified Court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, is satisfied that injustice would be caused if the order is not varied or revoked.
(6) To avoid doubt, unless the specified Court orders otherwise, the Secretary for Justice need not, for the purposes of an application under subsection (4), provide to the applicant documents submitted to the specified Court at the time when the Secretary for Justice made the application under subsection (1).
(7) To avoid doubt—
(a) this section does not limit any other power that any Court may exercise; and
(b) section 117 does not prevent a specified Court from ordering under subsection (1) any measures to be taken in relation to a document mentioned in section 117(2).
(8) In this section—
specified Court (指明法院) means any of the following courts of the Judiciary of the HKSAR—
(a) the Court of Final Appeal;
(b) the Court of Appeal;
(c) the Court of First Instance;
(d) the District Court;
(e) a Magistrates’ Court;
specified person (指明人士), in relation to any existing or contemplated proceedings, means the following person whom the proceedings involve or are likely to involve—
(a) a public servant;
(b) a judicial officer or a staff member of the Judiciary;
(c) a counsel or solicitor; or
(d) an informer or witness.
121.
Offence of contravening order prohibiting disclosure of identity
(1) If a person, knowing that an order prohibiting disclosure of identity has been made, discloses information the disclosure of which is prohibited by the order, the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 5 years.
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to establish that the person had a reasonable excuse or lawful authority to make the disclosure.
(3) A person is taken to have established a matter that needs to be established for a defence under subsection (2) if—
(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to that matter; and
(b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
(4) If—
(a) any—
(i) HKSAR resident;
(ii) body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in the HKSAR; or
(iii) body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in the HKSAR,
does any act outside the HKSAR; and
(b) the act would have constituted an offence under a subsection (1) had it been done in the HKSAR,
the resident or body commits the offence.
(5) In this section—order prohibiting disclosure of identity (身分披露禁令) means an order made under section 120(1) prohibiting any person from making the disclosure mentioned in section 120(2).
Enactments amended
The enactments specified in Divisions 2 to 29 are amended as set out in those Divisions.
Division 2: Amendment to Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1)
123.
Section 3 amended (interpretation of words and expressions)
Section 3—
Add in alphabetical order “national security (國家安全)—see section 4 of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024);”.
Division 3: Amendment to Evidence Ordinance (Cap. 8)
124.
Section 77 amended (privilege of witnesses)
Section 77(3)—
Repeal “the security of the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, or any other territory for which the United Kingdom is responsible under international law”
Substitute “national security or the security of the HKSAR”.
Division 4: Amendments to Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32)
125.
Section 181 amended (power to stay or restrain proceedings against company)
(1) Section 181—
Renumber the section as section 181(1).
(2) After section 181(1)—
Add “(2) However, if the action or proceeding relates to a case concerning national security (within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024)), the reference to “and before a winding-up order has been made” in subsection (1) is to be disregarded in applying that subsection.”.
126.
Section 186 amended (actions stayed on winding-up order)
(1) Section 186—
Renumber the section as section 186(1).
(2) After section 186(1)—
Add “(2) If any action or proceeding relates to a case concerning national security (within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024)), subsection (1) does not prevent the action or proceeding from being proceeded with or commenced against the company.”.
127.
Section 360C amended (power of the Chief Executive in Council to order company engaging in undesirable activities to be struck off)
(1) Section 360C(1)—
Repeal everything before “may order”
Substitute “(1) If the Chief Executive in Council is satisfied that a company formed and registered under the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622) or any former Companies Ordinance would—
if it were a society to which the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151) applied—
(i) be liable to have its registration or exemption from registration cancelled under section 5D of that Ordinance; or
(ii) be liable to have its operation or continued operation prohibited by the Secretary for Security under section 8 of that Ordinance; or
(b) if it were an organization to which section 60(1) or (2) of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024) applied—be liable to have its operation or continued operation in Hong Kong prohibited by the Secretary for Security under that section,
the Chief Executive in Council”.
(2) After section 360C(2)—
Add “(2A) A company dissolved under subsection (2)—
(a) in the case of subsection (1)(a)(ii)—is, for all purposes, to be regarded as an unlawful society; or
(b) in the case of subsection (1)(b)—is, for all purposes, to be regarded as a prohibited organization.
(2B) If a person is, because of the operation of this section, required to act as a member of an unlawful society or prohibited organization to deal with matters arising from the winding up or dissolution of the society or organization, the person does not commit any offence under the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151) or the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024) only because the person so acts.”.
(3) After section 360C(3)—
Add “(4) In this section—
prohibited organization (受禁組織) means a prohibited organization within the meaning of Division 2 of Part 6 of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024);
unlawful society (非法社團) means an unlawful society within the meaning of the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151).”.
128.
Section 360G amended (certain sections to apply)
Section 360G, after “211,”—
Add “216,”.
129.
Section 360M substituted
Section 360M—
Repeal the section
Substitute “360M.
Protection of Official Receiver etc.
(1) A person to whom this section applies is not personally liable for an act done or omitted to be done by the person in good faith in respect of the winding up of any company under this Part in—
(a) performing or purportedly performing a function under this Part; or
(b) exercising or purportedly exercising a power under this Part.
(2) The persons to whom this section applies are—
(a) the Official Receiver; and
(b) a public servant.”.
130.
Section 360N amended (non-Hong Kong companies)
(1) Section 360N—
Renumber the section as section 360N(1).
(2) Section 360N(1)—
Repeal everything before “Provided”
Substitute “(1) If the Chief Executive in Council is satisfied that a non-Hong Kong company would—
(a) if it were a society to which the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151) applied—
(i) be liable to have its registration or exemption from registration cancelled under section 5D of that Ordinance; or
(ii) be liable to have its operation or continued operation prohibited by the Secretary for Security under section 8 of that Ordinance; or
(b) if it were an organization to which section 60(1) or (2) of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024) applied—be liable to have its operation or continued operation in Hong Kong prohibited by the Secretary for Security under that section,
the Chief Executive in Council may order the company to cease to carry on business within Hong Kong, and the company must immediately cease to carry on business within Hong Kong:”.
(3) After section 360N(1)—
Add “(2) A company which has been ordered to cease to carry on business within Hong Kong under subsection (1)—
(a) in the case of subsection (1)(a)(ii)—is, for all purposes, to be regarded as an unlawful society; or
(b) in the case of subsection (1)(b)—is, for all purposes, to be regarded as a prohibited organization.
(3) If a person is, because of the operation of this section, required to act as a member of an unlawful society or prohibited organization to deal with matters arising from the winding up or dissolution of the society or organization, the person does not commit any offence under the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151) or the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024) only because the person so acts.
(4) In this section—
prohibited organization (受禁組織) means a prohibited organization within the meaning of Division 2 of Part 6 of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024);
unlawful society (非法社團) means an unlawful society within the meaning of the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151).”.
Division 5: Amendment to Pensions Ordinance (Cap. 89)
131.
Section 15 amended (pension, gratuity or allowance may be cancelled, suspended or reduced on conviction, etc.)
Section 15(1)(a)(iii)—
Repeal “treason under section 2 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200)”
Substitute “any offence endangering national security”.
Division 6: Amendment to Post Office Ordinance (Cap. 98)
132.
Section 32 amended (prohibited articles)
Section 32(1)—
Repeal paragraph (h)
Substitute “(h) anything the publication of which would constitute an offence endangering national security;”.
Division 7: Amendment to Pension Benefits Ordinance (Cap. 99)
133.
Section 29 amended (pension benefits may be cancelled, suspended or reduced on conviction, etc.)
Section 29(1)(c)—
Repeal “treason under section 2 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200)”
Substitute “any offence endangering national security”.
Division 8: Amendments to Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151)
134.
Section 2 amended (interpretation)
(1) Section 2(1), definition of election—
Repeal everything after “means”
Substitute “an election set out in section 4(1) of the Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Conduct) Ordinance (Cap. 554);”.
(2) Section 2(1)—
(a) definition of foreign political organization;
(b) definition of political organization of Taiwan;
(c) definition of connection—
Repeal the definitions.
(3) Section 2(1)—
Add in alphabetical order “connection (聯繫), in relation to a society or a branch, that is a political body, means the following circumstances—
(a) the society or the branch solicits or accepts financial contributions, financial sponsorships or financial support of any kind or loans, or substantive support by other means, directly or indirectly, from a political organization of an external place;
(b) the society or the branch is affiliated directly or indirectly with a political organization of an external place;
(c) any policy of the society or the branch is determined directly or indirectly by a political organization of an external place; or
(d) a political organization of an external place directs, controls, supervises, dictates or participates, directly or indirectly, in the decision making process of the society or the branch;
external place (境外) means a region or place outside Hong Kong (other than the Mainland and Macao);
political organization of an external place (境外政治性組織) includes—
(a) a government of a foreign country or a political subdivision of the government;
(b) the authority of an external place or a political subdivision of the authority;
(c) an agent of the government or authority or an agent of the political subdivision of the government or authority; and
(d) a political party in an external place or an agent of the political party;”.
(4) Section 2(4)—
Repeal everything after “Hong Kong.”.
135. Section 5A amended (registration and exemption from registration)
Section 5A(3)(b)—
Repeal “foreign political organization or a political organization of Taiwan”
Substitute “political organization of an external place”.
135.
Section 5A amended (registration and exemption from registration)
Section 5A(3)(b)—
Repeal “foreign political organization or a political organization of Taiwan”
Substitute “political organization of an external place”.
136.
Section 5D amended (cancellation of registration or exemption from registration)
Section 5D(1)(b)—
Repeal “foreign political organization or a political organization of Taiwan”
Substitute “political organization of an external place”.
137.
Section 8 amended (prohibition of operation of societies)
Section 8(1)—
Repeal everything after “prohibiting the operation or continued operation of”
Substitute “a society or a branch if the Societies Officer reasonably believes that the prohibition of the operation or continued operation of the society or the branch is necessary in the interests of public safety, public order or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”.
138.
Section 32 amended (power of entry in special cases)
Section 32—
Repeal “national security or to”.
Division 9: Amendment to Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200)
139.
Parts I and II repealed
Parts I and II—
Repeal the Parts.
Division 10: Amendments to Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221)
140.
Section 9 amended (rules and orders as to practice and procedure)
Section 9(3)—
Repeal “(including trials for treason or misprision of treason)”.
141.
Section 9G amended (an accused person may be refused bail in particular circumstances)
Section 9G—
Repeal subsection (10)
Substitute “(10) An accused person charged with murder may be admitted to bail only on the order of a judge.”.
142.
Section 14A amended (trial of offences)
(1) Section 14A(1)—
Repeal paragraph (a).
(2) Section 14A—
Repeal subsection (2)
Substitute “(2) Where any provision in any Ordinance creates, or results in the creation of, an offence and subject to subsection (4), the words “upon indictment” or “on indictment” appear, the offence is triable only on indictment.”.
143.
Section 51 amended (trial of offences)
Section 51(2)—
Repeal “other than treason”.
144.
Section 79I amended (court may take evidence by live television link from person outside Hong Kong)
(1) After section 79I(2)(a)—
Add “(ab) the criminal proceedings concerned are specified proceedings;”.
(2) After section 79I(2)—
Add “(3) Even if any permission has been given, in specified proceedings, under this section that is not yet amended, then, as long as a verdict has not yet been delivered in the proceedings, the permission is to be regarded as having never been given.
(4) In this section—
amended (經修訂) means amended by the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024);
specified proceedings (指明法律程序) means proceedings of a case concerning national security (within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024)).”.
145.
Section 91 amended (penalties for concealing offences)
Section 91(4)—
Repeal “other than treason”.
146.
Section 100 amended (abolition of presumption of coercion of married woman by husband)
Section 100—
Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security the maximum penalty for which is life imprisonment”.
147.
Section 123 amended (criminal proceedings may be held in camera and non-disclosure of identity of witnesses in certain cases)
(1) Section 123(1)—
Repeal “in the interests of justice or public order or security”
Substitute “for a purpose mentioned in subsection (1AA)”.
(2) After section 123(1)—
Add “(1AA) The purpose is—
(a) safeguarding national security, including preventing the disclosure of state secret (as defined by section 29 of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024));
(b) safeguarding public order;
(c) safeguarding justice; or
(d) any other proper purpose.”.
(3) Section 123(1A)(b)—
Repeal “prejudice the interests of justice or public order or security”
Substitute “be contrary to a purpose mentioned in subsection (1AA)”.
(4) Section 123(1B)(a)—
Repeal “and the decision of the Court of Appeal shall be final”.
(5) After section 123(1B)(a)—
Add “(ab) Also, if the case is a case to which Division 4 of Part 7 of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024) applies, then if the Court of Appeal grants leave, the prosecution may also appeal to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the court to refuse to make an order under subsection (1).
(ac) The decision of the Court of Appeal on the appeal is final.”.
(6) Section 123(1B)(d)(ii), after “order”—
Add “or decision”.
(7) Section 123(1B)(e), after “subsection (1)”—
Add “, or decisions of a court to refuse to make orders under subsection (1),”.
(8) Section 123(1B)(f)—
Repeal “in the interests of justice or public order or security”
Substitute “for a purpose mentioned in subsection (1AA)”.
148.
Schedule 3 amended (excepted offences)
Schedule 3—
Add “11. An offence endangering national security.”.
Division 11: Amendments to Legal Aid in Criminal Cases Rules (Cap. 221 sub. leg. D)
149.
Rule 13 amended (legal aid in certain cases)
(1) Rule 13(1)(a)—
Repeal “upon a charge of murder, treason or piracy with violence”
Substitute “for a specified offence”.
(2) Rule 13(1)(b)—
Repeal “charge of murder, treason or piracy with violence”
Substitute “specified offence”.
(3) Rule 13(1)(c)—
Repeal “charge of murder, treason or piracy with violence”
Substitute “specified offence”.
(4) After rule 13(3)—
Add “(4) In this rule—specified offence (指明罪行) means—
(a) an offence endangering national security the maximum penalty for which is life imprisonment;
(b) murder; or
(c) an offence under section 19 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200).”.
Division 12: Amendments to Magistrates Ordinance (Cap. 227)
150.
Second Schedule amended
(1) Second Schedule, Part I, item 2—
Repeal “or an offence against Part VIII of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200)”
Substitute “an offence against Part VIII of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200), or an offence endangering national security”.
(2) Second Schedule, Part I—
Repeal items 4 and 5.
(3) Second Schedule, Part I, item 7—
Repeal “, seditious”.
(4) Second Schedule, Part III, item 2—
Repeal “section 17, 28 or 29 of the Offences against the Person Ordinance (Cap. 212) or section 16, 17 or 18 of the Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance (Cap. 238)”
Substitute “an offence against section 17, 28 or 29 of the Offences against the Person Ordinance (Cap. 212), an offence against section 16, 17 or 18 of the Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance (Cap. 238), or an offence endangering national security”.
(5) Second Schedule, Part III—
Repeal items 4 and 5.
(6) Second Schedule, Part III, item 7—
Repeal “, seditious”.
Division 13: Amendment to Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232)
151.
Section 3 amended (interpretation)
Section 3—
Repeal the definition of serious arrestable offence
Substitute “serious arrestable offence (嚴重的可逮捕罪行) means—
(a) an offence endangering national security;
(b) an offence specified in Schedule 2; or
(c) any other offence for which a person may under or by virtue of any law be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not less than 7 years.”.
Division 14: Amendment to Prison Rules (Cap. 234 sub. leg. A)
152.
Rule 69 amended (remission of sentence)
After rule 69(1)—
Add “(1A) However, if a prisoner serves a sentence in respect of the prisoner’s conviction of an offence endangering national security, the prisoner must not be granted remission under subrule (1) unless the Commissioner is satisfied that the prisoner’s being granted remission will not be contrary to the interests of national security.
(1B) To avoid doubt, subsection (1A) applies whether the sentence of the prisoner mentioned in that subsection was imposed before, on or after the commencement of that subsection.
(1C) If a prisoner is not granted remission because of a decision made by the Commissioner under subsection (1A), the Commissioner must, after making the decision, review the decision annually.”.
Division 15: Amendment to Public Order Ordinance (Cap. 245)
Division 16: Amendment to Education Ordinance (Cap. 279)
154.
Section 31 amended (grounds for cancellation of registration of manager)
After section 31(1)(a)—
Add “(ab) if the Secretary for Security has made an order under section 60(1) or (2) of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024) in relation to an organization (as defined by section 58 of that Ordinance), and the person was an office-bearer (as defined by section 58 of that Ordinance) of the organization immediately before the order was made;
(ac) if the Chief Executive in Council has made an order under section 360C or 360N of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32) in relation to a company or non-Hong Kong company (as defined by section 2(1) of that Ordinance), and the person was a director (as defined by section 2(1) of that Ordinance) of the company immediately before the order was made;”.
Division 17: Amendment to Trade Unions Ordinance (Cap. 332)
155.
Section 48 amended (conspiracy in relation to trade disputes)
Section 48(4)—
Repeal “sedition or any offence against the State or the Sovereign”
Substitute “any offence endangering national security”.
Division 18: Amendments to Customs and Excise Service Ordinance (Cap. 342)
156.
Section 17 amended (when members to be deemed on duty)
Section 17, after “Schedule 2”—
Add “or in preventing, suppressing or investigating an offence endangering national security”.
157.
Section 17A amended (general powers of arrest and search)
(1) Section 17A(1)—
Repeal “an offence against this Ordinance or an Ordinance specified in Schedule 2”
Substitute “a specified offence”.
(2) After section 17A(4)—
Add “(5) In this section—specified offence (指明罪行) means—
(a) an offence endangering national security; or
(b) an offence against this Ordinance or an Ordinance specified in Schedule 2.”.
158.
Section 17B amended (power to enter and search for suspects)
Section 17B(5), definition of arrestable offence—
Repeal “an offence”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security, or any other offence”.
159.
Section 17BA amended (search and examination without warrant)
(1) Section 17BA(1)—
Repeal “, for the purposes of enforcing this Ordinance or an Ordinance specified in Schedule 2”.
(2) After section 17BA(1)—
Add “(1A) The power under subsection (1) may only be exercised for either or both of the following purposes—
(a) preventing, suppressing or investigating an offence endangering national security;
(b) enforcing this Ordinance or an Ordinance specified in Schedule 2.”.
160.
Section 17BB amended (inspection of travel documents)
(1) Section 17BB—
Renumber the section as section 17BB(1).
(2) Section 17BB(1)—
Repeal “in exercising any powers under this Ordinance or any Ordinance specified in Schedule 2,”.
(3) After section 17BB(1)—
Add “(2) The power under subsection (1) may only be exercised in either or both of the following circumstances—
(a) during the prevention, suppression or investigation of an offence endangering national security;
(b) during the exercise of any powers under this Ordinance or any Ordinance specified in Schedule 2.”.
Section 31 amended (pension benefits may be cancelled, suspended or reduced on conviction, etc.)
Section 31(1)(c)—
Repeal “treason under section 2 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200)”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.
Division 20: Amendment to Hong Kong Arts Development Council Ordinance (Cap. 472)
162.
Section 3 amended (establishment of the Council)
Section 3(6)(m)—
Repeal “treason”
Substitute “any offence endangering national security”.
Division 21: Amendment to Post-Release Supervision of Prisoners Ordinance (Cap. 475)
163.
Section 6 amended (Board may order early release of prisoner under supervision)
After section 6(3)—
Add “(3A) However, if a prisoner serves a sentence in respect of the prisoner’s conviction of an offence endangering national security, the Commissioner must not refer to the Board for its consideration under subsection (3) the case of the prisoner unless the Commissioner is satisfied that an early release of the prisoner will not be contrary to the interests of national security.
(3B) To avoid doubt, subsection (3A) applies whether the sentence of the prisoner mentioned in that subsection was imposed before, on or after the commencement of that subsection.
(3C) If the Commissioner decides under subsection (3A) not to refer to the Board for its consideration the case of the prisoner, the Commissioner must, after making the decision, review the decision annually.”.
Division 22: Amendment to Post-Release Supervision of Prisoners Regulation (Cap. 475 sub. leg. A)
164.
Schedule 1 amended (specified offences)
Schedule 1, before the Note—
Add “Others
8. An offence endangering national security”.
Division 23: Amendments to Official Secrets Ordinance (Cap. 521)
165.
Part II repealed (espionage)
Part II—Repeal the Part.
(2) Section 12(1), definition of public servant, paragraph (a)—
Repeal “Crown in right of the Government of Hong Kong”
Substitute “Government”.
(3) Section 12(1), definition of public servant—
Repeal paragraphs (b) and (c).
(4) Section 12(1)—
(a) definition of armed forces;
(b) definition of British national;
(c) definition of defence;
(d) definition of disclose and disclosure;
(e) definition of international relations—
Repeal the definitions.
(5) Section 12(1)—
Add in alphabetical order
“disclose (披露), in relation to a document or other article, includes parting with possession of the document or article, and disclosing the information contained in the document or article;
HKSAR resident (特區居民) means—
(a) a Hong Kong permanent resident; or
(b) a person who is qualified to be issued with an identity card under the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177) but has no right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115);
international organization (國際組織) means—
(a) an organization the members of which include 2 or more countries, regions, places, or entities entrusted with functions by any country, region or place; or
(b) an organization established by or under a treaty, convention or agreement made by 2 or more countries, regions or places, and includes an institution (however described) under the organization;”.
(6) Section 12(2)—
Repeal everything after “goods or services”
Substitute “for the purposes of the Government.”.
(7) Section 12—
Repeal subsections (4), (5) and (6).
167.
Section 13 amended (security and intelligence information—members of services and persons notified)
(1) Section 13(4)—
Repeal “Governor, and such a notice may be served if, in the Governor’s opinion, the work undertaken by the person in question is or includes work connected with the security or intelligence services and its nature is such that the interests of the national security of the United Kingdom or the security of Hong Kong”
Substitute “Chief Executive, and such a notice may be served if, in the Chief Executive’s opinion, the work undertaken by the person in question is or includes work connected with the security or intelligence services and its nature is such that the interests of the security of Hong Kong”.
(2) Section 13(6)—
Repeal “Governor on the person concerned and the Governor”
Substitute “Chief Executive on the person concerned and the Chief Executive”.
168.
Sections 15 and 16 repealed
Sections 15 and 16—Repeal the sections.
169.
Section 18 amended (information resulting from unauthorized disclosures or information entrusted in confidence)
(1) Section 18(1)(a) and (2)—
Repeal “to 17”
Substitute “, 14 and 17”.
(4) Section 18(5)—Repeal “British national or Hong Kong permanent resident”
Substitute “person mentioned in subsection (5A)”.
(5) After section 18(5)—
Add “(5A) The person is—
(a) a HKSAR resident;
(b) a body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in Hong Kong; or
(c) a body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in Hong Kong.”.
(6) Section 18—
Repeal subsection (6)
Substitute “(6) For the purposes of this section, information or a document or article is protected against disclosure by any of sections 13, 14 and 17 if—
(a) it relates to security or intelligence; or
(b) it is information or a document or article to which section 17 applies,
and information or a document or article is protected against disclosure by any of sections 13 and 14 if it falls within paragraph (a).”.
(7) Section 18(7)—Repeal “to 17”
Substitute “, 14 and 17”.
170.
Section 19 repealed (information resulting from spying)
Section 19—Repeal the section.
171.
Section 20 amended (information entrusted in confidence to territories, States or international organizations)
(1) Section 20(2)—Repeal “, defence or international relations”.
(2) Section 20(2)(a)—
Repeal “Government of the United Kingdom or Hong Kong”
Substitute “Central People’s Government or the Government”.
(1) Section 23—Renumber the section as section 23(1).
(2) Section 23(1)—Repeal “British national, a Hong Kong permanent resident or a public servant”
Substitute “person mentioned in subsection (2)”.
(3) After section 23(1)—Add “(2) The person is—
(a) a HKSAR resident;
(b) a body corporate that is incorporated, formed or registered in Hong Kong;
(c) a body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, that has a place of business in Hong Kong; or
(d) a public servant.”.
175.
Section 24 amended (provisions as to trial of offences)
Section 24(2)—Repeal “the United Kingdom or”.
Section 11 amended (duty of Commissioner to refer cases of prisoners to Board for review)
After section 11(1)—
Add
“(1A) However, if a prisoner serves a sentence in respect of the prisoner’s conviction of an offence endangering national security, the Commissioner must not refer to the Board for review the sentence of the prisoner under this section unless the Commissioner is satisfied that an early release of the prisoner will not be contrary to the interests of national security.
(1B) To avoid doubt, subsection (1A) applies whether the sentence of the prisoner mentioned in that subsection was imposed before, on or after the commencement of that subsection.
(1C) If the Commissioner decides under subsection (1A) not to refer to the Board for review the sentence of the prisoner, the Commissioner must, after making the decision, review the decision every 2 years.”.
177.
Section 28 amended (review of sentence after recall)
(1) Section 28—Renumber the section as section 28(1).
(2) After section 28(1)—
Add
“(2) However, if a prisoner serves a sentence in respect of the prisoner’s conviction of an offence endangering national security, the Commissioner must not refer the sentence to the Board for review under subsection (1) unless the Commissioner is satisfied that an early release of the prisoner will not be contrary to the interests of national security.
(3) To avoid doubt, subsection (2) applies whether the sentence was imposed before, on or after the commencement of that subsection.
(4) If the Commissioner decides under subsection (2) not to refer the sentence to the Board for review, the Commissioner must, after making the decision, review the decision every 2 years.”.
Division 25: Amendments to Legislative Council Ordinance (Cap. 542)
178.
Section 39 amended (when person is disqualified from being nominated as a candidate and from being elected as a Member)
Section 39(1)(c)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.
179.
Section 40 amended (what requirements are to be complied with by persons nominated as candidates)
Section 40(1)(b)(iii)(C)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.
Division 26: Amendments to District Councils Ordinance (Cap. 547)
180.
Section 14 amended (disqualification from being appointed as members)
Section 14(1)(c)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.
181.
Section 19 amended (disqualification from being registered as ex officio members)
Section 19(1)(c)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.
182.
Section 21 amended (when person is disqualified from being nominated as a candidate and from being elected as a member)
Section 21(1)(c)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.
183.
Section 26A amended (disqualification from holding office as members)
Section 26A(1)(c)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.
Division 27: Amendments to Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap. 569)
184.
Section 14 amended (disqualification from being nominated)
Section 14(1)(g)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.
185.
Section 16 amended (manner of nomination)
Section 16(5)(c), after “(c),”—Add “(ca),”.
186.
Section 26 amended (disqualification from voting)
Section 26(1)(c), after “(b),”—
Add “(ca),”.
187.
Schedule amended (Election Committee)
(1) The Schedule, after section 5M(1)(a)—
Add “(ab) has been convicted of an offence endangering national security;”.
(2) The Schedule, after section 9(1)(a)—
Add “(ab) has been convicted of an offence endangering national security;”.
(3) The Schedule, after section 18(1)(c)—
Add “(ca) has been convicted of an offence endangering national security;”.
Division 28: Amendments to Rural Representative Election Ordinance (Cap. 576)
188.
Section 9 amended (when a Rural Representative is disqualified from holding office)
Section 9(1)(c)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.
189.
Section 23 amended (when a person is disqualified from being nominated as a candidate and from being elected as a Rural Representative)
Section 23(1)(c)—Repeal “treason”
Substitute “an offence endangering national security”.
Division 29: Amendment to Legislation Publication Ordinance (Cap. 614)
190.
Section 4 amended (contents of database)
After section 4(1)(a)(vi)—Add “(vii) the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024);”.
(i) 按某些條款從指明人士取得該資料、文件或物品,而該等條款規定該資料、文件或物品須在機密情況下持有;或
(ii) 在某情況下從指明人士取得該資料、文件或物品,而該情況令該指明人士能夠合理地期望該資料、文件或物品會在機密情況下持有,
而該人沒有採取可合理地期望一名處於其位置的人會採取的謹慎措施,以防止該資料、文件或物品在未經授權下披露。
(i) 某指明人士;
(ii) 某指明人士的家人;
(iii) 某協助者;或
(iv) 某協助者的家人;及
(b) 該人犯該罪行 ——
(i) 其意圖是妨礙或阻嚇該指明人士執行其指明人士的職能,或妨礙或阻嚇該協助者就涉及國家安全的案件提供協助;或
(ii) 是由於該指明人士在合法執行其指明人士的職能的過程中作出(或試圖作出)的事情,或由於該協助者就涉及國家安全的案件提供協助的過程中作出(或試圖作出)的事情,即屬犯罪,一經循公訴程序定罪,可處監禁7年。
(i) 某指明人士;
(ii) 某指明人士的家人;
(iii) 某協助者;或
(iv) 某協助者的家人;及
(b) 該人犯該罪行 ——
(i) 其意圖是妨礙或阻嚇該指明人士執行其指明人士的職能,或妨礙或阻嚇該協助者就涉及國家安全的案件提供協助;或
(ii) 是由於該指明人士在合法執行其指明人士的職能的過程中作出(或試圖作出)的事情,或由於該協助者就涉及國家安全的案件提供協助的過程中作出(或試圖作出)的事情,即屬犯罪,一經循公訴程序定罪,可處監禁10年。
(3) 如 ——
(a) 任何 ——
(i) 特區居民;
(ii) 在特區成立、組成或註冊的法人團體;或
(iii) 不論是法團抑或不是法團的在特區有業務地點的團體,在特區以外地方作出任何作為;而
The inaugural speech of a new ROC president is usually regarded as a major political
statement about the concepts and plans the incoming head of state wishes to implement during his/her term of office, and it always
attracts close attention from domestic and international observers. The full texts of all inaugural addresses delivered by directly elected
ROC presidents since 1996 (Lee Teng-hui, Chen
Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai
Ing-wen, Lai Ching-te) on the day they were sworn in are presented below,
complete and unabridged, the official English translation followed by the Chinese original.
Ninth term ROC president (Zhonghua minguo
dijiuren zongtong 中華民國第九任總統): Lee Teng-hui 李登輝 (party affiliation during presidential term:
KMT), inaugurated on May 20, 1996 (Monday). Title of inaugural address—English
translation: 'Manage the Great Taiwan, Nurture a New Chinese Culture'; Chinese original:
jingying da Taiwan, jianli xin zhongyuan《經營大台灣,建立新中原》
Tenth term ROC president (Zhonghua minguo
dishiren zongtong 中華民國第十任總統): Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁 (party affiliation during presidential term:
DPP), inaugurated on May 20, 2000 (Saturday). Title of inaugural address—English
translation: 'Taiwan Stands Up: Toward the Dawn of a Rising Era'; Chinese original:
Taiwan zhanqilai—yingjie xiangshang tishengde xin shidai《台灣站起來——迎接向上提升的新時代》
Eleventh term ROC president (Zhonghua minguo
dishiyiren zongtong 中華民國第十一任總統): Chen Shui-bian (party affiliation during presidential term: DPP), inaugurated
on May 20, 2004 (Thursday). Title of inaugural address—English translation: 'Paving the Way for a Sustainable Taiwan';
Chinese original: wei yongxu Taiwan dianji《為永續台灣奠基》
Twelfth term ROC president (Zhonghua minguo
dishierren zongtong 中華民國第十二任總統): Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九 (party affiliation during presidential term: KMT), inaugurated
on May 20, 2008 (Tuesday). Title of inaugural address—English translation: 'Taiwan's Renaissance'; Chinese
original: renmin fenqi, Taiwan xinsheng《人民奮起,台灣新生》
Thirteenth term ROC president (Zhonghua minguo
dishisanren zongtong 中華民國第十三任總統): Ma Ying-jeou (party affiliation during presidential term: KMT), inaugurated
on May 20, 2012 (Sunday). Title of inaugural address—English translation: 'Upholding Ideals, Working Together for Reform and
Creating Greater Well-being for Taiwan'; Chinese original: jianzhi lixiang, xishou gaige,
dazao xingfu Taiwan《堅持理想、攜手改革、打造幸福臺灣》
Fourteenth term ROC president (Zhonghua minguo
dishisiren zongtong 中華民國第十四任總統): Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文 (party affiliation during presidential term: DPP), inaugurated
on May 20, 2016 (Friday). Title of inaugural address—English translation: 'N/A'; Chinese
original: dailing Taiwan yiqi wancheng xinshidai《帶領台灣一起完成新時代》
Fifteenth term ROC president (Zhonghua minguo
dishiwuren zongtong 中華民國第十五任總統): Tsai Ing-wen (party affiliation during presidential term: DPP), inaugurated
on May 20, 2020 (Wednesday). Title of inaugural address—English translation: 'N/A'; Chinese
original: N/A
Sixteenth term ROC president (Zhonghua minguo
dishiliuren zongtong 中華民國第十六任總統): Lai Ching-te 賴清德 (party affiliation during presidential term: DPP), inaugurated
on May 20, 2024 (Monday). Title of inaugural address—English translation: 'Building a democratic, peaceful, and prosperous new Taiwan'; Chinese
original: dazao minzhu heping fanrong de xin Taiwan《打造民主和平繁榮的新台灣》
The number of times the terms 'ROC' (Zhonghua minguo 中華民國) and 'Taiwan' (台灣 / 臺灣) were mentioned refers to the
Chinese original only, not to the English translation.
Your Majesty, Your Excellencies, Distinguished Guests, My Fellow
Countrymen, Ladies and Gentlemen:
Today we are assembled here to jubilantly and
solemnly celebrate the inauguration of the President and the Vice President
before all our compatriots. This gathering marks not only the commencement of
the ninth-term Presidency and Vice Presidency, but also a fresh beginning for
the future of the country and the people.
Today, the 21.3 million people in this country
formally march into the new era of "popular sovereignty."
Today, the Chinese people enter a new frontier
full of hope.
Today, we in Taiwan firmly tell the world, with
great pride and self- confidence:
—We now stand on the apex of democratic reform and
will remain there resolutely.
—We have proved eloquently that the Chinese are
capable of practicing democracy.
—We have effectively expanded the influence of the
international democratic camp and made significant contributions to the cause
of freedom and democracy.
Therefore, this gathering of today does not
celebrate the victory of any candidate, or any political party for that matter.
It honors a triumph of democracy for the 21.3 million people. It salutes the
confirmation of freedom and dignity—the most fundamental human values—in the Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu area.
My fellow countrymen: The doors have opened to
full democracy, with all its vigor in full swing. Today, most deserving of a
salute are the people of the Republic of China:
—A salute to them for being so resolute and
decisive when it comes to the future of the country.
—A salute to them for being so firm and determined
when it comes to the defense of democracy.
—A salute to them for being so calm and invincible
when it comes to facing up to threats.
From now on, the people as a whole, rather than
any individual or any political party, will be invested with the ruling power
of the nation. This is free will in full play, the fullest realization of
"popular sovereignty," the real "compliance with the will of Heaven and
response to human wishes," the getting rid of the old and ringing in the new.
All the glory belongs to the people.
My fellow countrymen: At this very fresh start of
history, we pledge ourselves to launch the new era with a new determination and
new deeds. This is our common homeland, and this is the fundamental support we
draw upon in our struggle for survival. Fifty years of a common destiny forged
in fortune and misfortune have united us all into a closely bound and
interdependent community. The first-ever popular presidential election has
reconfirmed our collective consciousness that we in Taiwan have to work
together as one man.
How to make this land of ours more beautiful and
how to make its inhabitants feel safer and live a happier and more harmonious
life is the common responsibility of the 21.3 million people!
"Whatever the people desire is always in my
heart." I am fully aware of the needs of the people and I pledge myself to do
my best to deserve their trust. But no individual or political party can
single-handedly decide a policy of far-reaching importance to the country. The
government will soon invite opinion leaders and other representatives from
various quarters to exchange views on major topics of future national
development. The consensus that emerges from such meetings will launch the
country into a new era.
The election is over, but the promises made during
the campaign will be kept and fulfilled as soon as possible. Building a modern
country entails the services of all available talents. I am convinced that only
when upright, insightful, capable and experienced people, regardless of their
political affiliation or social group, participate in the leadership of the
government will political stability and national growth be ensured.
The times are changing, so is the social climate.
Keeping in the old grooves while refraining from any innovation is doomed to
failure. Political maneuvering has no place in political interaction, nor can
self- interest have any role in deciding upon a political position. No quarrels
can be started under the pretense of representing the will of the voters. A
boycott certainly is not the equivalent of checks and balances. The ideal of
democracy we are pursuing means not just effective checks and balances; it
demands hand-in-hand cooperation for the welfare of the people among the
political parties.
Four years will soon pass. We have no time for
wavering or waiting. For the purpose of laying a solid and secure foundation
for the country and bequeathing a happy and comfortable life to the future
generations, let us get off to a very good start today—May 20, 1996.
Firstly, we have to broaden and deepen the
democratic exercise. Horizontally, we will share our democratic experience with
all Chinese and international friends. Vertically, we will proceed to phase 2
constitutional reform, promote clean elections, ensure clean and efficient
government, enhance law and order, restructure the political landscape, and
strengthen the multiparty political system, so as to guarantee stability and
development for democracy.
Economic growth and political democracy are equally
important. Without continued success in economic development, we risk losing
everything. We have to make sure that the plan for turning Taiwan into a hub for business operations in the Asia-Pacific region will proceed on
schedule so that this country may from a position of strength play a role to be
reckoned with in the international community and in the process of national
unification. In the meanwhile we have to plan ahead for national development
well into the next century, nurture a liberalized and internationalized
economic regime in as short as possible a period of time, foster a low-tax,
obstacle-free business climate, renovate the land system, improve the small and
medium businesses, and greatly enhance national competitiveness. Only when thus
prepared will we be able to compete in a new Asia-Pacific age of mutual benefit
and co-prosperity, thus becoming an indispensable partner for prosperity and
development internationally.
At the same time we do not intend to neglect
development in non- economic sectors. Our top priorities will be the judicial
system, education, culture, and social restructuring, which will have to move
ahead in tandem.
Judicial reform should be based above all on the
rule of law. All judicial judgments have to be fair and make sure that all are
equal before the law. The rule of law being the foundation of democracy, the
cause of democracy will be compromised to a serious extent if court rulings are
not trusted by the people. The reform will also guarantee full respect for any fundamental
human rights including those of prisoners and parties to a law suit. Rectitude
and efficiency in the court and prosecutorial system will have to be
drastically improved.
Reform in education aims to put into practice a
concept of education that imparts happiness, contentment, pluralism and mutual
respect. Such education is designed to develop potentialities, respect
individualism, promote humanism, and encourage creativeness. All unreasonable
restrictions will be removed to allow the emergence of the life education
system. Ample room will be reserved for individual originality and personal
traits to ensure the continued pursuit of self-growth and self- realization.
The new generation will be assisted to know their homeland, love their country
and foster a broad international view. Fortified in this manner they can better
meet international challenges and map out a bright future for their country in
an increasingly competitive global village.
My fellow countrymen: After 5,000 years the
Chinese are still going strong solely because they derive sustenance from an
excellent culture. Under the strong impact of Western civilization since the
mid-19th century, Chinese culture has gone through tribulations and shocks
giving rise to a sharp decline in national confidence. Bearing this in mind, I
have never stopped thinking about cultural regeneration. I am hoping that the
people of Taiwan will nurture a new life culture as well as a broad and
long-sighted view of life. The new Chinese culture, with moorings in the
immense Chinese heritage, will draw upon Western cultural essence to facilitate
adapting to the new climate of the next century.
This is the essence of the concept of "manage the
great Taiwan, nurture a new Chinese culture." All the major cultures originated
in a very restricted area. The 5,000-year Chinese culture also rose from a
small region called Chung Yuan. Uniquely situated at the confluence of mainland
and maritime cultures, Taiwan has been able in recent decades to preserve
traditional culture on the one hand and to come into wide contact with Western
democracy and science and modern business culture on the other. Equipped with a
much higher level of education and development than in other parts of China, Taiwan is set to gradually exercise its leadership role in cultural development and
take upon itself the responsibility for nurturing a new Chinese culture.
Managing the great Taiwan can nurture not just a
new culture, but also a new society. With political democracy, Taiwan's society has become robustly pluralistic. The vigor thus released will provide
nourishment for new social life and bring about further progress.
We will regenerate family ethics and build up a
strong sense of community beginning at the grass roots. This will enable us to
have a harmonious and communicative society where all members can have the joy
of family life. People will also be encouraged to live a simple life and
treasure all available resources. The land should be used based upon optimum
planning, and nature conservation should be promoted to make it possible for
future generations to savor the beauty of the landscape. In the same spirit, we
will take better care of the disadvantaged groups in the interests of social
harmony and human dignity. We also want to have in place a social security
system, fair to all and sure to endure, that provides for freedom from want.
But this system can only be installed gradually, depending upon the
availability of funding support.
At the very time when we are engaged in the task
of developing the Republic of China on Taiwan, the overseas Chinese are never
out of mind. We do our very best continuing to assist them in developing their
careers. The welfare of the Chinese in Hong Kong and Macao has always been of
great concern to us. We are ready to lend them a helping hand to help maintain
democracy, freedom and prosperity in this area.
Today the existence and development of the
Republic of China on Taiwan has won international recognition and respect. In
the new international order of today, such basic tenets as democracy, human
rights, peace and renunciation of force are universally adhered to; they are in
full accord with the ideals upon which our country was founded. We will
continue to promote pragmatic diplomacy in compliance with the principles of
goodwill and reciprocity. By so doing we will secure for our 21.3 million
people enough room for existence and development as well as the respect and
treatment they deserve in the international arena.
My fellow countrymen: China has suffered a lot in
the 20th century. In the initial stages, it was buffeted with a series of
invasions, and over the last 50 years an ideological gap has been responsible
for the Chinese- fighting-Chinese tragedy, resulting in confrontation and
enmity among the Chinese. I have been of the view that on the threshold of the
21st century the two sides of the Taiwan Straits should work for ending this
historical tragedy and ushering in a new epoch when Chinese should help each
other.
It is this consideration that over the past years
has been guiding our initiative in promoting a win-win strategy for expanding
cross-straits relations leading to eventual national unification, but we are
doing this on the premise that the Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu area is
well protected and the welfare of its people safeguarded. Unfortunately, the
cross-straits relationship has experienced bumps from time to time because the
Chinese Communists have refused to admit the very fact that the Republic of
China does exist in the area. Beginning last year, the Chinese Communists,
because of their opposition to democracy, launched against myself a smear
campaign using false charges to damage my credibility, but I simply ignore
their irrational behavior and remain patient. An eye for an eye is no solution
to an historical question of 50 years.
In an attempt to influence the outcome of the
first popular presidential election in March, the Chinese Communists conducted
a series of military exercises against Taiwan, but unrivaled restraint
prevailed in this country. We know that it is imperative that peace and
stability be maintained in the Asia-Pacific region. More important, we would
not like to see the sudden disappearance of the economic growth in mainland China that has been made possible with great difficulty by its openness policy over the
years. Patience on the part of the 21.3 million people is not tantamount to
cowardice. Because we believe quiet tolerance is the only way to dispel enmity
bred by confrontation. We will never negotiate under threat of attack, but we
do not fear to negotiate. Our position is that dialogue will lead to the
resolution of any issues between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits.
The Republic of China has always been a sovereign
state. Disputes across the Straits center around system and lifestyle; they
have nothing to do with ethnic or cultural identity. Here in this country it is
totally unnecessary or impossible to adopt the so-called course of "Taiwan independence." For over 40 years, the two sides of the Straits have been two
separate jurisdictions due to various historical factors, but it is also true
that both sides pursue eventual national unification. Only when both sides face
up to the facts and engage in dialogue with profound sincerity and patience
will they be able to find the solution to the unification question and work for
the common welfare of the Chinese people.
Today, I will seriously call upon the two sides of
the Straits to deal straightforwardly with the momentous question of how to
terminate the state of hostility between them, which will then make a crucial
contribution to the historic task of unification. In the future, at the call of
my country and with the support of its people, I would like to embark upon a
journey of peace to mainland China taking with me the consensus and will of the
21.3 million people. I am also ready to meet with the top leadership of the
Chinese Communists for a direct exchange of views in order to open up a new era
of communication and cooperation between the two sides and ensure peace,
stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.
My fellow countrymen: We in Taiwan have realized the Chinese dream. The Chinese of the 20th century have been striving
for the realization of a happy, wealthy China and of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "popular
sovereignty" ideal. For 50 years, we have created in the Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu area an eye-catching "economic miracle" and achieved a
world- acclaimed democratic reform. The Chinese who were regarded as
dictatorial, feudalistic, penurious, and backward by Western countries one
century ago have by now created in the Taiwan area a new land of democracy,
wealth and progress, proudly enjoying enthusiastic recognition from the world.
This stands for not just a proud achievement of our 21.3 million people; it
marks a crucial departure for the Chinese people to rise again to a new height
of glory. We believe that whatever is achieved by the Chinese in Taiwan can also be achieved by the Chinese in mainland China. We are willing to provide our
developmental experience as an aid in mapping out the direction of development
in mainland China. The fruits of our hard work can be used to assist in
enhancing the welfare of millions of our compatriots on the mainland. The
Chinese on the two sides can thus join forces for the benefit of the prosperity
and development of the Chinese nation as a whole.
My fellow countrymen: I wish to take this
opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude for the trust you have reposed in
me. Today, I have accepted with humility and solemnity the office of the
ninth-term President of the Republic of China at the swearing-in ceremony this
morning. I fully understand the meaning of this office as well as the duties of
this office. I pledge myself to the complete performance of my duties to the
best of my power. I would never fail you! Meanwhile, I sincerely call upon all
my fellow citizens to give me wholehearted, unselfish and patient support so
that we may stride forward hand in hand into the 21st century. I am convinced
that during the next century the Chinese people will be able to achieve the
historic enterprise of peaceful unification and do their very part for the
peace and development of the world.
May I wish the Republic of China continued
prosperity and all the distinguished guests health and happiness.
Leaders of our friendly nations, honored guests and compatriots from Taiwan and abroad;
This is a glorious moment; it is also a moment of dignity and hope.
I thank our honored guests, who have come here from afar,
as well as those friends from around the world who love democracy and care
about Taiwan, for sharing this glorious moment with us.
We are here today, not just to celebrate an inauguration,
but to witness the hard-won democratic values, and to witness the beginning of
a new era.
On the eve of the 21st Century, the people of Taiwan have completed a historic alternation of political parties in power. This is not
only the first of its kind in the history of the Republic of China, but also an
epochal landmark for Chinese communities around the world. Taiwan has not only set a new model for the Asian experience of democracy, but has also
added a moving example to the third wave of democracy the world over.
The election for the 10th-term President of the Republic
of China has clearly shown the world that the fruits of freedom and democracy
are not easily come by. Twenty-three million people with an unwavering will
have allayed enmity with love, overcome intimidation with hope, and conquered
fear with faith.
With our sacred votes, we have proven to the world that
freedom and democracy are indisputable universal values, and that peace is
humanity's highest goal.
The outcome of Taiwan's Year 2000 presidential election
is not the victory of an individual or a political party. It is a victory of
the people, a victory for democracy, because we have, while at the focus of
global attention, transcended fear, threats and oppression and bravely risen to
our feet together.
Taiwan stands up, demonstrating a firmness of purpose and faith in
democracy.
Taiwan stands up, representing the self-confidence of the people and the
dignity of the country.
Taiwan stands up, symbolizing the quest for hope and the realization of
dreams.
Dear compatriots, let's always remember this moment;
let's always remember to value and feel gratitude for it, because the fruits of
democracy did not come out of the blue. It was realized by going through many
perils and dangers, and by experiencing countless hardships. If not for the
fearless sacrifice of our democratic forebears, if not for the unswerving faith
of the tens of millions of Taiwanese people in freedom and democracy, we could
not possibly be standing on our beloved land today and celebrate a glorious
occasion that belongs to all the people.
Today, it is as if we are standing before a fresh new
gate in history. In the process of democratization, the Taiwanese people have
created a brand-new key to our shared destiny. The new century's gates of hope
are soon to open. We are humble but not submissive. We are full of
self-confidence but not the slightest bit of self-satisfaction.
Since that moment on March 18 when the election results
came to light, I have accepted the mandate of all Taiwanese people in a most
earnest and humble frame of mind, and have vowed to devote all my efforts,
understanding and courage to assuming the heavy responsibility of this
country's future.
I personally understand that the significance of the
alternation of political parties and the peaceful transition of power lies not
in that it is a change of personnel or political parties. Nor that it is a
dynastic change. Rather, it is the return of state and government power to the
people through a democratic procedure. The people are the true masters of the
country, which no individual or political party can possess. From the head of
state to the rank-and-file civil servant—the government exists for all the
people and serves all the people.
The alternation of political parties does not mean an
all-out negation of the past. We should be fair in evaluating the contributions
made by those in power throughout the ages. Mr. Lee Teng-hui deserves our
highest praise and heartfelt honor for his promotion of democratic reforms and
for his excellent performance during his twelve years of leadership.
Taiwan society has rallied and participated energetically in the election.
Despite the diverse views and stances, all individuals share the same intent—to
come forward for the sake of their political ideas and the country's future. We
believe that the end of an election is the beginning of reconciliation. After
the curtain falls on emotional campaigns, rationality should prevail. Under the
supreme principles of national interests and the welfare of the people, those in
power and in opposition should both fulfill their duties by the people and
realize the ideals of fair competition in party politics, as well as the checks
and balances of democratic politics.
A democratic society with fair competition, tolerance and
trust is the strongest impetus for a nation's development. Placing national
interests above those of political parties, we should solidify the will of the
people and seek consensus among the ruling and opposition parties, to promote
the country's development and reforms.
"A government for all people" and "rule by the clean and
upright" were my promises to the people during the election period. It is also
an important key for Taiwan society in stepping over its fault lines and
exalting to a higher level in the future.
The spirit of a "government for all people" lies in the
fact that "the government exists for the people." The people are the masters
and shareholders of the state. The government should rule on the basis of
majority public opinion. The interests of the people are absolutely above those
of any political party or individual.
I have always taken pride in being a member of the
Democratic Progressive Party, but from the moment I take my oath and assume the
president's post, I will put all my efforts into fulfilling my role as a
"president for all people." As in the formation of the new government, we
employ people according to their talents and do not discriminate on the basis
of ethnicity, gender or party affiliation. We will also place the welfare of the
populace as our primary goal in future.
The topmost initiatives of my promise to "rule by the
clean and upright" are to eliminate "black gold"—the involvement of organized
crime in politics—and to eradicate vote-buying. For a long time, the Taiwanese
people have been deeply repelled by money politics and the interference of
organized crime. A grassroots vote-buying culture has also robbed the people of
their right to elect the wise and the able. These have tainted the development
of Taiwan's democracy.
Today, I am willing to promise hereby that the new
government will eliminate vote-buying and crack down on "black gold" politics,
so that Taiwan can rise above such downward sinking forces. We must give the
people a clean political environment.
In the area of government reforms, we need to establish a
government that is clean, efficient, far-sighted, dynamic, highly flexible and
responsive, in order to ensure Taiwan's competitiveness in the face of
increasingly fierce global competition. The age of "large and capable"
governments has now passed, replaced by "small and effective" governments,
which have established partnership relations with the people. We should
accelerate the streamlining of government functions and organization and
actively expand the role of public participation.
This will not only allow the public to fully utilize
their energy but also significantly reduce the government's burdens.
Similar partnership relations should also be set up
between the central and local governments. We want to break the authoritarian
attitudes from the days of centralized, money-controlled power. We want to
realize the spirit of local autonomy, where the local and central governments
share resources and responsibilities, where "the central government will not do
what the local governments can do." Whether in the east, west, north or south,
or whether on Taiwan Proper or on offshore islands, all will get balanced,
pluralistic development, and the gap between urban and rural areas will
decrease.
Of course, we should understand that the government is no
panacea for all problems. The driving force for economic development and
societal progress comes from the people. Over the past half-century, the
Taiwanese people have toiled hard to create an economic miracle that has won
global applause, and to lay the foundation for the survival and development of
the Republic of China. Today, facing the impact of the fast-changing
information technologies and trade liberalization, Taiwan's industrial
development must move toward a knowledge-based economy. High-tech industries
need to be constantly innovative, while traditional industries need to undergo
transformation and upgrading.
The future government should not necessarily play the
role of a "leader" or "manager." On the contrary, it should be the "supporter"
and "service-provider," as expected by private enterprises. The responsibility
of a modern government is to raise administrative efficiency, improve the
domestic investment environment, and maintain financial order and stock market
stability, so as to allow economic development to move toward full
liberalization and internationalization with fair competition. By observing
these principles, the vitality of the public will naturally bloom and create a
new phase in Taiwan's economic miracle.
Apart from consolidating our democratic achievements,
promoting government reforms, and raising economic competitiveness, the new
government's foremost objective should be to adhere to public opinion and
implement reforms, so that the people on this land can live in more dignity,
more self-confidence and better quality.
Let our society be not only safe, harmonious and
prosperous, but also meet the principles of fairness and justice. As we
cultivate the ever-growing abilities of our citizens, we will let our next
generation learn in an environment filled with happiness and hope.
The 21st Century will be a time when "the right to a
quality life" and "refined lifestyles" are much emphasized. The government will
have to bring up solutions for all issues relating to the people's lives, such
as social order, social welfare, environmental protection, land planning, waste
treatment, cleaning up rivers and community-building. It will also have to
implement these solutions thoroughly.
At present, we need to immediately improve social order
and environmental protection, which are important indicators of the quality of
life. Building a new social order, we will let the people live and work in
peace and without fear. Finding a balance between ecological preservation and
economic development, we will develop Taiwan into a sustainable green silicon
island.
The integrity of the judiciary is a staunch line of
defense for democratic politics and social justice. An impartial, independent
judicial system is a safeguard for social order and a defender of the people's
rights. At present, we still have a long way to go in our judicial reforms. Our
compatriots should continue to give the judiciary their calls to action and
their ardent expectations. At the same time, we should also restrain our
administrative authority and give the judiciary room to operate independently
and without interference.
Human resources are Taiwan's most important resources.
Talent is the foundation of the country's competitiveness, while education is a
long-term plan for empowering the people. We will seek a consensus among the
ruling and opposition parties, academia and the public to carry on with
educational reforms and build a healthy, proactive, lively and innovative
education system, which will allow Taiwan to cultivate first-class, outstanding
talents amid the fierce international competition. We will let Taiwan move gradually toward a "learning organization" and a "knowledge-based society." We
will also encourage people to take up lifetime learning to fully develop their
potential and creativity.
Grassroots community organizations have now been
developing around the country, working to explore and preserve the history,
culture, geography and ecology of their localities. These are all part of Taiwan culture, whether they are local cultures, mass cultures or high cultures. Due to
special historical and geographical factors, Taiwan possesses a wealth of
diversified cultural elements. But cultural development is not something that
can bring immediate success. Rather, it has to be accumulated bit by bit. We
must open our hearts with tolerance and respect, so that our diverse ethnic
groups and different regional cultures communicate with each other, and so that
Taiwan's local cultures connect with the cultures of Chinese-speaking
communities and other world cultures, and create a new milieu of "a cultural Taiwan in a modern century."
The September 21 earthquake that occurred last year
brought to our land and our compatriots an unprecedented catastrophe, the pain
of which is yet to heal. The new government will brook no delay in the
reconstruction of disaster areas, including industrial and spiritual recovery.
We will work to ensure that care is extended to every victim and rebuild every
destroyed place. Here, we would also like to express our highest respect again
for all individuals and non-governmental organizations that have selflessly
contributed to the rescue and reconstruction work after the disaster. Amid the
fierce power of Nature, we have seen Taiwan's most beautiful compassion,
strongest faith and greatest trust. Our compatriots have been injured and
wounded during the September 21 earthquake, but with the spirit of a "volunteer
Taiwan," Taiwan's new family will stand up resolutely on its feet once again.
Dear compatriots, 400 years ago, Taiwan was called "Formosa"—the beautiful island—for its lustrous landscape. Today, Taiwan is manifesting the elegance of a democratic island, once again attracting global
attention, as the people on this land create a new page in our history.
We believe that the Republic of China, with its
democratic achievements and technological and economic prowess, can certainly
continue to play an indispensable role in the international community. In
addition to strengthening the existing relations with friendly nations, we want
to actively participate in all types of international non-governmental
organizations. Through humanitarian care, economic cooperation, cultural
exchanges and various other methods, we will actively participate in
international affairs, expand Taiwan's room for survival in the international
arena, and contribute to the welfare of the international community.
Besides, we are also willing to promise a more active
contribution in safeguarding international human rights. The Republic of China
cannot and will not remain outside global human rights trends. We will abide by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convention for
Civil and Political Rights, and the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action.
We will bring the Republic of China back into the international human rights
system.
The new government will request the Legislative Yuan to
pass and ratify the International Bill of Rights as a domestic law of Taiwan, so that it will formally become the "Taiwan Bill of Rights." We hope to set up an
independent national human rights commission in Taiwan, thereby realizing an
action long advocated by the United Nations. We will also invite two
outstanding non-governmental organizations, the International Commission of
Jurists and Amnesty International, to assist us in our measures to protect
human rights and make the Republic of China into a new indicator for human
rights in the 21st Century.
We firmly believe that in any time or any corner of the
world, the meaning and values of freedom, democracy and human rights cannot be
ignored or changed.
The history of the 20th Century left us with a major
lesson—that war is a failure of humanity. Waged for whatever purpose or
whatever imperious reasons, war is the greatest harm to freedom, democracy and
human rights.
Over the past one hundred plus years, China has suffered imperialist aggression, which left indelible wounds in her history. Taiwan's destiny has been even more arduous, tormented by brute force and the rule of
colonialist regimes. These similar historical experiences should bring mutual
understanding between the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, setting a
solid foundation for pursuing freedom, democracy and human rights together.
However, due to long periods of separation, the two sides have developed vastly
different political systems and lifestyles, obstructing empathy and friendship
between the people on the two sides, and even creating a wall of divisiveness
and confrontation.
Today, as the Cold War has ended, it is time for the two
sides to cast aside the hostilities left from the old era. We do not need to
wait further because now is a new opportunity for the two sides to create an
era of reconciliation together.
The people across the Taiwan Strait share the same
ancestral, cultural, and historical background. While upholding the principles
of democracy and parity, building upon the existing foundations, and
constructing conditions for cooperation through goodwill, we believe that the
leaders on both sides possess enough wisdom and creativity to jointly deal with
the question of a future "one China."
I fully understand that as the popularly elected
10th-term President of the Republic of China, I must abide by the Constitution,
maintain the sovereignty, dignity and security of our country, and ensure the
well-being of all citizens. Therefore, as long as the CCP regime has no
intention to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in
office, I will not declare independence, I will not change the national title,
I will not push forth the inclusion of the so-called "state-to-state"
description in the Constitution, and I will not promote a referendum to change
the status quo in regards to the question of independence or unification.
Furthermore, the abolition of the National Unification Council or the
Guidelines for National Unification will not be an issue.
History has illustrated that war will only create hatred
and enmity, with absolutely no benefit to the development of mutual relations.
Chinese people emphasize the difference between statesmanship and hegemony,
believing in the philosophy that a government which employs benevolence "will
please those near and appeal to those from afar," and "when those afar will not
submit, then one must practice kindness and virtue to attract them." Such
Chinese wisdom will remain universal words of value.
Under the leadership of Mr. Deng Xiaoping and Mr. Jiang
Zemin, the mainland has created a miracle of economic openness. In Taiwan, over a half century, not only have we created a miracle economy, we have also
created the political marvel of democracy. On such a basis, as long as the
governments and people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait can interact more,
following the principles of "goodwill reconciliation, active cooperation, and
permanent peace," while at the same time respecting the free choice of the
people and excluding unnecessary obstacles, both sides of the Strait can make
great contributions to the prosperity and stability of the Asia Pacific Region.
Both sides will also create a glorious civilization for the world's humanity.
Dear compatriots, we hope so much to share the moving
scene of this moment with all Chinese-speaking people around the world. The
wide Ketagelan Boulevard before us was bristling with security guards only a
few years ago. The building behind me used to be the Governor General's Mansion
during the colonial era. Today, we gather here to extol the glory and joy of
democracy with songs of the earth and the voice of the people. With a little
reflection, our compatriots should be able to appreciate the deep and
far-reaching meaning of this moment:
Authoritarianism and force can only bring surrender for
one time, while democracy and freedom are values that will endure forever.
Only by adhering to the will of the people can we pioneer
the paths of history and build enduring architecture.
Today, as a son of a tenant farmer and with a poor
family background, I have struggled and grown on this land and, after
experiencing defeat and tribulation, I have finally won the trust of the people
to take up the great responsibility leading the country. My individual
achievements are minor, but the message is valuable because each citizen of Formosa is a "child of Taiwan" just like me. In whatever difficult environment, Taiwan will be like a selfless, loving mother, who never stops giving us opportunities and
who helps us achieve our beautiful dreams.
The spirit of the "child of Taiwan" reveals to us that
even though Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu are tiny islands on the rim of the
Pacific, the map of our dreams knows no limits. It extends all the way to the
end of the horizon, as long as our 23 million compatriots fear no hardship and
move forward hand in hand.
Dear compatriots, this magnificent moment belongs to all
the people. All grace and glory belongs to Taiwan—our eternal Mother. Together,
let's extend our gratitude to the earth and respect to the people.
Long live freedom and democracy!
Long live the people of Taiwan!
We pray for the prosperity of the Republic of China, and
for the health and happiness of all compatriots and all honored guests!
Heads of States, Diplomatic Envoys and Foreign Dignitaries, Distinguished Guests, and
Fellow Citizens:
Firstly, I wish to thank our honorable guests, at home and from
abroad, who have joined us today for the Inauguration Ceremony of the 11th-Term
President and Vice President of the Republic of China. What we have come
together to witness are the progressive steps of Taiwan's democracy, as well as
a story, written jointly by the 23 million people of Taiwan—one that is extraordinary
and truly remarkable.
On this joyous occasion of national celebration, I will assume the
solemn duty bestowed upon me by the people. At this moment, that which fills my
mind is not eloquent words of glory and exaltation, but rather, weighty thoughts
of bigger responsibility, greater humility, and deeper self-reflection.
In the final year of the twentieth century, Taiwan crossed a historic doorsill, completing an unprecedented transfer of power between
political parties, and ushering in a new era in our nation's democratic
development. In that time of change over—between the old and the new
century—our fledgling democracy found itself stumbling down a rugged path of
trial and tribulation. Taiwan's maiden voyage into the new century came wrought
with turbulence as the old and the new, the weak and the strong, the emergence
of crisis and the rise of opportunity—all came clashing into co-existence.
In the eyes of Chinese societies and other emerging democratic
states, Taiwan's democracy embodies not merely a democratic experimentation; it
signifies an exemplary success. The standard of democracy achieved in Western
nations is the tried result through the test of time. In comparison, Taiwan's newfound democracy, after weathering rough waters, has burgeoned into an even more
precious accomplishment. Our experience also serves as testament that democracy
does not come ready-made, nor is it a Utopian ideal. There is no express train
to transport us to the final destination. Democratic advancement occurs only through
constant and gradual endeavor, one step at a time.
In the initial stage of Taiwan's democratization—from lifting of
the martial law, complete re-election of the national legislature to direct
presidential election—we have vested sovereignty with the people and began
fostering Taiwan's national identity. In the second stage, a greater emphasis
is placed on the establishment of a civil society and on the rebuilding of
unity through a sense of shared destiny.
From increased community and civic consciousness to broader
participation in public affairs and national policymaking—including the holding
of a referendum, the rights and duties of citizens in a civil society have been
affirmed and further improved; and thereby, the development towards a more matured,
rational, and responsive democracy. We must seek to establish a civil society,
and through joint participation and collective efforts, to create an identity
with this land and a common memory if we are to transcend the limitations of
ethnicity, lineage, language and culture, and to build a new and unified sense
of shared destiny.
In today's society, issues of identity and ethnicity are a serious
matter that cannot be denied or deliberately overlooked. My colleagues and I,
in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as the governing party, will lead the
way in addressing such issues. We will take the first step and begin with
candid self-reflection.
It was several hundred years ago that the generations before us
traversed the "Black-water Channel" (Taiwan Strait) or crossed the great ocean
to find a safe haven in Taiwan. No matter what year they arrived, regardless of
their ancestral origins and their mother tongues, even in spite of their
different hopes and dreams, all are our forefathers; all have settled down here
and together faced a common destiny. Whether indigenous peoples or "new
settlers," expatriates living abroad, foreign spouses or immigrant workers who
labor under Taiwan's blazing sun—all have made a unique contribution to this
land and each has become an indispensable member of our "New Taiwan" family.
Various ethnic groups, because of their disparate history and
distinctive subcultures, understandably hold divergent views and values.
Recognizing such inherent differences, we should embrace one another with more
tolerance and understanding. The authoritarian government of the past exploited
inequality among different ethnic groups, suppressing native languages and
cultures. Nonetheless, we must acknowledge that except for a few individuals in
power, members of all ethnic groups have been victimized. The February 28
Incident and the "White Terror," of which the victims include both the
"Ben-sheng" (Taiwanese) and the "Wai-sheng" (Mainlanders), were not historical
representations of subjugation by ethnic groups, rather, abuse of power by a
ruling government.
The fabric of Taiwan society today is comprised mainly of diverse
immigrant groups. It is not a minority-ruled colonial state; hence, no single
ethnic group alone should undeservingly bear the burden of history. Presently,
regardless of one's birthplace—be it Guangdong or Taitung, regardless of the
origin of one's mother—be it Vietnam or Tainan, and regardless of whether an
individual identifies with Taiwan or with the Republic of China, per se, a
common destiny has bequeathed upon all of us the same parity and dignity.
Therefore, let us relinquish our differentiation between native and foreign,
and between minority and majority, for the most complimentary and accurate
depiction of present-day Taiwan is of a people "ethnically diverse, but one as
a nation." A shared sense of belonging has become the common denominator among
all the 23 million people of Taiwan.
This year's presidential election was marked by an exceedingly
spirited campaign, hitherto unseen in history. The close results have prompted
opposition parties to question the process and file legal charges contesting
the results of the vote. As the incumbent president, I have, with the utmost
sincerity, expressed my highest respect for the independence and fairness of
our judicial system. I have also vowed to accept the result of its
investigation regardless of the final outcome. It is my firm belief that
abiding by and acceptance of the rule of law is the only conduit through which we
can resolve conflicts—for, if we were to rebuke the trust placed by the people
in Taiwan's democracy and independent judiciaries, then the end result would be
that "everyone loses." Today's timely spring shower will calm our spirits and
clear our minds.
In a democratic system, scheduled elections are designed for the
exercise of sovereignty by the people. They also provide a channel through
which popular will and social values can be regularly reassessed. Fierce
competition in the realm of politics forces politicians to undergo the most
direct form of evaluation, which often serves as their greatest inspiration. My
campaign, likewise, was subjected to rather tough scrutiny during the election,
as was my administration, but we have learned and improved as a result. In any
election, sharp differences among competing political factions are inevitable.
This could include contrasting ideologies, disparity in policy platforms, even
variation in methods used to mobilize supporters. However, a democratic
election is not equal to a "winner takes all" wager; nor should it lead to
purposefully fueled antagonism among voters. The checks and balances system of
multi-party politics constitutes a solid framework for democratic governance.
An accountable governing party and a loyal opposition, together, represent the
voice of the people; both are political assets of a free nation and a free
people. Be it the governing party or the opposition, their respective roles are
inherently bestowed by the people with an opportunity as well as a
responsibility.
In my opinion, the ultimate challenge of this past election lay not
as much in garnering a mandate as in the post-election hurdle of how to scale
the wall of antagonism, and, in finding ways to reconcile the deep divide
caused by distrust. We must not allow the narrow margin of victory to become a
source of greater conflict in society. Thus, I hereby pledge to listen, to
understand, to abide by laws and reasoning, and to strive to unify the people
of Taiwan—so as to dissipate the animosity engendered by the campaign and
rebuild a "bridge of trust" between the governing and opposition parties.
Unite Taiwan, stabilize cross-strait relations, seek social
harmony, and reinvigorate the economy. These are the earnest hopes of the people
and the preeminent mission of my new administration. But none of these
objectives can be accomplished through an individual effort, nor can one
political party do it alone. I shall go to the people with my plea for support,
just as I stand here today, calling on the opposition parties and the voices of
public opinion to join me in this historic endeavor.
BELIEVE IN TAIWAN—We must continue to foster national
competitiveness and cultivate an atmosphere of humanitarianism, environmental
protection, and sustainable development. PERSIST WITH REFORM—We shall forge
ahead in response to the people's demand for reform in our political and
judicial system, in the educational system, and in our financial and fiscal
infrastructures; for improvement in the quality of our media; and, for
comprehensive social reform. We shall be empowered by our faith in Taiwan; and we shall persevere in striving to achieve our goals. The efforts put forth
today will translate into an enduring legacy for the future generations: a just
new Taiwan where social justice, economic justice, fairness in our judicial
system, gender justice, and international justice are realized.
In our face-off with increasingly fierce and vigorous competition
on the international front, coalescing the power of the people and working
expeditiously to enhance the efficiency of government mechanisms—these are
tasks vital to Taiwan's sustained development. Yet, we must bear in mind that
historic and political circumstances confine us to an existing constitutional framework
that now poses the most direct impediment to effective governance.
The Constitution stands as the supreme legal basis of a nation,
symbolizing a paramount contract between the government and the people. Our
current Constitution was promulgated under circumstances that were very
different from the society we know today, and the majority of the articles in
the Constitution no longer address the present—much less the future—needs of
Taiwan. The promotion of constitutional re-engineering and the re-establishment
of the constitutional order are tasks that correspond with the expectations of
the people and are in accordance with the consensus shared by all political
parties.
The constitutional re-engineering project aims to enhance good
governance and increase administrative efficiency, to ensure a solid foundation
for democratic rule of law, and to foster long-term stability and prosperity of
the nation. There are many problems in our current Constitution that need to be
tackled, amongst which the more immediate and obvious include: whether to have
a three-branch or five-branch separation of power; whether to adopt a
presidential or parliamentary system of government; whether the president
should be elected by a relative majority or an absolute majority; reform of the
national legislature and relevant articles; the role of the National Assembly
and its retainment versus abolishment; whether to suspend or abolish the
provincial government; lowering of voting age; modification of compulsory
military service requirements; protection of basic human rights and the rights
of the disadvantaged; and, principles governing the running of the national
economy. Indeed, this will be a project of grand scale that is certain to have
significant impact.
To avoid repeating the same mistakes by past administrations—six
rounds of constitutional amendments in ten years time—the proposed
constitutional reform project must not be monopolized by one person or by a
single political party, nor should it be undertaken merely for the short-term.
In the future, we will invite members of the ruling party and the opposition
parties, as well as legal experts, academic scholars and representatives from
all fields and spanning all social classes, to collaborate in forming a
"Constitutional Reform Committee." Our aim will be to generate the highest
level of social consensus on the scope and procedure of the constitutional
reform, all of which are to be open to public scrutiny.
By the time I complete my presidency in 2008, I hope to hand to the
people of Taiwan and to our country a new version of our Constitution—one that
is timely, relevant and viable—this is my historic responsibility and my
commitment to the people. In the same context, I am fully aware that consensus
has yet to be reached on issues related to national sovereignty, territory and
the subject of unification/independence; therefore, let me explicitly propose
that these particular issues be excluded from the present constitutional
re-engineering project. Procedurally, we shall follow the rules set out in the
existing Constitution and its amendments. Accordingly, after the passage by the
national legislature, members of the first and also the last Ad Hoc National
Assembly will be elected and charged with the task of adopting the constitutional
reform proposal as passed by the legislature, abolishing the National Assembly,
and incorporating into the Constitution the people's right to referendum on
constitutional revision. By so doing, we hope to lay a solid foundation for the
long-term development of our constitutional democracy, and the people's right
to referendum on legislative proposals for constitutional revision.
During the last four years, we have witnessed dramatic political
and economic changes in the world. Taiwan, in the face of a new international
order, must stand firm yet persevere in our ongoing quest to become a better
and stronger nation. We must also endeavor to re-position ourselves in
equilibrium between global competition and international cooperation.
Taiwan's long-term friendship with the United States, Japan and our allies in the world has been founded on the safeguarding of
our common interests. More importantly, it is an alliance of core values that
we share: freedom, democracy, human rights and peace.
Taiwan's democratic development, and peace and
stability in the Taiwan Strait, remains a focal point of international
attention. On behalf of our government and people, I would like to once again
express our heartfelt gratitude for the friendship that has been extended to
us—reminding me of the old adage "together though apart." The people of Taiwan embrace peace. Needless to say, Taiwan's national security is of greater concern to
us than to anyone else in the world. Faced with an ever-increasing military threat
from across the Strait, it is imperative for all the people, including
political adversaries, to forge a strong will to defend ourselves, proactively
strengthening our defense equipment and upgrading our self-defense
capabilities. It is our sincere hope that our friends in the international
arena will continue to render their valuable attention and assistance to the
cause of peace in the Taiwan Strait and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region.
Let us take this opportunity to give a warm round of applause to our
international allies for their friendship and dedication.
Taiwan stands ready to continue in its role as
active participant and contributor to international society—this is the right
of Taiwan's 23 million people; likewise, it is our duty as citizens of the
world community. In the global campaign against terrorism, Taiwan has never been absent. In international humanitarian assistance efforts, Taiwan has always been there. Other recent accomplishments include the founding of the
Pacific Democratic Alliance and the establishment of the Taiwan Foundation for
Democracy. We can show a vigorous record of participation in international
non-governmental organizations (NGO's), in addition to our collaboration with
other members of the global village in advocacy and defense of the universal
values of freedom, democracy and human rights.
At present, Taiwan is the world's fifteenth largest trading nation,
with high rankings in international competitiveness. Yet, it took twelve years
of strenuous effort for Taiwan to become the 144th member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). We are still fighting relentlessly to join the World Health
Organization (WHO). Last year's outbreak of the SARS epidemic has taught the
world a hard lesson, that we are all equals in sickness and disease.
Nevertheless, despite the WHO's creed that health care—encompassing medicine,
public health and disease control—is a basic human right and should heed no
borders, Taiwan remains unjustly locked out. Let us come together in a
continuous effort toward our goal to join the World Health Organization in two
years.
Not long ago, the European Union (EU) welcomed the accession of ten
new member states. Following several decades of effort, with respect to each
individual country and by the free choice of citizens, the EU has successfully
integrated the common interests of the people of Europe. Such a valuable
experience has far-reaching implications and will impact world order in this
new century. From this we see that regional integration is not merely an
ongoing but also a future trend. This trend, in addition to globalization, has
led to fundamental changes in the conventional thinking of national sovereignty
and territorial boundaries, such that envisioning "universal harmony" will no
longer be an intangible ideal.
With the new century upon us, let the leaders on both sides of the
Strait, in striving to attain the greatest welfare for their peoples, heed this
new trend by adopting a brand new frame of mind—together, let us take a fresh,
unparalleled approach in addressing future cross-strait issues.
The peoples on both sides share a common ancestral, cultural and
historical heritage. In the past century, both have endured the repression of
foreign powers and the domination of authoritarian rule. Both our peoples now
share an indomitable resolve to stand up and be the masters of their own
destiny, a sentiment that is worthy of our full, mutual understanding.
We can understand why the government on the other side of the
Strait, in light of historical complexities and ethnic sentiments, cannot
relinquish the insistence on the "One China Principle." By the same token, the Beijing authorities must understand the deep conviction held by the people of Taiwan to strive for democracy, to love peace, to pursue their dreams free from threat,
and, to embrace progress. But if the other side is unable to comprehend that
this honest and simple wish represents the aspiration of Taiwan's 23 million
people, if it continues to threaten Taiwan with military force, if it persists
in isolating Taiwan diplomatically, if it keeps up irrational efforts to
blockade Taiwan's rightful participation in the international arena, this will
only serve to drive the hearts of the Taiwanese people further away and widen
the divide in the Strait.
The Republic of China now exists in Taiwan, Penghu (The
Pescadores), Kinmen and Matsu. This is a fact. Taiwan's existence as a member
of international society is also a fact. Such realities cannot be negated by
anyone for any reason—for therein lies the collective will of the people of Taiwan. A half century of toil and labor by the people of this land has culminated in what
is now known as the "Taiwan Experience," the fruits of which validate the
existence of the Republic of China and, what is more, have become the proud
assets, not only of the peoples on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, but of all
Chinese societies.
History has given rise to the development of two very different
political systems as well as two dissimilar ways of life on either side of the Taiwan Strait. However, if we make a concerted effort to find some positive aspect of our
differences and commonalities, perhaps we shall discover a wonderful
opportunity, a catalyst for building a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship.
Taiwan is a completely free and democratic society. Neither single individual
nor political party can make the ultimate choice for the people. If both sides
are willing, on the basis of goodwill, to create an environment engendered upon
"peaceful development and freedom of choice," then in the future, the Republic
of China and the People's Republic of China—or Taiwan and China—can seek to establish relations in any form whatsoever. We would not exclude any
possibility, so long as there is the consent of the 23 million people of Taiwan.
For more than a decade, interaction between the peoples on both
sides has grown closer and more intense. This development bears great
significance and increases the importance of furthering cross-strait relations.
In the future, we hope to continue pushing forth current liberalization
measures while expanding cross-strait exchange across the spectrum—from
journalism and information to education and culture, to economics and trade—and
to promote the establishment of channels for resuming cross-strait dialogue and
communication. By building bridges, we will aim to close gaps and establish a
foundation for mutual trust.
The first two decades of this century will be a crucial time for Taiwan to pursue a comprehensive program of upgrading and transformation; it also
represents an opportune moment in history for Mainland China to move forward with democratization and liberalization. Therefore, governments on
both sides should seize this timely opportunity to take on the challenges of
global competition, advocating for progress and development instead of dwelling
on the impasse of political debate. We have taken note that Chinese Communist
Party leaders repeatedly emphasize the importance of steady development for the
welfare of Mainland China's 1.3 billion people, hence, the espousal of
"peaceful emergence" as its tone for developing international relations. We
have no doubt the Beijing authorities recognize that maintaining the peaceful
status quo in the Taiwan Strait is of vital importance to sustainable
development for our respective sides and for the stability of the Asia-Pacific
region as a whole.
It is my belief that both sides must demonstrate a dedicated
commitment to national development, and through consultation, establish a
dynamic "peace and stability framework" for interactions; that we must work
together to guarantee there will be no unilateral change to the status quo in
the Taiwan Strait; and, additionally, we must further promote cultural,
economic and trade exchanges—including the three links—for only in so doing can
we ensure the welfare of our peoples while fulfilling the expectations of the
international community.
As the President of the Republic of China, I have been mandated by
the people of Taiwan to defend the sovereignty, security and dignity of this
nation, to chart our country's sustainable development, to safeguard peace and
stability in the Taiwan Strait, to seek consensus and garner the collective
support of all the people, and to carefully manage future relations across the
Strait. Today I would like to reaffirm the promises and principles set forth in
my inaugural speech in 2000. Those commitments have been honored—they have not
changed over the past four years, nor will they change in the next four years.
Upon this foundation, my next step will be to invite both the governing and
opposition parties, in conjunction with representatives from various walks of
the society, to participate in the establishment of a "Committee for
Cross-Strait Peace and Development," combining the collective insight and
wisdom of all parties and our citizenry, to draft the "Guidelines for
Cross-Strait Peace and Development." The goal will be to pave the way for
formulating a new relationship of cross-strait peace, stability and sustainable
development.
Honorable guests and fellow citizens, if we look at a map of the
world, Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu may seem like a tiny cluster of islands
in the margins of the Pacific Rim. However, if you take a closer look, what you
will discover are orchestral mountain ranges, painted with singing rivers,
adorning some of the world's most bountiful ecological landscapes. Amidst the
lush forestry and abundant wildlife, there is a human chain linking together 23
million warm smiles descended from an ethnic rainbow, with a history that spans
across centuries and reflects a myriad of cultural heritage juxtaposed with
political evolution and economic transformation—enough to fill an encyclopedia.
Taiwan is a tolerant, oceanic country, a small but proud island connected to
all corners of the world. Galvanizing these attributes will empower us to
expand our visions and unleash our minds far beyond the horizon.
The story of Taiwan touches people's hearts. But, what inspires
awe, more than its natural beauty, is the coloring that reflects the triumphant
experience of overcoming hardship, trials and tribulations. This is the "Spirit
of Taiwan," a gift passed through the generations, a glow which emits from the
faces of the Taiwan people.
Now, the torch of history has once again been passed into my hand;
each of you also holds the torch in your hands. I have set a goal for myself,
that, during the next four years, I will continue to uphold the principles of
sincerity and honesty, compassion and benevolence, unselfishness and
impartiality in leading our country down the "middle road." I ask my fellow
compatriots to stand by me in this endeavor. I will be counting on your support
and encouragement.
I am just an ordinary man. I have always believed that there is no
such thing as a great president, for only a great people can create a great
country. Fueled by the power of the people, let us work together. Together, let
us lay the foundation for our long-term national development—for sustainable democracy,
sustainable reforms, sustainable humanities, and sustainable peace. Let Taiwan, the Republic of China, work toward solidarity and harmony, fairness and justice,
prosperity and equality. History has endowed upon me this responsibility. It is
a mission entrusted to me by the people.
On February 28 of this year, more than one million people stood on
the land of Formosa, irrespective of ethnic affiliation, age, or gender. Hand
in hand, they formed a mesmerizing "wall of democracy" some five hundred kilometers
long, spanning the full length of the island and completing a breathtaking
portrait of Taiwan. The time has come for Taiwan to stand tall, to reach out
with courage and conviction. Let us mark a sustainable and firm place in the
world.
My fellow citizens, let us be thankful for this land and let us pay
tribute to the greatness of the people. We must unite for the sake of Taiwan. Together, we must defend our Taiwan, as we stride proudly forward into the
twenty-first century. Once again let us hand-in-hand author the next chapter in
this most inspirational story of twenty-first-century Taiwan.
Finally, let us wish the Republic of China great prosperity. And to
all my fellow citizens, dear friends and honorable guests, may health and
happiness be with you always.
Heads of State of Our Diplomatic Allies, Distinguished Guests,
Overseas Compatriots, My Fellow Taiwanese, and Dear Friends in front of a
Television Set or Computer: Good Morning!
I. Historical Significance of the Second Turnover of Power
Earlier this year on March 22, through the
presidential election of the Republic of China, the people changed the course
of their future. Today we are here not to celebrate the victory of a particular
party or individual, but to witness Taiwan pass a historic milestone.
Taiwan's democracy has been treading down a rocky road,
but now it has finally won the chance to enter a smoother path. During that difficult
time, political trust was low, political maneuvering was high, and economic
security was gone. Support for Taiwan from abroad had suffered an all-time low.
Fortunately, the growing pains of Taiwan's democracy did not last long compared
to those of other young democracies. Through these growing pains, Taiwan's democracy matured as one can see by the clear choice the people made at this
critical moment. The people have chosen clean politics, an open economy, ethnic
harmony, and peaceful cross-strait relations to open their arms to the future.
Above all, the people have rediscovered Taiwan's traditional core values of benevolence, righteousness, diligence, honesty,
generosity and industriousness. This remarkable experience has let Taiwan become "a beacon of democracy to Asia and the world." We, the people of Taiwan, should be proud of ourselves. The Republic of China is now a democracy respected by
the international community.
Yet we are still not content. We must better Taiwan's democracy, enrich its substance, and make it more perfect. To accomplish this, we
can rely on the Constitution to protect human rights, uphold law and order,
make justice independent and impartial, and breathe new life into civil
society. Taiwan's democracy should not be marred by illegal eavesdropping,
arbitrary justice, and political interference in the media or electoral
institutions. All of us share this vision for the next phase of political
reform.
On the day of Taiwan's presidential election,
hundreds of millions of ethnic Chinese worldwide watched the ballot count on TV
and the Internet. Taiwan is the sole ethnic Chinese society to complete a
second democratic turnover of power. Ethnic Chinese communities around the
world have laid their hopes on this crucial political experiment. By
succeeding, we can make unparalleled contributions to the democratic
development of all ethnic Chinese communities. This responsibility is ours to
fulfill.
II. Mission of the New Era
The new administration's most urgent task is to
lead Taiwan through the daunting challenges from globalization. The world
economy is changing profoundly, and newly emerging countries are arising
rapidly. We must upgrade Taiwan's international competitiveness and recover
lost opportunities. The uncertainty of the current global economy poses as the
main challenge to the revitalization of Taiwan's economy. Yet, we firmly
believe that, with right policies and steadfast determination, our goals are
within our grasp.
Islands like Taiwan flourish in an open economy and
wither in a closed one. This has been true throughout history. Therefore, we
must open up and deregulate the economy to unleash the vitality of the private
sector. This will strengthen Taiwan's comparative advantages. Taiwan's enterprises should be encouraged to establish themselves at home, network
throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and position themselves globally. Taiwan's labor force must learn to adapt to rapid technological changes and industrial
restructuring. Our youth must develop character, a sense of civic duty, global
perspectives and lifelong learning capabilities. All forms of political
interference in education must be eradicated. In this era of globalization, the
government must satisfy the basic needs of the underprivileged and create opportunities
for them to develop. While pursuing growth, we must seek environmental
sustainability for Taiwan and the rest of the world.
The new administration must also restore political
ethics to regain the people's trust in the government. We will endeavor to
create an environment that is humane, rational and pluralistic—one that fosters
political reconciliation and co-existence. We will promote harmony among
sub-ethnic groups and between the old and new immigrants, encourage healthy
competition in politics, and respect the media's monitoring of the government
and freedom of the press.
The new administration will push for clean
politics and set strict standards for the integrity and efficiency of
officials. It also will provide a code for the interaction between the public
and private sectors to prevent money politics. I hope every civil servant will
keep in mind: "Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." The KMT
will honor its sincere commitment to accountability in governance. The new government
will be for all the people, remain non-partisan and uphold administrative
neutrality. The government will not stand in the way of social progress, but
rather serve as the engine that drives it.
As President of the Republic of China, my most
solemn duty is to safeguard the Constitution. In a young democracy, respecting
the Constitution is more important than amending it. My top priority is to
affirm the authority of the Constitution and show the value of abiding by it.
Serving by example, I will follow the letter and the spirit of the
Constitution, especially the separation of powers. We must ensure that the
government is based on the rule of law. The Executive Yuan must answer to the
Legislative Yuan. The Judiciary must guarantee the rule of law and protect
human rights. The Examination Yuan must make the civil service sound. The
Control Yuan must redress mistakes by the government and censure malfeasance by
civil servants. All told, we must take this opportunity to re-establish a
robust constitutional tradition.
Taiwan has to be a respectable member of the global
village. Dignity, autonomy, pragmatism and flexibility should be Taiwan's guiding principles when developing foreign relations. As a world citizen, the
Republic of China will accept its responsibilities in promoting free trade,
nonproliferation, anti-global warming measures, counter-terrorism, humanitarian
aid, and other global commons. Taiwan must play a greater role in regional
cooperation. By strengthening economic relations with its major trading
partners, Taiwan can better integrate itself in East Asia and contribute more
to the region's peace and prosperity.
We will strengthen bilateral relations with the United States, our foremost security ally and trading partner. Taiwan will continue to
cherish its diplomatic allies and honor its commitments to them. We will expand
cooperation with like-minded countries. On top of that, we will rationalize our
defense budget and acquire necessary defensive weaponry to form a solid
national defense force. At the same time, we are committed to cross-strait
peace and regional stability. The Republic of China must restore its reputation
in the international community as a peace-maker.
I sincerely hope that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can seize this historic opportunity to achieve peace and co-prosperity. Under
the principle of "no unification, no independence and no use of force," as Taiwan's mainstream public opinion holds it, and under the framework of the ROC
Constitution, we will maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In 1992,
the two sides reached a consensus on "one China, respective interpretations."
Many rounds of negotiation were then completed, spurring the development of
cross-strait relations. I want to reiterate that, based on the "1992
Consensus," negotiations should resume at the earliest time possible. As
proposed in the Boao Forum on April 12 of this year, let's "face reality,
pioneer a new future, shelve controversies and pursue a win-win solution." This
will allow us to strike a balance as each pursues its own interests. The
normalization of economic and cultural relations is the first step to a win-win
solution. Accordingly, we are ready to resume consultations. It is our
expectation that, with the start of direct charter flights on weekends and the
arrival of mainland tourists in early July this year, we will launch a new era
of cross-strait relations.
We will also enter consultations with mainland China over Taiwan's international space and a possible cross-strait peace accord. Taiwan doesn't just want security and prosperity. It wants dignity. Only when Taiwan is no longer being isolated in the international arena can cross-strait relations
move forward with confidence. We have taken note that Mr. Hu Jintao has
recently spoken on cross-strait relations three times: first, in a conversation
of March 26 with US President George W. Bush on the "1992 Consensus"; second,
in his proposed "four continuations" on April 12 at the Boao Forum; and third,
on April 29 when he called for "building mutual trust, shelving controversies,
finding commonalities despite differences, and creating together a win-win
solution" across the Taiwan Strait. His views are very much in line with our
own. Here I would like to call upon the two sides to pursue reconciliation and
truce in both cross-strait and international arenas. We should help and respect
each other in international organizations and activities. In light of our
common Chinese heritage, people on both sides should do their utmost to jointly
contribute to the international community without engaging in vicious
competition and the waste of resources. I firmly believe that Taiwan and mainland China are open minded enough to find a way to attain peace and
co-prosperity.
In resolving cross-strait issues, what matters is
not sovereignty but core values and way of life. We care about the welfare of
the 1.3 billion people of mainland China, and hope that mainland China will continue to move toward freedom, democracy and prosperity for all the people.
This would pave the way for the long-term peaceful development of cross-strait
relations.
The damage from the recent earthquake in Sichuan was shocking. All Taiwanese have expressed deep concern and offered immediate
emergency assistance. We offer our deepest condolences to the earthquake
victims and pay homage to the rescue workers. May the reconstruction of the
affected area be completed at the earliest time possible!
III. Taiwan's Legacy and Vision
Upon being sworn in, I had an epiphany about the
significance of accepting responsibility for the 23 million people of Taiwan. Although I have never felt so honored in my life, this is the heaviest
responsibility that I have ever shouldered. Taiwan is not my birthplace, but it
is where I was raised and the resting place of my family. I am forever grateful
to society for accepting and nurturing this post-war immigrant. I will protect Taiwan with all my heart and resolutely move forward. I'll do my very best!
For over four centuries, this island of ours has
welcomed waves of immigrants, nurturing and sheltering us all. It has provided
us, our children and grandchildren, and the generations to come a safe haven.
With its lofty mountains and vast oceans, Taiwan has invigorated us in mind and
spirit. The cultural legacies we inherited over time not only survive on this
land, but flourish and evolve, creating a pluralistic and vigorous human
landscape.
The Republic of China was reborn on Taiwan. During my presidency, we will celebrate the 100th anniversary of the founding of
the Republic of China. This democratic republic, the very first in Asia, spent a short 38 years on the Chinese mainland, but has spent nearly 60 years in Taiwan. During these last six decades, the destinies of the Republic of China and Taiwan have been closely intertwined. Together, the two have experienced times good and
bad. On the jagged path toward democracy, the ROC has made great strides. Dr.
Sun Yat-sen's dream for a constitutional democracy was not realized on the
Chinese mainland, but today it has taken root, blossomed and borne fruit in Taiwan.
I am confident about Taiwan's future. Over the
years, I have traveled to every corner of the island and talked with people
from all walks of life. What impressed me most was that the traditional core
values of benevolence, righteousness, diligence, honesty, generosity and
industriousness could be seen everywhere in the words and deeds of the
Taiwanese people regardless of their location and age. These values have long
been ingrained in their character. This is the wellspring of our progress, also
lauded as the "Taiwan Spirit."
One can see that Taiwan is blessed with an
excellent geographic location, precious cultural assets, a maturing democracy,
innovative entrepreneurship, a pluralistic society, active civic groups,
patriotic overseas compatriots, and new immigrants from all over the world. We
should couple the "Taiwan Spirit" with our comparative advantages and the
principle of "putting Taiwan first for the benefit of the people." This way we
can transform our homeland—Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu—the envy of the
world.
To revive Taiwan requires the efforts of both the
government and the people. We need the expertise of the private sector,
cooperation among all political parties, and participation by all the people.
My dear compatriots, from this moment on, we must roll up our sleeves to build
up our homeland. Together, we can lay a solid foundation of peace and
prosperity for our children, grandchildren and the generations to come. Let's
work hand in hand for our future!
Esteemed Leaders, Distinguished Guests, Compatriots from Abroad, Fellow Citizens, and
Friends watching via television or the Internet: Good morning!
Historical Significance of the Fifth Direct Presidential Election: Heading Toward a Mature Democracy
On January 14, we smoothly completed the Republic of China's
fifth direct presidential election. This was an important milestone as Taiwan's
democracy heads toward maturity. In a free and fair election, the entire
electorate of Taiwan demonstrated a highly developed democratic mindset that
won praise from the international community. I would like to commend my
opponents, Democratic Progressive Party Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen and People's
First Party Chairman James Soong, for the democratic spirit they showed in
accepting the election results. Friends, let us join together in a cheer for
Taiwan's democracy!
Reflecting on the Past Four Years: Reforms Are Showing Results and the Nation Is Back on Track
Looking back at the past four years, I would like first
to specially thank the public for its support. Together, we have weathered the
global financial tsunami, allowing Taiwan's economic growth rate to once again
compare favourably among the Four Asian Tigers.
At home, together we have emerged from the destruction
brought in August 2009 by Typhoon Morakot, and have rebuilt the
disaster-stricken areas. We have restored a high level of ethics in public
affairs, safeguarded the spirit of the Constitution and enhanced judicial
fairness and transparency. We have also streamlined the central government, and
merged or upgraded the status of major cities and counties; both of these
undertakings were very major reforms. Moreover, we have vigorously reduced
energy use and cut carbon emissions, promoted housing justice, and greatly
expanded the social safety net.
We have also created the most peaceful state of
cross-strait relations in 60 years, thus winning the trust of our long-time
diplomatic partners and the affirmation of the international community. As a
result, ROC nationals now enjoy visa-free travel to 127 different countries and
territories.
Here I would like to especially thank former Vice
President Vincent Siew, former Premier Liu Chao-shiuan, former Premier Wu
Den-yih, Premier Sean Chen and all support staff throughout the government, as
well as the Legislative Yuan under the leadership of Speaker Wang Jin-pyng.
Working hand-in-hand with the public over the last four years, they have all
rendered tremendous service to the nation. I am most sincerely grateful for
their hard work and contributions, and shall continue to rely on their
experience and wisdom.
Golden Decade: Five Pillars to Make Taiwan Robustly Competitive
Looking ahead to the next four years, I shall strive
jointly with the entire citizenry to realize the vision of a Golden Decade for
our nation. Our objective is to build a nation that enjoys the benefits of
peace, justice and well-being. The government has identified five pillars of
national growth that it aims to achieve. First, it will enhance the drivers of
economic growth. Second, it will create employment and realize social justice.
Third, it will develop an environment characterized by low carbon emissions and
high reliance on green energy. Fourth, it will build up culture as a source of
national strength. And fifth, it will take active steps to cultivate, recruit
and retain talent. Accomplishing these tasks will comprehensively bolster
Taiwan's global competitiveness, so that during these four years, Taiwan can
achieve a fundamental transformation and create even greater well-being.
Enhancing the drivers of economic growth is the first
pillar for bolstering Taiwan's competitiveness. Further economic liberalization
and improvements to our industrial structure constitute the core drivers. We
saw the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement come into effect in March of this year,
and mainland China is about to begin negotiating a similar agreement with Japan
and South Korea later this year. We must step up the pace of liberalization;
there can be no further delay. Only if Taiwan opens up to the world will the
world embrace Taiwan. In an era when we are confronted by a restructuring of
the global political and economic order and a shift in the economic center of
gravity toward Asia, we must change from a protectionist mindset and revise
outdated legislation. We must eliminate artificial trade and investment
barriers and create a genuinely free and open economic environment for Taiwan
that is more in line with international practices.
We are planning to establish showcase free economic
zones, one of which will be in Kaohsiung. This is a crucial step in Taiwan's
move to becoming a "free trade island". We must speedily complete follow-up
talks under the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)
and expedite negotiations on economic cooperation agreements with important
trading partners like Singapore and New Zealand. Over the next eight years, we
must fully prepare to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership in order to seize the
historic opportunity to become further integrated into the global trading
system.
Our industrial sector has created many spectacular
successes, but it is now faced with longstanding bottlenecks that impede
further growth. In the future, we shall actively seek to improve industrial
structure and build on the efficiency-driven production model of the past to
actively develop a new "innovation-driven" and "value-creating" industrial
model. Our strategy is to incorporate special characteristics of services into
the manufacturing sector, while at the same time introducing technological and
international elements into service industries, and developing the unique
character of our traditional industries. Only in this way can our industrial
sector become more diverse and create higher added value; and only in this way
can our industrial sector genuinely transform and carve out an unassailable
niche in the global economy.
The second pillar for bolstering Taiwan's competitiveness
is creating employment and realizing social justice. Market liberalization due
to globalization has made job market competition global in nature. We must
pursue economic growth if we are to create more job opportunities. Economic
growth must spur pay increases across all sectors at the same time, or else it
is meaningless. Furthermore, we must firmly uphold fairness and justice, narrow
the gap between rich and poor, and ensure that the fruits of economic success
are enjoyed by all.
Bringing soundness to the government's fiscal structure
is a top priority. We are endeavoring to realize "taxation commensurate with
ability to pay" and "tax justice", establish a comprehensive social security
system, and safeguard the fundamental interests of the disadvantaged. At the
same time, we must reasonably allocate basic infrastructure, public services
and educational resources, and establish a model for balanced regional
development based on local characteristics. Doing so will reduce disparity
between urban and rural areas and allow every citizen-regardless of gender,
place of residence, ethnicity or social status-an equal opportunity to pursue
happiness.
Taiwan's birth rate has been declining, and its
population has been aging, for a long time. These trends are national security
issues that must be faced. Therefore, we need to formulate a forward-looking
population policy, institute a well thought-out national health insurance
program and national pension system, speedily promote a long-term care system,
and utilize more complete preschool care and education measures in order to
provide strong support for parents and children.
The judiciary is the force for justice which safeguards
the interests of the people. Over the past four years, we have completed
legislation of the Speedy Trial Act, the Judges Act and the Act Governing
Family Matters, and have established the Agency Against Corruption. The Supreme
Court practice of not disclosing how cases are assigned to judges is now also
history. The judiciary must be independent, but absolutely must not be an
island unto itself, nor can it act in a manner that defies the common-sense
expectations of the public for a just judiciary. Over the next four years, I
shall do everything in my power to promote judicial reform that accords with
the direction in which our society is moving. I want our judicial institutions,
which were transplanted from the West a century ago, to genuinely take root in
Taiwan so that the rule of law becomes a way of life and the safeguarding of
human rights becomes an internalized commitment.
The third pillar for bolstering Taiwan's competitiveness
is developing an environment characterized by low carbon emissions and high
reliance on green energy. Global climate change and imbalances between resource
supply and demand present Taiwan with both challenges and opportunities. In the
future, all industries around the world will emphasize green production. Green
industry will be a new arena of industrial competition, and consumer behavior
must fall in line with the need for energy conservation and reduced carbon
emissions. Therefore, we encourage the private sector to step up R&D and
investment in green-energy industries, green architecture and green production,
so that these become a new economic bright spot that brings employment and
development, and gradually turns Taiwan into a "low-carbon, green-energy island".
We must staunchly uphold the ideal of sustainable development and leave our
next generation clear skies, clean air and abundant water resources. The
mountains, forests, rivers, wetlands and oceans that we pass on to them must be
teeming with life and vitality.
In terms of policy, we must ensure that energy prices are
reasonable and create the impetus for energy conservation, carbon reduction and
increased investment in green-energy industries. We must restore market-based
prices for gasoline and electricity, and put into practice the "user pays"
principle. Furthermore, we must respond to high public expectations for reform
of and greater operational efficiency at state-run corporations in order to
create a win-win scenario for consumers and producers.
Building up culture as a source of national strength is
the fourth pillar for bolstering Taiwan's competitiveness. Taiwan has three
cultural traits: First, civic spirit is deep-rooted; second, traditional
culture is well preserved; and third, the links and transitions between
tradition and modernity are sophisticated. Democracy has made our civil society
what it is today. It is a civil society in which the atmosphere of openness and
the spirit of freedom have become the soil that nurtures creativity. In this
soil of openness and freedom, we have not only preserved traditional
culture-such as Taiwanese opera and glove puppetry-but have also developed
contemporary cultural brands, such as the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre and the Ju
Percussion Group. On the one hand, we are pursuing high technology and
internationalization; while on the other, we also champion grassroots access to
cultural activities.
It takes an open society to foster ebullient creativity;
bold imagination can only be tolerated in a climate of freedom. Taiwan's
creativity is infused into movies, pop music and publications, forming a
cultural industry that plays a decisively important role in the
Chinese-speaking world. However, there must be a means of achieving integration
within the industry so that, by adding value through creativity and utilizing
intellectual property mechanisms, we can market our culture globally and
transform the value of its content into economic output, which in turn can
nurture more creative talent.
Culture is not just art, creativity or an industry; it is
also a part of people's daily lives. Recently the prominent mainland Chinese
writer Han Han wrote about what he had personally experienced in Taiwan: A taxi
driver who returned a cell phone left in his cab, and an optician who went far
out of his way to offer help. Both incidents made a deep impression on him.
Similarly, not long ago, a Hualien taxi driver, Zeng Shicheng, discovered that
a Japanese passenger had left a wallet behind in his cab. He drove quickly to
the wharf but the passenger liner had already left shore. A tugboat pursued the
departing liner, and finally, the wallet was returned to its owner via a basket
lowered from the passenger ship. I think that such moving acts are reflections
of kindness and honesty, core values of Chinese culture that have become part
of daily life for people in Taiwan.
We must view culture as a source of national strength.
The development of culture is the development of national strength; investment
in culture is tantamount to investment in national strength.
The fifth pillar for bolstering Taiwan's competitiveness
is cultivating, recruiting and retaining talent. Since Taiwan lacks natural
resources, talent is our most important resource and the key to national
development.
We must turn our universities and colleges into cradles
of local talent and wellsprings of national competitiveness. Furthermore, we
must adopt open-minded, forward-looking policies, and create a livable,
friendly, international, non-discriminatory and salary-competitive environment
with which to retain outstanding home-grown talent while recruiting outstanding
talent from all over the world. In Chinese we speak of "building a nest to
attract the phoenix" — in other words, "build it, and they will come".
Children are our enduring concern. Every child, rich or
poor, should have the chance to develop his or her talent, and to advance-this
is the very core of education. In fact, several Taiwanese have come to stand
out in their respective fields, including Ang Lee and Xiao Qing-yang in the
cultural and creative arena, Billy Chang and Chen Hsinghe of Cirque du Soleil,
and Johan Ku and Jason Wu in the world of international fashion and design.
Over the past four years, students from Taiwan have won top prizes at various
international invention and design fairs. Taiwan has tremendous talent and
creativity. We need to work harder at cultivating the next generation by
providing quality 12-year public education so that each child can shine.
If we want our nation to develop, then we must reform; if
we want reform, then we must bear the short-term pains of adjustment. We
absolutely cannot leave the hot potato issues and heavy burdens to the next
generation. I am keenly aware that the most important duty and mission of a
re-elected president is to work with the people to forge greater well-being. In
my second term in office, we must take resolute steps while engaging in timely,
in-depth and extensive communication with the public to win its support.
Utilizing these five pillars to "create greater well-being for Taiwan" is the
goal of my second term. Taiwan needs to become more competitive if it is to
survive and the well-being of its people is to be guaranteed.
The Three Legs of National Security: Cross-strait Peace, Viable Diplomacy and a Strong Defense
National security is crucial for the survival of the
Republic of China. I believe that Taiwan's security rests on three legs. The
first is the use of cross-strait rapprochement to realize peace in the Taiwan
Strait. The second is the use of viable diplomacy to establish more breathing
space for ourselves in the international community. And the third is the use of
military strength to deter external threats. We must regard each as equally
important and develop them in a balanced manner.
The first leg, as I mentioned, is cross-strait
rapprochement to realize peace in the Taiwan Strait. Over the past four years,
this government has resumed institutionalized cross-strait negotiations, signed
16 bilateral agreements and made cross-strait rapprochement a reality. In the process,
we have staunchly maintained the precepts of "parity, dignity and reciprocity"
and the principle of "putting Taiwan first for the benefit of the people". The
executive branch has been openly and transparently accountable to the
legislature, and stepped up communication with opposition parties in an effort
to find consensus. This approach has created institutionalized safeguards for
cross-strait rapprochement.
Over the past four years, we have improved cross-strait
relations and reduced cross-strait tension. This has brought peace and
prosperity and won broad public support. Nevertheless, a part of the public
still has reservations about our mainland policies. Here, I would like to
solemnly point out that the Constitution of the Republic of China is the
supreme guiding principle for how the government deals with cross-strait
relations. Within that constitutional framework, our cross-strait policy must
maintain the status quo of "no unification, no independence and no use of force",
and promote peaceful cross-strait development on the basis of the 1992
Consensus, whereby each side acknowledges the existence of "one China", but
maintains its own interpretation of what that means.
When we speak of "one China", naturally it is the
Republic of China. According to our Constitution, the sovereign territory of
the Republic of China includes Taiwan and the mainland. At present, the ROC
government has authority to govern only in Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. In
other words, over the past two decades, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have
been defined as "one Republic of China, two areas". This status has remained
unchanged throughout the administrations of the past three presidents.
This is an eminently rational and pragmatic definition,
and constitutes the basis for assuring the ROC's long-term development and
safeguarding Taiwan's security. Both sides of the Taiwan Strait ought to
squarely face up to this reality, seek common ground while respecting
differences, and establish a consensus regarding "mutual non-recognition of
sovereignty and mutual non-denial of authority to govern". Only in this way can
the two sides move forward with confidence.
Over the past four years, we have promoted cross-strait
ties in accordance with the principles of putting "pressing matters before less
pressing ones, easily resolved issues before difficult ones, and economic
matters before political ones". This approach has yielded unprecedented
successes in the areas of economic and trade ties, transportation, public
health, culture, education, judicial assistance, and financial services.
In the next four years, the two sides of the strait have
to open up new areas of cooperation and continue working to consolidate peace,
expand prosperity and deepen mutual trust. We also hope that civic groups on
both sides of the Taiwan Strait will have more opportunities for exchanges and
dialogue focusing on such areas as democracy, human rights, rule of law and
civil society, to create an environment more conducive to peaceful cross-strait
development.
The people of the two sides of the strait share a common
Chinese ethnic heritage. We share common blood lines, history and culture. We
both revere our nation's founding father, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. We cannot forget his
precept that "the world is a commonwealth shared by all", or the ideals of
freedom, democracy and equitable distribution of wealth on which he founded
this nation.
Taiwan's experience in establishing democracy proves that
it is not impossible for democratic institutions from abroad to take root in an
ethnically Chinese society. I fervently look forward to the gradual opening up
of greater popular participation in the political process on the mainland,
along with steady improvement in human rights and the rule of law, and the
autonomous development of civil society. This will further reduce the feeling
of "otherness" between people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
The second leg of our national security is the use of
viable diplomacy to establish more breathing space for ourselves in the
international community and boost our contributions to international society.
Over the past four years, rather than adopting "scorched earth diplomacy", we
have chosen "viable diplomacy" and "above-board diplomacy", providing aid in
accordance with the principles of "seeking proper goals, acting lawfully, and
exercising effective administration". We have undertaken cooperation projects
with our diplomatic partners, and they have continually spoken up for us at
international organizations. We have restored mutual trust with the United
States through close cooperation in many areas. This has enabled us to bolster
channels of communication and build the most solid "security and economic
partnership" of the past 30 years. We have also achieved important breakthroughs
in relations with Japan. In addition to establishing a new representative
office, we have also made progress in such areas as aviation, culture and
investment. Our "special partnership" with Japan represents the friendliest
state of bilateral ties in 40 years. The European Union and the European
Parliament have both on many occasions issued statements and passed resolutions
to support our mainland policy, and to seek stronger trade and economic ties
between Taiwan and the EU.
Establishing more breathing room for ourselves in the
international community has been an important breakthrough. For the past three
years we have attended as an observer at the World Health Assembly after an
absence of 38 years, and in 2010 we acceded to the Government Procurement
Agreement under the World Trade Organization. The facts prove that progress in
the cross-strait relationship does not preclude our achievement of greater
international breathing room. On the contrary, the two can even be mutually
complementary. Over the next four years, we shall expand our participation in
international organizations, including the activities of United Nations
agencies that specialize in climate change and civil aviation. We also hope
that in international NGOs, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can demonstrate
mutual tolerance and assist each other so that this virtuous circle model
exerts an even greater positive effect.
As for contributing more to the international community,
Taiwan is endowed with the world's most precious assets, by which I am
referring to the abundant vitality of its civic groups, and the caring spirit
of its people.
When Haiti experienced a massive earthquake in January of
2010, I called Chen Shuntian, the head of our special rescue team that had
rushed to the disaster area. What I heard on the other end of the line was the
sound of excited shouting, since only 15 minutes before they had rescued a
victim who was still alive. This was a first for our international rescue team.
When Japan was hit by the tsunami in March of last year, NT$6.6 billion in
donations were raised through joint private sector and government effort. This
was not only the largest amount worldwide; it also exceeded the combined amount
donated by over 90 other countries. There is also a girl from Tainan City, Cai
Yuhua, who went to the disaster area and quietly helped old people there.
People in both Japan and Taiwan were deeply moved by her acts of kindness. And
during my trip to Africa in April of this year, I encountered a physician, Dr.
Huang Qilin, who has been providing medical care there for nearly 20 years. His
unflagging work over the years has showed the warmth and dedication behind the
white medical frock of a Taiwan doctor. These examples demonstrate an
enthusiasm for life and resilience that is undaunted by difficulty. They have
also won us sincere friendship.
The third leg of our national security is a strong
national defense to deter external threats. An ancient proverb clearly
admonishes us: "Though the world may be at peace, being unprepared to fight
invites danger". We do not seek a fight, but we do not fear it, either. We have
made significant progress on this front over the past four years. Our defense
industry is now much more self-sufficient. We have strengthened our
new-generation fighting capabilities. And our military forces are better
prepared to take part in disaster prevention and rescue. At the same time, we
have boosted our training programs and dramatically upgraded the physical
fitness and fighting skills of our soldiers, while making great strides toward
improving discipline and eliminating corruption. These are the concrete results
of our efforts to build military preparedness.
In the area of weapons procurement from overseas, the
United States has approved three arms sales to Taiwan since I took office, in
aggregate totaling US$18.3 billion, and exceeding all previous such sales in
terms of quality and amount. This provides us with an appropriate defensive
force in the future that will give the government and public greater confidence
and willingness to pursue continued stable and solid development of the
cross-strait relationship.
Over the next four years, we shall continue to purchase
weapons of a defensive nature that we cannot manufacture ourselves, and shall
complete the transition to a volunteer armed force. Necessary supporting
measures will also be taken. And, with a "rock solid defense and effective
deterrence" military strategy and "innovative and asymmetrical" thinking, we
shall establish a streamlined yet professional and sturdy national defense
force. At the same time, we shall enhance relations with neighbouring countries,
actively participate in international affairs, and promote establishment of
institutionalized channels for strategic dialogue and cooperation to defend the
sovereignty of the Republic of China, safeguard the security of Taiwan and
actively make a contribution to regional peace.
Standing at a Historic Watershed: A New Century, a Good Beginning
Fellow countrymen, looking back over the past four years
my heart is filled with profound gratitude. We have weathered the global
financial tsunami and greeted the ROC Centennial with joy. We have wept at the
wounds inflicted by severe natural catastrophes, and rejoiced at the
world-beating achievements of our fellow compatriots.
We are a family and Taiwan is home to us all. We strongly
believe that no matter what political differences there may be between the
ruling and opposition parties, we are still one family. Despite the many
difficulties over the past several years between the ruling and opposition
parties, I believe we share a common commitment to democracy. On this
foundation, we can surely seek consensus and work together to solve problems.
Over the past four years, I have continually invited civic groups to engage in
dialogue. I sincerely hope to open up dialogue with the opposition leaders as
soon as possible. We will show the people that the ruling and opposition
parties can not only compete but also cooperate. For the welfare of all our
people, let us jointly set a good example for Taiwan's democracy.
In this, the 101st year of the Republic of China, we
stand at a historic watershed. We are very familiar with the struggles that our
forefathers have been through over the past century. Looking ahead to the
coming century, we have a clear vision of where the nation's future challenges
and opportunities lie. I feel fortunate to be the first person to take the oath
of office as president at the very time the Republic of China enters upon its
second century. This is indeed a great responsibility.
During this solemn and sacred ceremony, I, as well as the
members of my administration, once more accept the responsibilities of this
commission from the entire populace. Such a responsibility sits heavily on our
shoulders. We must be ever conscious of the risks that face us, while doing
everything in our power to fulfill the duties set forth in the Constitution, so
that we can live up to the responsibilities entrusted to us by the citizens of
this country.
Standing at the starting line of this new century for our
Republic, I hope that the work we do now will provide a solid foundation for
our children's further progress, and that the seedlings we plant today continue
to grow and bear fruit to be enjoyed by the next generation. Let us uphold our
ideals, work together for reform and create greater well-being for Taiwan.
Esteemed heads of state and guests from our diplomatic allies, distinguished ambassadors
and representatives, dear friends, our fellow citizens across the country:
Our Gratitude and Responsibilities
Just moments ago, in the Presidential Office building,
Dr. Chen Chien-jen and I were officially sworn in as the 14th President and
Vice President of the Republic of China. We must express our gratitude to this
land for nurturing us and to the people for placing their trust in us. Most
importantly, we deeply appreciate the democratic institutions of this country,
which have allowed us to accomplish Taiwan's third transition of political
power through a peaceful electoral process. We also overcame many uncertainties
throughout a four months-long transition period that concluded peacefully
today.
Once again, the people of Taiwan have shown the world
through our actions that we, as a free and democratic people, are committed to
the defense of our freedom and democracy as a way of life. Each and every one
of us participated in this journey. My dear fellow Taiwanese, we did it.
I would like to tell you that, regarding the results of
the January 16th elections, I have always had one interpretation only. The
people elected a new president and new government with one single expectation:
solving problems.
At this very moment, Taiwan faces a difficult situation
that requires its leaders to shoulder the burdens without hesitation. This is
something I will not forget. I would also like to tell you that, the multitude
of challenges before us require that we face them honestly and shoulder the
responsibilities together.
Therefore, this speech is an invitation. I invite every
fellow citizen to carry the future of this country.
It is not the leader who makes a country great; it is the
collective striving of the people that makes this country great. A president
should not only unite her own supporters; she should unite the entire country.
To stand united for change — that is
my earnest hope for this country. Here, I sincerely call on everyone to give
this country a chance.
Let us leave behind the prejudices and conflicts of the
past, and together fulfill the mission that the new era has entrusted to us.
At this moment and as President, I declare to the
citizens of this country that my administration will demonstrate resolve in
spearheading this country's reform, and will never back down.
Building a Better Country for the Younger Generation
The path forward is not a smooth one. Taiwan needs a new
government that readily takes on each and every challenge. And it is my job to
lead such a government.
Our pension system will go bankrupt without reform.
Our rigid educational system is increasingly out of touch
with society. Our energy and resources are limited, and our economy lacks
momentum, with the old model of OEM manufacturing facing a bottleneck. This
country urgently needs a new model for economic development.
Our population is rapidly aging, while the long-term care
system remains inadequate.
Our birthrate remains low, while a sound childcare system
seems a distant prospect.
Our environment still suffers from severe pollution.
Our country's fiscal situation is far from optimistic.
Our judicial system has lost the trust of the people.
Our families are deeply disturbed by food safety
scandals.
Our wealth disparities are still widening.
Our social safety net is full of holes.
Most importantly, and I must stress: our young people
still suffer from low wages. Their lives are stuck, and they feel helpless and
confused about the future.
Young people's future is the government's responsibility.
If unfriendly structures persist, the situation for young people will never
improve, no matter how many elite talents we have. My self-expectation is that,
within my term as President, I will tackle this country's problems step by
step, starting with the basic structure.
This is what I want to do for the young people of Taiwan.
Although I cannot give every young person a raise instantly, I can promise that
the new administration will initiate actions immediately. Please give us some
time, and please join us on this journey of reform.
To change young people's predicament is to change a
country's predicament. When its young people have no future, a country is
certain to have no future. It is the solemn duty of the new administration to
help young people overcome difficulties, achieve generational justice, and
deliver to the next generation a better country.
1. Transforming Economic Structures
To build a better country, going forward, the new
administration must accomplish the following tasks. The first is to transform
Taiwan's economic structure. This is the most formidable task that the new
administration must take on. We must not think lightly of ourselves, and we
must not lose confidence. Taiwan enjoys many advantages that other countries
lack.
We have the vibrancy and resilience of a maritime
economy, high quality human resources, the pragmatic and reliable culture of
engineers, a well-developed industrial chain, nimble and agile small and medium
enterprises, and of course, our relentless entrepreneurial spirit. In order to
completely transform Taiwan's economy, from this moment on, we must bravely
chart a different course - and that is to build a "New Model for Economic Development"
for Taiwan.
The new administration will pursue a new economic model
for sustainable development based on the core values of innovation, employment
and equitable distribution. The first step of reform is to strengthen the
vitality and autonomy of our economy, reinforce Taiwan's global and regional
connections, and actively participate in multilateral and bilateral economic
cooperation as well as free trade negotiations including the TPP and RCEP.
We will also promote a "New Southbound Policy" in order
to elevate the scope and diversity of our external economy, and to bid farewell
to our past overreliance on a single market.
Furthermore, the new administration believes that the
only way for Taiwan to overcome the current economic stagnation is to stimulate
new momentum for growth. Our export and domestic demand will serve as twin
engines for growth, allowing business production to become closely integrated
with the livelihoods of the people, while building close ties between foreign
trade and the local economy.
We will prioritize our plans to promote five major
innovative industries, with the goal of reshaping Taiwan's global
competitiveness. By protecting labor rights, we will also actively raise
productivity and allow wages to grow in lockstep with the economy.
This is a crucial moment for Taiwan's economic
development. We have the resolve and the ability to communicate. Going forward,
we have systematic plans to engage in interagency cooperation, in order to
consolidate the strength of the entire country and bring forth this new model.
As we pursue economic development, we must not forget our
responsibility to the environment. Our New Model for Economic Development will
be fully integrated with national land-use planning, regional development and
environmental sustainability. Industrial planning strategy and national
land-use should not be fragmented or shortsighted.
We must also pursue balanced regional development, which
requires planning and coordination by the central administration. And it requires
our local governments to uphold the spirit of regional joint governance.
We must not endlessly expend natural resources and the
health of our citizens as we have done in the past. Therefore, we will strictly
monitor and control all sources of pollution. We will also bring Taiwan into an
age of circular economy, turning waste into renewable resources. We will
gradually adjust our energy options based on the concepts of sustainability.
The new administration will seriously address issues
related to climate change, land conservation and disaster prevention. After
all, we only have one earth, and we only have one Taiwan.
2. Strengthening the Social Safety Net
The second area that the new government must address is
to strengthen Taiwan's social safety net. Over the past few years, several
incidents of violent crime affecting the safety of children and youth have
shaken our entire society.
However, a government cannot remain in a state of shock.
It must demonstrate empathy. No one can endure the pain and suffering on behalf
of the victims' families. However, the government, and especially the first
responders, must let the victims and their family members feel that, when
unfortunate incidents occur, the government is on their side.
Beyond offering empathy, the government should propose
solutions. We must do everything we can to prevent the repeated occurrences of
tragedy, by swiftly mending holes in areas such as public safety, education,
mental health and social work. The new administration will address these issues
with the utmost seriousness and readiness to act, particularly on public safety
and anti-drug efforts.
The issue of pension reform is crucial for the survival
and development of Taiwan. We should not hesitate, nor should we act in haste.
Vice President Chen Chien-jen is spearheading the establishment of a Pension
Reform Committee. Previous administrations have devoted some effort to this
issue, but public participation was inadequate. The new government will launch
a collective negotiation process, because pension reform must unite everyone
involved.
For this reason, we will convene a national congress on
pension reform that brings together representatives from different social
classes and occupations to engage in negotiations on the basis of societal unity.
Within a year, we will offer a workable proposal for reform. Whether you are
employed in the private or the public sector, life after retirement for every
citizen should receive fair protection.
Furthermore, on the issue of long-term care, we will establish
a high-quality, affordable and extensive long-term care system. Like pension
reform, long-term care is a process of social mobilization. The new
administration's approach is for the government to lead and plan, while
encouraging citizens to organize in communities; through the efforts of
collective social assistance, our goal is to build an adequate and
comprehensive system.
Every senior citizen can comfortably enjoy life after
retirement in a community they are familiar with. Every family will see their
burden of care lightened. We cannot leave senior care entirely to the free
market. We will take up our responsibilities, plan and implement step by step,
and get adequately prepared for the arrival of a hyper-aging society.
3. Social Fairness and Justice
The third area the new government must address is social
fairness and justice. On this issue, the new government will continue to work
with civil society to align its policies with the values of diversity,
equality, openness, transparency, and human rights, so as to deepen and evolve
Taiwan's democratic institutions.
For the new democratic system to move forward, we must
first find a way to face the past together. I will establish a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission inside the Presidential Office, to address the
historical past in the most sincere and cautious manner. The goal of
transitional justice is to pursue true social reconciliation, so that all
Taiwanese can take to heart the mistakes of that era.
We will begin by investigating and sorting through the
facts. Within the next three years, we plan to complete Taiwan's own
investigative report on transitional justice. Follow-up work on transitional
justice will then be carried out in accordance with the truth unveiled by the
report. We will discover the truth, heal wounds, and clarify responsibilities.
From here on out, history will no longer divide Taiwan. Instead, it will propel
Taiwan forward.
Also related to fairness and justice, I will uphold the
same principles when addressing issues concerning Taiwan's indigenous peoples.
At today's Inauguration Ceremony, before they sang the national anthem, the
indigenous children first sang the traditional melodies of their tribes. This
means that we dare not forget who arrived first on this island.
The new government will address issues concerning
indigenous peoples with an apologetic attitude. My administration will work to
rebuild an indigenous historical perspective, progressively promote indigenous
autonomous governance, restore indigenous languages and cultures, and improve
the livelihood of indigenous communities.
Next, the new government will actively promote judicial
reform. At this juncture, this is the issue the people of Taiwan care the most
about. The general sentiment is that the judicial system is not close to the
people, and is not trusted by them. It is unable to fight crime effectively,
and has lost its function as the last line of defense for justice.
To demonstrate the new government's resolve, we will hold
a national congress on judicial issues this coming October. By allowing public
participation and letting in social forces, we will advance judicial reform
together. The judicial system must respond to the needs of the people. It will
no longer be a judicial system for legal professionals only, but for everyone.
Judicial reform is not only the business of legal professionals; it must be
inclusive. These are my expectations for judicial reform.
4. Regional Peace and Stability and Cross-Strait Relations
The fourth area for the new government to address is
regional peace, stability and development, as well as the proper management of
cross-Strait relations. Over the past 30 years, Asia and the world have
undergone dramatic changes. And governments have become increasingly concerned
over global and regional economic stability and collective security.
Taiwan has always played an indispensable role in the
region's development. But in recent years, regional dynamics have been changing
rapidly. If Taiwan does not effectively use its strengths and leverage to
proactively participate in regional affairs, it will not only become
insignificant, it may even become marginalized and lose the ability to
determine its own future.
But where there is crisis, there is opportunity. The
present stage of Taiwan's economic development is highly connected and
complementary with many countries in the region. If our efforts to build a New
Model for Economic Development can be linked to other Asian and Asia-Pacific
countries through cooperation, to jointly shape future development strategies,
we will not just contribute to the region's innovation.
We will also contribute greatly to the region's
structural adjustment and sustainable development. Together with other members
of this region, we will forge an intimate sense of "economic community."
We will share resources, talents and markets with other
countries to achieve economies of scale and to allow the efficient use of
resources. This is the spirit on which our "New Southbound Policy" is based. We
will broaden exchanges and cooperation with regional neighbours in areas such as
technology, culture and commerce, and expand in particular our dynamic
relationships with ASEAN and India.
We are also willing to engage in candid exchanges and
pursue possibilities for cooperation and collaboration with the other side of
the Strait on our common participation in regional development.
As we actively develop our economy, the security
situation in the Asia-Pacific region is becoming increasingly complex.
Cross-Strait relations have become an integral part of building regional peace
and collective security. In this process, Taiwan will be a "staunch guardian of
peace" that actively participates and is never absent. We will work to maintain
peace and stability in cross-Strait relations. We will make efforts to
facilitate domestic reconciliation, strengthen our democratic institutions,
consolidate consensus, and present a united position to the outside world.
For us to accomplish our goals, dialogue and
communication are absolutely crucial. Taiwan will also become a "proactive
communicator for peace." We will establish mechanisms for intensive and routine
communications with all parties involved, and exchange views at all times to
prevent misjudgment, establish mutual trust, and effectively resolve disputes.
We will handle related disputes in adherence to the principles of maintaining
peace and sharing interests.
I was elected President in accordance with the
Constitution of the Republic of China, thus it is my responsibility to
safeguard the sovereignty and territory of the Republic of China; regarding
problems arising in the East China Sea and South China Sea, we propose setting
aside disputes so as to enable joint development.
We will also work to maintain the existing mechanisms for
dialogue and communication across the Taiwan Strait. In 1992, the two
institutions representing each side across the Strait (SEF & ARATS),
through communication and negotiations, arrived at various joint
acknowledgements and understandings.
It was done in a spirit of mutual understanding and a
political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences. I
respect this historical fact. Since 1992, over twenty years of interactions and
negotiations across the Strait have enabled and accumulated outcomes which both
sides must collectively cherish and sustain; and it is based on such existing
realities and political foundations that the stable and peaceful development of
the cross-Strait relationship must be continuously promoted.
The new government will conduct cross-Strait affairs in
accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, the Act Governing Relations
Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other relevant
legislation. The two governing parties across the Strait must set aside the
baggage of history, and engage in positive dialogue, for the benefit of the
people on both sides.
By existing political foundations, I refer to a number of
key elements. The first element is the fact of the 1992 talks between the two
institutions representing each side across the Strait (SEF & ARATS), when
there was joint acknowledgement of setting aside differences to seek common
ground. This is a historical fact. The second element is the existing Republic
of China constitutional order. The third element pertains to the outcomes of
over twenty years of negotiations and interactions across the Strait. And the
fourth relates to the democratic principle and prevalent will of the people of
Taiwan.
5. Diplomatic and Global Issues
The fifth area for the new government to take up is to
fulfill our duty as a citizen of the world and contribute towards diplomatic
and global issues. We will bring Taiwan closer to the world, and the world
closer to Taiwan. With us here today are many heads of state and delegations.
I would like to thank them for their longstanding
assistance to Taiwan and for giving us the opportunity to participate in the
international community. Going forward, through governmental interactions,
business investment and people-to-people collaborations, we will continue to
share Taiwan's experience in economic development and build lasting
partnerships with our allies.
Taiwan has been a model citizen in global civil society.
Since our democratization, we have persisted in upholding the universal values
of peace, freedom, democracy and human rights. It is with this spirit that we
join the alliance of shared values and concerns for global issues. We will
continue to deepen our relationships with friendly democracies including the
United States, Japan and Europe to advance multifaceted cooperation on the
basis of shared values.
We will proactively participate in international economic
and trade cooperation and rule-making, steadfastly defend the global economic
order, and integrate into important regional trade and commercial architecture.
We will also not be absent on the prevention of global warming and climate
change.
We will create within the Executive Yuan an office for
energy and carbon-reduction. We will regularly review goals for cutting greenhouse
gas emissions in accordance with the agreement negotiated at the COP21 meeting
in Paris. Together with friendly nations we will safeguard a sustainable earth.
At the same time, the new government will support and
participate in international cooperation on emerging global issues including
humanitarian aid, medical assistance, disease prevention and research,
anti-terrorism cooperation and jointly tackling transnational crime. Taiwan
will be an indispensable partner for the international community.
Conclusion
From the first direct Presidential Election in 1996 to
today, exactly 20 years have gone by. Thanks to two decades of hard work by
successive governments and civil society, we have overcome many obstacles that
emerging democracies must confront. Throughout this process, we have had many
touching moments and stories. But like other countries, we have also
experienced anxiety, unease, contradictions and conflict.
We have witnessed confrontation within society;
confrontation between progressive and conservative forces, between
pro-environment and pro-development views, and between political ideologies.
These confrontations have sparked the energy for mobilization during election
seasons. But also because of these dichotomies, our democracy gradually lost
its ability to solve problems.
Democracy is a process. In every era, those who work in
politics must recognize clearly the responsibilities they shoulder. Democracy
can move forward, but it can also fall backwards. Standing here today, I want
to say to everyone: for us, falling backwards is not an option.
The new government's duty is to move Taiwan's democracy
forward to the next stage: before, democracy was about winning or losing the
election. Now, democracy is about the welfare of the people. Before, democracy
was a showdown between two opposing values. Now, democracy is a conversation
between many diverse values.
To build a "united democracy" that is not hijacked by
ideology; to build an "efficient democracy" that responds to the problems of
society and economy; to build a "pragmatic democracy" that takes care of the
people — this is the significance of the new era.
As long as we believe, the new era will arrive. As long
as our leaders have unwavering faith, the new era will be born in the hands of
our generation. Dear fellow Taiwanese, this speech is coming to a close, but
reforms are just about to start. From this moment on, the weight of the country
rests upon the new government. It is my duty for you all to see this country
change.
History will remember this courageous generation. This
country's prosperity, dignity, unity, confidence and justice all bear the marks
of our struggle. History will remember our courage. It will remember that in
the year 2016, we took this country in a new direction. Everyone on this land
can be proud of having participated in changing Taiwan.
In the earlier performance, I was really touched by a
verse in the lyrics of a song:
"Today is the day, my brave fellow Taiwanese."
Dear fellow citizens, dear 23 million people of Taiwan:
the wait is over. Today is the day. Today, tomorrow, and on every day to come,
we shall all vow to be a Taiwanese who safeguards democracy, freedom, and this
country.
Vice President Lai, esteemed guests, friends watching on TV and online, my fellow
citizens across the country, good morning.
A Taiwanese Community
I feel immensely grateful to stand here once again today
and take on the responsibility entrusted to me by the Taiwanese people.
This inauguration ceremony is unique in the history of
the Republic of China. What makes it special is not its size or the number of
people in attendance. It is special because we know how difficult it has been
for us to get to this point.
I want to thank the people of Taiwan for making such a
difficult feat possible.
I particularly want to thank a group of people who have
not received a lot of attention over the past four months in our fight against
COVID-19. I want to thank every single person who waited in line outside of the
pharmacy in the early days of the coronavirus outbreak. Thank you for your
patience, and thank you for trusting the government. You have shown the world
Taiwan's commitment to civic virtues, even in times of greatest distress.
I also want to thank everyone who was quarantined or
isolated at home, putting up with inconvenience in your daily life to keep
others safe and healthy. Thank you for exemplifying humanity's best qualities
and helping us successfully bring the coronavirus outbreak under control.
This sense of pride in our country, this community's
shared destiny, and the memories of these past months will live on in all of
our hearts. This is what solidarity feels like.
Many ambassadors and representatives from other countries
are here today, and I trust that many countries around the world are watching
Taiwan as well.
I want to take this opportunity to tell you that the
country you see is populated by kind and resilient people. No matter the
difficulties we face, we can always count on our democracy, our solidarity, and
our sense of responsibility towards each other to help us overcome challenges,
weather difficult times, and stand steadfast in the world.
Unprecedented Challenges and Unparalleled Opportunities
From January to now, Taiwan has amazed the international
community twice. The first was our democratic elections, and the second was our
success in the fight against COVID-19.
In recent months, Taiwan's name has appeared in headlines
around the world, thanks to our successful containment of the coronavirus
outbreak.
"Taiwan" is also emblazoned on the boxes of supplies we
are sending abroad. The Taiwanese people have the kindest hearts in the entire
world, and we will always offer help to the international community whenever we
are able.
I hope that in addition to sharing in a sense of pride
and joy, my fellow citizens can take to heart the spirit of "helping ourselves
to help others"; "when we help ourselves, others will help us".
This pandemic has not yet ended, and we must remain
vigilant. Even when it ends, its impacts will linger on.
The coronavirus has profoundly affected our world. It has
changed the global political and economic order, accelerated and expanded the
reorganization of global supply chains, restructured the global economy, and
changed the way we live and shop. It has even changed the way the international
community views Taiwan and developments in the surrounding region.
These changes present us with both challenges and
opportunities. I want to ask that my fellow citizens be prepared, because
countless challenges and difficulties remain ahead of us.
Over the next four years, only those who can end the
pandemic within their borders, lay out a strategy for their country's survival
and development, and take advantage of opportunities in the complex world of
tomorrow, will be able to set themselves apart on the international stage.
It takes more than fervor to govern a country. Leadership
means calmly taking the right direction in a changing world. That is precisely
what I have done over the past four years.
I said before that I will leave you with a better
country. So over the next four years, I will proactively develop our
industries, foster a safe society, ensure national security, and deepen our
democracy. I am going to reinvent Taiwan and lead our country into the future.
National Development
1. Industrial and Economic Development
I know that the Taiwanese people are most concerned about
our industrial and economic development. In 2016, we initiated a new economic
development model to help connect Taiwan's economy to the world. Over the past
four years, despite massive changes in the international economy, Taiwan has
done more than just weather the storm. Our economic growth has once again
topped the Four Asian Tigers, and the stock market index now regularly breaks
10,000 points.
Thanks to our successful control of the pandemic, so far,
Taiwan is able to maintain positive economic growth. This is rare in the world.
However, we need to continue to take early action on economic relief and
revitalization, and do whatever it takes to maintain stable economic growth.
Over the next four years, we will face more intense
changes in the global economy and the accelerated reorganization of supply
chains. We will continue to implement our Forward-looking Infrastructure
Development and trillion NT-dollar investment programs. We will do so in the
spirit of "achieving growth through stability, and seizing opportunity amid
changes", in order to secure Taiwan's economic development over the coming
decades.
In terms of industrial development, we are going to take
advantage of the opportunities before us in six core strategic industries
founded on our 5+2 Innovative Industries Program, to transform Taiwan into a
critical force in the global economy.
● Six Core Strategic Industries
First, we will continue to develop our information and
digital industries. We will take advantage of Taiwan's strengths in the
semiconductor and ICT industries to secure a central role in global supply
chains, and make Taiwan a major base for the development of next generation
technologies, including IoT and AI.
Second, we are going to develop a cybersecurity industry
that can integrate with 5G, digital transformation, and our national security.
We will strive to create cybersecurity systems and an industrial chain that can
protect our country and earn the world's trust.
Third, we are going to create biotech and medical
technology industries integrated with the rest of the world. Throughout this
pandemic, Taiwanese teams have proven that they are capable of working with
world-class technologies to produce reagents and develop new drugs and
vaccines. We are going to give these industries our utmost support, and
transform Taiwan into a key force in the global battle against infectious
diseases.
Fourth, we are going to develop national defense and
strategic industries by integrating military and civilian capabilities. In
addition to domestically-produced naval vessel and aircraft programs that are
currently underway, we will push harder to promote technological integration
between the military and the private sector, to stimulate private sector
production capabilities, and advance into the aviation and space industries.
Fifth, we are going to accelerate the development of
green energy and renewable energy industries. Over the past four years,
renewable energy has experienced explosive growth, and Taiwan has become a
hotspot for international investment. Building on this foundation, I am
confident that we will achieve our goal of deriving 20% of our overall energy
from green sources by 2025. We are going to make Taiwan a center for green
energy in Asia.
Sixth, we are going to establish strategic stockpile
industries that can ensure the steady provision of critical supplies. Facing
changes to the global order, we need to keep key industrial chains in Taiwan
and maintain a certain degree of self-sufficiency in the production of face
masks, medical and daily supplies, energy, and food.
In the current international climate, countries that end
their dependence on others will have a head start on national development. I
would like our friends across all industries to rest assured that our
government stands with you. Over the next few years, we have several strategies
to drive the growth of our industries.
● Industrial Development Strategy
First, we will use domestic demand, particularly demand from
the public sector and national security needs, as the basic engine for our
industrial development.
A prime example of this is the way strategic demand for
face masks and other medical supplies throughout this pandemic has spurred the
development of related industries. We can adopt a similar model for our
national defense and renewable energy industries to help accelerate their
development.
We will continue to organize "national teams", like our
face mask team, according to the size and conditions of different industries.
We will utilize our government's guarantee of domestic demand to establish a
global strategic materials manufacturing industry under the "Taiwanese brand"
and help it expand into other markets.
We know that financial support is crucial to industrial
development. Looking to the future, we will adopt more flexible financial
policies, continue to reform financial systems, and use more diverse means to
help industries obtain the financing they need.
We will also work to create a safe environment for our
industries. Our government is committed to maintaining sound public health and
national security systems, a stable society, strong rule of law, and a healthy
market. We need to offer these guarantees so that high-tech and strategic
industries will be willing to choose Taiwan as their production and R&D
base.
We will also continue to guide the global expansion of
our industries. We will keep working to sign trade or investment protection
agreements with the United States, Japan, and European countries.
As we continue to promote our New Southbound Policy, we
will also develop other potential markets and encourage firms to establish
operations there, giving our industries an edge when they engage in
international cooperation. Overseas Taiwanese business communities around the
world will be our best partners as we seek new international opportunities.
Finally, we have the issue of talent. In order for Taiwan
to become a key global economic force, we need a diverse talent pool. My
government will bring in the world's top technical, R&D, and management talents
to help globalize Taiwan's workforce, widen our industries' horizons, and give
them the ability to compete in the international arena.
Looking to the future, Taiwan must further connect with
the international community. We will work to cultivate more outstanding
bilingual and digital talents, giving our industries a global competitive edge.
Over the next four years, Taiwan's economy will enter a
new stage, complete with more flexible capital and talent flows, more robust
industrial capabilities, and closer ties with the world. Together, we are going
to enter a new era of shared prosperity.
2. Safe Society: Health and Social Safety Nets to Catch Those Who Need Help
As we develop our industries, we will also keep in mind
that the people expect the government to foster a safe society. To be a better
country, the government must take on more responsibilities to reduce the burden
on the people and mitigate issues in society.
Over the past few years, we have addressed Long-term Care
2.0, childcare, and residential justice issues. Over the next four years, my
goal is to weave an even tighter net that can catch every single person who
needs help and prevent future tragedies.
● Health and Disease Prevention Safety Net
First, we will strengthen our health and disease
prevention safety net. Taiwan is an ageing society, and infectious diseases
pose a serious challenge to the health of our people. That is why we need to
bolster our disease prevention and treatment capabilities and link industries
to make more breakthroughs in vaccine and new drug development, as well as
infectious disease prevention and treatment, so that people can enjoy healthy
lives and receive better care.
● Mending Gaps in the Social Safety Net
Our second step will be to mend the gaps in our social
safety net. Over the past few years, a great deal of discussion has arisen
around public safety incidents involving schizophrenia patients. The same goes
for other mental illnesses, drug addiction, and domestic violence.
I understand your concerns. These issues are not just the
responsibility of individuals or families, they are the responsibility of the
government. When families are unable to provide proper care, the government has
a duty to step in and help.
I am going to upgrade our social care system, enhance the
capabilities of frontline social workers, and improve their work environments,
so that they can work at the grassroots and identify people who have fallen
through the gaps in our safety net.
We cannot hold medical agencies or individual judges
solely responsible for controversies surrounding specific cases. Our judicial
and executive branches should reevaluate and optimize these systems and take
initiatives to make any necessary legal amendments.
3. National Security: National Defense Reforms, Active International Participation, Peaceful and Stable Cross-strait Relations
A better country requires a greater emphasis on national
security. Over the past four years, we have pushed for national defense
reforms, active international participation, and peaceful, stable cross-strait
relations. We hope that Taiwan can play a more active role in the peace,
stability, and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. Over the next four years,
the direction of our policies will remain the same, and we will do even more.
● National Defense Reforms
We have three important directions for our national
defense reforms. First is accelerating the development of our asymmetrical
capabilities. While we work to bolster our defense capabilities, future combat
capacity development will also emphasize mobility, countermeasures, and
non-traditional asymmetrical capabilities. We will also work to strengthen our
defenses against the threats of cyber warfare, cognitive warfare, and "unrestricted"
warfare to achieve our strategic goal of multidomain deterrence.
The second is substantive reforms to our military reserve
and mobilization systems. We need to enhance the quality of our reserve forces,
as well as their weapons, equipment, and training, in order to achieve
effective jointness with our regular forces. We also need to establish a
standing, interdepartmental system connecting our reserve and mobilization
systems. This system will help coordinate personnel and supplies, so that we
can successfully mobilize during a transition from peacetime to war.
Third is improvements to our military's management
institutions. Today's young servicemembers have all grown up in a democratic
society, and one of our most important missions will be to find ways for them
to better utilize their professional skills in line with military needs.
Some young servicemembers have difficulties adjusting to
military needs, reflecting the gap between today's society and our military
management institutions. We need to work to close that gap. We need to reduce
negative societal views of the military and end the gradual erosion of our
military's prestige and morale due to individual incidents caused by imperfect
institutions.
Thus, we will improve appeal and counseling mechanisms
within the military, establish a fair and equitable incident investigation
mechanism, and regularly evaluate personnel placements. In terms of education
and training, we will strengthen leadership capacities across all levels of
leadership and foster a modern management system that emphasizes professionalism.
We need to strike a balance between the team-oriented
military discipline needed for actual combat and society's respect for the
individual.
● Active International Participation
Over the past four years, we have actively taken part in
addressing major global issues, including counter-terrorism cooperation,
humanitarian assistance, religious freedom, and nontraditional security.
Throughout this global pandemic, we have been praised for
providing selfless assistance to the international community wherever we are
able.
Taiwan has been deemed a democratic success story, a
reliable partner, and a force for good in the world by the international community.
All Taiwanese people should take pride in this.
Over the next four years, we will continue to fight for
our participation in international organizations, strengthen mutually
beneficial cooperation with our allies, and bolster ties with the United States,
Japan, Europe, and other like-minded countries.
We will also participate more actively in regional
cooperation mechanisms and work hand-in-hand with countries in the region to
make concrete contributions to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific
region.
● Peaceful and Stable Cross-strait Relations
In the face of complex and changing cross-strait
circumstances, we have made the greatest effort to maintain peace and stability
in the Taiwan Strait over the past four years, gaining approval from the
international community. We will continue these efforts, and we are willing to
engage in dialogue with China and make more concrete contributions to regional
security.
Here, I want to reiterate the words "peace, parity,
democracy, and dialogue". We will not accept the Beijing authorities' use of
"one country, two systems" to downgrade Taiwan and undermine the cross-strait
status quo. We stand fast by this principle.
We will continue to handle cross-strait affairs according
to the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Act Governing Relations
between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. This has been our
consistent position for maintaining the peaceful and stable status quo in the
Taiwan Strait.
Cross-strait relations have reached a historical turning
point. Both sides have a duty to find a way to coexist over the long term and
prevent the intensification of antagonism and differences. Faced with changing
circumstances, I will hold firm to my principles, adopt an open attitude to
resolve issues, and shoulder my responsibilities as President. I also hope that
the leader on the other side of the Strait will take on the same
responsibility, and work with us to jointly stabilize the long-term development
of cross-strait relations.
Strengthening State Institutions and Democracy
While we work to achieve national development, it is
crucial that we optimize our government institutions over the next four years.
Our Legislative Yuan will establish a constitutional amendment committee,
giving us a platform to engage in dialogue and reach a consensus on
constitutional reforms pertaining to government systems and people's rights.
This democratic process will enable the constitutional
system to progress with the times and align with the values of Taiwanese society.
Our first priority should be to lower the voting age from 20 to 18, an issue on
which both the majority and opposition parties are in agreement.
In terms of judicial reform, I delivered on my promise to
convene a National Congress on Judicial Reform, and we completed amendments to
the Judges Act, the Attorney Regulation Act, the Constitutional Court Procedure
Act, and the Labor Incident Act. This is all base work for the further
improvement of our judicial system.
However, our judicial reforms are still in transition,
and our current progress has not yet met the public's expectations. I will
continue to solicit opinions from across society and keep pressing forward. The
people's dissatisfaction drives us to continue on the path of reform.
Within the next four years, we need to implement a lay
judge system, so that citizens can act as lay judges in court and become
catalysts for judicial reform. This will help bridge the distance between the
people and our judicial system, so that it aligns better with their
expectations and earns their trust.
All constitutional institutions must also continue on the
path of reform. The Executive Yuan will reevaluate and reinitiate its
organizational reform process, including the establishment of a specialized
digital development agency and adjustments to all ministries in line with
current needs. This will enable governance capabilities to be more responsive
to the needs of national development.
The National Human Rights Commission under the Control
Yuan will officially be established in August of this year. This will be a
milestone in our journey to place human rights at the center of Taiwan's
national ethos, and marks the start of a new chapter for the Control Yuan.
Our new Examination Yuan team will be instated in September,
and I will ask them to propose a comprehensive reform plan and evaluate past
policies, so that they can become an effective human resource department that
can cultivate the talent a modern government needs.
Conclusion
My fellow citizens, over the past 70 years, the Republic
of China (Taiwan) has grown more resilient and unified through countless
challenges. We have resisted the pressure of aggression and annexation. We have
made the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Although we were once isolated
in the world, we have always persisted in the values of democracy and freedom,
no matter the challenges ahead of us. We will always remain committed to our
common belief: Taiwan must help ourselves to help others, and when we help
ourselves, others will help us.
Many of the heroes in our fight against COVID-19 are here
with us today, including members of our national face mask team, our Central
Epidemic Command Center's public health team, and Premier Su Tseng-chang's
team.
There are many more heroes from all walks of life not in
attendance today: medical workers, postal workers, pharmacists, convenience
store clerks, taxi drivers, and many more.
I may not be able to call out all of your names, but I
want everyone to know that Taiwan has overcome countless challenges over the
past 70 years, relying on not just one or two heroes, but thanks to countless
heroes such as yourselves, working together to turn the wheels of history. You
have helped make Taiwan a happy, safe, and prosperous place for generations to
come.
I want to express my respect to all of you. Every single
person in Taiwan is a hero. Vice President Lai and I are honored to take on the
responsibility you have entrusted to us.
Taking on the responsibility of the President of the
Republic of China in such difficult times brings me more pressure than joy. But
I will not back down, because all of you are with me.
The path forward will not be easy, and greater challenges
await us. But we are a country that has persevered through even the greatest
hardships. We, the 23 million people, have always been and will always be a
community with a shared destiny.
I truly hope that all of my fellow citizens will remember
how it felt to come together to overcome the challenges of the past few months.
The Republic of China can be united. Taiwan can be safe. Being Taiwanese can be
an honor that makes you hold your head high.
My dear citizens, the path ahead of us is long, and we
are about to begin a new chapter in Taiwan's story. Taiwan's story belongs to
each and every one of us, and it needs each and every one of us.
I ask that the 23 million people of Taiwan act as our
guides and partners. Let us pool our wisdom and courage and make this country a
better place together. Thank you.
Building a democratic, peaceful, and prosperous new Taiwan
Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao, esteemed heads of state and guests from our allies, distinguished ambassadors and representatives, all visiting dignitaries, dear friends watching live on television and online, fellow citizens across the country: Good morning.
When I was young, I was determined to practice medicine and save lives.
When I went into politics, I was determined to transform Taiwan.
Now, standing here, I am determined to strengthen the nation.
With an unwavering heart, I accept the responsibility the people have entrusted to me as the 16th-term president of the Republic of China. In accordance with the Republic of China Constitution system, I will take on that solemn responsibility of leading the nation bravely forward.
On this day in 1949, martial law went into effect in Taiwan, and Taiwan plunged into a dark era of authoritarian rule.
On this day in 1996, Taiwan's first democratically elected president took the oath of office, conveying to the international community that the Republic of China Taiwan is a sovereign, independent nation in which sovereignty lies in the hands of the people.
On this day in 2024, having completed our third transition of political power, Taiwan officially commences, for the first time, the third consecutive term of the same political party in office. We also set sail into a new era that is full of challenges, yet also brimming with limitless hope.
This journey came about as a result of the valiant sacrifices and devotion of the many generations of people of this land. Although it was an arduous one, we made it through.
Now, we not only witness the beginning of a new administration, but also usher in another hard-earned victory for democracy.
Many people have interpreted my and Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao's election victory as "breaking the eight-year curse," referring to the fact that no political party has been able to remain in office for over two terms. But the reality is that in a democracy, the people have the final say. There is no such thing as a "curse" in any election. It is simply that the people put the ruling party under the toughest of tests, choosing the nation's future in the most genuine way.
I want to thank former President Tsai Ing-wen, former Vice President Chen Chien-jen, and the administrative team for their hard work over these past eight years. You have all helped build a solid base for Taiwan's development. Let's give them a big round of applause!
I also want to thank my fellow citizens once again for your support, for refusing to be swayed by external forces, for resolutely defending democracy, for pressing onward without turning back, and for turning a new page in Taiwan's history.
Every day of my term, I will strive to prove myself as someone in whom you can trust and count on, by acting justly, showing mercy, and being humble, and by treating our people as family. The new administration will work tirelessly and to the best of our ability, as all the nation's people put us to the test. We will also pursue continuous reform, shaping a new face for Taiwanese politics.
I. Coordination and cooperation between the executive and legislative branches to advance national policy
In February this year, a new Legislative Yuan was sworn in. This is the first time in 16 years that no party has an absolute majority. In the face of this new political landscape, some are feeling anticipation, while others are anxious.
I want to say to everyone, that this new structure is a result of the people's choice. Looking at it with a different frame of mind, a lack of absolute majority means that the ruling and opposition parties are now all able to share their ideas, and that we will be undertaking the nation's challenges as one.
However, Taiwan's people have high expectations for rational governance among political parties. Apart from competition, parties should also believe in cooperation. Only then can the nation continue down a stable path.
The Legislative Yuan should observe procedural justice. The majority should respect the minority, while the minority accepts majority rule. Only then can we avoid conflict and maintain a stable and harmonious society.
In a democratic society, the interests of the people come first - that is the root of democracy. Likewise, national interests come before the interests of parties - that is the sacred duty of each political party. When ruling or opposition parties put forth legislation that conforms with our Constitution; when we uphold the spirit of "people above all" and "nation above party," national policy will naturally and smoothly progress.
Premier Cho Jung-tai will lead the cabinet, and prioritize solving issues which benefit society and reflect consensus among ruling and opposition parties. He will respond to public opinion and address the issues people care about with proactive efforts and innovative thinking, and thus serve the people of Taiwan.
Today, recovery work following the April 3 earthquake is still underway. I would like to once again express my sympathy and condolences to the victims and their families. I also want to thank all our citizens who have assisted in the earthquake response and reconstruction efforts, as well as the international community for their concern and support.
The central government has already drawn up plans to funnel NT$28.55 billion into reconstruction and industry stimulus. This will help the people of Hualien return to their normal lives as quickly as possible.
I have high hopes for the future of cooperation between the central and local governments, as well as coordination between the executive and legislative branches. I also hope to work hard alongside all the people of Taiwan to further entrench our democracy, maintain peace in the Indo-Pacific, and boost global prosperity.
II. Democratic Taiwan as a global beacon
My fellow citizens: Democracy, peace, and prosperity form Taiwan's national roadmap. And they are also our links to the world. As an important link in the global chain of democracies, a glorious era of Taiwan's democracy has arrived.
Since Taiwan first held direct presidential elections, we have grown to become one of the world's most vibrant democracies. We have continued to enhance human rights, and show the world our values of democracy and freedom.
Taiwan was the first country in Asia to legalize same-sex marriage. Taiwan showed that democracy outperforms authoritarianism in fighting the pandemic.
Whether in terms of democracy or freedom, Taiwan is consistently highly ranked among Asian nations. Democratic Taiwan is already a global beacon. And this honor belongs to all the people of Taiwan.
As we move forward, my administration will continue using Taiwan's democratic vitality as a force for good, to promote national development and deepen international cooperation.
In terms of internal affairs, I will value meritocracy, and uphold honesty and diligence. I will practice democratic governance, and establish an open government. In the spirit of transparency and rule by the people, I encourage the populace to participate in public policy, and will continue to promote a voting age of 18. Together, we will fulfill our vision for our nation.
As for international affairs, we will continue working with other democratic nations to form a democratic community, and share our experiences across a range of fields. We will work together to combat disinformation, strengthen democratic resilience, address challenges, and allow Taiwan to become the MVP of the democratic world.
III. Democratic Taiwan as a pilot for global peace
Peace is priceless, and war has no winners. Next year, we will mark the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. As with other nations, Taiwan walked a difficult path for post-war revitalization, before getting to where we are today. No one wants these achievements to be destroyed by war.
Today, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and conflict between Israel and Hamas continue to shake the whole world. And China's military actions and gray-zone coercion are considered the greatest strategic challenges to global peace and stability.
Taiwan is strategically positioned in the first island chain, and what affects us here affects global geopolitical development. Even as early as 1921, Chiang Wei-shui said that Taiwan is a frontline guardian of world peace. Now, in 2024, Taiwan's role is even more significant.
There is already a strong international consensus, that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are indispensable to global security and prosperity.
To adapt to today's complicated international landscape, countries around the world have been actively cooperating to maintain regional peace and stability.
Just last month, the United States made into law the Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024. This will provide the Indo-Pacific region with additional security and assistance, thereby supporting the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait.
We thank nations around the world for their consideration and support for Taiwan. We would also like to declare to all that democracy and freedom are Taiwan's unwavering commitments. Peace is the only option. And prosperity, gained through lasting peace and stability, is our objective.
The future of cross-strait relations will have a decisive impact on the world. This means that we, who have inherited a democratic Taiwan, are pilots for peace. Our government will uphold the Four Commitments, neither yield nor provoke, and maintain the status quo.
I also want to call on China to cease their political and military intimidation against Taiwan, share with Taiwan the global responsibility of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as well as the greater region, and ensure the world is free from the fear of war.
Taiwanese are a peace-loving people who treat others with kindness. I have always believed that if the leader of a country puts the people's welfare above all, then peace in the Taiwan Strait, mutual benefits, and prosperous coexistence would be common goals.
Therefore, I hope that China will face the reality of the Republic of China's existence, respect the choices of the people of Taiwan, and in good faith, choose dialogue over confrontation, exchange over containment, and under the principles of parity and dignity, engage in cooperation with the legal government chosen by Taiwan's people. This can start from the resumption of tourism on a reciprocal basis, and enrollment of degree students in Taiwanese institutions. Let us together pursue peace and mutual prosperity.
My fellow citizens: As we pursue the ideal of peace, we must not harbor any delusions. So long as China refuses to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, all of us in Taiwan ought to understand, that even if we accept the entirety of China's position and give up our sovereignty, China's ambition to annex Taiwan will not simply disappear.
In face of the many threats and attempts of infiltration from China, we must demonstrate our resolution to defend our nation, and we must also raise our defense awareness and strengthen our legal framework for national security. This means actively promoting the Four Pillars of Peace action plan: strengthened national defense; improved economic security; stable and principled cross-strait leadership; and values-based diplomacy. By standing side-by-side with other democratic countries, we can form a peaceful global community that can demonstrate the strength of deterrence and prevent war, achieving our goal of peace through strength.
IV. Democratic Taiwan as a force for global prosperity
Taiwan needs the world, just as the world needs Taiwan. Taiwan is not just opening a door to the world - Taiwan is already on the world's center stage.
As we look toward our future, we know that semiconductors will be indispensable. And the AI wave has already swept in. Taiwan has already mastered advanced semiconductor manufacturing, and we stand at the center of the AI revolution. We are a key player in supply chains for global democracies. For these reasons, Taiwan has an influence on global economic development, as well as humanity's well-being and prosperity.
My fellow citizens: The future of the Republic of China Taiwan will be decided by its 23 million people. The future we decide is not just the future of our nation, but the future of the world.
We must walk on the right path, and our industries must make every effort, so that we may be a force for global prosperity. With every step forward that Taiwan takes, the world takes a step forward with us.
When I served as premier and vice president, I visited the various industries throughout Taiwan. I know well what our industry needs, and also what it is capable of. So, going forward, the government, working closely with the private sector, will take a threefold approach to further Taiwan's development.
The first is having a clear view for our future, and making Taiwan smart and sustainable.
As we face the dangers of climate change, we must be resolved in our transition to net-zero emissions by the year 2050. As we meet the global challenges of adopting more and more smart technologies, we in Taiwan, a "silicon island," must do all we can to expedite Taiwan's transformation into an "AI island." We must adapt AI for industry and step up the pace of AI innovation and applications. We must also adapt industry for AI and use AI's computational power to make our nation, our military, our workforce, and our economy stronger.
It is similarly crucial that we develop an economic model driven by innovation. Through our two-pronged approach of promoting digital transformation and net-zero transition, we will assist small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as they upgrade and transform, and we will seek inclusive growth, so as to create a new Taiwan that is smarter and more sustainable - a second Taiwan Miracle.
While we invest in innovation and nurture the next hidden champions, we must also make bold investments in quantum computing, robotics, the metaverse, precision medicine, and other advanced technologies, thus giving our young people the opportunity to pursue their dreams and solidifying Taiwan's leading position in the future global landscape.
The second is setting our sights on the space industry while further developing our strengths as a maritime nation.
Our sights are set on making Taiwan the Asian hub of UAV supply chains for global democracies, and developing the next generation of medium- and low-orbit communications satellites, bringing Taiwan's space and aerospace industries squarely into the international sphere.
At the same time, we will also explore and develop our strengths as a maritime nation, deepen our connections with the ocean, and invest more in marine science and technology research, thereby driving the development of our maritime industries. Altogether, this will make Taiwan a much stronger nation, and it will open up new horizons for the development of Taiwan's economy and industry. The possibilities are truly limitless.
The third is to help our enterprises expand their presence and market internationally.
Taiwan has officially applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and we will continue to engage actively in regional economic integration. We will endeavor to sign bilateral investment agreements with other democracies around the world and further deepen our trade partnerships. We will also work to resolve the carbon tax issue and thus open the path for further development.
Taiwan must hold firm its key position in the global supply chain and seize the business opportunities that come as a result of geopolitical changes. We aim to develop Five Trusted Industry Sectors, namely semiconductors, AI, military, security and surveillance, and next-generation communications; we also aim to improve the investment environment, welcome Taiwanese businesses abroad to come back and invest in Taiwan, and encourage local firms to expand their investments and set even deeper roots here in Taiwan.
Here today, I want to assure our friends from all different sectors: Just as you all are committed to be the best in your respective areas, the government is also committed to providing assistance so that you can expand your global presence and international markets from a solid base here in Taiwan.
Taiwan is eminently capable of being a thriving global economic powerhouse. Wherever the sun shines around the world, there are Taiwanese companies stimulating local development, while also enriching the livelihoods of the Taiwanese people.
V. Sympathizing with the joys and the concerns of the people
It is my firm belief that the fruits of economic development ought to be enjoyed by all the people of our nation. In the coming days of my presidency, I will launch the National Project of Hope and expand investment in society, through which I aim to shape a Taiwanese society with more love and moral courage. It will be a society in which young people have a vision of hope, people in their prime have the means to realize their dreams, the elderly can enjoy their days in happiness, and the disadvantaged can find the care they need. A society in which all people, at every stage of life, will be able to receive from the government the support they need.
Childcare, long-term care, and social housing services will continue to be expanded.
Prices of commodities and housing, as well as the wealth gap, will be addressed.
The safety and security of our food, our roads, our schools, and our social safety net will all be enhanced.
And our reform efforts in education, the judicial system, and transitional justice will continue.
I understand the concerns and expectations of the people of Taiwan. As to the issues you are concerned with and the reform society needs, the government will do its utmost to achieve solutions.
Everyone is working hard for higher pay. I will work to drive industrial upgrading and create an even better wage environment.
Everyone is hoping for more effective public safety. I will crack down on corruption and organized crime, guns, drugs, and fraud.
Everyone is wanting a stable supply of electricity. I will initiate our second energy transition, push for the development of more forms of green energy and smart grids, and help to make our electrical power generation system more resilient.
Everyone is concerned about the financing of labor insurance. I repeat here today: Labor insurance will not fail under our government.
Everyone is stressing the importance of transportation safety. I will help create a human-friendly transportation environment, putting an end to Taiwan's bad reputation as a "pedestrian hell."
Everyone is hoping that the government can help lighten the load for family caregivers and work to solve the labor shortage issue. I will do my utmost to arrive at solutions.
All of us, as we walk into the future, want a more resilient Taiwan, a Taiwan that can respond adequately to such crises as infectious disease and natural disasters, a Taiwan that can quicken the pace of urban renewal and the repair of dilapidated and dangerous old buildings.
All of us are also hoping for a healthier Taiwan. With my own expertise in medicine, I hope to bring together the strengths of other fields to beat cancer. I will establish a ministry of physical education and sports development to bring sports and athletics more into the lives of the people. I will also ensure that our National Health Insurance system remains sustainable, which will help our people live longer and healthier.
The Taiwan of tomorrow will preserve its diverse ecosystem, its diverse ethnic culture, and achieve sustainability, to create a better nation.
The Taiwan of tomorrow will have a more diverse innovation economy, a more widespread use of digital technology applications; it will be more competitive and bilingual; it will have a stronger public support service system; it will be more respectful of gender equality; it will ensure that the people are guaranteed their rights.
The Taiwan of tomorrow will allow each municipality to develop out of its own unique characteristics and promote revitalization of local industries; we will achieve the goal of a Taiwan with balanced development where all can live and work in peace and happiness.
VI. With greater solidarity, we become stronger as a nation
My dear compatriots, each and every one of you contributes a necessary part to our future development. In this era of globalization and wide-ranging competition, no one country can go it alone; and no society, if it is divided within, can successfully meet these challenges.
If we are united, we can walk with more confident strides. And when we support one another, our steps will take us further. For our nation to endure and progress, I will bring us together through the strength of democracy, for greater solidarity and a stronger nation.
I think it is apparent to us all: We have a nation insofar as we have sovereignty. Right in the first chapter of our Constitution, it says that "The sovereignty of the Republic of China shall reside in the whole body of citizens," and that "Persons possessing the nationality of the Republic of China shall be citizens of the Republic of China." These two articles tell us clearly: The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are not subordinate to each other. All of the people of Taiwan must come together to safeguard our nation; all our political parties ought to oppose annexation and protect sovereignty; and no one should entertain the idea of giving up our national sovereignty in exchange for political power.
As more countries around the world publicly express their support for Taiwan's meaningful international participation, there is increasing proof that Taiwan is a Taiwan of the world; that Taiwan is a worthy and reliable force for global peace and prosperity.
So long as we identify with Taiwan, Taiwan belongs to us all - all of the peoples of Taiwan, regardless of ethnicity, irrespective of when we arrived. Some call this land the Republic of China, some call it the Republic of China Taiwan, and some, Taiwan; but whichever of these names we ourselves or our international friends choose to call our nation, we will resonate and shine all the same. So let us overcome our differences and stride forward, with our shared aspirations, to meet the world.
VII. Taiwan greeting a new world, the world greeting a new Taiwan
As Taiwan engages more closely with the rest of the world, we welcome the world to come closer to Taiwan. Many new residents and foreign nationals have come and made Taiwan their home, writing a new chapter in Taiwan's story. To all of you, I give my sincere thanks and respect.
Here today are many friends who have come quite a long way from their countries to join us. And many overseas compatriots are also here showing their support with their presence. So, why don't we let them all know how much we appreciate their support? Please give them a round of applause!
Tonight we will be welcoming our distinguished guests at a state banquet in Tainan, the city where 1624 marked Taiwan's links to globalization. Now, as we stand here 400 years after that historical moment in Tainan, we in Taiwan must all demonstrate confidence and bravely set course for the new world, so that the world may embrace a new Taiwan.
On that note, I want to ask each fellow citizen to praise our mother Taiwan, the land that nurtures and supports us all, and to work together to protect her, honor her, let the world embrace her, and allow her the international respect she deserves as a great nation.
Since 1949 the relations between China and Taiwan have been characterized by constantly
strong tensions. Territory controlled by the Republic of China (ROC) had been shelled for two decades after 1958 by the People's
Republic of China (PRC). Before the early 1990s, no direct negotiations between the two sides took place.
On Nov. 21, 1990 the ROC founded the Straits Exchange Foundation (haixia jiaoliu
jijinhui 海峽交流基金會, abbrev. haijihui 海基會 in Chinese and SEF in English), on Dec. 16, 1991 the PRC followed suit with the
establishment of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (haixia liang'an
guanxi xiehui 海峽兩岸關係協會, abbrev. haixiehui 海協會 in Chinese and ARATS in English). Representatives of SEF and
ARATS first met March 22–27, 1992 in Beijing and have been conducting talks on behalf
of their respective government ever since.
A meeting which for more than two decades has been at the center of the "1992 Consensus" controversy took
place in Hong Kong in 1992 (Oct. 28–30), the SEF delegation being led by Shi Hwei-yow and the ARATS delegation by Zhou Ning.
In the first two years following the 1992 Hong Kong meeting, neither the term "1992 Consensus" (jiuer gongshi 九二共識)
nor its attributed core content—"one China, with each side having its own interpretation" (yige Zhongguo, ge zi biaoshu
一個中國,各自表述, abbrev. yi Zhong gebiao 一中各表)—were used by Taiwan's media. The latter apparently was first
mentioned in August 1995 by then-SEF secretary-general and KMT member Chiao Jen-ho 焦仁和
(b. 1948, Zhejiang). On March 18, 2000 the second direct ROC presidential election took
place, with DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian emerging as
winner and resulting in the first democratic, peaceful transfer of power in ROC history.
According to sources available online, the first public mention of the term "1992 Consensus" occurred on March 28, 2000 by NPlegislator Elmer Fung 馮滬祥 (1948-2021, Liaoning).
In the following years the term kept popping up in Taiwanese media and has played an important role in the debate about the
Cross-Strait relations since then.
According to the proponents of the "1992 Consensus", the term refers to a tacit agreement that was supposedly reached by SEF and ARATS
representatives at the 1992 Hong Kong meeting. The term suggests that both sides reached an understanding in Hong Kong about "one China,
with each side having its own interpretation". No documents proving that such a bilateral understanding was reached then were ever
provided by the ROC or the PRC, and on Feb. 21, 2006 Su Chi 蘇起 (b. 1949, Taiwan) admitted that he had in fact invented the term
in 2000. In 1992, Su had been deputy director of the KMT's Department of Mainland Affairs, between February 1999 and May 2000 he
headed the ROC's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), and between 2005 and 2008 he was member
of the ROC Legislative Yuan.
It should be pointed out that for many years official PRC media have been promoting the term "1992 Consensus". At the same time,
the whole formula "one China, with each side having its own interpretation" was never brought up in the PRC. For the Chinese Communists,
"1992 Consensus" means that the Taiwan authorities accepted the One China Principle (yige
Zhongguo yuanze 一個中國原則), that 'both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the one-China principle', nothing more—no mention of each side
having the right to their own interpretation of One China.
The 1992 Hong Kong meeting between SEF and ARATS was covered by The Free China Journal (FCJ), a newspaper published by the ROC's
Government information Office (GIO). The relevant articles give no indication whatsoever that a
concensus on the One China issue was achieved. The following table lists the headlines of those articles which are shown with their
full text below.
Date in 1992
FCJ headline
Page
Oct. 28 (Wed)
[News Briefs]
1
Oct. 30 (Fri)
SEF, ARATS make slow headway
2
Nov. 3 (Tue)
'One China' issue derails talks
2
Nov. 6 (Fri)
Mainland intransigence halts progress between SEF, ARATS
2
Nov. 10 (Tue)
Mainland wrecks document talks
2
It should be noted that an SEF-ARATS summit between SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu 辜振甫 (1917-2005, Taiwan)
and ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan 汪道涵 (1915-2005, Anhui) took place in 1993 (April 27–29) in Singapore. That
meeting was covered by FCJ as well, and in its articles the paper reported the breakthrough that was indeed
reached during the 1993 summit.
Date in 1993
FCJ headline
Page
April 27 (Tue)
Cross-Straits Koo-Wang talks begin
1
"
SEF, ARATS begin historic meeting
2
"
DPP group in Singapore to monitor Koo-Wang talks
2
April 30 (Fri)
Historic meeting produces 4 agreements
1
"
Outcome of Koo-Wang talks
2
"
Cross-Straits conference talk of the town in Taiwan
2
"
Bridging the cross-Straits gap
6
"
Sorry, it's a little early yet for talks on unification
6
"
Shadow of politics haunts talks
7
May 4 (Tue)
Koo-Wang talks dawn of new era of negotiation
1
"
ROC mainland policy unchanged
2
"
No mainland investment accord
3
May 7 (Fri)
President Lee stresses Taipei, Peking equal
2
The contrast in the FCJ coverage of the 1992 Hong Kong meeting to the 1993 Singapore meeting is striking. As
the ROC government had no reason to conceal a breakthrough in cross-strait negotiations, the FCJ coverage of the
1992 Hong Kong meeting serves as further evidence that no consensus was reached and the meeting was in fact a complete
failure that yielded no results.
Please note that this page shows only the full text of FCJ articles covering the 1992 Hong Kong meeting but not of
those covering the 1993 Singapore summit because the outcome of the latter was never controversial and has been irrelevant
for the debate surrounding the "1992 Consensus".
Long-halted talks between counterpart organizations on the two sides of the Taiwan Straits
are apparently on the verge of picking up once again.
Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation and mainland China's
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits will return to the
discussion table Oct. 28. The two-day meeting will take place in Hong Kong,
with the SEF delegation headed by Legal Services Department Director Shi
Hwei-yow (許惠祐).
Cross-Straits document verification is expected to be the
main focus. Negotiators are reportedly hopeful of working out the details for a
future agreement on procedures for verifying the documents that Taiwan and
mainland residents need to send to the opposite side.
Source: The Free China Journal—1992, Oct. 28 (Wednesday)
Negotiations between Taiwan and mainland China intermediary agencies finally resumed in Hong
Kong this week.
Representatives of Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation
met with their counterparts of the mainland's Association for Relations Across
the Taiwan Straits Oct. 28-29.
The second bilateral conference this year, however, has
apparently reached a deadlock over the "one China" issue.
As in past meetings between SEF and ARATS, a problem
emerged when the mainland representatives insisted on first discussing the
principle of "one China", and including those words in all agreements to be
signed between the two sides.
According to ARATS' Chou Ning (周寧), all matters between the two
agencies are "internal affairs of China".
SEF has rejected the proposal, saying that the discussion
of purely general affairs should not involve political principles.
Shi Hwei-yow, head of the SEF delegation, said that there
is no "logical connection" between the two organizations' affairs and the
political interpretation of the "one China" principle.
Besides, Shi said, President Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), Premier Hau Pei-tsun (郝柏村) and the National Unification
Council have all made the ROC government's stand on the "one China" principle
sufficiently clear.
The NUC in August of this year formally adopted the "one
China" principle as follows: "One China refers to the Republic of China that
has existed since 1912, with de jure sovereignty over all of China."
However, the ROC's current jurisdiction covers only
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, said the NUC. "Taiwan is part of China, and
the Chinese mainland is a part of China as well."
SEF had hoped to resume the talks that ended fruitlessly
in March, when the two sides failed to reach agreement on ways of handling the
verification of documents and indirect registered mail. SEF had also hoped to
reach an agreement with ARATS at the Hong Kong meeting on a framework for
handling similar cases in the future.
The two-day conference, however, made little progress in
formulating measures to speed up the often heavy work required in arranging
people-to-people exchanges across the Straits.
The two organizations did reach agreement on a few
matters. Both sides agreed to act as liaisons between their respective official
agencies, such as post offices and municipal authorities.
In addition, the two offices expanded the categories of
documents handled from three to seven. People of both sides may soon ask for
verification of inheritance, marriage, adoption, identity, birth, tax and
academic degrees. SEF also accepted ARATS' proposal of collecting a fee of at
least US$40 per service.
Source: The Free China Journal—1992, Oct. 30 (Friday)
SEF, ARATS fail to unravel document verification imbroglio
By Tammy C. Peng
Staff Writer
An extended meeting between representatives of Taiwan's Straits Exchange
Foundation and its mainland counterpart was suspended last week with the two
sides reaching little agreement.
The Hong Kong conference between SEF and the Association
for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits failed to reach an accord on ways of
verifying documents that are necessary for processing Taiwan-mainland
non-official exchanges.
In spite of the setback, SEF representatives are staying
on in Hong Kong until Nov. 4, hoping to begin another round of talks with
ARATS.
SEF and ARATS are private organizations established in
1991 to handle matters related to people-to-people exchanges between the two
sides of the Taiwan Straits. The Republic of China government on Taiwan
currently prohibits any official contacts with the Chinese Communist regime in
the mainland.
An important element of the exchanges is the verification
of documents that is often required to process entry and exit permits for
residents of both sides, in particular those applying to enter Taiwan.
The Hong Kong meeting, originally scheduled for Oct.
28-29, was aborted when ARATS representatives insisted on discussing the
principle of "one China". They also wanted the phrase incorporated in all
agreements to be signed by the two agencies.
SEF delegates said that the meeting was not the proper
venue to discuss politics.
SEF head delegate Shi Hwei-yow said he sees no "logical
connection" between the two organizations' general goals and the political
interpretation of "one China".
However, when ARATS representatives insisted on pushing
the issue, saying that all matters between the two agencies are "internal
affairs of China", Shi was forced to respond by citing the "one China"
principle upheld by the ROC government.
Shi said that "one China" refers to the ROC that has
existed since 1912 but was only temporarily divided in 1949. Shi explained that
because of the event in 1949, "one China" now hat two "equal political
entities" represented by both the ROC government in Taipei and the Chinese
Communist regime in Peking.
Such definition of "one China" is also the "bottom line"
that the ROC government is prepared to accept in any talks on Taiwan-mainland
exchanges, said Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), spokesman of the ROC Mainland Affairs Council.
Chen Jung-chieh (陳榮傑), SEF secretary-general, said
that despite the suspension of the formal meeting, the decision of the SEF
representatives to remain in Hong Kong proved that the ROC was "sincere in
seeking a satisfactory end to the talks".
The ARATS delegation returned to the mainland on Nov. 1,
indicating that the group has no intention of continuing the negotiations with
SEF.
Chou Ning, head representative of ARATS, suggested upon
his departure that if any new talks are to be held, they should either be in
Peking, Taipei, Amoy or Kinmen.
Source: The Free China Journal—1992, Nov. 3 (Tuesday)
The much publicized meeting between Taiwan and mainland China liaison agencies
yawned to a close Nov. 4, having achieved little toward advancing interest of
the people they represent.
Negotiators from Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation and
the mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits gathered in
Hong Kong Oct. 28 to iron out ways to improve civilian matters. High on the
agenda was a method for verifying the documents necessary in cross-Straits
non-official exchanges.
The meeting ended prematurely when ARATS representatives
insisted on switching from private sector concerns to the political arena to
discuss how the Chinese Communists and the ROC government interpret the "one
China" principle.
The mainland delegation returned home Nov. 1, as SEF
representatives stayed on in Hong Kong hoping the negotiations would resume. On
Nov. 4, it became clear that the latest round of SEF-ARATS talks had definitely
closed when an ARATS representative informed the mainland's China News Service
that the meeting was "officially over".
A meeting in March by the counterpart organizations had
the same fruitless scenario, with the two sides unable to sign an accord.
The report tried to blame the latest breakdown on SEF,
claiming the Taiwan group had "twisted" ARATS' intentions regarding discussing
the "one China" principle.
SEF's head delegate, Shi Hwei-yow, had told his ARATS
counterpart that the meeting was not the proper venue for discussing politics.
He had said he saw no "logical connection" between the founding goals of the
two private sector organizations and political interpretations of the term "one
China".
SEF, a private agency established last year, has been
commissioned by the ROC government to handle affairs related to
people-to-people exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland.
Source: The Free China Journal—1992, Nov. 6 (Friday)
The Chinese Communists' political intent and lack of sincerity were the two main stumbling
blocks to the success of a recent meeting between the two Chinese intermediary
agencies, the ROC's Mainland Affairs Council said in a statement Nov. 6.
The MAC, which oversees all matters related to
Taiwan-mainland China exchanges, condemned the Chinese Communist authorities
for resorting to extraneous matters, resulting in the collapse of the talks.
The Oct. 28-30 conference in Hong Kong over document
verification between Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation and the mainland's
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits ended without any agreement
after mainland representatives persisted on discussing political matters.
MAC said that issues involving document verification are
general affairs that the two agencies can tackle without touching on political
issues.
"The Chinese Communists attempted to achieve a
breakthrough of their so-called 'one country, two systems' tactics by insisting
on discussing the 'one China' principle," MAC said. "It was an obvious cover-up
of a political blackmail," MAC added.
Offering a word of comfort to the SEF delegation, Premier
Hau Pei-tsun said people should not have high hopes in any negotiations with
the Chinese Communists.
Negotiations are often used by the Chinese Communists to
achieve political ends, Hau said. Therefore, inconclusive negotiations are not
failures, he added.
The meeting in Hong Kong between representatives of SEF
and ARATS was the second time this year aimed at ironing out ways to improve
civilian matters, particularly the verification of documents necessary in
cross-Straits non-official exchanges.
The scheduled two-day meeting, which SEF had proposed to
last at least four days, was extended by an extra half-day after the two sides
were close to reaching an agreement. However, no specific conclusions were
made, and the ARATS delegation left Hong Kong Nov. 1.
Hoping to resume the discussions with their mainland
counterparts, SEF representatives stayed on in the British colony and left on
Nov. 5, when it became apparent that the talks were unlikely to reopen.
According to the Chinese Communist media, ARATS has said
that the meeting with SEF was "officially over". They also proposed another
conference either in Taiwan or in the mainland.
The MAC statement strongly criticized the insincerity of
ARATS and its want of authority from the Chinese Communists to discuss
pertinent matters out of the open.
MAC said that general affairs and technicalities are
problems that should be solved "immediately", adding that the time for
political negotiations are "not yet ripe".
"Even though the Hong Kong meeting has ended, the
problems have not disappeared", said MAC. It urged ARATS to return to the
negotiation table at the same venue. "The door to negotiation should not be
closed", the statement said.
SEF is a private organization authorized by the ROC
government to handle affairs related to people-to-people exchanges between
Taiwan and the mainland. SEF has no authority to discuss political issues,
whether with private or official mainland representatives.
Mainland authorities were reported to be eager to reopen
negotiations for a proposed meeting between SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu (辜振甫) and ARATS Chairman Wang Tao-han
(汪道涵), but the time and venue have
still to be agreed on. The much publicized proposed conference would be the
highest-level contact between non-officials of the two sides.
Source: The Free China Journal—1992, Nov. 10 (Tuesday)
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Legislator Su Chi (蘇起) yesterday admitted that he made
up the term "1992 consensus" in 2000, before the KMT handed over power to the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
Su said he invented the term in order to break the
cross-strait deadlock and alleviate tension.
"[Then president] Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) was not in the know when the
term was invented. Lee found out about it later from the newspaper, but he
never mentioned later that it was improper," said Su, who was chairman of the
Mainland Affairs Council at the time.
Su made the remarks yesterday in response to Lee who,
during a Taiwan Solidarity Union seminar on Monday, said that the so-called
"1992 consensus" was a fiction.
"Little monkey boy's trying to make up history," Lee said
of Su, daring him to respond on the matter.
When asked by reporters for a response yesterday, Su said
he did invent the term, which was meant to encourage observers to think that
"each side has its own interpretation on the meaning of 'one China.'"
The term "1992 consensus" is controversial. The KMT has insisted on
the existence of a "consensus" between Taiwan and China during a meeting in
Hong Kong in November 1992 that both sides should adhere to the "one China"
principle.
Since the term appeared, however, the DPP government has
insisted that no such consensus existed.
Stating that "no consensus" was reached on the definition
of "one China" during the 1992 meeting, President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) has said that the "1992
meeting" would be a more appropriate term to describe the conference in Hong
Kong.
Su said he made up the term "1992 consensus" as a
replacement for the expression "each side with its own interpretation" in order
to benefit cross-strait development.
"The wording 'each side with its own interpretation' of
the 'one China' principle had been used from 1992 to 2000. But China didn't
like the 'each side with its own interpretation' part and the DPP government
didn't like the part that said 'one China,'" Su said.
"On account of these differences and the fact they could
have led to more cross-strait tension after the DPP took power, I suggested the
new term as a common point that was acceptable to both sides so that Taiwan and
China could keep up cross-strait exchanges," he said.
Su said he initially thought the term could contribute to
a resumption of cross-strait negotiations and did not think that it would be
unacceptable to the DPP government.
Source: The Taipei Times—2006, Feb. 22 (Wednesday) [click here]
Kuomintang lawmaker Su Chi admitted yesterday what is known as the "consensus of 1992" is
his own handiwork, as former President Lee Teng-hui said it was.
Lee said Sunday he never knew there is any consensus of
1992 and charged Su with creating that non-existent unsigned agreement between
Taipei and Beijing.
However, there exists what amounts to a bout de papier or
aide memoire type agreement between the Straits Exchange Foundation and the
Association of Relations across the Taiwan Strait in 1992.
As an aide memoire, it was unsigned but dated and typed
on the paper with the titles of the two quasi-government organizations charged
with the conduct of "unofficial" relations between Taiwan and China.
Had it been a bout de papier, it would have been typed on
"just paper" and undated.
But the agreement per se is not typed on one piece of
paper. Rather the two organizations exchanged their aides memoire to complete
the agreement, under which Taipei and Beijing both accept one China whose
connotation can be individually and orally stated.
This agreement was characterized by Su, then chairman of
the Mainland Affairs Council, as the principle of "one China with different
interpretations."
China did not contest his characterization, however.
"I tried what I could to come up with a solution to the
imminent impasse between Taipei and Beijing right after President Chen
Shui-bian's election in 2000," Su recalled.
Su knew President Chen would never accept the principle
of one China with different interpretations. He also knew he had to do
something to prevent the stalemate.
"That's why I decided to repack the principle of 'one
China with different interpretations in the consensus of 1992," Su pointed out.
He said he did not tell President Lee of his decision and
went ahead with the announcement of his creation. "President Lee did not know
beforehand," he continued, "and he came to know only after reading the
newspaper."
"But," Su pointed out, "President Lee did not complain."
Lee is now complaining Su was trying to "create history."
Under that aide memoire agreement, C.F. Koo, SEF
chairman, met his Chinese counterpart Wang Daohan twice in 1993 and 1998 to
sign agreements to solve "issues of technicalities" between Taiwan and China.
Koo went to see Chinese President Jiang Zeming in Beijing after his meeting
with Wang in Shanghai in 1998.
On the other hand, Su said the consensus of 1992 sounds
better and is of more use to the ruling Democratic Progressive Party than the
principle of one China with different interpretations.
"Well," the Kuomintang legislator said, "the consensus of
1992 makes it possible for Taipei to differently 'interpret' one China."
Beijing wants dialogue with Taipei in accordance with the
consensus of 1992.
However, China now insists on the principle of one China
whose connotation can be individually and orally stated. The change came about
after James Soong, chairman of the People First Party, met and talked with Hu
Jintao, Chinese president, in Beijing in May last year.
Source: The China Post—2006, Feb. 22 (Wednesday)
[click here]
Please note that the China Post, founded on Sept. 3, 1952, was the oldest English-language
daily newspaper in Taiwan. While its print edition was stopped on May 15, 2017, the
online edition continued publishing content
well into the year 2021 but apparently has become inactive since, rendering the URL of above article
invalid.
The term “1992 Consensus” is misleading and distorts the political reality in cross-Strait
relations. The evidence for that can be summarized as follows.
Contemporary FCJ coverage as shown above gives no hint whatsoever that an
agreement on the One China issue was achieved at the 1992 Hong Kong meeting between SEF and ARATS representatives and its aftermath—no
consensus then.
Neither the ROC nor the PRC ever provided any documents which would prove that a bilateral unterstanding concerning the
One China issue was reached at the 1992 Hong Kong meeting.
According to sources available online, the formula "one China, with each side having its own interpretation" (yi Zhong
gebiao) came up only around August 1995 and is attributed to then-SEF secretary-general and KMT
member Chiao Jen-ho.
The term “1992 Consensus” never came up before the 2000 ROC presidential election which
took place on March 18 that year, and the first public mention of the term probably occurred shortly afterwards on March 28 by NPlegislator Elmer Fung.
As shown above, Su Chi admitted in February 2006 that it was him who had invented the term.
The PRC has never officially accepted the second part of the formula “yi Zhong gebiao”, rendering the term “1992 Consensus”
meaningless.