Other texts and documents

Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895)
Liaotung Convention (1895)
Peace Agreement between the Great Powers and China (1901)
Treaty of Portsmouth (1905)
Japan's "21 Demands" to China (1915)
Treaty of Versailles (1919) ✄
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933)
The ROC's Declaration of War Against Japan (1941)
Declaration by United Nations (1942)
Cairo Declaration (1943)
Convention on International Civil Aviation (1944)
Agreements reached at the Yalta Conference (1945)
Berlin Declaration (1945)
Potsdam Agreement (1945)
Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War (Jewel Voice Broadcast) (1945)
General Order No. 1 (1945)
Japan's First Instrument of Surrender (1945)
Act of Surrender (1945)
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction No. 677 (1946)
San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951)
Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan (1952)
Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty (1954)
The US Congress Formosa Resolution (1955)
PRC Defense Minister Peng Dehuai’s Proclamation to Taiwan Compatriots (1958)
Legal Problems Regarding Formosa and the Offshore Islands (1958)
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan (1960)
Czyzak Memorandum (1961)
UN Resolution 1668 (1961)
Okinawa Reversion Agreement (1971)
Starr Memorandum (1971)
UN Resolution 2758 (1971)
Shanghai Communiqué (1972)
Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the PRC (1972)
Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the PRC (1978)
Joint Communiqué of the US and the PRC (Normalization Communiqué) (1979)
Message to Compatriots in Taiwan (1979)
Taiwan Relations Act (1979)
Nagoya Resolution (1979)
Chairman Ye Jianying’s Elaborations on Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan To Motherland and Peaceful Unification (1981)
The "Six Assurances" to Taiwan ROC (1982)
Joint Communiqué of the PRC and the US (1982)
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [Article 121] (1982) ✄
Deng Xiaoping’s “Six Conceptions” (1983)
The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong (1984)
National Security Law During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion (1987)
Guidelines for National Unification (1991)
The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China (1993)
Bill Clinton's "Three No's" (1998)
US Senate Resolution 107 (1998)
US House of Representatives Resolution 301 (1998)
ROC President Lee Teng-hui's remarks about the "state-to-state relationship" extant between the ROC and the PRC (1999)
The One China Principle and Taiwan Question (2000)
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2002)
Colin Powell's statement on "one China" and Taiwan (2004)
The "Anti-Secession Law" of the PRC (2005)
South China Sea Arbitration—PCA Press Release (2016)
Taiwan Travel Act (2018)
Commitment to Taiwan (2018)
Xi Jinping’s “Five Points” (2019)
TAIPEI Act of 2019 (2019)
Hong Kong National Security Law (2020)
Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the HKSAR National Security Law (2020)
Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (2020)
The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era (2022)

Overview
Speech statistics
1996—Lee Teng-hui (9^th ROC presidential term)
2000—Chen Shui-bian (10^th ROC presidential term)
2004—Chen Shui-bian (11^th ROC presidential term)
2008—Ma Ying-jeou (12^th ROC presidential term)
2012—Ma Ying-jeou (13^th ROC presidential term)
2016—Tsai Ing-wen (14^th ROC presidential term)
2020—Tsai Ing-wen (15^th ROC presidential term)

Note: This page presents a collection of selected important texts and documents pertaining to the Taiwan Politics Database. Alternatively, the user can also refer to a PDF file that shows the contents of this page as well—557 pages in A5 format, file size: 8.46 MB (file includes the ROC Constitution); click here to open.
In addition, separate relevant PDF files in A4 format are available for free download as listed below:

◆ Selected important texts and documents

In the field of international politics, the status of the ROC has long been highly controversial. Most countries in the world recognize the so-called "One China" principle (yige Zhongguo yuanze 一個中國原則), i. e. its interpretation by the PRC, according to which "there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is a part of that China". Today less than two dozen states, most of them with no international importance, maintain formal diplomatic relations with the ROC. The existence of the ROC is not only denied internationally but also domestically by pro-independence activists in Taiwan who claim that there was no legal foundation for Taiwan to be put under ROC control in 1945, making the now Taipei-based ROC government a "government-in-exile" (liuwang zhengfu 流亡政府). More details in this context can be found under the headline "Legal aspects of Taiwan in the ROC" of the section Taiwan Province on the page "Local administration".

Please note that the documents shown in this page's chapter are listed in chronological order. Most of them were selected for their significance to the status of China and Taiwan/the PRC and the ROC. Others were picked for their significance in the dispute concerning the Diaoyutai Islands (Diaoyutai lieyu 釣魚台列嶼)—called "Senkaku Islands" (Jian'ge zhudao 尖閣諸島, Japanese pronunciation "Senkaku shotō") by Japan—in the East China Sea which are claimed by the ROC, the PRC, and Japan, or as reference to be used in the controversy about overlapping sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, e. g. the Spratly Islands (nansha qundao 南沙群島).

All documents are presented in original full text, with two exceptions. Because the Treaty of Versailles and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are far too large to be included here (in fact, UNCLOS is even larger than all other texts in this chapter combined), only parts deemed relevant by the editor were selected—of the Treaty of Versailles which in the original has 440 articles in 15 parts, ten articles are shown, and one article out of the 320 articles in 17 parts of UNCLOS. A scissors symbol ("✄") indicates that most of the document's articles were left out.

As for important quotes like Bill Clinton's "Three No's", Lee Teng-hui's remarks about the "special state-to-state relationship" between the ROC and the PRC, and Colin Powell's statement on "one China" and Taiwan, only the paragraph with the actual wording is rendered here. Additional notes from the editor (i. e. this website's chief researcher) are marked as such and highlighted with a stop sign symbol (🛑).

The following selected important texts and documents relevant to the status of Taiwan / the ROC are presented below.

Please note that the topic of Taiwan’s status under international law was the focus of a doctoral thesis written by German law expert Claudius Petzold: “Die völkerrechtliche Stellung Taiwans”, published in 2007 by Nomos Universitätsschriften – Recht, 226 pages (in German), ISBN 978-3-8329-2373-0. The text is available as eBook on the Nomos eLibrary.

Treaty of Shimonoseki

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of China, desiring to restore the blessings of peace to their countries and subjects and to remove all cause for future complications, have named as their Plenipotentiaries for the purpose of concluding a Treaty of Peace, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Count ITO Hirobumi, Junii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Paullownia, Minister President of State; and Viscount MUTSU Munemitsu, Junii, First Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

And His Majesty the Emperor of China, LI Hung-chang, Senior Tutor to the Heir Apparent, Senior Grand Secretary of State, Minister Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports of China, Viceroy of the province of Chili, and Earl of the First Rank; and LI Ching-fong, Ex-Minister of the Diplomatic Service, of the Second Official Rank:

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good and proper form, have agreed to the following Articles:—

China recognises definitively the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea, and, in consequence, the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China, in derogation of such independence and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the future.

China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon:—

(a) The southern portion of the province of Fêngtien within the following boundaries:

The line of demarcation begins at the mouth of the River Yalu and ascends that stream to the mouth of the River An-ping, from thence the line runs to Fêng-huang, from thence to Hai-cheng, from thence to Ying-kow, forming a line which describes the southern portion of the territory. The places above named are included in the ceded territory. When the line reaches the River Liao at Ying-kow, it follows the course of the stream to its mouth, where it terminates. The mid-channel of the River Liao shall be taken as the line of demarcation.

This cession also includes all islands appertaining or belonging to the province of Fêngtien situated in the eastern portion of the Bay of Liao-tung and the northern portion of the Yellow Sea.

(b) The island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa.

(c) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude.

The alignment of the frontiers described in the preceding Article, and shown on the annexed map, shall be subject to verification and demarcation on the spot by a Joint Commission of Delimitation, consisting of two or more Japanese and two or more Chinese delegates, to be appointed immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. In case the boundaries laid down in this Act are found to be defective at any point, either on account of topography or in consideration of good administration, it shall also be the duty of the Delimitation Commission to rectify the same.

The Delimitation Commission will enter upon its duties as soon as possible, and will bring its labours to a conclusion within the period of one year after appointment.

The alignments laid down in this Act shall, however, be maintained until the rectifications of the Delimitation Commission, if any are made, shall have received the approval of the Governments of Japan and China.

China agrees to pay to Japan as a war indemnity the sum of 200,000,000 Kuping taels; the said sum to be paid in eight instalments. The first instalment of 50,000,000 taels to be paid within six months, and the second instalment of 50,000,000 to be paid within twelve months, after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. The remaining sum to be paid in six equal instalments as follows: the first of such equal annual instalments to be paid within two years, the second within three years, the third within four years, the fourth within five years, the fifth within six years, and the the sixth within seven years, after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. Interest at the rate of 5 per centum per annum shall begin to run on all unpaid portions of the said indemnity from the date the first instalment falls due.

China shall, however, have the right to pay by anticipation at any time any or all of the said instalments. In case the whole amount of the said indemnity is paid within three years after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act all interest shall be waived, and the interest for two years and a half or for any less period, if any already paid, shall be included as part of the principal amount of the indemnity.

The inhabitants of the territories ceded to Japan who wish to take up their residence outside the ceded districts shall be at liberty to sell their real property and retire. For this purpose a period of two years from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the present Act shall be granted. At the expiration of that period those of the inhabitants who shall not have left such territories shall, at the option of Japan, be deemed to be Japanese subjects.

Each of the two Governments shall, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act, send one or more Commissioners to Formosa to effect a final transfer of that province, and within the space of two months after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act such transfer shall be completed.

All Treaties between Japan and China having come to an end as a consequence of war, China engages, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act, to appoint Plenipotentiaries to conclude with the Japanese Plenipotentiaries, a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and a Convention to regulate Frontier Intercourse and Trade. The Treaties, Conventions, and Regulations now subsisting between China and the European Powers shall serve as a basis for the said Treaty and Convention between Japan and China. From the date of the exchange of ratifications of this Act until the said Treaty and Convention are brought into actual operation, the Japanese governments, its officials, commerce, navigation, frontier intercourse and trade, industries, ships, and subjects, shall in every respect be accorded by China most favoured nation treatment.

China makes, in addition, the following concessions, to take effect six months after the date of the present Act:—

First.—The following cities, towns, and ports, in addition to those already opened, shall be opened to the trade, residence, industries, and manufactures of Japanese subjects, under the same conditions and with the same privileges and facilities as exist at the present open cities, towns, and ports of China:

●　Shashih, in the province of Hupeh.
●　Chungking, in the province of Szechwan.
●　Suchow, in the province of Kiangsu.
●　Hangchow, in the province of Chekiang.

The Japanese Government shall have the right to station consuls at any or all of the above named places.

Second.—Steam navigation for vessels under the Japanese flag, for the conveyance of passengers and cargo, shall be extended to the following places:

●　On the Upper Yangtze River, from Ichang to Chungking.
●　On the Woosung River and the Canal, from Shanghai to Suchow and Hangchow.

The rules and regulations that now govern the navigation of the inland waters of China by Foreign vessels shall, so far as applicable, be enforced, in respect to the above named routes, until new rules and regulations are conjointly agreed to.

Third.—Japanese subjects purchasing goods or produce in the interior of China, or transporting imported merchandise into the interior of China, shall have the right temporarily to rent or hire warehouses for the storage of the articles so purchased or transported without the payment of any taxes or extractions whatever.

Fourth.—Japanese subjects shall be free to engage in all kinds of manufacturing industries in all the open cities, towns, and ports of China, and shall be at liberty to import into China all kinds of machinery, paying only the stipulated import duties thereon.

All articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in China shall, in respect of inland transit and internal taxes, duties, charges, and exactions of all kinds, and also in respect of warehousing and storage facilities in the interior of China, stand upon the same footing and enjoy the same privileges and exemptions as merchandise imported by Japanese subjects into China.

In the event additional rules and regulations are necessary in connexion with these concessions, they shall be embodied in the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation provided for by this Article.

Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding Article, the evacuation of China by the armies of Japan shall be completely effected within three months after the exchange of the ratificatioins of the present Act.

As a guarantee of the faithful performance of the stipulations of this Act, China consents to the temporary occupation by the military forces of Japan of Weihaiwei, in the province of Shantung.

Upon payment of the first two instalments of the war indemnity herein stipulated for and the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce and navigation, the said place shall be evacuated by the Japanese forces, provided the Chinese Government consents to pledge, under suitable and sufficient arrangements, the Customs revenue of China as security for the payment of the principal and interest of the remaining instalments of the said indemnity. In the event that no such arrangements are concluded, such evacuation shall only take place upon the payment of the final instalment of said indemnity.

It is, however, expressly understood that no such evacuation shall take place until after the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.

Immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act, all prisoners of war then held shall be restored, and China undertakes not to ill-treat or punish prisoners of war so restored to her by Japan. China also engages to at once release all Japanese subjects accused of being military spies or charged with any other military offences. China further engages not to punish in any manner, nor to allow to be punished, those Chinese subjects who have in any manner been compromised in their relations with the Japanese army during the war.

All offensive military operations shall cease upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act.

The present Act shall be ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of China, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Chefoo on the 8th day of the 5th month of the 28th year of MEIJI, corresponding to the 14th day of the 4th month of the 21st year of KUANG HSÜ.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same and affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

DONE in Shimonoseki, in duplicate, this 17th day of the fourth month of the 28th year of MEIJI, corresponding to the 23rd day of the 3rd month of the 21st year of KUANG HSÜ.

Count Ito Hirobumi (Junii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Paullownia; Minister President of State; Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan)

Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu (Junii, First Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure; Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan)

Li Hung-chang (Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China; Senior Tutor to the Heir Apparent; Senior Grand Secretary of State; Minister Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports of China; Viceroy of the province of Chili; Earl of the First Rank)

Li Ching-fong (Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China; Ex-Minister of the Diplomatic Service, of the Second Official Rank)

大清帝國大皇帝陛下及大日本帝國大皇帝陛下為訂立和約，俾兩國及其臣民重修和平，共用幸福，且杜絕將來紛紜之端，大清帝國大皇帝陛下特簡大清帝國欽差頭等全權大臣太子太傅文華殿大學士北洋通商大臣直隸總督一等肅毅伯爵李鴻章、大清帝國欽差全權大臣二品頂戴前出使大臣李經方、大日本帝國大皇帝陛下特簡大日本帝國全權辦理大臣內閣總理大臣從二位勳一等伯爵伊藤博文、大日本帝國全權辦理大臣外務大臣從二位勳一等子爵陸奧宗光為全權大臣，彼此校閱所奉諭旨，認明均屬妥實無闕。會同議定各條款，開列於左：

中國認明朝鮮國確為完全無缺之獨立自主國，故凡有虧損其獨立自主體制，即如該國向中國所修貢獻典禮等，嗣後全行廢決。

中國將管理下開地方之權，並將該地方所有堡壘軍器工廠及一切屬公對象，永遠讓與日本。
一、下開劃界以內之奉天省南邊地方以鴨綠江溯該江以抵安平河口，又以該河口劃至鳳凰城、海城、及營口而止，劃成折線以南地方。所有前開各城市，皆包括在劃界線內。該線抵營口之遼河後，及順流至海口止，彼此以河中心為界。遼東灣南岸及黃海北岸，在奉天所屬諸島亦一併在所讓界內。
二、臺灣全島及所有附屬各島嶼。
三、澎湖列島，即英國格林尼次東經百十九度起至百二十度止，及北緯三十三度起至二十四度之間諸島嶼。

前款所載及黏附本國之地圖所劃疆界，俟本約批准互換之後，兩國應各選派官員二名以上，為公同劃定疆界委員，就地踏勘，確定劃界。若遇本國所約疆界於地形或地理所關有礙難不便等情，各該委員等當妥為參酌更改。各該委員等當從速辦理界務，以期奉委之後限一年竣事，但遇各該委員等有所更定劃界，兩國政府未經認準以前，應據本約所定劃界為正。

中國約將庫平銀二萬萬兩交與日本，作為賠償軍費。該款分作八次交完。第一次五千萬兩，應在本約批准互換六個月內交清。第二次五千萬兩，應在本約批准互換後十二個月內交清。款平分六次，遞年交納，其法列下：第一次平分遞年之款，於兩年內交清。第二次於三年內交清，第三次於四年內交清，第四次於五年內交清，第五次於六年內交清，第六次於七年內交清。其年分均以本約批准互換之後起算。又第一次賠款交清後，未經交完之款，應按年加每百抽五之息，但無論何時應賠之款或全數或幾分，先期交清，均聽中國之便。如從條約批准互換之日起三年之內能全數還清，除將已付息金或兩年半或不及兩年半於應付本銀扣還外，仍全數免息。

本約批准互換之後，限兩年之內，日本準中國讓與地方人民願遷居讓與地方之外者，任便變賣所有產業退去界外，但限滿之後尚未遷徙者，酌宜視為日本臣民。又臺灣一省應於本約批准互換後，兩國立即各派大臣至臺灣，限於本約批准後兩個月交接清楚。

中日兩國所有約章，因此次失和，自屬廢決。中國約俟本約批准之後速派全權大臣與日本所派全權大臣，會同訂立通商行船條約，及陸路通商章程。兩國新訂約章，應以中國與泰西交國見行約章為本。又本國批准互換之日起，新訂約章未經實行之前，所有日本官吏臣民及商業工藝行船船隻陸路通商等，與中國最為優待之國禮護視，一律無異。
中國約將下開讓與各款，以兩國全權大臣押蓋印日起，六個月後方可照辦。
第一、見今中國已開通商口岸之外，應準添設下開各處，立為通商口岸以便日本臣民往來僑寓，從事商業工藝製作。所有添設口岸，均照向開通商海口或向開內地鎮市章程一體辦理，應得優例及利益等，亦當一律享受。
（一）湖北省荊州府沙市。
（二）四川省重慶府。
（三）江蘇省蘇州府。
（四）浙江省杭州府。日本政府得派遣領事官於前開各口駐紮。
第二、日本輪船得駛入下開各口，附搭行客裝運貨物：
（一）從湖北省宜昌溯長江以至四川省重慶府。
（二）從上海駛進吳淞江及運河以至蘇州府杭州府。中日兩國未經商定行船章程以前，上開各口行船務依外國船隻駛入中國內地水路見行章程照行。
第三、日本臣民在中國內地購買工貨件，若自生之物，或將進口商貨運往內地之物，欲暫行存棧，除勿庸攳鈔派徵一切旅費外，得暫租棧房存貨。
第四、日本臣民得在中國通商口岸城邑任便從事各項工藝製造，又得將各項機器任便裝運進口，只交所定進口稅。日本臣民在中國製造一切貨物，其於內地運送稅，內地稅鈔課什派，以及中國內地沾及寄存棧房之益即照日臣民運入中國之貨物一體辦理，至應優例豁除，亦莫不相同。
嗣後如有因以上加讓之事應增章程規條，即載入本款所稱之行船通商條約內。

日本軍隊見駐中國境內者，應於本約批准互換之後三個月內撤回，但須照次款所定辦理。

中國為保證認真實行約內所訂各款，聽允日本軍隊暫佔守山東省威海衛。又於中國將本約所定第一、第二兩次賠款交清，通商行船亦經批准互換之後，中國政府與日本政府確定周全妥善辦法，將通商口岸關稅作為剩款並息之抵押，日本可允撤回軍隊。倘中國不即確定抵押辦法則未經交清末次賠款之前，日本仍不撤回軍隊。

本約批准互換之後，兩國應將是時所有俘虜盡數交還。中國約將由日本遣還俘虜，並不加以虐待若或置於罪戾。中國約將認為軍事間諜或被嫌逮係之日本臣民，即行釋放，並約此次交仗之所有關涉日本軍隊之中國臣民，概予寬貸，並飭有司不得擅為逮係。

自本約奉大清國大皇帝陛下及日本帝國大皇帝陛下批准之後，定於光緒二十一年四月十四日，即日本明治二十八年五月初八日，在煙臺互換。

大清帝國欽差頭等全權大臣太子太傅文華殿大學士北洋通商大臣直隸總督一等肅毅伯爵李鴻章（押印）
大清帝國欽差全權大臣二品頂戴前出使大臣李經芳（押印）

大日本帝國全權辦理大臣內閣總理大臣從二位一等伯爵伊藤博文（押印）
大日本帝國全權辦理大臣外務大臣從二位勳一等子爵陸奧宗光（押印）

光緒二十一年三月二十三日訂於下之關繕寫兩分。
明治二十八年四月十七日

The Treaty of Shimonoseki (Maguan tiaoyue 馬關條約; title in Japanese: Shimonoseki Jōyaku 下関条約) was signed at Shimonoseki (下關) on April 17, 1895 and entered into force on May 8, 1895 by the exchange of the instruments of ratification at Chefoo (芝罘).

Liaotung Convention

His Majesty the Emperor of China and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, desiring to conclude a Convention for the retrocession by Japan of all of the southern portion of the province of Fêngtien to the sovereignty of China, have for that purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of China, LI HUNG-CHANG, Minister Plenipotentiary, Senior Tutor of the Heir Apparent, Senior Grand Secretary of State and Earl of the First Rank, and
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Baron HAYASHI TADASU, Shoshii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Grand Officer of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary,
who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, which were found to be in good and proper form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same and affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

DONE in Peking this 22nd day of the 9th month of the 21st year of KUANG HSÜ, corresponding to the 8th day of the 11th month of the 28th year of MEIJI.

LI HUNG-CHANG, [L.S.]———Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China
Senior Tutor to the Heir Apparent
Senior Grand Secretary of State
Earl of the First Rank

Baron HAYASHI TADASU, [L.S.]———Shoshii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure
Grand Officer of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun
Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan

大清國大皇帝陛下、大日本國大皇帝陛下欲締結條約，由日本國交還奉天省南邊地方，一切仍歸中國管理。大清國大皇帝陛下持簡欽差全權大臣太子太傅文華殿大學士一等肅毅伯爵李鴻章；

大日本國大皇帝陛下特簡欽差駐紮北京全權大臣正四位勳一等男爵林董；

大清帝國欽差全權大臣太子太傅文華殿大學土。一等肅毅伯爵李鴻章
大日本帝國欽差駐紮北京全權大臣正四位勳一等男爵林董

光緒二十一年九月二十二日
明治二十八年十一月初八日
訂於北京

The Liaotung Convention (Liaodong tiaoyue 遼東條約 or Liaodong xieyi 遼東協議) was signed in Beijing on Nov. 8, 1895 and is also known under the following names: Fengtian Peninsula Return Treaty (Fengtian bandao huanfu tiaoyue 奉天半島還付條約), Sino-Japanese Liao-south Treaty (Zhong Ri Liaonan tiaoyue 中日遼南條約), or Treaty of Peking (Beijing tiaoyue 北京條約); in Japanese: Treaty Concerning Fengtien Peninsula Return (Hōten hantō kanpu ni kansuru jōyaku 奉天半島還付に関する条約).

Peace Agreement between the Great Powers and China

The Plenipotentiaries
—of Germany, M. Alfons Mumm (Freiherr von Schwarzenstein);
—of Austria-Hungary, Baron Moritz Czikann von Wahlborn;
—of Belgium, Maurice Joostens;
—of Spain, M. Bernardo J. de Cólogan;
—of the United States, Mr. William W. Rockhill;
—of France, M. Paul Beau;
—of Great Britain, Sir Ernest Satow;
—of Italy, Marquis Salvago Raggi;
—of Japan, M. Jutaro Komura 小村壽太郎;
—of the Netherlands, M. Fridolin Marinus Knobel;
—of Russia, M. Michael de Giers;
and the Plenipotentiaries of China, His Highness Yi-K'uang 奕劻, Prince of the First Rank; Ch'ing, President of the Board of Foreign Affairs; and his Excellency Li Hung-chang 李鴻章, Count of the First Rank; Su-Yi, Tutor of the Heir Apparent; Grand Secretary of the Wen-Hua Throne Hall, Minister of Commerce, Superintendent of Trade for the North, Governor-General of Chihli,
have met for the purpose of declaring that China has complied with the conditions laid down in the note of the 22nd December, 1900, and which were accepted in their entirety by His Majesty the Emperor of China in a Decree dated the 27th December, 1900.

1) By an Imperial Edict of the 9th June last, Tsai-Feng, Prince of the First Rank, Chün, was appointed Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of China, and directed in that capacity to convey to His Majesty the German Emperor the expression of the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China and of the Chinese Government at the assassination of his Excellency the late Baron von Ketteler, German Minister.

Prince Chün left Peking on the 12th July last to carry out the orders which had been given him.

2) The Chinese Government has stated that it will erect on the spot of the assassination of his Excellency the late Baron von Ketteler, commemorative monument worthy of the rank of the deceased, and bearing an inscription in the Latin, German, and Chinese languages which shall express the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China for the murder committed.

The Chinese Plenipotentiaries have informed his Excellency the German Plenipotentiary, in a letter dated the 22nd July last, that an arch of the whole width of the street would be erected on the said spot, and that work on it was begun on the 25th June last.

1) Imperial Edicts of the 13th and 21st February, 1901, inflicted the following punishments on the principal authors of the attempts and of the crimes committed against the foreign Governments and their nationals:—

Tsa-Ii, Prince Tuan, and Tsai-Lan, Duke Fu-kuo, were sentenced to be brought before the Autumnal Court of Assize for execution, and it was agreed that if the Emperor saw fit to grant them their lives, they should be exiled to Turkestan, and there imprisoned for life, without the possibility of commutation of these punishments.

Tsai Hsün, Prince Chuang, Ying-Nien, President of the Court of Censors, and Chao Shu-chiao, President of the Board of Punishments, were condemned to commit suicide.

Yü Hsien, Governor of Shansi, Chi Hsiu, President of the Board of Rites, and Hsü Cheng-yu, formerly Senior Vice-President of the Board of Punishments, were condemned to death.

Posthumous degradation was inflicted on Kang Yi, Assistant Grand Secretary, President of the Board of Works, Hsü Tung, Grand Secretary, and Li Ping-heng, former Governor-General of Szu-chuan.

Imperial Edict of the 13th February last rehabilitated the memories of Hsu Yung-yi, President of the Board of War; Li Shan, President of the Board of Works; Hsu Ching Cheng, Senior Vice-President of the Board of Civil Office; Lien Yuan, Vice-Chancellor of the Grand Council; and Yuan Chang, Vice-President of the Court of Sacrifices, who had been put to death for having protested against the outrageous breaches of international law of last year.

Prince Chuang committed suicide on the 21st February last; Ying Nien and Chao Shu-chiao on the 24th February; Yu Hsien was executed on the 22nd February; Chi Hsiu and Hsü Cheng-yu on the 26th February; Tung Fu-hsiang, General in Kan-su, has been deprived of his office by Imperial Edict of the 13th February last, pending the determination of the final punishment to be inflicted on him.

Imperial Edicts, dated the 29th April and 19th August, 1901, have inflicted various punishments on the provincial officials convicted of the crimes and outrages of last summer.

2) An Imperial Edict, promulgated the 19th August, 1901, ordered the suspension of official examinations for five years in all cities where foreigners were massacred or submitted to cruel treatment.

So as to make honourable reparation for the assassination of Mr. Sugiyama, Chancellor of the Japanese Legation, His Majesty the Emperor of China, by an Imperial Edict of the 18th June, 1901, appointed Na T'ung, Vice-President of the Board of Finances, to be his Envoy Extraordinary, and specially directed him to convey to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan the expression of the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China and of his Government at the assassination of Mr. Sugiyama.

The Chinese Government has agreed to erect an expiatory monument in each of the foreign or international cemeteries which were desecrated, and in which the tombs were destroyed.

It has been agreed with the Representatives of the Powers that the Legations interested shall settle the details for the erection of these monuments, China bearing all the expenses thereof, estimated at 10,000 taels, for the cemeteries at Peking and in its neighbourhood, and at 5,000 taels for the cemeteries in the provinces. The amounts have been paid, and the list of these cemeteries is inclosed herewith.

China has agreed to prohibit the importation into its territory of arms and ammunition, as well as of materials exclusively used for the manufacture of arms and ammunition.

An Imperial Edict has been issued on the 25th August, forbidding said importation for a term of two years. New Edicts may be issued subsequently extending this by other successive terms of two years in case of necessity recognized by the Powers.

By an Imperial Edict dated the 29th May, 1901, His Majesty the Emperor of China agreed to pay the Powers an indemnity of 450,000,000 of Haikwan taels.

This sum represents the total amount of the indemnities for States, Companies, or Societies, private individuals and Chinese, referred to in Article 6 of the note of the 22nd December, 1900.

1) These 450,000,000 constitute a gold debt calculated at the rate of the Haikwan tael to the gold currency of each country, as indicated below:—

This sum in gold shall shall bear interest at 4 per cent. per annum, and the capital shall be reimbursed by China in thirty-nine years in the manner indicated in the annexed plan of amortization. Capital and interest shall be payable in gold or at the rates of exchange corresponding to the dates at which the different payments fall due.

The amortization shall commence the 1st January, 1902, and shall finish at the end of the year 1940. The amortizations are payable annually, the first payment being fixed on the 1st January, 1903.

Interest shall run from the 1st July, 1901, but the Chinese Government shall have the right to pay off within a term of three years, beginning January 1902, the arrears of the first six months ending the 31st December, 1901, on condition, however, that it pays compound interest at the rate of 4 per cent. a year on the sums the payment of which shall have been thus deferred.

Interest shall be payable semi-annually, the first payment being fixed on the 1st July, 1902.

2) The service of the debt shall take place in Shanghai in the following manner:—

Each Power shall be represented by a Delegate on a Commission of bankers authorized to receive the amount of interest and amortization which shall be paid to it by the Chinese authorities designated for that purpose, to divide it among the interested parties, and to give a receipt for the same.

3) The Chinese Government shall deliver to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps at Peking a bond for the lump sum, which shall subsequently be converted into fractional bonds bearing the signature of the Delegates of the Chinese Government designated for that purpose. This operation and all those relating to issuing of the bonds shall be performed by the above-mentioned Commission, in accordance with the instructions which the Powers shall send their Delegates.

4) The proceeds of the revenues assigned to the payment of the bonds shall be paid monthly to the Commission.

a) The balance of the revenues of the Imperial Maritime Customs, after payment of the interest and amortization of preceding loans secured on these revenues, plus the proceeds of the raising to 5 per cent. effective of the present tariff of maritime imports, including articles until now on the free list, but exempting rice, foreign cereals, and flour, gold and silver bullion and coin.

b) The revenues of the native Customs, administered in the open ports by the Imperial Maritime Customs.

c) The total revenues of the salt gabelle, exclusive of the fraction previously set aside for other foreign loans.

6) The raising of the present tariff on imports to 5 per cent. effective is agreed to on the conditions mentioned below. It shall be put in force two months after the signing of the present Protocol, and no exceptions shall be made except for merchandize in transit not more than ten days after the said signing.

a) All duties levied on imports ad valorem shall be converted as far as possible and as soon as may be into specific duties.

The average value of merchandize at the time of their landing during the three years 1897, 1898, and 1899, that is to say, the market price less the amount of import duties and incidental expenses, shall be taken as the basis for the valuation of merchandize.

Pending the result of the work of conversion, duties shall be levied ad valorem.

b) The beds of the Rivers Whangpoo and Peiho shall be improved with the financial participation of China.

The Chinese Government has agreed that the quarter occupied by the Legations shall be considered as one specially reserved for their use and placed under their exclusive control, in which Chinese shall not have the right to reside, and which may be made defensible.

●　On the east, Ketteler Street (10, 11, 12).
●　On the north, the line, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
●　On the west, the line 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
●　On the south, the line 12—1, drawn along the exterior base of the tartar wall, and following the line of the bastions.

In the Protocol annexed to the letter of the 16th January, 1901, China recognized the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the said quarter for the defence of its Legation.

The Chinese Government has consented to raze the forts of Taku, and those which might impede free communication between Peking and the sea. Steps have been taken for carrying this out.

The Chinese Government conceded the right to the Powers in the Protocol annexed to the letter of the 16th January, 1901, to occupy certain points, to be determined by an Agreement between them for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea. The points occupied by the Powers are:—

Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tien-tsin, Chun-liang-Cheng, Tong-ku, Lu-tai, Tong-shan, Lan-chou, Chang-li, Chin-wang Tao, Shan-hai Kuan.

The Chinese Government has agreed to post and to have published during two years in all district cities the following Imperial Edicts:—

1) Edict of the ist February, 1901, prohibiting for ever under pain of death, membership in any anti-foreign society.

2) Edicts of the 13th and 21st February, 29th April and 19th August, 1901, enumerating the punishments inflicted on the guilty.

3) Edict of the 19th August, 1901, prohibiting examinations in all cities where foreigners were massacred or subjected to cruel treatment.

4) Edicts of the ist February, 1901, declaring all Governors-General, Governors, and provincial or local officials responsible for order in their respective districts, and that in case of new anti-foreign troubles or other infractions of the Treaties which shall not be immediately repressed and the authors of which shall not have been punished, these officials shall be immediately dismissed without possibility of being given new functions or new honours.

The Chinese Government has agreed to negotiate the amendments deemed necessary by the foreign Governments to the Treaties of Commerce and Navigation and the other subjects concerning commercial relations with the object of facilitating them.

At present, and as a result of the stipulation contained in Article 6 concerning the indemnity, the Chinese Government agrees to assist in the improvement of the courses of the Rivers Peiho and Whang-poo, as stated below.—

1) The works for the improvement of the navigability of the Peiho, begun in 1898 with the co-operation of the Chinese Government, have been resumed under the direction of an International Commission. As soon as the Administration of Tien-tsin shall have been handed back to the Chinese Government it will be in a position to be represented on this Commission, and will pay each year a sum of 60,000 Haikwan taels for maintaining the works.

2) A Conservancy Board, charged with the management and control of the works for straightening the Whangpoo and the improvement of the course of that river, is hereby created.

The Board shall consist of members representing the interests of the Chinese Government and those of foreigners in the shipping trade of Shanghai.

The expenses incurred for the works and the general management of the undertaking are estimated at the annual sum of 460,000 Haikwan taels for the first twenty years. This sum shall be supplied in equal portions by the Chinese Government and the foreign interests concerned.

An Imperial Edict of the 24th July, 1901, reformed the Office of Foreign Affairs, Tsung-li Yamen, on the lines indicated by the Powers, that is to say, transformed it into a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wai Wu Pu, which takes precedence over the six other Ministries of State; the same Edict appointed the principal Members of this Ministry.

An agreement has also been reached concerning the modification of Court ceremonial as regards the reception of foreign Representatives, and has been the subject of several notes from the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, the substance of which is embodied in a Memorandum herewith annexed.

Finally, it is expressly understood that as regards the declarations specified above and the annexed documents originating with the foreign Plenipotentiaries, the French text only is authoritative.

The Chinese Government having thus complied to the satisfaction of the Powers with the conditions laid down in the above-mentioned note of the 22nd December, 1900, the Powers have agreed to accede to the wish of China to terminate the situation created by the disorders of the summer of 1900. In consequence thereof, the foreign Plenipotentiaries are authorized to declare in the names of their Governments that, with the exception of the Legation guards mentioned in Article VII, the international troops will completely evacuate the city of Peking on the 17th September, 1901, and, with the exception of the localities mentioned in Article IX, will withdraw from the Province of Chihli on the 22nd September, 1901.

The present final Protocol has been drawn up in twelve identical copies, and signed by all the Plenipotentiaries of the contracting countries. One copy shall be given to each of the foreign Plenipotentiaries, and one copy shall be given to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries.

大清欽命全權大臣便宜行事總理外務部事務和碩慶親王；
大清欽差全權大臣便宜行事太子太傅文華殿大學士北洋大臣直隸總督部堂一等肅毅伯李鴻章；

大德欽差駐扎中華便宜行事大臣穆默；
大奧欽差駐扎中華便宜行事全權大臣齊乾
大比欽差駐扎中華便宜行事全權大臣姚士登；
大日欽差駐扎中華全權大臣葛絡乾；
大美國欽差特辦議和事宜全權大臣柔克義；
大法欽差全權大臣駐扎中國京都總理本國事務便宜行事鮑渥；
大英欽差便宜行事全權大臣薩道義；
大義欽差駐扎中華大臣世襲侯爵薩爾瓦葛；
大日本國欽差全權大臣小村壽太郎；
大和欽差駐扎中華便宜行事全權大臣克羅伯；
大俄欽命全權大臣內廷大夫格爾思；

今日會同聲明，核定大清國按西曆一千九百年十二月二十二日，即中曆光緒二十六年十一月初一日文內各款，當經大清國大皇帝于西曆一千九百年十二月二十七日，即中曆光緒二十六年十一月初六日，降旨全行照允，足適諸國之意妥辦（附件一）。

（一）大德國欽差男爵克大臣被戕害一事，前於西曆本年六月初九日，即中曆四月二十三日奉諭旨附件二，欽派醇親王載澧為頭等專使大臣，赴大德國大皇帝前，代表大清國大皇帝暨國家惋惜之意。醇親王已遵旨於西曆本年七月十二日，即中曆五月二十七日自北京起程。
（二）大清國國家業已聲明，在遇害處所豎立銘志之碑，與克大臣品位相配，列敘大清國大皇帝惋惜凶事之旨，書以辣丁德漢各文。前於西曆本年七月二十二日，即中曆六月初七日，經大清國欽差全權大臣，文致大德國欽差全權大臣附件三，現於遇害處所，建立牌坊一座，足滿街衢，已於西曆本年六月二十五日，即中曆五月初十日興工。

（一）懲辦傷害諸國國家及人民之首禍諸臣，將西曆本年二月十三、二十一等日，即中曆上年十二月二十五、本年正月初三等日，先後降旨所定罪名開列於後附件四、五、六：端郡王載漪、輔國公載瀾均定斬監候罪名，又約定，如皇上以為應加恩貸其一死，即發往新疆永遠監禁，永不減免。莊親王載勳、都察院左都禦史英年、刑部尚書趙舒翹均定為賜令自盡。山西巡撫毓賢、禮部尚書啟秀、刑部左侍郎徐承煜均定為即行正法。協辦大學士·吏部尚書剛毅、大學士徐桐、前四川總督李秉衡均已身故，追奪原官，即行革職。又兵部尚書徐用儀、戶部尚書立山、吏部左侍郎許景澄、內閣學士兼禮部侍郎銜聯元、太常寺卿袁昶，因上年力駁殊悖諸國義法極惡之罪被害，於西曆本年二月十三日，即中曆上年十二月二十五日，奉上諭開復原官，以示昭雪附件七。莊親王載勳已於西曆本年二月二十一日，即中曆正月初三日；英年趙舒翹已於二十四日，即初六日，均自盡。毓賢已於二十二日，即初四日，啟秀徐承煜已於二十六日，即初八日，均正法。又西曆本年二月十三日，上諭將甘肅提督董福祥革職，俟應得罪名定讞懲辦。西曆本年四月二十九、六月初三、八月十九等日，即中曆三月十一、四月十七、七月初六等日，先後降旨將上年夏間凶慘案內，所有承認獲咎之各外省官員分別懲辦。
（二）西曆本年八月十九日，即中曆二十七年七月初六日，上諭將諸國人民遇害被虐之城鎮，停止文武各等考試五年附件八。

因大日本國使館書記生杉山彬被害，大清國大皇帝從優榮之典，已於西曆本年六月十八日，即中曆五月初三日，降旨簡派戶部侍郎那桐為專使大臣，赴大日本國大皇帝前，代表大清國大皇帝及國家惋惜之意附件九。

大清國國家允定在於諸國被汙瀆及挖掘各墳塋，建立滌垢雪侮之碑，已與諸國全權大臣會同商定，其碑由各該國使館督建，並由中國國家付給估算各費銀兩。京師一帶每處一萬兩，外省每處五千兩，此項銀兩業已付清。茲將建碑之墳塋，開列清單附後附件十。

大清國國家允定不準將軍火暨專為製造軍火各種器料運入中國境內，已於西曆本年八月二十五日，即中曆二十七年七月十二日，降旨禁止進口二年，嗣後如諸國以為有仍應續禁之處，亦可降旨將二年之限續展附件十一。

按照西曆本年五月二十九日，即中曆四月十二日上諭，大清國大皇帝允定，付諸國償款海關銀四百五十兆兩。此款系西曆一千九百年十二月二十二日，即中曆光緒二十六年十一月初一日條款內第六款所載之各國各會各人及中國人民之賠償總數附件十二。
（甲）此四百五十兆系照海關銀兩市價易為金款，此市價按諸國各金錢之價易金如左：海關銀一兩，即德國三馬克零五五，即奧國三克勒尼五九五，即美國圓零七四二，即法國三佛郎克七五，即英國三先零，即日本一圓四零七，即荷蘭國一弗樂林七九六，即俄國一魯布四一二，俄國魯布按金平算，即十七多理亞四二四。此四百五十兆按年息四厘，正本由中國分三十九年按後附之表各章清還附件十三。本息用金付給，或按應還日期之市價易金付給，還本於一千九百零二年正月初一日起，一千九百四十年終止。還本各款應按每屆一年付還，初次定於一千九百零三年正月初一日付還，利息由一千九百零一年七月初一日起算。惟中國國家亦可將所欠首六個月至一千九百零一半十二月三十一日之息，展在自一千九百零二年正月初一日起，於三年內付還。但所展息款之利，亦應按年四厘付清。又利息每屆六個月付給，初次定於一千九百零二年七月初一日付給。
（乙）此欠款一切事宜，均在上海辦理如後，諸國各派銀行董事一名，會同將所有由該管之中國官員付給之本利總數收存，分給有干涉者，該銀行出付回執。
（丙）由中國國家將全數保票一紙，支付駐京諸國欽差領銜大臣手內。此保票以後分作零票，每票上各由中國特派之官員畫押。此節以及發票一切事宜，應由以上所述之銀行董事，各遵本國飭令而行。
（丁）付還保票財源各進款，應每月給銀行董事收存。
（戊）所定承擔保票之財源開列於後：一、新關各進款俟前已作為擔保之借款各本利付給之後餘剩者，又進口貨稅增至切實值百抽五，將所增之數加之，所有向例進口免稅各貨，除外國運來之米及各雜色糧面，並金銀以及金銀各錢外，均應列入切實值百抽五貨內。二、所有常關各進款，在各通商日岸之常關均歸新關管理。三、所有鹽政各進項，除歸還前泰西借款一宗外，餘剩一併歸入。至進口貨稅增至切實值百抽五，諸國現允可行，惟須二端：一、將現在照估價抽收進口各稅，凡能改者，皆當急速改為按件抽稅幾何。定辦改稅一層如後：為估算貨價之基，應以一千八百九十七、八、九三年卸貨時各貨牽算價值，乃開除進口稅及雜費總數之市價。其未改以前各該稅，仍照估價徵收。二、北河黃浦兩水路均應改善，中國國家即應撥款相助。增稅一層，俟此條款畫押日兩個月後，即行開辦。除在此畫押日期後至遲十日已在途間之貨外，概不得免抽。

大清國國家允定各使館境界以為專與住用之處，並獨由使館管理，中國民人概不准在界內居住，亦可自行防守。使館界線於附件之圖上標明如後附件十四：東面之線系崇文門大街，圖上十、十一、十二等字，北面圖上系五、六、七、八、九、十等字之線，西面圖上系一、二、三、四、五等字之線，南面圖上系十二、一等字之線，此線循城牆南址隨城垛而畫。按照西曆一千九百零一年正月十六日，即中曆上年十一月二十六日文內後附之條款，中國國家應允諸國分應自主，常留兵隊分保使館。

大清國國家應允將大沽炮臺及有礙京師至海通道之各礮台，一律削平，現已設法照辦。

按照西曆一千九百零一年正月十六日，即中曆上年十一月二十六日文內後附之條款，中國國家應允由諸國分應主辦會同酌定數處，留兵駐守，以保京師至海通道無斷絕之虞。今諸國駐守之處，系黃村郎坊楊村天津軍糧城坡沽炮臺唐山灤州昌黎秦皇島山海關。

大清國國家允定兩年之久，在各府廳州縣將以後所述之上諭頒行佈告：
一、西曆本年二月初一日，即中曆上年十二月十三日，上諭以永禁或設或入與諸國仇敵之會，違者皆斬附件十五。
二、西曆本年二月十三、二十一、四月二十九、八月十九等日，即中曆上年十二月二十五、本年正月初三、三月十一、七月初六等日，上諭一道，犯罪之人如何懲辦之處，均一一載明。
三、西曆本年八月十九日，即中曆七月初六日，上諭以諸國人民遇害被虐各城鎮，停止文武各等考試。
四、西曆本年二月初一日，即中曆上年十二月十三日，上諭以各省督撫文武大吏暨有司各官，於所屬境內均有保平安之責。如複滋傷害諸國人民之事，或再有違約之行，必須立時彈壓懲辦，否則該管之員，即行革職，永不敘用，亦不得開脫別給獎敘附件十六。以上諭旨，現於中國全境慚次張貼。

大清國國家允定將通商行船各條約內，諸國視為應行商改之處，及有關通商各他事宜，均行議商，以期妥善簡易。現按照第六款賠償事宜，約定中國國家應允襄辦改善北河黃浦兩水路，其襄辦各節如左：
一、北河改善河道，在一千八百九十八年會同中國國家所興各工，近由諸國派員重修，一俟治理天津事務交還之後，即可由中國國家派員與諸國所派之員會辦。中國國家應付海關銀每年六萬兩，以養其工。
二、現設立黃浦河道局，經管整理改善水道各工，所派該局各員，均代中國暨諸國保守在滬所有通商之利益。預估後二十年該局各工及經營各費，應每年支用海關銀四十六萬兩，此數平分，半由中國國家付給，半由外國各干涉者出資。該局員差並權責及進款之詳細各節，皆於後附檔內列明附件十七。

西曆本年七月二十四日，即中曆六月初九日，降旨將總理各國事務衙門，按照諸國酌定改為外務部，班列六部之前，此上諭內已簡派外務部各王大臣矣附件十八。且變通諸國欽差大臣覲見禮節，均已商定，由中國全權大臣屢次照會在案，此照會在後附之節略內述明附件十九。
茲特為議明以上所述各語，及後附諸國全權大臣所發之文牘，均系以法文為憑。大清國國家既如此，按以上所述，西曆一千九百年十二月二十二日，即中曆光緒二十六年十一月初一日文內存款，足適諸國之意妥辦，則中國願將一千九百年夏間變亂所生之局勢完結，諸國亦照允隨行。是以諸國全權大臣，現奉各本國政府之命，代為聲明，除第七款所述之防守使館兵隊外，諸國兵隊即於西曆一千九百零一年九月十七日，即中曆光緒二十七年八月初五日，全由東城撤退；並除第九款所述各處外，亦於西曆一千九百零一年九月二十二日，即中曆光緒二十七年八月初十日由直隸省撤退。
今將以上條款繕定同文十二份，均由諸中國全權大臣畫押，諸國全權大臣各存一份，中國全權大臣收存一份。

一千九百零一年九月初七日
光緒二十七年七月二十五日
在北京定立

In Chinese, the Boxer Protocol is also called Peking Protocol (Beijing yidingshu 北京議定書), likewise in Japanese: Pekin giteisho 北京議定書.

Treaty of Portsmouth

The Emperor of Japan on the one part, and the Emperor of all the Russias, on the other part, animated by a desire to restore the blessings of peace, have resolved to conclude a treaty of peace, and have for this purpose named their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say, for his Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Baron Komura Jutaro, Jusami, Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, and his Excellency Takahira Kogoro, Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, his Minister to the United States, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, his Excellency Sergius Witte, his Secretary of State and President of the Committee of Ministers of the Empire of Russia, and his Excellency Baron Roman Rosen, Master of the Imperial Court of Russia, his Majesty's Ambassador to the United States, who, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good and due form, and concluded the following articles:

There shall henceforth be peace and amity between their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias, and between their respective States and subjects.

The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military and economical interests engages neither to obstruct nor interfere with measures for guidance, protection and control which the Imperial Government of Japan may find necessary to take in Korea. It is understood that Russian subjects in Korea shall be treated in exactly the same manner as the subjects and citizens of other foreign Powers; that is to say, they shall be placed on the same footing as the subjects and citizens of the most favored nation. It is also agreed that, in order to avoid causes of misunderstanding, the two high contracting parties will abstain on the Russian-Korean frontier from taking any military measure which may menace the security of Russian or Korean territory.

First. — To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, in conformity with the provisions of the additional article I annexed to this treaty, and,

Second. — To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria now in occupation, or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the territory above mentioned.

The Imperial Government of Russia declares that it has not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in the impairment of Chinese sovereignty, or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.

Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce or industry of Manchuria.

The Imperial Russian Government transfers and assigns to the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Talien and the adjacent territorial waters, and all rights, privileges and concessions connected with or forming part of such lease, and it also transfers and assigns to the Imperial Government of Japan all public works and properties in the territory affected by the above-mentioned lease.

The two contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.

The Imperial Government of Japan, on its part, undertakes that the proprietary rights of Russian subjects in the territory above referred to shall be perfectly respected.

The Imperial Russian Government engages to transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, without compensation and with the consent of the Chinese Government, the railway between Chang-chunfu and Kuanchangtsu and Port Arthur, and all the branches, together with all the rights, privileges and properties appertaining thereto in that region, as well as all the coal mines in said region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway. The two high contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Government of China mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.

Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and nowise for strategic purposes. It is understood that this restrictiction does not apply to the railway in the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.

The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia with the view to promote and facilitate intercourse and traffic will as soon as possible conclude a separate convention for the regulation of their connecting railway services in Manchuria.

The Imperial Russian Government cedes to the Imperial Government of Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern portion of the Island of Saghalin and all the islands adjacent thereto and the public works and properties thereon. The fiftieth degree of north latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded territory. The exact alignment of such territory shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the additional article II annexed to this treaty.

Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct in their respective possessions on the Island of Saghalin or the adjacent islands any fortification or other similar military works. They also respectively engage not to take any military measures which may impede the free navigation of the Strait of La Perouse and the Strait of Tartary.

It is reserved to Russian subjects, inhabitants of the territory ceded to Japan, to sell their real property and retire to their country, but if they prefer to remain in the ceded territory they will be maintained protected in the full exercise of their industries and rights of property on condition of submitting to the Japanese laws and jurisdiction. Japan shall have full liberty to withdraw the right of residence in or to deport from such territory of any inhabitants who labor under political or administrative disability. She engages, however, that the proprietary rights of such inhabitants shall be fully respected.

Russia engages to arrange with Japan for granting to Japanese subjects rights of fishery along the coasts of the Russian possession in the Japan, Okhotsk and Bering Seas.

It is agreed that the foregoing engagement shall not affect rights already belonging to Russian or foreign subjects in those regions.

The treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and Russia having been annulled by the war the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia engage to adopt as a basis for their commercial relations pending the conclusion of a new treaty of commerce and navigation the basis of the treaty which was in force previous to the present war, the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing of the most favored nation, in which are included import and export duties, customs formalities, transit and tonnage dues and the admission and treatment of agents, subjects and vessels of one country in the territories of the other.

As soon as possible after the present treaty comes in force all prisoners of war shall be reciprocally restored. The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia shall each appoint a special commissioner to take charge of the prisoners. All prisoners in the hands of one Government shall be delivered to and be received by the commissioner of the other Government or by his duly authorized representative in such convenient numbers and at such convenient ports of the delivering State as such delivering State shall notify in advance to the commissioner of the receiving State.

The Governments of Japan and Russia shall present each other as soon as possible after the delivery of the prisoners is completed with a statement of the direct expenditures respectively incurred by them for the care and maintenance of the prisoner from the date of capture or surrender and up to the time of death or delivery. Russia engages to repay as soon as possible after the exchange of statement as above provided the difference between the actual amount so expended by Japan and the actual amount similarly disbursed by Russia.

The present treaty shall be ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias. Such ratification shall be with as little delay as possible, and in any case no later than fifty days from the date of the signature of the treaty, to be announced to the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia respectively through the French Minister at Tokio and the Ambassador of the United States at St. Petersburg, and from the date of the latter of such announcements shall in all its parts come into full force. The formal exchange of ratifications shall take place at Washington as soon as possible.

The present treaty shall be signed in duplicate in both the English and French languages. The texts are in absolute conformity, but in case of a discrepancy in the interpretation the French text shall prevail.

In conformity with the provisions of articles 3 and 9 of the treaty of the peace between Japan and Russia of this date the undersigned plenipotentiaries have concluded the following additional articles:

The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia mutually engage to commence the withdrawal of their military forces from the territory of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately after the treaty of peace comes into operation, and within a period of eighteen months after that date the armies of the two countries shall be completely withdrawn from Manchuria, except from the leased territory of the Liaotung Peninsula. The forces of the two countries occupying the front positions shall first be withdrawn.

The high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria. The number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per kilometre and within that maximum number the commanders of the Japanese and Russian armies shall by common accord fix the number of such guards to be employed as small as possible while having in view the actual requirements.

The commanders of the Japanese and Russian forces in Manchuria shall agree upon the details of the evacuation in conformity with the above principles and shall take by common accord the measures necessary to carry out the evacuation as soon as possible, and in any case not later than the period of eighteen months.

As soon as possible after the present treaty comes into force a committee of delimitation composed of an equal number of members is to be appointed by the two high contracting parties which shall on the spot mark in a permanent manner the exact boundary between the Japanese and Russian possessions on the Island of Saghalin. The commission shall be bound so far as topographical considerations permit to follow the fiftieth parallel of north latitude as the boundary line, and in case any deflections from that line at any points are found to be necessary compensation will be made by correlative deflections at other points. It shall also be the duty of the said commission to prepare a list and a description of the adjacent islands included in the cession, and finally the commission shall prepare and sign maps showing the boundaries of the ceded territory. The work of the commission shall be subject to the approval of the high contracting parties.

The foregoing additional articles are to be considered ratified with the ratification of the treaty of peace to which they are annexed.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and affixed seals to the present treaty of peace.

Done at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, this fifth day of the ninth month of the thirty-eighth year of the Meiji, corresponding to the twenty-third day of August, one thousand nine hundred and five (September 5, 1905).

日本國皇帝陛下及全俄國皇帝陛下，欲使兩國及兩國之人民回復平和之幸福，決定訂立講和條約，是以日本國皇帝陛下特派外務部大臣從三位勳一等男爵小村壽太郎及駐紮美國待命全權公使從三份勳一等高平小五郎，全俄國皇帝陛下特派內閣總理大臣威特及駐紮美國特命全權大使俄國御前大臣羅善，為全權委員，各將所奉全權文憑校閱，認明懼屬妥善，會上訂立各條款開列於下：

日本國至帝陛下與全俄國皇帝陛下間，及兩國並兩國臣民間，當和平親睦。

俄國政府承認日本國于韓國之政治軍事經濟上均有卓絕之利益，加指導保護監理等事，日本政府視為必要者即可措置，不得阻礙干涉。在韓國之俄國臣民，均應按照最惠國之臣民一律看待，不得歧視。
兩締約國為避一切誤解之原因起見，彼此同意于俄韓兩國交界間不得執軍事上之措置，致侵迫俄韓兩國領土之安全。

日俄兩國互相約定各事如下；
一、除遼東半島租借權所及之地域不計外，所有在滿洲之兵，當按本條約附約第一款所定，由兩國同時全數撤退；
二、除前記之地域外，現被日俄兩國軍隊佔領及管理之滿洲全部，交還中國接收，施行政務；俄國政府聲明在滿洲之領土上利益，或優先的讓與，或專屬的讓與，有侵害中國主權及有違機會均等主義各，一概無之。

日俄兩國彼此約定，凡中國在滿洲為發達商務工業起見，所有一切辦法列國視為當然者，不得阻礙。

俄國政府以中國政府之允許，將旅順口、大連灣並其附近領土領水之租借權內一部份之一切權利及所讓與者，轉移與日本政府，俄國政府又將該租界疆域內所造有一切公共營造物及財產，均移讓於日本政府。
兩締約國互約，前條所定者，須商請中國政府允諾。
日本政府允將居住前開各地內之俄國臣民之財產權，當完全尊重。

俄國政府允將由長春(寬城子)至旅順口之鐵路及一切支路，並在該地方鐵道內所附屬之一切權利財產，以及在該處鐵道內附屬之一切煤礦，或為鐵道利益起見所經營之一切煤礦，不受補償，且以清國政府允許者均移讓於日本政府。
兩締約國互約前條所定者，須商請中國政府承諾。

日俄兩國約在滿洲地方，各自經營專以商工業為目的之鐵道，決不經營以軍事為目的之鐵道。
但遼東半島租借權效力所及地域之鐵道不在此限。

日本政府及俄國政府，為圖來往輸運均臻便捷起見，妥訂滿洲接續鐵道營業章程，務須從速另訂別約。

俄國政府允將庫頁島南部及其附近一切島嶼，並各該處之一切公共營造物及財產之主權，永遠讓與日本政府；其讓與地域之北方境界，以北緯五十度為起點，至該處確界須按照本條約附約第二條所載為准。
日俄兩國彼此商允在庫頁島及其附近島嶼之各自所屬領地內，不築造堡壘及類於堡壘之軍事上工作物；又兩國約定凡軍事上之措置有礙于宗穀海峽及韃靼海峽航行自由者，不得施設。

居住於讓與日本國地域內之俄國人民，可出賣財產，退還本國；若仍欲留住該地域時，當服從日本國之法律及管轄權。至該住民經營事業行使財產，當由日本國完全保護，其有不安本分者，日本國亦當撤回其居住權並放逐之，但該住民之財產當完全尊重。

俄國當與口本國協定允准日木國臣民在日本海、鄂霍次克海、白今海之俄國所屬沿岸一帶有經營漁業之權。
前項約束，經雙方同意，不得影響於俄國及週邊臣民在彼處應有之權利。

日俄通商航海條約，因此次戰爭作廢，日本國政府及俄國政府允諾以開戰前所施行之條約為本，另訂通商航海新約；其未定以前，所有進口稅、出口稅、關章、子口稅、船鈔，並代表臣民船舶，由此國進彼國領土或由彼國進此國領土時之許可及待遇，均照相待最優之國辦理。

本條約一經施行，速將一切俘虜彼此交還，由日俄兩政府各派接收俘虜之特別委員一名專司其事，彼此送還時，應由交犯國將在該國某處口岸可交還人數若干，預先知照收犯國，即由兩國專派員或該員所派之有權代表員照以前通知之口岸人數，彼此交收。
日俄兩國政府一俟交還俘虜完畢後，將虜犯自被擄或投降之日起至死亡或交換之日止，所有因照管：及留養該犯之一切費用細帳互相交換後，俄國政府應將日本實用數目中，除去俄國實用數目，尚差若干，當由俄國從速償還日本。

本條約當由日本國皇帝陛下及全俄國皇帝陛下批准，從速在華盛頓互換，自簽字之日起，無論如何當於五十日以內，由駐紮日本之法國公使及駐紮俄國之美國大使，各通知駐在國政府，宣佈之後，本條約即全部生效。

本條約繕就英文法文各兩本，分別簽字，其本文雖全然符合，設有解釋不同之處，以法文為准。為此兩國全權委員署名蓋印，以昭信守。

口俄兩國按照本口所訂講和條約第三條及第九條所載，由兩國全權委員另立附約如下，

此條應附於正約第三條。日俄兩國政府彼此商允，一候講和條約施行後即將滿洲地域內軍隊同時開始撤退；自講和條約施行之日起，以十八個月為限，所有兩國在滿洲之軍隊除遼東半島租借地外，一律撤退。
兩國佔領陣地之前敵軍隊當先行撤退。
兩訂約國可留置守備兵保護滿洲各自之鐵道線路，至守備兵人數，每一公里不過十五名之數，由此數內，日俄兩國軍司令官可因時酌減，以至少足用之數為率。
滿洲之日本國及俄國軍司令官，可遵照以上所定，協商撤兵細目，並以必要之方法從速實行撤兵，無論如何不得逾十八個月之限。

此條應附正約第九條。兩訂約國一俟本約施行後須從速各派數目相等之劃界委員，將庫頁島之俄日兩國所屬確界劃清，以垂久遠。劃界委員應就地形以北緯五十度為境界線，倘遇有不能直劃必須偏出緯度以外時，則偏出緯度若干，當另在他處偏入緯度內若干以補償之。至讓界附近之島嶼，該委員等應備表及詳細書，並將所劃讓地界線繪圖簽名，呈由兩訂約國政府批准。

In Japanese, the Treaty of Portsmouth is called Pōtsumasu Jōyaku ポーツマス条約 or Nichi Ro Kōwa Jōyaku 日露講和条約.

Japan's "21 Demands" to China

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous to maintain the general peace in the Far East and to strengthen the relations of amity and good neighbourhood existing between the two countries, agree to the following articles:

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, in view of the fact that the Chinese Government has always recognized the predominant position of Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, having regard to the close relations existing between Japanese capitalists and the Han-Yeh-Ping Company and desiring to promote the common interests of the two nations, agree to the following articles:

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China, agree to the following article:

第二號，關於「日本國在南滿洲及東部內蒙古享有優越地位」，共七款：

In Japanese the Twenty-One Demands are called Taika Nijūikkajō Yōkyū 対華二十一ヵ条要求.

Negotiations between Japan and China’s Yuan Shikai administration in the aftermath of the Twenty-One Demands resulted in an agreement which did not include the demands in Group 5, signed on May 25, 1915 under the name "Sino-Japanese Agreement" (Zhong Ri xinyue 中日新約) aka "Treaties of the Fourth Year of the Republic" (min si tiaoyue 民四條約), comprising the "Treaty Respecting the Province of Shandong" (guanyu Shandong zhi tiaoyue 關於山東之條約), the "Treaty Respecting Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia" (guanyu nan Manzhou ji dongbu Neimenggu zhi tiaoyue 關於南滿洲及東部內蒙古之條約), the "Exchange of Notes Respecting the Matter of Hanyehping" (guanyu Hanyeping shixiang zhi huanwen 關於漢冶萍事項之換文), the "Exchange of Notes Respecting the Restoration of the Leased Territory of Jiaozhou Bay" (guanyu jiaohuan Jiaoao zhi huanwen 關於交還膠澳之換文), and the "Exchange of Notes Respecting the Fujian Question" (guanyu Fujian shixiang zhi huanwen 關於福建事項之換文).

Treaty of Versailles ✄

Germany renounces in favour of China all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on September 7, 1901, and from all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto. She likewise renounces in favour of China any claim to indemnities accruing thereunder subsequent to March 14, 1917.

From the coming into force of the present Treaty the High Contracting Parties shall apply, in so far as concerns them respectively:

1. The Arrangement of August 29, 1902, regarding the new Chinese customs tariff;

2. The Arrangement of September 27, 1905, regarding Whang-Poo (黄浦), and the provisional supplementary arrangement of April 4, 1912. China, however, will no longer be bound to grant to Germany the advantages or privileges which she allowed Germany under these Arrangements.

Subject to the provisions of Section VIII of this Part, Germany cedes to China all the buildings, wharves and pontoons, barracks, forts, arms and munitions of war, vessels of all kinds, wireless telegraphy installations and other public property belonging to the German Government, which are situated or may be in the German Concessions at Tientsin (天津) and Hankow (漢口) or elsewhere in Chinese territory. It is understood, however, that premises used as diplomatic or consular residences or offices are not included in the above cession, and, furthermore, that no steps shall be taken by the Chinese Government to dispose of the German public and private property situated within the so-called Legation Quarter (東交民巷) at Peking (北京) without the consent of the Diplomatic Representatives of the Powers which, on the coming into force of the present Treaty, remain Parties to the Final Protocol of September 7, 1901.

Germany undertakes to restore to China within twelve months from the coming into force of the present Treaty all the astronomical instruments which her troops in 1900-1901 carried away from China, and to defray all expenses which may be incurred in effecting such restoration, including the expenses of dismounting, packing, transporting, insurance and installation in Peking.

Germany agrees to the abrogation of the leases from the Chinese Government under which the German Concessions at Hankow and Tientsin are now held. China, restored to the full exercise of her sovereign rights in the above areas, declares her intention of opening them to international residence and trade. She further declares that the abrogation of the leases under which these concessions are now held shall not affect the property rights of nationals of Allied and Associated Powers who are holders of lots in these concessions.

Germany waives all claims against the Chinese Government or against any Allied or Associated Government arising out of the internment of German nationals in China and their repatriation. She equally renounces all claims arising out of the capture and condemnation of German ships in China, or the liquidation, sequestration or control of German properties, rights and interests in that country since August 14, 1917. This provision, however, shall not affect the rights of the parties interested in the proceeds of any such liquidation, which shall be governed by the provisions of Part X (Economic Clauses) of the present Treaty.

Germany renounces in favour of the Government of His Britannic Majesty the German State property in the British Concession at Shameen (沙面) at Canton (廣州). She renounces in favour of the French and Chinese Governments conjointly the property of the German school situated in the French Concession at Shanghai (上海).

Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title and privileges particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow (膠州), railways, mines and submarine cables which she acquired in virtue of the Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung (山東). All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway (膠濟鐵路), including its branch lines together with its subsidiary property of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and material for the exploitation of the mines, are and remain acquired by Japan, together with all rights and privileges attaching thereto. The German State submarine cables from Tsingtao (青島) to Shanghai and from Tsingtao to Chefoo (芝罘), with all the rights, privileges and properties attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and encumbrances.

The movable and immovable property owned by the German State in the territory of Kiaochow, as well as all the rights which Germany might claim in consequence of the works or improvements made or of the expenses incurred by her, directly or indirectly, in connection with this territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and encumbrances.

Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and documents of every kind, wherever they may be, relating to the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial or other, of the territory of Kiaochow. Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of all treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the rights, title or privileges referred to in the two preceding Articles.

The Treaty of Versailles (in French: Traité de Versailles, in Chinese: Fanersai tiaoyue 凡爾賽條約 or Fanersai heyue 凡爾賽和約, in Japanese Verusaiyu Jōyaku ヴェルサイユ条約) was signed on June 28, 1919 during the Paris Peace Conference which took place between Jan. 18, 1919 and Jan. 21, 1920. Members of the Chinese delegation included Lou Tseng-tsiang (陸徵祥), Wellington Koo (顧維鈞), Thomas Wang (王正廷), Alfred Sao-ke Sze (施肇基), Wei Chen-zu (魏宸組), and Tsao Ju-lin (曹汝霖), leading members of the large Japanese delegation were Marquess Saionji Kinmochi (西園寺公望), Baron Makino Nobuaki (牧野伸顕), Viscount Chinda Sutemi (珍田捨巳), Matsui Keishirō (松井慶四郎), and Ijuin Hikokichi (伊集院彦吉). Signatories were the German Reich, the Allied Powers (France, the British Empire, Italy, Japan, and the United States) and other countries including Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hejaz (= today's Saudi Arabia), Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Siam (= today's Thailand), Uruguay, and Yugoslavia as as well as Australia, Canada, South Africa, India, and New Zealand as part of the British Empire. China's representatives refused to sign the treaty because many former German concessions in China were not returned but handed to Japan instead.

Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States

This treaty was signed at the International Conference of American States in Montevideo, Uruguay on December 26, 1933. It entered into force on December 26, 1934. The treaty discusses the definition and rights of statehood.

The Governments represented in the Seventh International Conference of American States:

Wishing to conclude a Convention on Rights and Duties of States, have appointed the following Plenipotentiaries:

United States of America: CORDELL HULL; ALEXANDER W. WEDDELL; J. REUBEN CLARK; J. BUTLER WRIGHT; SPRUILLE BRADEN; Miss SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE

Argentina: CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS; JUAN F. CAFFERATA; RAMON S. CASTILLO; CARLOS BREBBIA; ISIDORO RUIZ MORENO; LUIS A. PODESTA COSTA; RAUL PREBISCH; DANIEL ANTOKOLETZ

Uruguay: ALBERTO MANE; JUAN JOSE AMEZAGA; JOSE G. ANTUNA; JUAN CARLOS BLANCO; Senora SOFIA A. V. DE DEMICHELI; MARTIN R. ECHEGOYEN; LUIS ALBERTO DE HERRERA; PEDRO MANINI RIOS; MATEO MARQUES CASTRO; RODOLFO MEZZERA; OCTAVIO MORAT; LUIS MORQUIO; TEOFILO PINEYRO CHAIN; DARDO REGULES; JOSE SERRATO; JOSE PEDRO VARELA

Paraguay: JUSTO PASTOR BENITEZ; GERONIMO RIART; HORACIO A. FERNANDEZ; Senorita MARIA F. GONZALEZ

Mexico: JOSE MANUEL PUIG CASAURANC; ALFONSO REYES; BASILIO VADILLO; GENARO V. VASQUEZ; ROMEO ORTEGA; MANUEL J. SIERRA; EDUARDO SUAREZ

Guatemala: ALFREDO SKINNER KLEE; JOSE GONZALEZ CAMPO; CARLOS SALAZAR; MANUEL ARROYO

Brazil: AFRANIO DE MELLO FRANCO; LUCILLO A DA CUNHA BUENO; FRANCISCO LUIS DA SILVA CAMPOS; GILBERTO AMADO; CARLOS CHAGAS; SAMUEL RIBEIRO

Ecuador: AUGUSTO AGUIRRE APARICIO; HUMBERTO ALBORNOZ; ANTONIO PARRA; CARLOS PUIG VILASSAR; ARTURO SCARONE

Chile: MIGUEL CRUCHAGA TOCORNAL; OCTAVIO SENORET SILVA; GUSTAVO RIVERA; JOSE RAMON GUTIERREZ; FELIX NIETO DEL RIO; FRANCISCO FIGUEROA SANCHEZ; BENJAMIN COHEN

Who, after having exhibited their Full Powers, which were found to be in good and due order, have agreed upon the following:

The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a ) a permanent population; b ) a defined territory; c ) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.

The federal state shall constitute a sole person in the eyes of international law.

The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts.

The exercise of these rights has no other limitation than the exercise of the rights of other states according to international law.

States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity in their exercise. The rights of each one do not depend upon the power which it possesses to assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence as a person under international law.

The fundamental rights of states are not susceptible of being affected in any manner whatsoever.

The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law. Recognition is unconditional and irrevocable.

The recognition of a state may be express or tacit. The latter results from any act which implies the intention of recognizing the new state.

No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.

The jurisdiction of states within the limits of national territory applies to all the inhabitants.

Nationals and foreigners are under the same protection of the law and the national authorities and the foreigners may not claim rights other or more extensive than those of the nationals.

The primary interest of states is the conservation of peace. Differences of any nature which arise between them should be settled by recognized pacific methods.

The contracting states definitely establish as the rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure. The territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever even temporarily.

The present Convention shall not affect obligations previously entered into by the High Contracting Parties by virtue of international agreements.

The present Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uruguay shall transmit authentic certified copies to the governments for the aforementioned purpose of ratification. The instrument of ratification shall be deposited in the archives of the Pan American Union in Washington, which shall notify the signatory governments of said deposit. Such notification shall be considered as an exchange of ratifications.

The present Convention will enter into force between the High Contracting Parties in the order in which they deposit their respective ratifications.

The present Convention shall remain in force indefinitely but may be denounced by means of one year's notice given to the Pan American Union, which shall transmit it to the other signatory governments. After the expiration of this period the Convention shall cease in its effects as regards the party which denounces but shall remain in effect for the remaining High Contracting Parties.

The present Convention shall be open for the adherence and accession of the States which are not signatories. The corresponding instruments shall be deposited in the archives of the Pan American Union which shall communicate them to the other High Contracting Parties.

In witness whereof, the following Plenipotentiaries have signed this Convention in Spanish, English, Portuguese and French and hereunto affix their respective seals in the city of Montevideo, Republic of Uruguay, this 26th day of December, 1933.

The Delegation of the United States of America, in signing the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, does so with the express reservation presented to the Plenary Session of the Conference on December 22, 1933, which reservation reads as follows:

The Delegation of the United States, in voting "yes" on the final vote on this committee recommendation and proposal, makes the same reservation to the eleven articles of the project or proposal that the United States Delegation made to the first ten articles during the final vote in the full Commission, which reservation is in words as follows:

"The policy and attitude of the United States Government toward every important phase of international relationships in this hemisphere could scarcely be made more clear and definite than they have been made by both word and action especially since March 4. I [Secretary of State Cordell Hull, chairman of U.S. delegation] have no disposition therefore to indulge in any repetition or rehearsal of these acts and utterances and shall not do so. Every observing person must by this time thoroughly understand that under the Roosevelt Administration the United States Government is as much opposed as any other government to interference with the freedom, the sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes of the governments of other nations.

"In addition to numerous acts and utterances in connection with the carrying out of these doctrines and policies, President Roosevelt, during recent weeks, gave out a public statement expressing his disposition to open negotiations with the Cuban Government for the purpose of dealing with the treaty which has existed since 1903. I feel safe in undertaking to say that under our support of the general principle of non-intervention as has been suggested, no government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt Administration. I think it unfortunate that during the brief period of this Conference there is apparently not time within which to prepare interpretations and definitions of these fundamental terms that are embraced in the report. Such definitions and interpretations would enable every government to proceed in a uniform way without any difference of opinion or of interpretations. I hope that at the earliest possible date such very important work will be done. In the meantime in case of differences of interpretations and also until they (the proposed doctrines and principles) can be worked out and codified for the common use of every government, I desire to say that the United States Government in all of its international associations and relationships and conduct will follow scrupulously the doctrines and policies which it has pursued since March 4 which are embodied in the different addresses of President Roosevelt since that time and in the recent peace address of myself on the 15th day of December before this Conference and in the law of nations as generally recognized and accepted".

The delegates of Brazil and Peru recorded the following private vote with regard to article 11: "That they accept the doctrine in principle but that they do not consider it codifiable because there are some countries which have not yet signed the Anti-War Pact of Rio de Janeiro 4 of which this doctrine is a part and therefore it does not yet constitute positive international law suitable for codification".

Argentina: CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS; JUAN F. CAFFERATA; RAMON S. CASTILLO; I. Rulz MORENO; L. A. PODESTA COSTA; D. ANTOKOLETZ

Uruguay: A. MANE; JOSE PEDRO VARELA; MATEO MARQuEs CASTRO; DARDO REGULES; SOFIA ALVAREZ VIGNOLI DE DEMICIIELI; TEOFILO PINEYRO CHAIN; LUIS A. DE HERRERA; MARTIN R. EcnEcoYEN; JOSE G. ANTUNA; J. C. BLANCO; PEDRO MANINI RIOS; RODOLFO MEZZERA; OCTAVTO MORATO; LUIS MOROQUIO; JOSE SERRATO

Ecuador: A. AGUIRRE APARICIO; H. ALBORNOZ; ANTONIO PARRA V.; C. PUIG V.; ARTURO SCARONE

Chile: MIGUEL CRUCHAGA; J. RAMON GUTIERREZ; F. FIGUEROA; F. NIETO DEL RIO; B. COHEN

The "Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States" is translated as Mengteweiduo guojia quanli yiwu gongyue 蒙特維多國家權利義務公約 in Chinese.

The ROC's Declaration of War Against Japan

Japan's national policy has always aimed at the domination of Asia and mastery of the Pacific. For more than four years China has resolutely resisted Japan's aggression, regardless of suffering and sacrifice, in order not only to maintain her national independence and freedom but also to uphold international law and justice and to promote world peace and human happiness.

China is a peace-loving nation. In taking up arms in self-defense, China entertained the hope that Japan might yet realise the futility of her plans of conquest. Throughout the struggle all the other powers have shown the utmost forbearance likewise in the hope that Japan might one day repent and mend her ways in the interest of peace in the entire Pacific region.

Unfortunately Japan's aggressive capacities prove to be incorrigible. After her long and fruitless attempt to conquer China, Japan, far from showing any signs of penitence, has treacherously launched an attack on China's friends, the United States and Great Britain, thus extending the theater of her aggressive activities and making herself the arch-enemy of justice and world peace.

This latest act of aggression on the part of Japan lays bare her insatiable ambitions and has created a situation that no nation which believes in international good faith and human decency can tolerate.

The Chinese Government hereby formally declares war on Japan. The Chinese Government further declares that all treaties, conventions, agreements and contracts regarding relations between China and Japan are and remain null and void.

日本軍閥夙以征服亞洲，并獨霸太平洋為其國策。數年以來，中國不顧一切犧牲，繼續抗戰，其目的不僅在保衛中國之獨立生存，實欲打破日本之侵略野心，維護國際公法、正義及人類福利与世界和平，此中國政府屢經聲明者也。

中國為酷愛和平之民族，過去四年余之神圣抗戰，原期侵略者之日本于遭受實際之懲創后，終能反省。在此時期，各友邦亦极端忍耐，冀其悔禍，俾全太平洋之和平，得以維持。不料強暴成性之日本，執迷不悟，且更悍然向我英、美諸友邦幵釁，擴大其戰爭侵略行動，甘為破壞全人類和平与正義之戎首，逞其侵略無厭之野心。舉凡尊重信義之國家，咸屬忍無可忍。茲特正式對日宣戰，昭告中外，所有一切條約、協定、合同，有涉及中、日間之關系者，一律廢止，特此布告。

Declaration by United Nations

A Joint Declaration by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia.

Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter.

Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world,

(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war.

(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.

The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.

美利堅合衆國、大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國、蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯盟、中國、澳大利亞、比利時、加拿大、哥斯達黎加、古巴、捷克斯洛伐克、多米尼加共和國、薩爾瓦多、希臘、危地馬拉、海地、洪都拉斯、印度、盧森堡、荷蘭、新西蘭、尼加拉瓜、挪威、巴拿馬、波蘭、南非聯邦和南斯拉夫各國的聯合宣言。

本宣言簽字國政府，對于1941年8月14日美利堅合衆國總統和大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國首相多座聯合宣言稱爲大西洋憲章內所載宗旨與原則的共同方案也已表示贊同，

深信完全戰勝它們的敵對國對于保衛生命、自由、獨立和宗教自由並對于保全其本國和其他各國的人權和正義非常重要，同時它們現在正對力圖征服世界的野蠻和殘暴的力量從事共同的鬥爭，

（一）每一征服各自保證對各該政府作戰的三國同盟成員國及其附從者使用其全部資源，不論軍事的或經濟的。

（二）每一政府各自保證瘀斑宣言簽字國合作，並不與敵人締結單獨停戰協定或協約。

現在或可能將在戰勝希特勒主義的鬥爭中給予物質上援助和貢獻的其他國家得加入上述宣言。

Cairo Declaration

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Mr. Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa. The following general statement was issued:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.

"The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

"With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

羅斯福總統、蔣委員長、邱吉爾首相、偕同各該國軍事與外交顧問人員，在北非舉行會議，業已完畢，茲發表概括之聲明如下：

三國軍事方面人員關於今後對日作戰計畫，已獲得一致意見，我三大盟國決心以不鬆弛之壓力從海陸空各方面加諸殘暴之敵人，此項壓力已經在增長之中。我三大盟國此次進行戰爭之目的，在於制止及懲罰日本之侵略，三國決不為自己圖利，亦無拓展領土之意思。三國之宗旨，在剝奪日本自從一九一四年第一次世界大戰開始後在太平洋上所奪得或佔領之一切島嶼；在使日本所竊取於中國之領土，例如東北四省(2)、臺灣、澎湖群島等，歸還中華民國；其他日本以武力或貪欲所攫取之土地，亦務將日本驅逐出境；我三大盟國稔知朝鮮人民所受之奴隸待遇，決定在相當時期，使朝鮮自由與獨立。根據以上所認定之各項目標，並與其他對日作戰之聯合國(3)目標相一致，我三大盟國將堅忍進行其重大而長期之戰爭，以獲得日本之無條件投降。

The Cairo Conference was attended by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and ROC President Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 and took place Nov. 22–26, 1943. The Cairo Declaration (also called "Cairo Communique") was not a treaty, was not signed, and was released via radio broadcast on Dec. 1, 1943. It is called Kairo sengen カイロ宣言 in Japanese.

Convention on International Civil Aviation

Preamble

WHEREAS the future development of international civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can become a threat to the general security; and

WHEREAS it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that cooperation between nations and peoples upon which the peace of the world depends;

THEREFORE, the undersigned governments having agreed on certain principles and arrangements in order that international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically;

Part I. Air Navigation

CHAPTER 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION

CHAPTER II: FLIGHT OVER TERRITORY OF CONTRACTING STATES

CHAPTER III: NATIONALITY OF AIRCRAFT

CHAPTER IV: MEASURES TO FACILITATE AIR NAVIGATION

CHAPTER V: CONDITIONS TO BE FULFILLED WITH RESPECT TO AIRCRAFT

CHAPTER VI: INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES

Part II. The International Civil Aviation Organization

CHAPTER VII: THE ORGANIZATION

CHAPTER VIII: THE ASSEMBLY

CHAPTER IX: THE COUNCIL

CHAPTER X: AIR NAVIGATION COMMISSION

CHAPTER XI: PERSONNEL

CHAPTER XII: FINANCE

CHAPTER XIII: OTHER INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Part III. International Air Transport

CHAPTER XIV: INFORMATION AND REPORTS

CHAPTER XV: AIRPORTS AND OTHER AIR NAVIGATION FACILITIES

CHAPTER XVI: JOINT OPERATING ORGANIZATIONS AND POOLED SERVICES

Part IV. Final Provisions

CHAPTER XVII: OTHER AERONAUTICAL AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS

CHAPTER XVIII: DISPUTES AND DEFAULT

CHAPTER XIX: WAR

CHAPTER XX: ANNEXES

CHAPTER XXI: RATIFICATIONS, ADHERENCES, AMENDMENTS, AND DENUNCIATIONS

CHAPTER XXII: DEFINITIONS

Signature of Convention

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned plenipotentiaries, having been duly authorized, sign this Convention on behalf of their respective governments on the dates appearing opposite their signatures.

DONE at Chicago the seventh day of December 1944, in the English language. A text drawn up in the English, French, and Spanish languages, each of which shall be of equal authenticity, shall be open for signature at Washington, D. C. Both texts shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America, and certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to the governments of all the States which may sign or adhere to this Convention.

The Delegation of the Republic of Panama signs this Convention ad referendum, and subject to the following reservations:
1. Because of its strategic position and responsibility in the protection of the means of communication in its territory, which are of the utmost importance to world trade, and vital to the defense of the Western Hemisphere, the Republic of Panama reserves the right to take, with respect to all flights through the air space above territory, all measures which in its judgment may be proper for its own security or the protection of said means of communication.
2. The Republic of Panama understands that the technical annexes to which reference is made in the Convention constitute recommendations only, and not binding obligations.

The Convention on International Civil Aviation was called guoji minyong hangkong gongyue 國際民用航空公約 or Zhijiage gongyue 芝加哥公約 in Chinese. It went into effect on April 4, 1947, the same day the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was established.

The Convention was signed at the end of the International Civil Aviation Conference which took place from Nov. 1 to Dec. 7, 1944 in Chicago (USA). The following 55 countries were invited by the US to attend the conference: Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, the USSR (= Soviet Union), Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

The official ICAO website lists 52 countries sending delegations to the Chicago conference, and the Convention was signed by 54 countries. While most of the invited countries sent delegates to the conference and signed the Convention, please note some additional remarks about the following countries.

The Chinese delegation consisted of chairman Chang Kia-ngau 張嘉璈 (1889-1979, Jiangsu), Liu Chieh 劉鍇 (1907-1991, Guangdong) and Mow Pang-tsu 毛邦初 (1904-1987, Shanghai).

Agreements reached at the Yalta Conference

The Crimea Conference of the heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which took place from Feb. 4 to 11, came to the following conclusions:

1. That a United Nations conference on the proposed world organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25 April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.

(b) Such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1 March, 1945. (For this purpose, by the term "Associated Nations" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the Conference on world organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United State of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e., the Ukraine and White Russia.

3. That the United States Government, on behalf of the three powers, should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

4. That the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations conference should be as follows:

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic invite the Government of -------- to send representatives to a conference to be held on 25 April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco, in the United States of America, to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The above-named Governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks conference and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.'

"In the event that the Government of -------- desires in advance of the conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments."

It was agreed that the five nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to

(d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be place under trusteeship.

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the people of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter — the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live — the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived to them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require,

(b) to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples;

(c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measure necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order, under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. John Winant, and Mr. Fedor T. Gusev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be allocated France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.

On the Talks Between the Heads of Three Governments at the Crimean Conference on the Question of the German Reparations in Kind

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

(b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied reparation commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives — one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression, the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

"The Moscow reparation commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the Paragraph 2 should be 22 billion dollars and that 50 per cent should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The British delegation was of the opinion that, pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow reparation commission, no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow reparation commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the commission.

The conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the conference.

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional of Government National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

"The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions in territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course of the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference."

(a) That the Tito-Subasitch agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new government formed on the basis of the agreement.

(I) That the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and

(II) That legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly; and that this statement should be published in the communiqué of the conference.

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with Mr. Molotov in Moscow. Mr. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

The British delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

(b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.

Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.

The conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.

These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreaux Convention, and report to their Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.

The forgoing protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the Crimean Conference Feb. 11, 1945.

The leaders of the three great powers — the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain — have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved.

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:

(a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;

(b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored;

(c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria;

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to maintain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part, the Soviet Union expresses it readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Below are the Chinese and Japanese translations for the term "Yalta Conference".

Berlin Declaration

DECLARATION REGARDING THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY AND THE ASSUMPTION OF SUPREME AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

The German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air have been completely defeated and have surrendered unconditionally and Germany, which bears responsibility for the war, is no longer capable of resisting the will of the victorious Powers. The unconditional surrender of Germany has thereby been effected, and Germany has become subject to such requirements as may now or hereafter be imposed upon her.

There is no central Government or authority in Germany capable of accepting responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country and compliance with the requirements of the victorious Powers.

It is in these circumstances necessary, without prejudice to any subsequent decisions that may be taken respecting Germany, to make provision for the cessation of any further hostilities on the part of the German armed forces, for the maintenance of order in Germany and for the administration of the country, and to announce the immediate requirements with which Germany must comply.

The Representatives of the Supreme Commands of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the French Republic, hereinafter called the "Allied Representatives," acting by authority of their respective Governments and in the interests of the United Nations, accordingly make the following Declaration:

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority. The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of the said authority and powers does not affect the annexation of Germany.

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, will hereafter determine the boundaries of Germany or any part thereof and the status of Germany or of any area at present being part of German territory.

In virtue of the supreme authority and powers thus assumed by the four Governments, the Allied Representatives announce the following requirements arising from the complete defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany with which Germany must comply:

Germany, and all German military, naval and air authorities and all forces under German control shall immediately cease hostilities in all theatres of war against the forces of the United Nations on land, at sea and in the air.

(a) All armed forces of Germany or under German control, wherever they may be situated, including land, air, anti-aircraft and naval forces, the S.S., S.A. and Gestapo, and all other forces of auxiliary organisations equipped with weapons, shall be completely disarmed, handing over their weapons and equipment to local Allied Commanders or to officers designated by the Allied Representatives.

(b) The personnel of the formations and units of all the forces referred to in paragraph (a) above shall, at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Allied State concerned, be declared to be prisoners of war, pending further decisions, and shall be subject to such conditions and directions as may be prescribed by the respective Allied Representatives.

(c) All forces referred to in paragraph (a) above, wherever they may be, will remain in their present positions pending instructions from the Allied Representatives.

(d) Evacuation by the said forces of all territories outside the frontiers of Germany as they existed on the 31st December, 1937, will proceed according to instructions to be given by the Allied Representatives.

(e) Detachments of civil police to be armed with small arms only, for the maintenance of order and for guard duties, will be designated by the Allied Representatives.

(a) All aircraft of any kind or nationality in Germany or German-occupied or controlled territories or waters, military, naval or civil, other than aircraft in the service of the Allies, will remain on the ground, on the water or aboard ships pending further instructions.

(b) All German or German-controlled aircraft in or over territories or waters not occupied or controlled by Germany will proceed to Germany or to such other place or places as may be specified by the Allied Representatives.

(a) All German or German-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft, and merchant and other shipping, wherever such vessels may be at the time of this Declaration, and all other merchant ships of whatever nationality in German ports, will remain in or proceed immediately to ports and bases as specified by the Allied Representatives. The crews of such vessels will remain on board pending further instructions.

(b) All ships and vessels of the United Nations, whether or not title has been transferred as the result of prize court or other proceedings, which are at the disposal of Germany or under German control at the time of this Declaration, will proceed at the dates and to the ports or bases specified by the Allied Representatives.

(a) All or any of the following articles in the possession of the German armed forces or under German control or at German disposal will be held intact and in good condition at the disposal of the Allied Representatives, for such purposes and at such times and places as they may prescribe:

(i) all arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war materials;

(ii) all naval vessels of all classes, both surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft and all merchant shipping, whether afloat, under repair or construction, built or building;

(iii) all aircraft of all kinds, aviation and anti-aircraft equipment and devices;

(iv) all transportation and communications facilities and equipment, by land, water or air;

(v) all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments;

(vi) all factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions, designed or intended to produce or to facilitate the production or use of the articles, materials, and facilities referred to in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) above or otherwise to further the conduct of war.

(b) At the demand of the Allied Representatives the following will be furnished:

(i) the labour, services and plant required for the maintenance or operation of any of the six categories mentioned in paragraph (a) above; and

(ii) any information or records that may be required by the Allied Representatives in connection with the same.

(c) At the demand of the Allied Representatives all facilities will be provided for the movement of Allied troops and agencies, their equipment and supplies, on the railways, roads and other land communications or by sea, river or air. All means of transportation will be maintained in good order and repair, and the labour, services and plant necessary therefor will be furnished.

(a) The German authorities will release to the Allied Representatives, in accordance with the procedure to be laid down by them, all prisoners of war at present in their power, belonging to the forces of the United Nations, and will furnish full lists of these persons, indicating the places of their detention in Germany or territory occupied by Germany. Pending the release of such prisoners of war, the German authorities and people will protect them in their persons and property and provide them with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical attention and money in accordance with their rank or official position.

(b) The German authorities and people will in like manner provide for and release all other nationals of the United Nations who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint, and all other persons who may be confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as a result of any Nazi action, law or regulation which discriminates on the ground of race, colour, creed or political belief.

(c) The German authorities will, at the demand of the Allied Representatives, hand over control of places of detention to such officers as may be designated for the purpose by the Allied Representatives.

(a) full information regarding the forces referred to in Article 2 (a), and, in particular, will furnish forthwith all information which the Allied Representatives may require concerning the numbers, locations and dispositions of such forces, whether located inside or outside Germany;

(b) complete and detailed information concerning mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air, and the safety lanes in connection therewith. All such safety lanes will be kept open and clearly marked; all mines, minefields and other dangerous obstacles will as far as possible be rendered safe, and all aids to navigation will be reinstated. Unarmed German military and civilian personnel with the necessary equipment will be made available and utilized for the above purposes and for the removal of mines, minefields and other obstacles as directed by the Allied Representatives.

There shall be no destruction, removal, concealment, transfer or scuttling of, or damage to, any military, naval, air, shipping, port, industrial and other like property and facilities and all records and archives, wherever they may be situated, except as may be directed by the Allied Representatives.

Pending the institution of control by the Allied Representatives over all means of communication, all radio and telecommunication installations and other forms of wire or wireless communications, whether ashore or afloat, under German control, will cease transmission except as directed by the Allied Representatives.

The forces, ships, aircraft, military equipment, and other property in Germany or in German control or service or at German disposal, of any other country at war with any of the Allies, will be subject to the provisions of this Declaration and of any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder.

(a) The principal Nazi leaders as specified by the Allied Representatives, and all persons from time to time named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives as being suspected of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes or analogous offences, will be apprehended and surrendered to the Allied Representatives.

(b) The same will apply in the case of any national of any of the United Nations who is alleged to have committed an offence against his national law, and who may at any time be named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives.

(c) The German authorities and people will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for the apprehension and surrender of such persons.

The Allied Representatives will station forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany as they may determine.

(a) In the exercise of the supreme authority with respect to Germany assumed by the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the four Allied Governments will take such steps, including the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, as they deem requisite for future peace and security.

(b) The Allied Representatives will impose on Germany additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements arising from the complete defeat of Germany. The Allied Representatives, or persons or agencies duly designated to act on their authority, will issue proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions for the purpose of laying down such additional requirements, and of giving effect to the other provisions of this Declaration. All German authorities and the German people shall carry out unconditionally the requirements of the Allied Representatives, and shall fully comply with all such proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions.

This Declaration enters into force and effect at the date and hour set forth below. In the event of failure on the part of the German authorities or people promptly and completely to fulfill their obligations hereby or hereafter imposed, the Allied Representatives will take whatever action may be deemed by them to be appropriate under the circumstances.

This Declaration is drawn up in the English, Russian, French and German languages. The English, Russian and French are the only authentic texts.

The Berlin Declaration (in Chinese: Bolin xuanyan 柏林宣言) was signed by the Allied commanders-in-chief:

● Georgy Zhukov for the Soviet Union
● Dwight D. Eisenhower for the United States
● Bernard Montgomery for the United Kingdom
● Jean de Lattre de Tassigny for France.

Potsdam Agreement

The Berlin Conference of the three heads of government of the USSR, USA, and UK, which took place from July 17 to August 2, 1945, came to the following conclusions:

A. The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements:

(1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United States.

(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London which shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Ministers, and by a small staff of technical advisers.

(ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1st 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time.

(3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.

(ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other Members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.

(iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the Member Governments.

(4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question.

(ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problems under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the State chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem.

B. It was agreed that the three Governments should each address an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council. The text of the approved invitation was as follows:

Council of Foreign Ministers Draft for identical invitation to be sent separately by each of the Three Governments to the Governments of China and France.

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the U. S. S. R. consider it necessary to begin without delay the essential preparatory work upon the peace settlements in Europe. To this end they are agreed that there should be established a Council of the Foreign Ministers of the Five Great Powers to prepare treaties of peace with the European enemy States, for submission to the United Nations. The Council would also be empowered to propose settlements of outstanding territorial questions in Europe and to consider such other matters as member Governments might agree to refer to it.

In agreement with the Governments of the United States and U. S. S. R., His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and U. S. S. R., the United States Government, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Government extend a cordial invitation to the Government of China (France) to adopt the text quoted above and to join in setting up the Council. His Majesty's Government, The United States Government, The Soviet Government attach much importance to the participation of the Chinese Government (French Government) in the proposed arrangements and they hope to receive an early and favorable reply to this invitation.

C. It was understood that the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the text would be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodical consultation between the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom.

D. The Conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the Agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of surrender for Germany, for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the coordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Control Council at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly it was agreed to recommend that the European Advisory Commission be dissolved.

II. The principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period

1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council.

2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are:

(i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:-

(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the SS., SA., SD., and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations and all other military and semi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism;

(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms. ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented.

(ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

(iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.

(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.

4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discriminations on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.

5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.

7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.

8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion.

9. The administration in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:-

(i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation;

(ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;

(iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government;

(iv) for the time being, no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed.

12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.

13. In organizing the German Economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.

14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to:

In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions.

15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary:

(a) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament, demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports.

(b) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R.).

(c) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports.

(d) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein.

(e) to control all German public or private scientific bodies research and experimental institutions, laboratories, et cetera connected with economic activities.

16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any break-down in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited.

18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.

19. Payment of Reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports.

The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4 (a) and 4 (b) of the Reparations Agreement.

1. Reparation claims of the U. S. S. R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U. S. S. R., and from appropriate German external assets.

2. The U. S. S. R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.

3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German external assets.

4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U. S. S. R. from its own zone of occupation, the U. S. S. R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones:

(a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.

(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously.

5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest.

6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 (a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U. S. S. R. in agreed installments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed.

7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect to such equipment as will be determined to he eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6.

8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below.

9. The Governments of the U. K. and U. S. A. renounce all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria.

10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany.

A. The following principles for the distribution of the German Navy were agreed:

(1) The total strength of the German surface navy, excluding ships sunk and those taken over from Allied Nations, but including ships under construction or repair, shall be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., U. K., and U. S. A.

(2) Ships under construction or repair mean those ships whose construction or repair may be completed within three to six months, according to the type of ship. Whether such ships under construction or repair shall be completed or repaired shall be determined by the technical commission appointed by the Three Powers and referred to below, subject to the principle that their completion or repair must be achieved within the time limits above provided, without any increase of skilled employment in the German shipyards and without permitting the reopening of any German ship building or connected industries. Completion date means the date when a ship is able to go out on its first trip, or, under peacetime standards, would refer to the customary date of delivery by shipyard to the Government.

(3) The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. Not more than thirty submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the U. S. S. R., U. K., and U. S. A. for experimental and technical purposes.

(4) All stocks of armament, ammunition and supplies of the German Navy appertaining to the vessels transferred pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3) hereof shall be handed over to the respective powers receiving such ships.

(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite naval commission comprising two representatives for each government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German warships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German fleet. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than 15th August, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each Delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect German warships wherever they may be located.

(6) The Three Governments agreed that transfers, including those of ships under construction and repair, shall be completed as soon as possible, but not later than 15th February, 1946. The Commission will submit fortnightly reports, including proposals for the progressive allocation of the vessels when agreed by the Commission.

B. The following principles for the distribution of the German Merchant Marine were agreed:-

(1) The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever located, shall be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., the U. K., and the U. S. A. The actual transfers of the ships to the respective countries shall take place as soon as practicable after the end of the war against Japan. The United Kingdom and the United States will provide out of their shares of the surrendered German merchant ships appropriate amounts for other Allied States whose merchant marines have suffered heavy losses in the common cause against Germany, except that the Soviet Union shall provide out of its share for Poland.

(2) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships during the Japanese War period shall fall under the cognizance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority.

(3) While actual transfer of the ships shall be delayed until after the end of the war with Japan, a Tripartite Shipping Commission shall inventory and value all available ships and recommend a specific distribution in accordance with paragraph (1).

(4) German inland and coastal ships determined to be necessary to the maintenance of the basic German peace economy by the Allied Control Council of Germany shall not be included in the shipping pool thus divided among the Three Powers.

(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite merchant marine commission comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German merchant ships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German merchant ships. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than September 1st, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect the German merchant ships wherever they may be located.

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government to the effect that pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia.

The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above subject to expert examination of the actual frontier.

The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.

The Three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London between British, United States, Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes under the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943 have no particular geographical localization. The Three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring these criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of these major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before 1st September.

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria.

The three governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the city of Vienna.

We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their territories and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.

The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens

The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference, has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections.

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north 'end west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories cast of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinamunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

IX. Conclusion on peace treaties and admission to the United Nations Organization

The three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views.

For their part the three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty for Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations.

The three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic governments in these States will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.

The three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

As regards the admission of other States into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;

2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

The three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above.

The three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favour any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the question of trusteeship territories as defined in the decision of the Crimea Conference and in the Charter of the United Nations Organization.

After an exchange of views on this question it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian colonial territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy and that the question of Italian colonial territory would be considered by the September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

XI. Revised allied control commission procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary

The three Governments took note that the Soviet Representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased.

The three Governments agreed that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries would now be undertaken, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries, and accepting as a basis, in respect of all three countries, the Soviet Government's proposals for Hungary as annexed hereto. (Annex I)

The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.

Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem, with special regard to the question of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out having regard to the present situation in Germany.

The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending an examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council.

The Conference agreed to set up two bilateral commissions of experts, one to be composed of United Kingdom and Soviet Members and one to be composed of United States and Soviet Members, to investigate the facts and examine the documents, as a basis for the settlement of questions arising from the removal of oil equipment in Rumania. It was further agreed that these experts shall begin their work within ten days, on the spot.

It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Tehran, and that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September, 1945.

A proposal by the Soviet Government was examined and the following decisions were reached:

Having examined the question of the Zone of Tangier, the three Governments have agreed that this Zone, which includes the City of Tangier and the area adjacent to it, in view of its special strategic importance, shall remain international.

The question of Tangier will be discussed in the near future at a meeting in Paris of representatives of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France.

The Three Governments recognized that the Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present-day conditions.

It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government.

The Conference considered a proposal of the U. S. Delegation on this subject and agreed to refer it for consideration to the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

The British and U. S. Delegations to the Conference informed the Soviet Delegation of the desire of the British and U. S. Governments to reconvene the European Inland Transport Conference and stated that they would welcome assurance that the Soviet Government would participate in the work of the reconvened conference. The Soviet Government agreed that it would participate in this conference.

The Three Governments agreed that each would send a directive to its representative on the Control Council for Germany informing him of all decisions of the Conference affecting matters within the scope of his duties.

The proposal (Annex II) presented by the United States Delegation was accepted in principle by the Conference, but the drafting of an agreement on the matter was left to be worked out through diplomatic channels.

During the Conference there were meetings between the Chiefs of Staff of the Three Governments on military matters of common interest.

TEXT OF A LETTER TRANSMITTED ON JULY 12 TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U. S. AND U. K. GOVERNMENTS ON THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION IN HUNGARY

In view of the changed situation in connection with the termination of the war against Germany, the Soviet Government finds it necessary to establish the following order of work for the Allied Control Commission in Hungary.

1. During the period up to the conclusion of peace with Hungary the President (or Vice-President) of the ACC will regularly call conferences with the British and American representatives for the purpose of discussing the most important questions relating to the work of the ACC. The conferences will be called once in 10 days, or more frequently in case of need.

Directives of the ACC on questions or principle will be issued to the Hungarian authorities by the President of the Allied Control Commission after agreement on these directives with the English and American representatives.

2. The British and American representatives in the ACC will take part in general conferences of heads of divisions and delegates of the ACC, convoked by the President of the ACC, which meetings will be regular in nature. The British and American representatives will also participate personally or through their representatives in appropriate instances in mixed commissions created by the President of the ACC for questions connected with the execution by the ACC of its functions

3. Free movement by the American and British representatives in the country will be permitted provided that the ACC is previously informed of the time and route of the journeys.

4. All questions connected with permission for the entrance and exit of members of the staff of the British and American representatives in Hungary will be decided on the spot by the President of the ACC within a time limit of not more than one week.

5. The bringing in and sending out by plane of mail, cargoes and diplomatic couriers will be carried out by the British and American representatives on the ACC under arrangements and within time limits established by the ACC, or in special cases by previous coordination with the President of the ACC.

I consider it necessary to add to the above that in all other points the existing Statutes regarding the ACC in Hungary, which was confirmed on January 20, 1945, shall remain in force in the future.

1. The burden of reparation and "war trophies" should not fall on Allied nationals.

2. Capital Equipment-We object to the removal of such Allied property as reparations, "war trophies", or under any other guise. Loss would accrue to Allied nationals as a result of destruction of plants and the consequent loss of markets and trading connections. Seizure of Allied property makes impossible the fulfillment by the satellite of its obligation under the armistice to restore intact the rights and interests of the Allied Nations and their nationals.

The United States looks to the other occupying powers for the return of any equipment already removed and the cessation of removals. Where such equipment will not or cannot be returned, the U. S. will demand of the satellite adequate, effective and prompt compensation to American nationals, and that such compensation have priority equal to that of the reparations payment.

These principles apply to all property wholly or substantially owned by Allied nationals. In the event of removals of property in which the American as well as the entire Allied interest is less than substantial, the U. S. expects adequate, effective, and prompt compensation.

3. Current Production-While the U. S. does not oppose reparation out of current production of Allied investments, the satellite must provide immediate and adequate compensation to the Allied nationals including sufficient foreign exchange or products so that they can recover reasonable foreign currency expenditures and transfer a reasonable return on their investment. Such compensation must also have equal priority with reparations.

We deem it essential that the satellites not conclude treaties, agreements or arrangements which deny to Allied nationals access, on equal terms, to their trade, raw materials and industry; and appropriately modify any existing arrangements which may have that effect.

(1) We–The President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, All mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those [industries] which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

(13) We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

The "Potsdam Agreement" was the result of the Potsdam Conference which took place from July 17 to Aug. 2, 1945 in Germany's Potsdam. The delegations of the three participating powers were represented by US President Harry S. Truman, the British Prime Minister—before July 26 Winston S. Churchill, after that Clement Attlee—and the Premier of the USSR Joseph V. Stalin. What is shown above as "b) Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender" also became known as "Potsdam Declaration" issued by US President Truman, UK Prime Minister Churchill and ROC Chairman of the Nationalist Government Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石.

Below are the Chinese and Japanese translations for both terms "Potsdam Agreement" and "Potsdam Declaration".

（一）余等：美國總統、中國國民政府主席及英國首相代表余等億萬國民，業經會商，並同意對日本應予以一機會，以結束此次戰事。

（二）美國、英帝國及中國之龐大陸、海、空部隊，業已增強多倍，其由西方調來之軍隊及空軍，即將予日本以最後之打擊，彼等之武力受所有同盟國之決心之支持及鼓勵，對日作戰，不至其停止抵抗不止。

（三）德國無效果及無意抵抗全世界激起之自由人之力量，所得之結果，彰彰在前，可為日本人民之殷鑒。此種力量當其對付抵抗之納粹時，不得不將德國人民全體之土地、工業及其生活方式摧殘殆盡。但現在集中對待日本之力量則較之更為龐大，不可衡量。吾等之軍力，加以吾人之堅決意志為後盾，若予以全部實施，必將使日本軍隊完全毀滅，無可逃遁，而日本之本土亦必終歸全部殘毀。

（四）現時業已到來，日本必須決定一途，其將繼續受其一意孤行計算錯誤，使日本帝國已陷于完全毀滅之境之軍人之統制，即或走向理智之路。

（五）以下為吾人之條件，吾人決不更改，亦無其他另一方式。猶豫遷延，更為吾人所不容許。

（六）欺騙及錯誤領導日本人民使其妄欲征服世界者之威權及勢力，必須永久剔除。蓋吾人堅持非將負責之窮兵黷武主義驅出世界，則和平安全及正義之新秩序勢不可能。

（七）直至如此之新秩序成立時，及直至日本製造戰爭之力量業已毀滅，有確定可信之証據時，日本領土經盟國之指定，必須佔領，俾吾人在此陳述之基本目的得以完成。

（八）《開羅宣言》之條件必將實施，而日本之主權必將限於本州、北海道、九州、四國及吾人所決定之其他小島之內。

（九）日本軍隊在完全解除武裝以後，將被允許返其家鄉，得有和平及生產生活之機會。

（十）吾人無意奴役日本民族或消滅其國家，但對於戰罪人犯，包括虐待吾人俘虜在內，將處以法律之裁判，日本政府必須將阻止日本人民民主趨勢在內之復興及增強之所有障礙予以消除，言論、宗教及思想自由以及對於基本人權之重視必須成立。

（十一）日本將被允許維持其經濟所必需及可以償付貨物賠款之工業，但可以使其重新武裝作戰之工業不在其內。為此目的，可准其獲得原料，以別于統制原料，日本最後參加國際貿易關係當可准許。

（十二）上述目的達到及依據日本人民自由之意志成立一傾向和平及負責之政府后，同盟國佔領軍隊當即撤退。

（十三）吾人通告日本政府立即宣布所有日本武裝部隊無條件投降，並對此種行動誠意實行予以適當之各項保証，除此一途，日本即將迅速完全毀滅。

Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War (Jewel Voice Broadcast)

After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure.

We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration.

To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of Our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by Our Imperial Ancestors and which lies close to Our heart.

Indeed, We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement.

But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone — the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people — the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.

Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should We continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.

We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to Our Allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently cooperated with the Empire towards the emancipation of East Asia.

The thought of those officers and men as well as others who have fallen in the fields of battle, those who died at their posts of duty, or those who met with untimely death and all their bereaved families, pains Our heart night and day.

The welfare of the wounded and the war-sufferers, and of those who have lost their homes and livelihood, are the objects of Our profound solicitude.

The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable.

Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial State, We are always with you, Our good and loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity.

Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion which may engender needless complications, or any fraternal contention and strike which may create confusion, lead you astray and cause you to lose the confidence of the world.

Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith in the imperishability of its sacred land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibility, and of the long road before it.

Unite your total strength, to be devoted to construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitude, foster nobility of spirit, and work with resolution — so that you may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State and keep pace with the progress of the world.

惟天下之大勢，睹本朝之現狀，欲取非常之措施，收拾時局。茲佈告天下：朕已諭令廷臣通告美、英、支、蘇四國，願受諾其共同宣言。

朕纘承洪緒，錫福生民。曩者，本朝傳檄四方、戰與英美，本求社稷於億萬斯年之舉，兼定東亞安寧平和之意。至如毀別國之宗社、奪領邦之故土，悉非朕意。今征伐已曆四載，雖我將兵驍勇善戰，百官有司勵精圖治，一億眾庶奉公體國，然時局每況愈下，失勢之徵已現。及今，夷軍彈石之殘虐，頻殺無辜，慘害生靈，實難逆料。如若征伐相續，則我生民不存於世，被髮左衽之期重現；如此，則朕何以保全億兆赤子、何面目複見列祖列宗乎？此朕所以敕令廷臣接受聯軍之誥者也。

至若同事業之盟邦，朕遺餘恨也。然念及臣工黔首曝屍於沙場，忠志之士殉國於內外，遺屬之狀慟天，朕五臟為之俱裂。而殘喘之生民，或負戰傷、禍難，或失家業、生計，朕所視之，深為軫念。故日後國朝所受之苦非常，臣民衷情之表勝往；雖時運之所趨，然朕欲忍所難忍、耐所難耐，以開太平于萬世。

朕於茲得護國體，賴爾等忠良之精誠，並與臣民之同在。若夫為情所激、妄滋事端，或同胞相煎、擾亂時局，何至迷途于大道、失信於天下哉？斯之謬誤，朕當深鑒。今誠宜舉國一家，子孫相傳，信神州之不沉，保家國於不滅，念任重而道遠，傾全力於建設，篤守道義，鞏固志操，誓必揚國體之精華，期同步天下之進化。於嚱，咨爾多方，宜悉朕意。

The Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War is called "Daitōa-sensō-shūketsu-no-shōsho" (大東亜戦争終結ノ詔書) in Japanese, abbreviated as "Sensō-no-shōsho" (終戦の詔書). "Jewel Voice Broadcast" in Japanese: Gyokuon-hōsō (玉音放送). It was broadcast in Japan's radio network on Aug. 15, 1945.

General Order No. 1

General order No. 1 (Enclosure), as approved by the President for issue by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters by direction of the Emperor, is circulated for information.

The President approved it with the understanding that it is subject to change both by further instructions issued through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by changes in matters of detail made by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the light of the operational situation as known by him.

1. The Imperial General Headquarters by direction of the Emperor, and pursuant to the surrender to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of all Japanese armed forces by the Emperor, hereby orders all of its commanders in Japan and abroad to cause the Japanese armed forces and Japanese-controlled forces under their command to cease hostilities at once, to lay down their arms, to remain in their present locations and to surrender unconditionally to commanders acting on behalf of the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as indicated hereafter or as may be further directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Immediate contact will be made with the indicated commanders, or their designated representatives, subject to any changes in detail prescribed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and their instructions will be completely and immediately carried out.

a. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa and French Indo-China north of 16 north latitude shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

b. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 38 north latitude and Karafuto shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.

c. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the Andamans, Nicobars, Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China south of 16 degrees north latitude, Malaya, Borneo, Netherlands Indies, New Guinea, Bismarcks and the Solomons, shall surrender to (the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Command or the Commanding General, Australian Forces—the exact breakdown between Mountbatten and the Australians to be arranged between them and the details of this paragraph then prepared by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers).

d. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the Japanese Mandated Islands, Ryukyus, Bonins, and other Pacific Islands shall surrender to the Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet.

e. The Imperial General Headquarters, its senior commanders, and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the main islands of Japan, minor islands adjacent thereto, Korea south of 38 north latitude, and the Philippines shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific.

f. The above indicated commanders are the only representatives of the Allied Powers empowered to accept surrenders and all surrenders of Japanese Forces shall be made only to them or to their representatives.

The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters further orders its commanders in Japan and abroad to disarm completely all forces of Japan or under Japanese control, wherever they may be situated and to deliver intact and in safe and good condition all weapons and equipment at such time and at such places as may be prescribed by the Allied Commanders indicated above. (Pending further instructions, the Japanese police force in the main islands of Japan will be exempt from this disarmament provision. The police force will remain at their posts and shall be held responsible for the preservation of law and order. The strength and arms of such a police force will be prescribed.)

2. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt of this order, complete information with respect to Japan and all areas under Japanese control as follows:

(a) Lists of all land, air and anti-aircraft units showing locations and strengths in officers and men.

(b) Lists of all aircraft, military, naval and civil giving complete information as to the number, type, location and condition of such aircraft.

(c) Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine and auxiliary naval craft in or out of commission and under construction giving their position, condition and movement.

(d) Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled merchant ships of over100 gross tons, in or out of commission and under construction, including merchant ships formerly belonging to any of the United Nations which are now in Japanese hands, giving their position con dition and movement.

(e) Complete and detailed information, accompanied by maps, showing location and layouts of all mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air and the safety lanes in connection therewith.

(f) Locations and descriptions of all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, anti-aircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas.

(g) Locations of all camps and other places of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees.

3. Japanese armed forces and civil aviation authorities will insure that all Japanese military, naval and civil aircraft remain on the ground on the water or abroad ship until further notification of the disposition to be made of them.

4. Japanese or Japanese-controlled naval or merchant vessels of all types will be maintained without damage and will undertake no movement pending instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Vessels at sea will immediately render harmless and throw overbroad explosives of all types. Vessels not at sea will immediately remove explosives of all types to safe storage ashore.

5. Responsible Japanese or Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities will insure that:

a. All Japanese mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea and air, wherever located, be removed according to instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

c. All safety lanes be kept open and clearly marked pending accomplishment of a. above.

6. Responsible Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities will hold intact and in good condition pending further instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the following:

a. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war material (except as specifically prescribed in Section 4 of this order).

b. All land, water and air transportation and communication facilities and equipment.

c. All military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, anti-aircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments.

d. All factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions designed or intended to produce or facilitate the production or use of all implements of war and other material and property used by or intended for use by any military or paramilitary organizations in connection with their operations.

7. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt of this order, complete lists of all the items specified in paragraph a, b and d of Section 6 above, indicating the numbers, types and locations of each.

8. The manufacture and distribution of all arms, ammunition and implements of war will cease forthwith.

9. With respect to United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of Japanese or Japanese-controlled authorities:

a. The safety and well-being of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees will be scrupulously preserved to include the administrative and supply services essential to provide adequate food shelter, clothing and medical care until such responsibility is undertaken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers;

b. Each camp or other place of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees together with nits equipment, stores, records, arms and ammunition will be delivered immediately to the command of the senior officer or designated representative of the prisoner of war and civilian internees;

c. As directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, prisoners of war and civilian internees will be transported to places of safety where they can be accepted by allied authorities;

d. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters will furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of the receipt of this order, complete lists of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees, indicating their location.

10. All Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities shall aid and assist the occupation of Japan and Japanese-controlled areas by forces of the Allied Powers.

11. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and appropriate Japanese officials shall be prepared on instructions from Allied occupation commanders to collect and deliver all arms in the possession of the Japanese civilian population.

12. This and all subsequent instructions issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or other allied military authorities will be scrupulously and promptly obeyed by Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil officials and private persons. Any delay or failure to comply with the provisions of this or subsequent orders and any action which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers determines to be detrimental to the Allied Powers, will incur drastic and summary punishment at the hands of allied military authorities and the Japanese Government.

一、日本帝國大本營遵奉日本天皇之指示，下令「所有日本軍隊」向盟軍最高統帥（麥克阿瑟元帥）投降。茲令所有日本帝國內外之司令官，使在其指揮之下之日本軍隊以及日本管制之軍隊，立刻停止戰鬥行為、放下武器、駐在其現時所在之地點，並向代表美國、中國、英國、蘇聯之司令官，如下列指定或如盟軍最高統帥所追加指定者，無條件投降。應立即連繫指定之司令官或其指定之代表，並接受盟軍最高統帥對於詳細規定的指示變更，各司令官及其代表之命令應馬上完全地執行。

甲、在中國（滿洲除外）、台灣及北緯十六度以北之法屬印度支那境內的日軍高階司令官及所有陸、海、空軍及輔助部隊應向蔣介石統帥投降。

乙、在滿洲、北緯三十八度以北之朝鮮半島部份及庫頁島境內之日軍高階司令官及所有陸、海、空軍及輔助部隊應向遠東蘇軍總司令官投降。

丙、在安達曼群島、尼科巴群島、緬甸、泰國、北緯十六度以南之法屬印度支那、馬來亞、婆羅洲、荷屬印度、新幾內亞、俾斯麥群島及所罗门群岛境內之日軍高階司令官及所有陸、海、空軍及輔助部隊應向東南亞盟軍司令部最高統帥或澳大利亞軍隊之司令官投降，蒙巴頓與澳軍之確實劃分，由其自行商定後，再由盟軍最高統帥對於此節詳細規定。

丁、在日本委任統治各島、琉球群島、小笠原群島及其他太平洋島嶼之日軍高階司令官及所有陸、海、空軍及輔助部隊應向美國太平洋艦隊總司令投降。

戊、日本帝國大本營在日本主要島嶼、附近各小島、北緯三十八度以南之朝鮮半島及菲律賓之日軍高階司令官及所有陸、海、空軍及輔助部隊應向美國太平洋艦隊陸軍總司令投降。

己、上述各指定司令官為唯一授權接受投降之同盟國代表，所有日本軍隊應只向彼等或其代表投降。

日本帝國大本營且命令其在日本及國外之各司令官，將日軍部隊及在日本策劃下之部隊，無論在何地點完全解除武器，並在同盟國司令官所指定之時間及地點，將所有武器及裝備完整與安全的繳出（在日本本土之日本警察，在另有命令以前，得免受此項解除武裝之規定。警察部隊各留崗位，並應負責維持法律與秩序。此類警察部隊之人數及武裝另行規定之）。

二、日本帝國大本營應在收到此命令（若干日）內，以關於日本及在日本管制下各地區之全部情報供給盟軍最高統帥，如下：

甲、關於一切陸上、空中及防空單位之明細表，說明此類官佐士兵之地點與人數。

乙、所有陸軍、海軍和民用飛機之數量、型式、位置及狀態的完整資料明細表。

丙、日本帝國及日本帝國控制下之所有海軍艦艇明細表，如水上及潛艇和輔導海軍艦艇，無論其係服役中、非服役中或建造中，均須提出其位置、狀態和航行資料。

丁、日本帝國及日本帝國控制下總噸數超過一百噸之商船明細表（包括以往曾屬於同盟國，但現為日本帝國權力範圍內者），無論其係服役中、非服役中或建造中，均須提出其位置、狀態和航行資料。

戊、現出所有地雷、水雷及其他對陸、海、空造成行動障礙之障礙物的位置與佈局，以及與上述相關之安全通道的完整、詳細且附有地圖之資料。

己、包含機場、水上飛機基地、防空設施、港口及海軍基地、油庫、常設與臨時的陸上及海岸防禦碉堡、要塞及其他設防區在內之所有軍事設施和建築之位置及說明。

庚、所有同盟國俘虜及被拘留平民之收容所或其他拘留場所的位置。

三、在接獲進一步部署的通知之前，日軍及民間航空當局之一切日本帝國陸、海軍及民用航空機，須確實停留於其所在之陸上、海上及艦上之定點。

四、在接獲盟軍最高統帥指示之前，日本帝國或日本帝國控制下之所有型式的海軍艦艇或商船，須毫無損傷地加以保存且不得加以移動。至於航海中之船舶須立即放下武器使其無害，並將所有種類之爆炸物拋入海中，而非航海中之船舶則須立即將所有種類之爆炸物移至岸上安全貯藏處所。

五、日本帝國及日本帝國控制下負有責任之軍事政府及民間政府，須確實執行下列事項：

甲、所有日本帝國內埋藏地雷、水雷及其他對陸、海、空行動之障礙物，無其位於任何地點，均須依盟軍最高統帥之指示予以去除。

丙、在前項實施完成之前，須開放且明白標示所有安全通路。

六、日本帝國及日本帝國控制下負有責任之軍事政府及民間政府，在接獲盟軍最高統帥進一步指示之前，應將下列事物保持原狀且儘量維持良好狀態。

甲、所有種類之武器、彈藥、爆炸物、軍用裝備、貯藏品、軍需品、軍用器材，及一切軍用物資（除本命令第四項之特別規定外）。

丙、所有機場、水上飛機基地、防空設施、港口及海軍基地、油庫、常設與臨時的陸上及海岸防禦碉堡，要塞及其他設防區，包含所有這些防禦設施、軍事設施和建築之圖面。

丁、所有工廠、製造場所、工作場所、研究所、實驗所、試驗所、技術數據、專利、設計、圖面及發明，以用來設計或意圖製造、或促成生產，做為提供任何軍事機關或準軍事組織運作所使用的，或意圖使用的所有軍用器材與其他物資，及做為物業用途。

七、日本帝國大本營於接獲本命令後，應毫無延遲就上面第六項甲、乙、丁中指定之所有項目，將其關於各自數量、型式及位置之完整明細表，提供給盟軍最高統帥。

九、關於日本帝國或日本帝國控制下之政權掌握之同盟國俘虜及被拘留平民：

甲、須嚴謹的維持所有同盟國俘虜及被拘留平民之安全及福祉，至盟軍最高統帥接替其責任為止，須提供包括充足的食物、住所、服裝及醫療在內之必要的管理及補給業務。

乙、應立即將同盟國俘虜及被拘留平民所在之收容所及其他拘留所之設備、貯藏品、記錄、武器及彈藥，移交給俘虜及被拘留平民裡面的高階軍官或指定之代表，並置於其指揮之下。

丙、依盟軍最高統帥所指示之地點，將俘虜及被拘留平民運送至同盟國當局能交接之安全處所。

丁、日本帝國大本營於接獲本命令之後，應毫無延遲地將所有同盟國俘虜及被拘留平民所在地點之明細表，提供給盟軍最高統帥。

十、所有日本帝國及日本帝國統治下之軍事政府及民間政府，應協助同盟國軍隊佔領日本帝國及日本帝國統治地域。

十一、日本帝國大本營及日本帝國軍官應做成準備，在同盟國佔領軍司令官有所指示之際，收集且移交一般日本帝國國民所有之一切武器。

十二、日本帝國及日本帝國統治下之軍部、行政官員及無官職人員，應嚴格且迅速服從本命令及爾後盟軍最高統帥或其他同盟國軍事當局所發出之一切指示，若有遲延或不遵守本命令和爾後任何命令之規定者，以及被盟軍最高統帥認定為係對同盟國有害之行為時，同盟國軍事當局及日本帝國政府將立即加以嚴懲。

General Order No. 1 was General Douglas MacArthur's first order to the forces of the Empire of Japan following the surrender of Japan, and its final form was approved by US President Harry S. Truman on Aug. 17, 1945. It instructed Japanese forces to surrender to designated Allied commanders, reveal all current military deployments, and preserve military equipment for later disarmament. General Order No. 1 became known to the world when it was announced at the Japanese Surrender Ceremony on Sept. 2, 1945, being issued by Japan's Imperial General Headquarters that day. Please note that this document is also often referred to as "SCAP General Order No. 1", SCAP standing for "Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers" or "Supreme Command of Allies in the Pacific" (in Chinese: zhu Ri mengjun zongsiling 駐日盟軍總司令, in Japanese: rengō kokugun saikō shireikan sōshireibu 連合国軍最高司令官総司令部). Some sources use the heading "Surrender Order of the Imperial General Headquarters of Japan".

Japan's First Instrument of Surrender

We, acting by command of and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions set forth in the declaration issued by the Heads of the Governments of the United States, China, and Great Britain on 26 July 1945 at Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which four powers are hereafter referred to as the Allied Powers.

We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese armed forces and all armed forces under the Japanese control wherever situated.

We hereby command all Japanese forces wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilites forthwith, to preserve and save from damage all ships, aircraft, and military and civil property and to comply with all requirements which my be imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by agencies of the Japanese Government at his direction.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Headquarters to issue at once orders to the Commanders of all Japanese forces and all forces under Japanese control wherever situated to surrender un- conditionally themselves and all forces under their control.

We hereby command all civil, military and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, and orders and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority and we direct all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their non-combatant duties unless specifically relieved by him or under his authority.

We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever actions may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Poers or by any other designated representative of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that Declaration.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to liberate all allied prisoners of war and civilian internees now under Japanese control and to provide for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to places as directed.

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender.

Mamoru Shiegemitsu (By Command and on Behalf of the Emperor of Japan and the Japanese Government)

Yoshijiro Umezu (By Command and on Behalf of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters)

Accepted at TOKYO BAY, JAPAN at 0903 I on the SECOND day of SEPTEMBER, 1945, for the United States, Republic of China, United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and in the interests of the other United Nations at war with Japan.

Jacques LeClerc (Provisional Government of the French Republic Representative)

餘等茲對合衆國、中華民國及大不列顛帝國，各國政府首腦于1945年7月26日於波茨坦宣佈，爾後由蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯邦之參加宣言條款，並根據日本國政府、天皇及日本帝國大本營之命令代表受諾之；右述四國以後稱之爲聯合國。

餘等此佈告，無論日本帝國、大本營及任何地方所有之日本國軍隊與日本國所支配下之一切軍隊，悉對聯合國無條件投降。

餘等茲命令任何地方之一切日本國軍隊及日本國臣民，即刻停止敵對行為，保存所有船舶及軍用財產，且防止損毀，並服從聯合國最高司令官及其指示，對日本國政府之各機關所課之一切要求應予以應諾。

餘等此命令日本帝國大本營，對於任何地方之一切日本國軍隊，及由日本國支配下之一切軍隊指揮官，速即發佈其本身或其支配下之一切軍隊無條件投降之命令。

餘等茲對所有官廳、陸軍及海軍之職員，命令其遵守且施行聯合國最高司令官為實施此投降之檔,認為適當而由其自己發出或根據其委任發出之一切佈告及指示,且命令右開職員除由聯合國最高司令官，或根據其事務委任與解除其任務以外均須留於各自原有地位，且仍繼續行使各個之非戰鬥任務。

余等茲為天皇、日本國政府及其繼續者，承約切實履行波茨坦宣言之條款，發佈為實施該宣言之聯合國最高司令官及其他特派聯合國代表要求之一切命令，且實施一切措置。

餘等茲對日本國政府及日本帝國大本營命令，即速解放現由日本國支配下,所有聯合國俘虜及被拘留者，且執行對彼等之保護，津貼給養及對指定地點迅速運輸等措置。

天皇及日本國政府統治國家之權，限置於為實施投降條款採用認為適當措置之聯合國最高司令官之限制下。

1945年9月2日午前9時4分于東京灣密蘇裏號艦上簽字之，並根據大日本帝國天皇陛下及日本國政府之命令且以其名義。

1945年9月2日午前9時4分於東京灣爲合衆國、中華民國、聯合王國及蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯邦及與日本國存在戰爭狀態之其他聯合國之利益受諾之。

In Japanese, this document is called "Nipponno kōfuku bunsho" (日本の降伏文書).

Act of Surrender

1. The Emperor of Japan, the Japanese government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, having recognized the complete military defeat of the Japanese military forces by the Allied forces and having surrendered unconditionally to the Supreme Commander for the Allied powers.

2. The Supreme Commander for the Allied powers directed by his General Order No. 1 that the senior commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces of Japan within China excluding Manchuria, Formosa and French Indo-China north of 16 degrees north latitude shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

3. We, the Japanese Commanders of all Japanese forces and auxiliaries in the areas named above, also recognizing the complete military defeat of the Japanese military forces by the Allied forces, hereby surrender unconditionally all of the forces under our command to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

4. All the Japanese forces hereby surrendered will cease hostilities and will remain at the stations they now occupy. They are now non-combatant troops and in due course will be demobilized.

5. They will assemble, preserve without damage, and turn over to the forces specified by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, all arms, ammunition, equipment, supplies, records, information and other assets of any kind belonging to the Japanese forces. Pending specific instructions, all Japanese aircraft, naval units, and merchant ships in the areas named above will be held without damage where they are at present located.

6. All the Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees now under Japanese control in the areas named above will be liberated at once and the Japanese forces will provide protection, care, maintenance, and transportation to places as directed.

7. Henceforth, all the Japanese forces, hereby surrendered, will be subject to the control of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Their movements and activities will be dictated by him, and they will obey only the orders and proclamations issued, or authorised, by him, or the orders of their Japanese commanders based upon his instructions.

8. This act of surrender and all subsequent orders and proclamations of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to the surrender forces will be issued at once to the appropriate subordinate commanders and forces and it will be the responsibility of all Japanese commanders and forces to see that such proclamations and orders are immediately and completely complied with.

9. For any failure or delay, by any member of the forces surrendered hereby to act in accordance with this act of surrender or future orders or proclamations of the Generalissimo, he will summarily and drastically punish both the violator and his responsible commanders.

Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, Signatory under orders of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and Commander of the Japanese Forces in Central China. (Signature and official seal)

Signed at 9.00 a.m. on Sept. 9 in the 20^th year of Showa (1945 AD) in Nanjing, Republic of China.

The Representative of the Republic of China, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the other Allied Forces at war with Japan, accepted this act of surrender at 9.00 a.m. on Sept. 9 in the 34^th year of the Republic of China (1945 AD) in Nanjing, Republic of China.

Army General Ho Ying-chen, Special Envoy of Supreme Commander in the China Theatre Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Army. (Signature and official seal)

一、日本帝國政府及日本帝國大本營已向聯合國最高統帥無條件投降。

二、聯合國最高統帥第一號命令規定在「中華民國（東三省除外）臺灣與越南北緯十六度以北地區內之日本全部陸、海、空軍與輔助部隊應向蔣委員長投降」。

三、吾等在上述區域內之全部日本陸海空軍及輔助部隊之將領，願率領所屬部隊，向蔣委員長無條件投降。

四、本官當立即命令所有上第二款所述區域內之全部日本陸、海、空各級指揮官，及其所屬部隊與所控制之部隊，向蔣委員長特派受降代表中國戰區中國陸軍總司令何應欽上將及何應欽上將指定之各地區受降主官投降。

五、投降之全部日本陸、海、空軍立即停止敵對行動，暫留原地待命，所有武器、彈藥、裝具、器材、補給品、情報資料、地圖、文獻檔案及其他一切資產等，當暫時保管。所有航空器及飛機場一切設備，艦艇、船舶、車輛、碼頭、工廠、倉庫及一切建築物，以及現在上第二款所述地區內日本陸、海、空軍或其控制之部隊所有或所控制之軍用或民用財產，亦均保持完整，全部待繳於蔣委員長及其代表何應欽上將所指定之部隊及政府機關代表接收。

六、上第二款所述區域內日本陸、海、空軍所俘聯合國戰俘及拘留之人民，立予釋放，並保護送至指定地點。

七、自此以後，所有上第二款所述區域內之日本陸、海、空軍當即服從蔣委員長之節制，並接受蔣委員長及其代表何應欽上將所頒發之命令。

八、本官對本降書所列各款及蔣委員長與其代表何應欽上將以後對投降日軍所頒發之命令，當立即對各級軍官及士兵轉達遵照，上第二款所述地區之所有日本軍官佐士兵，均須負完全履行此項命令之責。

九、投降之日本陸、海、空軍任何人員，對於本降書所列各款及蔣委員長與其代表何應欽上將嗣後所授之命令，倘有未能履行或遲延情事，各級負責官長及違反命令者願受懲罰。

奉日本帝國政府及日本帝國大本營命簽字人中國派遣軍總司令官陸軍大將岡村寧次（簽字蓋章）

昭和二十年（公曆一九四五年）九月九日午前九時零分簽字於中華民國南京。

代表中華民國、美利堅合眾國，大不列顛聯合王國、蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯邦，並為對日本作戰之其他聯合國之利益，接受本降書於中華民國三十四年（公曆一九四五年）九月九日午前九時零分簽字於中華民國南京。

中國戰區最高統帥特級上將蔣中正特派代表中國陸軍總司令陸軍一級上將何應欽（簽字蓋章）

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction No. 677

SUBJECT: Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan.

1. The Imperial Japanese Government is directed to cease exercising, or attempting to exercise, governmental or administrative authority over any area outside of Japan, or over any government officials and employees or any other persons within such areas.

2. Except as authorized by this Headquarters, the Imperial Japanese Government will not communicate with government officials and employees or with any other persons outside of Japan for any purpose other than the routine operation of authorized shipping, communications and weather services.

3. For the purpose of this directive, Japan is defined to include the four main islands of Japan (Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku) and the approximately 1,000 smaller adjacent islands, including the Tsushima Islands and the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands north of 30° North Latitude (excluding Kuchinoshima Island); and excluding (a) Utsuryo (Ullung) Island, Liancourt Rocks (Take Island) and Quelpart (Saishu or Cheju) Island, (b) the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands south of 30° North Latitude (including Kuchinoshima Island), the Izu, Nanpo, Bonin (Ogasawara) and Volcano (Kazan or Iwo) Island Groups, and all the other outlying Pacific Islands [including the Daito (Ohigashi or Oagari) Island Group, and Parece Vela (Okino-tori), Marcus (Minami-tori) and Ganges (Nakano-tori) Islands], and (c) the Kurile (Chishima) Islands, the Habomai (Hapomaze) Island Group (including Suisho, Yuri, Akiyuri, Shibotsu and Taraku Islands) and Shikotan Island.

4. Further areas specifically excluded from the governmental and administrative jurisdiction of the Imperial Japanese Government are the following: (a) all Pacific Islands seized or occupied under mandate or otherwise by Japan since the beginning of the World War in 1914, (b) Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, (c) Korea, and (d) Karafuto.

5. The definition of Japan contained in this directive shall also apply to all future directives, memoranda and orders from this Headquarters unless otherwise specified therein.

6. Nothing in this directive shall be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate determination of the minor islands referred to in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration.

7. The Imperial Japanese Government will prepare and submit to this Headquarters a report of all governmental agencies in Japan the functions of which pertain to areas outside a statement as defined in this directive. Such report will include a statement of the functions, organization and personnel of each of the agencies concerned.

8. All records of the agencies referred to in paragraph 7 above will be preserved and kept available for inspection by this Headquarters.

San Francisco Peace Treaty

WHEREAS the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those of nations which, as sovereign equals, cooperate in friendly association to promote their common welfare and to maintain international peace and security, and are therefore desirous of concluding a Treaty of Peace which will settle questions still outstanding as a result of the existence of a state of war between them;

WHEREAS Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations and in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; to strive to realize the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to seek to create within Japan conditions of stability and well-being as defined in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by post-surrender Japanese legislation; and in public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair practices;

WHEREAS the Allied Powers welcome the intentions of Japan set out in the foregoing paragraph;

THE ALLIED POWERS AND JAPAN have therefore determined to conclude the present Treaty of Peace, and have accordingly appointed the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, who, after presentation of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

(a) The state of war between Japan and each of the Allied Powers is terminated as from the date on which the present Treaty comes into force between Japan and the Allied Power concerned as provided for in Article 23.

(b) The Allied Powers recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters.

(a) Japan recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.

(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.

(d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations Mandate System, and accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of 2 April 1947, extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan.

(e) Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals or otherwise.

(f) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 deg. north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this Article, the disposition of property of Japan and of its nationals in the areas referred to in Article 2, and their claims, including debts, against the authorities presently administering such areas and the residents (including juridical persons) thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and residents, and of claims, including debts, of such authorities and residents against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and such authorities. The property of any of the Allied Powers or its nationals in the areas referred to in Article 2 shall, insofar as this has not already been done, be returned by the administering authority in the condition in which it now exists. (The term nationals whenever used in the present Treaty includes juridical persons.)

(b) Japan recognizes the validity of dispositions of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to directives of the United States Military Government in any of the areas referred to in Articles 2 and 3.

(c) Japanese owned submarine cables connection Japan with territory removed from Japanese control pursuant to the present Treaty shall be equally divided, Japan retaining the Japanese terminal and adjoining half of the cable, and the detached territory the remainder of the cable and connecting terminal facilities.

(a) Japan accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular the obligations

(i) to settle its international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

(ii) to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;

(iii) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action.

(b) The Allied Powers confirm that they will be guided by the principles of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations in their relations with Japan.

(c) The Allied Powers for their part recognize that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements.

(a) All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty, and in any case not later than 90 days thereafter. Nothing in this provision shall, however, prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which have been or may be made between one or more of the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other.

(b) The provisions of Article 9 of the Potsdam Proclamation of 26 July 1945, dealing with the return of Japanese military forces to their homes, to the extent not already completed, will be carried out.

(c) All Japanese property for which compensation has not already been paid, which was supplied for the use of the occupation forces and which remains in the possession of those forces at the time of the coming into force of the present Treaty, shall be returned to the Japanese Government within the same 90 days unless other arrangements are made by mutual agreement.

(a) Each of the Allied Powers, within one year after the present Treaty has come into force between it and Japan, will notify Japan which of its prewar bilateral treaties or conventions with Japan it wishes to continue in force or revive, and any treaties or conventions so notified shall continue in force or by revived subject only to such amendments as may be necessary to ensure conformity with the present Treaty. The treaties and conventions so notified shall be considered as having been continued in force or revived three months after the date of notification and shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. All such treaties and conventions as to which Japan is not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated.

(b) Any notification made under paragraph (a) of this Article may except from the operation or revival of a treaty or convention any territory for the international relations of which the notifying Power is responsible, until three months after the date on which notice is given to Japan that such exception shall cease to apply.

(a) Japan will recognize the full force of all treaties now or hereafter concluded by the Allied Powers for terminating the state of war initiated on 1 September 1939, as well as any other arrangements by the Allied Powers for or in connection with the restoration of peace. Japan also accepts the arrangements made for terminating the former League of Nations and Permanent Court of International Justice.

(b) Japan renounces all such rights and interests as it may derive from being a signatory power of the Conventions of St. Germain-en-Laye of 10 September 1919, and the Straits Agreement of Montreux of 20 July 1936, and from Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923.

(c) Japan renounces all rights, title and interests acquired under, and is discharged from all obligations resulting from, the Agreement between Germany and the Creditor Powers of 20 January 1930 and its Annexes, including the Trust Agreement, dated 17 May 1930, the Convention of 20 January 1930, respecting the Bank for International Settlements; and the Statutes of the Bank for International Settlements. Japan will notify to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris within six months of the first coming into force of the present Treaty its renunciation of the rights, title and interests referred to in this paragraph.

Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas.

Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China, including all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on 7 September 1901, and all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto, and agrees to the abrogation in respect to Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes and documents.

Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan, and will carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan. The power to grant clemency, to reduce sentences and to parole with respect to such prisoners may not be exercised except on the decision of the Government or Governments which imposed the sentence in each instance, and on recommendation of Japan. In the case of persons sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, such power may not be exercised except on the decision of a majority of the Governments represented on the Tribunal, and on the recommendation of Japan.

(a) Japan declares its readiness promptly to enter into negotiations for the conclusion with each of the Allied Powers of treaties or agreements to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis.

(b) Pending the conclusion of the relevant treaty or agreement, Japan will, during a period of four years from the first coming into force of the present Treaty

(i) most-favoured-nation treatment with respect to customs duties, charges, restrictions and other regulations on or in connection with the importation and exportation of goods;

(ii) national treatment with respect to shipping, navigation and imported goods, and with respect to natural and juridical persons and their interests — such treatment to include all matters pertaining to the levying and collection of taxes, access to the courts, the making and performance of contracts, rights to property (tangible and intangible), participating in juridical entities constituted under Japanese law, and generally the conduct of all kinds of business and professional activities;

(2) ensure that external purchases and sales of Japanese state trading enterprises shall be based solely on commercial considerations.

(c) In respect to any matter, however, Japan shall be obliged to accord to an Allied Power national treatment, or most-favored-nation treatment, only to the extent that the Allied Power concerned accords Japan national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment, as the case may be, in respect of the same matter. The reciprocity envisaged in the foregoing sentence shall be determined, in the case of products, vessels and juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, any non-metropolitan territory of an Allied Power, and in the case of juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, any state or province of an Allied Power having a federal government, by reference to the treatment accorded to Japan in such territory, state or province.

(d) In the application of this Article, a discriminatory measure shall not be considered to derogate from the grant of national or most-favored-nation treatment, as the case may be, if such measure is based on an exception customarily provided for in the commercial treaties of the party applying it, or on the need to safeguard that party's external financial position or balance of payments (except in respect to shiping and navigation), or on the need to maintain its essential security interests, and provided such measure is proportionate to the circumstances and not applied in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.

(e) Japan's obligations under this Article shall not be affected by the exercise of any Allied rights under Article 14 of the present Treaty; nor shall the provisions of this Article be understood as limiting the undertakings assumed by Japan by virtue of Article 15 of the Treaty.

(a) Japan will enter into negotiations with any of the Allied Powers, promptly upon the request of such Power or Powers, for the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements relating to international civil air transport.

(b) Pending the conclusion of such agreement or agreements, Japan will, during a period of four years from the first coming into force of the present Treaty, extend to such Power treatment not less favorable with respect to air-traffic rights and privileges than those exercised by any such Powers at the date of such coming into force, and will accord complete equality of opportunity in respect to the operation and development of air services.

(c) Pending its becoming a party to the Convention on International Civil Aviation in accordance with Article 93 thereof, Japan will give effect to the provisions of that Convention applicable to the international navigation of aircraft, and will give effect to the standards, practices and procedures adopted as annexes to the Convention in accordance with the terms of the Convention.

(a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the same time meet its other obligations.

1. Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question. Such arrangements shall avoid the imposition of additional liabilities on other Allied Powers, and, where the manufacturing of raw materials is called for, they shall be supplied by the Allied Powers in question, so as not to throw any foreign exchange burden upon Japan.

2. (I) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (II) below, each of the Allied Powers shall have the right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of all property, rights and interests of

which on the first coming into force of the present Treaty were subject to its jurisdiction. The property, rights and interests specified in this subparagraph shall include those now blocked, vested or in the possession or under the control of enemy property authorities of Allied Powers, which belong to, or were held or managed on behalf of, any of the persons or entities mentioned in (a), (b) or (c) above at the time such assets came under the controls of such authorities.

(II) The following shall be excepted from the right specified in subparagraph (I) above:

(i) property of Japanese natural persons who during the war resided with the permission of the Government concerned in the territory of one of the Allied Powers, other than territory occupied by Japan, except property subjected to restrictions during the war and not released from such restrictions as of the date of the first coming into force of the present Treaty;

(ii) all real property, furniture and fixtures owned by the Government of Japan and used for diplomatic or consular purposes, and all personal furniture and furnishings and other private property not of an investment nature which was normally necessary for the carrying out of diplomatic and consular functions, owned by Japanese diplomatic and consular personnel;

(iii) property belonging to religious bodies or private charitable institutions and used exclusively for religious or charitable purposes;

(iv) property, rights and interests which have come within its jurisdiction in consequence of the resumption of trade and financial relations subsequent to 2 September 1945, between the country concerned and Japan, except such as have resulted from transactions contrary to the laws of the Allied Power concerned;

(v) obligations of Japan or Japanese nationals, any right, title or interest in tangible property located in Japan, interests in enterprises organized under the laws of Japan, or any paper evidence thereof; provided that this exception shall only apply to obligations of Japan and its nationals expressed in Japanese currency.

(III) Property referred to in exceptions (i) through (v) above shall be returned subject to reasonable expenses for its preservation and administration. If any such property has been liquidated the proceeds shall be returned instead.

(IV) The right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of property as provided in subparagraph (I) above shall be exercised in accordance with the laws of the Allied Power concerned, and the owner shall have only such rights as may be given him by those laws.

(V) The Allied Powers agree to deal with Japanese trademarks and literary and artistic property rights on a basis as favorable to Japan as circumstances ruling in each country will permit.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.

(a) Upon application made within nine months of the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned, Japan will, within six months of the date of such application, return the property, tangible and intangible, and all rights or interests of any kind in Japan of each Allied Power and its nationals which was within Japan at any time between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945, unless the owner has freely disposed thereof without duress or fraud. Such property shall be returned free of all encumbrances and charges to which it may have become subject because of the war, and without any charges for its return. Property whose return is not applied for by or on behalf of the owner or by his Government within the prescribed period may be disposed of by the Japanese Government as it may determine. In cases where such property was within Japan on 7 December 1941, and cannot be returned or has suffered injury or damage as a result of the war, compensation will be made on terms not less favorable than the terms provided in the draft Allied Powers Property Compensation Law approved by the Japanese Cabinet on 13 July 1951.

(b) With respect to industrial property rights impaired during the war, Japan will continue to accord to the Allied Powers and their nationals benefits no less than those heretofore accorded by Cabinet Orders No. 309 effective 1 September 1949, No. 12 effective 28 January 1950, and No. 9 effective 1 February 1950, all as now amended, provided such nationals have applied for such benefits within the time limits prescribed therein.

(c) (i) Japan acknowledges that the literary and artistic property rights which existed in Japan on 6 December 1941, in respect to the published and unpublished works of the Allied Powers and their nationals have continued in force since that date, and recognizes those rights which have arisen, or but for the war would have arisen, in Japan since that date, by the operation of any conventions and agreements to which Japan was a party on that date, irrespective of whether or not such conventions or agreements were abrogated or suspended upon or since the outbreak of war by the domestic law of Japan or of the Allied Power concerned.

(ii) Without the need for application by the proprietor of the right and without the payment of any fee or compliance with any other formality, the period from 7 December 1941 until the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned shall be excluded from the running of the normal term of such rights; and such period, with an additional period of six months, shall be excluded from the time within which a literary work must be translated into Japanese in order to obtain translating rights in Japan.

As an expression of its desire to indemnify those members of the armed forces of the Allied Powers who suffered undue hardships while prisoners of war of Japan, Japan will transfer its assets and those of its nationals in countries which were neutral during the war, or which were at war with any of the Allied Powers, or, at its option, the equivalent of such assets, to the International Committee of the Red Cross which shall liquidate such assets and distribute the resultant fund to appropriate national agencies, for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families on such basis as it may determine to be equitable. The categories of assets described in Article 14(a)2(II)(ii) through (v) of the present Treaty shall be excepted from transfer, as well as assets of Japanese natural persons not residents of Japan on the first coming into force of the Treaty. It is equally understood that the transfer provision of this Article has no application to the 19,770 shares in the Bank for International Settlements presently owned by Japanese financial institutions.

(a) Upon the request of any of the Allied Powers, the Japanese Government shall review and revise in conformity with international law any decision or order of the Japanese Prize Courts in cases involving ownership rights of nationals of that Allied Power and shall supply copies of all documents comprising the records of these cases, including the decisions taken and orders issued. In any case in which such review or revision shows that restoration is due, the provisions of Article 15 shall apply to the property concerned.

(b) The Japanese Government shall take the necessary measures to enable nationals of any of the Allied Powers at any time within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned to submit to the appropriate Japanese authorities for review any judgment given by a Japanese court between 7 December 1941 and such coming into force, in any proceedings in which any such national was unable to make adequate presentation of his case either as plaintiff or defendant. The Japanese Government shall provide that, where the national has suffered injury by reason of any such judgment, he shall be restored in the position in which he was before the judgment was given or shall be afforded such relief as may be just and equitable in the circumstances.

(a) It is recognized that the intervention of the state of war has not affected the obligation to pay pecuniary debts arising out of obligations and contracts (including those in respect of bonds) which existed and rights which were acquired before the existence of a state of war, and which are due by the Government or nationals of Japan to the Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers, or are due by the Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers to the Government or nationals of Japan. The intervention of a state of war shall equally not be regarded as affecting the obligation to consider on their merits claims for loss or damage to property or for personal injury or death which arose before the existence of a state of war, and which may be presented or re-presented by the Government of one of the Allied Powers to the Government of Japan, or by the Government of Japan to any of the Governments of the Allied Powers. The provisions of this paragraph are without prejudice to the rights conferred by Article 14.

(b) Japan affirms its liability for the prewar external debt of the Japanese State and for debts of corporate bodies subsequently declared to be liabilities of the Japanese State, and expresses its intention to enter into negotiations at an early date with its creditors with respect to the resumption of payments on those debts; to encourage negotiations in respect to other prewar claims and obligations; and to facilitate the transfer of sums accordingly.

(a) Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of the war or out of actions taken because of the existence of a state of war, and waives all claims arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of any of the Allied Powers in Japanese territory prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty.

(b) The foregoing waiver includes any claims arising out of actions taken by any of the Allied Powers with respect to Japanese ships between 1 September 1939 and the coming into force of the present Treaty, as well as any claims and debts arising in respect to Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of the Allied Powers, but does not include Japanese claims specificially recognized in the laws of any Allied Power enacted since 2 September 1945.

(c) Subject to reciprocal renunciation, the Japanese Government also renounces all claims (including debts) against Germany and German nationals on behalf of the Japanese Government and Japanese nationals, including intergovernmental claims and claims for loss or damage sustained during the war, but excepting (a) claims in respect of contracts entered into and rights acquired before 1 September 1939, and (b) claims arising out of trade and financial relations between Japan and Germany after 2 September 1945. Such renunciation shall not prejudice actions taken in accordance with Articles 16 and 20 of the present Treaty.

(d) Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of occupation under or in consequence of directives of the occupation authorities or authorized by Japanese law at that time, and will take no action subjecting Allied nationals to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts or omissions.

Japan will take all necessary measures to ensure such disposition of German assets in Japan as has been or may be determined by those powers entitled under the Protocol of the proceedings of the Berlin Conference of 1945 to dispose of those assets, and pending the final disposition of such assets will be responsible for the conservation and administration thereof.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 25 of the present Treaty, China shall be entitled to the benefits of Articles 10 and 14(a)2; and Korea to the benefits of Articles 2, 4, 9 and 12 of the present Treaty.

If in the opinion of any Party to the present Treaty there has arisen a dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaty, which is not settled by reference to a special claims tribunal or by other agreed means, the dispute shall, at the request of any party thereto, be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice. Japan and those Allied Powers which are not already parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice will deposit with the Registrar of the Court, at the time of their respective ratifications of the present Treaty, and in conformity with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council, dated 15 October 1946, a general declaration accepting the jurisdiction, without special agreement, of the Court generally in respect to all disputes of the character referred to in this Article.

(a) The present Treaty shall be ratified by the States which sign it, including Japan, and will come into force for all the States which have then ratified it, when instruments of ratification have been deposited by Japan and by a majority, including the United States of America as the principal occupying Power, of the following States, namely Australia, Canada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. The present Treaty shall come into force of each State which subsequently ratifies it, on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

(b) If the Treaty has not come into force within nine months after the date of the deposit of Japan's ratification, any State which has ratified it may bring the Treaty into force between itself and Japan by a notification to that effect given to the Governments of Japan and the United States of America not later than three years after the date of deposit of Japan's ratification.

All instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America which will notify all the signatory States of each such deposit, of the date of the coming into force of the Treaty under paragraph (a) of Article 23, and of any notifications made under paragraph (b) of Article 23.

For the purposes of the present Treaty the Allied Powers shall be the States at war with Japan, or any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, provided that in each case the State concerned has signed and ratified the Treaty. Subject to the provisions of Article 21, the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits on any State which is not an Allied Power as herein defined; nor shall any right, title or interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision of the Treaty in favour of a State which is not an Allied Power as so defined.

Japan will be prepared to conclude with any State which signed or adhered to the United Nations Declaration of 1 January 1942, and which is at war with Japan, or with any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, which is not a signatory of the present Treaty, a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty, but this obligation on the part of Japan will expire three years after the first coming into force of the present Treaty. Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.

The present Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America which shall furnish each signatory State with a certified copy thereof.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this eighth day of September 1951, in the English, French, and Spanish languages, all being equally authentic, and in the Japanese language.

For Liberia: Gabriel L. DENNIS, James ANDERSON, Raymond HORACE, J. Rudolf GRIMES

For the Republic of the Philippines: Carlos P. RÓMULO, J.M. ELIZALDE, Vicente FRANCISCO, Diosdado MACAPAGAL, Emiliano T. TIRONA, V.G. SINCO

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Herbert MORRISON, Kenneth YOUNGER, Oliver FRANKS

For the United States of America: Dean ACHESON, John Foster DULLES, Alexander WILEY, John J. SPARKMAN

For Japan: Shigeru YOSHIDA 吉田茂, Hayato IKEDA 池田勇人, Gizo TOMABECHI 苫米地義三, Niro HOSHIJIMA 星島二郎, Muneyoshi TOKUGAWA 徳川宗敬, Hisato ICHIMADA 一万田尚登

Neither the ROC nor the PRC were invited to the San Francisco Peace Conference which took place Sept. 4–8, 1951, and neither were parties to the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT). The ROC concluded a separate peace treaty with Japan in 1952 (see below). Of the 51 nations that had sent delegates to the conference, three (Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union) did not sign the SFPT, India and Burma were not present at the conference at all.

Below see the translations for the term "San Francisco Peace Treaty" in Chinese and for the term "Treaty of Peace with Japan" in Japanese.

Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan

Entered into force on August 5, 1952, by the exchange of the instruments of ratification at Taipei

Considering their mutual desire for good neighbourliness in view of their historical and cultural ties and geographical proximity; Realising the importance of their close cooperation to the promotion of their common welfare and to the maintenance of international peace and security; Recognising the need for a settlement of problems that have arisen as a result of the existence of a state of war between them; Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace and have accordingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries,

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

The state of war between the Republic of China and Japan is terminated as from the date on which the present Treaty enters into force.

It is recognised that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace which Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on 8 September 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the San Francisco Treaty), Japan has renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratley Islands and the Paracel Islands.

The disposition of property of Japan and its nationals in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores), and their claims, including debts, against the authorities of the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and the residents thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and residents and their claims, including debts, against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between the Government of the Republic of China and the Government of Japan. The terms nationals and residents include juridical persons.

It is recognised that all treaties, conventions, and agreements concluded before 9 December 1941 between Japan and China have become null and void as a consequence of the war.

It is recognised that under the provisions of Article 10 of the San Francisco Treaty, Japan has renounced all special rights and its interests in China, including all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on 7 September 1901, and all annexes, notes, and documents supplementary thereto, and has agreed to the abrogation in respect to Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes, and documents.

(a) The Republic of China and Japan will be guided by the principles of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations in their mutual relations.

(b) The Republic of China and Japan will cooperate in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, will promote their common welfare through friendly cooperation in the economic field.

The Republic of China and Japan will endeavour to conclude, as soon as possible, a treaty or agreement to place their trading, maritime, and other commercial relations, on a stable and friendly basis.

The Republic of China and Japan will endeavour to conclude, as soon as possible, an agreement relating to civil air transport.

The Republic of China and Japan will endeavour to conclude, as soon as possible, an agreement providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas.

For the purposes of the present Treaty, nationals of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all the inhabitants and former inhabitants of Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and their descendents who are of the Chinese nationality in accordance with the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores); and juridical persons of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all those registered under the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores).

Unless otherwise provided for in the present Treaty and the documents supplementary thereto, any problem arising between the Republic of China and Japan as a result of the existence of a state of war shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of the San Francisco Treaty.

Any dispute that may arise out of the interpretation or application of the present Treaty shall be settled by negotiation or other pacific means.

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Taipei as soon as possible. The present Treaty shall enter into force as from the date on which such instruments of ratification are exchanged.

The present Treaty shall be in the Chinese, Japanese, and English languages. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at Taipei, this Twenty Eighth day of the Fourth month of the Forty First year of the REPUBLIC OF CHINA, corresponding to the Twenty Eighth day of the Fourth month of the Twenty Seventh year of SHOWA of Japan and to the Twenty Eighth day of April in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty Two.

民國四十一年四月二十八日簽訂，民國四十一年八月五日互換批准書，民國四十一年八月五日生效】

鑒於兩國由於其歷史文化關係及領土鄰近而產生之相互睦鄰願望；

了解兩國之密切合作對於增進其共同福利及維持世界和平與安全，均屬重要；

均認由於兩國間戰爭狀態之存在而引起之各項問題，亟待解決；

中華民國總統閣下：葉公超先生；日本國政府：河田烈先生；

各該全權代表經將其所奉全權證書提出互相校閱，認為均屬妥善，爰議定條款如左：

第一條中華民國與日本國間之戰爭狀態，自本約發生效力之日起，即告終止。

第二條茲承認依照公曆一千九百五十一年九月八日在美利堅合眾國金山市簽訂之對日和平條約（以下簡稱金山和約）第二條，日本國業已放棄對於臺灣及澎湖群島以及南沙群島及西沙群島之一切權利、權利名義與要求。

第三條關於日本國及國民在臺灣及澎湖之財產及其對於在臺灣及澎湖之中華民國當局及居民所作要求(包括債權在內)之處置，及該中華民國當局及居民在日本國之財產及其對於日本國及日本國國民所作要求(包括債權在內)之處置，應由中華民國政府與日本國政府間另商特別處理辦法。本約任何條款所用「國民」及「居民」等名詞，均包括法人在內。

第四條茲承認中國與日本國間在中華民國三十年即公曆一千九百四十一年十二月九日以前所締結之一切條約、專約及協定，均因戰爭結果而歸無效。

第五條茲承認依照金山和約第十條之規定，日本國業已放棄在中國之一切特殊權利及利益。包括由於中華民國紀元前十一年即公曆一千九百零一年九月七日在北京簽訂之最後議定書與一切附件及補充之各換文暨文件所產生之一切利益與特權；並已同意就關於日本國方面廢除該議定書、附件、換文及文件。

第六條（甲）中華民國與日本國在其相互之關係上，願各遵聯合國憲章第二條之各項原則　（乙）中華民國與日本國願依聯合國憲章之原則彼此合作，並特願經由經濟方面之友好合作，促進兩國之共同福利。

第七條中華民國與日本國願儘速商訂一項條約或協定，藉以將兩國貿易、航業及其他商務關係，置於穩定與友好之基礎上。

第八條中華民國與日本國願儘速商訂一項關於民用航空運輸之協定。

第九條中華民國與日本國願儘速締結一項為規範或限制捕魚、及保存暨開發公海漁業之協定。

第十條就本約而言，中華民國國民應認為包括依照中華民國在臺灣及澎湖所已施行或將來可能施行之法律規章而具有中國國籍之一切臺灣及澎湖居民及前屬臺灣及澎湖之居民及其後裔；中華民國法人應認為包括依照中華民國在臺灣及澎湖所已施行或將來可能施行之法律規章所登記之一切法人。

第十一條除本約及其補充文件另有規定外，凡在中華民國與日本國間因戰爭狀態存在之結果而引起之任何問題，均應依照金山和約之有關規定予以解決。

第十二條凡因本約之解釋或適用可能發生之任何爭執，應以磋商或其他和平方式解決之。

第十三條本約應予批准，批准文件應儘速在臺北互換。本約應自批准文件互換之日起發生效力。

第十四條本約應分繕中文、日文及英文。遇有解釋不同，應以英文本為準。

本約共繕二份，於中華民國四十一年四月二十八日即日本國昭和二十七年四月二十八日即公曆一千九百五十二年四月二十八日訂於臺北。

中華民國代表　葉公超（蓋印）日本國代表　河田烈（蓋印）

The Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan/Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (abbrev. Zhong Ri heping tiaoyue 中日和平條約 or Zhong Ri heyue 中日和約) is commonly also known as the Treaty of Taipei (Taibei heyue 台北和約); in Japanese: Nippon kokuto Chuka minkoku tono aidano heiwa jōyaku 日本国と中華民国との間の平和条約.

Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty

Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of America February 9, 1955;

WHEREAS the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China was signed at Washington on December 2, 1954 by their respective plenipotentiaries, the original of which Treaty in the English and Chinese languages is word for word as follows:

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the West Pacific Area,

Recalling with mutual pride the relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side by side against imperialist aggression during the last war,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the West Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the West Pacific Area,

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with each other in the development of economic progress and social well-being and to further their individual and collective efforts toward these ends.

The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty.

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it world act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms "territorial" and "territories" shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores: and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction. The provisions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.

The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government of the United Stares of America accepts, the right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement.

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of China in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Taipei.

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

DONE in duplicate, in the English and Chinese languages, at Washington on this second day of December of the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty-four, corresponding to the second day of the twelfth month of the Forty-third year of the Republic of China.

茲重申其對聯合國憲章之宗旨與原則之信心，及其與所有人民及政府和平相處之願望，並欲增強西太平洋區域之和平結構；

以光榮之同感，追溯上次大戰期間，兩國人民為對抗帝國主義侵略，而在相互同情與共同理想之結合下，團結一致併肩作戰之關係；

願公開正式宣告其團結之精誠，及為其自衛而抵禦外來武裝攻擊之共同決心，俾使任何潛在之侵略者不存有任一締約國在西太平洋區域立於孤立地位之妄想；並

願加強兩國為維護和平與安全而建立集體防禦之現有努力，以待西太平洋區域安全制度之發展；

第一條本條約締約國承允依照聯合國憲章之規定，以不危及國際和平安全與正義之和平方法，解決可能牽涉兩國之任何國際爭議，並在其國際關係中，不以任何與聯合國宗旨相悖之方式，作武力之威脅或使用武力。

第二條為期更有效達成本條約之目的起見，締約國將個別並聯合以自助及互助之方式，維持並發展其個別及集體之能力，以抵抗武裝攻擊，及由國外指揮之危害其領土完整與政治安定之共產顛覆活動。

第三條締約國承允加強其自由制度，彼此合作以發展其經濟進步與社會福利，並為達到此等目的，而增加其個別與集體之努力。

第四條締約國將經由其外交部部長或其代表，就本條約之實施隨時會商。

第五條每一締約國承認對在西太平洋區域內任一締約國領土之武裝攻擊，即將危及其本身之和平與安全。茲並宣告將依其憲法程序採取行動，以對付此共同危險。

任何此項武裝攻擊及因而採取之一切措施，應立即報告聯合國安全理事會。此等措施應於安全理事會採取恢復並維持國際和平與安全之必要措施時予以終止。

第六條為適用於第二條及第五條之目的，所有『領土』等辭，就中華民國而言，應指台灣與澎湖；就美利堅合眾國而言，應指西太平洋區域內在其管轄下之各島嶼領土。第二條及第五條之規定，並將適用於共同協議所決定之其他領土。

第七條中華民國政府給予，美利堅合眾國政府接受，依共同協議之決定，在台灣澎湖及其附近，為其防衛所需而部署美國陸海空軍之權利。

第八條本條約並不影響，且不應被解釋為影響，締約國在聯合國憲章下之權利及義務，或聯合國為維持國際和平與安全所負之責任。

第九條本條約應由美利堅合眾國與中華民國各依其憲法程序以批准，並將於在台北互換批准書之日起發生效力。

第十條本條約應無限期有效。任一締約國得於廢約之通知送達另一締約國一年後，予以終止。

美利堅合眾國代表：約翰‧福斯特‧杜勒斯【John Foster Dulles】

The US Congress Formosa Resolution

[Approved by House vote 409-3 on January 25, 1955 and by Senate vote 85-3 on January 28, 1955]

U.S. Congressional Authorization for the President to Employ the Armed Forces of the United States to Protect Formosa, the Pescadores, and Related Positions and Territories of That Area

Whereas the primary purpose of the United States, in its relations with all other nations, is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and Whereas certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China are now under armed attack, and threats and declarations have been and are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores,

Whereas such armed attack if continued would gravely endanger the peace and security of the West Pacific Area and particularly of Formosa and the Pescadores; and

Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and

Whereas the President of the United States on January 6, 1955, submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification a Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China, which recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against territories, therein described, in the region of Formosa and the Pescadores, would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the parties to the treaty:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.

In Chinese, the Formosa Resolution by the US Congress (Meiguo guohui 美國國會) is called Taiwan jueyi'an 台灣決議案 or Fuermosha jueyi'an 福爾摩沙決議案. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed it into law on Jan. 29, 1955. It was repealed by the US Congress on Oct. 26, 1974.

PRC Defense Minister Peng Dehuai’s Proclamation to Taiwan Compatriots

We are all Chinese; of the thirty-six stratagems, Peace is the best. The battle for Jinmen is of a punitive nature. Your leaders have for a long time been too outrageous, directing aircraft to fly all over the mainland, reaching as far as Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Xikang, Qinghai, where they scattered leaflets, dropped spies, bombed Fujian, and harassed Jiangsu and Zhejiang. This is beyond intolerable. Therefore, we fired a few cannons, to get your attention.

Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu are Chinese territory. On this point you agree, as can be seen in your leader’s statements, and they are definitely not American territory. Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu are part of China, and not a separate country. There is only one China in the world, there are not two Chinas. On this point you also agree, as can be seen in your leader’s statements. Your leader has signed a military agreement with the Americans, which is one-sided, we don’t accept it, and it ought to be invalidated.

The Americans will certainly one day abandon you, don’t you believe it? The giant that is history will bear evidence to this. The clue is already exposed in Dulles’ September 30 interview. Can you not shiver, standing in your position? After all, American imperialism is our common enemy. 130,000 soldiers and civilians on Jinmen are running out of supplies, suffering from cold and hunger. They cannot go on in this condition. For humanitarian reasons, I have already ordered the front lines in Fujian [to observe] a one week temporary cease fire, starting on October 6, so that you can completely and freely transport supplies, on the condition that there is no American convoy. If there is a convoy then it won’t apply.

This war between us has already been going on for more than thirty years and still hasn’t ended, and that is not good. We propose holding negotiation, to achieve a peaceful settlement. Several years ago Premier Zhou [Enlai] had already told you about this. This is China’s internal affair, a problem between our two sides, it isn’t a bilateral problem involving the United States and China. The U.S. occupation of Taiwan, Penghu, and the Taiwan Straits – that is a bilateral problem between the United States and China, which ought to be resolved through negotiations between the two countries, and there are currently talks being held in Warsaw.

The Americans will have to leave one day, there is no alternative. It would be in the Americans’ interest to leave earlier, because they would retain the initiative. Leaving later won’t be good [for them] because they will be forced. Why did an Eastern Pacific country come to the Western Pacific? The Western Pacific is the Western Pacific people’s Western Pacific, just the same as the Eastern Pacific is the Eastern Pacific people’s Eastern Pacific, this is just common sense, and the Americans ought to understand it. There is no war between the People’s Republic of China and the United States, so there is no so-called cease-fire. To talk about a cease-fire where there is no fire, isn’t it plain nonsense? Friends on Taiwan, there are the fires of war between us, which ought to stop, and be extinguished. This will require negotiations. Of course, to fight for another thirty years would be no big deal, but ultimately it would be preferable to come to an early peaceful resolution. Please, it’s up to you to decide where you want to go.

我們都是中國人。三十六計，和為上計。金門戰鬥，屬於懲罰性質。你們的領導者們過去長時期間太倡狂了，命令飛機向大陸亂鑽，遠及雲、貴、川、康、青海，發傳單，丟特務，炸福州，擾江浙。是可忍，孰不可忍？因此打一些炮，引起你們注意。

台、澎、金、馬是中國領土，這一點你們是同意的，見之于你們領導人的文告，確實不是美國人的領土。台、澎、金、馬是中國的一部分，不是另一個國家。世界上只有一個中國，沒有兩個中國。這一點，也是你們同意的，見之于你們領導人的文告。你們領導人與美國人訂立軍事協定，是片面的，我們不承認，應予廢除。

美國人總有一天肯定要拋棄你們的。你們不信嗎？歷史巨人會要出來作證明的。杜勒斯九月三十日的談話，端倪已見。站在你們的地位，能不寒心？歸根結底，美帝國主義是我們的共同敵人。十三萬金門軍民，供應缺乏，饑寒交迫，難為久計。為了人道主義，我已命令福建前線，從十月六日起，暫以七天為期，停止炮擊，你們可以充分地自由地輸送供應品，但以沒有美國人護航為條件。如有護航，不在此例。

你們與我們之間的戰爭，三十年了，尚未結束，這是不好的。建議舉行談判，實行和平解決。這一點，周恩來總理在幾年前已經告訴你們了。這是中國內部貴我兩方有關的問題，不是中美兩國有關的問題。美國侵佔台澎與臺灣海峽，這是中美兩方有關的問題，應當由兩國舉行談判解決，目前正在華沙舉行。

美國人總是要走的，不走是不行的。早走于美國有利，因為它可以取得主動。遲走不利，因為它老是被動。一個東太平洋國家，為什麼跑到西太平洋來了呢？西太平洋是西太平洋人的西太平洋，正如東太平洋是東太平洋人的東太平洋一樣。這一點是常識，美國人應當懂得。中華人民共和國與美國之間並無戰爭，無所謂停火。無火而談停火，豈非笑話？臺灣的朋友們，我們之間是有戰火的，應當停止，並予熄滅。這就需要談判。當然，再打三十年，也不是什麼了不起的大事，但是究竟以早日和平解決較為妥善。何去何從，請你們酌定。

A separate PDF file (102 pages in A4 format, file size 3.2 MB) showing above text plus selected other statements, declarations, treaties, laws, and communiqués written or co-authored by high-ranking representatives of the PRC pertaining to the relations with Taiwan can be found here. To view another PDF file—69 A4 pages, 3.2 MB—showing the full text of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by SEF and ARATS representatives in June 2010 please click here.

Legal Problems Regarding Formosa and the Offshore Islands

Since August 23, when the Chinese Communists began their massive bombardment of Quemoy, no item has received as much coverage in the world press as the problems of Formosa and the offshore islands. We are now in a period of relative calm. However, in the 4 months that have elapsed since August 23 considerable discussion and world anxiety have been generated by the matter. In this discussion there have been intertwined elements of policy and of law. I do not intend here to go into the policy issues. I appreciate the opportunity you have afforded me to take up the legal problems. With respect to the questions of law these involve a blend of national and international aspects.

Before going into the legal problems it is desirable to review briefly the geographical and historical background of Formosa and the offshore islands.

Formosa, or Taiwan, is an island about 100 miles from the mainland of China. It has an area equal to that of Maryland and a population of about 10 million people, comprising 8.5 million persons of Chinese descent, 1.5 million mainland Chinese, and 100,000 aborigines. Close to and westward of Formosa are the Pescadores Islands, or Penghus. I shall use the term “Formosa” hereafter as also covering these islands.

Close to the mainland of China, in the vicinity of the city of Amoy and about 5 miles away, is the Quemoy group of islands consisting mainly of Big Quemoy, Little Quemoy, and the two tiny Tan Islands.

About 120 miles up the mainland coast and in the vicinity of Foochow and about 10 miles off the coast is the Matsu group of islands.

Both these groups are in the control of the Republic of China. I shall hereafter speak of them as the offshore islands. These islands have been for a very long time under Chinese sovereignty.

Since the middle of the 17th century and up to 1895 Formosa was a part of the Chinese Empire. In 1895 under the Treaty of Shimonoseki China ceded Formosa to Japan. In the Cairo conference in November 1943 the United States, United Kingdom, and China declared it was their “purpose” that Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores “shall be restored to the Republic of China.” Thereafter in August 1945 in the Potsdam conference the United States, United Kingdom, and China declared that “the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out.” This Potsdam declaration was subsequently adhered to by the U.S.S.R. On September 2, 1945, the Japanese Government, in the instrument of surrender, accepted the provisions of the declaration. The Supreme Allied Commander for the Allied Powers then issued Directive No. 1, under which the Japanese Imperial Headquarters issued General Order No. 1 requiring Japanese commanders in Formosa to surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China. Since September 1945 the United States and the other Allied Powers have accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over the island. In article 2 of the Japanese Peace Treaty, which entered into force April 28, 1952, Japan renounced all “right, title and claim” to Formosa. Neither this agreement nor any other agreement thereafter has purported to transfer the sovereignty of Formosa to China.

In the meantime, since the end of the war in 1945, the Chinese Communists had been engaged in open hostilities with the Republic of China. On October 1, 1949, they proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Two days later the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with this regime. The Chinese Communists made their first attempt to capture Quemoy in late 1949 and were repulsed with heavy losses by the Chinese Government on October 27. The Chinese Government had been transferring its offices to Taipei, Formosa, and early in December 1949 Taipei became the provisional capital of the Republic of China.

On January 5, 1950, President Truman, in a public statement regarding Formosa, declared that the United States had no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory, did not seek any special privileges therein, and would not pursue a course which would lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. ² However, when the Communists attacked the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950, President Truman issued a public statement noting that the Communists had made clear their intent to use armed invasion and war for purposes of conquest and had defied the Security Council of the United Nations. ³ He thereupon ordered the Seventh Fleet “to prevent any attacks on Formosa” and as a corollary called upon the Chinese Government to cease all operations against the mainland. In addition he stated that “The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.”

On August 24, 1950, the Chinese Communist regime sent a telegram to the President of the United Nations Security Council calling President Truman's action “a direct armed aggression on the territory of China and a total violation of the United Nations Charter.” In a statement on the same day the State Department said the United States would welcome the United Nations consideration of the problem, and on September 21 we formally asked that it be put on the agenda of the General Assembly. The United States made this request at a time when there seemed to be a reasonable prospect that peace and security could be restored in Korea. When these hopes were destroyed by Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, the United States on November 15 asked that consideration of the Formosa question be deferred. In the meantime the Soviet Union had initiated resolutions in the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations condemning the United States for alleged “armed invasion” of Formosa. The General Assembly never endorsed the charges, and they were dropped. The Security Council defeated the Soviet resolution on November 30 by a vote of 9 to 1.

In July of 1954, at the time when the Geneva Accords were being negotiated to end hostilities in Indochina, the Chinese Communist regime launched a massive propaganda campaign for the “liberation of Taiwan.” On September 3 the Chinese Communists began a heavy bombardment of the island of Quemoy, and military attacks spread to coastal islands including the Tachen Islands to the north. Against this background the United States–Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty was signed on December 2, 1954. ⁴ The territorial coverage of the treaty in respect of China was limited to Formosa. The treaty was accompanied by an exchange of notes of December 10 ⁵ by which the United States and the Republic of China undertook not to use force from the Formosa area or the offshore islands except by joint agreement or in self-defense. It might be pointed out that these defensive arrangements merely formalized and did not in any way extend the United States undertaking for the defense of Formosa going back to June 1950.

The Peiping regime propaganda campaign was stepped up throughout December and January, and the Chinese Communists launched heavy aerial bombardment on the coastal islands and invaded and seized Ichiang Island. These actions were accompanied by broadcast declarations that the actions were preliminary to the taking of Formosa. Following these attacks President Eisenhower on January 24, 1955, requested a resolution from Congress publicly establishing the authority of the President to employ United States forces as he deemed necessary to secure and protect Formosa from armed attack. This joint resolution was passed January 29. ⁶ The United States also supported in the United Nations Security Council a New Zealand proposal for the consideration of the question of hostilities in the offshore-island area. However, the Peiping regime refused the invitation of the Security Council to be present and participate in the discussion. The Chinese Communists said that the New Zealand resolution was not within the competence of the United Nations because the liberation of Formosa and other coastal islands was a matter of “sovereign right” and an internal affair.

In several statements made in 1955 the President and the Secretary of State reiterated the desire of the United States to find a peaceful solution to the tension in the Formosa area, and ambassadorial talks were opened in Geneva in 1955 with the Chinese Communists relating to this subject as well as other topics. However, these conversations proved abortive since the Chinese Communists refused to agree to a proposal which concerned renunciation of force in the Formosa area.

During the period from February 1955 up to August 23 of this year the Chinese Communist attacks on the Republic of China were relatively infrequent. Then on August 23 the Chinese Communists commenced a massive bombardment of the Quemoy Islands, once again resorting to armed force and precipitating a grave situation in the Formosan Straits. From the beginning of the attacks the United States has shown a desire for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in the Formosa Straits. When the Chinese Communists on September 6 stated a willingness to resume the suspended ambassadorial talks at Geneva, the United States welcomed the prospect. Since that time the United States has, in talks now taking place in Warsaw, been seeking to obtain a cessation of Chinese Communist attacks.

On October 5 the Chinese Communists announced a 1-week suspension of the bombardment, conditional on the discontinuance of the United States escort activities. The Department of State issued a statement welcoming the Communist move and expressing the hope it foreshadowed a permanent end to the attacks. ⁷ At the end of the week the Chinese Communists extended their cease-fire for another 2 weeks. However, on October 20, justifying their action on alleged escorting activities, the Chinese Communists resumed bombardment but announced shortly thereafter that bombardment of certain areas on Quemoy would only take place on odd numbered days. Since that time bombardment has greatly diminished.

As a result of meetings between Secretary Dulles and Chiang Kai-shek pursuant to article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty a joint communique was issued on October 23. ⁸ In this communique it was recognized that under the present conditions the defense of the offshore islands is “closely related” to the defense of Formosa. Further, the Republic of China stated that the “principal means” of restoring freedom to its people on the mainland is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's “three people's principles” and “not the use of force.”

This then brings us up to the present. On the basis of this background we can now go into the legal issues presented.

The legal problems concerning Formosa and the offshore islands break down into two main subdivisions: (a) the legal problems with respect to the authority of the Executive under United States law, and (b) the authority of the United States Government under international law. It may be best to consider the national aspect first.

In January 1955, in a period in which the Chinese Communists were taking menacing actions with respect to the offshore islands and Formosa and after we had signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, the President sent a message to Congress urging a resolution by Congress authorizing him, if necessary, to take military action in the Formosa area. The message recited that Formosa constituted a part of the vital island chain of defenses of the United States and free nations in the Western Pacific. The President alluded to Quemoy as “one of the natural approaches to Formosa” and said that attacks upon the offshore islands have been asserted by the Chinese Communists themselves to be “a prelude to the conquest of Formosa.” The President then said:

But, unhappily, the danger of armed attack directed against that area compels us to take into account closely related localities and actions which, under current conditions, might determine the failure or success of such an attack. The authority that may be accorded by the Congress would be used only in situations which are recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries to, an attack against the main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores.

After serious debate Congress passed House Joint Resolution 159 (Public Law 4, 84th Congress, 1st session, chapter 4). This resolution reads in pertinent part:

... the President of the United States be and he is hereby authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

In the light of the above, let us first take up the question of the authority of the President to take military action to defend Formosa. In this connection it should be recalled that under article V of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Government of China it is provided that an armed attack on the territories of one of the parties would be dangerous to the other party's peace and security and the other party declare that it would act to meet the common danger “in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Under article VI the term “territories” in respect to the Republic of China is limited to Formosa (and the Pescadores). Thus if an armed attack took place on Formosa the question might arise as to the content of the phrase “in accordance with its constitutional processes.” It might be argued that it is only Congress which could take action under the constitutional provision giving it the power to declare war. However, as is well known, it is considered that the President has a large power to take military action in emergency situations for the defense of the United States without awaiting action by Congress. In the present situation, House Joint Resolution 159 eliminates any problem on this score since, in the words of the President's message, the resolution clearly and publicly establishes the authority of the President to take military action in the defense of Formosa as he deems necessary.

The second question concerns the authority of the President to take action to defend the offshore islands. The Mutual Defense Treaty does not cover in its territorial scope the offshore islands, and there is no commitment therein of United States action in their defense. However, House Joint Resolution 159 authorizes the President to protect “such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands” and to take “such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.” What is the meaning of this clause?

It has been argued that the phrase “related positions and territories” refers only to areas that are necessary from the standpoint of military tactics for the defense of Formosa. Thus, this argument runs, the President has only the power to defend Quemoy if Quemoy in a military sense is essential to the defense of Formosa, so that if Quemoy fell the defense of Formosa would be tactically impossible. The argument continues that, since Quemoy is not essential in this sense, the President has no authority to defend it.

It is our view that the language with respect to the offshore islands, read in its natural sense and with relation to the background message of the President and the debate in Congress, permits a broader meaning. (1) The word “related” would seem logically to cover the situation where the position or territory in question is not “essential” to the defense of Formosa but one in which the loss of the position or territory would make that defense harder or more difficult. (2) More importantly, the word “related” would appear to cover the situation in which the offshore islands are part and parcel of a general plan for the seizure of Formosa or preliminary thereto. In the present situation it is evident from the innumerable statements issued by the Chinese Communists that they view their whole action with respect to the offshore islands as related in this way to the “liberation” of Formosa. (3) Further, it is improper in our view to give a too physical interpretation to the word “related.” In this connection it might be pointed out that the offshore islands constitute an extremely important psychological element in the will to resist of the defenders of Formosa. In this sense the loss of the offshore islands is quite clearly related to the defense of Formosa. (4) Fourthly, emphasis should be given to the language “such related positions” as “he judges to be required or appropriate” in assuring the defense of Formosa. Implicit in this language is that discretion is lodged in the President to determine what related positions are required or appropriate in the defense of Formosa. (5) Fifthly, it should be emphasized the President has also power to take “such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate” in the defense of Formosa, and this is not tied down to any phrase as to “related positions.”

Considering the cumulative effect of all these points and taking into account the inherent constitutional powers of the President, it is our view that the President has an extremely broad latitude of decision with respect to taking action to defend the offshore islands. In this connection it will be recalled that in the joint communique issued on October 23 at Taipei, at the conclusion of the Dulles-Chiang discussions, it was stated that “It was recognized that under the present conditions the defense of the Quemoys, together with the Matsus, is closely related” to the defense of Formosa.

On the international front it is best to examine the problem of Formosa separately from the problem of the offshore islands.

In giving the historical background of Formosa it has been pointed out that at Cairo the Allies stated it was their purpose to restore Formosa to Chinese sovereignty and that at the end of the war the Republic of China receive the surrender of Japanese forces on Formosa. It has also been pointed out that under the Japanese Peace Treaty Japan renounced all right, title, and claim to Formosa. However, neither in that treaty nor in any other treaty has there been any definitive cession to China of Formosa. The situation is, then, one where the Allied Powers still have to come to some agreement or treaty with respect to the status of Formosa. Any action, therefore, of the Chinese Communist regime to seize Formosa constitutes an attempt to seize by force territory which does not belong to it. Such a seizure is prohibited by international law and the United Nations Charter as an attempt to settle a claim to territory by force. It would thus appear that the United States is within its legal rights in taking action to defend Formosa.

With respect to the offshore islands the situation is admittedly somewhat different. There is no question that these islands are a part of the state of China. It may be admitted further that these islands are close to the mainland of China. However, the offshore islands have been in the possession and effective control of the Government of the Republic of China since its inception, except for the period of the Japanese war. Since 1949 a status quo has come into existence vis-a-vis the Peiping regime. It is this status quo which the Chinese Communists have threatened with the menace of armed force. It is our view that we have here in fact a situation comparable to that which obtained in Korea preceding the invasion of south Korea by north Korea. In other words, the action of the Chinese Communists in taking warlike measures is an effort to change the status quo and to gain additional territory by force in violation of the prohibitions of the United Nations Charter.

It has been urged that this is essentially a civil war and therefore it is improper for the United States to participate with the Government of the Republic of China in defense of the offshore islands. It should first be pointed out that it is too narrow to look upon the conflict merely as a civil war. Even as early as the end of the war with Japan the Soviet Union, in violation of its treaty with the Chinese Nationalists, turned over large stores of equipment and in other ways furnished material aid to the Chinese Communists. Since that time the Soviet Union has continued giving large assistance to the Chinese Communist regime. Thus much of the ammunition, artillery, and planes that are at present being used by that regime derive from Russian sources. And the Soviet Union is allied by military treaty with the Chinese regime. On the other hand the United States has vital interests in the Formosa area and is allied with the Republic of China in a Mutual Defense Treaty and has agreements to supply arms for defensive purposes. In the circumstances it seems fair to say that we are here involved in what is realistically an international dispute which the Communist regime is attempting to settle by force.

Further with respect to the argument that this is a civil war, it will be recalled that this was the same argument that was made by Vishinsky regarding the north Korean invasion of south Korea. It was an argument however which the United Nations paid no heed to but, instead, viewed the action of the north Koreans as one of aggression which came under the ban of the United Nations Charter. Secretary Dulles has summarized the situation forcefully in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly on September 18. ⁹ He said:

1. The Chinese Communist regime has never during its 9 years of existence exercised authority over Taiwan, the Penghus, or the Quemoy or Matsu Islands.

2. The Chinese Communist regime is now attempting to extend its authority to these areas by the use of naked force.

In 1950 the United Nations met that issue squarely. By overwhelming vote it found that the attack of north Korea to “unify” Korea was armed aggression. It condemned the Chinese Communist regime as an aggressor because of its part in that armed attack.

I do not ignore the argument that today's Chinese Communist attack is a “civil war” operation. Mr. Vishinsky made a parallel argument in 1950. He told us that the war in Korea was purely a “civil war” and that outsiders who intervened were “aggressors.” The United Nations overwhelmingly rejected that contention. ...

The fact is that, when one regime attempts by force to take additional territory which has long been under the authority of another government, recognized as such by a respectable part of the world community, that is a use of force which endangers world order.

On this phase of the matter it is our view, then, that the United States would be justified from an international standpoint in cooperating with the Republic of China in the defense of the offshore islands and Formosa.

Related to the problems of Formosa and the offshore islands is the question of the recognition policy of the United States. The United States Government has been criticized for its failure to recognize the Chinese Communist regime, some commentators taking the view that, since the Communist regime controls the great mass of mainland China as well as its 600 million inhabitants, the United States must accord recognition. It is the view of the United States Government that international law does not require one government to accord diplomatic recognition to another government. It is our view that the matter of diplomatic recognition is one solely to be determined as the national interest dictates, and in this case on an examination of all facets of the subject the United States Government believes that it would be contrary to our national interest to accord recognition. The various considerations involved in reaching this conclusion were spelled out in press release No. 459 of August 11, 1958, issued by the State Department. ¹⁰ This press release embodied the text of a memorandum sent by the Department to its missions abroad.

It is true that, in reviewing whether we should extend recognition, the United States Government, in this as well as in previous administrations, has looked to certain factors which are generally considered significant. These factors are (1) whether the government in question is in control of a certain territory, (2) whether the government reflects the will of the nation substantially declared, (3) whether the government is prepared to honor its international obligations. While the United States examines these factors, we do not view recognition as required upon a satisfactory finding with respect to these factors. Even if that were our view, there is serious question whether the Chinese Communist regime can in any way be considered to reflect the will of the nation; and there is no doubt, in view of flagrant past treaty violations and violations of the United Nations Charter and violations of international law and in view of statements made by the Chinese Communist regime about disregarding preexisting treaties, that the Chinese Communist regime is not prepared to honor its international obligations. Thus, even on this view, the Chinese Communists are not entitled to recognition.

As Secretary Dulles has pointed out, however, our failure to recognize the Chinese Communist regime has not meant that we refuse to deal with them where it is essential to our purpose and inures to our benefit. Thus we are at present carrying on conversations in Warsaw as we have carried on conversations in Geneva; we dealt with them in the Korean armistice negotiations; we dealt with them with respect to the cease-fires in Indochina; and we are prepared to deal with them whenever we believe it to be in the interest of the United States to do so.

As a collateral legal issue related to the Formosa Straits area there has arisen the question of the extent of the territorial sea. The Chinese Communist regime in a declaration dated September 4, 1958 declared their territorial sea to extend to 12 miles. In addition, their declaration indicated that they viewed the baselines from which the 12 miles were to be calculated as being points connecting basepoints on the mainland and on certain islands offshore. On the ground of this declaration they considered all the waters around the Quemoys and Matsus and areas well into the Formosa Straits as being internal or territorial waters, and they have charged the United States forces with more than 40 intrusions of such internal or territorial waters by warships and aircraft. The United States position on this matter is quite clear. The United States only recognizes the Government of the Republic of China; and as far as the United States is concerned the declaration of the Chinese Communist regime has therefore no force or validity. In addition the United States considers that international law recognizes only a 3-mile limit, that it is not possible for a country by unilateral action to take unto itself that which is the common property of all nations, and that this is, moreover, in violation of the universally accepted principle of the freedom of the high seas. The United States position finds support in the report of the United Nations International Law Commission ¹¹ wherein it is stated that “international law does not require states to recognize a breadth [of territorial sea] beyond 3 miles.”

Further, a country is not free to choose whether its territorial sea will be measured from the lowwater mark on the coast, which is the normal baseline, or whether it will use straight baselines connecting salient points or offshore islands. While article 4 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone ¹² adopted by the recent Geneva Conference on Law of the Sea permits the establishment of straight baselines in localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, it is clear that the Chinese coast along which the straight lines described in the statement of September 4 are drawn does not conform to the geographic conditions which are set forth in article 4. There is even less legal basis for drawing straight baselines from outermost points on a group of islands and claiming waters thereby included as internal waters. Similar attempts by other countries to claim, as internal waters, large areas of high seas within groups of islands or archipelagoes have been protested by many countries. The straight baselines described in the statement of September 4, 1958, are accordingly regarded by the United States as completely arbitrary and without any basis in recognized international law.

Another problem has been raised in the press with respect to United States escort activities of vessels of the Republic of China. Heretofore the United States vessels have avoided entering the territorial sea around Quemoy and the other offshore islands. The question has been raised whether in so doing we have been giving some implied recognition to the claim of the Chinese Communist regime as to its right to this territorial sea. Nothing could be further from the fact. Since the Government of the Republic of China is in effective control of Quemoy and the other offshore islands, we consider that it has the right to the territorial sea around these islands, just as it has the right to the territorial sea around Formosa. Moreover, just as our warships have, with the consent of the Government of the Republic of China, moved through the territorial sea of Formosa, so similarly with the consent of the Government of the Republic of China they could move through the territorial sea of Quemoy and the other offshore islands. There is no question that the Government of the Republic of China would be willing to give the United States such permission with respect to Quemoy and the offshore islands. However, the United States has thought it best as a matter of policy to keep United States warships in what are clearly international waters near Quemoy and the other offshore islands.

In conclusion, it is our view that from a national and international standpoint the President may properly use United States armed forces for the defense of Formosa and the offshore islands; the United States is not required to recognize the Chinese Communist regime; the declaration by the Chinese Communist regime regarding a 12-mile territorial sea has no validity.

Footnotes

(Source: Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1017, pp. 1005-1011; dated Dec. 22, 1958)

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,

Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

This Treaty shall be ratified by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.

This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area. However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

Done in duplicate at Washington in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan is called as follows in Chinese and Japanese:

Czyzak Memorandum

Memorandum from the Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs (L/FE - John J. Czyzak) to Mr. Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser

From the middle of the 17th century to 1895, Formosa and the Pescadores were part of the Chinese Empire. China then ceded these islands to Japan in 1895 in the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

When China declared war on Japan on December 9, 1941, she also declared that all treaties concerning the relations between China and Japan "are and remain null and void".

In the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the United States, Great Britain and China stated it to be their purpose that "all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as ... Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China". These same three governments on July 26, 1945 issued the Potsdam Proclamation declaring that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine". On August 8, 1945 the Soviet Union adhered to the Potsdam Proclamation. In the Instrument of Surrender signed September 2, 1945, the Japanese Government accepted its provisions.

Pursuant to Japanese Imperial General Headquarters General Order No. 1 issued at the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Japanese commanders in Formosa surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek "acting on behalf of the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". Continuously since that time, the Government of the Republic of China has occupied and administered Formosa and the Pescadores and subsequent to the surrender declared Formosa to be a part of China. Although there is no indication that the United States ever received official notification of such declaration, it can be said that the United States was aware of the fact that the Republic of China treated Formosa as a part of China. The view of the United States government in the post-war period, however, was typified by a statement on April 11, 1947 of Acting Secretary Acheson that the transfer of sovereignty over Formosa to China "has not yet been formalized". Sovereignty, it would appear, remained in Japan.

After a prolonged period of civil strife, the Chinese Communists succeeded in driving the Government of the Republic of China off the Chinese mainland. On October 1, 1949 the Chinese Communists proclaimed the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China. The seat of the Government of the Republic of China was transferred to Formosa, and in early December 1949, Taipei became its provisional capital.

The outbreak of hostilities in Korea on June 25, 1950 brought to the fore the question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores. President Truman, in ordering the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, stated that "the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations".

[On August 25, 1950] the United States replied to the United Nations Security Council that

"The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the allied forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the Island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now."

By a letter dated September 20, 1950, the United States requested that the question of Formosa be placed on the agenda of the fifth session of the U.N. General Assembly. In an explanatory note of September 21, the United States, citing the Cairo and Potsdam declarations and the Japanese surrender, stated nevertheless:

"Formal transfer of Formosa to China was to await the conclusion of peace with Japan or some other appropriate formal act."

Meanwhile the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council condemning the United States for acts of aggression and intervention in the internal affairs of China. The USSR also proposed for inclusion on the agenda of the fifth regular session of the General Assembly the question of "American aggression against China". In both cases the USSR asserted that Taiwan was an inalienable part of the territory of China. The U.S. delegate in Committee One, John Foster Dulles, answered the Soviet complaint of aggression in part as follows:

"In connection with this whole question of Formosa, I think it is wise for us to bear in mind that Formosa is still affected with an international interest. It is a former Japanese colony in the process of detachment. The United States certainly is entitled to some voice in the determination of the future of Formosa, because if it were not for the tremendous military effort and the great sacrifice which the United States made in that area of the world, none of us here today would be sitting around talking about Formosa.

"The United States, as one of the principal victors in the war against Japan, has a legitimate voice in what President Truman referred to as the "determination of the future status of Formosa," which he says, "must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan or consideration by the United Nations."

The Security Council defeated the Soviet resolution, and the General Assembly failed to endorse the charges against the U.S.

In September and October 1950, the United States proposed in a brief statement to the members of the Far Eastern Commission general principles for a Peace Treaty with Japan.

"2. By the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943 . . . and the Potsdam Agreement of July 26, 1945 . . . the question of returning Formosa and the Pescadores to China was decided. In a similar manner the Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945 . . . decided the questions of returning the southern part of Sakhalin Island and the adjacent islands to the Soviet Union and handing over to her the Kurile Islands."

" ... 2. The Cairo Declaration of 1943 stated the purpose to restore 'Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores to the Republic of China.' That declaration, like other wartime declarations such as those of Yalta and Potsdam, was in the opinion of the United States Government subject to any final peace settlement where all relevant factors should be considered ... "

From September 4 to 8, 1951 a conference for the conclusion and signature of a Treaty of Peace with Japan was held at San Francisco. China was not represented at the Conference because of the disagreement among the participants as to who actually represented the government of that country. Reflecting this disagreement is Article 2 of the Peace Treaty as it was signed on September 8 which reads in its pertinent part:

John Foster Dulles, U.S. delegate at the Conference, commented on this provision in Article 2:

"Some Allied Powers suggested that Article 2 should not merely delimit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam, but specify precisely the ultimate disposition of each of the ex-Japanese territories. This, admittedly, would have been neater. But it would have raised questions as to which there are now no agreed answers. We had either to give Japan peace on the Potsdam surrender terms or deny peace to Japan while the allies quarrel about what shall be done with what Japan is prepared, and required, to give up. Clearly, the wise course was to proceed now, so far as Japan is concerned, leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international solvents other than this treaty."

"The treaty also provides for Japan to renounce its sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. The treaty itself does not determine the future of these islands."

The USSR refused to sign the Treaty. It objected, among other things, to the provision regarding Formosa and the Pescadores:

" ... this draft grossly violates the indisputable rights of China to the return of integral parts of Chinese territory; Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Paracel and other islands ... the draft contains only a reference to the renunciation by Japan of its rights to these territories but intentionally omits any mention of the further fate of these territories."

It is clear from these and other statements made at San Francisco, that sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores was not considered to have finally been determined by the Peace Treaty.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations also took this view. In its Report on the Treaty dated February 14, 1952, the Committee stated:

"It is important to remember that Article 2 is a renunciatory article and makes no provision for the power or powers which are to succeded Japan in the possession of and sovereignty over the ceded territory.

"During the negotiation of the Treaty some of the Allied Powers expressed the view that Article 2 of the treaty should not only relieve Japan of its sovereignty over the territories in question but should indicate specifically what disposition was to be made of each of them. The committee believes, however, that this would have been an unwise course to pursue. It might have raised differences among the allies which would have complicated and prolonged the conclusions of the peace. Under the circumstances it seems far better to have the treaty enter into force now, leaving to the future the final disposition of such areas as South Sakhalin and the Kuriles."

Although China was not a party to the San Francisco Treaty, a separate Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan was signed in Taipei on April 28, 1952. Article II of that treaty provided:

"It is recognized that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco in the United States of America on September 8, 1951 ... Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands."

Article 25 of the Treaty stated that the Treaty shall not confer any rights, title or benefits on any state not a party to the Treaty.

Against the background of a massive Chinese Communist propaganda campaign for the "liberation" of Taiwan, supplemented by military action against Quemoy and other offshore islands, the United States and the Republic of China signed a Mutual defense Treaty on December 2, 1954. The first paragraph of Article V of the Treaty reads:

"Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

Article VI provides that for the purpose of Article V the term "territories" shall mean in respect to the Republic of China, "Taiwan and the Pescadores". In an exchange of notes accompanying the Treaty, there appears the statement, "The Republic of China effectively controls both the territory described in Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Defense . . . and other territory".

In its report on the Treaty, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations briefly discussed the question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores:

"By the peace treaty of September 8, 1951, signed with the United States and other powers, Japan renounced 'all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.' The treaty did not specify the nation to which such right, title and claim passed. Although the Republic of China was not a signatory to the Treaty, it and the parties at the conference expressly recognized that it did not dispose finally of Formosa and the Pescadores . . . .

"Secretary Dulles informed the committee that the reference in Article V to 'the territories of either of the Parties' was language carefully chosen to avoid denoting anything one way or another as to their sovereignty.

"It is the view of the committee that the coming into force of the present treaty will not modify or affect the existing legal status of Formosa and the Pescadores. The treaty appears to be wholly consistent with all actions taken by the United States in this matter since the end of World War II, and does not introduce any basically new element in our relations with the territories in question . . . .

"To avoid any possibility of misunderstanding on this aspect of the treaty, the committee decided it would be useful to include in this report the following statement: It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or sovereignty of the territories to which it applies."

The question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores was again discussed on January 24, 1955, before a joint executive session of the Senate committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, in connection with the Formosa Resolution. It is understood that during the course of these hearings, Secretary Dulles indicated that sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores was not considered to have been transferred to the Republic of China in the Japanese Peace Treaty and that the question of sovereignty over these islands was not yet finally determined.

It may be well at this time to examine the various legal theories outlined [in] this memorandum regarding the status of Formosa and the Pescadores in the light of the historical analysis set forth above.

1. The most tenable theory regarding the status of Formosa and the Pescadores is that sovereignty over the islands has not yet been finally determined. The Cairo and Potsdam declarations were statements of intention on the part of the Allied Powers that the islands would return to "the Republic of China". Chiang Kai-shek was authorized by the Allied Powers to take the surrender of the Japanese on the islands, and the Government of the Republic of China has continued to occupy and administer the islands ever since. This surrender by Japan of Formosa and the Pescadores, although providing a legal basis for the continued occupation and administration of the islands by the Government of the Republic of China, would not appear to have effected a transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of China.

Because of differences among the Allied Powers as to who represented China, no agreement on the disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores could be reached in the Japanese Peace Treaty. That the San Francisco Peace Treaty was intended to divest Japan of its sovereignty over the islands without transferring that sovereignty to any other country is abundantly clear from the record. There does not appear to have occurred anything subsequent to the Peace Treaty which can be said to have effected a transfer of that sovereignty.

An analogy to the status of Formosa as described may be found in the case of Cuba after the Spanish-American War. By Article I of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, Spain relinquished "all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba". Although the treaty named the United States as occupying power for the relinquished territory, it did not specify to whom sovereignty was to be transferred.

It may be well to point out that the legal status of the offshore islands, the Quemoy and Matsu groups, is different from that of Formosa and the Pescadores as described here. The offshore islands, although like Formosa and the Pescadores under the control of the Republic of China, have always been considered as part of "China". As Secretary Dulles explained:

"The legal position is different . . . , by virtue of the fact that technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been settled. That is because the Japanese Peace Treaty merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to these islands. But the future title is not determined by the Japanese Peace Treaty nor is it determined by the Peace Treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and Japan. Therefore the juridical status of these islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, is different from the juridical status of the offshore islands which have always been Chinese territory."

The usual way in which a formal transfer of territory is effected under international law is by cession, which typically consists of an agreement between the ceding and acquiring state. No such cession has occurred here. As has been seen, the Republic of China did declare the islands to be a part of China subsequent to the surrender, and such declaration might be considered an annexation of this territory. However, in view of the fact that Chiang Kai-shek, in accepting the Japanese surrender, was acting on behalf of the Allied Powers, it may be questioned whether any such attempted annexation would have validity in international law. Normally, military occupation does not have the effect of transferring sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant. Furthermore, the whole history of the San Francisco and Sino-Japanese Peace Treaties casts doubt on this interpretation.

... it has been contended that the transfer of Formosa and the Pescadores to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki was null and void in that these islands had been taken away from China at that time by force, contrary to international law. However, it is generally accepted that international law as it existed at that time disregarded "the effect of coercion in the conclusion of a treaty imposed by the victor upon the vanquished State" [I Oppenheim, International Law 891 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955)].

On February 11, 1945, at Yalta, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin agreed that the USSR would enter the war against Japan on condition, among others, that the southern part of Sakhalin and all the islands adjacent to it "shall be returned to the Soviet Union" and that the Kurile Islands "shall be handed over the Soviet Union". The Yalta agreement like the Cairo declaration has been considered by the United States to be a statement of intention rather than as creating binding international commitments.

The question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores must be viewed in the light of a parallel question regarding the Kurile Islands, the southern portions of Sakhalin and certain islands adjacent to it. Pursuant to the same instrument which directed Chiang Kai-shek to accept the Japanese surrender on Formosa and the Pescadores, the Soviet Union accepted the Japanese surrender on these islands had has continuously thereafter controlled and administered them. The USSR purported to annex the islands by a decree of February 2, 1946. The United States Government has maintained, however, that the USSR does not possess sovereignty over them.

UN Resolution 1668

Noting that a serious divergence of views exists among Member States concerning the representation of a founder Member who is named in the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling that this matter has been described repeatedly in the General Assembly by all segments of opinion as vital and crucial and that on numerous occasions its inclusion in the agenda has been requested under rule 15 of the Assembly's rules of procedure as an item of an important and urgent character,

Recalling further the recommendation contained in its resolution 396 (V) of 14 December 1950 that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case,

Decides, in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations, that any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question.

鑒於各會員國對於列名於聯合國憲章之一創始會員國之代表權問題，意見極度懸殊，

憶及此一問題會一再在大會被各方意見指為重大而有決定性之問題，且屢經依據大會議事規則第十五條作為重要而緊急之項目請求列入議程，

復憶大會一九五０年十二月十四日決議案三九六（五）中建議，凡遇主張有權代表某一會員國出席聯合國之政府不止一個當局，而該問題又成為聯合國爭執之點時，則此問題應依憲章宗旨原則並就個別情形，予以審議，

茲決議依照聯合國憲章第十八條之規定，任何改變中國代表權之提案為一重要問題。

According to records provided by the United Nations, voting summary was as follows: 61 Yes, 34 No, 7 Abstentions, 2 Non-voting. Total voting membership was 104. The following list shows the voting summary in detail.

UN Resolution 2758: Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations (1971)

Okinawa Reversion Agreement

Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands

Noting that the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Japan reviewed together on November 19, 20, and 21, 1969 the status of the Ryukyu Islands the Daito Islands, referred to as "Okinawa" in the Joint Communique between the President and the Prime Minister issued on November 21, 1969, and agreed that the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan should enter immediately into consultations regarding the specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of these islands to Japan;

Noting that the two Governments have conducted such consultations and have reaffirmed that the reversion of these islands to Japan be carried out on the basis of the said Joint Communique;

Considering the United States of America desires, with respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, to relinquish in favour of Japan all rights and interests under Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the City of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, and thereby to have relinquished all its rights and interests in all territories under the said Article; and Considering further that Japan is willing to assume full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands;

1. With respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, as defined in paragraph 2 below, the United States of America relinquishes in favour of Japan all rights and interests under Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the City of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, effective as of the date of entry into force of this Agreements. Japan, as of such date, assumes full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the said islands.

2. For the purpose of this Agreement, the term "the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands" means all the territories and their territorial waters with respect to which the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction was accorded to the United States of America under Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan other than those with respect to which such right has already been returned to Japan in accordance with the Agreement concerning the Amami Islands and the Agreement concerning Nanpo Shoto and Other Islands signed between the United States of America and Japan, respectively on December 24, 1953 and April 5, 1968.

It is confirmed that treaties, conventions and other agreements concluded between the United States of America and Japan, including, but without limitation, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, and its related arrangements and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of American and Japan signed at Tokyo on April 2,1953, become applicable to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement.

1. Japan will grant the United States of America on the date of entry into force of this Agreement the use of facilities and areas in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in accordance with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan signed at Washington on January 19, 1960 and its related arrangements.

2. In the application of Article lV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of the United States Armed Forces in Japan signed on January 19, 1960, to the facilities and areas the use of which will be granted in accordance with paragraph I above to the United States of America on the date of entry into force of this Agreement, it is understood that the phrase "the condition in which they were at the time they became available to the United States Armed Forces" in paragraph I of the said Article IV refers to the condition in which the facilities and areas first came into the use of the United States Armed Forces, and that the term "improvements" in paragraph 2 of the said Article includes those made prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement.

1. Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nations against the United States of America and its nationals and against the local authorities of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of the United States of America in these islands, or from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of the United States of America having had any effect upon these islands, prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement.

2. The waiver in paragraph 1 above does not, however, include claims of Japanese nationals specifically recognized in the laws of the United States of America or the local laws of these islands applicable during the period of United States administration of these islands. The Government of the United States of America is authorised to maintain its duly empowered officials in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in order to deal with and settle such claims on and after the date of entry into force of this Agreement in accordance with the procedures to be established in consultation with the Government of Japan.

3. The Government of the United States of America will make ex gratia contributions for restoration of lands to the nationals of Japan whose lands in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands were damaged prior to July 1, 1950, while placed under the use of United States authorities, and were released from their use after June 30, 1961 and before the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Such contributions will be made in an equitable manner in relation under High Commissioner Ordinance Number 60 of 1967 to claims for damages done prior to July 1, 1950 to the lands released prior to July 1, 1961.

4. Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of the United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands under or in consequence of directives of the United States or local authorities, authorised by existing law during that period, and will take no action subjecting the United States nationals or the residents of these islands to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts of omissions.

1. Japan recognizes the validity of, and will continue in full force and effect, final judgements in civil cases rendered by any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement, provided that such recognition or continuation would not be contrary to public policy.

2. Without in any way adversely affecting the substantive rights and positions of the litigants concerned, Japan will assume jurisdiction over and continue judgement and execution of any civil case pending as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement in any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.

3. Without in any way adversely affecting the substantive rights of the accused or suspect concerned, Japan will assume jurisdiction over, and may continue or institute proceedings with respect to, any criminal cases with which any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands is seized as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement or would have been seized had the proceedings been instituted prior to such date.

4. Japan may continue the execution of any final judgements rendered in criminal cases by any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.

1. The properties of the Ryukyu Electric Power Corporation, the Ryukyu Domestic Water Corporation and the Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation shall be transferred to the Government of Japan on the date of entry into force of this Agreement, and the rights and obligations of the said Corporations shall be assumed by the Government of Japan on that date on conformity with the laws and regulations of Japan.

2. All other properties of the Government of the United States of America, existing in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement and located outside the facilities and areas provided on that date in accordance with Article III of this Agreement, shall be transferred to the Government of Japan on that date, except for those that are located on the lands returned to the landowners concerned before the date of entry into force of this Agreement and for those the title to which will be retained by the Government of the United States of America after that date with the consent of the Government of Japan.

3. Such lands in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands reclaimed by the Government of the United States of America and such other reclaimed lands acquired by it in these islands are held by the Government of the United States of America as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement become the property of the Government of Japan on that date.

4. The United States of America is not obliged to compensate Japan or its nationals for any alteration made prior to the date of entry into force of this agreement to the lands upon which the properties transferred to the Government of Japan under paragraphs I and 2 above are located.

Considering, inter alia, that United States assets are being transferred to the Government of Japan under Article VI of this Agreement, that the Government of the United States of America is carrying out the return of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands to Japan in a manner consistent with the policy of the Government of Japan as specified in paragraph 8 of the Joint Communique of November 21,1969, and that the Government of the United States of America will bear extra costs, particularly in the area of employment after reversion, the Government of Japan will pay to the Government of the United States of America in United States dollars a total amount of three hundred and twenty million United States dollars (U.S. $320,000,000) over a period of five years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Of the said amount, the Government of Japan will pay one hundred million United States dollars (U.S. $100,000,000) within one week after the date of entry into force of this Agreement and the remainder in four equal annual instalments in June of each calendar year subsequent to the year in which this Agreement enters into force.

The Government of Japan consents to the continued operation by the Government of the United States of America of the Voice of America relay station on Okinawa island for a period of five years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement in accordance with the arrangements to be concluded between the two Governments. The two Governments shall enter into consultation two years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement on future operation of the Voice of America on Okinawa Island.

This Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Tokyo. This Agreement shall enter into force two months after the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Washington and Tokyo, this seventeenth day of June, 1971, in duplicate in the English and Japanese language, both equally authentic.

The full formal title (Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands) translates to Japanese as follows: Ryūkyū shotō oyobi Daitō shotō ni kansuru Nippon kokuto Amerika gasshū koku tono aidano kyōtei 琉球諸島及び大東諸島に関する日本国とアメリカ合衆国との間の協定.

Starr Memorandum

Memorandum from the Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asia and the Pacific (L/EA - Robert I. Starr) to the Director of the Office of Republic of China Affairs (Charles T. Sylvester)

You have asked for a comprehensive memorandum analyzing the question of the legal status of Taiwan in terms suitable for Congressional presentation. Attached is a paper that should serve this purpose. It is drawn mainly from the February 3, 1961 Czyzak memorandum, and contains no sensitive information or reference to classified documents.

From the middle of the 17th century to 1895, Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores (Penghu) were part of the Chinese Empire. China then ceded these islands to Japan in 1895 in the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shimonoseki.

In the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the United States, Great Britain, and China stated it to be their purpose that "all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as…Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China". These same three governments on July 26, 1945 issued the Potsdam Proclamation declaring that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine". On August 8, 1945 the Soviet Union adhered to the Potsdam Proclamation. By an Imperial Rescript of September 2, 1945, the Japanese Emperor accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, and in the Instrument of Surrender signed on the same date, the Japanese Government "and their successors" undertook to carry out the provisions of the Declaration.

Pursuant to Japanese Imperial General Headquarters General Order No. 1, issued at the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Japanese commanders in Formosa surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek "acting on behalf of the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". Continuously since that time, the Government of the Republic of China has occupied and exercised authority over Formosa and the Pescadores.

The view of the U.S. in the intermediate post-war period was typified by a statement on April 11, 1947 of then Acting Secretary of State Acheson, in a letter to Senator Ball, that the transfer of sovereignty over Formosa to China "has not yet been formalized".

After a prolonged period of civil strife the Chinese Communists succeeded in driving the Government of the Republic of China off the Chinese mainland. On October 1, 1949 the Chinese Communists proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The seat of the Government of the Republic of China was transferred to Formosa, and in early December 1949, Taipei became its provisional capital.

Shortly thereafter, President Truman, in a statement of January 5, 1950, referred to a U.N. General Assembly Resolution of December 8, 1949, (Res. 291(IV)) which called on all states to refrain from "(a) seeking to acquire spheres of influence or to create foreign controlled regimes within the territory of China; (b) seeking to obtain special rights or privileges within the territory of China". He said:

"A specific application of the foregoing principles is seen in the present situation with respect to Formosa …

"The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time… the United States Government will no pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China."

The outbreak of hostilities in Korea on June 25, 1950 brought to the fore the question of the status of Formosa and the Pescadores. President Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, and as a corollary called upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all operations against the mainland. In addition, he stated that "the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations".

On August 24, 1950 the United States explained its position to the United Nations Security Council in the following terms:

"The action of the United States was expressly to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the allied forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the Island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now."

"Formal transfer of Formosa to China was to await the conclusion of peace with Japan or some other appropriate formal act."

"The Government of the United States has made it abundantly clear that the measures it has taken with respect to Formosa were without prejudice to the long-term political status of Formosa, and the United States has no territorial ambitions and seeks no special position of privilege with respect to Formosa. The United States believes further that the future of Formosa and of the nearly eight million people inhabited there should be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."

From September 4 to 8, 1951 a conference for the conclusion and signature of a Treaty of Peace was held at San Francisco. China was not represented at the Conference because of the disagreement among the participants as to who actually represented the government of that country. Reflecting this disagreement is article 2 of the Peace Treaty, which reads in its pertinent part:

"(b) Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores."

John Foster Dulles, U.S. delegate at the Conference, commented on this provision in article 2:

"Some Allied Powers suggested that article 2 should not merely delimit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam, but specify precisely the ultimate disposition of each of the ex-Japanese territories. This, admittedly, would have been neater. But it would have raised questions as to which there are now no agreed answers. We had either to give Japan peace on the Potsdam Surrender Terms or deny peace to Japan while the allies quarrel about what shall be done with what Japan is prepared, and required, to give up. Clearly, the wise course was to proceed now, so far as Japan is concerned, leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international solvents other than this treaty."

"The treaty also provides for Japan to renounce its sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. The treaty itself does not determine the future of these islands."

The USSR refused to sign the Treaty. It objected, among other things, to the provision regarding Formosa and the Pescadores:

"…this draft grossly violates the indisputable rights of China to the return of integral parts of Chinese territory: Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Paracel and other islands…. The draft contains only a reference to the renunciation by Japan of its rights to these territories but intentionally omits any mention of the further fate of these territories."

It is clear from these and other statements made at San Francisco, that although the Treaty provision constituted an appropriate act of renunciation by Japan, the future status of Formosa and the Pescadores was not considered to have finally been determined by the Peace Treaty.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations also took this view. In its Report on the Treaty dated February 14, 1952, the Committee stated:

"It is important to remember that article 2 is a renunciatory article and makes no provision for the power or powers which are to succeed Japan in the possession of and sovereignty over the ceded territory.

"During the negotiation of the Treaty some of the Allied Powers expressed the view that article 2 of the treaty should not only relieve Japan of its sovereignty over the territories in question but should indicate specifically what disposition was to be made of each of them. The committee believes, however, that this would have complicated and prolonged the conclusion of the peace. Under the circumstances it seems far better to have the treaty enter into force now, leaving to the future the final disposition of such areas as South Sakhalin and the Kuriles."

"It is recognized that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco in the united States of America on September 8, 1951…, Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores)…."

Explaining this provision to the Legislative Yuan, Foreign Minister Yeh of the Republic of China stated that under the San Francisco Peace Treaty "no provision was made for the return [of these islands] to China." He continued:

"Inasmuch as these territories were originally owned by us and as they are now under our control and, furthermore, Japan has renounced in the Sino-Japanese peace treaty these territories under the San Francisco Treaty of Peace, they are, therefore, in fact restored to us."

At another point, Foreign Minister Yeh stated that "no provision has been made either in the San Francisco Treaty of Peace as to the future of Taiwan and Penghu". During the interpellations of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in the Legislative Yuan, the Foreign Minister was asked, "What is the status of Formosa and the Pescadores?" He replied:

"Formosa and the Pescadores were formerly Chinese territories. As Japan has renounced her claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, only China has the right to take them over. In fact, we are controlling them now, and undoubtedly they constitute a part of our territories. However, the delicate international situation makes it that they do not belong to us. Under present circumstances, Japan has no right to transfer Formosa an the Pescadores to us; nor can we accept such a transfer from Japan even if she so wishes… In the Sino-Japanese peace treaty, we have made provisions to signify that residents including juristic persons of Formosa and the Pescadores bear Chinese nationality, and this provision may serve to mend any future gaps when Formosa and the Pescadores are restored to us."

Against the background of a Chinese Communist propaganda campaign in July, 1954 for the "liberation" of Taiwan, supplemented in September, 1954 by military action against Quemoy and other offshore islands, the United States and the Republic of China signed a Mutual Defense Treaty on December 2, 1954. The first paragraph of Article V of the Treaty reads:

In its report on the Treaty, the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations discussed the question of the true status of Formosa and the Pescadores:

"By the peace treaty of September 8, 1951, signed with the United States and other powers, Japan renounced 'all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.' The treaty did not specify the nation to which such right, title and claim passed. Although the Republic of China was not a signatory to the Treaty, it recognized that it did not dispose finally of Formosa and the Pescadores ….

"…he (Secretary Dulles) informed the committee that the reference in article V to 'the territories of either of the Parties' was language carefully chosen to avoid denoting anything one way or the other as to their sovereignty.

"It is the view of the committee that the coming in to force of the present treaty will not modify or affect the existing legal status of Formosa and the Pescadores. The treaty appears to be wholly consistent with all actions taken by the United States in this matter since the end of World War II, and does not introduce any basically new element in our relations with the territories in question. Both by act and by implication we have accepted the Nationalist Government as the lawful authority on Formosa."

To avoid any possibility of misunderstanding on this aspect of the treaty, the committee decided it would be useful to include in this report to following statement: "It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or sovereignty of the territories to which it applies."

In presenting the Committee's report to the Senate on February 9, 1955, Senator Walter George referred to the question of the legal status of Taiwan: "The view was advance during committee's consideration of the treaty that it may have the effect of recognizing that the government of Chiang Kai-shek has sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores."

On the one hand, reference was made to the Cairo Declaration which stated that Japan was to be stripped of her island territories in the Pacific and that territories stolen from the Chinese such as Formosa and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic of China. On the other hand, reference was made to the fact that while Japan renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, such title was not conveyed to any nation. After full exploration of this matter with Secretary Dulles, the committee decided that this treaty was not a competent instrument to resolve doubts about sovereignty over Formosa. It agreed to include in its report the following statement:

"It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the present treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or the sovereignty of the territories referred to in article VI.

In other words, so far as the United States in concerned, it is our understanding that the legal status of the territories referred to in article VI, namely, Formosa and the Pescadores – whatever their status may be – is not altered in any way by the conclusion of this treaty."

It may be well to note the special status of the offshore islands, the Quemoy and Matsu groups, in contrast to that of Formosa and the Pescadores as described here. The offshore islands have always been considered as part of "China". As Secretary Dulles explained in 1954:

"The legal position is different..., by virtue of the fact that technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been settled. That is because the Japanese Peace Treaty merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to these islands. But the future title is not determined by the Japanese Peace Treaty nor is it determined by the Peace Treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and Japan. Therefore the juridical status of these islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, is different from the juridical status of the offshore islands which have always been Chinese territory."

The position of the United States was set forth by the States Department in connection with the 1970 Hearings before the Subcommittee on the United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (91st Cong., 2d Sess.):

"Legal Status of Taiwan as Defined in Japanese Peace Treaty and Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty

"Article 2 of the Japanese Peace treaty, signed on September 8, 1951 at San Francisco, provides that 'Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores'. The same language was used in Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace between China and Japan signed on April 28, 1952. In neither treaty did Japan cede this area to any particular entity. As Taiwan and the Pescadores are not covered by any existing international disposition, sovereignty over the area is an unsettled question subject to future international resolution. Both the Republic of China and the Chinese Communists disagree with this conclusion and consider that Taiwan and the Pescadores are part of the sovereign state of China. The United States recognized the Government of the Republic of Taiwan as legitimately occupying and exercising jurisdiction over Taiwan and the Pescadores."

The future relationship of Taiwan to mainland China and the resolution of disputes dividing the governments in Taipei and Peking involve issues that the United States cannot resolve. We have made clear that our primary concern is that these issues should be resolved by peaceful means, without resort to the use of force. Until such a resolution is achieved we may continue to deal respectively with the government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of China on matters affecting mutual interests, accepting the practical situation as we find it.

UN Resolution 2758

2758 (XXVI). Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations

Considering the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China is essential both for the protection of the Charter of the United Nations and for the cause that the United Nations must serve under the Charter,

Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council,

Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.

二七五八（二十六）．恢復中華人民共和國在聯合國的合法權利

考慮到，恢復中華人民共和國的合法權利對於維護聯合國憲章和聯合國組織根據憲章所必須從事的事業都是必不可少的，

承認中華人民共和國政府的代表是中國在聯合國組織的唯一合法代表，中華人民共和國是安全理事會五個常任理事國之一，

決定：恢復中華人民共和國的一切權利，承認她的政府的代表為中國在聯合國組織的唯一合法代表並立即把蔣介石的代表從它在聯合國組織及其所屬一切機構中所非法佔據的席位上驅逐出去。

According to records provided by the United Nations, voting summary was as follows: 76 Yes, 35 No, 17 Abstentions, 3 Non-voting. Total voting membership was 131. The following list shows the voting summary in detail, ROC diplomatic allies at the time being highlighted with a red asterisk (*).

On the day of the vote the ROC maintained diplomatic relations with 59 states, 56 of them UN members, but only 33 allies supported keeping the ROC on China's UN seat, 23 allies denying the ROC support in the vote by voting Yes, abstaining or not participating in the vote.

10 ROC diplomatic allies voted Yes (i. e. in favour of the PRC and against the ROC): Belgium, Botswana, Ecuador, Libya, Mexico, Peru, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, and Togo. All of them cut ties with the ROC before the end of September 1978.

12 ROC diplomatic allies abstained: Argentina, Barbados, Colombia, Cyprus, Greece, Jamaica, Jordan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Panama, Spain, and Thailand. All of them (except Panama) cut ties with the ROC before the end of February 1980; Panama did so on June 13, 2017.

The Maldives were an ROC diplomatic ally (until April 15, 1972) but are listed as non-voting.

Two UN members which did not maintain formal diplomatic relations with the ROC at the time but supported the ROC by voting No were the Khmer Republic (today's Cambodia) and South Africa.

The voting list did not include three additional ROC diplomatic allies—South Korea became a UN member on Sept. 17, 1991 (cut ties with the ROC on Aug. 24, 1992); Vietnam joined the UN on Sept. 20, 1977 (South Vietnam cut ties with the ROC on April 30, 1975); and the Vatican is not a UN member but an observer since April 6, 1964.

It should be pointed out that the text of the UN Resolution 2758 does not mention Taiwan at all, so it doesn't support Beijing's claim that Taiwan 'is part of the PRC'.

Shanghai Communiqué

1. President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

2. President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tsetung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

3. During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

4. President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

5. The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

6. The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution—this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal: big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea". It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the Indo-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

7. The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to reexamine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Viet Nam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of december 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

8. There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-in- terference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

9. With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

10. Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

11. The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined".

12. The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

13. Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

14. The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

15. The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

16. President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

中華人民共和國和美利堅合眾國聯合公報（《上海公報》）

1. 應中華人民共和國總理周恩來的邀請，美利堅合眾國總統理查德.尼克松自一九七二年二月二十一日至二月二十八日訪問了中華人民共和國。陪同總統的有尼克松夫人、美國國務卿威廉.羅杰斯、總統助理亨利.基辛格博適和其他美國官員。

2. 尼克松總統于二月二十一日會見了中國共產黨主席毛澤東。兩位領導人就中美關係和國際事務認真、坦率地交換了意見。

3. 訪問中，尼克松總統和周恩來總理就美利堅合眾國和中華人民共和國關係正常化以及雙方關心的其他問題進行了廣泛、認真和坦率的討論。此外，國務卿威廉.羅杰斯和外交部長姬鵬飛也以同樣精神進行了會談。

4. 尼克松總統及其一行訪問了北京，參觀了文化、工業和衣業項目，還訪問了杭州和上海，在那裡繼續同中國領導人進行討論，並參觀了類似的項目。

5. 中華人民共和國和美利堅合眾國領導人經過這麼多年一直沒有接觸之後，現在有機會坦率地互相介紹彼此對各種問題的觀點，對此，雙方認為是有益的。他們回顧了經歷著重大變化和巨大動盪的國際形勢，闡明了各自的立場和態度。

6. 中國方面聲明：那裡有壓迫，那裡就有反抗。國家要獨立，民族要解放，人民要革命，已成為不可抗拒的歷史潮流。國家不分大小，應該一律平等，大國不應欺負小國，強國不應欺負弱國。中國決不做超級大國，並且反對任何霸權主權和強權政治。中國方面表示：堅決支持一切被壓迫人民和被壓迫民族除爭取自由、解放的鬥爭，各國人民有權按照自已的意願，選擇本國的社會制度，有權維護本國獨立、主權和領土完整，反對外來侵略、干涉、控制和顛覆。一切外國軍隊都應撤回本國去。中國方面表示：堅決支持越南、查莫、柬埔寨三國人民為實現自己的目標所作的努力，堅決支持越南南方共和臨時革命政府的七點建議以及在今年二月對其中兩個關鍵問題的說明和印度支那人民最高級會議聯合聲明；堅決支持朝鮮民主主義人民共和國政府一九七一年四月十二日提出的朝鮮和平統一的八點方案和取消"聯合國韓國統一復興委員會"的主張；堅決反對日本軍國主義的復活和對外擴張，堅決支持日本人民要求建立一個獨立、民主、和平和中立的日本的願望；堅決主張印度和巴基斯坦按照聯合國關於印巴問題的決議，立即把自己的軍隊全部撤回到本國境內以及查莫和克什米爾停火線的各自一方，堅決支持巴基斯坦政府和人民維護獨立、主權的鬥爭以及查莫和克什米爾人民爭取自決權的鬥爭。

7. 美國方面聲明：為了亞洲和世界的和平，需要對緩和當前的緊張局勢和消除衝突的基本原因作出努力。美國將致力於建立公正而穩定的和平。這種和平是公正的，因為它滿足各國人民和各國爭取自由和進步的願望。這種和平是穩定的，因為它消除外來侵略的危險。美國支持全世界各國人民在沒有外來壓力和干預的情況下取得個人自由和社會進步。美國相信，改善具有不同意勢形態的國與國之間的聯繫，以便減少由於事故、錯誤估計或誤會而引起的對峙的危險，有助於緩和緊張局勢的努力。各國應該互相尊重並願進行和平競賽，讓行動作出最後判斷。任何國家都不應自稱一慣正確，各國都要準備為了共同的利益重新檢查自己的態度。美國強調：應該允許印度支那各國人民在不受外來干涉的情況下決定自己的命運；美國一慣的首要目標是談判解決。越南共和國和美國在一九七二年一月二十七日提出的八點建議提供了實現這個目標的基礎；在談判得不到解決時，美國預計在符合印度支那每個國家自決這一目標的情況下以這個地區最終撤出所有美國軍隊。美國將保持其與大韓民國的密切聯繫和對它的支持；美國將支持大韓民國為謀求在朝鮮半島緩和緊張局勢和增加聯繫的努力。美國最高度地珍視同日本的友好關係，並將繼續發展現存的緊密紐帶。按照一九七一年十二月廿一日聯合國安全理事會的決議，美國贊成印度和巴基斯坦之間的停火繼續下去，並把全部軍事力量撤至本國境內以及查漠和克什米爾停火線的各自一方；美國支持南亞各國人民和平地、不受軍事威脅地建設自己的未來的權力，而不使這個地區成為大國競爭的目標。

8. 中美兩國的社會制度和對外政策有著本質的區別。但是，雙方同意，各國不論社會制度如何，都應根據尊重各國主權和領土完整、不侵犯別國、不干涉別國內政、平等互利、和平共處的原則來處理國與國之間的關係。國際爭端因在此基礎上予以解決，而不訴諸武力和武力威脅。美國和中華人民共和國準備在它們的相互關係中實行這些原則。

── 任何一方都不應該在亞洲－太平洋地區謀求霸權，每一方都反對任何其他國家或國家集團建立這種霸權的努力；

── 任何一方都不准備代表任何第三方進行談判，也不准備同對方達成針對其他國家的協定或諒解。

10. 雙方都認為，任何大國與另一大國進行勾結反對其他國家，或者大國在世界上劃分利益範圍，那都是違背世界各國人民利益的。

11. 雙方回顧了中美兩國之間長期存在的嚴重爭端。中國方面重申自己的立場；台灣問題是阻礙中美兩國關係正常化的關鍵問題；中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府；台灣是中國的一個省，早已歸還祖國；解放台灣是中國內政，別國無權干涉；全部美國武裝力量和軍事設施必須從台灣撤走。中國政府堅決反對任何旨在製造"一中一台"，"一個中國、兩個政府"、"兩個中國"、"台灣獨立"和鼓吹"台灣地位未定"的活動。

12. 美國方面聲明：美國認識到，在台灣海峽兩邊的所有中國人都認為只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部份。美國政府對這一立場不提出異議。它重申它對由中國人自己和平解決台灣問題的關心。考慮到這一前景，它確認從台灣撤出全部美國武裝力量和軍事設施的最終目標。在此期間，它將隨著這個地區緊張局勢的緩和逐步減少它在台灣的武裝力量和軍事設施。雙方同意，擴大兩國人民之間的瞭解是可取的。為此目的，它們就科學、技術、文化、體育和新聞等方面的具體領域進行了討論。在這些領域中進行人民之間的聯繫和交流將會是互相有利的。雙方各自承諾對進一步發展這種聯繫和交流提供便利。

13. 雙方把雙邊貿易看作是另一個可以帶來互利的領域，並一致認為平等互利的經濟關係是符合兩國人民的利益的。它們同意為逐步發展兩國間的貿易提供便利。

14. 雙方同意，它們將通過不同渠道保持接觸，包括不定期地派遣美國高級代表前來北京，就促進兩國關係正常化進行具體磋商並繼續就共同關心的問題交換意見。

15. 雙方希望，這次訪問的成果將為兩國關係開闢新的前景。雙方相信，兩國關係正常化不僅符合中美兩國人民的利益，而且會對緩合亞洲及世界緊張局勢作出貢獻。

16. 尼克松總統、尼克松夫人及美方一行對中華人民共和國政府和人民給予他們有禮貌的款待，表示感謝。

Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the PRC

Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier of the State Council Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from September 25 to September 30, 1972. Accompanying Prime Minister Tanaka were Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ohira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido and other government officials.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung met Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on September 27. They had an earnest and friendly conversation.

Prime Minister Tanaka and Minister for Foreign Affairs Ohira had an earnest and frank exchange of views with Premier Chou En-lai and Minister for Foreign Affairs Chi Peng-fei in a friendly atmosphere throughout on the question of the normalization of relations between Japan and China and other problems between the two countries as well as on other matters of interest to both sides, and agreed to issue the following Joint Communique of the two Governments:

Japan and China are neighbouring countries, separated only by a strip of water with a long history of traditional friendship. The peoples of the two countries earnestly desire to put an end to the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The realization of the aspiration of the two peoples for the termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between Japan and China will add a new page to the annals of relations between the two countries.

The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself. Further, the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations between the two countries from the stand of fully understanding "the three principles for the restoration of relations" put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.

In spite of the differences in their social systems existing between the two countries, the two countries should, and can, establish relations of peace and friendship. The normalization of relations and development of good-neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the interests of the two peoples and will contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and peace in the world.

1. The abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of China is terminated on the date on which this Joint Communique is issued.

2. The Government of Japan recognizes that Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.

3. The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Postsdam Proclamation.

4. The Government of Japan and the Government of People's Republic of China have decided to establish diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to take all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of the functions of each other's embassy in their respective capitals in accordance with international law and practice, and to exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.

5. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.

6. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to establish relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

The two Governments confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Japan and China shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.

7. The normalization of relations between Japan and China is not directed against any third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

8. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, the two Governments will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace and friendship.

9. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to further promoting relations between the two countries and to expanding interchanges of people, the two Governments will, as necessary and taking account of the existing non-governmental arrangements, enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding agreements concerning such matters as trade, shipping, aviation, and fisheries.

中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府聯合聲明(中日聯合聲明)

日本國內閣總理大臣田中角榮應中華人民共和國國務院總理周恩來的邀請，於一九七二年九月二十五日至九月三十日訪問了中華人民共和國。陪同田中角榮總理大臣的有大平正芳外務大臣、二階堂進內閣官房長官以及其他政府官員。

毛澤東主席于九月二十七日會見了田中角榮總理大臣。雙方進行了認真、友好的談話。周恩來總理、姬鵬飛外交部長和田中角榮總理大臣、大平正芳外務大臣，始終在友好氣氛中，以中日兩國邦交正常化問題為中心，就兩國間的各項問題，以及雙方關心的其他問題，認真、坦率地交換了意見，同意發表兩國政府的下述聯合聲明：

中日兩國是一衣帶水的鄰邦，有著悠久的傳統友好的歷史。兩國人民切望結束迄今存在於兩國間的不正常狀態。戰爭狀態的結束，中日邦交的正常化，兩國人民這種願望的實現，將揭開兩國關係史上新的一頁。

日本方面痛感日本國過去由於戰爭給中國人民造成的重大損害的責任，表示深刻的反省。日本方面重申站在充分理解中華人民共和國政府提出的"複交三原則"的立場上，謀求實現日中邦交正化這一見解。中國方面對此表示歡迎。

中日兩國儘管社會制度不同，應該而且可以建立和平友好關係。兩國邦交正常化，發展兩國的睦鄰友好關係，是符合兩國人民利益的，也是對緩和亞洲緊張局勢和維護世界和平的貢獻。

（一）自本聲明公佈之日起，中華人民共和國和日本國之間迄今為止的不正常狀態宣告結束。

（二）日本國政府承認中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府。

（三）中華人民共和國政府重申：臺灣是中華人民共和國領土不可分割的一部分。日本國政府充分理解和尊重中國政府的這一立場，並堅持遵循波茨坦公告第八條的立場。

（四）中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府決定自一九七二年九月二十九日起建立外交關係。兩國政府決定，按照國際法和國際慣例，在各自的首都為對方大使館的建立和履行職務採取一切必要的措施，並儘快互換大使。

（五）中華人民共和國政府宣佈：為了中日兩國人民的友好，放棄對日本國的戰爭賠償要求。

（六）中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府同意在互相尊重主權和領土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉內政、平等互利、和平共處各項原則的基礎上，建立兩國間持久的和平友好關係。根據上述原則和聯合國憲章的原則，兩國政府確認，在相互關係中，用和平手段解決一切爭端，而不訴諸武力和武力威脅。

（七）中日邦交正常化，不是針對第三國的。兩國任何一方都不應在亞洲和太平洋地區謀求霸權，每一方都反對任何其他國家或集團建立這種霸權的努力。

（八）中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府為了鞏固和發展兩國間的和平友好關係，同意進行以締結和平友好條約為目的的談判。

（九）中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府為進一步發展兩國間的關係和擴大人員往來，根據需要並考慮到已有的民間協定，同意進行以締結貿易、航海、航空、漁業等協定為目的的談判。

In Japanese, the "Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the PRC" is called as follows: Nippon koku seifuto Chūgoku jimmin kyōwakoku seifuno kyōdō seimei 日本国政府と中華人民共和国政府の共同声明.

Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the PRC

Recalling with satisfaction that since the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China issued a Joint Communique in Peking on September 29, 1972, the friendly relations between the two Governments and the peoples of the two countries have developed greatly on a new basis.

Confirming that the above-mentioned Joint Communique constitutes the basis of the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries and that the principles enunciated in the Joint Communique should be strictly observed.

Confirming that the principles of the Charter of the United Nations should be fully respected.

For the purpose of solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries.

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace and Friendship and for that purpose have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

1. The Contracting Parties shall develop relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

2. The Contracting Parties confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, they shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.

The Contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

The Contracting parties shall, in the good-neighborly and friendly spirit and in conformity with the principles of equality and mutual benefit and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, endeavor to further develop economic and cultural relations between the two countries and to promote exchanges between the peoples of the two countries.

The present Treaty shall not affect the position of either Contracting Party regarding its relations with third countries.

1. The present Treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification which shall take place at Tokyo. The present Treaty shall remain in force for ten years and thereafter shall continue to be in force until terminated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2.

2. Either Contracting Party may, by giving one year's written notice to the other Contracting Party, terminate the present Treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE in duplicate, in the Japanese and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic, at Peking, this twelfth day of August, 1978.

中華人民共和國和日本國和平友好條約（中日和平友好條約）

1972年中日邦交正常化後，雙方在政治、經濟等方面的交流發展很快。在此背景下，兩國要求儘早展開和平友好條約談判的呼聲日益高漲。1975年1月，中日兩國進行了預備性談判，並達成兩點共識。但是，由於雙方在某些特定問題上始終無法達成一致，談判一度擱淺。

隨著國際局勢和中日兩國國內形勢的變化，締約談判出現轉機。1978年7月，中斷了兩年多的中日締約談判在北京重新舉行。經歷多輪艱苦談判後，中國外交部長黃華與日本外相園田直8月12日在北京正式簽訂《中日和平友好條約》。10月23日，中國國務院副總理鄧小平訪問日本期間，兩國互換《中日和平友好條約》批准書，條約正式生效。

中華人民共和國和日本國滿意地回顧了自一九七二年九月二十九日中華人民共和國政府和日本國政府在北京發表聯合聲明以來，兩國政府和兩國人民之間的友好關係在新的基礎上獲得很大的發展；確認上述聯合聲明是兩國間和平友好關係的基礎，聯合聲明所表明的各項原則應予嚴格遵守；確認聯合國憲章的原則應予充分尊重；希望對亞洲和世界的和平與安定作出貢獻；為了鞏固和發展兩國間的和平友好關係；決定締結和平友好條約，為此各自委派全權代表如下：

雙方全權代表互相校閱全權證書，認為妥善後，達成協議如下：

第一條一、締約雙方應在互相尊重主權和領土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉內政、平等互利、和平共處各項原則的基礎上，發展兩國間持久的和平友好關係。

二、根據上述各項原則和聯合國憲章的原則，締約雙方確認，在相互關係中，用和平手段解決一切爭端，而不訴諸武力和武力威脅。

第二條締約雙方表明：任何一方都不應在亞洲和太平洋地區或其他任何地區謀求霸權，並反對任何其他國家或國家集團建立這種霸權的努力。

第三條締約雙方將本著睦鄰友好的精神，按照平等互利和互不干涉內政的原則，為進一步發展兩國之間的經濟關係和文化關係，促進兩國人民的往來而努力。

第五條一、本條約須經批准，自在東京交換批准書之日起生效。本條約有效期為十年。十年以後，在根據本條第二款的規定宣佈終止以前，將繼續有效。

二、締約任何一方在最初十年期滿時或在其後的任何時候，可以在一年以前，以書面預先通知締約另一方，終止本條約。

本條約於一九七八年八月十二日在北京簽訂，共兩份，每份都用中文和日文寫成，兩種文本具有同等效力。

In Japanese, the "Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the PRC" is called as follows: Nippon kokuto Chūgoku jimmin kyōwakoku tono aidano heiwa yūkō jōyaku 日本国と中華人民共和国との間の平和友好条約.

Joint Communiqué of the US and the PRC (Normalization Communiqué)

1. The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.

2. The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

3. The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué and emphasize once again that:

5. Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

6. Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

7. The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

8. Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange Ambassadors and establish Embassies on March 1, 1979.

美國──中華人民共和國建立外交關係的聯合公報（關係正常化公報）

1. 中華人民共合國和美利堅合眾國商定自一九七九年一月一日起互相承認並建立外交關係。

2. 美利堅合眾國承認中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府。在此範圍內，美國人民將同台灣人民保持文化、商務和其他非官方關係。

3. 中華人民共和國和美利堅合眾國重申上海公報中雙方一致同意的各項原則，並再次強調。

5. 任何一方都不應該在亞洲-太平洋地區以及世界上任何地區謀求霸權，每一方都反對任何其他國家或國家集團建立這種霸權的努力。

6. 任何一方都不準備代表任何第三方進行談判，也不準備同對方達成針對其他國家的協議或諒解。

7. 美利堅合眾國政府承認中國的立場，即只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部份。

8. 雙方認為，中美關係正常化不僅符合中國人民和美國人民的利益，而且有助於亞洲和世界的和平事實。

中華人民共和國和美利堅合眾國將於一九七九年三月一日互派大使並建立大使館。

Message to Compatriots in Taiwan

(The Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress at its Fifth Plenary Session on December 26, 1978 adopted after discussion a message to compatriots in Taiwan.)

Today is New Year's Day 1979. We hereby extend our cordial and sincere greetings to you on behalf of the people of all nationalities on the mainland of our motherland.

As an old saying goes, "When festival times come round people think all the more of their loved ones." On this happy occasion as we celebrate New Year's Day, our thoughts turn all the more to our kith and kin, our old folks, our brothers and sisters, in Taiwan. We know you have the motherland and your kinsfolk on the mainland in mind too. This mutual feeling of many years standing grows with each passing day. From the day when Taiwan was unfortunately separated from the motherland in 1949, we have not been able to communicate with or visit each other, our motherland has not been able to achieve reunification, relatives have been unable to get together, and our nation, country and people have suffered greatly as a result. All Chinese compatriots and people of Chinese descent throughout the world look forward to an early end to this regrettable state of affairs.

The Chinese nation is a great nation. It accounts for almost a quarter of the world's population and has a long history and brilliant culture, and its outstanding contributions to world civilization and human progress are universally recognized. Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times. The Chinese nation has great vitality and cohesion. Throughout its history, foreign invasions and internal strife have failed to split our nation permanently. Taiwan's separation from the motherland for nearly 30 years has been artificial and against our national interests and aspirations, and this state of affairs must not be allowed to continue. Every Chinese, in Taiwan or on the mainland, has a compelling responsibility for the survival, growth and prosperity of the Chinese nation. The important task of reunifying our motherland, on which hinges the future of the whole nation, now lies before us all; it is an issue no one can evade or should try to. If we do not quickly set about ending this disunity so that our motherland is reunified at an early date, how can we answer our ancestors and explain to our descendants? This sentiment is shared by all. Who among the descendants of the Yellow Emperor wishes to go down in history as a traitor?

Radical changes have taken place in China's status in the world over the past 30 years. Our country's international prestige is rising constantly and its international role becomes ever more important. The people and governments of almost all countries place tremendous hopes on us in the struggle against hegemonism and in safeguarding peace and stability in Asia and the world as a whole. Every Chinese is proud to see the growing strength and prosperity of our motherland. If we can end the present disunity and join forces soon, there will be no end to our contributions to the future of mankind. Early reunification of our motherland is not only the common desire of all the people of China, including our compatriots in Taiwan, but the common wish of all peace-loving peoples and countries the world over.

Reunification of China today is consonant with popular sentiment and the general trend of development. The world in general recognizes only one China, with the government of the People's Republic of China as its sole legal government. The recent conclusion of the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the normalization of relations between China and the United States show still more clearly that no one can stop this trend. The present situation in the motherland, one of stability and unity, is better than ever. The people of all nationalities on the mainland are working hard with one will for the great goal of the four modernizations. It is our fervent hope that Taiwan returns to the embrace of the motherland at an early date so that we can work together for the great cause of national development. Our state leaders have firmly declared that they will take present realities into account in accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the motherland and respect the status quo on Taiwan and the opinions of people in all walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures in settling the question of reunification so as not to cause the people of Taiwan any losses. On the other hand, people in all walks of life in Taiwan have expressed their yearning for their homeland and old friends, stated their desire "to identify themselves with and rejoin their kinsmen," and raised diverse proposals which are expressions of their earnest hope for an early return to the embrace of the motherland. As all conditions now are favourable for reunification and everything is set, no one should go against the will of the nation and against the trend of history.

We place hopes on the 17 million people on Taiwan and also the Taiwan authorities. The Taiwan authorities have always taken a firm stand of one China and have been opposed to an independent Taiwan. We have this stand in common and it is the basis for our co-operation. Our position has always been that all patriots belong to one family. The responsibility for reunifying the motherland rests with each of us. We hope the Taiwan authorities will treasure national interests and make valuable contributions to the reunification of the motherland.

The Chinese government has ordered the People's Liberation Army to stop the bombardment of Jinmen (Quemoy) and other islands as from today. A state of military confrontation between the two sides still exists along the Taiwan Straits. This can only breed man-made tension. We hold that first of all this military confrontation should be ended through discussion between the government of the People's Republic of China and the Taiwan authorities so as to create the necessary prerequisites and a secure environment for the two sides to make contacts and exchanges in whatever area.

The prolonged separation has led to inadequate mutual understanding between the compatriots on the mainland and on Taiwan and various inconveniences for both sides. Since overseas Chinese residing in faraway foreign lands can return for visits and tours and hold reunions with their families, why can't compatriots living so near, on the mainland and on Taiwan, visit each other freely? We hold that there is no reason for such barriers to remain. We hope that at an early date transportation and postal services between both sides will be established to make it easier for compatriots of both sides to have direct contact, write to each other, visit relatives and friends, exchange tours and visits and carry out academic, cultural, sports and technological interchanges.

Economically speaking, Taiwan and the mainland of the motherland were originally one entity. Unfortunately, economic ties have been suspended for many years. Construction is going ahead vigorously on the motherland and it is our wish that Taiwan also grows economically more prosperous. There is every reason for us to develop trade between us, each making up what the other lacks, and carry out economic exchanges. This is mutually required and will benefit both parties without doing any harm to either.

The bright future of our great motherland belongs to us and to you. The reunification of the motherland is the sacred mission history has handed to our generation. Times are moving ahead and the situation is developing. The earlier we fulfil this mission, the sooner we can jointly write an unprecedented, brilliant page in the history for our country, catch up with advanced powers and work together with them for world peace, prosperity and progress. Let us join hands and work together for this glorious goal!

（一九七九年一月一日，第五屆全國人民代表大會常務委員會於一九七八年十二月二十六日舉行第五次會議討論通過）

今天是一九七九年元旦。我們代表祖國大陸的各族人民，向諸位同胞致以親切的問候和衷心的祝賀。

昔人有言："每逢佳節倍思親"。在這歡度新年的時刻，我們更加想念自己的親骨肉——台灣的父老兄弟姐妹。我們知道，你們也無限懷念祖國和大陸上的親人。這種綿延了多少歲月的相互思念之情與日俱增。自從一九四九年台灣同祖國不幸分離以來，我們之間音訊不通，來往斷絕，祖國不能統一，親人無從團聚，民族、國家和人民都受到了巨大的損失。所有中國同胞以及全球華裔，無不盼望早日結束這種令人痛心的局面。

我們中華民族是偉大的民族，占世界人口近四分之一，享有悠久的歷史和優秀的文化，對世界文明和人類發展的卓越貢獻，舉世共認。台灣自古就是中國不可分割的一部分。中華民族是具有強大的生命力和凝聚力的。儘管歷史上有過多少次外族入侵和內部紛爭，都不曾使我們的民族陷於長久分裂。近三十年台灣同祖國的分離，是人為的，是違反我們民族的利益和願望的，決不能再這樣下去了。每一個中國人，不論是生活在台灣的還是生活在大陸上的，都對中華民族的生存、發展和繁榮負有不容推諉的責任。統一祖國這樣一個關係全民族前途的重大任務，現在擺在我們大家的面前，誰也不能回避，誰也不應回避。如果我們還不儘快結束目前這種分裂局面，早日實現祖國的統一，我們何以告慰于列祖列宗？何以自解於子孫後代？人同此心，心同此理，凡屬黃帝子孫，誰願成為民族的千古罪人？

近三十年來，中國在世界上的地位已發生根本變化。我國國際地位越來越高，國際作用越來越重要。各國人民和政府為了反對霸權主義、維護亞洲和世界的和平穩定，幾乎莫不對我們寄予極大期望。每一個中國人都為祖國的日見強盛而感到自豪。我們如果儘快結束目前的分裂局面，把力量合到一起，則所能貢獻於人類前途者，自更不可限量。早日實現祖國統一，不僅是全中國人民包括台灣同胞的共同心願，也是全世界一切愛好和平的人民和國家的共同希望。

今天，實現中國的統一，是人心所向，大勢所趨。世界上普遍承認只有一個中國，承認中華人民共和國政府是中國唯一合法的政府。最近中日和平友好條約的簽定，和中美兩國關係正常化的實現，更可見潮流所至，實非任何人所得而阻止。目前祖國安定團結，形勢比以往任何時候都好。在大陸上的各族人民，正在為實現四個現代化的偉大目標而同心戮力。我們殷切期望台灣早日歸回祖國，共同發展建國大業。我們的國家領導人已經表示決心，一定要考慮現實情況，完成祖國統一大業，在解決統一問題時尊重台灣現狀和台灣各界人士的意見，採取合情合理的政策和辦法，不使台灣人民蒙受損失。台灣各界人士也紛紛抒發懷鄉思舊之情，訴述"認同回歸"之願，提出種種建議，熱烈盼望早日回到祖國的懷抱。時至今日，種種條件都對統一有利，可謂萬事俱備，任何人都不應當拂逆民族的意志，違背歷史的潮流。

我們寄希望於一千七百萬台灣人民，也寄希望於台灣當局。台灣當局一貫堅持一個中國的立場，反對台灣獨立。這就是我們共同的立場，合作的基礎。我們一貫主張愛國一家。統一祖國，人人有責。希望台灣當局以民族利益為重，對實現祖國統一的事業作出寶貴的貢獻。

中國政府已經命令人民解放軍從今天起停止對金門等島嶼的炮擊。台灣海峽目前仍然存在著雙方的軍事對峙，這只能製造人為的緊張。我們認為，首先應當通過中華人民共和國政府和台灣當局之間的商談結束這種軍事對峙狀態，以便為雙方的任何一種範圍的交往接觸創造必要的前提和安全的環境。

由於長期隔絕，大陸和台灣的同胞互不瞭解，對於雙方造成各種不便。遠居海外的許多僑胞都能回國觀光，與家人團聚。為什麼近在咫尺的大陸和台灣的同胞卻不能自由來往呢？我們認為這種藩籬沒有理由繼續存在。我們希望雙方儘快實現通航通郵，以利雙方同胞直接接觸，互通訊息，探親訪友，旅遊參觀，進行學術文化體育工藝觀摩。

台灣和祖國大陸，在經濟上本來是一個整體。這些年來，經濟聯繫不幸中斷。現在，祖國的建設正在蓬勃發展，我們也希望台灣的經濟日趨繁榮。我們相互之間完全應當發展貿易，互通有無，進行經濟交流。這是相互的需要，對任何一方都有利而無害。

我們偉大祖國的美好前途，既屬於我們，也屬於你們。統一祖國，是歷史賦於我們這一代人的神聖使命。時代在前進，形勢在發展。我們早一天完成這一使命，就可以早一天共同創造我國空前未有的光輝燦爛的歷史，而與各先進強國並駕齊驅，共謀世界的和平、繁榮和進步。讓我們攜起手來，為這一光榮目標共同奮鬥！

Taiwan Relations Act

To help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

(a) The President—having terminated governmental relations between the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, the Congress finds that the enactment of this Act is necessary—

(2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan.

(1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area;

(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;

(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;

(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;

(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

(c) Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the United States in human rights, especially with respect to the human rights of all the approximately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.

(a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

(b) The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.

(c) The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.

(a) The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect the application of the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan, and the laws of the United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979.

(b) The application of subsection (a) of this section shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

(1) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with such respect to Taiwan.

(2) Whenever authorized by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to conduct or carry out programs, transactions, or other relations with respect to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized to conduct and carry out, in accordance with section 6 of this Act, such programs, transactions, and other relations with respect to Taiwan (including, but not limited to, the performance of services for the United States through contracts with commercial entities on Taiwan), in accordance with the applicable laws of the United States.

(3) (A) The absence of diplomatic relations and recognition with respect to Taiwan shall not abrogate, infringe, modify, deny, or otherwise affect in any way any rights or obligations (including but not limited to those involving contracts, debts, or property interests of any kind) under the laws of the United States heretofore or hereafter acquired by or with respect to Taiwan.

(B) For all purposes under the laws of the United States, including actions in any court in the United States, recognition of the People's Republic of China shall not affect in any way the ownership of or other rights or interests in properties, tangible and intangible, and other things of value, owned or held on or prior to December 31, 1978, or thereafter acquired or earned by the governing authorities on Taiwan.

(4) Whenever the application of the laws of the United States depends upon the law that is or was applicable on Taiwan or compliance therewith, the law applied by the people on Taiwan shall be considered the applicable law for that purpose.

(5) Nothing in this Act, nor the facts of the President's action in extending diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, the absence of diplomatic relations between the people on Taiwan and the United States, or the lack of recognition by the United States, and attendant circumstances thereto, shall be construed in any administrative or judicial proceeding as a basis for any United States Government agency, commission, or department to make a finding of fact or determination of law, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, to deny an export license application or to revoke an existing export license for nuclear exports to Taiwan.

(6) For purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Taiwan may be treated in the manner specified in the first sentence of section 202(b) of that Act.

(7) The capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued in courts in the United States, in accordance with the laws of the United States, shall not be abrogated, infringed, modified, denied, or otherwise affected in any way by the absence of diplomatic relations or recognition.

(8) No requirement, whether expressed or implied, under the laws of the United States with respect to maintenance of diplomatic relations or recognition shall be applicable with respect to Taiwan.

(c) For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United States, the Congress approves the continuation in force of all treaties and other international agreements, including multilateral conventions, entered into by the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and in force between them on December 31, 1978, unless and until terminated in accordance with law.

(d) Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization.

(a) During the three-year period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, the $1,000 per capita income restriction in insurance, clause (2) of the second undesignated paragraph of section 231 of the reinsurance, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall not restrict the activities of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in determining whether to provide any insurance, reinsurance, loans, or guaranties with respect to investment projects on Taiwan.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, in issuing insurance, reinsurance, loans, or guaranties with respect to investment projects on Taiwan, the Overseas Private Insurance Corporation shall apply the same criteria as those applicable in other parts of the world.

(a) Programs, transactions, and other relations conducted or carried out by the President or any agency of the United States Government with respect to Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be conducted and carried out by or through—

(1) The American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia, or

(2) such comparable successor nongovernmental entity as the President may designate, (hereafter in this Act referred to as the "Institute").

(b) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to enter into, perform, enforce, or have in force an agreement or transaction relative to Taiwan, such agreement or transaction shall be entered into, performed, and enforced, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, by or through the Institute.

(c) To the extent that any law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the District of Columbia, or of any State or political subdivision thereof in which the Institute is incorporated or doing business, impedes or otherwise interferes with the performance of the functions of the Institute pursuant to this Act; such law, rule, regulation, or ordinance shall be deemed to be preempted by this Act.

(1) to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, affidavit, or deposition, and to perform any notarial act which any notary public is required or authorized by law to perform within the United States;

(2) To act as provisional conservator of the personal estates of deceased United States citizens; and

(3) to assist and protect the interests of United States persons by performing other acts such as are authorized to be performed outside the United States for consular purposes by such laws of the United States as the President may specify.

(b) Acts performed by authorized employees of the Institute under this section shall be valid, and of like force and effect within the United States, as if performed by any other person authorized under the laws of the United States to perform such acts.

(a) The Institute, its property, and its income are exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States (except to the extent that section 11(a)(3) of this Act requires the imposition of taxes imposed under chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, relating to the Federal Insurance Contributions Act) or by State or local taxing authority of the United States.

(1) For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the Institute shall be treated as an organization described in sections 170(b)(1)(A), 170(c), 2055(a), 2106(a)(2)(A), 2522(a), and 2522(b).

(a) Any agency of the United States Government is authorized to sell, loan, or lease property (including interests therein) to, and to perform administrative and technical support functions and services for the operations of, the Institute upon such terms and conditions as the President may direct. Reimbursements to agencies under this subsection shall be credited to the current applicable appropriation of the agency concerned.

(b) Any agency of the United States Government is authorized to acquire and accept services from the Institute upon such terms and conditions as the President may direct. Whenever the President determines it to be in furtherance of the purposes of this Act, the procurement of services by such agencies from the Institute may be effected without regard to such laws of the United States normally applicable to the acquisition of services by such agencies as the President may specify by Executive order.

(c) Any agency of the United States Government making funds available to the Institute in accordance with this Act shall make arrangements with the Institute for the Comptroller General of the United States to have access to the; books and records of the Institute and the opportunity to audit the operations of the Institute.

(a) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to render or provide to or to receive or accept from Taiwan, any performance, communication, assurance, undertaking, or other action, such action shall, in the manner and to the. extent directed by the President, be rendered or Provided to, or received or accepted from, an instrumentality established by Taiwan which the President determines has the necessary authority under the laws applied by the people on Taiwan to provide assurances and take other actions on behalf of Taiwan in accordance with this Act.

(b) The President is requested to extend to the instrumentality established by Taiwan the same number of offices and complement of personnel as were previously operated in the United States by the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979.

(c) Upon the granting by Taiwan of comparable privileges and immunities with respect to the Institute and its appropriate personnel, the President is authorized to extend with respect to the Taiwan instrumentality and its appropriate; personnel, such privileges and immunities (subject to appropriate conditions and obligations) as may be necessary for the effective performance of their functions.

(a) (1) Under such terms and conditions as the President may direct, any agency of the United States Government may separate from Government service for a specified period any officer or employee of that agency who accepts employment with the Institute.

(2) An officer or employee separated by an agency under paragraph (1) of this subsection for employment with the Institute shall be entitled upon termination of such employment to reemployment or reinstatement with such agency (or a successor agency) in an appropriate position with the attendant rights, privileges, and benefits with the officer or employee would have had or acquired had he or she not been so separated, subject to such time period and other conditions as the President may prescribe.

(3) An officer or employee entitled to reemployment or reinstatement rights under paragraph (2) of this subsection shall, while continuously employed by the Institute with no break in continuity of service, continue to participate in any benefit program in which such officer or employee was participating prior to employment by the Institute, including programs for compensation for job-related death, injury, or illness; programs for health and life insurance; programs for annual, sick, and other statutory leave; and programs for retirement under any system established by the laws of the United States; except that employment with the Institute shall be the basis for participation in such programs only to the extent that employee deductions and employer contributions, as required, in payment for such participation for the period of employment with the Institute, are currently deposited in the program's or system's fund or depository. Death or retirement of any such officer or employee during approved service with the Institute and prior to reemployment or reinstatement shall be considered a death in or retirement from Government service for purposes of any employee or survivor benefits acquired by reason of service with an agency of the United States Government.

(4) Any officer or employee of an agency of the United States Government who entered into service with the Institute on approved leave of absence without pay prior to the enactment of this Act shall receive the benefits of this section for the period of such service.

(b) Any agency of the United States Government employing alien personnel on Taiwan may transfer such personnel, with accrued allowances, benefits, and rights, to the Institute without a break in service for purposes of retirement and other benefits, including continued participation in any system established by the laws of the United States for the retirement of employees in which the alien was participating prior to the transfer to the Institute, except that employment with the Institute shall be creditable for retirement purposes only to the extent that employee deductions and employer contributions, as required, in payment for such participation for the period of employment with the Institute, are currently deposited in the system' s fund or depository.

(c) Employees of the Institute shall not be employees of the United States and, in representing the Institute, shall be exempt from section 207 of title 18, United States Code.

(1) For purposes of sections 911 and 913 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, amounts paid by the Institute to its employees shall not be treated as earned income. Amounts received by employees of the Institute shall not be included in gross income, and shall be exempt from taxation, to the extent that they are equivalent to amounts received by civilian officers and employees of the Government of the United States as allowances and benefits which are exempt from taxation under section 912 of such Code.

(2) Except to the extent required by subsection (a)(3) of this section, service performed in the employ of the Institute shall not constitute employment for purposes of chapter 21 of such Code and title II of the Social Security Act.

(a) The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress the text of any agreement to which the Institute is a party. However, any such agreement the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States shall not be so transmitted to the Congress but shall be transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President.

(1) any agreement entered into between the Institute and the governing authorities on Taiwan or the instrumentality established by Taiwan; and

(2) any agreement entered into between the Institute and an agency of the United States Government.

(c) Agreements and transactions made or to be made by or through the Institute shall be subject to the same congressional notification, review, and approval requirements and procedures as if such agreements and transactions were made by or through the agency of the United States Government on behalf of which the Institute is acting.

(d) During the two-year period beginning on the effective date of this Act, the Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House and Senate House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of Foreign Relations the Senate, every six months, a report describing and reviewing economic relations between the United States and Taiwan, noting any interference with normal commercial relations.

The President is authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act. During the three-year period beginning on the effective date speaker of this Act, such rules and regulations shall be transmitted promptly to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Such action shall.not, however, relieve the Institute of the responsibilities placed upon it by this Act.'

(a) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and other appropriate committees of the Congress shall monitor—

(3) the legal and technical aspects of the continuing relationship between the United States and Taiwan; and

(4) the implementation of the policies of the United States concerning security and cooperation in East Asia.

(b) Such committees shall report, as appropriate, to their respective Houses on the results of their monitoring.

(1) the term "laws of the United States" includes any statute, rule, regulation, ordinance, order, or judicial rule of decision of the United States or any political subdivision thereof; and

(2) the term "Taiwan" includes, as the context may require, the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores, the people on those islands, corporations and other entities and associations created or organized under the laws applied on those islands, and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing authorities (including political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities thereof).

In addition to funds otherwise available to carry out the provisions of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State for the fiscal year 1980 such funds as may be necessary to carry out such provisions. Such funds are authorized to remain available until expended.

If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

本法乃為協助維持西太平洋之和平、安全與穩定，並授權繼續維持美國人民與在台灣人民間之商業、文化及其他關係，以促進美國外交政策，並為其他目的。

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

（甲）由於美國總統已終止美國和臺灣統治當局（在1979年1月1日前美國承認其為中華民國）間的政府關係，美國國會認為有必要制訂本法：

　（二）授權繼續維持美國人民及臺灣人民間的商務、文化及其他各種關係，以促進美國外交政策的推行。

　（一）維持及促進美國人民與臺灣之人民間廣泛、密切及友好的商務、文化及其他各種關係；並且維持及促進美國人民與中國大陸人民及其他西太平洋地區人民間的同種關係；

　（二）表明西太平洋地區的和平及安定符合美國的政治、安全及經濟利益，而且是國際關切的事務；

　（三）表明美國決定和「中華人民共和國」建立外交關係之舉，是基於臺灣的前途將以和平方式決定這一期望；

　（四）任何企圖以非和平方式來決定臺灣的前途之舉 -- 包括使用經濟抵制及禁運手段在內，將被視為對西太平洋地區和平及安定的威脅，而為美國所嚴重關切；

　（六）維持美國的能力，以抵抗任何訴諸武力、或使用其他方式高壓手段，而危及臺灣人民安全及社會經濟制度的行動。

（丙）本法律的任何條款不得違反美國對人權的關切，尤其是對於臺灣地區一千八百萬名居民人權的關切。玆此重申維護及促進所有臺灣人民的人權是美國的目標。

（甲）為了推行本法第二條所明訂的政策，美國將使臺灣能夠獲得數量足以使其維持足夠的自衛能力的防衛物資及技術服務；

（乙）美國總統和國會將依據他們對臺灣防衛需要的判斷，遵照法定程序，來決定提供上述防衛物資及服務的種類及數量。對臺灣防衛需要的判斷應包括美國軍事當局向總統及國會提供建議時的檢討報告。

（丙）指示總統如遇臺灣人民的安全或社會經濟制度遭受威脅，因而危及美國利益時，應迅速通知國會。總統和國會將依憲法程序，決定美國應付上述危險所應採取的適當行動。

（甲）缺乏外交關係或承認將不影嚮美國法律對臺灣的適用，美國法律將繼續對臺灣適用，就像1979年1月1日之前，美國法律對臺灣適用的情形一樣。

（乙）前項所訂美國法律之適用，包括下述情形，但不限於下述情形：

　（一）當美國法律中提及外國、外國政府或類似實體、或與之有關之時，這些字樣應包括臺灣在內，而且這些法律應對臺灣適用；

　（二）依據美國法律授權規定，美國與外國、外國政府或類似實體所進行或實施各項方案、交往或其他關係，美國總統或美國政府機構獲准，依據本法第六條規定，遵照美國法律同樣與臺灣人民進行或實施上述各項方案、交往或其他關係（包括和臺灣的商業機構締約，為美國提供服務）。

　（三）１美國對臺灣缺乏外交關係或承認，並不消除、剝奪、修改、拒絕或影響以前或此後臺灣依據美國法律所獲得的任何權利及義務（包括因契約、債務關係及財產權益而發生的權利及義務）。

　２為了各項法律目的，包括在美國法院的訴訟在內，美國承認「中華人民共和國」之舉，不應影響臺灣統治當局在1978年12月31日之前取得或特有的有體財產或無體財產的所有權，或其他權利和利益，也不影響臺灣當局在該日之後所取得的財產。

　（四）當適用美國法律需引據遵照臺灣現行或舊有法律，則臺灣人民所適用的法律應被引據遵照。

　（五）不論本法律任何條款，或是美國總統給予「中華人民共和國」外交承認之舉、或是臺灣人民和美國之間沒有外交關係、美國對臺灣缺乏承認、以及此等相關情勢，均不得被美國政府各部門解釋為，依照1954年原子能法及1978年防止核子擴散法，在行政或司法程序中決定事實及適用法律時，得以拒絕對臺灣的核子輸出申請，或是撤銷已核准的輸出許可證。

　（六）至於移民及國籍法方面，應根據該法202項(b)款規定對待臺灣。

　（七）臺灣依據美國法律在美國法院中起訴或應訴的能力，不應由於欠缺外交關係或承認，而被消除、剝奪、修改、拒絕或影響。

　（八）美國法律中有關維持外交關係或承認的規定，不論明示或默示，均不應對臺灣適用。

（丙）為了各種目的，包括在美國法院中的訴訟在內，國會同意美國和(美國在1979年1月1日前承認為中華民國的)臺灣當局所締結的一切條約和國際協定(包括多國公約)，至1978年12月31日仍然有效者，將繼續維持效力，直至依法終止為止。

（丁）本法律任何條款均不得被解釋為，美國贊成把臺灣排除或驅逐出任何國際金融機構或其他國際組織。

（甲）當本法律生效後三年之內，1961年援外法案231項第2段第2款所訂國民平均所得一千美元限制。將不限制美國海外私人投資保證公司活動，其可決定是否對美國私人在臺投資計畫提供保險、再保險、貸款或保證。

（乙）除了本條(A.)項另有規定外，美國海外私人投資保證公司在對美國私人在臺投資計畫提供保險、再保險、貸款或保證時，應適用對世界其他地區相同的標準。

（甲）美國總統或美國政府各部門與臺灣人民進行實施的各項方案、交往或其他關係，應在總統指示的方式或範圍內，經由或透過下述機構來進行實施：

　（一）美國在台協會，這是一個依據哥倫此亞特區法律而成立的一個非營利法人：

　（二）總統所指示成立，繼承上述協會的非政府機構。（以下將簡稱「美國在台協會」為「該協會」。）

（乙）美國總統或美國政府各部門依據法律授權或要求，與臺灣達成、進行或實施協定或交往安排時，此等協定或交往安排應依美國總統指示的方式或範圍，經由或透過該協會達成、進行或實施。

（丙）該協會設立或執行業務所依據的哥倫比亞特區、各州或地方政治機構的法律、規章、命令，阻撓或妨礙該協會依據本法律執行業務時，此等法律、規章、命令的效力應次於本法律。

　（一）執行美國法律所規定授權之公證人業務，以採錄證詞，並從事公證業務：

　（三）根據美國總統指示，依照美國法律之規定，執行領事所獲授權執行之其他業務，以協助保護美國人民的利益。

（乙）該協會雇員獲得授權執行之行為有效力，並在美國境內具有相同效力，如同其他人獲得授權執行此種行為一樣。

該協會、該協會的財產及收入，均免受美國聯邦、各州或地方稅務當局目前或嗣後一切課稅。

對該協會提供財產及服務、以及從該協會獨得之財產及服務———第九條

（甲）美國政府各部門可依總統所指定條件，出售、借貸或租賃財產（包括財產利益）給該協會，或提供行政和技術支援和服務，供該協會執行業務。此等機構提供上述服務之報酬，應列入各機構所獲預算之內。

（乙）美國政府各部門得依總統指示的條件，獲得該協會的服務。當總統認為，為了實施本法律的宗旨有必要時，可由總統頒佈行政命令，使政府各部門獲得上述服務，而不顧上述部門通常獲得上述服務時，所應適用的法律。

（丙）依本法律提供經費給該協會的美國政府各部門，應和該協會達成安排，讓美國政府主計長得查閱該協會的帳冊記錄，並有機會查核該協會經費動用情形。

（甲）美國總統或美國政府各機構依據美國法律授權或要求，向臺灣提供，或由臺灣接受任何服務、連絡、保證、承諾等事項，應在總統指定的方式及範圍內，向臺灣設立的機構提供上述事項，或由這一機構接受上述事項。此一機構乃總統確定依臺灣人民適用的法律而具有必需之權力者，可依據本法案代表臺灣提供保證及採取其他行動者。

（乙）要求總統給予臺灣設立的機構相同數目的辨事處及規定的全體人數，這是指與1979年1月1日以前美國承認為中華民國的台灣當局在美國設立的辦事處及人員相同而言。

（丙）根據臺灣給予美國在臺協會及其適當人員的特權及豁免權，總統已獲授權給予臺灣機構及其適當人員有效履行其功能所需的此種特權及豁免權（要視適當的情況及義務而定）。

（甲）（一）依據總統可能指示的條件及情況，任何美國政府機構可在一特定時間內，使接受服務於美國在臺協會的任何機構職員或雇員脫離政府職務。

　（二）任何根據上述(1.)節情況離開該機構而服務於該協會的任何職員或雇員，有權在終止於協會的服務時，以適當的地位重新為原機構（或接替的機構）雇用或復職，該職員或雇員並保有如果末在總統指示的期間及其他情況下離職所應獲得的附帶權利、特權及福利。

　（三）在上述(2.)項中有權重新被雇用或復職的職員或雇員，在繼續不斷為該協會服務期間，應可繼續參加未受雇於該協會之前所參加的任何福利計劃，其中包括因公殉職、負傷或患病的補償；衛生計劃及人壽保險；年度休假、病假、及其他例假計劃；美國法律下任何制度的退休安排。此種職員或雇員如果在為該協會服務期間，及重為原機構雇用或復職之前死亡或退休，應視為在公職上死亡或退休。

　（四）任何美國政府機構的職員或雇員，在本法案生效前享准保留原職而停薪情況進入該協會者，在服務期間將獲受本條之下的各項福利。

（乙）美國政府任何機構在臺灣雇用外國人員者，可將此種人員調往該協會，要自然增加其津貼、福利及權利，並不得中斷其服務，以免影響退休及其他福利，其中包括繼續參加調往該協會前，法律規定的退休制度。

（丙）該協會的雇用人員不是美國政府的雇用的人員，其在代表該協會時，免於受美國法典第18條207項之約束。

（丁）（一）依據一九五四年美國國內稅法911及913項，該協會所付予雇用人員之薪水將不視為薪資所得。該協會雇用人員所獲之薪水應予免稅，其程度與美國政府的文職人員情況同。

　（二）除了前述(A.)(3.)所述範圍，受雇該協會所作的服務，將不構成社會安全法第二條所述之受雇目的。

（甲）國務卿應將該協會為其中一造的任何協定內容全文送交國會。但是，如果總統認為立即公開透露協定內容會危及美國的國家安全，則此種協定不應送交國會，而應在適當的保密命令下，送交參院及眾院的外交委員會，僅於總統發出適當通知時才得解除機密。

　（一）該協會與臺灣的治理當局或臺灣設立之機構所達成的任何協定；

（丙）經由該協會所達成的協定及交易，應接受同樣的國會批准、審查、及認可，如同這些協定是經由美國各機構達成一樣，該協會是代表美國政府行事。

（丁）在本法案生效之日起的兩年期間，國務卿應每六個月向眾院議長及參院外交委員會提出一份報告，描述及檢討與臺灣的經濟關係，尤其是對正常經濟關係的任何干預。

授權總統規定適於執行本法案各項目的的規則與章程。在本法案生效之日起三年期間，此種規則與章程應立即送交眾院議長及參院外交委員會。然而，此種規則章程不得解除本法案所賦予該協會的責任。

（甲）眾院外交委員會，參院外交委員會及國會其他適當的委員會將監督：

（甲）「美國法律」一詞，包括美國任何法規、規則、章程、法令、命令、美國及其政治分支機構的司法程序法；

（乙）「臺灣」一詞將視情況需要，包括臺灣及澎湖列島，這些島上的人民、公司及根據適用於這些島嶼的法律而設立或組成的其他團體及機構，1979年1月1日以前美國承認為中華民國的臺灣治理當局，以及任何接替的治理當局（包括政治分支機構、機構等）。

除了執行本法案各條款另外獲得的經費外，本法案授權國務卿在1980會計年度撥用執行本法案所需的經費。此等經費已獲授權保留運用，直到用盡為止。

如果本法案的任何條款被視為無效，或條款對任何人或任何情況的適用性無效，則本法案的其他部份，以及此種條款適用於其他個人或情況的情形，並不受影響。

Additional information concerning the Taiwan Relations Act can be found on relevant page of the US Congress; please click here.

Nagoya Resolution

NOC anthem, flag and emblem: flag and anthem of People’s Republic of China.
The emblem submitted to and approved by the Executive Board.

NOC anthem, flag and emblem: Other than that used at present and which must be approved by the Executive Board of the IOC.

The Nagoya Resolution represents a decision by the IOC Executive Board allowing teams both from Taiwan/the ROC and China/the PRC to participate in future Olympic Games, with precise specifications for admissible flag, emblem, and team name. The resolution was published in English and French, but no officially authorized Chinese version was released. More information concerning the name issue can be found here.

Ye Jianying’s “Nine-Point Policy”

Chairman Ye Jianying’s Elaborations on Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan To Motherland and Peaceful Unification

Ye Jianying, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, in an interview with a Xinhua correspondent on September 30, 1981, elaborated on the policy concerning the return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of China’s peaceful reunification.
The full text of his statement follows:

Today, on the eve of the 32nd anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China and at the approach of the 70th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, I wish, first of all, to extend my festive greetings and cordial regards to the people of all, to extend my festive greetings and cordial regards to the people of all nationalities throughout the country, including the compatriots in Taiwan, Xianggang (Hong Kong) and Aomen (Macao), and Chinese nationals residing in foreign countries.

On New Year’s Day 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress issued a message to the compatriots in Taiwan, in which it proclaimed the policy of striving to reunify the motherland peacefully. The message received warm support and active response from the people of all nationalities throughout China, including the compatriots in Taiwan, Xianggang and Aomen, and those residing abroad. A relaxed atmosphere has set in across the Taiwan Straits. Now, I would taken this opportunity to elaborate on the policy concerning the return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of peaceful reunification:

Taiwan’s return to the embrace of the motherland and the accomplishment of the great cause of national reunification is a great and glorious mission history has bequeathed on our generation. China’s reunification and prosperity is in the vital interest of the Chinese people of all nationalities-not only those on the mainland, but those in Taiwan as well. It is also in the interest of peace in the Far East and the world.

We hope that our compatriots in Taiwan will give full play to their patriotism and work energetically for the early realization of the great unity of our nation and share the honor of it. We hope that our compatriots in Xianggang and Aomen and Chinese nationals residing abroad will continue to act in the role of a bridge and contribute their share to the reunification of the motherland.

We hope that the Kuomintang authorities will stick to their one-China position and their opposition to “two Chinas” and that they will put national interests above everything else, forget previous will and join hands with us in accomplishing the great cause of national reunification and the great goal of making China prosperous and strong, so as to win glory for our ancestors, being benefit to our posterity and write a new and glorious page in the history of the Chinese nation!

(Xinhua News Agency, September 30, 1981, Beijing)
Source: Beijing Review 1981, No. 40 (October 5 edition), p. 10-11; retrieved from Taiwan Info

今天是中華人民共和國32周年國慶前夕，又欣逢辛亥革命70周年紀念日即將來臨之際，我首先向全國各族人民，包括台灣同胞、港澳同胞以及國外僑胞致以節日祝賀和親切問候。

1979年元旦，全國人民代表大會常務委員會發表《告台灣同胞書》，宣佈了爭取和平統一祖國的大政方針，得到全中國各族人民，包括台灣同胞、港澳同胞以及國外僑胞的熱烈擁護和積極回應。台灣海峽出現了和緩氣氛。現在，我願趁此機會進一步闡明關於台灣回歸祖國，實現和平統一的方針政策：

（一）為了儘早結束中華民族陷於分裂的不幸局面，我們建議舉行中國共產黨和中國國民黨兩黨對等談判，實行第三次合作，共同完成祖國統一大業。雙方可先派人接觸，充分交換意見。
（二）海峽兩岸各族人民迫切希望互通音訊、親人團聚、開展貿易、增進瞭解。我們建議雙方共同為通郵、通商、通航、探親、旅遊以及開展學術、文化、體育交流提供方便，達成有關協議。
（三）國家實現統一後，台灣可作為特別行政區，享有高度的自治權，並可保留軍隊。中央政府不干預台灣地方事務。
（四）台灣現行社會、經濟制度不變，生活方式不變，同外國的經濟、文化關係不變。私人財產、房屋、土地、企業所權、合法繼承權和外國投資不受侵犯。
（五）台灣當局和各界代表人士，可擔全國性政治機構的領導職務，參與國家管理。
（六）台灣地方財政遇有困難時，可由中央政府酌情補助。
（七）台灣各族人民、各界人士願回祖國大陸定居者，保證妥善安排，不受歧視，來去自由。
（八）歡迎台灣工商界人士回祖國大陸投資，興辦各種經濟事業，保證其合法權益和利潤。
（九）統一祖國，人人有責。我們熱誠歡迎台灣各族人民、各界人士、民眾團體通過各種管道、採取各種方式提供建議，共商國事。

台灣回歸祖國，完成統一大業是我們這一代人光榮、偉大的歷史使命。中國的統一和富強，不僅是祖國大陸各族人民的根本利益所在，同樣是台灣各族同胞的根本利益所在，而且有利於遠東和世界和平。
我們希望廣大台灣同胞，發揚愛國主義精神，積極促進全民族大團結早日實現，共用民族榮譽。希望港澳同胞、國外僑胞繼續努力，發揮橋樑作用，為統一祖國貢獻力量。
我們希望國民黨當局堅持「一個中國」、反對「兩個中國」的立場，以民族大義為重，捐棄前嫌，同我們攜起手來，共同完成統一祖國大業，實現振興中華的宏圖，為列祖列宗爭光，為子孫後代造福，在中華民族歷史上譜寫新的光輝篇章。
中央政府門戶網站　來源：新華社

The formal term of Ye Jianying’s “Nine-Point Policy” is “Nine Principles for the Peaceful Reunification with Taiwan” (youguan heping tongyi Taiwan de jiutiao fangzhen zhengce 有關和平統一台灣的九條方針政策, abbrev. Ye jiutiao 葉九條), in English it is also often referred to as “Ye’s Nine Principles” or “Nine-Article Statement”. On Jan. 11, 1982 Deng Xiaoping revealed to foreign guests that Ye’s Nine-Point Policy actually means “One Country, Two Systems” (yiguo liangzhi 一國兩制, abbrev. 1C2S) and would also apply to the issue of Hong Kong. In this context Deng on June 26, 1983 explained his “Six Conceptions for the Peaceful Reunification” (guanyu shixian Taiwan han zuguo dalu heping tongyide liutiao gouxiang 關於實現台灣和祖國大陸和平統一的六條構想, abbrev. Deng liutiao 鄧六條) which are shown further below.

The "Six Assurances" to Taiwan ROC

Note: On July 14, 1982, James Lilley, at the time director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the US's nominally unofficial representative body in Taiwan, called on ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo. In US President Ronald Reagan's name, Lilley delivered orally—not in writing—six assurances regarding US policy toward Taiwan. Lilley explained:

● had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to the Republic of China;

● had not agreed to hold prior consultations with the PRC regarding arms sales to the Republic of China;

● would not exert pressure on the Republic of China to enter into negotiations with the PRC.

Joint Communiqué of the PRC and the US

(1) In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America, the United States of America recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. Within that context, the two sides agreed that the people of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between China and the United States were normalized.

(2) The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side stated that it would raise the issue again following normalization. Recognizing that this issue would seriously hamper the development of China-United States relations, they have held further discussions on it, during and since the meetings between Premier Zhao Ziyang and President Ronald Reagan and between Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua and Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. in October 1981.

(3) Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding China-United States relations. These principles were confirmed in the Shanghai Communiqué of February 28, 1972 and reaffirmed in the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on January 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically state that these principles continue to govern all aspects of their relations.

(4) The Chinese Government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair. The Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued By China on January 1, 1979 promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification of the motherland. The Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981 represented a further major effort under this fundamental policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.

(5) The United States Government attaches great importance to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." The United States Government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question as indicated in China's Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued on January 1, 1979 and the Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981. The new situation which has emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also provides favorable conditions for the settlement of China-United States differences over United States arms sales to Taiwan.

Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue.

(6) In order to bring about, over a period of time, a final settlement of the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan, which is an issue rooted in history, the two Governments will make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to the through settlement of this issue.

(7) The development of United States–China relations is not only in the interests of the two peoples but also conducive to peace and stability in the world. The two sides are determined, on the principle of equality and mutual benefit, to strengthen their ties in the economic, cultural, educational, scientific, technological and other fields and make strong, joint efforts for the continued development of relations between the Governments and peoples of the United States and China.

(8) In order to bring about the healthy development of United States–China relations, maintain world peace and oppose aggression and expansion, the two Governments reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique and the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. The two sides will maintain contact and hold appropriate consultations on bilateral and international issues of common interest.

一、在中華人民共和國政府和美利堅合衆國政府發表的一九七九年一月一日建立外交關係的聯合公報中，美利堅合衆國承認中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府，並承認中國的立場，即只有一個中國，臺灣是中國的一部分。在此範圍內，雙方同意，美國人民將同臺灣人民繼續保持文化、商務和其他非官方關係。在此基礎上，中美兩國關係實現了正常化。

二、美國向臺灣出售武器的問題在兩國談判建交的過程中沒有得到解決。雙方的立場不一致，中方聲明在正常化以後將再次提出這個問題。雙方認識到這一問題將會嚴重妨礙中美關係的發展，因而在趙紫陽總理與羅納德·雷根總統以及黃華副總理兼外長與亞歷山大·黑格國務卿于一九八一年十月會見時以及在此以後，雙方進一步就此進行了討論。

三、互相尊重主權和領土完整、互不干涉內政是指導中美關係的根本原則。一九七二年二月二十八的上海公報確認了這些原則。一九七九年一月一日生效的建交公報又重申了這些原則。雙方強調聲明，這些原則仍是指導雙方關係所有方面的原則。

四、中國政府重申，臺灣問題是中國的內政。一九七九年一月一日中國發表的告臺灣同胞書宣佈了爭取和平統一祖國的大政方針。一九八一年九月三十日中國提出的九點方針是按照這一大政方針爭取和平解決臺灣問題的進一步重大努力。

五、美國政府非常重視它與中國的關係，並重申，它無意侵犯中國的主權和領土完整，無意干涉中國的內政，也無意執行 "兩個中國" 或 "一中一台" 政策。美國政府理解並欣賞一九七九年一月一日中國發表的告臺灣同胞書和一九八一年九月三十日中國提出的九點方針中所表明的中國爭取和平解決臺灣問題的政策。臺灣問題上出現的新形勢也爲解決中美兩國在美國售台武器問題上的分歧提供了有利的條件。

六、考慮到雙方的上述聲明，美國政府聲明，它不尋求執行一項長期向臺灣出售武器的政策，它向臺灣出售的武器在性能和數量上將不超過中美建交後近幾年供應的水平，它準備逐步減少它對臺灣的武器出售，並經過一段時間導致最後的解決。在作這樣的聲明時，美國承認中國關於徹底解決這一問題的一貫立場。

七、爲了使美國售台武器這個歷史遺留的問題，經過一段時間最終得到解決，兩國政府將盡一切努力，採取措施，創造條件，以利於徹底解決這個問題。

八、中美關係的發展不僅符合兩國人民的利益，而且也有利於世界和平與穩定。雙方決心本著平等互利的原則，加強經濟、文化、教育、科技和其他方面的聯繫，為繼續發展中美兩國政府和人民之間的關係共同作出重大努力。

九、為了使中美關係健康發展和維護世界和平、反對侵略擴張，兩國政府重申上海公報和建交公報中雙方一致同意的各項原則。雙方將就共同關心的雙邊問題和國際問題保持接觸並進行適當的磋商。

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [Article 121] ✄

1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.

2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.

3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no EEZ or continental shelf.

1. 島嶼是四面環水並在高潮時高於水面的自然形成的陸地區域。

2. 除第3款另有規定外,島嶼的領海、毗連區、專屬經濟區和大陸架應按照本公約適用於其他陸地領土的規定加以確定。

3. 不能維持人類居住或其本身的經濟生活的岩礁,不應有專屬經濟區或大陸架。

Deng Xiaoping’s “Six Conceptions”

Meeting with Professor Yang Liyu from Seton Hall University of the US on June 26, 1983, Deng Xiaoping elaborated the concept of “One Country, Two Systems”.

1983 年 6 月 25 日，鄧小平在會見美國西東大學教授楊力宇時，闡述了按照「一國兩制」解決台灣問題、實現國家統一的構想：

Most Chinese sources have omitted the precise numbering which in this version was derived from the website of the PRC embassy in Japan but does not exactly correspond with the numbering shown in the official English version.

The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong

Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China have reviewed with satisfaction the friendly relations existing between the two Governments and peoples in recent years and agreed that a proper negotiated settlement of the question of Hong Kong, which is left over from the past, is conducive to the maintenance of the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and to the further strengthening and development of the relations between the two countries on a new basis. To this end, they have, after talks between the delegations of the two Governments, agreed to declare as follows:

1. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that to recover the Hong Kong area (including Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories, hereinafter referred to as Hong Kong) is the common aspiration of the entire Chinese people, and that it has decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997.

2. The Government of the United Kingdom declares that it will restore Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China with effect from 1 July 1997.

3. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that the basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong are as follows:

(1) Upholding national unity and territorial integrity and taking account of the history of Hong Kong and its realities, the People's Republic of China has decided to establish, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region upon resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong.

(2) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be directly under the authority of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People's Government.

(3) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The laws currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged.

(4) The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive will be appointed by the Central People's Government on the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally. Principal officials will be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for appointment by the Central People's Government. Chinese and foreign nationals previously working in the public and police services in the government departments of Hong Kong may remain in employment. British and other foreign nationals may also be employed to serve as advisers or hold certain public posts in government departments of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(5) The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will be protected by law.

(6) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the status of a free port and a separate customs territory.

(7) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the status of an international financial centre, and its markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures will continue. There will be free flow of capital. The Hong Kong dollar will continue to circulate and remain freely convertible.

(8) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will have independent finances. The Central People's Government will not levy taxes on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(9) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may establish mutually beneficial economic relations with the United Kingdom and other countries, whose economic interests in Hong Kong will be given due regard.

(10) Using the name of "Hong Kong, China", the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own maintain and develop economic and cultural relations and conclude relevant agreements with states, regions and relevant international organisations.

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own issue travel documents for entry into and exit from Hong Kong.

(11) The maintenance of public order in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be the responsibility of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(12) The above-stated basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong and the elaboration of them in Annex I to this Joint Declaration will be stipulated, in a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, and they will remain unchanged for 50 years.

4. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China declare that, during the transitional period between the date of the entry into force of this Joint Declaration and 30 June 1997, the Government of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong with the object of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity and social stability; and that the Government of the People's Republic of China will give its co-operation in this connection.

5. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China declare that, in order to ensure a smooth transfer of government in 1997, and with a view to the effective implementation of this Joint Declaration, a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group will be set up when this Joint Declaration enters into force; and that it will be established and will function in accordance with the provisions of Annex II to this Joint Declaration.

6. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China declare that land leases in Hong Kong and other related matters will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Annex III to this Joint Declaration.

7. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to implement the preceding declarations and the Annexes to this Joint Declaration.

8. This Joint Declaration is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which shall take place in Beijing before 30 June 1985. This Joint Declaration and its Annexes shall be equally binding.

Done in duplicate at Beijing on December 19, 1984 in the English and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Margaret Thatcher

Elaboration by the government of the People's Republic of China of its basic policies regarding Hong Kong

The Government of the People's Republic of China elaborates the basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong as set out in paragraph 3 of the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong as follows:

The Constitution of the People's Republic of China stipulates in Article 31 "that the state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by laws enacted by the National People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions." In accordance with this Article, the People's Republic of China shall, upon the resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997, establish the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China shall enact and promulgate a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Basic Law) in accordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, stipulating that after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region the socialist system and socialist policies shall not be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and that Hong Kong's previous capitalist system and life-style shall remain unchanged for 50 years.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be directly under the authority of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Except for foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People's Government, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The Central People's Government shall authorise the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to conduct on its own those external affairs specified in Section XI of this Annex.

The government and legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government. Principal officials (equivalent to Secretaries) shall be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and appointed by the Central People's Government. The legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by elections. The executive authorities shall abide by the law and shall be accountable to the legislature.

In addition to Chinese, English may also be used in organs of government and in the courts in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Apart from displaying the national flag and national emblem of the People's Republic of China, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may use a regional flag and emblem of its own.

After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong (i.e. the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law) shall be maintained, save for any that contravene the Basic Law and subject to any amendment by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature.

The legislative power of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The legislature may on its own authority enact laws in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and legal procedures, and report them to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record. Laws enacted by the legislature which are in accordance with the Basic Law and legal procedures shall be regarded as valid.

The laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the Basic Law, and the laws previously in force in Hong Kong and laws enacted by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature as above.

After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the judicial system previously practised in Hong Kong shall be maintained except for those changes consequent upon the vesting in the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the power of final adjudication.

Judicial power in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The courts shall exercise judicial power independently and free from any interference. Members of the judiciary shall be immune from legal action in respect of their judicial functions. The courts shall decide cases in accordance with the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and may refer to precedents in other common law jurisdictions.

Judges of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region courts shall be appointed by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region acting in accordance with the recommendation of an independent commission composed of local judges, persons from the legal profession and other eminent persons. Judges shall be chosen by reference to their judicial qualities and may be recruited from other common law jurisdictions. A judge may only be removed for inability to discharge the functions of his office, or for misbehaviour, by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region acting in accordance with the recommendation of a tribunal appointed by the chief judge of the court of final appeal, consisting of not fewer than three local judges. Additionally, the appointment or removal of principal judges (i.e. those of the highest rank) shall be made by the chief executive with the endorsement of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature and reported to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record. The system of appointment and removal of judicial officers other than judges shall be maintained.

The power of final judgment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the court of final appeal in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which may as required invite judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the court of final appeal.

A prosecuting authority of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall control criminal prosecutions free from any interference.

On the basis of the system previously operating in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall on its own make provision for local lawyers and lawyers from outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to work and practise in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

The Central People's Government shall assist or authorise the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to make appropriate arrangements for reciprocal juridical assistance with foreign states.

After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, public servants previously serving in Hong Kong in all government departments, including the police department, and members of the judiciary may all remain in employment and continue their service with pay, allowances, benefits and conditions of service no less favourable than before. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall pay to such persons who retire or complete their contracts, as well as to those who have retired before 1 July 1997, or to their dependants, all pensions, gratuities, allowances and benefits due to them on terms no less favourable than before, and irrespective of their nationality or place of residence.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may employ British and other foreign nationals previously serving in the public service in Hong Kong, and may recruit British and other foreign nationals holding permanent identity cards of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to serve as public servants at all levels, except as heads of major government departments (corresponding to branches or departments at Secretary level) including the police department, and as deputy heads of some of those departments. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may also employ British and other foreign nationals as advisers to government departments and, when there is a need, may recruit qualified candidates from outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to professional and technical posts in government departments. The above shall be employed only in their individual capacities and, like other public servants, shall be responsible to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government.

The appointment and promotion of public servants shall be on the basis of qualifications, experience and ability. Hong Kong's previous system of recruitment, employment, assessment, discipline, training and management for the public service (including special bodies for appointment, pay and conditions of service) shall, save for any provisions providing privileged treatment for foreign nationals, be maintained.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall deal on its own with financial matters, including disposing of its financial resources and drawing up its budgets and its final accounts. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall report its budgets and final accounts to the Central People's Government for the record.

The Central People's Government shall not levy taxes on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall use its financial revenues exclusively for its own purposes and they shall not be handed over to the Central People's Government. The systems by which taxation and public expenditure must be approved by the legislature, and by which there is accountability to the legislature for all public expenditure, and the system for auditing public accounts shall be maintained.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the capitalist economic and trade systems previously practised in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall decide its economic and trade policies on its own. Rights concerning the ownership of property, including those relating to acquisition, use, disposal, inheritance and compensation for lawful deprivation (corresponding to the real value of the property concerned, freely convertible and paid without undue delay) shall continue to be protected by law.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall retain the status of a free port and continue a free trade policy, including the free movement of goods and capital. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own maintain and develop economic and trade relations with all states and regions.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a separate customs territory. It may participate in relevant international organisations and international trade agreements (including preferential trade arrangements), such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and arrangements regarding international trade in textiles. Export quotas, tariff preferences and other similar arrangements obtained by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be enjoyed exclusively by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have authority to issue its own certificates of origin for products manufactured locally, in accordance with prevailing rules of origin.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, as necessary, establish official and semi-official economic and trade missions in foreign countries, reporting the establishment of such missions to the Central People's Government for the record.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall retain the status of an international financial centre. The monetary and financial systems previously practised in Hong Kong, including the systems of regulation and supervision of deposit taking institutions and financial markets, shall be maintained.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may decide its monetary and financial policies on its own. It shall safeguard the free operation of financial business and the free flow of capital within, into and out of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. No exchange control policy shall be applied in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures shall continue.

The Hong Kong dollar, as the local legal tender, shall continue to circulate and remain freely convertible. The authority to issue Hong Kong currency shall be vested in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may authorise designated banks to issue or continue to issue Hong Kong currency under statutory authority, after satisfying itself that any issue of currency will be soundly based and that the arrangements for such issue are consistent with the object of maintaining the stability of the currency. Hong Kong currency bearing references inappropriate to the status of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China shall be progressively replaced and withdrawn from circulation.

The Exchange Fund shall be managed and controlled by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, primarily for regulating the exchange value of the Hong Kong dollar.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain Hong Kong's previous systems of shipping management and shipping regulation, including the system for regulating conditions of seamen. The specific functions and responsibilities of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government in the field of shipping shall be defined by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government on its own. Private shipping businesses and shipping-related businesses and private container terminals in Hong Kong may continue to operate freely.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be authorised by the Central People's Government to continue to maintain a shipping register and issue related certificates under its own legislation in the name of 'Hong Kong, China'.

With the exception of foreign warships, access for which requires the permission of the Central People's Government, ships shall enjoy access to the ports of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the status of Hong Kong as a centre of international and regional aviation. Airlines incorporated and having their principal place of business in Hong Kong and civil aviation related businesses may continue to operate. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall continue the previous system of civil aviation management in Hong Kong, and keep its own aircraft register in accordance with provisions laid down by the Central People's Government concerning nationality marks and registration marks of aircraft. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be responsible on its own for matters of routine business and technical management of civil aviation, including the management of airports, the provision of air traffic services within the flight information region of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the discharge of other responsibilities allocated under the regional air navigation procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organisation.

The Central People's Government shall, in consultation with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, make arrangements providing for air services between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other parts of the People's Republic of China for airlines incorporated and having their principal place of business in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other airlines of the People's Republic of China. All Air Service Agreements providing for air services between other parts of the People's Republic of China and other states and regions with stops at the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and air services between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other states and regions with stops at other parts of the People's Republic of China shall be concluded by the Central People's Government. For this purpose, the Central People's Government shall take account of the special conditions and economic interests of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and consult the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. Representatives of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may participate as members of delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of China in air service consultations with foreign governments concerning arrangements for such services.

Acting under specific authorisations from the Central People's Government, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may:

All scheduled air services to, from or through the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region which do not operate to, from or through the mainland of China shall be regulated by Air Service Agreements or provisional arrangements referred to in this paragraph.

The Central People's Government shall give the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government the authority to:

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the educational system previously practised in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall on its own decide policies in the fields of culture, education, science and technology, including policies regarding the educational system and its administration, the language of instruction, the allocation of funds, the examination system, the system of academic awards and the recognition of educational and technological qualifications. Institutions of all kinds, including those run by religious and community organisations, may retain their autonomy. They may continue to recruit staff and use teaching materials from outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Students shall enjoy freedom of choice of education and freedom to pursue their education outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Subject to the principle that foreign affairs are the responsibility of the Central People's Government, representatives of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may participate, as members of delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of China, in negotiations at the diplomatic level directly affecting the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region conducted by the Central People's Government. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own, using the name 'Hong Kong, China', maintain and develop relations and conclude and implement agreements with states, regions and relevant international organisations in the appropriate fields, including the economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping, communications, touristic, cultural and sporting fields. Representatives of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may participate, as members of delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of China, in international organisations or conferences in appropriate fields limited to states and affecting the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, or may attend in such other capacity as may be permitted by the Central People's Government and the organisation or conference concerned, and may express their views in the name of 'Hong Kong, China'. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, using the name 'Hong Kong, China', participate in international organisations and conferences not limited to states.

The application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of international agreements to which the People's Republic of China is or becomes a party shall be decided by the Central People's Government, in accordance with the circumstances and needs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and after seeking the views of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. International agreements to which the People's Republic of China is not a party but which are implemented in Hong Kong may remain implemented in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Central People's Government shall, as necessary, authorise or assist the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to make appropriate arrangements for the application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of other relevant international agreements. The Central People's Government shall take the necessary steps to ensure that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall continue to retain its status in an appropriate capacity in those international organisations of which the People's Republic of China is a member and in which Hong Kong participates in one capacity or another. The Central People's Government shall, where necessary, facilitate the continued participation of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in an appropriate capacity in those international organisations in which Hong Kong is a participant in one capacity or another, but of which the People's Republic of China is not a member.

Foreign consular and other official or semi-official missions may be established in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region with the approval of the Central People's Government. Consular and other official missions established in Hong Kong by states which have established formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China may be maintained. According to the circumstances of each case, consular and other official missions of states having no formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China may either be maintained or changed to semi-official missions. States not recognised by the People's Republic of China can only establish non-governmental institutions.

The United Kingdom may establish a Consulate-General in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

The maintenance of public order in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the responsibility of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. Military forces sent by the Central People's Government to be stationed in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for the purpose of defence shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Expenditure for these military forces shall be borne by the Central People's Government.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall protect the rights and freedoms of inhabitants and other persons in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region according to law. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall maintain the rights and freedoms as provided for by the laws previously in force in Hong Kong, including freedom of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, to form and join trade unions, of correspondence, of travel, of movement, of strike, of demonstration, of choice of occupation, of academic research, of belief, inviolability of the home, the freedom to marry and the right to raise a family freely.

Every person shall have the right to confidential legal advice, access to the courts, representation in the courts by lawyers of his choice, and to obtain judicial remedies. Every person shall have the right to challenge the actions of the executive in the courts.

Religious organisations and believers may maintain their relations with religious organisations and believers elsewhere, and schools, hospitals and welfare institutions run by religious organisations may be continued. The relationship between religious organisations in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and those in other parts of the People's Republic of China shall be based on the principles of non-subordination, non-interference and mutual respect.

The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force.

The following categories of persons shall have the right of abode in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and, in accordance with the law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, be qualified to obtain permanent identity cards issued by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, which state their right of abode:

The Central People's Government shall authorise the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to issue, in accordance with the law, passports of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China to all Chinese nationals who hold permanent identity cards of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and travel documents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China to all other persons lawfully residing in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The above passports and documents shall be valid for all states and regions and shall record the holder's right to return to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

For the purpose of travelling to and from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may use travel documents issued by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, or by other competent authorities of the People's Republic of China, or of other states. Holders of permanent identity cards of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may have this fact stated in their travel documents as evidence that the holders have the right of abode in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of persons from other parts of China shall continue to be regulated in accordance with the present practice.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may apply immigration controls on entry, stay in and departure from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by persons from foreign states and regions.

Unless restrained by law, holders of valid travel documents shall be free to leave the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region without special authorisation.

The Central People's Government shall assist or authorise the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to conclude visa abolition agreements with states or regions.

1. In furtherance of their common aim and in order to ensure a smooth transfer of government in 1997, the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed to continue their discussions in a friendly spirit and to develop the cooperative relationship which already exists between the two Governments over Hong Kong with a view to the effective implementation of the Joint Declaration.

2. In order to meet the requirements for liaison, consultation and the exchange of information, the two Governments have agreed to set up a Joint Liaison Group.

c) to exchange information and conduct consultations on such subjects as may be agreed by the two sides.

Matters on which there is disagreement in the Joint Liaison Group shall be referred to the two Governments for solution through consultations.

4. Matters for consideration during the first half of the period between the establishment of the Joint Liaison Group and 1 July 1997 shall include:

a) action to be taken by the two Governments to enable the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to maintain its economic relations as a separate customs territory, and in particular to ensure the maintenance of Hong Kong's participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Multifibre Arrangement and other international arrangements; and

b) action to be taken by the two Governments to ensure the continued application of international rights and obligations affecting Hong Kong.

5. The two Governments have agreed that in the second half of the period between the establishment of the Joint Liaison Group and 1 July 1997 there will be need for closer cooperation, which will therefore be intensified during that period. Matters for consideration during this second period shall include:

b) action to assist the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to maintain and develop economic and cultural relations and conclude agreements on these matters with states, regions and relevant international organisations.

6. The Joint Liaison Group shall be an organ for liaison and not an organ of power. It shall play no part in the administration of Hong Kong or the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Nor shall it have any supervisory role over that administration. The members and supporting staff of the Joint Liaison Group shall only conduct activities within the scope of the functions of the Joint Liaison Group.

7. Each side shall designate a senior representative who shall be of Ambassadorial rank, and four other members of the group. Each side may send up to 20 supporting staff.

8. The Joint Liaison Group shall be established on the entry into force of the Joint Declaration. From 1 July 1988 the Joint Liaison Group shall have its principal base in Hong Kong. The Joint Liaison Group shall continue its work until 1 January 2000.

9. The Joint Liaison Group shall meet in Beijing, London and Hong Kong. It shall meet at least once in each of the three locations in each year. The venue for each meeting shall be agreed between the two sides.

10. Members of the Joint Liaison Group shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities as appropriate when in the three locations. Proceedings of the Joint Liaison Group shall remain confidential unless otherwise agreed between the two sides.

11. The Joint Liaison Group may by agreement between the two sides decide to set up specialist sub-groups to deal with particular subjects requiring expert assistance.

12. Meetings of the Joint Liaison Group and sub-groups may be attended by experts other than the members of the Joint Liaison Group. Each side shall determine the composition of its delegation to particular meetings of the Joint Liaison Group or sub-group in accordance with the subjects to be discussed and the venue chosen.

13. The working procedures of the Joint Liaison Group shall be discussed and decided upon by the two sides within the guidelines laid down in this Annex.

The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with effect from the entry into force of the Joint Declaration, land leases in Hong Kong and other related matters shall be dealt with in accordance with the following provisions:

1. All leases of land granted or decided upon before the entry into force of the Joint Declaration and those granted thereafter in accordance with paragraph 2 or 3 of this Annex, and which extend beyond 30 June 1997, and all rights in relation to such leases shall continue to be recognised and protected under the law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

2. All leases of land granted by the British Hong Kong Government not containing a right of renewal that expire before 30 June 1997, except short term tenancies and leases for special purposes, may be extended if the lessee so wishes for a period expiring not later than 30 June 2047 without payment of an additional premium. An annual rent shall be charged from the date of extension equivalent to 3 per cent of the rateable value of the property at that date, adjusted in step with any changes in the rateable value thereafter. In the case of old schedule lots, village lots, small houses and similar rural holdings, where the property was on 30 June 1984 held by, or, in the case of small houses granted after that date, the property is granted to, a person descended through the male line from a person who was in 1898 a resident of an established village in Hong Kong, the rent shall remain unchanged so long as the property is held by that person or by one of his lawful successors in the male line. Where leases of land not having a right of renewal expire after 30 June 1997, they shall be dealt with in accordance with the relevant land laws and policies of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

3. From the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997, new leases of land may be granted by the British Hong Kong Government for terms expiring not later than 30 June 2047. Such leases shall be granted at a premium and nominal rental until 30 June 1997, after which date they shall not require payment of an additional premium but an annual rent equivalent to 3 per cent of the rateable value of the property at that date, adjusted in step with changes in the rateable value thereafter, shall be charged.

4. The total amount of new land to be granted under paragraph 3 of this Annex shall be limited to 50 hectares a year (excluding land to be granted to the Hong Kong Housing Authority for public rental housing) from the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997.

5. Modifications of the conditions specified in leases granted by the British Hong Kong Government may continue to be granted before 1 July 1997 at a premium equivalent to the difference between the value of the land under the previous conditions and its value under the modified conditions.

6. From the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997, premium income obtained by the British Hong Kong Government from land transactions shall, after deduction of the average cost of land production, be shared equally between the British Hong Kong Government and the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. All the income obtained by the British Hong Kong Government, including the amount of the above-mentioned deduction, shall be put into the Capital Works Reserve Fund for the financing of land development and public works in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government's share of the premium income shall be deposited in banks incorporated in Hong Kong and shall not be drawn on except for the financing of land development and public works in Hong Kong in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 7(d) of this Annex.

7. A Land Commission shall be established in Hong Kong immediately upon the entry into force of the Joint Declaration. The Land Commission shall be composed of an equal number of officials designated respectively by the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China together with necessary supporting staff. The officials of the two sides shall be responsible to their respective governments. The Land Commission shall be dissolved on 30 June 1997.

b) to monitor observance of the limit specified in paragraph 4 of this Annex, the amount of land granted to the Hong Kong Housing Authority for public rental housing, and the division and use of premium income referred to in paragraph 6 of this Annex;

c) to consider and decide on proposals from the British Hong Kong Government for increasing the limit referred to in paragraph 4 of this Annex;

d) to examine proposals for drawing on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government's share of premium income referred to in paragraph 6 of this Annex and to make recommendations to the Chinese side for decision.

Matters on which there is disagreement in the Land Commission shall be referred to the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China for decision.

8. Specific details regarding the establishment of the Land Commission shall be finalised separately by the two sides through consultations.

In connection with the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the question of Hong Kong to be signed this day, the Government of the United Kingdom declares that, subject to the completion of the necessary amendments to the relevant United Kingdom legislation:

a) All persons who on 30 June 1997 are, by virtue of a connection with Hong Kong, British Dependent Territories Citizens (BDTCs) under the law in force in the United Kingdom will cease to be BDTCs with effect from 1 July 1997, but will be eligible to retain an appropriate status which, without conferring the right of abode in the United Kingdom, will entitle them to continue to use passports issued by the Government of the United Kingdom. This status will be acquired by such persons only if they hold or are included in such a British passport issued before 1 July 1997, except that eligible persons born on or after 1 January 1997 but before 1 July 1997 may obtain or be included in such a passport up to 31 December 1997.

b) No person will acquire BDTC status on or after 1 July 1997 by virtue of a connection with Hong Kong. No person born on or after 1 July 1997 will acquire the status referred to as being appropriate in sub-paragraph (a).

c) United Kingdom consular officials in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and elsewhere may renew and replace passports of persons mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) and may also issue them to persons, born before 1 July 1997 of such persons, who had previously been included in the passport of their parent.

d) Those who have obtained or been included in passports issued by the Government of the United Kingdom under sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) will be entitled to receive, upon request, British consular services and protection when in third countries.

The Government of the People's Republic of China has received the memorandum from the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated 19 December 1984.

Under the Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, all Hong Kong Chinese compatriots, whether they are holders of the 'British Dependent Territories Citizens' Passport' or not, are Chinese nationals.

Taking account of the historical background of Hong Kong and its realities, the competent authorities of the Government of the People's Republic of China will, with effect from 1 July 1997, permit Chinese nationals in Hong Kong who were previously called 'British Dependent Territories Citizens' to use travel documents issued by the Government of the United Kingdom for the purpose of travelling to other states and regions.

The above Chinese nationals will not be entitled to British consular protection in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other parts of the People's Republic of China on account of their holding the above-mentioned British travel documents.

《中華人民共和國政府和大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府關於香港問題的聯合聲明》

中華人民共和國政府和大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府滿意地回顧了近年來兩國政府和兩國人民之間的友好關係，一致認為通過協商妥善地解決歷史上遺留下來的香港問題，有助於維持香港的繁榮與穩定，並有助於兩國關係在新的基礎上進一步鞏固和發展，為此，經過兩國政府代表團的會談，同意聲明如下：

一、中華人民共和國政府聲明：收回香港地區（包括香港島、九龍和"新界"，以下稱香港）是全中國人民的共同願望，中華人民共和國政府決定於一九九七年七月一日對香港恢復行使主權。

二、聯合王國政府聲明：聯合王國政府於一九九七年七月一日將香港交還給中華人民共和國。

三、中華人民共和國政府聲明，中華人民共和國對香港的基本方針政策如下：

（一）爲了維護國家的統一和領土完整，並考慮到香港的歷史和現實情況，中華人民共和國決定在對香港恢復行使主權時，根據中華人民共和國憲法第三十一條的規定，設立香港特別行政區。

（二）香港特別行政區直轄於中華人民共和國中央人民政府。除外交和國防事務屬中央人民政府管理外，香港特別行政區享有高度的自治權。

（三）香港特別行政區享有行政管理權、立法權、獨立的司法權和終審權。現行的法律基本不變。

（四）香港特別行政區政府由當地人組成。行政長官在當地通過選舉或協商産生，由中央人民政府任命。主要官員由香港特別行政區行政長官提名，報中央人民政府任命。原在香港各政府部門任職的中外藉公務、警務人員可以留用。香港特別行政區各政府部門可以聘請英籍人士或其他外籍人士擔任顧問或某些公職。

（五）香港的現行社會、經濟制度不變；生活方式不變。香港特別行政區依法保障人身、言論、出版、集會、結社、旅行、遷徙、通信、罷工、選擇職業和學術研究以及宗教信仰等各項權利和自由。私人財産、企業所有權、合法繼承權以及外來投資均受法律保護。

（六）香港特別行政區將保持自由港和獨立關稅地區的地位。

（七）香港特別行政區將保持國際金融中心的地位，繼續開放外匯、黃金、證券、期貨等市場，資金進出自由。港幣繼續流通，自由兌換。

（八）香港特別行政區將保持財政獨立。中央人民政府不向香港特別行政區徵稅。

（九）香港特別行政區可同聯合王國和其他國家建立互利的經濟關係。聯合王國和其他國家在香港的經濟利益將得到照顧。

（十）香港特別行政區可以 "中國香港" 的名義單獨地同各國、各地區及有關國際組織保持和發展經濟、文化關係，並簽訂有關協定。香港特別行政區政府可自行簽發出入香港的旅行證件。

（十一）香港特別行政區的社會治安由香港特別行政區政府負責維持。

（十二）關於中華人民共和國對香港的上述基本方針政策和本聯合聲明附件一對上述基本方針政策的具體說明，中華人民共和國全國人民代表大會將以中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法規定之，並在五十年內不變。

四、中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府聲明：自本聯合聲明生效之日起至一九九七年六月三十日止的過渡時期內，聯合王國政府負責香港的行政管理，以維護和保持香港的經濟繁榮和社會穩定；對此，中華人民共和國政府將給予合作。

五、中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府聲明：為求本聯合聲明得以有效執行，並保證一九九七年政權的順利交接，在本聯合聲明生效時成立中英聯合聯絡小組；聯合聯絡小組將根據本聯合聲明附件二的規定建立和履行職責。

六、中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府聲明：關於香港土地契約和其他有關事項，將根據本聯合聲明附件三的規定處理。

七、中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府同意，上述各項聲明和本聯合聲明的附件均將付諸實施。

八、本聯合聲明須經批准，並自互換批准書之日起生效。批准書應於一九八五年六月三十日前在北京互換。本聯合聲明及其附件具有同等約束力。

一九八四年十二月十九日在北京簽訂，共兩份，每份都用中文和英文寫成，兩種文本具有同等效力。

大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府代表瑪格麗特 • 柴契爾（簽字）

中華人民共和國政府就中華人民共和國政府和大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府關於香港問題的聯合聲明第三款所載中華人民共和國對香港的基本方針政策，具體說明如下：

中華人民共和國憲法第三十一條規定："國家在必要時得設立特別行政區。在特別行政區內實行的制度按照具體情況由全國人民代表大會以法律規定。"據此，中華人民共和國將在一九九七年七月一日對香港恢復行使主權時，設立中華人民共和國香港特別行政區。中華人民共和國全國人民代表大會將根據中華人民共和國憲法制定並頒布中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法（以下簡稱《基本法》），規定香港特別行政區成立後不實行社會主義的制度和政策，保持香港原有的資本主義制度和生活方式，五十年不變。

香港特別行政區直轄於中華人民共和國中央人民政府，並享有高度的自治權。除外交和國防事務屬中央人民政府管理外，香港特別行政區享有行政管理權、立法權、獨立的司法權和終審權。中央人民政府授權香港特別行政區自行處理本附件第十一節所規定的各項涉外事務。

香港特別行政區政府和立法機關由當地人組成。香港特別行政區行政長官在當地通過選舉或協商產生，由中央人民政府任命。香港特別行政區政府的主要官員（相當於"司"級官員）由香港特別行政區行政長官提名，報請中央人民政府任命。香港特別行政區立法機關由選舉產生。行政機關必須遵守法律，對立法機關負責。

香港特別行政區的政府機關和法院，除使用中文外，還可使用英文。

香港特別行政區除懸掛中華人民共和國國旗和國徽外，還可以使用區旗和區徽。

香港特別行政區成立後，香港原有法律（即普通法及衡平法、條例、附屬立法、習慣法）除與《基本法》相抵觸或香港特別行政區的立法機關作出修改者外，予以保留。

香港特別行政區的立法權屬於香港特別行政區立法機關。立法機關可根據《基本法》的規定並依照法定程序制定法律，報中華人民共和國全國人民代表大會常務委員會備案。立法機關制定的法律凡符合《基本法》和法定程序者，均屬有效。

在香港特別行政區實行的法律為《基本法》，以及上述香港原有法律和香港特別行政區立法機關制定的法律。

香港特別行政區成立後，除因香港特別行政區法院享有終審權而產生的變化外，原在香港實行的司法體制予以保留。

香港特別行政區的審判權屬於香港特別行政區法院。法院獨立進行審判，不受任何干涉。司法人員履行審判職責的行為不受法律追究。法院依照香港特別行政區的法律審判案件，其他普通法適用地區的司法判例可作參考。

香港特別行政區法院的法官，根據當地法官和法律界及其他方面知名人士組成的獨立委員會的推薦，由行政長官予以任命。法官應根據本人的司法才能選用，並可從其他普通法適用地區聘用。法官只有在無力履行職責或行為不檢的情況下，才能由行政長官根據終審法院首席法官任命的不少於三名當地法官組成的審議庭的建議，予以免職。主要法官（即最高一級法官）的任命和免職，還須由行政長官徵得香港特別行政區立法機關的同意並報全國人民代表大會常務委員會備案。法官以外的其他司法人員的任免制度繼續保持。

香港特別行政區的終審權屬於香港特別行政區終審法院。終審法院可根據需要邀請其他普通法適用地區的法官參加審判。

香港特別行政區的檢察機關主管刑事檢察工作，不受任何干涉。

香港特別行政區政府可參照原在香港實行的辦法，作出有關當地和外來的律師在香港特別行政區工作和執業的規定。

中央人民政府將協助或授權香港特別行政區政府同外國就司法互助關係作出適當安排。

香港特別行政區成立後，原在香港各政府部門（包括警察部門）任職的公務人員和司法人員均可留用，繼續工作；其薪金、津貼、福利待遇和服務條件不低於原來的標準。對退休或約滿離職的人員，包括一九九七年七月一日以前退休的人員，不論其所屬國籍或居住地點，香港特別行政區政府將按不低於原來的標準向他們或其家屬支付應得的退休金、酬金、津貼及福利費。

香港特別行政區政府可任用原香港公務人員中的或持有香港特別行政區永久性居民身份證的英籍和其他外籍人士擔任政府部門的各級公務人員，各主要政府部門，（相當於"司"級部門，包括警察部門）的正職和某些主要政府部門的副職除外。香港特別行政區政府還可聘請英籍和其他外籍人士擔任政府部門的顧問；必要時並可從香港特別行政區以外聘請合格人員擔任政府部門的專業和技術職務。上述人士只能以個人身份受聘，並和其他公務人員一樣對香港特別行政區政府負責。

公務人員應根據本人的資格、經驗和才能予以任命和提升。香港原有關於公務人員的招聘、僱用、考核、紀律、培訓和管理的制度（包括負責公務人員的任用、薪金、服務條件的專門機構），除有關給予外籍人員特權待遇的規定外，予以保留。

香港特別行政區自行管理財政事務，包括支配財政資源，編製財政預算和決算。香港特別行政區的預決算須報中央人民政府備案。

中央人民政府不向香港特別行政區徵稅。香港特別行政區的財政收入全部用於自身需要，不上繳中央人民政府。徵稅和公共開支經立法機關批准、公共開支向立法機關負責和公共帳目的審計等制度，予以保留。

香港特別行政區保持原在香港實行的資本主義經濟制度和貿易制度。香港特別行政區政府自行制定經濟和貿易政策。財產所有權，包括財產的取得、使用、處置和繼承的權利，以及依法徵用財產得到補償（補償相當於該財產的實際價值、可自由兌換、不無故遲延支付）的權利，繼續受法律保護。香港特別行政區將保持自由港地位，並繼續實行自由貿易政策，包括貨物和資本的自由流動。香港特別行政區可單獨同各國、各地區保持和發展經濟和貿易關係。

香港特別行政區為單獨的關稅地區。香港特別行政區可參加關稅和貿易總協定、關於國際紡織品貿易安排等有關的國際組織和國際貿易協定，包括優惠貿易安排。香港特別行政區取得的出口配額、關稅優惠和達成的其他類似安排，全由香港特別行政區享有。香港特別行政區有權根據當時的產地規則，對在當地製造的產品簽發產地來源證。

香港特別行政區可根據需要在外國設立官方或半官方的經濟和貿易機構，並報中央人民政府備案。

香港特別行政區將保持國際金融中心的地位。原在香港實行的貨幣金融制度，包括對接受存款機構和金融市場的管理和監督制度，予以保留。

香港特別行政區政府可自行制定貨幣金融政策，並保障金融企業的經營自由以及資金在香港特別行政區流動和進出香港特別行政區的自由。香港特別行政區不實行外匯管制政策。外匯、黃金、證券、期貨市場繼續開放。

港元作為當地的法定貨幣，繼續流通，自由兌換。港幣發行權屬香港特別行政區政府，在確知港幣的發行基礎是健全的以及有關發行的安排符合保持港幣穩定的目的的情況下，香港特別行政區政府可授權指定銀行根據法定權限發行或繼續發行香港貨幣。凡所帶標誌與中華人民共和國香港特別行政區地位不符的香港貨幣，將逐步更換和退出流通。

外匯基金由香港特別行政區政府管理和支配，主要用於調節港元匯價。

香港特別行政區保持原在香港實行的航運經營和管理體制，包括有關海員的管理體制。香港特別行政區政府可自行規定在航運方面的具體職能和責任。香港的私營航運及與航運有關的企業和私營集裝箱碼頭，可繼續自由經營。

香港特別行政區經中央人民政府授權繼續進行船舶登記，並可根據法律以"中國香港"名義頒發有關證件。

除外國軍用船隻進入香港特別行政區須經中央人民政府特別許可外，其他船舶可根據香港特別行政區法律進出其港口。

香港特別行政區將保持香港作為國際和區域航空中心的地位。在香港註冊並以香港為主要營業地的航空公司和與民用航空有關的行業可繼續經營。香港特別行政區繼續沿用原在香港實行的民用航空管理制度，並按中央人民政府關於飛機國籍標誌和登記標誌的規定，設置自己的飛機登記冊。香港特別行政區自行負責民用航空的日常業務和技術管理，包括機場管理，在香港特別行政區飛行情報區內提供空中交通服務，以及履行國際民用航空組織的區域性航行規劃程序所規定的其他職責。

中央人民政府經同香港特別行政區政府磋商作出安排，為在香港特別行政區註冊並以香港特別行政區為主要營業地的航空公司和中華人民共和國的其他航空公司，提供香港特別行政區和中華人民共和國其他地區之間的往返航班。凡涉及中華人民共和國其他地區與其他國家和地區的往返並經停香港特別行政區的航班，和涉及香港特別行政區與其他國家和地區的往返並經停中華人民共和國其他地區航班的民用航空運輸協定，由中央人民政府簽訂。為此，中央人民政府將考慮香港特別行政區的特殊情況和經濟利益，並同香港特別行政區政府磋商。中央人民政府在同外國政府商談有關此類航班的安排時，香港特別行政區政府的代表可作為中華人民共和國政府代表團成員參加。

經中央人民政府具體授權，香港特別行政區政府可以：對原有的民用航空運輸協定和協議續簽或修改，這些協定和協議原則上都可以續簽或修改，原協定和協議規定的權利盡可能保留；談判簽訂新的民用航空運輸協定，為在香港特別行政區註冊並以香港特別行政區為主要營業地的航空公司提供航線，以及過境和技術停降權利；在同外國和其它地區沒有民用航空運輸協定的情況下，談判簽訂臨時協議。凡不涉及往返、經停中國內地而只往返、經停香港特別行政區的定期航班，均由本段所述的民用航空運輸協定或臨時協議加以規定。

中央人民政府授權香港特別行政區政府：同其他當局商談並簽訂有關執行上述民用航空運輸協定和臨時協議的各項安排；對在香港特別行政區註冊並以香港特別行政區為主要營業地的航空公司簽發執照；按照上述民用航空運輸協定和臨時協議指定航空公司；對外國航空公司除往返、經停中國內地的航班以外的其他航班簽發許可證。

香港特別行政區保持原在香港實行的教育制度。香港特別行政區政府自行制定有關文化、教育和科學技術方面的政策，包括教育體制及管理、教學語言、經費分配、考試制度、學位制度、承認學歷及技術資格等政策。各類院校，包括宗教及社會團體所辦院校，均可保留其自主性，並可繼續從香港特別行政區以外招聘教職員，選用教材。學生享有選擇院校和在香港特別行政區以外求學的自由。

在外交事務屬中央人民政府管理的原則下，香港特別行政區政府的代表，可作為中華人民共和國政府代表團的成員，參加由中央人民政府進行的與香港特別行政區直接有關的外交談判。香港特別行政區可以"中國香港"的名義，在經濟、貿易、金融、航運、通訊、旅遊、文化、體育等領域單獨地同世界各國、各地區及有關國際組織保持和發展關係，並簽訂和履行有關協定。對以國家為單位參加的、與香港特別行政區有關的、適當領域的國際組織和國際會議，香港特別行政區政府的代表可作為中華人民共和國政府代表團的成員或以中央人民政府和上述有關國際組織或國際會議允許的身份參加，並以"中國香港"的名義發表意見。對不以國家為單位參加的國際組織和國際會議，香港特別行政區可以"中國香港"的名義參加。

中華人民共和國締結的國際協定，中央人民政府可根據香港特別行政區的情況和需要，在徵詢香港特別行政區政府的意見後，決定是否適用於香港特別行政區。中華人民共和國尚未參加但已適用於香港的國際協定仍可繼續適用。中央人民政府根據需要授權或協助香港特別行政區政府作出適當安排，使其他有關的國際協定適用於香港特別行政區。對中華人民共和國已經參加而香港目前也以某種形式參加的國際組織，中央人民政府將採取必要措施使香港特別行政區以適當形式繼續保持在這些組織中的地位。對中華人民共和國尚未參加而香港目前以某種形式參加的國際組織，中央人民政府將根據需要使香港特別行政區以適當形式繼續參加這些組織。

外國在香港特別行政區設立領事機構或其他官方、半官方機構，須經中央人民政府批准。同中華人民共和國建立正式外交關係的國家在香港設立的領事機構和其他官方機構，可予保留；尚未同中華人民共和國建立正式外交關係國家的領事機構和其他官方機構，可根據情況予以保留或改為半官方機構；尚未為中華人民共和國承認的國家，只能設立民間機構。

香港特別行政區的社會治安由香港特別行政區政府負責維持。中央人民政府派駐香港特別行政區負責防務的部隊不干預香港特別行政區的內部事務，駐軍軍費由中央人民政府負擔。

香港特別行政區政府依法保障香港特別行政區居民和其他人的權利和自由。香港特別行政區政府保持香港原有法律中所規定的權利和自由，包括人身、言論、出版、集會、結社、組織和參加工會、通信、旅行、遷徙、罷工、遊行、選擇職業、學術研究和信仰自由、住宅不受侵犯、婚姻自由以及自願生育的權利。

任何人均有權得到秘密法律諮詢、向法院提起訴訟、選擇律師在法庭上為其代理以及獲得司法補救。任何人均有權對行政部門的行為向法院申訴。

宗教組織和教徒可同其他地方的宗教組織和教徒保持關係，宗教組織所辦學校、醫院、福利機構等均可繼續存在。香港特別行政區的宗教組織與中華人民共和國其他地區宗教組織的關係應以互不隸屬、互不干涉和互相尊重的原則為基礎。

《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》和《經濟、社會與文化權利的國際公約》適用於香港的規定將繼續有效。

在香港特別行政區有居留權並有資格按香港特別行政區的法律獲得香港特別行政區政府簽發的載明此項權利的永久性居民身份證者為：在香港特別行政區成立以前或以後在當地出生或通常居住連續七年以上的中國公民及其在香港以外所生的中國籍子女；在香港特別行政區成立以前或以後在當地通常居住連續七年以上並以香港為永久居住地的其他人及其在香港特別行政區成立以前或以後在當地出生的未滿二十一歲的子女；以及在香港特別行政區成立前只在香港有居留權的其他人。

中央人民政府授權香港特別行政區政府依照法律，給持有香港特別行政區永久性居民身份證的中國公民簽發中華人民共和國香港特別行政區護照，並給在香港特別行政區的其他的合法居留者簽發中華人民共和國香港特別行政區其他旅行證件。上述護照和證件，前往各國和各地區有效，並載明持有人有返回香港特別行政區的權利。

香港特別行政區居民出入當地，可使用香港特別行政區政府或中華人民共和國其他主管部門，或其他國家主管部門簽發的旅行證件。凡持有香港特別行政區永久性居民身份證者，其旅行證件可載明此項事實，以證明其在香港特別行政區有居留權。

對中國其他地區的人進入香港特別行政區將按現在實行的辦法管理。

對其他國家和地區的人入境、逗留和離境，香港特別行政區政府可實行出入境管制。

有效旅行證件持有人，除非受到法律制止，可自由離開香港特別行政區，無需特別批准。

中央人民政府將協助或授權香港特別行政區政府同各國或各地區締結互免簽證協定。

一、為促進雙方共同目標，並為保證一九九七年政權的順利交接，中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府同意，繼續以友好的精神進行討論並促進兩國政府在香港問題上已有的合作關係，以求《聯合聲明》得以有效執行。

二、為了進行聯絡、磋商及交換情況的需要，兩國政府同意成立聯合聯絡小組。

聯合聯絡小組未能取得一致意見的問題，提交兩國政府通過協商解決。

四、在聯合聯絡小組成立到一九九七年七月一日的前半段時期中審議的事項包括：

（一）兩國政府為使香港特別行政區作為獨立關稅地區保持其經濟關係，特別是為確保香港特別行政區繼續參加關稅及貿易總協定、多種纖維協定及其他國際性安排所需採取的行動；

（二）兩國政府為確保同香港有關的國際權利與義務繼續適用所需採取的行動。

五、兩國政府同意，在聯合聯絡小組成立到一九九七年七月一日的後半段時期中，有必要進行更密切的合作，因此屆時將加強合作，在此第二階段時期中審議的事項包括：

（二）為協助香港特別行政區同各國、各地區及有關國際組織保持和發展經濟、文化關係並就此類事項簽訂協議所需採取的行動。

六、聯合聯絡小組是聯絡機構而不是權力機構，不參與香港或香港特別行政區的行政管理，也不對之起監督作用。聯合聯絡小組的成員和工作人員只在聯合聯絡小組職責範圍內進行活動。

七、雙方各指派一名大使級的首席代表和另外四名小組成員。每方可派不超過二十名的工作人員。

八、聯合聯絡小組在《聯合聲明》生效時成立。聯合聯絡小組自一九八八年七月一日起以香港為主要駐地。聯合聯絡小組將繼續工作到二○○○年一月一日為止。

九、聯合聯絡小組在北京、倫敦和香港開會。每年至少在上述三地各開會一次。每次開會地點由雙方商定。

十、聯合聯絡小組成員在上述三地享有相應的外交特權與豁免。除非雙方另有協議，聯合聯絡小組討論情況須加以保密。

十一、經雙方協議，聯合聯絡小組可決定設立專家小組以處理需要專家協助的具體事項。

十二、聯合聯絡小組成員以外的專家可參加聯合聯絡小組和專家小組的會議。每方按照討論的問題和選定的地點，決定其參加聯合聯絡小組或專家小組每次會議的人員組成。

十三、聯合聯絡小組的工作程序由雙方按照本附件規定討論決定。

中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府同意自《聯合聲明》生效之日起，按下列規定處理關於香港土地契約和其他有關事項：

一、《聯合聲明》生效前批出或決定的超越一九九七年六月三十日年期的所有土地契約和與土地契約有關的一切權利，以及該聲明生效後根據本附件第二款或第三款批出的超越一九九七年六月三十日年期的所有土地契約和與土地契約有關的一切權利，按照香港特別行政區的法律繼續予以承認和保護。

二、除了短期租約和特殊用途的契約外，已由香港英國政府批出的一九九七年六月三十日以前滿期而沒有續期權利的土地契約，如承租人願意，均可續期到不超過二○四七年六月三十日，不補地價。從續期之日起，每年交納相當於當日該土地應課差餉租值百分之三的租金，此後，隨應課差餉租值的改變而調整租金。至於舊批約地段、鄉村屋地、丁屋地和類似的農村土地，如該土地在一九八四年六月三十日的承租人，或在該日以後批出的丁屋地的承租人，其父系為一八九八年在香港的原有鄉村居民，只要該土地的承租人仍為該人或其合法父系繼承人，租金將維持不變。一九九七年六月三十日以後滿期而沒有續期權利的土地契約，將按照香港特別行政區有關的土地法律及政策處理。

三、從《聯合聲明》生效之日起至一九九七年六月三十日止，香港英國政府可以批出租期不超過二○四七年六月三十日的新的土地契約。該項土地的承租人須交納地價並交納名義租金至一九九七年六月三十日，該日以後不補地價，但需每年交納相當於當日該土地應課差餉租值百分之三的租金，此後，隨應課差餉租值的改變而調整租金。

四、從《聯合聲明》生效之日起至一九九七年六月三十日止，根據本附件第三款所批出的新的土地，每年限於五十公頃，不包括批給香港房屋委員會建造出租的公共房屋所用的土地。

五、在一九九七年七月一日之前，可繼續批准修改香港英國政府所批出的土地契約規定的土地使用條件，補交的地價為原有條件的土地價值和修改條件後的土地價值之間的差額。

六、從《聯合聲明》生效之日起至一九九七年六月三十日止，香港英國政府從土地交易所得的地價收入，在扣除開發土地平均成本的款項後，均等平分，分別歸香港英國政府和日後的香港特別行政區政府所有。屬於香港英國政府所得的全部收入，包括上述扣除的款項，均撥入"基本工程儲備基金"，用於香港土地開發和公共工程。屬於香港特別行政區政府的地價收入部分，將存入在香港註冊的銀行，除按照本附件第七款（四）的規定用於香港土地開發和公共工程外，不得動用。

七、《聯合聲明》生效之日起，立即在香港成立土地委員會。土地委員會由中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府指派同等人數的官員組成，輔以必要的工作人員。雙方官員向各自的政府負責。土地委員會將於一九九七年六月三十日解散。

（二）監察本附件第四款規定的限額，批給香港房屋委員會建造出租的公共房屋所用的土地數量，以及本附件第六款關於地價收入的分配和使用的執行；

（三）根據香港英國政府提出的建議，考慮並決定提高本附件第四款所述的限額數量；

（四）審核關於擬動用本附件第六款所述的屬於香港特別行政區政府的地價收入部分的建議，並提出意見，供中方決定。

土地委員會未能取得一致意見的問題，提交中華人民共和國政府和聯合王國政府決定。

聯繫到今天簽訂的大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府和中華人民共和國政府關於香港問題的聯合聲明，聯合王國政府聲明，在完成對聯合王國有關立法的必要修改的情況下，

一、凡根據聯合王國實行的法律，在1997年6月30日由於同香港的關係為英國屬土公民者，從1997年7月1日起，不再是英國屬土公民，但將有資格保留某種適當地位，使其可繼續使用聯合王國政府簽發的護照，而不賦予在聯合王國的居留權。取得這種地位的人，必須為持有在1997年7月1日以前簽發的該種英國護照或包括在該種護照上的人，但1997年1月1日或該日以後、1997年7月1日以前出生的有資格的人，可在1997年12月31日截止的期間內取得該種護照或包括在該種護照上。

二、在1997年7月1日或該日以後，任何人不得由於同香港的關係而取得英國屬土公民的地位。凡在1997年7月1日或該日以後出生者，不得取得第一節中所述的適當地位。

三、在香港特別行政區和其他地方的聯合王國的領事官員可為第一節中提及的人所持的護照延長期限和予以更換，亦可給他們在1997年7月1日前出生並且原來包括在他們護照上的子女簽發護照。

四、根據第一節和第三節已領取聯合王國政府簽發的護照的人或包括在該護照上的人，經請求有權在第三國獲得英國的領事服務和保護。

中華人民共和國政府收到了大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國政府1984年 12月19日的備忘錄。

根據中華人民共和國國籍法，所有香港中國同胞，不論其是否持有"英國屬土公民護照"，都是中國公民。

考慮到香港的歷史背景和現實情況，中華人民共和國政府主管部門自1997年7月1日起，允許原被稱為"英國屬土公民"的香港中國公民使用由聯合王國政府簽發的旅行證件去其他國家和地區旅行。

上述中國公民在香港特別行政區和中華人民共和國其他地區不得因其持有上述英國旅行證件而享受英國的領事保護的權利。

National Security Law During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion

Adopted by the Legislative Yuan on June 23, 1987, promulgated by the President on July 1, 1987, effective as of July 15, 1987.

(Note: This is a translation from the Chinese text of the law. In case of any discrepancy between the Chinese and English texts, the Chinese text shall govern.)

Article 1
The present law is hereby enacted to safeguard national security and maintain social stability during the period of national mobilization for suppression of the Communist rebellion.
Matters for which the present law does not provide shall be governed by other relevant laws.

Article 2
No person may violate the Constitution or advocate Communism or the division of national territory in the exercise of the people’s freedom of assembly and association.
The assembly and association stated in the preceding paragraph shall be governed by laws to be enacted separately.

Article 3
For entry into and exit from the Taiwan Region¹, all persons shall apply for permission from the Entry and Exit Service Bureau of the National Police Administration, Ministry of the Interior. A person without permission may not enter into or depart from the Taiwan Region.
Applications for entry or exit permission may be denied if the applicants:
(1) have been sentenced under a final criminal judgment to punishments of imprisonment or greater but have not served or completed the term of sentence, or have been wanted by the judicial authorities, or have been otherwise denied exit permission by the civilian or military judicial authorities; or
(2) have been strongly suspected, on the bases of sufficient factual evidence, to be grave security risks to national security or social stability; or
(3) have been denied entry or exit permission pursuant to other laws.
Applicants denied such permission shall be notified in writing with reasons for denial and with directions appended regarding remedial procedures.
The Ministry of the Interior shall organize a review committee compsed of, inter alia, generally recognized impartial personages to review cases of denial decided pursuant to subparagraph (2), paragraph 2 of the present Article.

Article 4
The police authorities may, when necessary, conduct searches and inspection on the following persons, goods, and transports:
(1) entry and exit passengers and their belongings;
(2) entry and exit vessels, aircraft and other transports;
(3) inland vessels, rafts, aircraft and the passengers and cargo aboard;
(4) sailors, flight crews, fishermen, and other working members of the transports stated in the preceding two subparagraphs, and their belongings.

Article 5
To safeguard coastal defenses, military installations and mountain areas, the Ministry of National Defense may, in consultation with the Ministry of the Interior, designate and declare certain sea coasts, mountain areas or important military facilities as restricted zones.
All persons desiring entry into and exit from the restricted zones stated in the preceding paragraph shall apply for permission from the authorities in charge.
Within these restriced zones stated in paragraph 1, construction may be restricted or prohibited as required by military considerations; the scope of which shall be determined jointly Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, and other related agencies.
Taxes and other levies on the land on which construction is restricted or prohibited shall be reduced or exempted.

Article 6
A person who violated paragraph 1 of Article 3 by entering into or departing from the Taiwan Region without permission shall be punished with imprisonment of not more than three years, detention, and/or a fine of not more than 30,000 yuan.
A person who without justifiable reason refuses or evades searches or inspections conducted pursuant to Article 4 shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than six months, detention, and/or a fine of not more than 5,000 yuan.

Article 7
A person who without reason violates paragraph 2 of Article 5 by entering into or departing from the restricted zones without applying for permission and refuses to leave after having been notified to do so shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than six months, detention, and/or a fine of not more than 5,000 yuan.
A person who without reason violates paragraph 3 of Article 5 concerning prohibited or restricted construction and refuses to comply with instructions to cease construction shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than six months, detention, and/or a fine of not more than 5,000 yuan.

Article 8
Except for military personnel in active military service, no civilian shall be subjected to military trial.
All military personnel in active military service who have committed a criminal offense shall be prosecuted and tried by military judicial authorities unless the criminal offense committed is not provided for under the Criminal Code of the Armed Forces or other special enactments thereof but is provided for under Article 61 of the Criminal Code.

Article 9
Criminal cases regarding civilians who, having been tried or being tried by military courts in areas in which the Chieh-yen² (Emergency) Decree had been in effect, shall be dealt with according to the following provisions after the termination of the Chieh-yen (Emergency) Decree:
(1) Where military trial proceedings have not been completed, cases undergoing investigation shall be transferred to competent (civilian) public prosecutor for investigation; cases pending trial shall be transferred to a competent (civilian) court for trial.
(2) Where criminal judgments have become final, appeal or interlocutory appeal to a competent (civilian) court shall not be allowed; however, where grounds for retrial or extraordinary appeal exist, applications for retrial or extraordinary appeal may be made pursuant to the law.
(3) Where final criminal judgments have not yet been executed, or are being executed, they shall be transferred to a competent (civilian) public prosecutor for execution under his direction.

Article 10
The enforcement regulations of the present law and the date of its coming into force shall be made and determined respectively by the Executive Yuan.

Translator’s notes:
1. The term “Taiwan Region” refers to Taiwan, the Pescadores, Kinmen (Quemoy), Matsu and other territories currently under the effective control of the Republic of China government.
2. The term “Chieh-yen” is generally but inadequately translated as “martial law”. Under the Republic of China’s legal system, which is continental-European in origin, the Chieh-yen Law and the Chieh-yen Decree are two different matters. The former does not apply unless and until activated by the president’s issuance of the latter. When the Chieh-yen Decree is lifted, the Chieh-yen Law remains on the books but becomes inoperative.

When the National Security Law During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion (dongyuan kanluan shiqi guojia anquanfa 動員戡亂時期國家安全法) was promulgated on July 1, 1987, martial law was still in force in Taiwan. The name of the law was changed to National Security Act (guojia anquanfa 國家安全法) by ROC President Lee Teng-hui on July 29, 1992. Its legislative history is as follows:

The source for the English text is the Republic of China Yearbook 1989, p. 724-725.

Guidelines for National Unification

Adopted by the National Unification Council at its third meeting on February 23, 1991, and by the Executive Yuan Council at its 2223rd meeting on March 14, 1991.

The unification of China is meant to bring about a strong and prosperous nation with a long-lasting, bright future for its people; it is the common wish of Chinese people at home and abroad. After an appropriate period of forthright exchange, cooperation and consultation conducted under the principles of reason, peace, parity, and reciprocity, the two sides of the Taiwan Straits should foster a consensus of democracy, freedom, and equal prosperity and together build anew a unified China. Based on this understanding, these Guidelines have been specially formulated with the express hope that all Chinese throughout the world will work with one mind toward their fulfillment.

Both the mainland and Taiwan areas are parts of Chinese territory. Helping to bring about national unification should be the common responsibility of all Chinese people. The unification of China should be for the welfare of all its people and not be subject to partisan conflict. China's unification should aim at promoting Chinese culture, safeguarding human dignity, guaranteeing fundamental human rights, and practicing democracy and the rule of law. The timing and manner of China's unification should first respect the rights and interests of the people in the Taiwan area, and protect their security and welfare. It should be achieved in gradual phases under the principles of reason, peace, parity, and reciprocity.

(1) To enhance understanding through exchanges between the two sides of the Strait and eliminate hostility through reciprocity; and to establish a mutually benign relationship by not endangering each other's security and stability while in the midst of exchanges and not denying the other's existence as a political entity while in the midst of effecting reciprocity.

(2) To set up an order for exchanges across the Strait, to draw up regulations for such exchanges, and to establish intermediary organizations so as to protect people's rights and interests on both sides of the Strait; to gradually ease various restrictions and expand people-to-people contacts so as to promote the social prosperity of both sides.

(3) In order to improve the people's welfare on both sides of the Strait with the ultimate objective of unifying the nation, in the mainland area economic reform should be carried out forthrightly, the expression of public opinion there should be gradually allowed, and both democracy and the rule of law should be implemented while in the Taiwan area efforts should be made to accelerate constitutional reform and promote national development to establish a society of equitable prosperity.

(4) The two sides of the Strait should end the state of hostility and, under the principle of one China solve all disputes through peaceful means, and furthermore respect, not reject, each other in the international community, so as to move toward a phase of mutual trust and cooperation.

(1) Both sides of the Strait should establish official communication channels on equal footing.

(2) Direct postal, transport and commercial links should be allowed and both sides should jointly develop the southeastern coastal area of the Chinese mainland and then gradually extend this development to other areas of the mainland in order to narrow the gap in living standards between the two sides.

(3) Both sides of the Strait should work together and assist each other in taking part in international organizations and activities.

(4) Mutual visits by high-ranking officials on both sides should be promoted to create favorable conditions for consultation and unification.

A consultative organization for unification should be established through which both sides, in accordance with the will of the people in both the mainland and Taiwan areas, and while adhering to the goals of democracy, economic freedom, social justice and nationalization of the armed forces, jointly discuss the grand task of unification and map out a constitutional system to establish a democratic, free, and equitably prosperous China.

中華民國八十年二月二十三日國家統一委員會第三次會議通過,

中華民國九十五年三月一日行政院第二九八０次院會決定「『國家統一綱領』終止適用」函知本院所屬各機關查照

中國的統一，在謀求國家的富強與民族長遠的發展，也是海內外中國人共同的願望。海峽兩岸應在理性、和平、對等、互惠的前提下，經過適當時期的坦誠交流、合作、協商，建立民主、自由、均富的共識，共同重建一個統一的中國。基此認識，特制訂本綱領，務期海內外全體中國人同心協力，共圖貫徹。

一、大陸與台灣均是中國的領土，促成國家的統一，應是中國人共同的責任。

二、中國的統一，應以全民的福祉為依歸，而不是黨派之爭。

三、中國的統一，應以發揚中華文化，維護人性尊嚴，保障基本人權，實踐民主法治為宗旨。

四、中國的統一，其時機與方式，首應尊重台灣地區人民的權益並維護其安全與福祉，在理性、和平、對等、互惠的原則下，分階段逐步達成。

(一) 以交流促進瞭解，以互惠化解敵意；在交流中不危及對方的安全與安定，在互惠中不否定對方為政治實體，以建立良性互動關係。

(二) 建立兩岸交流秩序，制訂交流規範，設立中介機構，以維護兩岸人民權益；逐步放寬各項限制，擴大兩岸民間交流，以促進雙方社會繁榮。

(三) 在國家統一的目標下，為增進兩岸人民福祉：大陸地區應積極推動經濟改革，逐步開放輿論，實行民主法治；台灣地區則應加速憲政改革，推動國家建設，建立均富社會。

(四) 兩岸應摒除敵對狀態，並在一個中國的原則下，以和平方式解決一切爭端，在國際間相互尊重，互不排斥，以利進入互信合作階段。

(二) 開放兩岸直接通郵、通航、通商，共同開發大陸東南沿海地區，並逐步向其他地區推展，以縮短兩岸人民生活差距。

成立兩岸統一協商機構，依據兩岸人民意願，秉持政治民主、經濟自由、社會公平及軍隊國家化的原則，共商統一大業，研訂憲政體制，以建立民主、自由、均富的中國。

The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China

Foreword

It is the sacred right of each and every sovereign State and a fundamental principle of international law to safeguard national unity and territorial integrity. The Charter of the United Nations specifically stipulates that the United Nations and its Members shall refrain from any action against the territorial integrity or political independence of any of its Members or any State and shall not intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. The United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations points out that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity, territorial integrity or political independence of a State or country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The modern history of China was a record of subjection to aggression, dismemberment and humiliation by foreign powers. It was also a chronicle of the Chinese people's valiant struggles for national independence and in defense of their state sovereignty, territorial integrity and national dignity. The origin and evolution of the Taiwan question are closely linked with that period of history. For various reasons Taiwan is still separated from the mainland. Unless and until this state of affairs is brought to an end, the trauma on the Chinese nation will not be healed and the Chinese people's struggle for national reunification and territorial integrity will continue.

What is the present state of the Taiwan question? What is the crux of the problem? What are the position and views of the Chinese Government regarding the settlement of this issue? In order to facilitate a better understanding by the international community, it is necessary to elucidate the following points.

I. Taiwan -- an Inalienable Part of China

Lying off the southeastern coast of the China mainland, Taiwan is China's largest island and forms an integral whole with the mainland.

Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times. It was known as Yizhou or Liuqiu in antiquities. Many historical records and annals documented the development of Taiwan by the Chinese people in earlier periods. References to this effect were to be found, among others, in Seaboard Geographic Gazetteer compiled more than 1,700 years ago by Shen Ying of the State of Wu during the period of the Three Kingdoms. This was the world's earliest written account of Taiwan. Several expeditions, each numbering over ten thousand men, had been sent to Taiwan by the State of Wu (third century A.D.) and the Sui Dynasty (seventh century A.D.) respectively. Since early seventeenth century the Chinese people began to step up the development of Taiwan. Their numbers topped one hundred thousand at the end of the century. By 1893 (19th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu) their population exceeded 2.54 million people in 507,000 or more households. That was a 25-fold increase in 200 years. They brought in a more advanced mode of production and settled the whole length and breadth of Taiwan. Thanks to the determined efforts and hard toil of the pioneers, the development of the island as a whole greatly accelerated. This was the historical fact of how Taiwan, like the other parts of China, came to be opened up and settled by the Chinese people of various nationalities. From the very beginning the Taiwan society derived from the source of the Chinese cultural tradition. This basic fact had not changed even during the half century of Japanese occupation. The history of Taiwan's development is imbued with the blood, sweat, and ingenuity of the Chinese people including the local ethnic minorities.

Chinese governments of different periods set up administrative bodies to exercise jurisdiction over Taiwan. As early as in the mid-12th century the Song Dynasty set up a garrison in Penghu, putting the territory under the jurisdiction of Jinjiang County of Fujian's Quanzhou Prefecture. The Yuan Dynasty installed an agency of patrol and inspection in Penghu to administer the territory. During the mid- and late 16th century the Ming Dynasty reinstated the once abolished agency and sent reinforcements to Penghu in order to ward off foreign invaders. In 1662 (first year of the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi) General Zheng Chenggong (known in the West as Koxinga) instituted Chengtian Prefecture on Taiwan. Subsequently, the Qing government expanded the administrative structure in Taiwan, thereby strengthening its rule over the territory. In 1684 (23rd year of the reign of Emperor Kangxi) a Taiwan-Xiamen Patrol Command and a Taiwan Prefecture Administration were set up under the jurisdiction of Fujian Province. These in turn exercised jurisdiction over three counties on the island: Taiwan (present-day Tainan), Fengshan (present-day Gaoxiong) and Zhuluo (present-day Jiayi). In 1714 (53rd year of the reign of Emperor Kangxi) the Qing government ordered the mapping of Taiwan to determine its size. In 1721 (60th year of the reign of Emperor Kangxi) an office of imperial supervisor of inspecting Taiwan was created and the Taiwan-Xiamen Patrol Command was renamed Prefecture Administration of Taiwan and Xiamen, incorporating the subsequently-created Zhanghua County and Danshui Canton. In 1727 (5th year of the reign of Emperor Yongzheng) the administration on the island was reconstituted as the Prefecture Administration of Taiwan (which was later renamed Prefecture Command for Patrol of Taiwan) and incorporated the new Penghu Canton. The territory then became officially known as Taiwan. In order to upgrade the administration of Taiwan, the Qing government created Taibei Prefecture, Jilong Canton and three counties of Danshui, Xinzhu and Yilan in 1875 (1st year of the reign of Emperor Guangxu). In 1885 (11th year of the reign of Emperor Guangxu), the government formally made Taiwan a full province covering three prefectures and one subprefecture and incorporating 11 counties and 5 cantons. Liu Mingchuan was appointed first Governor of Taiwan. During his tenure of office, railways were laid, mines opened, telegraph service installed, merchant ships built, industries started and new-style schools set up. Considerable social, economic and cultural advancement in Taiwan was achieved as a result.

After the Chinese people's victory in the war against Japanese aggression in 1945, the Chinese government reinstated its administrative authority in Taiwan Province.

Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits carried out a prolonged, unremitting struggle against foreign invasion and occupation of Taiwan. Since the late 15th century Western colonialists started to grab and conquer colonies in a big way. In 1624 (4th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Tianqi) Dutch colonialists invaded and occupied the southern part of Taiwan. Two years later Spanish colonialists seized the northern part of Taiwan. In 1642 (15th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Chongzhen) the Dutch evicted the Spaniards and took over north Taiwan. The Chinese people on both sides of the Straits waged various forms of struggle including armed insurrections against the invasion and occupation of Taiwan by foreign colonialists. In 1661 (18th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Shunzhi) General Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) led an expedition to Taiwan and expelled the Dutch colonialists from the island in the following year.

Japan launched a war of aggression against China in 1894 (20th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu). In the ensuing year, as a result of defeat the Qing government was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, ceding Taiwan to Japan. This wanton betrayal and humiliation shocked the whole nation and touched off a storm of protests. A thousand or more candidates from all 18 provinces including Taiwan who had assembled in Beijing for the Imperial Examination signed a strongly-worded petition opposing the ceding of Taiwan. In Taiwan itself, people wailed and bemoaned the betrayal and went on general strikes. General Liu Yongfu and others of the garrison command stood with Taiwan compatriots and put up a fierce fight against the Japanese landing forces. To support this struggle, people on the mainland, particularly in the southeastern region, showed their solidarity by generous donations or organizing volunteers to Taiwan to fight the Japanese forces. Taiwan compatriots never ceased their dauntless struggle throughout the Japanese occupation. Initially, they formed insurgent groups to wage guerrilla warfare for as long as seven years. When the Revolution of 1911 overthrew the Qing monarchy they in turn lent support to their mainland compatriots by staging more than a dozen armed insurrections. The 1920s and 1930s witnessed surging waves of mass action sweeping across the island against Japanese colonial rule.

In 1937 the Chinese people threw themselves into an all-out war of resistance against Japanese aggression. In its declaration of war against Japan, the Chinese Government proclaimed that all treaties, conventions, agreements, and contracts regarding relations between China and Japan, including the Treaty of Shimonoseki, had been abrogated. The declaration stressed that China would recover Taiwan, Penghu and the four northeastern provinces. After eight years of grueling war against Japanese aggression the Chinese people won final victory and recovered the lost territory of Taiwan in 1945. Taiwan compatriots displayed an outburst of passion and celebrated the great triumph of their return to the fold of the motherland by setting off big bangs of fireworks and performing rites to communicate the event to their ancestors.

The international community has acknowledged the fact that Taiwan belongs to China. The Chinese people's war of resistance against Japanese aggression, being part of the world-wide struggle against Fascism, received extensive support from people all over the world. During the Second World War China, the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and others formed an alliance to oppose the Axis of Germany, Japan and Italy. The Cairo Declaration issued by China, the United States and Great Britain on 1 December 1943 stated: "It is the purpose of the three great Allies that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores [Penghu], shall be restored to China." The Potsdam Proclamation signed by China, the United States and Great Britain on 26 July 1945 (subsequently adhered to by the Soviet Union) reiterated: "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." On 15 August of the same year, Japan declared surrender. The instrument of Japan's surrender stipulated that "Japan hereby accepts the provisions in the declaration issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, China and Great Britain on July 26, 1945 at Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." On 25 October the ceremony for accepting Japan's surrender in Taiwan Province of the China war theater of the Allied powers was held in Taibei. On the occasion the chief officer for accepting the surrender proclaimed on behalf of the Chinese government that from that day forward Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago had again been incorporated formally into the territory of China and that the territory, people, and administration had now been placed under the sovereignty of China. From that point in time forward, Taiwan and Penghu had been put back under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty.

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, 157 countries have established diplomatic relations with China. All these countries recognize that there is only one China and that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China and Taiwan is part of China.

II. Origin of the Taiwan Question

Taiwan was returned to China de jure and de facto at the end of the Second World War. It became an issue only as an aftermath of the ensuing anti-popular civil war started by Kuomintang, and more especially because of intervention by foreign forces.

Taiwan question and civil war launched by Kuomintang. During the war of resistance against Japanese aggression the Chinese Communist Party and other patriotic groups pressed Kuomintang into a national united front with the Communist Party to fight Japanese imperialist aggression. After victory of the war the two Parties should have joined hands to work for the resurgence of China. But the Kuomintang clique headed by Chiang Kaishek flouted the people's fervent aspirations for peace and for building an independent, democratic and prosperous new China. Relying on U.S. support, this clique tore up the 10 October 1945 agreement between the two Parties and launched an all-out anti-popular civil war. The Chinese people were compelled to respond with a people's liberation war which was to last more than three years under the leadership of the Communist Party. Since the Kuomintang clique had already been spurned by the people of all nationalities for its reign of terror, the government of the "Republic of China" in Nanjing was finally overthrown by the Chinese people. The People's Republic of China was proclaimed on 1 October 1949 and the Government of the new People's Republic became the sole legal government of China. A group of military and political officials of the Kuomintang clique took refuge in Taiwan and, with the support of the then U.S. administration, created the division between the two sides of the Straits.

Taiwan question and responsibility of the United States. Against the backdrop of East-West confrontation in the wake of the Second World War and guided by its conceived global strategy and national interest considerations, the U.S. government gave full support to the Kuomintang, providing it with money, weapons and advisors to carry on the civil war and block the advance of the Chinese people's revolution. However, the U.S. government never achieved its objective. The White Paper on United States Relations with China released by the Department of State in 1949 and Secretary of State Dean Acheson's letter of transmittal to President Harry S. Truman had to admit this. Dean Acheson lamented in his letter: "The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. ... Nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not."

At the time of the founding of the People's Republic of China the then U.S. administration could have pulled itself from the quagmire of China's civil war. But it failed to do so. Instead, it adopted a policy of isolation and containment of New China. When the Korean War broke out, it started armed intervention in the inter-Taiwan Straits relations which were entirely China's internal affairs. On 27 June 1950 President Truman announced: "I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa." Thus the Seventh Fleet invaded the Taiwan Straits and the U.S. 13th Air Force set up base in Taiwan. In December 1954 the U.S. concluded with the Taiwan authorities a so-called mutual defense treaty placing China's Taiwan Province under U.S. "protection". The erroneous policy of the U.S. government of continued interference in China's internal affairs led to prolonged and intense confrontation in the Taiwan Straits area and henceforth the Taiwan question became a major dispute between China and the United States.

In order to ease tension in the Taiwan Straits area and seek ways of solving the dispute between the two countries, the Chinese Government started dialogues with the United States from the mid-1950s onwards. The two countries held 136 sessions of talks at ambassadorial level from August 1955 to February 1970. However, no progress had been made in that period on the key issue of easing and removing tension in the Taiwan Straits area. It was not until late 1960s and early 1970s when the international situation had undergone changes and as New China had gained in strength that the U.S. began to readjust its China policy and the relations between the two countries started a thawing. In October 1971 the United Nations General Assembly adopted at its 26th session Resolution 2758 which restored all the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and expelled the "representatives" of the Taiwan authorities from the U.N. U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China in February 1972 in the course of which the two countries issued a joint communiqu'e?? in Shanghai stating that: "The U.S. side declared: the United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position."

In December 1978 the U.S. Government accepted the three principles proposed by the Chinese Government for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, namely, the United States should sever "diplomatic relations" and abrogate the "mutual defense treaty" with the Taiwan authorities and withdraw U.S. military forces from Taiwan. On 1 January 1979 China and the United States formally established diplomatic relations. The Communiqu'e on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations said that: "The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan ... ... The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." Normalization of Sino-U.S. relations was thus achieved.

Regrettably, however, scarcely three months after the event, a so-called Taiwan Relations Act was passed by the U.S. Congress and signed into law by the President. A domestic legislation of the U.S. as it was, this Act contained many clauses that contravened the communiqu'e? on the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S. and the principles of international law, and seriously prejudiced the rights and interests of the Chinese people. Invoking this legislation, the U.S. Government has continued its arms sales to Taiwan, interference in China's internal affairs and obstruction to Taiwan's reunification with the mainland.

In order to resolve the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the Chinese and the U.S. governments negotiated and reached an agreement on 17 August 1982. A communique? bearing the same date became the third joint communique? governing Sino-U.S. relations. In that communique? the U.S. Government stated that: "It does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution." Yet in the past dozen or more years the U.S. Government has not only failed to implement the communiqu'e? in earnest, but has repeatedly contravened it. In September 1992 the U.S. Government even decided to sell 150 F-16 high-performance fighter aircraft to Taiwan. This action of the U.S. Government has added a new stumbling block in the way of the development of Sino-U.S. relations and settlement of the Taiwan question.

It is clear from the foregoing that the U.S. Government is responsible for holding up the settlement of the Taiwan question. Since the 1970s many Americans of vision and goodwill in or outside the administration have contributed much by way of helping to resolve the differences between China and the U.S. on the Taiwan question. The aforesaid three joint communiqu'e?s testify to their effort and contribution of which the Chinese Government and people are highly appreciative. On the other hand, one cannot fail to note that there are people in the U.S. who still do not want to see a reunified China. They have cooked up various pretexts and exerted influence to obstruct the settlement of the Taiwan question.

The Chinese Government is convinced that the American and the Chinese peoples are friendly to each other and that the normal development of the relations between the two countries accords with the long-term interests and common aspiration of both peoples. Both countries should cherish the three hard-won joint communiqu'e?s guiding the development of bilateral relations. As long as both sides abide by the principles enshrined in those communique?s, respect each other and set store by their overall common interests, it will not be difficult to settle the Taiwan question that has been left over from history and Sino-U.S. relations will surely see steady improvement and development ahead.

III. The Chinese Government's Basic Position Regarding Settlement of the Taiwan Question

To settle the Taiwan question and achieve national reunification -- this is a sacrosanct mission of the entire Chinese people. The Chinese Government has persistently worked towards this end since the founding of the People's Republic. Its basic position on this question is: peaceful reunification; one country, two systems.

Peaceful reunification; one country, two systems -- how has this position been formulated? The Chinese Government conceived a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question as early as in the 1950s. In May 1955 the late Premier Zhou Enlai said at a NPC Standing Committee meeting that two alternatives were open to the Chinese people for the solution of the Taiwan question -- by resort to war or by peaceful means. The Chinese people would strive for a peaceful solution wherever possible, he affirmed. In April 1956 the late Chairman Mao Zedong put forward thoughts for policymaking such as "peace is the best option", "all patriots are of one family" and "it is never too late to join the ranks of patriots". However, those wishes have not come to fruition for reasons such as interference by foreign forces.

Major changes took place in and outside China in the 1970s. Diplomatic ties were established and relations normalized between China and the United States. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to shift the focus of the work of the Party and the State to the economic modernization programme. In the meantime, people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, compatriots of Hong Kong and Macao as well as overseas Chinese and people of Chinese descent all expressed their fervent hope that the two sides of the Straits would join hands to work for a resurgence of China. It was against this historical background that the Chinese Government formulated the position of "peaceful reunification; one country, two systems". The position takes the overall national interests and the future of the country into consideration. It respects history as well as the prevailing situation. It is realistic and takes care of the interests of all.

On 1 January 1979 the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China issued a message to compatriots in Taiwan, pronouncing the Chinese Government's basic position regarding peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. It called for the holding of talks between the two sides of the Straits to seek an end to the military confrontation. It pledged that in the pursuit of national reunification, the Government "will respect the status quo on Taiwan and the views of people of all walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures".

In a statement on 30 September 1981 the late Chairman Ye Jianying of the NPC Standing Committee further elaborated the policy and principles for the settlement of the Taiwan question. He affirmed that "after the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region" and proposed that talks be held on an equal footing between the ruling Parties on each side of the Straits, namely, the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang.

Referring to Ye Jianying's remarks, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping pointed out on 11 January 1982 that this in effect meant "one country, two systems", i.e., on the premise of national reunification, the main body of the nation would continue with its socialist system while Taiwan could maintain capitalism.

On 26 June 1983 Deng Xiaoping further enunciated the concept of peaceful reunification, stressing that the crucial point was national reunification. He went on to expound the Government's policy on reunification and on the creation of a Taiwan special administrative region.

On 12 October 1992 General Secretary Jiang Zemin of the CPC Central Committee pointed out: "We shall work steadfastly for the great cause, adhering to the principles of peaceful reunification and 'one country, two systems' ... ... We reiterate that the Chinese Communist Party is ready to establish contact with the Chinese Kuomintang at the earliest possible date to create conditions for talks on officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits and gradually realizing peaceful reunification. Representatives from other parties, mass organizations and all circles on both sides of the Taiwan Straits could be invited to join in such talks."

Basic Contents of "peaceful reunification; one country, two systems". This position is an important component of the theory and practice of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and a fundamental state policy of the Chinese Government which will not change for a long time to come. Its basic contents are as follows:

1. Only one China. There is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and the seat of China's central government is in Beijing. This is a universally recognized fact as well as the premise for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question.

The Chinese Government is firmly against any words or deeds designed to split China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It opposes "two Chinas", "one China, one Taiwan", "one country, two governments" or any attempt or act that could lead to "independence of Taiwan". The Chinese people on both sides of the Straits all believe that there is only one China and espouse national reunification. Taiwan's status as an inalienable part of China has been determined and cannot be changed. "Self- determination" for Taiwan is out of the question.

2. Coexistence of two systems. On the premise of one China, socialism on the mainland and capitalism on Taiwan can coexist and develop side by side for a long time without one swallowing up the other. This concept has largely taken account of the actual situation in Taiwan and practical interests of our compatriots there. It will be a unique feature and important innovation in the state system of a reunified China.

After reunification, Taiwan's current socio-economic system, its way of life as well as economic and cultural ties with foreign countries can remain unchanged. Private property, including houses and land, as well as business ownership, legal inheritance and overseas Chinese and foreign investments on the island will all be protected by law.

3. A high degree of autonomy. After reunification, Taiwan will become a special administrative region. It will be distinguished from the other provinces or regions of China by its high degree of autonomy. It will have its own administrative and legislative powers, an independent judiciary and the right of adjudication on the island. It will run its own party, political, military, economic and financial affairs. It may conclude commercial and cultural agreements with foreign countries and enjoy certain rights in foreign affairs. It may keep its military forces and the mainland will not dispatch troops or administrative personnel to the island. On the other hand, representatives of the government of the special administrative region and those from different circles of Taiwan may be appointed to senior posts in the central government and participate in the running of national affairs.

4. Peace negotiations. It is the common aspiration of the entire Chinese people to achieve reunification of the country by peaceful means through contacts and negotiations. People on both sides of the Straits are all Chinese. It would be a great tragedy for all if China's territorial integrity and sovereignty were to be split and its people were to be drawn into a fratricide. Peaceful reunification will greatly enhance the cohesion of the Chinese nation. It will facilitate Taiwan's socio-economic stability and development and promote the resurgence and prosperity of China as a whole.

In order to put an end to hostility and achieve peaceful reunification, the two sides should enter into contacts and negotiations at the earliest possible date. On the premise of one China, both sides can discuss any subject, including the modality of negotiations, the question of what Parties, groups and personalities may participate as well as any other matters of concern to the Taiwan side. So long as the two sides sit down and talk, they will always be able to find a mutually acceptable solution.

Taking into account the prevailing situation on both sides of the Straits, the Chinese Government has proposed that pending reunification the two sides should, according to the principle of mutual respect, complementarity and mutual benefit, actively promote economic cooperation and other exchanges. Direct trade, postal, air and shipping services and two-way visits should be started in order to pave the way for the peaceful reunification of the country.

Peaceful reunification is a set policy of the Chinese Government. However, any sovereign state is entitled to use any means it deems necessary, including military ones, to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Chinese Government is under no obligation to undertake any commitment to any foreign power or people intending to split China as to what means it might use to handle its own domestic affairs.

It should be pointed out that the Taiwan question is purely an internal affair of China and bears no analogy to the cases of Germany and Korea which were brought about as a result of international accords at the end of the Second World War. Therefore, the Taiwan question should not be placed on a par with the situation of Germany or Korea. The Chinese Government has always opposed applying the German or Korean formulas to Taiwan. The Taiwan question should and entirely can be resolved judiciously through bilateral consultations and within the framework of one China.

IV. Relations Across Taiwan Straits: Evolution and Stumbling Blocks

The present division between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits is a misfortune for the Chinese nation. All the Chinese people are yearning for an early end to this agonizing situation.

In order to enable normal movement of people across the Straits and to achieve reunification of the country, the Chinese Government has made proposals towards this end and, at the same time, adopted measures to step up the development of inter-Straits relations.

On the political plane, policy adjustments have been made with a view to breaking down the mentality of hostility. The Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate have decided respectively that people who had gone to Taiwan would no longer be prosecuted for offenses prior to the founding of the People's Republic of China.

On the military plane, initiatives have been taken to ease military confrontation across the Straits. Shelling of Jinmen and other islands have been discontinued. Some forward defense positions and observation posts along the Fujian coast have been transformed into economic development zones or tourist attractions.

On the economic plane, doors have been flung open to facilitate the flow of goods and people. Businessmen from Taiwan are welcome to invest or trade on the mainland. They are accorded preferential treatment and legal safeguards.

The Chinese Government has also adopted a positive attitude and taken measures to encourage bilateral exchanges and cooperation in areas such as two-way travels, post and communications as well as scientific, cultural, sports, academic and journalistic activities. A non-governmental Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits has been set up and authorized by the Government to liaise with the Straits Exchange Foundation and other relevant non-governmental bodies in Taiwan for the purpose of upholding the legitimate rights and interests of people on both sides and promoting inter-Straits relations.

Such policies and measures of the Chinese Government have won the understanding and support of more and more Taiwan compatriots, compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao as well as overseas Chinese and people of Chinese descent. On their part, Taiwan compatriots have contributed tremendously to the development of inter-Straits relations. In recent years the Taiwan authorities have in turn made readjustments in their policy regarding the mainland. They have taken steps to ease the situation, such as allowing people to visit relatives on the mainland, gradually reducing the restrictions on people-to-people exchanges and contact, expanding indirect trade, permitting indirect investment and cutting red tape in inter-Straits post, telecommunications and bank remittance services. All these are conducive to better interchanges. The past few years have witnessed rapid growth of economic relations and trade as well as increasing mutual visits and sundry exchanges across the Straits. The Wang Daohan--Koo Chen-fu Talks in April 1993 resulted in four agreements, marking a step forward of historic significance in inter-Straits relations. Thus an atmosphere of relaxation prevails in the Taiwan Straits for the first time in the past four decades. This is auspicious to peaceful reunification.

It should be pointed out that notwithstanding a certain measure of easing up by the Taiwan authorities, their current policy vis-a-vis the mainland still seriously impedes the development of relations across the Straits as well as the reunification of the country. They talk about the necessity of a reunified China, but their deeds are always a far cry from the principle of one China. They try to prolong Taiwan's separation from the mainland and refuse to hold talks on peaceful reunification. They have even set up barriers to curb the further development of the interchanges across the Straits.

In recent years the clamours for "Taiwan independence" on the island have become shriller, casting a shadow over the course of relations across the Straits and the prospect of peaceful reunification of the country. The "Taiwan independence" fallacy has a complex social-historical root and international background. But the Taiwan authorities have, in effect, abetted this fallacy by its own policy of rejecting peace negotiations, restricting interchanges across the Straits and lobbying for "dual recognition" or "two Chinas" in the international arena. It should be affirmed that the desire of Taiwan compatriots to run the affairs of the island as masters of their own house is reasonable and justified. This should by no means be construed as advocating "Taiwan independence". They are radically distinct from those handful of "Taiwan independence" protagonists who trumpet "independence" but vilely rely on foreign patronage in a vain attempt to detach Taiwan from China, which runs against the fundamental interests of the entire Chinese people including Taiwan compatriots. The Chinese Government is closely following the course of events and will never condone any manoeuvre for "Taiwan independence".

Certain foreign forces who do not want to see a reunified China have gone out of their way to meddle in China's internal affairs. They support the anti-Communist stance of the Taiwan authorities of rejecting peace talks and abet the secessionists on the island, thereby erecting barriers to China's peaceful reunification and seriously wounding the national feelings of the Chinese people.

The Chinese Government is convinced that Taiwan compatriots want national reunification and that this is also true with most of the political forces in or out of office in Taiwan. The people on both sides of the Straits will overcome all the barriers and stumbling blocks by their joint efforts and ensure a better development of relations across the Straits.

V. Several Questions Involving Taiwan in International Relations

As has been elucidated in the foregoing, there is only one China in the world, of which Taiwan is an inalienable part. The Government of the People's Republic of China has been recognized by the United Nations and throughout the world as the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people. In the interest of safeguarding state sovereignty and realizing national reunification the Chinese Government has always stood firm on the principle of one China and ensured the interests of Taiwan compatriots in international relations involving Taiwan. The Chinese Government has no doubt that its position will be respected by all other governments and people.

The Chinese Government deems it necessary to reiterate its position and policy on the following matters.

(1) Relations between Taiwan and countries maintaining diplomatic ties with China

All countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China have, in conformity with international law and the principle of one China, undertaken in formal agreement or understanding with the Chinese Government not to establish any ties of an official nature with Taiwan. According to international law, a sovereign state can only be represented by a single central government. As a part of China, Taiwan has no right to represent China in the international community, nor can it establish diplomatic ties or enter into relations of an official nature with foreign countries. Nevertheless, considering the needs of Taiwan's economic development and the practical interests of Taiwan compatriots, the Chinese Government has not objected to non-governmental economic or cultural exchanges between Taiwan and foreign countries.

In recent years the Taiwan authorities have vigorously launched a campaign of "pragmatic diplomacy" to cultivate official ties with countries having diplomatic relations with China in an attempt to push "dual recognition" and achieve the objective of creating a situation of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". The Chinese Government is firmly against this scheme.

It is noted that the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world cherish friendly relations with China and abide by their agreement or understanding with China on the issue of Taiwan. The Chinese Government appreciates this. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that, in disregard of their international credibility, certain countries have breached the undertaking made at the time of the establishment of diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China by evolving official relations with Taiwan, thereby putting a spoke in the wheel of China's reunification. The Chinese Government sincerely hopes that the governments in question will take measures to rectify the situation.

The sovereignty of each State is an integral whole which is indivisible and unsharable. The Government of the People's Republic of China, as the sole legal government of China, has the right and obligation to exercise state sovereignty and represent the whole of China in international organizations. The Taiwan authorities' lobbying for a formula of "one country, two seats" in international organizations whose membership is confined to sovereign states is a manoeuvre to create "two Chinas". The Chinese Government is firmly opposed to such an attempt. Its principled position fully conforms to the fundamental interests of the entire Chinese people including Taiwan compatriots and overseas Chinese. Only on the premise of adhering to the principle of one China and in the light of the nature and statutes of the international organizations concerned as well as the specific circumstances, can the Chinese Government consider the question of Taiwan's participation in the activities of such organizations and in a manner agreeable and acceptable to the Chinese Government.

All the specialized agencies and organizations of the United Nations system are inter-governmental organizations composed of sovereign states. After the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, all the specialized agencies and organizations of the U.N. system have formally adopted resolutions restoring to the People's Republic of China its lawful seat and expelling the "representatives" of the Taiwan authorities. Since then the issue of China's representation in the U.N. system has been resolved once and for all and Taiwan's re-entry is out of the question. However, it should be pointed out that recently some elements of the Taiwan authorities have been clamouring for "returning to the United Nations". Apparently, this is an attempt to split state sovereignty, which is devoid of any legal or practical basis. The Chinese Government is convinced that all governments and organizations of the U.N. system will be alert to this scheme and refrain from doing anything prejudicial to China's sovereignty.

In principle, Taiwan is also ineligible for membership in other categories of inter-governmental organizations. As to regional economic organizations such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Taiwan's participation is subject to the terms of agreement or understanding reached between the Chinese Government and the parties concerned which explicitly prescribe that the People's Republic of China is a full member as a sovereign state whereas Taiwan may participate in the activities of those organizations only as a region of China under the designation of Taipei, China (in ADB) or Chinese Taipei (in APEC). This is only an ad hoc arrangement and cannot constitute a "model" applicable to other inter-governmental organizations or international gatherings.

As regards participation in non-governmental international organizations, the relevant bodies of the People's Republic of China may reach an agreement or understanding with the parties concerned so that China's national organizations would use the designation of China, while Taiwan's organizations may participate under the designation of Taipei, China or Taiwan, China.

(3) Aviation services between Taiwan and countries having diplomatic relations with China

Airspace is an inalienable part of a country's territory. The 1919 Paris Aviation Convention and the 1944 Chicago Convention affirm the principle of complete and exclusive sovereignty of each country over its airspace. Therefore, the opening of aviation services with Taiwan by any airlines, including privately-operated ones, of countries having diplomatic relations with China is a political issue affecting China's sovereignty and cannot be regarded as a non-political transaction. State-run airlines of countries having diplomatic relations with China certainly must not operate air services to Taiwan. Privately-operated airlines must seek China's consent through consultations between their government and the Chinese Government before they can start reciprocal air services with privately-operated airlines of Taiwan. As a matter of fact, according to the afore-said principle the Chinese Government has consented to such services between privately-operated airlines of Britain, Germany, Canada, etc. and their counterparts in Taiwan.

As for countries which already had aviation services with Taiwan before the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, they can negotiate with the Chinese Government to change the official nature of such services so as to be able to continue the operations as privately-run commercial transportation undertakings.

The Chinese Government has always firmly opposed any country selling any type of arms or transferring production technology of the same to Taiwan. All countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China should abide by the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and refrain from providing arms to Taiwan in any form or under any pretext. Failure to do so would be a breach of the norms of international relations and an interference in China's internal affairs.

All countries, and especially big powers shouldering major responsibilities for world peace, are obligated to strictly abide by the guidelines laid down by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to restrict the proliferation of conventional weapons so as to contribute to maintaining and promoting regional peace and security. However, at a time when relations across the Taiwan Straits are easing up, certain powers have seen fit to renege on their undertakings under international agreements and to flout the Chinese Government's repeated strong representations by making arms sales to Taiwan, thereby whipping up tension between the two sides of the Straits. This not only constitutes a serious threat to China's security and an obstacle to China's peaceful reunification, but also undermines peace and stability in Asia and the world at large. It stands to reason that the Chinese people should voice strong resentment against this conduct.

In international affairs the Chinese Government always pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and adheres to the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful Co-existence. It actively seeks to develop friendly relations with all countries of the world and will never undermine any country's interests nor interfere in its internal affairs. By the same token it expects all other governments to refrain from undermining China's interests or interfering in China's internal affairs and to correctly handle their relations with Taiwan.

Conclusion

Reunification of the country embodies the fundamental interest of the Chinese nation.

After national reunification the two sides of the Taiwan Straits can pool their resources and make common cause in economic development and work towards China's resurgence. Numerous problems that have been besetting Taiwan would be judiciously resolved within the framework of one China. Taiwan compatriots will share the pride and glory of a great nation with their kith and kin from the other parts of the motherland.

Taiwan question has long been a destabilizing factor in the Asia-Pacific region. Reunification of China will not only bolster the stability and development of the country itself, but also contribute to the further enhancement of the friendly relations and cooperation between China and other countries as well as to peace and development in the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole.

The Chinese Government is confident that it can count on the understanding and support of governments and people of all countries in the pursuit of its just cause of safeguarding its state sovereignty and territorial integrity.

前言

維護國家統一和領土完整，是每個主權國家的神聖權利，也是國際法的基本原則。聯合國憲章明確規定：聯合國和它的成員國不得侵害任何會員國或國家之領土完整或政治獨立，不得干涉在本質上屬於任何國家國內管轄的事件。聯合國《關於各國依聯合國憲章建立友好關係及合作之國際法原則之宣言》指出：凡以局部或全部破壞國家統一及領土完整或政治獨立為目的之企圖，都是不符合聯合國憲章精神的。

中國近代史是一部被侵略、被宰割、被淩辱的歷史，也是中國人民為爭取民族獨立，維護國家主權、領土完整和民族尊嚴而英勇奮鬥的歷史。台灣問題的産生與發展，都與這段歷史有著緊密的聯絡。由於種種原因，台灣迄今尚處於與大陸分離的狀態。這種狀態一天不結束，中華民族所蒙受的創傷就一天不能癒合，中國人民為維護國家統一和領土完整的鬥爭也一天不會結束。

台灣問題的現狀如何?癥結何在?中國政府解決台灣問題的立場與主張是什麼?為了便於國際社會有一個清楚的了解，有必要就下列問題加以闡述。

一、台灣是中國不可分割的一部分

台灣地處中國大陸的東南緣，是中國第一大島，同大陸是不可分割的整體。

台灣自古即屬於中國。台灣古稱夷洲、流求。大量的史書和文獻記載了中國人民早期開發台灣的情景。距今一千七百多年以前，三國時吳人沈瑩的《臨海水土志》等對此就有所著述，它們是世界上記述台灣最早的文字。公元三世紀和七世紀，三國孫吳政權和隋朝政府都曾先後派萬餘人去臺。進入十七世紀之後，中國人民在台灣的開拓規模越來越大。十七世紀末，大陸赴臺開拓者超過十萬人。至公元一八九三年(清光緒十九年)時，總數達到五十點七萬餘戶，二百五十四萬餘人。二百年間增長二十五倍。他們帶去先進的生産方式，由南到北，由西及東，篳路藍縷，披荊斬棘，大大加速了台灣整體開發的進程。這一史實説明，台灣和中國其他省區一樣，同為中國各族人民所開拓所定居。台灣社會的發展始終延續著中華文化的傳統，即使在日本侵佔的五十年間，這一基本情況也沒有改變。台灣的開拓發展史，凝聚了包括當地少數民族在內的中國人民的血汗和智慧。

中國歷代政府在台灣先後建立了行政機構，行使管轄權。早在公元十二世紀中葉，宋朝政府即已派兵駐守澎湖，將澎湖地區劃歸福建泉州晉江縣管轄。元朝政府在澎湖設置行政管理機構“巡檢司”。明朝政府於十六世紀中後期，恢復了一度廢止的“巡檢司”，併為防禦外敵侵犯，增兵澎湖。一六六二年(清康熙元年)，鄭成功在台灣設“承天府”。清朝政府逐步在台灣擴增行政機構，加強了對台灣的治理。一六八四年(清康熙二十三年)設“分巡臺廈兵備道”及“台灣府”，下設“台灣”(今台南)、“鳳山”(今高雄)、“諸羅”(今嘉義)三縣，隸屬福建省管轄。一七一四年(清康熙五十三年)，清政府派員測繪台灣地圖，勘丈全境裏數。一七二一年(清康熙六十年)，增設“巡視台灣監察御史”，改“分巡臺廈兵備道”為“分巡臺廈道”。爾後又增設“彰化縣”和“淡水廳”。一七二七年(清雍正五年)，復改“分巡臺廈道”為“分巡台灣道”(後又改為“分巡台灣兵備道”)，增“澎湖廳”，定“台灣”為官方統一的名稱。一八七五年(清光緒元年)，清政府為進一步經營和治理台灣，再增設“台北府”及“淡水”、“新竹”、“宜蘭”三縣和“基隆廳”。一八八五年(清光緒十一年)，清政府正式劃台灣為單一行省，任劉銘傳為首任巡撫，行政區擴為三府一州，領十一縣五廳。劉在任內，鋪鐵路，開礦山，架電線，造商輪，興辦企業，創設新學堂，把台灣社會經濟文化的發展大大向前推進。

一九四五年中國人民抗日戰爭勝利後，中國政府重新恢復了台灣省的行政管理機構。

海峽兩岸中國人為反對外國侵佔台灣進行了長期不懈的鬥爭。十五世紀後期起，西方殖民主義者大肆掠奪殖民地。一六二四年(明天啟四年)，荷蘭殖民者侵佔台灣南部。一六二六年(明天啟六年)，西班牙殖民者入侵台灣北部。一六四二年(明崇禎十五年)，荷蘭又取代西班牙佔領台灣北部。兩岸同胞為反對外國殖民者侵佔台灣進行了包括武裝起義在內的各種方式的鬥爭。一六六一年(清順治十八年)，鄭成功率眾進軍台灣，於次年驅逐了盤踞台灣的荷蘭殖民者。

一八九四年(清光緒二十年)，日本發動侵略中國的“甲午戰爭”。翌年，清政府戰敗，在日本威迫下簽訂喪權辱國的《馬關條約》，割讓台灣。消息傳來，舉國同憤。在北京會試的包括台灣在內的十八省千余舉人“公車上書”，反對割臺。台灣全省“哭聲震天”，嗚鑼罷市。協理台灣軍務的清軍將領劉永福等和台灣同胞一起，與佔領台灣的日軍拼死搏門。中國大陸東南各地居民為支援這一斗爭，或捐輸餉銀，或結隊赴臺，反抗日本侵略。在日本侵佔台灣期間，台灣同胞一直堅持英勇不屈的鬥爭。初期，他們組織義軍，進行武裝遊擊抵抗，前後達七年之久。繼而，在辛亥革命推翻清政府後，他們又匯同大陸同胞一道，先後發起十余次武裝起義。及至本世紀二十和三十年代，島內反抗日本殖民統治的群眾運動更加波瀾壯闊，席捲台灣南北。

一九三七年，中國人民開始了全民族的抗日戰爭。中國政府在《中國對日宣戰佈告》中明確昭告中外：所有一切條約、協定、合同有涉及中日關係者，一律廢止。《馬關條約》自屬廢止之列。這一佈告並鄭重宣佈：中國將“收復台灣、澎湖、東北四省土地”。中國人民經過八年艱苦的抗日戰爭，於一九四五年取得了最後的勝利，收復了失土台灣。台灣同胞鳴放鞭炮，歡欣鼓舞，祭告祖先，慶祝回歸祖國懷抱的偉大勝利。

國際社會公認台灣屬於中國。中國人民的抗日戰爭是世界反法西斯鬥爭的一部分，得到了世界人民的廣泛支持。在第二次世界大戰中，為了反對德、日、意法西斯軸心國，中國與美國、蘇聯、英國、法國等結成同盟國。一九四三年十二月一日，中、美、英三國簽署的《開羅宣言》指出：“三國之宗旨，在剝奪日本自一九一四年第一次世界大戰開始以後在太平洋所奪得或佔領之一切島嶼，在使日本所竊取於中國之土地，例如滿洲、台灣、澎湖列島等，歸還中國。”一九四五年七月二十六日，中、美、英三國簽署(後蘇聯參加)的《波茨坦公告》又重申：“開羅宣言之條件必將實施。”同年八月十五日，日本宣佈投降，《日本投降條款》規定：“茲接受中美英三國共同簽署的、後來又有蘇聯參加的一九四五年七月二十六日的波茨坦公告中的條款。”十月二十五日，同盟國中國戰區台灣省受降儀式於台北舉行，受降主官代表中國政府宣告：自即日起，台灣及澎湖列島已正式重入中國版圖，所有一切土地、人民、政事皆已置於中國主權之下。至此，台灣、澎湖重歸於中國主權管轄之下。

中華人民共和國成立以來，一百五十七個國家先後同中國建立了外交關係，它們都承認只有一個中國，中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府，台灣是中國的一部分。

二、台灣問題的由來

台灣在第二次世界大戰之後，不僅在法律上而且在事實上已歸還中國。之所以又出現台灣問題，與隨後中國國民黨發動的反人民內戰有關，但更重要的是外國勢力的介入。

台灣問題與國民黨發動的內戰。中國抗日戰爭期間，在中國共産黨和其他愛國力量的推動下，中國國民黨與中國共産黨建立了抗日民族統一戰線，抗擊日本帝國主義的侵略。抗日戰爭勝利後，兩黨本應繼續攜手，共肩振興中華大業，惟當時以蔣介石為首的國民黨集團依仗美國的支持，置全國人民渴望和平與建設獨立、民主、富強的新中國的強烈願望於不顧，撕毀國共兩黨簽訂的《雙十協定》，發動了全國規模的反人民內戰。中國人民在中國共産黨領導下被迫進行了三年多的人民解放戰爭，由於當時的國民黨集團倒行逆施，已為全國各族人民所唾棄，中國人民終於推翻了南京的“中華民國”政府。一九四九年十月一日成立了中華人民共和國，中華人民共和國政府成為中國的唯一合法政府。國民黨集團的一部分軍政人員退據台灣。他們在當時美國政府的支持下，造成了台灣海峽兩岸隔絕的狀態。

台灣問題與美國政府的責任。第二次世界大戰後，在當時東西方兩大陣營對峙的態勢下，美國政府基於它的所謂全球戰略及維護本國利益的考慮，曾經不遺餘力地出錢、出槍、出人，支持國民黨集團打內戰，阻撓中國人民革命的事業。然而，美國政府最終並未達到它自己所希望達到的目的。美國國務院一九四九年發表的《美國與中國的關係》白皮書和艾奇遜國務卿給杜魯門總統的信，都不得不承認這一點。艾奇遜在他的信中説：“中國內戰不祥的結局超出美國政府控制的能力，這是不幸的事，卻也是無可避免的”；“這種結局之所以終於發生，也並不是因為我們少做了某些事情。這是中國內部各種力量的産物，我國曾經設法去左右這些力量，但是沒有效果”。

中華人民共和國誕生以後，當時的美國政府本來可以從中國內戰的泥潭中拔出來，但是它沒有這樣做，而是對新中國採取了孤立、遏制的政策，並且在朝鮮戰爭爆發後武裝干涉純屬中國內政的海峽兩岸關係。一九五○年六月二十七日，美國總統杜魯門發表聲明宣佈：“我已命令第七艦隊阻止對台灣的任何攻擊”。美國第七艦隊侵入了台灣海峽，美國第十三航空隊進駐了台灣。一九五四年十二月，美國又與台灣當局簽訂了所謂《共同防禦條約》，將中國的台灣省置於美國的“保護”之下。美國政府繼續干預中國內政的錯誤政策，造成了台灣海峽地區長期的緊張對峙局勢，台灣問題自此亦成為中美兩國間的重大爭端。

為了緩和台灣海峽地區的緊張局勢，探尋解決中美兩國之間爭端的途徑，中國政府自五十年代中期起，即開始與美國對話。一九五五年八月至一九七○年二月，中美兩國共舉行了一百三十六次大使級會談，但在緩和與消除台灣海峽地區緊張局勢這個關鍵問題上，未取得任何進展。及至六十年代末七十年代初，隨著國際局勢的發展變化和新中國的壯大，美國開始調整其對華政策，兩國關係逐步出現解凍的形勢。一九七一年十月，第二十六屆聯合國大會通過二七五八號決議，恢復中華人民共和國在聯合國的一切合法權利，並驅逐台灣當局的“代表”。一九七二年二月，美國總統尼克松訪問中國，中美雙方在上海發表了聯合公報。公報稱：“美國方面聲明：美國認識到，在台灣海峽兩邊的所有中國人都認為只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分。美國政府對這一立場不提出異議”。

一九七八年十二月，美國政府接受了中國政府提出的建交三原則，即：美國與台灣當局“斷交”、廢除《共同防禦條約》以及從台灣撤軍。中美兩國於一九七九年一月一日正式建立外交關係。中美建交聯合公報聲明：“美利堅合眾國承認中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府。在此範圍內，美國人民將同台灣人民保持文化、商務和其他非官方聯絡”；“美利堅合眾國政府承認中國的立場，即只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分”。自此，中美關係實現正常化。

但遺憾的是，中美建交不過三個月，美國國會竟通過了所謂《與台灣關係法》，並經美國總統簽署生效。這個《與台灣關係法》，以美國國內立法的形式，作出了許多違反中美建交公報和國際法原則的規定，嚴重損害中國人民的權益。美國政府根據這個關係法，繼續向台灣出售武器和干涉中國內政，阻撓台灣與中國大陸的統一。

為解決美國售臺武器問題，中美兩國政府通過談判，於一九八二年八月十七日達成協定，發表了有關中美關係的第三個聯合公報，簡稱“八·一七公報”。美國政府在公報中聲明：“它不尋求執行一項長期向台灣出售武器的政策，它向台灣出售的武器在性能和數量上將不超過中美建交後近幾年供應的水平，它準備逐步減少它對台灣的武器出售，並經過一段時間導致最後的解決。”然而，十多年來美國政府不但沒有認真執行公報的規定，而且不斷發生違反公報的行為。一九九二年九月，美國政府甚至決定向台灣出售一百五十架F-16型高性能戰鬥機。美國政府的這一行動，給中美關係的發展和台灣問題的解決增加了新的障礙和阻力。

由上可見，台灣問題直到現在還未得到解決，美國政府是有責任的。自七十年代以來，美國朝野許多有識之士和友好人士，曾經為促使中美之間在台灣問題上的分歧的解決做了大量有益的工作，上述三個聯合公報就包含著他們的努力和貢獻。中國政府和人民對此十分讚賞。然而也不能不看到，美國確也有人至今仍不願看到中國的統一，製造種種藉口，施加種種影響，阻撓台灣問題的解決。

中國政府相信，美國人民與中國人民是友好的。兩國關係的正常發展，是符合兩國人民的長遠利益和共同願望的。中美兩國都應珍視來之不易的指導兩國關係發展的三個聯合公報。只要雙方都能恪守三個公報的原則，相互尊重，以大局為重，歷史遺留下來的台灣問題就不難得到解決，中美關係就一定能不斷獲得改善和發展。

三、中國政府解決台灣問題的基本方針

解決台灣問題，實現國家統一，是全體中國人民一項莊嚴而神聖的使命。中華人民共和國成立後，中國政府為之進行了長期不懈的努力。中國政府解決台灣問題的基本方針是“和平統一、一國兩制”。v

“和平統一、一國兩制”方針的形成。早在五十年代，中國政府就曾設想以和平方式解決台灣問題。一九五五年五月，周恩來總理在全國人民代表大會常務委員會會議上即提出：中國人民解決台灣問題有兩種可能的方式，即戰爭的方式和和平的方式，中國人民願意在可能的條件下，爭取用和平的方式解決問題。一九五六年四月，毛澤東主席又提出：“和為貴”、“愛國一家”、“愛國不分先後”等政策主張。但由於某些外國勢力的干預等原因，這些主張未能付諸實踐。

自七十年代末開始，國際國內形勢發生了一些重要變化：中美建立外交關係，實現了關係正常化；中國共産黨召開十一屆三中全會，決定把黨和國家的工作中心轉移到現代化經濟建設上來。與此同時，海峽兩岸的中國人、港澳同胞以及海外僑胞、華人，都殷切期望兩岸攜手合作，共同振興中華。在這樣的歷史條件下，中國政府出於對整個國家民族利益與前途的考慮，本著尊重歷史、尊重現實、實事求是、照顧各方利益的原則，提出了“和平統一、一國兩制”的方針。

一九七九年一月一日，中華人民共和國全國人民代表大會常務委員會發表《告台灣同胞書》，鄭重宣告了中國政府和平解決台灣問題的大政方針，呼籲兩岸就結束軍事對峙狀態進行商談。表示在實現國家統一時，一定“尊重台灣現狀和台灣各界人士的意見，採取合情合理的政策和辦法”。

一九八一年九月三十日，全國人民代表大會常務委員會委員長葉劍英發表談話，進一步闡明解決台灣問題的方針政策。表示“國家實現統一後，台灣可作為特別行政區，享有高度的自治權”，並建議由兩岸執政的國共兩黨舉行對等談判。

一九八二年一月十一日，中國領導人鄧小平就葉劍英的上述談話指出：這實際上就是“一個國家、兩種制度”，在國家實現統一的大前提下，國家主體實行社會主義制度，台灣實行資本主義制度。

一九八三年六月二十六日，鄧小平進一步發揮了關於實現台灣與大陸和平統一的構想，指出，問題的核心是祖國統一。他還就兩岸統一和設置台灣特別行政區問題，闡明了中國政府的政策。

一九九二年十月十二日，中共中央總書記江澤民指出：“我們堅定不移地按照‘和平統一、一國兩制’的方針，積極促進祖國統一。”“我們再次重申，中國共産黨願意同中國國民黨儘早接觸，以便創造條件，就正式結束兩岸敵對狀態、逐步實現和平統一進行談判。在商談中，可以吸收兩岸其他政黨、團體和各界有代表性的人士參加。”

“和平統一、一國兩制”的基本點。“和平統一、一國兩制”是建設有中國特色的社會主義理論和實踐的重要組成部分，是中國政府一項長期不變的基本國策。這一方針，有以下基本點：

(一)一個中國。世界上只有一個中國，台灣是中國不可分割的一部分，中央政府在北京。這是舉世公認的事實，也是和平解決台灣問題的前提。

中國政府堅決反對任何旨在分裂中國主權和領土完整的言行，反對“兩個中國”、“一中一台”或“一國兩府”，反對一切可能導致“台灣獨立”的企圖和行徑。海峽兩岸的中國人民都主張只有一個中國，都擁護國家的統一，台灣作為中國不可分割的一部分的地位是確定的、不能改變的，不存在什麼“自決”的問題。

(二)兩制並存。在一個中國的前提下，大陸的社會主義制度和台灣的資本主義制度，實行長期共存，共同發展，誰也不吃掉誰。這種考慮，主要是基於照顧台灣的現狀和台灣同胞的實際利益。這將是統一後的中國國家體制的一大特色和重要創造。

兩岸實現統一後，台灣的現行社會經濟制度不變，生活方式不變，同外國的經濟文化關係不變。諸如私人財産、房屋、土地、企業所有權、合法繼承權、華僑和外國人投資等，一律受法律保護。

(三)高度自治。統一後，台灣將成為特別行政區。它不同於中國其他一般省區，享有高度的自治權。它擁有在台灣的行政管理權、立法權、獨立的司法權和終審權；黨、政、軍、經、財等事宜都自行管理；可以同外國簽訂商務、文化等協定，享有一定的外事權；有自己的軍隊，大陸不派軍隊也不派行政人員駐臺。特別行政區政府和台灣各界的代表人士還可以出任國家政權機構的領導職務，參與全國事務的管理。

(四)和平談判。通過接觸談判，以和平方式實現國家統一，是全體中國人的共同心願。兩岸都是中國人，如果因為中國的主權和領土完整被分裂，兵戎相見，骨肉相殘，對兩岸的同胞都是極其不幸的。和平統一，有利於全民族的大團結，有利於台灣社會經濟的穩定和發展，有利於全中國的振興和富強。

為結束敵對狀態，實現和平統一，兩岸應儘早接觸談判。在一個中國的前提下，什麼問題都可以談，包括談判的方式，參加的黨派、團體和各界代表人士，以及台灣方面關心的其他一切問題。只要兩岸坐下來談，總能找到雙方都可以接受的辦法。

鑒於兩岸的現實狀況，中國政府主張在實現統一之前，雙方按照相互尊重、互補互利的原則，積極推動兩岸經濟合作和各項交往，進行直接通郵、通商、通航和雙向交流，為國家和平統一創造條件。

和平統一是中國政府既定的方針。然而，每一個主權國家都有權採取自己認為必要的一切手段包括軍事手段，來維護本國主權和領土的完整。中國政府在採取何種方式處理本國內部事務的問題上，並無義務對任何外國或圖謀分裂中國者作出承諾。

這裡還應指出，台灣問題純屬中國的內政，不同於第二次世界大戰後經國際協議而形成的德國問題和朝鮮問題。因此，台灣問題不能和德國、朝鮮問題相提並論。中國政府歷來反對用處理德國問題、朝鮮問題的方式來處理台灣問題。台灣問題應該也完全可以通過兩岸的協商，在一個中國的架構內求得合理的解決。

四、台灣海峽兩岸關係的發展及其阻力

台灣海峽兩岸目前的分離狀態，是中華民族的不幸。所有中國人無不殷切盼望早日結束這種令人痛心的局面。

為了實現兩岸人民正常往來和國家統一，中國政府在提出和平統一主張的同時，也採取了一系列推動兩岸關係發展的措施：

政治方面，調整有關政策措施，化解敵對情緒。最高人民法院、最高人民檢察院決定不再追訴去臺人員在中華人民共和國成立前的犯罪行為。

軍事方面，主動緩和海峽兩岸軍事對峙狀態，停止對金門等島嶼的炮擊，並把福建沿海一些前沿陣地、觀察所開闢為經濟開發區和旅遊點。

經濟方面，敞開門戶，促進交流，歡迎臺商來大陸投資和從事貿易活動，併為之提供優惠條件和法律保障。

其他如人員往來、郵電交通以及科技、文化、體育、學術、新聞等方面，中國政府亦持積極態度，採取了相應措施，鼓勵發展兩岸在各個領域的交流與合作。還成立了得到政府授權的民間團體“海峽兩岸關係協會”，同台灣“海峽交流基金會”及有關民間團體建立聯絡，維護兩岸人民的合法權益，推動兩岸關係的發展。

中國政府的對臺政策和措施，得到了越來越多的台灣同胞、港澳同胞和海外僑胞、華人的理解和支持。廣大台灣同胞為發展兩岸關係作出了很大的努力。台灣當局近幾年也相應調整了對大陸的政策，採取了一些鬆動措施，諸如開放島內民眾赴大陸探親，逐步放寬對兩岸民間交流交往的限制，擴大間接貿易，開放間接投資，簡化兩岸同胞通話、通郵、通匯的手續。這些都是有利於相互交往的。近年來，兩岸的經濟貿易迅速發展，人員往來及各項交流活動不斷擴大。一九九三年四月舉行的“汪辜會談”簽訂了四項協議，邁出了兩岸關繫上具有歷史意義的重要一步。台灣海峽出現了四十餘年來前所未有的緩和氣氛，這是有利於和平統一的。

必須指出，台灣當局雖對兩岸關係作了某些鬆動，但其現行大陸政策仍嚴重阻礙著兩岸關係的發展和國家的統一。他們口頭上雖聲稱“中國必須統一”，但行動上卻總是背離一個中國的原則，繼續維持與大陸分離的局面，拒絕就和平統一問題進行商談，甚至設置障礙，限制兩岸交往的進一步發展。

近年來，台灣島內“台獨”活動日形囂張，給兩岸關係的發展和國家和平統一投下了陰影。“台獨”的産生有著複雜的社會歷史根源和國際背景，而台灣當局拒絕和談、限制交往、在國際上推行“雙重承認”和“兩個中國”的政策，又實際上為“台獨”活動提供了條件。應當説，台灣同胞要求當家作主管理台灣的願望是合情合理的、正當的，這不同於“台灣獨立”，更與極少數堅持要走“台獨”道路的人有著根本的區別。極少數“台獨”分子鼓吹“獨立”，甚至投靠外國，妄圖將台灣從中國分裂出去，這是違揹包括台灣同胞在內的全中國人民的根本利益的。中國政府嚴重關注這一事態的發展，對任何製造“台灣獨立”的行徑絕不會坐視不理。

某些國際勢力不希望中國統一，仍千方百計插手中國內政，支持台灣當局的“反共拒和”政策和島內的分裂勢力，為中國的和平統一製造障礙，嚴重傷害了中國人民的民族感情。

中國政府堅信，廣大台灣同胞是要求國家統一的；台灣朝野政治力量的大多數也是主張國家統一的。在兩岸人民共同努力下，上述障礙和阻力一定可以排除，兩岸關係一定可以獲得更好的發展。

五、國際事務中涉及台灣的幾個問題

如前所述，世界上只有一個中國，台灣是中國不可分割的一部分。中華人民共和國政府作為代表全中國人民的唯一合法政府，得到了聯合國及世界各國的普遍承認。為維護國家主權和實現國家的統一，中國政府在國際事務中處理涉及台灣的問題時，始終堅持一個中國的原則，一貫維護台灣同胞的利益。中國政府相信，這一立場必能贏得各國政府和人民的尊重。在此，中國政府認為有必要就以下幾個問題重申自己的立場和政策。

(一)與中國建交國同台灣的關係問題。目前，世界上凡與中國建交的國家，均遵照國際法和一個中國的原則，與中國政府就台灣問題達成正式協議或諒解，承諾不與台灣建立任何官方性質的關係。按照國際法，一個主權國家只能有一個中央政府代表這個國家。台灣作為中國的一部分，它在國際上無權代表中國，不能與外國建立外交關係和發展具有官方性質的關係。但考慮到台灣經濟發展的需要和台灣同胞的實際利益，對台灣同外國的民間經濟、文化往來，中國政府不持異議。

近幾年，台灣當局在國際上竭力推行所謂“務實外交”，謀求同一些與中國建交的國家發展官方關係，推行“雙重承認”，達到製造“兩個中國”、“一中一台”的目的。對此，中國政府堅決反對。

應該指出，世界上絕大多數國家都能珍視同中國的友好關係，恪守在台灣問題上和中國達成的協議和諒解，中國政府對此表示讚賞。但也不能不指出，有的國家竟不顧國際信譽，違反與中華人民共和國建交時所作的承諾，同台灣發展官方關係，從而給中國統一事業設置障礙。中國政府衷心希望，有關國家的政府能夠採取措施，糾正這一做法。

(二)國際組織與台灣的關係問題。每個國家的主權是完整的，既不能分割，也不能分享。中華人民共和國政府作為中國的唯一合法政府，有權利也有義務在國際組織中行使國家主權，代表整個中國。台灣當局企圖在某些只有主權國家才能參加的國際組織中搞所謂“一國兩席”，就是要製造“兩個中國”。中國政府堅決反對這種行徑。這一原則立場完全符合包括台灣同胞和海外僑胞在內的全中國人民的根本利益。只有在堅持一個中國原則立場的前提下，中國政府才可以考慮，根據有關國際組織的性質、章程規定和實際情況，以中國政府同意和接受的某種方式，來處理台灣參加某些國際組織活動的問題。

聯合國系統的所有機構，是由主權國家代表參加的政府間國際組織。在恢復中華人民共和國在聯合國的合法權利後，聯合國系統的所有機構都已通過正式決議，恢復中華人民共和國享有的合法席位，驅逐了台灣當局的“代表”。自此，在聯合國組織中的中國代表權問題已獲得了徹底的解決，根本不存在台灣再加入的問題。需要指出的是，近一個時期來，台灣當局的某些人又為“重返聯合國”而大肆鼓噪。十分明顯，這是一種妄圖割裂國家主權的行徑，它無論在法理上或實際上都是行不通的。中國政府相信各國政府和聯合國系統的組織會識破這一圖謀，不做有損於中國主權的事情。

其他政府間國際組織，原則上台灣也無權參加。至於亞洲開發銀行(ADB)、亞太經濟合作組織(APEC)等地區性經濟組織，台灣的加入係根據中國政府與有關方面達成的協議或諒解，明確規定中華人民共和國作為主權國家參加，台灣只作為中國的一個地區以“中國台北”(英文在亞行為TAIPEI，CHINA；在亞太經濟合作組織為CHINESETAIPEI)的名稱參加活動。這種做法屬於特殊安排，不能構成其他政府間國際組織及國際活動效倣的“模式”。

在民間性質的國際組織中，中華人民共和國的相應組織同有關方面達成協定或諒解，在中國的全國性組織以中國的名義參加的情況下，台灣的相應組織可以以“中國台北”(TAIPEI，CHINA)或“中國台灣”(TAIWAN，CHINA)的名稱參加。

(三)與中國建交國同台灣通航問題。一個國家的領空是該國領土不可分割的組成部分。一九一九年公佈的《巴黎航空公約》和一九四四年簽署的《芝加哥公約》均確認，每個國家對其領空具有完全的、排他性的主權的原則。因此，凡是同中國建交國家的任何航空公司，即使是私營航空公司與台灣通航，都是涉及中國主權的政治問題，而不是一般的民間關係。與中國建交國家的官方航空公司當然不可與台灣通航，而其民間航空公司如欲同台灣通航，則須由其政府與中國政府磋商。在徵得中國政府同意後，其民間航空公司始可同台灣的私營航空公司互飛。實際上，根據上述原則，中國政府已經同意英、德、加拿大等國的民間航空公司與台灣的私營航空公司通航。

有的國家在與中華人民共和國建交前就同台灣通航的，則可通過與中國政府談判，改變其同台灣通航的官方性質後繼續其民間商業運輸安排。

(四)與中國建交國向台灣出售武器問題。中國政府一貫堅決反對任何國家向台灣出售任何種類的武器裝備或提供生産武器的技術。凡與中國建交的國家，都應遵循互相尊重主權和領土完整、互不干涉內政的原則，而不以任何形式或藉口向台灣提供武器，否則就是違反國際關係準則，干涉中國內政。

世界各國，尤其是對世界和平事業負有重大責任的大國，理應嚴格遵守聯合國安理會五常任理事國關於限制常規武器擴散的指導原則，為維護和促進地區的和平與安全作出貢獻。然而，在目前台灣海峽兩岸關係日益緩和的形勢下，有的國家竟違背自己在國際協議中的承諾，置中國政府的一再嚴正交涉於不顧，向台灣出售武器，在海峽兩岸之間製造緊張局勢。這不僅是對中國安全的嚴重威脅，為中國的和平統一事業設置障礙，也不利於亞洲和世界的和平與穩定。中國人民當然要強烈反對。

在國際事務中，中國政府一貫奉行獨立自主的和平外交政策，堅持“互相尊重主權和領土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉內政、平等互利、和平共處”五項原則，積極發展同世界各國的友好關係，從不損害別國利益，不干涉別國內政。同樣，中國政府也要求各國政府，不做損害中國利益、干涉中國內政的事情，正確處理與台灣的關係問題。

結束語

中國實現統一後，兩岸可攜手合作，互補互助，發展經濟，共同振興中華。原來一直困擾台灣的各種問題，都將在一個中國的架構下得到合理解決。台灣同胞將與祖國其他地區人民一道共享一個偉大國家的尊嚴和榮譽。

長期以來，台灣問題一直是亞洲與太平洋地區一個不穩定的因素。中國的統一，不僅有利於中國本身的穩定和發展，也有利於中國同各國進一步加強友好合作關係，有利於亞太地區乃至全世界的和平與發展。

中國政府相信，在維護自己國家主權與領土完整的正義事業中，一定能夠得到世界各國政府和人民的理解和支持。

This white paper was issued on Aug. 31, 1993 and was the first of altogether three white papers the PRC issued on Taiwan so far. The second white paper on the topic was issued on Feb. 21, 2000, the third on Aug. 10, 2022.

See also the URLs leading to the sources of this white paper in English and Chinese.

Bill Clinton's "Three No's"

On June 30, 1998, during his nine-day state visit to the PRC, US President Bill Clinton made a statement on his new Taiwan position at the Shanghai Library (上海圖書館):

[...] I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan—one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member of any organization for which statehood is a requirement. [...]

[...] 這使我有機會在這裡重申我方的臺灣政策，即我們不支持臺灣獨立，不支持兩個中國或一中一台，不支持臺灣加入任何必須由主權國家才能參加的國際組織。[...]

US Senate Resolution 107

Whereas at no time since the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, has Taiwan been under the control of the People's Republic of China;

Whereas the United States began its long, peaceful, friendly relationship with Taiwan in 1949;

Whereas since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, the policy of the United States has been based on the expectation that the future relationship between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan would be determined by peaceful means;

Whereas in March 1996, the People's Republic of China held provocative military maneuvers, including missile launch exercises in the Taiwan Strait, in an attempt to intimidate the people of Taiwan during their historic, free and democratic presidential election;

Whereas officials of the People's Republic of China refuse to renounce the use of force against democratic Taiwan;

Whereas Taiwan has achieved significant political and economic strength as one of the world's premier democracies and as the nineteenth largest economy in the world;

Whereas Taiwan is the seventh largest trading partner of the United States and imports more than twice as much annually from the United States as does the People's Republic of China; and

Whereas no treaties exist between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan that determine the future status of Taiwan: Now therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That Congress—

(1) affirms its longstanding commitment to Taiwan and the people of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8);

(2) affirms its expectation, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and considers any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of grave concern to the United States;

(3) affirms its commitment, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;

(4) affirms its commitment, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, that only the President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of defense articles and services for Taiwan based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan; and

(5) urges the President of the United States to seek a public renunciation by the People's Republic of China of any use of force, or threat to use force, against democratic Taiwan.

The title was amended so as to read: 'Affirming U.S. Commitments Under the Taiwan Relations Act'.

Additional information concerning the US Senate Resolution 107 can be found on relevant page of the US Congress; please click here. The title of this document can be translated to Chinese as follows: Meiguo canyiyuan yilingqi hao gongtong jueyi'an 美國參議院 107 號共同決議案.

US House of Representatives Resolution 301

Whereas at no time since the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, has Taiwan been under the control of the People's Republic of China;

Whereas the United States began its long, peaceful, friendly relationship with Taiwan in 1949;

Whereas since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, the policy of the United States has been based on the expectation that the further relationship between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan would be determined by peaceful means;

Whereas in March 1996, the People's Republic of China held provocative military maneuvers including missile launch exercises in the Taiwan Strait, in an attempt to intimidate the people of Taiwan during their historic, free, and democratic Presidential election;

Whereas officials of the People's Republic of China refuse to renounce the use of force against democratic Taiwan;

Whereas Taiwan has achieved significant political and economic strength as one of the world's premier democracies and as the 19th largest economy in the world;

Whereas no agreements exist between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan that determine the future status of Taiwan; and

Whereas the House of Representatives passed a resolution by a vote of 411-0 in June 1998 urging the President to seek, during his recent summit meeting in Beijing, a public renunciation by the People's Republic of China of any use of force, or threat of use of force, against democratic Taiwan: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That Congress—

(1) affirms its longstanding commitment to Taiwan and the people of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8);

(2) affirms its expectation, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, that the future status of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that the people of both sides of the Taiwan Strait should determine their own future, and considers any effort to determine or influence the future status of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific region and of grave concern to the United States;

(3) affirms its commitment, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services, including appropriate ballistic missile defenses, in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;

(5) urges the President, once again, to seek a public renunciation by the People's Republic of China of any use of force, or threat of use of force, against the free people of Taiwan; and

(6) affirms its strong support, in accordance with the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act, of appropriate membership for Taiwan in international financial institutions and other international organizations.

Additional information concerning the US Senate Resolution 107 can be found on relevant page of the US Congress; please click here. The title of this document can be translated to Chinese as follows: Meiguo zhongyiyuan sanlingyi hao gongtong jueyi'an 美國眾議院 301 號共同決議案.

ROC President Lee Teng-hui's remarks about the "state-to-state relationship" extant between the ROC and the PRC

On July 9, 1999, ROC president Lee Teng-hui made a statement on the relations between the ROC and the PRC during an interview with journalists of German broadcasting station Deutsche Welle:

[...] The 1991 constitutional amendments have designated cross-strait relations as a state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship, rather than an internal relationship between a legitimate government and a renegade group, or between a central government and a local government. Thus, the Beijing authorities' characterization of Taiwan as a "renegade province" is historically and legally untrue. [...]

[...] 一九九一年修憲以來，已將兩岸關係定位在國家與國家，至少是特殊的國與國的關係，而非一合法政府，一叛亂團體，或一中央政府，一地方政府的「一個中國」的內部關係。所以，您提到北京政府將台灣視為「叛離的一省」，這完全昧於歷史與法律上的事實。[...]

The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China

Foreword

On October 1, 1949, the Chinese people won a great victory in the new democratic revolution and founded the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Kuomintang (KMT) ruling clique retreated from the mainland to entrench in China's Taiwan Province in confrontation with the Central Government with the support of foreign forces. This is the origin of the Taiwan issue. Settlement of the Taiwan issue and realization of the complete reunification of China embody the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. The Chinese government has worked persistently toward this goal in the past 50 years. From 1979, the Chinese government has striven for the peaceful reunification of China in the form of "one country, two systems" with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort. Economic and cultural exchanges and people-to-people contacts between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits have made rapid progress since the end of 1987. Unfortunately, from the 1990s, Lee Teng-hui, the leader of the Taiwan authorities, has progressively betrayed the One-China Principle, striving to promote a separatist policy with "two Chinas" at the core, going so far as to openly describe the cross-Straits relations as "state to state relations, or at least special state to state relations."This action has seriously damaged the basis for peaceful reunification of the two sides, harmed the fundamental interests of the entire Chinese nation including the Taiwan compatriots, and jeopardized peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The Chinese government has consistently adhered to the One-China Principle and resolutely opposed any attempt to separate Taiwan from China. The struggle between the Chinese government and the separatist forces headed by Lee Teng-hui finds its concentrated expression in the question of whether to persevere in the One-China Principle or to create "two Chinas" or "One-China, one Taiwan."

In August 1993, we issued a white paper entitled "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China," which systematically expounds the fact concerning Taiwan as an inalienable part of China, the origin of the Taiwan issue and the Chinese government's basic principles and related policies regarding resolution of the Taiwan question. We deem it necessary here to further explain to the international community the Chinese government's position and policy on the One-China Principle.

I. The Basis for One China, de Facto and de Jure

The One-China Principle has been evolved in the course of the Chinese people's just struggle to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its basis, both de facto and de jure, is unshakable.

Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. All the facts and laws about Taiwan prove that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. In April 1895, through a war of aggression against China, Japan forced the Qing government to sign the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki, and forcibly occupied Taiwan. In July 1937, Japan launched an all-out war of aggression against China. In December 1941, the Chinese government issued the Proclamation of China's Declaration of War Against Japan, announcing to the world that all treaties, agreements and contracts concerning Sino-Japanese relations, including the Treaty of Shimonoseki, had been abrogated, and that China would recover Taiwan. In December 1943, the Cairo Declaration was issued by the Chinese, U.S. and British governments, stipulating that Japan should return to China all the territories it had stolen from the Chinese, including Northeast China, Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago. The Potsdam Proclamation signed by China, the United States and Britain in 1945 (later adhered to by the Soviet Union) stipulated that "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." In August of that year, Japan declared surrender and promised in its instrument of surrender that it would faithfully fulfill the obligations laid down in the Potsdam Proclamation. On October 25, 1945, the Chinese government recovered Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago, resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan.

On October 1, 1949, the Central People's Government of the PRC was proclaimed, replacing the government of the Republic of China to become the only legal government of the whole of China and its sole legal representative in the international arena, thereby bringing the historical status of the Republic of China to an end. This is a replacement of the old regime by a new one in a situation where the main bodies of the same international laws have not changed and China's sovereignty and inherent territory have not changed therefrom, and so the government of the PRC naturally should fully enjoy and exercise China's sovereignty, including its sovereignty over Taiwan.

Since the KMT ruling clique retreated to Taiwan, although its regime has continued to use the designations "Republic of China" and "government of the Republic of China," it has long since completely forfeited its right to exercise state sovereignty on behalf of China and, in reality, has always remained only a local authority in Chinese territory.

The formulation of the One-China Principle and its basic meaning. On the day of its founding, the Central People's Government of the PRC declared to governments of all countries in the world, "This government is the sole legitimate government representing the entire people of the People's Republic of China. It is ready to establish diplomatic relations with all foreign governments that are willing to abide by the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty." Shortly afterwards, the Central People's Government telegraphed the United Nations, announcing that the KMT authorities had "lost all basis, both de jure and de facto, to represent the Chinese people," and therefore had no right to represent China at all. One principle governing New China's establishment of diplomatic relations with a foreign country is that it recognizes the government of the PRC as the sole legitimate government representing the whole of China, severs or refrains from establishing diplomatic relations with the Taiwan authorities.

These propositions of the Chinese government met with obstruction by the U.S. government. On January 5, 1950, the U.S. President Truman issued a statement, saying that the U.S. and other Allied countries recognized China's exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan Island in the four years since 1945. However, after the start of the Korean War in June 1950, to isolate and contain China the U.S. government not only sent troops to occupy Taiwan, but it also dished out such fallacies as "the status of Taiwan has yet to be determined" and later, step by step, lobbied for "dual recognition" among the international community in order to create "two Chinas." Naturally, the Chinese government resolutely opposed this, insisting that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China. China has evolved the One-China Principle precisely in the course of the endeavor to develop normal diplomatic relations with other countries and the struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The above propositions constitute the basic meaning of the One-China Principle, the crucial point being to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

During the 30 or 40 years after 1949, although the Taiwan authorities did not recognize the legitimate status of the government of the PRC as the representative of the whole of China, they did insist that Taiwan is a part of China and that there is only one China, and opposed "two Chinas" and "Taiwan independence. " This shows that for a long time there has been a common understanding among the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits on the fundamental question that there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory. As far back as October 1958, when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was engaged in the battle to bombard Jinmen, Chairman Mao Zedong declared to the Taiwan authorities, "There is only one China, not two, in the world. You agree with us on this point, as indicated in your leaders' proclamations." In January 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) issued a Message to Taiwan Compatriots, pointing out that "the Taiwan authorities have always stood firm on the one China position and opposed the independence of Taiwan. This is our common stand and our basis for cooperation."

The Chinese government's solemn and reasonable stand for the One-China Principle has gained the understanding and support of more and more countries and international organizations, and the One-China Principle has been gradually accepted by the international community at large. In October 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted at its 26th session Resolution 2758, which expelled the representatives of the Taiwan authorities and restored the seat and all the lawful rights of the government of the PRC in the United Nations. In September 1972, China and Japan signed a Joint Statement, announcing establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and that Japan recognizes the government of the PRC as the only legitimate government of China, fully understands and respects the Chinese government's position that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC, and promises to adhere to the position as prescribed in Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation. In December 1978, China and the U.S. issued the Joint Communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations, in which the U.S. " recognizes the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China" and "acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China. " Up to now, 161 countries have established diplomatic relations with the PRC; they all acknowledge the One-China Principle and promise to handle their relations with Taiwan within the one-China framework.

II. The One-China Principle--the Basis and Prerequisite for Achieving Peaceful Reunification

The One-China Principle is the foundation stone for the Chinese government's policy on Taiwan. On Comrade Deng Xiaoping's initiative, the Chinese government has, since 1979, adopted the policy of peaceful reunification and gradually evolved the scientific concept of "one country, two systems." On this basis, China established the basic principle of "peaceful reunification, and one country, two systems." The key points of this basic principle and the relevant policies are: China will do its best to achieve peaceful reunification, but will not commit itself to ruling out the use of force; will actively promote people-to-people contacts and economic and cultural exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, and start direct trade, postal, air and shipping services as soon as possible; achieve reunification through peaceful negotiations and, on the premise of the One-China Principle, any matter can be negotiated. After reunification, the policy of "one country, two systems" will be practiced, with the main body of China (Chinese mainland) continuing with its socialist system, and Taiwan maintaining its capitalist system for a long period of time to come. After reunification, Taiwan will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, and the Central Government will not send troops or administrative personnel to be stationed in Taiwan. Resolution of the Taiwan issue is an internal affair of China, which should be achieved by the Chinese themselves, and there is no call for aid by foreign forces. The afore-mentioned principles and policies embody the basic stand and spirit of adhering to the One-China Principle, and fully respect Taiwan compatriots' wish to govern and administer Taiwan by themselves. On January 30, 1995, President Jiang Zemin put forward eight propositions on the development of relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits and the promotion of peaceful reunification of China, explicitly pointing out: "Adhering to the One-China Principle is the basis and prerequisite for peaceful reunification. "

Only by adhering to the One-China Principle can peaceful reunification be achieved. The Taiwan issue is one left over by the Chinese civil war. As yet, the state of hostility between the two sides of the Straits has not formally ended. To safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and realize the reunification of the two sides of the Straits, the Chinese government has the right to resort to any necessary means. Peaceful means would be favorable to the common development of the societies on both sides of the Straits, and to the harmony and unity of the compatriots across the Straits. Peaceful means is therefore the best means. The Chinese government's declaration in 1979 on implementing the principle of peaceful reunification was based on the premise that the Taiwan authorities at that time upheld the principle that there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is a part of China. Meanwhile, the Chinese government took into account the fact that the U.S. government, which for many years had supported the Taiwan authorities, had accepted that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the only legitimate government of China, and saw this acknowledgment as being beneficial to the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. While carrying out the policy of peaceful reunification, the Chinese government always makes it clear that the means used to solve the Taiwan issue is a matter of China's internal affairs, and China is under no obligation to commit itself to rule out the use of force. This is by no means directed against Taiwan compatriots, but against the scheme to create an "independent Taiwan" and against the foreign forces interfering in the reunification of China, and is intended as a necessary safeguard for the striving for peaceful reunification. Resort to force would only be the last choice made under compelling circumstances.

As for Taiwan, upholding the principle of one China indicates that it acknowledges that China's sovereignty and territory are inalienable. In this way, both sides of the Taiwan Straits will have a common basis and premise and may find ways to solve their political differences and realize peaceful reunification through consultation on an equal footing. If Taiwan denies the One-China Principle and tries to separate Taiwan from the territory of China, the premise and basis for peaceful reunification will cease to exist. As for the United States, if it promises to follow a one-China policy, it should earnestly implement the three communiques between the Chinese and U.S. governments and fulfill the series of promises it has made. It should maintain only cultural, commercial and other non-governmental relations with Taiwan; oppose "Taiwan independence," "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" and not to stand in the way of the reunification of China. Acting otherwise will destroy the external conditions necessary for the Chinese government to strive for peaceful reunification.

As for countries in the Asia-Pacific region and other regions in the world, the situation across the Taiwan Straits has always been closely linked with the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Adherence to the policy of one China by countries concerned will be beneficial to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and favorable for China to develop friendly relations with other countries, and therefore conforms to the interests of the Asia-Pacific region and other countries in the world.

The Chinese government is actively and sincerely striving for peaceful reunification. To achieve peaceful reunification, the Chinese government has appealed time and again for cross-Straits negotiations on the basis of equality and the One-China Principle. Taking Taiwan's political reality into full account and out of consideration for the Taiwan authorities' request for the negotiations to be held on an equal footing, we have put forward one proposal after another, such as that the negotiations should be held between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese KMT on a reciprocal basis and that the talks between the two parties may include representatives from all parties and mass organizations of Taiwan, and we have never spoken of negotiations between the "central and local authorities." The Chinese government has also proposed that dialogues may start first, including political dialogues, which may gradually move on to procedural consultations for political talks to solve the name, the topics for discussion and the forms of official talks before political talks are held. Political talks may be carried out step by step. First, negotiations should be held and an agreement reached on an official end to the state of hostility between the two sides under the principle of one China so as to jointly safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and work out plans for the development of the future cross-Straits relations. In January 1998, to seek and expand the political basis for relations between the two sides, the Chinese government explicitly proposed to the Taiwan side that before the realization of reunification and in handling affairs concerning inter-Straits relations, especially during the talks between the two sides, the One-China Principle should be upheld, namely that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is not to be separated. The Chinese government hopes that on the basis of the One-China Principle, the two sides will hold consultations on an equal footing and discuss national reunification together.

To strive for peaceful reunification, the Chinese government has adopted a series of positive policies and measures to promote the comprehensive development of cross-Straits relations. From the end of 1987, when the state of isolation between the two sides was terminated, to the end of 1999, the number of Taiwan compatriots coming to the mainland of China for visiting their relatives, sightseeing or exchanges reached 16 million by turnstile count. The total indirect trade volume between the two sides of the Straits has exceeded US$ 160 billion; the agreed capital to be invested by Taiwan business people in the mainland has exceeded US$ 44 billion, of which US$ 24 billion has been actually used. Great progress has been made in the exchange of mail and telecommunications across the Straits; and some progress has been made in the exchange of air and shipping services too. The NPC and its Standing Committee, the State Council, and local governments have worked out a sequence of laws and regulations to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan compatriots. To properly solve the concrete issues arising from the people-to-people contacts between the two sides through consultations, in November 1992 the mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation reached the common understanding during talks on routine affairs that each of the two organizations should express verbally that "both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the One-China Principle." On this basis, the leaders of these two organizations successfully held the "Wang Daohan-Koo Chen-fu talks" and signed several agreements on protecting the legitimate rights and interests of the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits in April 1993. In October 1998, the leaders of the two organizations met in Shanghai, starting political dialogue across the Straits. The talks between the two organizations were carried out on an equal footing. Practice has proved that on the basis of the One-China Principle, it is entirely possible to find a proper way for holding talks, based on equality, between the two sides. Since Hong Kong and Macao's return to China, people-to-people contacts and exchanges between Hong Kong and Taiwan and between Macao and Taiwan have continued and developed on the basis of the One-China Principle.

III. The Chinese Government--Staunch Champion for the One-China Principle

Separatist forces in Taiwan are bent on violating the One-China Principle. In 1988, after Lee Teng-hui became the leader of the Taiwan authorities, he publicly stated time and again that the basic policy of the Taiwan authorities was that "there is only one China, not two," and "we have always maintained that China should be reunited, and we adhere to the principle of 'one China.'” However, since the early 1990s, Lee Teng-hui has gradually deviated from the One-China Principle, trumpeting "two governments," "two reciprocal political entities," "Taiwan is already a state with independent sovereignty," and "At the present stage the Republic of China is on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China is on the mainland." Moreover, he went back on his words, saying that "I have never said that there is only one China." In addition, he has connived at and provided support for the separatists who advocate "Taiwan independence" and their activities, thus helping the rapid development of the "Taiwan independence" forces and the spread of the "Taiwan independence" ideology. Under the direction of Lee Teng-hui, the Taiwan authorities have adopted a series of measures toward actual separation. In matters of Taiwan's form of government, the Taiwan authorities are seeking to transform Taiwan into an "independent political entity" through a "constitutional reform," so as to suit the needs of creating "two Chinas." In foreign relations, the Taiwan authorities have spared no effort to carry out the activities for "expanding the international space of survival," with the aim of creating "two Chinas." Since 1993, for seven years running, the Taiwan authorities have maneuvered for participation in the United Nations. In military affairs, the Taiwan authorities have bought large quantities of advanced weapons from foreign countries and sought to join the Theater Missile Defense system (TMD), in an attempt to establish a military alliance of a disguised form with the United States and Japan.

In ideology and culture, the Taiwan authorities have endeavored to obliterate the Chinese awareness of Taiwan compatriots, especially young people, and their identification with the motherland, in order to create misunderstanding of the motherland among Taiwan compatriots and estrange them from her, thus cutting off the ideological and cultural ties between the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. Since 1999, Lee Teng-hui has stepped up his separatist activities. In May, he published the book The Road to Democracy, which advocates the division of China into seven regions, each enjoying "full autonomy." On July 9, he went so far as to publicly distort the cross-Straits relations as "state to state relations, or at least special state to state relations," in an attempt to fundamentally change the status of Taiwan as a part of China, sabotage the relations between both sides of the Taiwan Straits, especially the basis for cross-Straits political dialogues and negotiations, and wreck the foundation for peaceful reunification. Lee Teng-hui has become the general representative of Taiwan's separatist forces, a saboteur of the stability of the Taiwan Straits, a stumbling-block preventing the development of relations between China and the United States, and a troublemaker for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

The Chinese government firmly defends the One-China Principle. The Chinese government and people have always maintained sharp vigilance and fought resolutely against the secessionist activities of the Taiwan separatists, represented by Lee Teng-hui.

After Lee Teng-hui's "private" visit to the United States in June 1995, the Chinese government has waged a resolute struggle against separation and against "Taiwan independence," and made strong protests and representations to the U.S. government for openly allowing Lee Teng-hui to visit the U.S., violating its promises made in the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques, and seriously prejudicing China's sovereignty. This struggle has shown the Chinese government and people's firm resolve and ability to safeguard state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and exerted an important and far-reaching influence. Compatriots in Taiwan have further realized the serious harm "Taiwan independence" can cause. Lee Teng-hui has received a heavy blow for his separatist activities in the international community, so that some of the " Taiwan independence" protagonists have had to abandon certain extremist propositions aimed at division. The international community has further realized the necessity of upholding the one-China policy. The U.S. government has explicitly undertaken not to support "Taiwan independence," not to support "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan," and not to support Taiwan joining any international organization whose membership is restricted to sovereign states.

The Chinese government and people have fought more unremittingly after Lee Teng-hui cooked up his "two states" theory. The relevant department of the Chinese government has clearly stated that the attempt of the Taiwan separatists to implement the "two states" theory in "legal" form was an even more serious and dangerous step toward division and a grave provocation against peaceful reunification. Were the attempt to succeed, it would be impossible for China to achieve peaceful reunification. The struggle against this attempt has grown in momentum with Chinese both at home and abroad condemning the "two states" theory with one voice. Most countries in the world have reaffirmed their position of upholding the One-China Policy. The U.S. government has also reasserted its adherence to the One-China Policy and its commitment to the "Three Non-supports" for Taiwan. Finally, the Taiwan authorities have been compelled to announce that they will not amend their "constitution" and "laws" according to the "two states" theory.

Nevertheless, separatists in Taiwan are still attempting to detach Taiwan "de jure" from China in the name of the "Republic of China" by various forms, including "formulating a new constitution," "amending the constitution," and "explaining the constitution" or through "legislation." Special vigilance should be maintained to the fact that the Taiwan separatists are continually scheming to disrupt the Sino-U.S. relations and provoke conflicts and confrontation between the two nations to achieve their aim of dividing China.

Facts prove that a serious crisis still exists in the situation of the Taiwan Straits. To safeguard the interests of the entire Chinese people including compatriots in Taiwan and maintain the peace and development of the Asia-Pacific region, the Chinese government remains firm in adhering to "peaceful reunification" and "one country, two systems"; upholding the eight propositions put forward by President Jiang Zemin for the development of cross-Straits relations and the acceleration of the peaceful reunification of China; and doing its utmost to achieve the objective of peaceful reunification. However, if a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries, or if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese government will only be forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force, to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and fulfill the great cause of reunification. The Chinese government and people absolutely have the determination and ability to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will never tolerate, condone or remain indifferent to the realization of any scheme to divide China. Any such scheme is doomed to failure.

IV. Several Questions Involving the One-China Principle in the Cross-Straits Relations

Chinese territory and sovereignty has not been split, and the two sides of the Straits are not two states. The Taiwan authorities support their position on "two Chinas," including the "two states" theory proposed by Lee Teng-hui, with the following arguments:

Since 1949, the territories on either side of the Straits have been divided and governed separately, with neither side having jurisdiction over the other; the government of the PRC has never ruled Taiwan; and since 1991 Taiwan has witnessed a form of government that has nothing to do with that of the Chinese mainland. These arguments are absolutely untenable, and can never lead to the conclusion that Taiwan may declare itself a state under the name of the "Republic of China," or that the two sides of the Straits have been divided into two states. Firstly, state sovereignty is inseparable. The territory is the space in which a state exercises its sovereignty. In the territory of a country there can only be a central government exercising sovereignty on behalf of the state. As we have already said, Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and, after replacing the government of the Republic of China in 1949, the government of the PRC has become the sole legal government of China, enjoying and exercising sovereignty over the whole of China, including Taiwan.

Although the two sides of the Straits remain to be reunified, the long-term existence of this abnormal situation has not imbued Taiwan with a status and rights in international law, nor can it change the legal status of Taiwan as a part of China. The problem now is that the separatists in Taiwan and some foreign anti-China forces seek to change this state of affairs, and it is this that the Chinese government and people are firmly against.

We firmly oppose changing Taiwan's status as a part of China by referendum. The Taiwan separatists' attempt to change Taiwan's status as a part of China by referendum on the pretext that " sovereignty belongs to the people" is futile. Firstly, under both domestic and international laws Taiwan's legal status as a part of Chinese territory is unequivocal, and there can be no premise for using referendum to decide any matter of self-determination. Secondly, the phrase "sovereignty belongs to the people" refers to all the people of state, and not certain people or the people of a certain area. The sovereignty over Taiwan belongs to all the Chinese people including Taiwan compatriots, and not to some of the people in Taiwan. Thirdly, at no time in history has Taiwan been a state in its own right, and since 1945 Taiwan has not been a foreign colony, nor has it been under foreign occupation. The issue of national self-determination, therefore, does not exist. In short, from the time that China recovered Taiwan in 1945, there has been no question at all of changing Taiwan's status as a part of China by holding a referendum. The only future for Taiwan is reunification with the China mainland, and certainly not separation. Any attempt to separate Taiwan from China through so-called referendum would only lead the Taiwan people to disaster.

The "two German states formula" cannot be applied to the settlement of the Taiwan issue. Some people in Taiwan have suggested that cross-Straits relations should be dealt with according to the "two German states formula," since Germany was divided into two states after the Second World War, and was later reunified. This proposal shows a misunderstanding of history and reality. The division of Germany after the war and the temporary division between the two sides of the Straits are questions of a different nature, the difference lying mainly in three aspects. The first is the reasons for, and the nature of, the division. After its defeat in the Second World War in 1945, Germany was divided into zones occupied separately by the four victorious nations of the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union according to a declaration on the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority and the subsequent Potsdam Agreement. The reunification of Germany became a focus of the confrontation in Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war. The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were established in the zones occupied by the U.S., Britain and France, and that occupied by the Soviet Union. Thus Germany was divided into two states. Obviously, the German question arose entirely from external factors, while the Taiwan issue, left over by China's civil war, is a matter of China 's internal affairs. The second aspect is the difference in status between the two under international law. Germany was divided according to a series of international treaties during and after the Second World War, while the Taiwan question involves provisions of the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and other international treaties, stating that Japan must return Taiwan, which it had stolen from China, to the Chinese. The third is the difference between the two in their actual conditions of existence.

Against the backdrop of the confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the two German states had foreign troops stationing in their territories and so were compelled to recognize each other and co-exist in the international community. The Chinese government has always persisted in the principle of one China. Before Lee Teng-hui assumed power, and during his early days in office, the Taiwan authorities recognized only one China and opposed "two Chinas," and the One-China Principle has also been widely accepted by the international community. For these reasons, the Taiwan issue and the German issue cannot be placed in the same category, nor can the "two German states formula" be copied to settle the Taiwan question. Any question can be discussed under the One-China Principle. The Chinese government advocates that the final purpose of cross-Straits negotiations is to achieve peaceful reunification; and that to achieve this purpose, talks should be held based on the principle of one China. However, the proposals for " Taiwan independence," "two Chinas" and "two states," aiming for separation instead of reunification, violate the One-China Principle, and are naturally unacceptable to the Chinese government. Provided that it is within the framework of one China, any question can be discussed, including the various issues that are of concern to the Taiwan side. The Chinese government believes that Taiwan's international space for economic, cultural and social activities compatible with its status, the political status of the Taiwan authorities and other questions can be finally settled in the process of peaceful reunification through political negotiations within this framework.

The so-called controversy about democracy and system is an excuse for obstructing the reunification of China. In recent years the Taiwan authorities have repeatedly declared that " democratization on the China mainland is the key to the reunification of China" and that "the real essence of the cross-Straits issue is a contest between systems." This is an excuse for postponing and resisting reunification, as well as a scheme to deceive compatriots in Taiwan and world opinion. The CPC and the Chinese government have consistently striven to achieve socialist democracy. To achieve peaceful reunification in the form of "one country, two systems," and to allow the two different social systems on both sides of the Straits to coexist without imposing them on one or the other--this is best able to embody the wishes of compatriots on both sides of the Straits and is itself democratic. The different social systems across the Straits, therefore, should not constitute any barrier to peaceful reunification. Moreover, the Chinese government acknowledges the differences between Taiwan on the one hand and Hong Kong and Macao on the other and, after peaceful reunification, is prepared to apply a looser form of the "one country, two systems" policy in Taiwan than in Hong Kong and Macao. It is totally unreasonable and undemocratic for the Taiwan authorities to seek to obstruct reunification on the pretext of the "controversy about democracy and system" and to force the more than 1.2 billion people living on the Chinese mainland to practice the political and economic systems in Taiwan. The demand for democracy should not be used as a reason for refusing reunification. The essence of the difference between the two sides of the Straits on this question lies by no means in the controversy over whether to practice democracy or in the controversy over what system to practice, but rather a controversy over the choice between reunification and separation.

V. Several Questions Involving Adherence to the One-China Principle in the International Community

The Chinese government has expressed its appreciation to the international community for widely pursuing a one-China policy. In August 1993, we published the white paper The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China. In Chapter V of this document, "Several Questions Involving Taiwan in International Relations," we explained our position and policy on a number of issues, including relations between Taiwan and countries maintaining diplomatic ties with China, relations between international organizations and Taiwan, aviation services between Taiwan and countries having diplomatic relations with China, and arms sales to Taiwan by countries having diplomatic relations with China. Here, we would like to reaffirm our related position and policy.

Taiwan is ineligible for membership of the United Nations and other international organizations whose membership is confined to sovereign states. The United Nations is an inter-governmental international organization composed of sovereign states. After the restoration of the lawful rights of the PRC in the United Nations, the issue of China's representation in the UNO was resolved once and for all and Taiwan's re-entry became totally out of the question. The Taiwan authorities have asserted that Resolution 2758 of the UN resolved only "the problem of China's representation," but not "the problem of Taiwan's representation," and demanded participation in the UN. We will never permit such a separatist act of creating "two Chinas' or "one China, one Taiwan."

All members of the UN should adhere to the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and related UN resolutions, abide by norms governing international relations, including mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and never, in any form, support Taiwan's joining the UN or other international organizations whose membership is confined to sovereign states.

On the basis of the principle of one China, the Chinese government has made arrangements for Taiwan's participation in some inter-governmental international organizations which accept region membership in an agreeable and acceptable way according to the nature, regulations and actual conditions of these international organizations. As a region of China, Taiwan has participated in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) respectively in the names of " Taipei, China" and "Chinese Taipei." In September 1992, the chairman of the council of the predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), stated that Taiwan may participate in this organization as "a separate Taiwan-Penghu-Jinmen-Mazu tariff zone" (abbreviated as Chinese Taipei) after the PRC's entry to GATT. The WTO should persist in the principle defined in the afore-said statement when examining the acceptance of Taiwan's entry to the organization. This is only an ad hoc arrangement and cannot constitute a model applicable to other inter-governmental international organizations or international gatherings.

No country maintaining diplomatic relations with China should provide arms to Taiwan or enter into military alliance of any form with Taiwan. All countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China should abide by the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and refrain from providing arms to Taiwan or helping Taiwan produce arms in any form or under any pretext.

The Taiwan question is the most crucial and most sensitive issue in the relations between China and the U.S. The three Sino-U.S. joint communiques are the basis for the healthy and stable development of relations between the two countries. For over twenty years, the U.S. has promised to adhere to a One-China Policy, which has brought to itself benefits such as the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, the development of Sino-U.S. relations and the relative stability of the Taiwan situation. Regrettably, the U.S. has repeatedly contravened its solemn undertakings to China made in the August 17 Communique and continued its sale of advanced arms and military equipment to Taiwan. Recently, some people in the U.S. Congress have cooked up the so-called Taiwan Security Enhancement Act and are attempting to include Taiwan in the TMD. This is gross interference in China 's internal affairs and a grave threat to China's security, obstructing the peaceful reunification of China and jeopardizing the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. The Chinese government is firmly against such actions.

The Chinese government adheres to the One-China Principle in dealing with Taiwan's contacts with the outside world. The Taiwan authorities have spared no effort to promote "pragmatic diplomacy" in the international arena and enlarge their "international space of survival," the essence of these being to create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." It is only natural that the Chinese government should firmly oppose these. Meanwhile, considering the needs of Taiwan's socio-economic development and the actual benefits of compatriots in Taiwan, the Chinese government has no objection to Taiwan's non-governmental economic and cultural contacts with foreign countries; in fact, on the premise of one China, it has adopted many flexible measures to make Taiwan's economic, trade and cultural contacts with foreign countries more convenient. For example, Taiwan may stay on the International Olympic Committee in the name of "Chinese Taipei." As a matter of fact, Taiwan has maintained extensive economic, trade and cultural relations with many countries and regions in the world. Every year, a million Taiwan compatriots go abroad for travel, business or study, as well as for academic, cultural or sports exchanges, and Taiwan's annual import and export trade volume has exceeded the US$200-billion mark. This has demonstrated that adhering to the One-China Principle has not prevented Taiwan compatriots from engaging in non-governmental international exchanges or affected the needs of Taiwan's normal economic, trade and cultural activities.

The Chinese government safeguards all the justified and lawful rights and interests of Taiwan compatriots abroad. The people of Taiwan are of the same flesh and blood with us. The Chinese government has always worked for safeguarding their justified and lawful rights and interests abroad. Chinese embassies and consulates stationed abroad have always considered it their duties to strengthen their ties with Taiwan compatriots, listen to their suggestions and requests and safeguard their interests, and done everything they can to help them overcome their difficulties. During the Gulf War, the Chinese embassy helped Taiwanese labor service personnel stranded in Kuwait pull out of dangerous places safely. After the big earthquakes in Osaka and Kobe, Japan, the Chinese embassy and consulate general there promptly extended their sympathies to stricken Taiwan compatriots. When the civil war in Cambodia broke out, the Chinese embassy lost no time in helping Taiwanese business people and tourists whose lives and property were seriously imperiled by the war to move to safe places. All the above-mentioned facts reflect the Chinese government's care for Taiwan compatriots. When both sides of the Taiwan Straits are reunified, Taiwan compatriots will, together with people of all ethnic groups in the country, have more possibilities to fully enjoy the dignity and honor of the PRC in the world.

Conclusion

China has a long history of 5,000 years. The Chinese people have lived and multiplied on this land where all ethnic groups have mixed together, in the course of which they have evolved powerful cohesiveness, and the values of cherishing and safeguarding unity. Over the long course of history, the Chinese nation has witnessed changes of dynasties, transfers of governments, local separatist regimes, and foreign invasions, especially the untold invasions and dismemberment by foreign powers in modern history. However, unity has always been the main trend in the development of Chinese history. After every separation, the country was invariably reunified, only to be followed in its wake by rapid political, economic, cultural, scientific and technological development. Our compatriots in Taiwan have a glorious tradition of patriotism, and have performed brilliant exploits in the struggles against foreign invasions of Taiwan. Since the founding of the PRC, the Chinese people have particularly valued their hard-earned national independence, firmly upheld state sovereignty and territorial integrity and struggled unswervingly for reunification of the motherland. The 5,000-year history and culture have been implanted deeply in the minds of the Chinese people, sprouting the strong national consciousness of the need for national unification.

The Chinese government hopes that the international community will follow the principle of one China now and always and that the U.S. government will earnestly fulfil all the principles concerning the Taiwan issue in the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques, and its solemn promise to uphold the One-China Principle.

As the Chinese government has successively resumed the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao, the people of the whole of China are eager to resolve the Taiwan issue as early as possible and realize the total reunification of the country. They cannot allow the resolution of the Taiwan issue to be postponed indefinitely. We firmly believe that the total reunification of China will be achieved through the joint efforts of the entire Chinese people including compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits and those living overseas.

中華人民共和國
國務院台灣事務辦公室
國務院新聞辦公室
二○○○年二月·北京

前言
一、一個中國的事實和法理基礎
二、一個中國原則是實現和平統一的基礎和前提
三、中國政府堅決捍衛一個中國原則
四、兩岸關係中涉及一個中國原則的若干問題
五、在國際社會中堅持一個中國原則的若干問題
結束語

前言

一九四九年十月一日，中國人民取得了新民主主義革命的偉大勝利，建立了中華人民共和國。國民黨統治集團退踞中國的台灣省，在外國勢力的支持下，與中央政府對峙，由此産生了台灣問題。

解決台灣問題，實現中國完全統一，是中華民族的根本利益。五十年來，中國政府為此進行了不懈的奮鬥。一九七九年後，中國政府以極大的誠意、盡最大的努力，爭取以“一國兩制”的方式實現和平統一。自一九八七年底以來，兩岸經濟、文化交流和人員往來有了長足的發展。但是，九十年代以來，台灣當局領導人李登輝逐步背棄一個中國原則，極力推行以製造“兩個中國”為核心的分裂政策，一直髮展到公然主張兩岸關係是“國家與國家，至少是特殊的國與國的關係”，嚴重損害了兩岸和平統一的基礎，危害了包括台灣同胞在內的整個中華民族的根本利益，也危害了亞洲太平洋地區的和平與穩定。中國政府始終如一地堅持一個中國原則，堅決反對任何把台灣從中國分割出去的圖謀。中國政府與以李登輝為首的分裂勢力的鬥爭，集中表現在是堅持一個中國原則還是製造“兩個中國”、“一中一台”的問題上。

我們于一九九三年八月發表了《台灣問題與中國的統一》白皮書，系統地論述了台灣是中國不可分割的一部分、台灣問題的由來、中國政府解決台灣問題的基本方針和有關政策。現在，有必要進一步向國際社會闡述中國政府堅持一個中國原則的立場和政策。

一、一個中國的事實和法理基礎

一個中國原則是在中國人民捍衛中國主權和領土完整的正義鬥爭中形成的，具有不可動搖的事實和法理基礎。

台灣是中國不可分割的一部分。有關台灣的全部事實和法律證明，台灣是中國領土不可分割的一部分。一八九五年四月，日本通過侵華戰爭，強迫清朝政府簽訂不平等的《馬關條約》，霸佔了台灣。一九三七年七月，日本發動全面侵華戰爭。一九四一年十二月，中國政府在《中國對日宣戰佈告》中昭告各國，中國廢止包括《馬關條約》在內的一切涉及中日關係的條約、協定、合同，並將收復台灣。一九四三年十二月，中美英三國政府發表的《開羅宣言》規定，日本應將所竊取于中國的包括東北、台灣、澎湖列島等在內的土地，歸還中國。一九四五年，中美英三國共同簽署、後來又有蘇聯參加的《波茨坦公告》規定：“開羅宣言之條件必將實施。”同年八月，日本宣佈投降，並在《日本投降條款》中承諾“忠誠履行波茨坦公告各項規定之義務”。十月二十五日，中國政府收復台灣、澎湖列島，重新恢復對台灣行使主權。

一九四九年十月一日，中華人民共和國中央人民政府宣告成立，取代中華民國政府成為全中國的唯一合法政府和在國際上的唯一合法代表，中華民國從此結束了它的歷史地位。這是在同一國際法主體沒有發生變化的情況下新政權取代舊政權，中國的主權和固有領土疆域並未由此而改變，中華人民共和國政府理所當然地完全享有和行使中國的主權，其中包括對台灣的主權。

國民黨統治集團退踞台灣以來，雖然其政權繼續使用“中華民國”和“中華民國政府”的名稱，但它早已完全無權代表中國行使國家主權，實際上始終只是中國領土上的一個地方當局。

一個中國原則的産生和基本涵義。中華人民共和國中央人民政府成立當天即向各國政府宣佈：“本政府為代表中華人民共和國全國人民的唯一合法政府。凡願遵守平等、互利及互相尊重領土主權等項原則的任何外國政府，本政府均願與之建立外交關係。”隨後又致電聯合國，聲明：國民黨當局“已喪失了代表中國人民的任何法律的與事實的根據”，完全無權代表中國。外國承認中華人民共和國政府是代表全中國的唯一合法政府，與台灣當局斷絕或不建立外交關係，是新中國與外國建交的原則。

中國政府的上述主張受到當時美國政府的阻撓。儘管一九五○年一月五日美國總統杜魯門發表聲明，表示美國及其他盟國承認一九四五年以來的四年中國對台灣島行使主權，但是同年六月朝鮮戰爭爆發後，美國政府為了孤立、遏制中國，不僅派軍隊侵佔台灣，而且拋出“台灣地位未定”等謬論，以後又逐步在國際社會策動“雙重承認”，企圖製造“兩個中國”。對此，中國政府理所當然地予以堅決反對，主張和堅持世界上只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分，中華人民共和國政府是代表全中國的唯一合法政府。正是在中國與外國發展正常的外交關係中，在維護中國的主權和領土完整的鬥爭中，産生了一個中國原則。上述主張構成了一個中國原則的基本涵義，核心是維護中國的主權和領土完整。

在一九四九年後的三四十年間，台灣當局雖然不承認中華人民共和國政府代表全中國的合法地位，但也堅持台灣是中國的一部分、只有一個中國的立場，反對製造“兩個中國”和“台灣獨立”。這説明，在一個相當長的時間裏，兩岸的中國人在只有一個中國、台灣是中國領土的一部分這一根本問題上具有共識。早在一九五八年十月，中國人民解放軍在進行炮擊金門的戰鬥時，毛澤東主席就向台灣當局公開指出：“世界上只有一個中國，沒有兩個中國。這一點，也是你們同意的，見之於你們領導人的文告。”一九七九年一月，全國人大常委會發表《告台灣同胞書》，指出“台灣當局一貫堅持一個中國的立場，反對台灣獨立。這就是我們共同的立場，合作的基礎。”

中國政府堅持一個中國原則的嚴正立場和合理主張，贏得了越來越多的國家和國際組織的理解和支持，一個中國原則逐步為國際社會所普遍接受。一九七一年十月，第二十六屆聯合國大會通過2758號決議，驅逐了台灣當局的代表，恢復了中華人民共和國政府在聯合國的席位和一切合法權利。一九七二年九月，中日兩國簽署聯合聲明，宣佈建立外交關係，日本承認中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府，充分理解和尊重中國政府關於台灣是中華人民共和國領土不可分割的一部分的立場，並且堅持遵循《波茨坦公告》第八條規定的立場。一九七八年十二月，中美發表建交公報，美國“承認中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府”；“承認中國的立場，即只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分”。目前，161個國家與中華人民共和國建立了外交關係，它們都承認一個中國原則，並且承諾在一個中國的框架內處理與台灣的關係。

二、一個中國原則是實現和平統一的基礎和前提

一個中國原則是中國政府對臺政策的基石。經由鄧小平同志的倡導，中國政府自一九七九年開始實行和平統一的方針，並逐步形成了“一國兩制”的科學構想，在此基礎上，確立了“和平統一、一國兩制”的基本方針。這一基本方針和有關政策的要點是：爭取和平統一，但是不承諾放棄使用武力；積極推動兩岸人員往來和經濟、文化等各項交流，早日實現兩岸直接通郵、通航、通商；通過和平談判實現統一，在一個中國原則下什麼都可以談；統一後實行“一國兩制”，中國的主體（中國大陸）堅持社會主義制度，台灣保持原有的資本主義制度長期不變；統一後台灣實行高度自治，中央政府不派軍隊和行政人員駐臺；解決台灣問題是中國的內政，應由中國人自己解決，不需借助外國力量。上述方針和政策，貫徹了堅持一個中國原則的基本立場和精神，也充分尊重了台灣同胞當家作主、管理台灣的願望。江澤民主席在一九九五年一月發表發展兩岸關係、推進祖國和平統一進程的八項主張時，明確指出：“堅持一個中國的原則，是實現和平統一的基礎和前提。”

只有堅持一個中國原則才能實現和平統一。台灣問題是中國內戰遺留下來的問題。迄今，兩岸敵對狀態並未正式結束。為了維護中國的主權和領土完整，為了實現兩岸統一，中國政府有權採用任何必要的手段。採用和平的方式，有利於兩岸社會的共同發展，有利於兩岸同胞感情的融合和團結，是最好的方式。中國政府于一九七九年宣佈實行和平統一的方針時，是基於一個前提，即當時的台灣當局堅持世界上只有一個中國、台灣是中國的一部分。同時，中國政府考慮到長期支持台灣當局的美國政府承認了世界上只有一個中國、台灣是中國的一部分、中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府，這也有利於用和平的方式解決台灣問題。中國政府在實行和平統一方針的同時始終表明，以何種方式解決台灣問題是中國的內政，並無義務承諾放棄使用武力。不承諾放棄使用武力，決不是針對台灣同胞的，而是針對製造“台灣獨立”的圖謀和干涉中國統一的外國勢力，是為爭取實現和平統一提供必要的保障。採用武力的方式，將是最後不得已而被迫作出的選擇。

對台灣而言，堅持一個中國原則，標誌著承認中國的主權和領土不可分割，這就使兩岸雙方有了共同的基礎和前提，可以通過平等協商，找到解決雙方政治分歧的辦法，實現和平統一。如果否認一個中國原則，圖謀將台灣從中國領土中分割出去，那就使和平統一的前提和基礎不復存在。

對美國而言，承諾奉行一個中國政策，就要切實執行中美兩國政府之間的三個公報和美方的一系列承諾，就應當只與台灣保持文化、商務和其他非官方的關係，反對所謂“台灣獨立”、“兩個中國”、“一中一台”，不阻撓中國的統一。反之，就破壞了中國政府爭取和平統一的外部條件。

對於亞太地區和世界其他地區的國家而言，台灣海峽局勢一直與亞太地區的安定密切相關。有關各國堅持一個中國政策，有利於維護亞太地區的和平與穩定，也有利於中國同各國發展友好關係，符合亞太地區乃至世界各國的利益。

中國政府積極地真誠地努力爭取實現和平統一。為了爭取和平統一，中國政府一再呼籲在一個中國原則基礎上舉行兩岸平等談判。充分考慮到台灣的政治現實，為了照顧台灣當局關於平等談判地位的要求，我們先後提出了舉行中國共産黨和中國國民黨兩黨對等談判、兩黨談判可以吸收台灣各黨派團體有代表性的人士參加等主張，而始終不提“中央與地方談判”。中國政府還提出，可先從進行包括政治對話在內的對話開始，逐步過渡到政治談判的程序性商談，解決正式談判的名義、議題、方式等問題，進而展開政治談判。政治談判可以分步驟進行，第一步，先就在一個中國原則下正式結束兩岸敵對狀態進行談判，並達成協定，共同維護中國的主權和領土完整，並對今後兩岸關係發展進行規劃。一九九八年一月，為尋求和擴大兩岸關係的政治基礎，中國政府向台灣方面明確提出，在統一之前，在處理兩岸關係事務中，特別是在兩岸談判中，堅持一個中國原則，也就是堅持世界上只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分，中國的主權和領土完整不容分割。中國政府希望，在一個中國原則基礎上，雙方平等協商，共議統一。

為爭取和平統一，中國政府採取了一系列積極的政策和措施，全面推動兩岸關係發展。自一九八七年底兩岸隔絕狀態被打破後至一九九九年底，到中國大陸從事探親、旅遊、交流的台灣同胞已達1600萬人次；兩岸間接貿易總額超過1600億美元，臺商在中國大陸投資的協議金額及實際到位金額分別超過了440億美元與240億美元；兩岸互通郵政、電信取得了很大進展；兩岸海上、空中通航也取得了局部進展。全國人民代表大會及其常務委員會、國務院、地方政府制定了一系列法律、法規，依法保障台灣同胞的正當權益。為了通過商談妥善解決兩岸同胞交往中所衍生的具體問題，一九九二年十一月，海峽兩岸關係協會與台灣的海峽交流基金會達成在事務性商談中各自以口頭方式錶述“海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國原則”的共識，在此基礎上，兩會領導人于一九九三年四月成功舉行了“汪辜會談”，並簽署了幾項涉及保護兩岸同胞正當權益的協議。一九九八年十月，兩會領導人在上海會晤，開啟了兩岸政治對話。兩會商談是在平等的地位上進行的。實踐證明，在一個中國原則的基礎上，完全可以找到兩岸平等談判的適當方式。香港、澳門回歸中國以來，港臺之間、澳臺之間原有的各種民間往來與交流，在一個中國原則的基礎上繼續保持和發展。

三、中國政府堅決捍衛一個中國原則

台灣分裂勢力蓄意破壞一個中國原則。一九八八年，李登輝繼任為台灣當局的領導人。當時他多次公開表示，台灣當局的基本政策就是“只有一個中國而沒有兩個中國的政策”；“我們一貫主張中國應該統一，並堅持‘一個中國’的原則”。

但是，從九十年代初開始，李登輝逐步背離一個中國原則，相繼鼓吹“兩個政府”、“兩個對等政治實體”、“台灣已經是個主權獨立的國家”、“現階段是‘中華民國在台灣’與‘中華人民共和國在大陸’”，而且自食其言，説他“始終沒有講過一個中國”。李登輝還縱容、扶持主張所謂“台灣獨立”的分裂勢力及其活動，使“台獨”勢力迅速發展、“台獨”思潮蔓延。在李登輝主導下，台灣當局採取了一系列實際的分裂步驟。在台灣政權體制方面，力圖通過所謂的“憲政改革”將台灣改造成一個“獨立的政治實體”，以適應製造“兩個中國”的需要。在對外關係方面，不遺餘力地進行以製造“兩個中國”為目的的“拓展國際生存空間”活動。一九九三年以來，連續七年推動所謂“參與聯合國”的活動。在軍事方面，大量向外國購買先進武器，謀求加入戰區導彈防禦系統，企圖變相地與美、日建立某種形式的軍事同盟。在思想文化方面，圖謀抹殺台灣同胞、特別是年輕一代的中國人意識和對祖國的認同，挑起台灣同胞對祖國的誤解和疏離感，割斷兩岸同胞的思想和文化紐帶。

一九九九年以來，李登輝的分裂活動進一步發展。五月，他出版《台灣的主張》一書，鼓吹要把中國分成七塊各自享有“充分自主權”的區域。七月九日，他公然將兩岸關係歪曲為“國家與國家，至少是特殊的國與國的關係”，企圖從根本上改變台灣是中國一部分的地位，破壞兩岸關係、特別是兩岸政治對話與談判的基礎，破壞兩岸和平統一的基礎。李登輝已經成為台灣分裂勢力的總代表，是台灣海峽安定局面的破壞者，是中美關係發展的絆腳石，也是亞太地區和平與穩定的麻煩製造者。

中國政府堅決捍衛一個中國原則。對於以李登輝為代表的台灣分裂勢力的種種分裂活動，中國政府和人民一直保持著高度的警惕，並進行了堅決的鬥爭。

一九九五年六月李登輝以所謂“私人”名義訪問美國後，中國政府果斷地開展了反分裂、反“台獨”的鬥爭，並對美國政府公然允許李登輝訪美、違背美國在中美三個聯合公報中所作的承諾、嚴重損害中國主權的行為，提出了強烈的抗議，進行了嚴正的交涉。這場鬥爭顯示了中國政府和人民捍衛國家主權和領土完整的堅強決心和能力，産生了重大和深遠的影響。台灣同胞進一步認識到“台獨”的嚴重危害。李登輝在國際上進行分裂活動受到沉重打擊。部分“台獨”勢力被迫放棄了某些極端的分裂主張。國際社會進一步注意到堅持一個中國政策的必要性，美國政府還明確承諾不支持“台灣獨立”、不支持“兩個中國”或“一中一台”、不支持台灣加入任何必須由主權國家參加的國際組織。

李登輝拋出“兩國論”後，中國政府和人民進行了更加堅決的鬥爭。針對台灣分裂勢力企圖通過所謂“法律”形式落實“兩國論”的活動，中國政府有關部門明確指出，這是一個更加嚴重和危險的分裂步驟，是對和平統一的極大挑釁。如果這一圖謀得逞，中國和平統一將變得不可能。這場鬥爭形成了海內外中國人同聲譴責“兩國論”的強大聲勢。世界上大多數國家重申堅持一個中國政策。美國政府也重申堅持一個中國政策和對台灣“三不支持”的承諾。台灣當局被迫表示不會依照“兩國論”修改所謂“憲法”、“法律”。

但是，台灣分裂勢力仍在企圖以所謂“制憲”、“修憲”、“解釋憲法”或“立法”等多種形式，用所謂“法律”形式實現在“中華民國”名義下把台灣從中國分割出去的圖謀。特別值得警惕的是，台灣分裂勢力一貫圖謀破壞中美關係，挑起中美衝突和對抗，以便實現他們的分裂圖謀。

事實證明，台灣海峽局勢仍然存在著嚴重的危機。為了維護包括台灣同胞在內的全中國人民的利益，也為了維護亞太地區的和平與發展，中國政府仍然堅持“和平統一、一國兩制”方針不變，仍然堅持江澤民主席提出的發展兩岸關係、推進祖國和平統一進程的八項主張不變，仍然盡一切可能爭取和平統一。但是，如果出現台灣被以任何名義從中國分割出去的重大事變，如果出現外國侵佔台灣，如果台灣當局無限期地拒絕通過談判和平解決兩岸統一問題，中國政府只能被迫採取一切可能的斷然措施、包括使用武力，來維護中國的主權和領土完整，完成中國的統一大業。中國政府和人民完全有決心、有能力維護國家主權和領土完整，決不容忍、決不姑息、決不坐視任何分裂中國的圖謀得逞，任何分裂圖謀都是註定要失敗的。

四、兩岸關係中涉及一個中國原則的若干問題

中國領土和主權沒有分裂，海峽兩岸並非兩個國家。台灣當局支撐其製造“兩個中國”的主張，包括李登輝提出的“兩國論”的所謂理由無非是：一九四九年以後海峽兩岸已經分裂分治且互不隸屬，中華人民共和國政府從未統治過台灣，一九九一年以後台灣也已産生了與中國大陸沒有關係的政權體制。這些理由是根本不能成立的，也絕對不能得出台灣可以“中華民國”的名義自立為一個國家和海峽兩岸已經分裂為兩個國家的結論。第一，國家主權不可分割。領土是國家行使主權的空間。在一個國家的領土上，只能有一個代表國家行使主權的中央政府。如前所述，台灣是中國領土不可分割的一部分，一九四九年中華人民共和國政府取代中華民國政府成為全中國的唯一合法政府，已經享有和行使包括台灣在內的全中國的主權。雖然海峽兩岸尚未統一，但是台灣是中國領土一部分的地位從未改變，由此，中國擁有對台灣的主權也從未改變。第二，國際社會承認只有一個中國、台灣是中國的一部分、中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府。第三，台灣問題長期得不到解決，主要是外國勢力干涉和台灣分裂勢力阻撓的結果。海峽兩岸尚未統一，這種不正常狀態的長期存在，並沒有賦予台灣在國際法上的地位和權利，也不能改變台灣是中國一部分的法律地位。目前的問題是台灣分裂勢力和某些外國反華勢力要改變這種狀況，而這正是中國政府和人民堅決反對的。

堅決反對以公民投票方式改變台灣是中國一部分的地位。台灣分裂勢力以“主權在民”為藉口，企圖以公民投票方式改變台灣是中國一部分的地位，這是徒勞的。首先，台灣是中國領土一部分的法律地位，無論在國內法還是在國際法上，都已經是明確的，不存在用公民投票方式決定是否應自決的前提。其次，“主權在民”是指主權屬於一個國家的全體人民，而不是指屬於某一部分或某一地區的人民。對台灣的主權，屬於包括台灣同胞在內的全中國人民，而不屬於台灣一部分人。第三，歷史上台灣從未曾成為一個國家；一九四五年以後，台灣既不是外國的殖民地，又不處於外國佔領之下，不存在行使民族自決權的問題。總之，自一九四五年中國收復台灣之後，就根本不存在就改變台灣是中國一部分的地位舉行公民投票的問題。台灣的前途只有一條，就是走向與祖國大陸的統一，而決不能走向分裂。任何人以所謂公民投票的方式把台灣從中國分割出去，其結果必將把台灣人民引向災難。

“兩德模式”不能用於解決台灣問題。台灣有些人主張用第二次世界大戰後德國被分裂為兩個國家後又重新統一的所謂“兩德模式”來處理兩岸關係。這是對歷史和現實的誤解。戰後德國的分裂和兩岸暫時分離是兩個不同性質的問題。主要有三點不同：第一，兩者形成的原因、性質不同。一九四五年德國在二戰中戰敗，被美、英、法、蘇四個戰勝國依據《鋻於德國失敗和接管最高政府權力的聲明》及其後的波茨坦協議，分區佔領。冷戰開始後，德國統一問題成為美蘇兩國在歐洲對抗的一個焦點，在美英法佔領區和蘇聯佔領區分別相繼成立了德意志聯邦共和國和德意志民主共和國，德國被分裂為兩個國家。顯然，德國問題完全是由外部因素造成的。而台灣問題則是中國內戰遺留的問題，是內政問題。第二，兩者在國際法上的地位不同。德國的分裂，為二戰期間和戰後一系列國際條約所規定。而台灣問題，則有《開羅宣言》、《波茨坦公告》等國際條約關於日本必須將竊取于中國的台灣歸還中國的規定。第三，兩者存在的實際狀況不同。在美蘇兩國對抗的背景下，兩個德國都分別駐有外國軍隊，被迫相互承認和在國際社會並存。而中國政府始終堅持一個中國原則，李登輝上臺前的台灣當局和李登輝上臺初期也承認一個中國，反對“兩個中國”；一個中國原則也被國際社會所普遍接受。因而，德國問題與台灣問題不能相提並論，更不能照搬“兩德模式”解決台灣問題。

在一個中國原則下，什麼問題都可以談。中國政府主張兩岸談判最終目的是實現和平統一；主張以一個中國原則為談判基礎，是為了保證實現談判的目的。而“台灣獨立”、“兩個中國”、“兩國論”違背了一個中國原則，不是談統一，而是談分裂，當然不可能被中國政府接受。只要在一個中國的框架內，什麼問題都可以談，包括台灣方面關心的各種問題。中國政府相信，台灣在國際上與其身份相適應的經濟的、文化的、社會的對外活動空間，台灣當局的政治地位等等，都可以在這個框架內，通過政治談判，最終在和平統一的過程中得到解決。

所謂“民主和制度之爭”是阻撓中國統一的藉口。近些年來，台灣當局一再聲稱，“大陸的民主化是中國再統一的關鍵”、“兩岸問題的真正本質是制度競賽”。這是拖延和抗拒統一的藉口，是欺騙台灣同胞和國際輿論的伎倆。中國共産黨和中國政府不斷為實現社會主義民主的理想而奮鬥。按照“一國兩制”的方式實現和平統一，允許海峽兩岸兩種社會制度同時存在，互不強加於對方，最能體現兩岸同胞的意願，這本身就是民主的。兩岸不同的社會制度，不應構成和平統一的障礙。而且，中國政府注意到台灣與香港、澳門的不同特點，實現兩岸和平統一之後，在台灣實行“一國兩制”的內容，可以比香港、澳門更為寬鬆。台灣當局企圖以“民主和制度之爭”阻撓統一，妄想居住在中國大陸的十二億多人實行台灣的政治、經濟制度，是毫無道理的，也是不民主的。“要民主”不應成為“不要統一”的理由。兩岸雙方在這個問題上分歧的實質，絕不是要不要民主之爭、實行哪種制度之爭，而是要統一還是要分裂之爭。

五、在國際社會中堅持一個中國原則的若干問題

中國政府對於國際社會普遍奉行一個中國政策表示讚賞。我們于一九九三年八月發表的《台灣問題與中國的統一》白皮書，在第五部分“國際事務中涉及台灣的幾個問題”中，闡述了在有關與中國建交國同台灣的關係、國際組織與台灣的關係、與中國建交國同台灣通航、與中國建交國向台灣出售武器等問題上的立場和政策。在此，謹重申有關立場和政策。

台灣無權參加聯合國及其他只有主權國家參加的國際組織。聯合國是由主權國家組成的政府間國際組織。中華人民共和國政府在聯合國的合法權利恢復後，聯合國組織中的中國代表權問題已經獲得徹底解決，根本不存在台灣當局加入聯合國的問題。台灣當局聲稱聯合國2758號決議只解決了“中國代表權問題”，沒有解決“台灣的代表權問題”，要求“參與聯合國”。這是製造“兩個中國”、“一中一台”的分裂行徑，是絕對不能允許的。聯合國的所有成員國，都應遵守《聯合國憲章》的宗旨、原則及有關聯合國決議，遵循相互尊重主權和領土完整、互不干涉內政等國際關係準則，不以任何方式支持台灣加入聯合國及只能由主權國家參加的其他國際組織。

對於某些允許地區參加的政府間國際組織，中國政府已經基於一個中國原則，根據有關國際組織的性質、章程和實際情況，以所能同意和接受的方式對台灣的加入問題作出了安排。台灣已作為中國的一個地區，以“中國台北”的名義，分別參加了亞洲開發銀行（英文名稱為TAI-PEI，CHINA）和亞太經合組織（英文名稱為CHINESETAIPEI）等組織。一九九二年九月，世界貿易組織的前身關稅及貿易總協定理事會主席聲明指出，在中華人民共和國加入關貿總協定後，台灣可以“台灣、澎湖、金門、馬祖單獨關稅區”（簡稱“中國台北”）的名義參加。世貿組織在審議接納台灣加入該組織時，應堅持上述聲明確定的原則。上述特殊安排，並不構成其他政府間國際組織及國際活動仿傚的模式。

與中國建交的國家不能向台灣出售武器，或與台灣進行任何形式的軍事結盟。凡是與中國建交的國家，都應本著互相尊重主權和領土完整、互不干涉內政的原則，不以任何形式或藉口向台灣出售武器，或幫助台灣生産武器。

台灣問題是中美關係中最核心、最敏感的問題。中美三個聯合公報是兩國關係健康、穩定發展的基礎。二十多年來，美國承諾堅持一個中國政策，為自己帶來了美中建交、兩國關係發展和台灣局勢相對穩定的利益。令人遺憾的是，美國一再違反自己在“八·一七公報”中對中國作出的莊嚴承諾，不斷向台灣出售先進的武器和軍事裝備。現在，美國國會又有人炮製所謂《加強台灣安全法》，還企圖將台灣納入戰區導彈防禦系統。這是對中國內政的粗暴干涉和對中國安全的嚴重威脅，阻礙了中國的和平統一進程，同時也危害了亞太地區乃至世界的和平與穩定。對此，中國政府堅決反對。

中國政府以一個中國原則對待台灣的對外交往活動。台灣當局極力在國際上推行所謂“務實外交”，擴大所謂“國際生存空間”，其實質是製造“兩個中國”、“一中一台”。中國政府理所當然地要堅決反對。同時，考慮到台灣經濟社會發展的需要和台灣同胞的實際利益，中國政府對台灣同外國進行民間性質的經濟、文化往來不持異議；並在一個中國前提下，採取了許多靈活措施，為台灣同外國的經貿、文化往來提供方便。例如，台灣可以“中國台北”的名義繼續留在國際奧委會中。事實上，台灣與世界上許多國家和地區保持著廣泛的經貿和文化聯絡，台灣同胞每年到國外旅遊、經商、求學和進行學術、文化、體育交流活動的人員多達百萬人次，年進出口貿易額高達2000多億美元。這表明，堅持一個中國原則並不影響台灣同胞從事民間的對外交流活動，並未影響台灣正常的經貿、文化活動的需要。

中國政府保障台灣同胞在國外的一切正當、合法權益。台灣人民是我們的骨肉同胞。中國政府一貫致力於維護台灣同胞在國外的正當的、合法的權益。中國駐外國使領館一向把加強與台灣同胞的聯絡、傾聽台灣同胞的意見和要求、保障台灣同胞的利益作為自己的責任，盡可能幫助他們解決困難。在海灣戰爭中，中國使館幫助滯留在科威特的台灣勞務人員安全撤離險境。日本阪神大地震發生後，中國使領館及時撫慰受災的台灣同胞。柬埔寨爆發內戰後，中國使館積極幫助生命財産受到嚴重威脅的台灣商人和旅遊者安全轉移和撤離。上述事例體現了中國政府對台灣同胞的關心和照顧。在海峽兩岸實現統一後，台灣同胞更能夠與全國各族人民一道充分共享中華人民共和國在國際上的尊嚴與榮譽。

結束語

中國具有五千年悠久歷史。中華民族繁衍生息在中國這塊土地上，各民族相互融合，具有強大的凝聚力，形成了崇尚統一、維護統一的價值觀念。在漫長的歷史過程中，中國雖然經歷過改朝換代、政權更迭，出現過地方割據，遭遇過外敵入侵，特別是近代史上曾飽受外國列強的侵略和瓜分，但統一始終是中國歷史發展的主流，每一次分裂之後都復歸統一，並且都贏來了國家政治、經濟、文化、科技的快速發展。台灣同胞具有光榮的愛國主義傳統，在反抗外國侵略台灣的鬥爭中建立了卓越的功勳。中華人民共和國誕生後，中國人民倍加珍視得來不易的民族獨立，堅決捍衛國家主權和領土完整，併為實現祖國的完全統一而努力奮鬥。中國五千年的歷史和文化深深地在中國人的心中根植了一種強烈的民族意識，這就是中國必須統一。中國政府希望國際社會始終如一地奉行一個中國政策，希望美國政府切實履行中美三個聯合公報關於台灣問題的各項原則和自己作出的堅持一個中國政策的莊嚴承諾。

隨著中國政府相繼對香港、澳門恢復行使主權，全中國人民迫切期望早日解決台灣問題，實現國家的完全統一，不能允許台灣問題再無限期地拖下去了。我們堅信，在包括兩岸同胞和海外僑胞在內的全中國人民的共同努力下，中國的完全統一一定能夠實現。

This white paper was issued on Feb. 21, 2000 and was the second of altogether three white papers the PRC issued on Taiwan so far. The first white paper on the topic had been issued on Aug. 31, 1993, the third was issued on Aug. 10, 2022.

See also the URLs leading to the sources of this white paper in English and Chinese.

Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea

The Governments of the Member States of ASEAN and the Government of the People's Republic of China,

REAFFIRMING their determination to consolidate and develop the friendship and cooperation existing between their people and governments with the view to promoting a 21st century-oriented partnership of good neighbourliness and mutual trust;

COGNIZANT of the need to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious environment in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China for the enhancement of peace, stability, economic growth and prosperity in the region;

COMMITTED to enhancing the principles and objectives of the 1997 Joint Statement of the Meeting of the Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN and President of the People's Republic of China;

DESIRING to enhance favourable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and disputes among countries concerned;

1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and other universally recognized principles of international law which shall serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state relations;

2. The Parties are committed to exploring ways for building trust and confidence in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and on the basis of equality and mutual respect;

3. The Parties reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;

4. The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;

5. The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.

Pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes, the Parties concerned undertake to intensify efforts to seek ways, in the spirit of cooperation and understanding, to build trust and confidence between and among them, including:

a. holding dialogues and exchange of views as appropriate between their defense and military officials;

b. ensuring just and humane treatment of all persons who are either in danger or in distress;

c. notifying, on a voluntary basis, other Parties concerned of any impending joint/combined military exercise; and

6. Pending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the disputes, the Parties concerned may explore or undertake cooperative activities. These may include the following:

e. combating transnational crime, including but not limited to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in arms.

The modalities, scope and locations, in respect of bilateral and multilateral cooperation should be agreed upon by the Parties concerned prior to their actual implementation.

7. The Parties concerned stand ready to continue their consultations and dialogues concerning relevant issues, through modalities to be agreed by them, including regular consultations on the observance of this Declaration, for the purpose of promoting good neighbourliness and transparency, establishing harmony, mutual understanding and cooperation, and facilitating peaceful resolution of disputes among them;

8. The Parties undertake to respect the provisions of this Declaration and take actions consistent therewith;

9. The Parties encourage other countries to respect the principles contained in this Declaration;

10. The Parties concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective.

Done on the Fourth Day of November in the Year Two Thousand and Two in Phnom Penh, the Kingdom of Cambodia.

For the People's Republic of China: Wang Yi 王毅, Special Envoy and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Kingdom of Cambodia: Hor Namhong, Senior Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

For the Lao People's Democratic Republic: Somsavat Lengsavad, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Kingdom of Thailand: Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai, Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam: Nguyen Dy Nien 阮怡年, Minister of Foreign Affairs

中華人民共和國和東盟各成員國政府，重申各方決心鞏固和發展各國人民和政府之間業已存在的友誼與合作，以促進面向21世紀睦鄰互信夥伴關係；

認識到為增進本地區的和平、穩定、經濟發展與繁榮，中國和東盟有必要促進南海地區和平、友好與和諧的環境；

承諾促進 1997 年中華人民共和國與東盟成員國國家元首或政府首腦會晤《聯合聲明》所確立的原則和目標；

希望為和平與永久解決有關國家間的分歧和爭議創造有利條件；

一、各方重申以《聯合國憲章》宗旨和原則、1982 年《聯合國海洋法公約》、《東南亞友好合作條約》、和平共處五項原則以及其它公認的國際法原則作為處理國家間關係的基本準則。

二、各方承諾根據上述原則，在平等和相互尊重的基礎上，探討建立信任的途徑。

三、各方重申尊重並承諾，包括 1982 年《聯合國海洋法公約》在內的公認的國際法原則所規定的在南海的航行及飛越自由。

四、有關各方承諾根據公認的國際法原則，包括 1982 年《聯合國海洋法公約》，由直接有關的主權國家通過友好磋商和談判，以和平方式解決它們的領土和管轄權爭議，而不訴諸武力或以武力相威脅。

五、各方承諾保持自我克制，不採取使爭議複雜化、擴大化和影響和平與穩定的行動，包括不在現無人居住的島、礁、灘、沙或其它自然構造上採取居住的行動，並以建設性的方式處理它們的分歧。

在和平解決它們的領土和管轄權爭議之前，有關各方承諾本著合作與諒解的精神，努力尋求各種途徑建立相互信任，包括：

（一）在各方國防及軍隊官員之間開展適當的對話和交換意見；

（二）保證對處於危險境地的所有公民予以公正和人道的待遇；

（三）在自願基礎上向其它有關各方通報即將舉行的聯合軍事演習；

六、在全面和永久解決爭議之前，有關各方可探討或開展合作，可包括以下領域：

（五）打擊跨國犯罪，包括但不限於打擊毒品走私、海盜和海上武裝搶劫以及軍火走私。

在具體實施之前，有關各方應就雙邊及多邊合作的模式、範圍和地點取得一致意見。

七、有關各方願通過各方同意的模式，就有關問題繼續進行磋商和對話，包括對遵守本宣言問題舉行定期磋商，以增進睦鄰友好關係和提高透明度，創造和諧、相互理解與合作，推動以和平方式解決彼此間爭議。

八、各方承諾尊重本宣言的條款並採取與宣言相一致的行動。

十、有關各方重申制定南海行為準則將進一步促進本地區和平與穩定，並同意在各方協商一致的基礎上，朝最終達成該目標而努力。

The text of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was published on the website of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), please click here.

Colin Powell's statement on "one China" and Taiwan

On Oct. 25, 2004, Colin Powell, US Secretary of State [Jan. 2001 to Jan. 2005], stated in an interview with Anthony Yuen (阮次山) of Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV (鳳凰衛視) in Beijing's China World Hotel (中國大飯店):

[...] Our policy is clear, there is only one China. Taiwan is not independent. It does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation, and that remains our policy, our firm policy. [...]

[...] 鮑威爾稱，美國的政策是明確的，就是只有一個中國，台灣不是獨立的，不享有作為一個"國家的主權"，那是美國的堅定政策。[...]

The "Anti-Secession Law" of the PRC

The Anti-Secession Law, adopted at the Third Session of the Tenth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on March 14, 2005, is hereby promulgated and shall go into effect as of the date of promulgation.

(Adopted at the Third Session of the Tenth National People's Congress on March 14, 2005)

This Law is formulated, in accordance with the Constitution, for the purpose of opposing and checking Taiwan's secession from China by secessionists in the name of "Taiwan independence", promoting peaceful national reunification, maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, preserving China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and safeguarding the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation.

There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division. Safeguarding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included.

Taiwan is part of China. The state shall never allow the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means.

The Taiwan question is one that is left over from China's civil war of the late 1940s.

Solving the Taiwan question and achieving national reunification is China's internal affair, which subjects to no interference by any outside forces.

Accomplishing the great task of reunifying the motherland is the sacred duty of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included.

Upholding the principle of one China is the basis of peaceful reunification of the country.

To reunify the country through peaceful means best serves the fundamental interests of the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. The state shall do its utmost with maximum sincerity to achieve a peaceful reunification.

After the country is reunified peacefully, Taiwan may practice systems different from those on the mainland and enjoy a high degree of autonomy.

The state shall take the following measures to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and promote cross-Straits relations:

(1) to encourage and facilitate personnel exchanges across the Straits for greater mutual understanding and mutual trust;

(2) to encourage and facilitate economic exchanges and cooperation, realize direct links of trade, mail and air and shipping services, and bring about closer economic ties between the two sides of the Straits to their mutual benefit;

(3) to encourage and facilitate cross-Straits exchanges in education, science, technology, culture, health and sports, and work together to carry forward the proud Chinese cultural traditions;

(4) to encourage and facilitate cross-Straits cooperation in combating crimes; and

(5) to encourage and facilitate other activities that are conducive to peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and stronger cross-Straits relations.

The state protects the rights and interests of the Taiwan compatriots in accordance with law.

The state stands for the achievement of peaceful reunification through consultations and negotiations on an equal footing between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. These consultations and negotiations may be conducted in steps and phases and with flexible and varied modalities.

The two sides of the Taiwan Straits may consult and negotiate on the following matters:

(5) the Taiwan region's room of international operation that is compatible with its status; and

(6) other matters concerning the achievement of peaceful national reunification.

In the event that the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The State Council and the Central Military Commission shall decide on and execute the non-peaceful means and other necessary measures as provided for in the preceding paragraph and shall promptly report to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

In the event of employing and executing non-peaceful means and other necessary measures as provided for in this Law, the state shall exert its utmost to protect the lives, property and other legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan civilians and foreign nationals in Taiwan, and to minimize losses. At the same time, the state shall protect the rights and interests of the Taiwan compatriots in other parts of China in accordance with law.

第一條爲了反對和遏制 "台獨" 分裂勢力分裂國家，促進祖國和平統一，維護臺灣海峽地區和平穩定，維護國家主權和領土完整，維護中華民族的根本利益，根據憲法，制定本法。

第二條世界上只有一個中國，大陸和臺灣同屬一個中國，中國的主權和領土完整不容分割。維護國家主權和領土完整是包括臺灣同胞在內的全中國人民的共同義務。

臺灣是中國的一部分。國家絕不允許 "台獨" 分裂勢力以任何名義、任何方式把臺灣從中國分裂出去。

解決臺灣問題，實現祖國統一，是中國的內部事務，不受任何外國勢力的干涉。

第四條完成統一祖國的大業是包括臺灣同胞在內的全中國人民的神聖職責。

以和平方式實現祖國統一，最符合臺灣海峽兩岸同胞的根本利益。國家以最大的誠意，盡最大的努力，實現和平統一。

國家和平統一後，臺灣可以實行不同於大陸的制度，高度自治。

第六條國家採取下列措施，維護臺灣海峽地區和平穩定，發展兩岸關係：

（二）鼓勵和推動兩岸經濟交流與合作，直接通郵通航通商，密切兩岸經濟關係，互利互惠；

（三）鼓勵和推動兩岸教育、科技、文化、衛生、體育交流，共同弘揚中華文化的優秀傳統；

（五）鼓勵和推動有利於維護臺灣海峽地區和平穩定、發展兩岸關係的其他活動。

第七條國家主張通過臺灣海峽兩岸平等的協商和談判，實現和平統一。協商和談判可以有步驟、分階段進行，方式可以靈活多樣。

第八條 "台獨" 分裂勢力以任何名義、任何方式造成臺灣從中國分裂出去的事實，或者發生將會導致臺灣從中國分裂出去的重大事變，或者和平統一的可能性完全喪失，國家得採取非和平方式及其他必要措施，捍衛國家主權和領土完整。

依照前款規定採取非和平方式及其他必要措施，由國務院、中央軍事委員會決定和組織實施，並及時向全國人民代表大會常務委員會報告。

第九條依照本法規定採取非和平方式及其他必要措施並組織實施時，國家盡最大可能保護臺灣平民和在臺灣的外國人的生命財産安全和其他正當權益，減少損失；同時，國家依法保護臺灣同胞在中國其他地區的權利和利益。

A useful commentary written by German law expert Christoph Henke LL.D. about the PRC's "Anti-Secession Law" can be found here.

South China Sea Arbitration—PCA Press Release

A unanimous Award has been issued today by the Tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the "Convention") in the arbitration instituted by the Republic of the Philippines against the People's Republic of China.

This arbitration concerned the role of historic rights and the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, the status of certain maritime features and the maritime entitlements they are capable of generating, and the lawfulness of certain actions by China that were alleged by the Philippines to violate the Convention. In light of limitations on compulsory dispute settlement under the Convention, the Tribunal has emphasized that it does not rule on any question of sovereignty over land territory and does not delimit any boundary between the Parties.

China has repeatedly stated that "it will neither accept nor participate in the arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines." Annex VII, however, provides that the "[a]bsence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings." Annex VII also provides that, in the event that a party does not participate in the proceedings, a tribunal "must satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law." Accordingly, throughout these proceedings, the Tribunal has taken steps to test the accuracy of the Philippines' claims, including by requesting further written submissions from the Philippines, by questioning the Philippines both prior to and during two hearings, by appointing independent experts to report to the Tribunal on technical matters, and by obtaining historical evidence concerning features in the South China Sea and providing it to the Parties for comment.

China has also made clear—through the publication of a Position Paper in December 2014 and in other official statements—that, in its view, the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction in this matter. Article 288 of the Convention provides that: "In the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal." Accordingly, the Tribunal convened a hearing on jurisdiction and admissibility in July 2015 and rendered an Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility on 29 October 2015, deciding some issues of jurisdiction and deferring others for further consideration. The Tribunal then convened a hearing on the merits from 24 to 30 November 2015.

The Award of today's date addresses the issues of jurisdiction not decided in the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility and the merits of the Philippines' claims over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction. The Award is final and binding, as set out in Article 296 of the Convention and Article 11 of Annex VII.

Historic Rights and the 'Nine-Dash Line': The Tribunal found that it has jurisdiction to consider the Parties' dispute concerning historic rights and the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea. On the merits, the Tribunal concluded that the Convention comprehensively allocates rights to maritime areas and that protections for pre-existing rights to resources were considered, but not adopted in the Convention. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that, to the extent China had historic rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished to the extent they were incompatible with the exclusive economic zones provided for in the Convention. The Tribunal also noted that, although Chinese navigators and fishermen, as well as those of other States, had historically made use of the islands in the South China Sea, there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources. The Tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the 'nine-dash line'.

Status of Features: The Tribunal next considered entitlements to maritime areas and the status of features. The Tribunal first undertook an evaluation of whether certain reefs claimed by China are above water at high tide. Features that are above water at high tide generate an entitlement to at least a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, whereas features that are submerged at high tide do not. The Tribunal noted that the reefs have been heavily modified by land reclamation and construction, recalled that the Convention classifies features on their natural condition, and relied on historical materials in evaluating the features. The Tribunal then considered whether any of the features claimed by China could generate maritime zones beyond 12 nautical miles. Under the Convention, islands generate an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and a continental shelf, but "[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf." The Tribunal concluded that this provision depends upon the objective capacity of a feature, in its natural condition, to sustain either a stable community of people or economic activity that is not dependent on outside resources or purely extractive in nature. The Tribunal noted that the current presence of official personnel on many of the features is dependent on outside support and not reflective of the capacity of the features. The Tribunal found historical evidence to be more relevant and noted that the Spratly Islands were historically used by small groups of fishermen and that several Japanese fishing and guano mining enterprises were attempted. The Tribunal concluded that such transient use does not constitute inhabitation by a stable community and that all of the historical economic activity had been extractive. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that none of the Spratly Islands is capable of generating extended maritime zones. The Tribunal also held that the Spratly Islands cannot generate maritime zones collectively as a unit. Having found that none of the features claimed by China was capable of generating an exclusive economic zone, the Tribunal found that it could—without delimiting a boundary—declare that certain sea areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China.

Lawfulness of Chinese Actions: The Tribunal next considered the lawfulness of Chinese actions in the South China Sea. Having found that certain areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, the Tribunal found that China had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone by (a) interfering with Philippine fishing and petroleum exploration, (b) constructing artificial islands and (c) failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone. The Tribunal also held that fishermen from the Philippines (like those from China) had traditional fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal and that China had interfered with these rights in restricting access. The Tribunal further held that Chinese law enforcement vessels had unlawfully created a serious risk of collision when they physically obstructed Philippine vessels.

Harm to Marine Environment: The Tribunal considered the effect on the marine environment of China's recent large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands and found that China had caused severe harm to the coral reef environment and violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species. The Tribunal also found that Chinese authorities were aware that Chinese fishermen have harvested endangered sea turtles, coral, and giant clams on a substantial scale in the South China Sea (using methods that inflict severe damage on the coral reef environment) and had not fulfilled their obligations to stop such activities.

Aggravation of Dispute: Finally, the Tribunal considered whether China's actions since the commencement of the arbitration had aggravated the dispute between the Parties. The Tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the implications of a stand-off between Philippine marines and Chinese naval and law enforcement vessels at Second Thomas Shoal, holding that this dispute involved military activities and was therefore excluded from compulsory settlement. The Tribunal found, however, that China's recent large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands was incompatible with the obligations on a State during dispute resolution proceedings, insofar as China has inflicted irreparable harm to the marine environment, built a large artificial island in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone, and destroyed evidence of the natural condition of features in the South China Sea that formed part of the Parties' dispute.

The Tribunal was constituted on 21 June 2013 pursuant to the procedure set out in Annex VII of the Convention to decide the dispute presented by the Philippines. The Tribunal is composed of Judge Thomas A. Mensah of Ghana, Judge Jean-Pierre Cot of France, Judge Stanislaw Pawlak of Poland, Professor Alfred H.A. Soons of the Netherlands, and Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum of Germany. Judge Thomas A. Mensah serves as President of the Tribunal. The Permanent Court of Arbitration acts as the Registry in the proceedings.

Further information about the case may be found at www.pcacases.com/web/view/7, including the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Rules of Procedure, earlier Press Releases, hearing transcripts, and photographs. Procedural Orders, submissions by the Philippines, and reports by the Tribunal's experts will be made available in due course, as will unofficial Chinese translations of the Tribunal's Awards.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is an intergovernmental organization established by the 1899 Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. The PCA has 121 Member States. Headquartered at the Peace Palace in The Hague, the Netherlands, the PCA facilitates arbitration, conciliation, fact-finding, and other dispute resolution proceedings among various combinations of States, State entities, intergovernmental organizations, and private parties. The PCA's International Bureau is currently administering 8 interstate disputes, 73 investor-State arbitrations, and 34 cases arising under contracts involving a State or other public entity. The PCA has administered 12 cases initiated by States under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

In July 2013, the Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration appointed the PCA to serve as Registry for the proceedings. The Tribunal's Rules of Procedure provide that the PCA shall "maintain an archive of the arbitral proceedings and provide appropriate registry services as directed by the Arbitral Tribunal." Such services include assisting with the identification and appointment of experts; publishing information about the arbitration and issuing press releases; organizing the hearings at the Peace Palace in The Hague; and the financial management of the case, which involves holding a deposit for expenses in the arbitration, such as to pay arbitrator fees, experts, technical support, court reporters etc. The Registry also serves as the channel of communications amongst the Parties and the Tribunal and observer States.

Photograph: Hearing in session, July 2015, Peace Palace, The Hague. Clockwise from top left: Registrar and PCA Senior Legal Counsel Judith Levine; Judge Stanislaw Pawlak; Professor Alfred H. A. Soons; Judge Thomas A. Mensah (Presiding Arbitrator); Judge Jean-Pierre Cot; Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum; PCA Senior Legal Counsel Garth Schofield; former Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, Mr. Albert F. Del Rosario; former Solicitor General Mr. Florin T. Hilbay, Counsel for the Philippines; Mr. Paul S. Reichler; Professor Philippe Sands; Professor Bernard H. Oxman; Professor Alan E. Boyle; Mr. Lawrence H. Martin.

SUMMARY OF THE TRIBUNAL'S DECISIONS ON ITS JURISDICTION AND ON THE MERITS OF THE PHILIPPINES' CLAIMS

The South China Sea Arbitration between the Philippines and China concerned an application by the Philippines for rulings in respect of four matters concerning the relationship between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea. First, the Philippines sought a ruling on the source of the Parties' rights and obligations in the South China Sea and the effect of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("Convention") on China's claims to historic rights within its so-called 'nine-dash line'. Second, the Philippines sought a ruling on whether certain maritime features claimed by both China and the Philippines are properly characterized as islands, rocks, low-tide elevations or submerged banks under the Convention. The status of these features under the Convention determines the maritime zones they are capable of generating. Third, the Philippines sought rulings on whether certain Chinese actions in the South China Sea have violated the Convention, by interfering with the exercise of the Philippines' sovereign rights and freedoms under the Convention or through construction and fishing activities that have harmed the marine environment. Finally, the Philippines sought a ruling that certain actions taken by China, in particular its large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands since this arbitration was commenced, have unlawfully aggravated and extended the Parties' dispute.

The Chinese Government has adhered to the position of neither accepting nor participating in these arbitral proceedings. It has reiterated this position in diplomatic notes, in the "Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines" dated 7 December 2014 ("China's Position Paper"), in letters to members of the Tribunal from the Chinese Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and in many public statements. The Chinese Government has also made clear that these statements and documents "shall by no means be interpreted as China's participation in the arbitral proceeding in any form."

Two provisions of the Convention address the situation of a party that objects to the jurisdiction of a tribunal and declines to participate in the proceedings:

(a) Article 288 of the Convention provides that: "In the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal."

Other texts and documents

Preamble

Part I. Air Navigation

CHAPTER 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION

CHAPTER II: FLIGHT OVER TERRITORY OF CONTRACTING STATES

CHAPTER III: NATIONALITY OF AIRCRAFT

CHAPTER IV: MEASURES TO FACILITATE AIR NAVIGATION

CHAPTER V: CONDITIONS TO BE FULFILLED WITH RESPECT TO AIRCRAFT

CHAPTER VI: INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES

Part II. The International Civil Aviation Organization

CHAPTER VII: THE ORGANIZATION

CHAPTER VIII: THE ASSEMBLY

CHAPTER IX: THE COUNCIL

CHAPTER X: AIR NAVIGATION COMMISSION

CHAPTER XI: PERSONNEL

CHAPTER XII: FINANCE

CHAPTER XIII: OTHER INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Part III. International Air Transport

CHAPTER XIV: INFORMATION AND REPORTS

CHAPTER XV: AIRPORTS AND OTHER AIR NAVIGATION FACILITIES

CHAPTER XVI: JOINT OPERATING ORGANIZATIONS AND POOLED SERVICES

Part IV. Final Provisions

CHAPTER XVII: OTHER AERONAUTICAL AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS

CHAPTER XVIII: DISPUTES AND DEFAULT

CHAPTER XIX: WAR

CHAPTER XX: ANNEXES

CHAPTER XXI: RATIFICATIONS, ADHERENCES, AMENDMENTS, AND DENUNCIATIONS

CHAPTER XXII: DEFINITIONS

Signature of Convention

Footnotes

Foreword

I. Taiwan -- an Inalienable Part of China

II. Origin of the Taiwan Question

III. The Chinese Government's Basic Position Regarding Settlement of the Taiwan Question

IV. Relations Across Taiwan Straits: Evolution and Stumbling Blocks

V. Several Questions Involving Taiwan in International Relations

Conclusion

前言

一、台灣是中國不可分割的一部分

二、台灣問題的由來

三、中國政府解決台灣問題的基本方針

四、台灣海峽兩岸關係的發展及其阻力

五、國際事務中涉及台灣的幾個問題

結束語

Foreword

I. The Basis for One China, de Facto and de Jure

II. The One-China Principle--the Basis and Prerequisite for Achieving Peaceful Reunification

III. The Chinese Government--Staunch Champion for the One-China Principle

IV. Several Questions Involving the One-China Principle in the Cross-Straits Relations

V. Several Questions Involving Adherence to the One-China Principle in the International Community

Conclusion

目錄

前言

一、一個中國的事實和法理基礎

二、一個中國原則是實現和平統一的基礎和前提

三、中國政府堅決捍衛一個中國原則

四、兩岸關係中涉及一個中國原則的若干問題

五、在國際社會中堅持一個中國原則的若干問題

結束語